Health
Scientific Committees
Scientific Steering Committee (former MDSC)
Outcome of discussions
Scientific
Opinion on the conditions related to "BSE Negligible risk
(closed) bovine herds" adopted by the Scientific Steering
Committee at its meeting of 22-23 July 1999
The conditions related to "BSE
Negligible risk (closed) bovine herds"
1.
Terms of reference.
The SSC was requested to deliver an
opinion on the following question:
"
Under what conditions could it be considered that the
concept of 'Closed herds' (where there are controlled and
documented conditions of breeding and slaughter), offers
the same guarantees as the so called 'BSE-free regions'? It
is understood that these 'Closed herds' may not necessarily
be themselves situated in 'BSE free regions'."
A working group was established by the
TSE/BSE ad-hoc group to put together the scientific basis
for an opinion on this issue.
2.
Scope of the question.
In the pharmaceutical, medical sector,
one of the preconditions for putting animal derived
products on the market is that they are derived from safe
sources. These might be countries, accepted to be BSE-free.
However, countries may have or have had BSE at some point
in time. Therefore, the practical concept of "negligible
BSE-risk" herds, sometimes inappropriately called "closed
herds" was developed.
In the context of the present report,
negligible BSE-risk implies that (1) all the animals alive,
at the moment of certification, have never been exposed to
any source of infection and (2) have no epidemiological
link with TSE cases.
In January 1998, in view of the
increased awareness of the potential threat that BSE could
be transferred to man not only by food but also via
medicinal products and devices derived from cattle, the EC
services responsible for preparing regulations on this
topic, raised various questions in relation to the use of
bovine derived products in the medical sector, including
the topic on closed herds which was felt necessary in order
to test the basis and validity of the concept.
3.
Definitions.
For the purpose of this report,
- a
herd is defined as an entity, where cattle are kept
under the same conditions.
- a "
Closed-Herd" is defined as a cattle-herd which is
closed with regard to those factors which could introduce
the BSE agent into the herd. Following the terminology in
the medical sector, and because the term "closed herd" is
differently used in the veterinary field, the term
"negligible BSE-risk herd" is preferred.
Note: In normal terminology the term
'closed herd' refers to herds into which no external
genetic material is imported. In discussing the mandate,
the Working Group agreed, however, that under normal
circumstances it is not possible to guarantee that a herd
is fully closed without seriously prejudicing the genetic
makeup of the herd. A fully closed herd could only be
maintained over a relatively short period before further
introduction of genetic material proved necessary.
4.
Critical factors in the establishment and maintenance
of "Closed herds"
The following critical factors are
identified :
a. Feeding of Meat and Bone Meal (MBM).
It is generally accepted that BSE is
mainly, if not entirely, initiated by exposure, to
contaminated feed. Inappropriately prepared MBM is assumed to
be the most probable source. As long as no guarantee can be
provided that MMBM use is made solely of animals or
materials
1
that present no risk and that are
processed appropriately
2
,
3
. and without subsequent (cross-)
contamination with TSE infectivity, MBM should not be fed.
Because of the risk of cross-contamination
4
, continued feeding would also perpetuate
the risk of further exposure depending on the degree of
infectivity in the MMBM and the amount of infected MMBM fed.
However, the SSC recognises that so far herds have been fed
with MBM (e.g., from fish or poultry), but recommends that in
the future all animal proteins should be excluded.
It is therefore proposed that a
negligible BSE-risk herd must be able to prove that no M
MBM has been fed to any cattle in that herd for at least 8
years. This period is chosen because of the long incubation
period of BSE and in order to provide a safety margin in
comparison to the average incubation period of 5 years. On
the level of an individual animal it has to be guaranteed
that it never has been exposed to MMBM. This must be the
case for any animal imported into the herd (see
below).
In order to guarantee that no MMBM,
either directly or indirectly,
i.e. by cross-contamination of composite feed, has
been fed to the herd, detailed records of the diets must be
available for the entire period, which would allow the feed
and feed ingredients to be traced back to their origins.
Proof must be provided that no MMBM could possibly have
been fed.
Because the risk of accidentally feeding
potentially infected MMBM increases considerably when other
domestic species, which normally receive MMBM in their
diets, are held in the same herd (pigs, poultry, sheep)
this should not be allowed. With regard to cross
contamination, reference is made to the opinion of the SSC
on this subject (SSC, 25/9/98).
b. Introduction of genetic material.
A second way of introducing the
BSE-agent into a herd could be via the importation of
genetic material, i.e. live-animals, semen or
embryos.
-
Semen and embryos:
An opinion of the SSC Vertical
transmission of BSE has been adopted on 18-19 March 1999.
It considers it unlikely that semen constitutes a
risk-factor for BSE transmission and that the risk of
transmission of BSE via embryo transfer is low to
negligible.
As a precautionary measure no embryos or
semen originating from donor animals which developed BSE
should have been used in the herd in the previous 8 years.
If semen or embryos are used from a donor animal that
develops BSE, as a precautionary measure, all progeny
(first generation) should be eliminated.
In addition the conditions for safe
semen and embryos have to be met in accordance to the
requirements defined in the OIE code on BSE, adopted on 21
May 1999.
-
Live animals:
Live animals carry the same BSE-risk as
their source. Any animal imported from a non-safe source
would therefore pose a threat to the BSE-free status of a
herd. Due to the theoretical or actual risk of maternal
transmission of BSE the offspring of female animals that
have, or subsequently develop BSE also constitute a risk.
This includes the genetic offspring of the BSE 'at risk'
females and unrelated offspring that have been gestated by
the BSE 'at risk' female. Thus live animals of any age
should not be imported into the herd unless derived from a
herd of equal or superior BSE health status. The safest way
of importing genetic material is by the use of semen and
embryos according to the recommendations in the OIE
International Animal Health Code chapter on BSE
(OIE, 1999)
5
.
In view of the risk presented even by a
single animal (see above the discussion on hazards) it is
proposed that since 8 years onwards, no animal should have
been introduced into the 'closed herd' unless sourced from
a herd with an equivalent status or from a country or
region classified as "negligible till zero BSE-risk". For
herds established for less than 8 years, all animals must
come from such safe sources of an equivalent standard as
mentioned above.
c. Vaccines and veterinary medicaments
Although there is presently no direct
scientific evidence cattle-to-cattle transmission of BSE
the risk can not be excluded, because of the analogy to
human CJD and vCJD (e.g. the growth hormone cases) and
because there are recent reports of scrapie being
transmitted to sheep and goats in Italy with a
Mycoplasma agalactiae vaccine being implicated as
the means by which the animals became infected. (Capucchio
et al, 1998; Agrimi
et al, 1999)
6
. The vaccine was prepared from
homogenised sheep materials including central nervous
system tissues. In the United Kingdom there has been a
similar incident in the early 1930s with sheep vaccinated
against louping ill in which the vaccine was prepared from
sheep brain (Gordon, 1946; Greig, 1950)
7
. Special risks can be attributed
depending of the origin of the material (bovine or not,
geographical region, SRM used or not, etc.). However,
vaccines produced in accordance with requirements of the
CVMP, are regarded to be safe with respect to the risk of
transferring BSE.
d. Other feed components than MMBM
According to the opinions of the SSC on
the safety of tallow, gelatine and hydrolysed proteins,
these products could constitute a certain risk if they are
produced from BSE-contaminated bovine sources. Even if this
risk is regarded to be low as long as the conditions for
the safe production stipulated by the SSC are respected, a
certain risk remains due to the unavoidable uncertainty
about the source of the original raw material. It is
therefore important that the animals in a negligible
BSE-risk herd are not fed these products. For the same
reason, feed of unknown origin, such as waste food, should
not be given in 'negligible BSE-risk herds'.
5.
Information needed for establishing and maintaining
the status of a "negligible BSE-risk herd"
a. Disease history.
Due to the long incubation period of BSE
and the late appearance of clinical signs, the occurrence
of BSE in the past could point to a certain risk that more
than the affected animal (particularly one born in the same
birth cohort) had been exposed to the BSE-agent and are
still alive in the herd. Only if the case was 8 years or
more ago, and exposure of the animals in the herd to the
BSE-agent through feed or maternal transmission since then
can be excluded, is the risk of hidden BSE, (i.e.
pre-clinical cases) remaining in the herd, considered to be
negligible.
It is therefore concluded that in the
previous eight years, or since its establishment of the
herd (whatever is shorter), no BSE case must have been
diagnosed in the herd. Also all animals showing signs of
neurological disorders should be examined to exclude the
possibility of infection with BSE. Where possible an
alternative diagnosis should be available. Whenever such
disease did not respond to treatment, or the animal died, a
post-mortem examination and testing for BSE by an
approved method at an approved reference laboratory is
essential. However, it will not always be possible to
arrive at a definite diagnosis for all cases of
neurological disease.
With respect to certification of
previous cases of BSE there may need to be some degree of
interpretation. Depending on whether the case was homebred
or purchased, and for the latter depending on how soon
after purchase the animal was clinically affected, the
statement on past BSE history does indicate the extent to
which the herd has been at risk of exposure, and under
veterinary supervision. In other words, it supports
statements relating to the absence of risk
via feed or animal movements.
On clinical and
post-mortem examinations, it is essential to detect
affected animals as soon as possible in view of their
potential to donate tissues or fluids which could be
administered to humans parentally. In the absence of
significant experience of BSE it is perfectly possible
however that farmers and even veterinarians will fail to
recognise some of the signs of BSE and in such
circumstances a
post-mortem examination of animals that do not
recover could provide additional reassurance that the
disease is not BSE.
For newly established herds, sufficient
guarantees have to be given that the herd is constituted
only from animals from a country of negligible to zero
BSE-risk or from herds of an equivalent status.
If a BSE case is detected in a
'negligible risk herd', the herd can no longer been
considered as ' negligible risk herd'.
As a precautionary measure it is
recommended that in a "negligible BSE-risk herd" brains
from all bovines from the herd, that have died or have been
slaughtered at an age over 1 year
8
, must be examined in an approved
reference laboratory, using at least one immunological test
for the detection of PrP
sc (Western blotting, immunocytochemistry).
[Note: If animals are sold on to another owner, not a
negligible risk herd, it will be difficult to guarantee
that the brain is examined at slaughter or death. Therefore
in practice animals leaving the herd might have to be
killed at that time unless they go to another negligible
risk herd.] Once available, pre-clinical
in vivo tests should be applied on a regular basis
dependent on the capacity of the test to detect infectivity
in the early stages of incubation.
This recommendation is based on the
results of the testing of cohorts of BSE affected animals,
carried out by the Irish and Swiss authorities. In both
instances some animals have been detected in the
pre-clinical stage of infection.
b. Records, surveillance, and management
Without good records it would be
impossible to certify the past health status of a herd and
to verify that the cattle originating from the herd have
not died elsewhere.
Therefore, for the last 8 years or since
herd establishment (whatever is shorter) complete records
of births, deaths and all movements of the individual
animals are needed. They must allow the fate of all animals
that have resided in the herd within the past eight years
to be determined. To this end it is essential that for at
least eight years, each animal must have been identified
and monitored beyond doubt. For animals which have entered
the herd during the past 8 years, records must allow their
tracing back to the natal herd, in order to allow an
assessment of their status with regard to BSE, especially
with respect to their birth cohort.
Veterinary surveillance of the herd
should be of such level that guarantee is given that all
cases of neurological disorders for which BSE cannot be
excluded, are immediately recognised.
The management of the 'negligible
BSE-risk herd' must be such that this herd is separated
totally from other herds, and must ensure that physical
contact with cattle from other herds is avoided as well as
contact with potentially infected materials and other
domestic species, especially sheep. The latter is to avoid
a hypothetical exposure to BSE infectious material (i.e.
placenta from TSE (BSE)-infected sheep ).
Unless reared in complete isolation and
kept under separate (e.g., feeding, grazing, ...)
conditions or unless a total ban on the use of MMBM is in
place, chickens and pigs should not be on the same premises
as the 'closed herd' because of the possibility of
accidental feeding of cattle with pig and poultry feed
containing MMBM.
6.
Further conclusions
If a herd complies, in addition to the
recommendations formulated in the previous sections, with
the following conditions it may be classified as a
negligible BSE-risk herd, providing the same degree of
safety as sourcing from a BSE-free (negligible BSE-risk)
country or region:
- The feed provided to the herd during
the last 8 years (or since establishment, whatever is
shorter) must be fully documented, allowing the tracing of
any feed back to the producer and hence allowing
verification of its composition.
- For each animal that resided in the
herd during the last 8 years complete identification and
movement records must be available, to allow the tracing of
those that entered the herd to all herds, including the
natal herd and any herd, in which they have previously
resided
9
. As far as possible animals should also
be traceable after having left the herd, at least to their
herds of residence during the 6 months following their
departure, unless slaughtered sooner. In the latter case
they should be tested for BSE infectivity.
- If a herd is established for less than
8 years, each animal comprising it must either be sourced
from a "BSE negligible risk" country or herd free of the
disease for at least 8 years and complying with all the
other rules.
- A complete record of clinical disease
investigated and treatments received should be kept for
each animal. In the case of neurological diseases which did
not respond to treatment, a complete examination for the
presence of BSE must be documented. Any inconclusive
treatment or diagnosis has to be assumed as a BSE-suspect
and hence the two strategies described above under "Disease
history" have to be considered.
It is recommended to submit all animals
older then 12 months at slaughte
r to the best test available for the detection of
BSE infectivity.
The recommendations made by the SSC in
its various opinions on safety of ruminant-derived
products, geographical risk, intra-species recycling,
vertical transmission, fallen stock, etc., remain valid and
are also applicable to "closed herds".
7.
Acknowledgements
The present report of the working group
is substantially based on the work of the Working Group
chaired by Dr E. Vanopdenbosch. The other members of the
group were: Mr R. Bradley, Dr D. Matthews, Prof.Dr. G. Del
Real, Prof.Dr. A.Osterhaus, Prof.Dr. P Willeberg.
----------------------------------------
1
See also the SSC's opinion on the
Intraspecies recycling of pigs, poultry, fish and
ruminants.
2
See the SSC opinion of 26-27 March 1998 on
The safety of meat and bone meal from mammalian animals,
naturally or experimentally susceptible to Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathies. See also the SSC's updated
scientific report of 24-25 September 1998 on The safety of
meat-and-bone meal derived from mammalian animalsfed to
non-ruminant food-producing farm animals
3
Poultry fed with TSE contaminated feed may
carry infectivity in their digestive tract. Therefore, if MBM
is produced from poultry, feeding with such MBM should stop
for a number of days before slaughter so that the materials
can be digested or excreted.
4
See the SSC opinion of 24-25 September
1998 on Mammalian derived meat and bone meal forming a
cross-contaminant of animal feedstuffs.
5
OIE (1999). International Animal Health
Code chapter 3.2.13 on BSE. Adopted on 21.05.99,
Paris.
6
Agrimi U., Ru G., Cardone, F., Pocchiari,
M, Caramelli, M., 1999. Epidemic of transmissible spongiform
encephalopathy in sheep and goats in Italy. The Lancet 353,
560-561.
Capucchio MT, Guarda F, Isaia MC,
Caracappa S, Di Marco, V., 1998. Natural occurrence of
scrapie in goats in Italy. The Veterinary Record, 143,
452-453.
7
Gordon, W.S., 1946. Advances in veterinary
research: louping ill, tick-borne fever and scrapie. Vet Rec
58, 516-525.
Greig, J.R. ,1950. Scrapie in sheep. J
Comp Path, 60, 263-266.
8
See SSC opinion adopted on 24-25 June 1999
on "The risks of non conventional transmissible agents,
conventional infectious agents or other hazards such as toxic
substances entering the human food or animal feed chains via
raw material from fallen stock and dead animals (including
also: ruminants, pigs, poultry, fish, wild/exotic/zoo
animals, fur animals, cats, laboratory animals and fish) or
via condemned materials."
9
For practical purposes it might be
advisable to allow only animals that moved directly from
their natal herd into the closed herd without intermediate
steps and provided the natal herd also complies with the
closed herd criteria.
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