The respite which should have followed the cessation of hostilities did not materialise for the people of Europe. No sooner had the Second World War ended than the threat of a third between East and West loomed up very quickly. The breakdown on 24 April 1947 of the Moscow conference on the German issue convinced the West that the Soviet Union, an ally in the fight against the Nazis, was about to become the source of an immediate threat to western democracies. The creation in October 1947 of the Kominform establishing a coalition of the world's communist parties, the 'Prague coup' of 25 February 1948 guaranteeing domination for the communists in Czechoslovakia, then the Berlin blockade in June 1948 which heralded the division of Germany into two countries, further heightened tension. By signing the Atlantic Pact with the United States on 4 April 1949, western Europe laid the basis of its collective security. However, the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949 and the proliferation of threats from the Kremlin leaders contributed to spreading this climate of fear which came to be known as the cold war.

The status of the Federal Republic of Germany, which itself directed its own internal policy since the promulgation of the fundamental law of 23 May 1949, then became a focal point of East-West rivalry. The United States wanted to step up the economic recovery of a country at the heart of the division of the continent and already in Washington there was a call in some quarters for the defeated power to be re-armed. French diplomacy was torn by a dilemma. Either it yielded to American pressure and, in the face of public opinion, agreed to the reconstitution of the German power on the Ruhr and the Saar; or else it stood firm against its main ally and took its relationship with Bonn into an impasse.

In spring 1950 came the hour of truth. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Affairs Minister, had been entrusted by his American and British counterparts with a vital mission, namely to make a proposal to bring Federal Germany back into the western fold. A meeting between the three governments was scheduled for 10 May 1950 and France could not evade its responsibilities.

On top of the political deadlock came economic problems. Steelmaking capacity in the various European countries seemed set to create a crisis of overproduction. Demand was dwindling, prices were falling and the signs were that producers, faithful to the traditions of the forgemasters of the inter-war period, would reconstitute a cartel in order to restrict competition. In the midst of the reconstruction phase, the European economies could not stand by and leave their basic industries to speculation or organised shortages.

Jean Monnet's ideas

In order to unravel this web of difficulties where traditional diplomacy was proving powerless, Robert Schuman called upon the inventive genious of a man as yet unknown to the general public but who had acquired exceptional experience during a very long and eventful international career. Jean Monnet, at the time responsible for the French modernisation plan and appointed by Charles de Gaulle in 1945 to put the country back on its economic feet, was one of the most influential Europeans in the western world.

Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman

During the First World War, he had organised the joint supply structures for the Allied Forces. Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations, banker in the United States, western Europe and China, he was one of President Roosevelt's close advisers and the architect of the Victory programme which ensured America's military superiority over the Axis forces. Unfettered by any political mandate, he advised governments and had acquired the reputation of being a pragmatist whose prime concern was effectiveness.

The French Minister had approached Jean Monnet with his concerns. The question 'What to do about Germany?' was an obsession for Robert Schuman, a native of Lorraine and a Christian moved by the resolve to do something so that any possibility of further war between the two countries could be averted once and for all.

At the head of a small team in rue de Martignac, headquarters of the Commissariat au plan, Jean Monnet was himself committed to this quest for a solution. His main concern was international politics. He felt that the cold war was the consequence of competition between the two big powers in Europe and a divided Europe was a source of major concern. Fostering unity in Europe would reduce tension. He pondered the merits of an international-level initiative mainly designed to decompress the situation and establish world peace through a real role played by a reborn, reconciled Europe.

Jean Monnet had watched the various unsuccessful attempts to move towards integration which had followed in the wake of the solemn plea, launched at the congress organised by the European movement in The Hague in 1948, for the union of the continent.

The European Organisation for Economic Cooperation, set up in 1948, had a purely coordinative mission and had been powerless to prevent the economic recovery of European countries coming about in a strictly national framework. The creation of the Council of Europe on 5 May 1949 showed that governments were not prepared to surrender their prerogatives. The advisory body had only deliberative powers and each of its resolutions, which had to be approved by a two-thirds majority, could be vetoed by the ministerial committee.Jean Monnet had understood that any attempt to introduce a comprehensive institutional structure in one go would bring a huge outcry from the different countries and was doomed to failure. It was too early yet to envisage wholesale transfers of sovereignty. The war was too recent an experience in people's minds and national feelings were still running very high.

Success depended on limiting objectives to specific areas, with a major psychological impact, and introducing a joint decision-making mechanism which would gradually be given additional responsibilities.

The declaration of 9 May 1950

Launch of the Schuman plan, 9 May 1950: salon de l'Horloge, Quai d'Orsay, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the microphone, Robert Schuman; on his right, Jean Monnet.

Jean Monnet and his co-workers during the close of April 1950 drafted a note of a few pages setting out both the rationale behind, and the steps envisaged in, a proposal which was going to radically shake up traditional diplomacy. As he set about his task, instead of the customary consultations of the responsible ministerial departments, Jean Monnet on the contrary maintained the utmost discretion in order to avoid the inevitable objections or counterproposals which would have detracted from the revolutionary nature of the project and removed the advantage of surprise. When he handed over his document to Bernard Clappier, director of Robert Schuman's private office, Jean Monnet knew that the minister's decision could alter the course of events. So when, upon his return from a weekend in his native Lorraine, Robert Schuman told his colleagues: 'I've read this proposal. I'll use it', the initiative had entered the political arena. At the same time as the French Minister was defending his proposal on the morning of 9 May, in front of his government colleagues, a messenger from his private office delivered it personally to Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn. The latter's reaction was immediate and enthusiastic. He immediately replied that he was wholeheartedly behind the proposal.

So, backed by the agreement of both the French and the German Governments, Robert Schuman made his declaration public at a press conference held at 4 p.m. in the salon de l'Horloge at the Quai d'Orsay. He preceded his declaration with a few introductory sentences: 'It is no longer a time for vain words, but for a bold, constructive act. France has acted, and the consequences of her action may be immense. We hope they will. She has acted essentially in the cause of peace. For peace to have a chance, there must first be a Europe. Nearly five years to the day after the unconditional surrender of Germany, France is now taking the first decisive step towards the construction of Europe and is associating Germany in this venture. It is something which must completely change things in Europe and permit other joint actions which were hitherto impossible. Out of all this will come forth Europe, a solid and united Europe. A Europe in which the standard of living will rise thanks to the grouping of production and the expansion of markets, which will bring down prices ...'

The scene was thus set. This was no new technical arrangement subject to fierce bargaining. France extended a hand to Germany, proposing that it take part on an equal footing in a new entity, first to manage jointly coal and steel in the two countries, but also on a broader level to lay the first stone of the European federation.

The declaration puts forward a number of principles:

- Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through practical achievements which will first create real solidarity;

- the age-old enmity between France and Germany must be eliminated; any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries, but it is open to any other European nations which share the aims;

- action must be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point: Franco-German production of coal and steel must be placed under a common High Authority;

- the fusion of these economic interests will help to raise the standard of living and establish a European Community;

- the decisions of the High Authority will be binding on the member countries. The High Authority itself will be composed of independent persons and have equal representation. The authority's decisions will be enforceable.

The preparation of the ECSC Treaty

Swift action was needed for the French initiative, which quickly became a Franco-German initiative, to retain its chances of becoming reality. On 20 June 1950, France convened an intergovernmental conference in Paris, chaired by Jean Monnet. The three Benelux countries and Italy answered the call and were at the negotiating table. Jean Monnet circumscribed the spirit of the discussions which were about to open: 'We are here to undertake a common task - not to negotiate for our own national advantage, but to seek it to the advantage of all. Only if we eliminate from our debates any particularist feelings shall we reach a solution. In so far as we, gathered here, can change our methods, the attitude of all Europeans will likewise gradually change' (1).

The discussions were an opportunity to clarify the type of international edifice envisaged. The independence and the powers of the High Authority were never questioned, for they constituted the central point of the proposal. At the request of the Netherlands, the Council of Ministers, representing the Member States and which was to give its assent in certain cases, was set up. A Parliamentary Assembly and a Court of Justice were to round off the structure which underpins the institutional system of the current Communities.

The negotiators never lost sight of the fact that they had the political mandate to construct an organisation which was totally new with regard to its objectives and methods. It was essential for the emerging institution to avoid all the shortcomings peculiar to the traditional intergovernmental organisations: the requirement of unanimity for national financial contributions, and subordination of the executive to the representatives of the national States.

Robert Schuman's declaration of 9 May 1950 was followed, on 18 April 1951, by the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the first of the Treaties establishing the European Community.

On 18 April 1951, the Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community was signed for a period of 50 years. It was ratified by the six signatory countries and on 10 August 1952 the High Authority, chaired by Jean Monnet, took up its seat in Luxembourg.

1  Jean Monnet, Memoirs, (trad. R. Mayne): London, etc., William Collins and Son Ltd, 1976, p. 323.