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Directorate F - Food and Veterinary Office

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FINAL REPORT OF AN AUDIT

CARRIED OUT IN

LITHUANIA

FROM 27 FEBRUARY TO 02 MARCH 2012

IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE ACTIONS TAKEN DURING RECENT OUTBREAKS OF
CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER AND TO ASSESS CONTINGENCY PLANNING OF EPIZOOTIC
DISEASE

Executive Summary

This report describes the outcome of an audit carried out by the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) in Lithuania from 27 February to 2 March 2012.

The overall objectives of the audit were to review and evaluate the measures taken by the Lithuanian authorities to eradicate classical swine fever (CSF) following several outbreaks in 2011 and to follow up on progress in implementing an action plan provided in response to recommendations relating to contingency planning following FVO audit 2009/8265.

Overall the report concludes that:

In respect of the 2011 CSF outbreaks: The competent authority took effective measures to eliminate CSF in line with the requirements of Council Directive No 2001/89/EC. However, there were delays in implementing diagnostic requirements and in treating the initial disease situation as a suspect CSF outbreak on the first infected holding. In addition the rate at which pigs could be killed on infected farms was limited by the capacity of the rendering plant to dispose of them. There were also delays in imposition of movement restrictions on the first outbreak and on enforcement of restrictions on movements in the surveillance zone. The delays in initially recognising the disease as suspect CSF and the delays in imposing movement restrictions could potentially have led to the spread of the disease. The NRL for CSF operated in accordance with the requirements of Council Directive No 2001/89/EC and Commission Decision 2002/106/EC.

In respect of follow up of audit FVO report 2009/8265 recommendations on contingency planning: The competent authority has largely addressed the recommendations of this report in that there are now satisfactory contingency plans in place for all the major epizootic diseases. However, work is still required to ensure that all horses are properly registered and identified and that horses entering the food chain are eligible to do so

The report includes a number of recommendations to the Lithuanian competent authority aimed at rectifying the identified shortcomings and enhancing the control system in place.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

Abbreviation	Explanation
AHS	African Horse Sickness
AIRBC	Agricultural Information and Rural Business Centre
ASF	African Swine Fever
CDB	The central database for animal identification and registration
CSF	Classical Swine Fever
DG SANCO	Directorate-General health and Consumers
EU	European Union
FVO	Food and Veterinary Office
FVO report 2008/7806	Report of an FVO audit on the implementation of EU animal health requirements for intra-community trade in live animals
FVO report 2009/8265	Report of an FVO audit in order to evaluate contingency plans for epizootic diseases and the eradication programme for rabies
LDCC	Local Disease Control Centre
NDCC	National Disease Control Centre
NFVRAI	National Food and Veterinary Risk Assessment Institute
NRL	National Reference Laboratory for CSF (the NFVRAI)
RT_PCR	Reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction
SFVS	State Food and Veterinary Service

1 INTRODUCTION

This audit took place in Lithuania from 27 February to 2 March 2012. The audit team comprised two inspectors and one detached national expert from the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO).

The audit was undertaken in response to a series of outbreaks of Classical Swine Fever (CSF) in Lithuania in 2011 and in order to assess contingency planning for epizootic disease.

The audit team was accompanied throughout the audit by representatives of the Lithuanian State Food and Veterinary Service (SFVS) which is the competent authority within the scope of this audit.

2 OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the audit were:

- To review and evaluate the measures taken by the Lithuanian authorities to eradicate the CSF outbreaks that took place during 2011. In particular, attention was paid to:

- The action taken to determine the source of, and to control outbreaks of, CSF including procedures for the destruction and disposal of infected animals.
- The measures taken to prevent the spread of CSF outside Lithuania.
- The state of preparedness of the Lithuanian authorities including the CSF contingency plan in place at the time of the outbreak.

- To assess progress made in the development and testing of contingency plans for dealing with other epizootic diseases, in particular to follow up on progress in implementing an action plan provided in response to recommendations relating to contingency planning following FVO audit 2009/8265.

In pursuit of these objectives the following sites were visited:

COMPETENT AUTHORITY VISITS		COMMENTS
Central Competent Authority	2	Opening and closing meeting with SFVS (representatives of the Ministry of Environment were also present)
Agricultural Information and Rural Business Centre	1	Responsible for holdings/animal identification databases (also one issuer of horse passports)
Regional Veterinary Office	2	Acted as Local disease control centres during the 2009 and 2011 CSF outbreaks.
National Food and Veterinary Risk Assessment Institute	1	Acts as NRL for epizootic diseases including CSF and as risk assessor for animal health and food safety issues
OTHER SITES VISITED		
Farms	1	One commercial pig farm
Private Veterinarians	2	Met during visits (one contracted to work on a commercial farm and one ambulatory)

3 LEGAL BASIS

The audit was carried out under the general provisions of Community legislation and in particular Article 45 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animals health and animal welfare rules.

Full legal references are provided in the annex. Legal acts quoted in this report refer, where applicable to the last amended version. In addition to these legal acts, Commission Implementing Decision 2011/508/EU¹ imposed protection measures on Lithuania to prevent the spread of CSF to other member states and third countries. These protection measures were repealed by Commission Implementing Decision 2011/546/EU².

4 BACKGROUND

4.1 CSF IN LITHUANIA

In June and July of 2011 there were 5 outbreaks of Classical Swine Fever (CSF) in Lithuania. These were the first outbreaks since a single outbreak of CSF in Lithuania in July 2009. The outbreaks of 2009 and 2011 were both of genotype 2.1 of the CSF virus. Prior to July 2009, CSF had not been detected in Lithuania since 1992.

4.2 RESULTS OF PREVIOUS FVO AUDITS

A specific audit in order to evaluate contingency plans for epizootic diseases and the eradication

1 Commission implementing decision of 16 August 2011 concerning certain protection measures relating to classical swine fever in Lithuania 2011/508/EU(OJ No. L 209, 17.08.2011, p. 53)

2 Commission implementing decision of 16 September 2011 repealing Implementing Decision 2011/508/EU concerning certain protection measures relating to classical swine fever in Lithuania 2011/546/EU (OJ L 241, 17.09.2011, p. 34)

programme for rabies was carried out in Lithuania from 20 to 24 July 2009 - it is reported in DG(SANCO)/2009/8265 (hereafter referred to as FVO report 2009/8265). Another FVO audit on the implementation of EU animal health requirements for intra-community trade in live animals assessed the identification system for livestock (including pigs). It is reported in DG(SANCO)/2008/7806 (hereafter referred to as FVO report 2008/7806). Both of these reports are published on the FVO website at:

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/index_en.cfm.

The current audit assessed progress made by the Lithuanian competent authorities in implementation of the action plans in respect of the recommendations made relating to contingency planning following these audits. Where appropriate the relevant recommendations will be quoted in this report for ease of reference.

5 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 COMPETENT AUTHORITIES


5.1.1 Legal Requirements

Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 requires Member States to designate the competent authorities responsible for official controls. Article 4(6) requires internal audits to be carried out. Article 6 requires that staff are adequately trained to carry out official controls.

5.1.2 Findings

On 1 July 2011 the Government of the Republic of Lithuania approved a new administrative structure of the SFVS. The new structure aims to simplify budgetary administration by replacing 51 budgetary institutions with two public legal persons: the SFVS and the National Food and Veterinary Risk Assessment Institute (NFVRAI). It maintains the direct line of command between central and regional levels as illustrated in the following organigramme.

**Structure of SFVS (number of staff - 1675, including 309 in NFVRAI)
with effect as of 1 July 2011**



The NFVRAI provides risk assessment and laboratory diagnostic expertise in respect of animal diseases and food safety issues. It has the equivalent of 309 staff spread over five sites - the main centre being based in Vilnius. It acts as the NRL for animal health and food safety issues and the Vilnius site includes the only laboratory in Lithuania which carries out CSF diagnostic tests (serology, detection of antigen and strain typing).

The Agricultural Information and Rural Business Centre (AIRBC) is a state company which reports to the Ministry of Agriculture. It maintains the central database for registration of holdings and animal identification database (CDB) and issues passports for cattle and horses.

The organisation of the competent authority in the recent past has been described in the Lithuanian country profile (DG/SANCO/2010/8374 - Final) published on the FVO website.³

The audit team noted that:

- the Internal Audit unit of the SFVS has carried out audits on its territorial divisions following both the 2009 and the 2011 outbreaks. At the time of this FVO audit the 2011 audit report had still not been finalised but the FVO team were informed of some of the

³ http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/msm_en.cfm?co_id=LT

findings in the district of Jonava where the 2011 outbreaks of CSF occurred. These findings included shortcomings in the local contingency plan for dealing with CSF such as contact data not being updated and insufficient availability of vehicles. The 2010 Internal Audit covered contingency planning, rabies control, and identification of animals and holdings. Amongst other shortcomings it identified that contingency plans were not available for African Swine Fever (ASF), African Horse Sickness (AHS), findings which were also noted in FVO report 2009/8265. Recommendations were made to the territorial divisions to correct deficiencies found;

- in the territorial divisions visited monthly information and training meetings with, and training of, private veterinarians had taken place. In December 2011 specific trainings took place to cascade information received at a centralised training session on dealing with epizootic diseases.

5.1.3 Conclusions

Competent authorities have been designated in line with Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 and internal audits have been carried out in line with Article 4(6). Training of staff in relation to control of epizootic diseases has taken place in line with the requirements of Article 6.

5.2 LEGISLATION

Article 3 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC requires that CSF is compulsorily notifiable to the competent authority and that the competent authority must notify and give information to the Commission and other Member States on suspicions and confirmed outbreaks of the disease.

Chapter II of the Annex to Commission Decision 2002/106/EC (the CSF diagnostic manual) sets out guidelines for the main criteria to be considered for the recognition of a holding as a CSF suspected holding.

5.2.1 Findings

The requirements of CSF control Directive 2001/89/EC and Commission Decision 2002/106/EC (the CSF diagnostic manual) are transposed into Lithuanian legislation in SFVS Order 283 of 21 June 2003 and SFVS Order B1-591 of 30 June 2003 respectively. The text in these orders follows the requirements of Council Directive 2001/89/EC and Commission Decision 2002/106/EC.

5.2.2 Conclusion

CSF is notifiable in Lithuania as required by Article 3 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC which has been transposed into Lithuanian legislation. Commission Decision 2002/106/EC has been transposed into Lithuanian legislation.

5.3 REGISTRATION OF PIG HOLDINGS AND IDENTIFICATION OF PIGS

5.3.1 Legal Requirements

Article 3 of Council Directive 2008/71/EC requires the competent authority to keep an updated list of all holdings which keep pigs. Article 4 requires pig keepers to maintain a register of animals on the holding and a record of movements on and off the holding. Article 5 requires that pigs must be

marked by eartag or tattoo as soon as possible, and in any event, before leaving the holding. Article 18 of Council Directive 64/432/EEC requires reporting of movements from pig holdings. Commission Decision 2000/678/EC fixes the data that the pig holding registration database should contain including a data field where restrictions on movements can be recorded by the competent authority.

5.3.2 Findings

For a description of the identification system of pigs in Lithuania please refer to FVO report 2008/7806. During that audit it was found that the registration of small pig herds in Lithuania was ongoing and a recommendation was made requiring the competent authority to have an up-to-date list of all holdings in Lithuania on which pigs are held or kept, in accordance with Article 3 of Council Directive 2008/71/EC and to ensure reporting of movements from these holdings for animal health reasons as required by Article 18 of Council Directive 64/432/EEC.

Following an amendment to Lithuanian Order no 3D-551 of the Minister of Agriculture of 15 October 2008 on the rules of identification and registration of farm animals by Order No 3D-6 of the Minister of Agriculture on 8 January 2010 the registration of all pig keepers (even those who have only one pig intended for their own use or consumption) is now mandatory in Lithuania. Pig keepers are responsible for notification of the CDB. In July 2010, in an update of the actions taken to address recommendations made in previous FVO missions, the Competent Authority indicated that the registration of pig holdings was ongoing.

The audit team noted that:

- Article 27 of Order No 3D-6 requires pig keepers to provide updated pig census to the CDB and Article 40 requires identification of pigs before they move off a holding;
- registration of pig holdings has been significantly progressed by the AIRBC. The SFVS estimates that more than 90% of holdings are now registered following publicity campaigns and on-the-spot inspections to detect unregistered pigs. This registration includes those small back-yard holdings with a single pig for the personal consumption of the owner;
- in three districts checked by the audit team there were approximately 800 registered pig holdings, of these 0.5% had more than 1000 pigs, 0.25% had 100 to 1000 pigs. Two of these regions had 716 pig holdings, 98% of which had less than 30 pigs;
- at the time of the 2011 CSF outbreak only 8 pig holdings with less than 1000 pigs were registered in Jonava, where the 2011 outbreaks took place. Since the outbreak, 227 holdings with 731 pigs have been registered;
- one fine and several warning letters have been issued in cases where undeclared pig holdings had been detected;
- the CDB contains a data field that can be used to indicate movement restrictions that may be imposed on pig holdings, thus addressing recommendation 7 in FVO report 2009/8265 (see section 5.5).

5.3.3 Conclusions

National legislation is in place to implement the requirements of Council Directive 2008/71/EC and Article 18 of Council Directive 64/432/EEC. Since the initial measures taken during the 2011 outbreak was hampered by the lack of registration of small pig holdings the competent authority has enforced the requirement for all pig farmers to register their holdings and the registration is now largely completed. As long as this register is maintained and kept up to date the rapid identification of the population at risk will be possible in case of outbreaks of epizootic diseases in pigs.

A data field where restrictions on movements of pigs can be recorded is included in the CDB as required by Commission Decision 2000/678/EC.


5.4 THE CSF EPIZOOTIC OF JUNE TO JULY 2011

The Lithuanian Competent Authority has provided detailed presentations on the 2011 CSF outbreaks to the Standing Committee for the Food Chain and Animal Health (Animal Health and Welfare Section) during the period from July to September 2011. These presentations are available for consultation on the internet at:


http://ec.europa.eu/food/committees/regulatory/scfcah/animal_health/

In summary there were five outbreaks of CSF the first one being confirmed on 1 June 2011. Two secondary outbreaks on farms belonging to the same company which had received pigs from the primary outbreak were confirmed on the 2nd of June. A further outbreak (within the surveillance zone of the primary outbreak) was confirmed on 3rd July 2011 and the last outbreak was confirmed on 8 July 2011 (within the surveillance zone of outbreak 3). The following maps show the relative location of the outbreaks.

Location of first outbreak



Relative location of outbreaks



A total of 39 110 pigs were culled in the five CSF outbreaks.

5.4.1 Measures taken in case of suspicion of CSF

5.4.1.1 Legal Requirements

Article 4 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC sets out the measures that must be taken when the presence of CSF is suspected on a holding. They include the taking of a census of all pigs on a holding, restrictions on the movement of pigs, animal products and people from the holding, disinfection measures to be taken and the launching of an epidemiological enquiry.

5.4.1.2 Findings

The first official notification of disease problems on the primary CSF outbreak holding of CSF in 2011 was made by a telephone call from the private veterinarian of the holding to the Jonava territorial office of the SFVS on 23 May 2011. Prior to this a post mortem on two sows carried out in a veterinary post mortem facility on 17 May had resulted in a putative diagnosis of a food borne toxicosis. As the morbidity and mortality of pigs continued to increase a further eight pigs were sent to a veterinary post mortem facility on 26 May 2011. On 30 May 2011 the company that owned the holding sent a letter to the Jonava territorial office stating that the mortality was increasing and the disease was spreading throughout the farm. The emergency team of the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) was sent to the holding on 31 May 2011 and an epidemiological enquiry was started. Clinical signs were, at that stage, considered to be typical of CSF. Samples of tissue and blood from 63 pigs were confirmed to be CSF virus positive by Reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) on 1 June 2011. The CSF outbreak was reported to the Commission on the same day by faxed letter and e-mail and also reported electronically in the Animal Disease Notification System. Following this primary outbreak daily reports were sent to the Commission giving updated information on actions taken to control the disease on this holding and on further confirmed outbreak holdings.

The audit team noted that:

- the actions taken by the territorial SFVS following the notification on the 23 May were not documented;
- on 24 May blood two samples were taken for detection of antibodies to CSF, African Swine Fever (ASF), Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Swine Vesicular Disease (SVD) and 59 samples were taken for Aujeszky's Disease within the routine disease surveillance programme. All samples were submitted to the NFVRAI (the National Reference Laboratory for CSF - NRL). The samples were tested as surveillance samples and were serologically negative for all diseases tested including CSF. Tests for the presence of ASF viral antigen were also carried out with negative results;
- despite the the macroscopic post-mortem findings on the pigs examined on 26 May being consistent with CSF, no samples were sent to the NRL for further testing and no diagnosis was recorded on the form that reported the findings of the post-mortem.
- restrictions on the movements of pigs, humans and materials that could transmit CSF virus were not put in place during the official investigations of a suspicion of CSF on the primary outbreak holding. Restrictions were put in place on the primary outbreak holding at the time of official confirmation of the CSF outbreak on 1 June 2011.

5.4.1.3 Conclusion

The actions taken following the suspicion of CSF on 31 May 2011 were in accordance with the requirements of Article 4 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC apart from the delay in placing restrictions on the holding at the suspect stage. There was also an excessive time delay between the appearance of signs of significant disease problems on the holding and the presence of CSF being suspected despite a typical post mortem picture of CSF being present in carcasses that had been submitted to a veterinary post mortem facility.

5.4.2 Measures taken following confirmation of CSF

5.4.2.1 Legal requirements

Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC set out the measures that must be taken when the presence of CSF is confirmed on a holding and in holdings with different production units. These measures include the slaughter and disposal of all pigs, cleaning and disinfection to ensure CSF virus is destroyed, sampling to determine the manner of introduction of the CSF virus into the holding and to determine the genetic type of the CSF virus. In addition, meat of pigs slaughtered during the period between the probable introduction of the CSF virus and restrictions being imposed should be traced and destroyed to avoid the risk of virus spread.

Article 7 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC also sets out the measures to be taken in contact holdings which are at risk of being infected with CSF virus according to epidemiological investigations. The main criteria and risk factors to be taken into account when deciding whether to kill pigs on contact holdings are set out in Annex V to Council Directive 2001/89/EC.

Article 12 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC sets out the requirements for cleaning and disinfection of holdings that were CSF outbreaks.

5.4.2.2 Findings

On confirmation of the primary outbreak (1 June 2011) the Director of the SFVS published order B1-231 which prohibited the export and import of live pigs and the movement of all pigs on the territory of Lithuania except to slaughter. On 9 June 2011 this order was extended to cover the export or trade to other Member States of porcine semen, ova and embryos. Three other holdings of the same company had received pigs from the primary outbreak holding since March 2011. On the basis of Article 7 of Council Directive 2001/89 these three contact holdings were suspected holdings. On two of these three holdings clinical symptoms were also present and the holdings were confirmed as CSF positive by RT-PCR on 2 June 2011 (outbreaks 2 and 3). The CSF virus responsible for the outbreak was genotyped in the NRL (see section 5.4.4.2 on findings relating to epidemiology). On a fourth holding belonging to the same company the pigs showed no signs of CSF. Pigs on this holding were regularly sampled during time of the epizootic and samples were tested for CSF by serology and RT-PCR.

Once the disease was confirmed on an outbreak holding the competent authority proceeded to kill the pigs under official supervision. Various methods were used including electrocution, intravenous injection with T61 and euthanasia with carbon dioxide. From the confirmation of the first three outbreaks on 1 & 2 June 2011 to 14 June 2011 approximately 24,000 pigs were killed. The competent authority informed the mission team that the limiting factor on the rate of killing of the pigs was the processing capacity of the one rendering plant in Lithuania.

The preliminary cleaning and disinfection on outbreak farms was completed shortly after all pigs were killed. Final cleaning and disinfection was completed four to six weeks later on all outbreak holdings. The audit team were informed by the Competent authority that inspectors were present on the holdings to confirm that both preliminary and final cleaning and disinfection had been satisfactorily carried out.

The audit team noted that:

- following confirmation of CSF on the primary outbreak holding the competent authority took immediate steps to identify contact holdings.
- there were delays in imposing movement restrictions on farms in surveillance zones (see section 5.4.2)
- the audit team did not see any documentation to show that meat of pigs slaughtered during the period between the probable introduction of CSF virus and restrictions being imposed on holdings was traced and destroyed.
- on the fourth holding belonging to the affected company there was one positive serology result on 15 July 2011. However, testing with RT-PCR and subsequent sampling and testing on the holding did not confirm this result which was considered to be a false positive result. This holding was depopulated by 13 August - the pigs were slaughtered in two slaughterhouses and serology and RT-PCR testing was negative in all pigs tested.
- sampling of pigs on outbreak farms had taken place promptly in an effort to determine the manner of introduction of the CSF virus and to determine the genetic type of the CSF virus. However, no source of virus introduction could be determined;
- On 31 May a consignment of slaughter pigs was dispatched from the second outbreak holding to a slaughterhouse in a third country. This consignment was intercepted at the border and returned to the first outbreak holding to be culled. Another consignment of slaughter pigs had been consigned to the same slaughter house on 30 May from the holding that was confirmed as outbreak 3 on 2 June 2011. These pigs had already been slaughtered on 2 June. The competent authority stated that the competent authority of the third country was informed by telephone that they had been consigned from a holding that had subsequently been confirmed as infected with CSF.
- in the districts of Jonava, Kėdainiai and Ukmergė a total of 274 samples were taken from wild boar including 129 samples from the protection zones and surveillance around the outbreaks. In these zones permission had been given to hunt all classes of wild boar including adults which are not normally hunted during the time period when the outbreaks were occurring. In the rest of Lithuania an SFVS order required that all wild boar found dead were to be sampled for CSF. A total of 499 samples were taken from wild boar in the other regions of Lithuania. All samples from wild boar were negative for CSF.

5.4.2.3 Conclusion

Once the outbreaks of CSF had been confirmed, the competent authority implemented measures to control and eliminate the disease in line with the requirements of Articles 5, 6,7 and 12 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC apart from the requirement to trace and destroy meat of pigs slaughtered

during the period between the probable introduction of the CSF virus and restrictions being imposed.

5.4.3 Application of contingency Plan for CSF, Disease control centres and expert groups.

5.4.3.1 Legal Requirements

Article 22 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC requires a Member State to draw up a contingency plan specifying the national measures to be taken in the event of an outbreak of CSF.

Article 23 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC requires that a national disease control centre (NDCC) and local disease control centres (LDCCs) can be immediately established in the event of CSF outbreaks. It also requires that member states have a permanently operational expert group in order to assist the competent authority in ensuring disease preparations.

5.4.3.2 Findings

A contingency plan for controlling outbreaks of CSF was already in place at the time of the 2009 CSF outbreak having been approved under Commission Decision 2007/19/EC. This plan was modified following the 2009 CSF outbreak and again following the 2011 CSF outbreak.

The audit team noted that

- The latest version (December 2011) of the CSF contingency plan also covers African Swine Fever (ASF) and was approved by an Order of the Director of the SFVS on 30 December 2011. (This addresses one of the recommendations in FVO report 2009/8265 - see section 5.5.2)

The current CSF/ASF contingency plan is a comprehensive document running to 100 pages. As required by Council Directive 2001/89/EC it covers the following topics, amongst others:

- basic information about both diseases;
- the setting up of a NDCC and LDCCs;
- setting up and the functions of the Expert Group, details the measures to be taken in dealing with suspicions of and confirmed CSF/ASF outbreaks (including what samples must be taken and what tests should be carried out);
- procedures for emergency vaccination should it be needed;
- procedures for re-population of holdings following outbreaks of CSF/ASF;
- training for expert group members and others;
- contact information for key staff that will be involved in dealing with outbreaks and also details the staff resources that are available for disease control measures (including private veterinarian numbers);
- comprehensive report forms for epidemiological investigations;
- template tables for recording census information on PZs and SZs and the activities that are undertaken during outbreaks;
- templates for warning signs and publicity materials for advising the public of the disease situation and control measures;
- tables of criteria and risk factors to inform decisions on disease control measures eg. whether to slaughter out contact holdings.

The audit team noted that:

- the CSF/ASF contingency plan comprises all elements required under Annex VII of Council Directive 2001/89/EC;
- a NDCC and a LDCC were established in accordance with the procedures established in the CSF contingency plan;
- the expert group was established in accordance with the CSF contingency plan and epidemiological enquiries were carried out by the group on suspect and confirmed outbreaks of CSF. (see section 5.4.4). These enquiries were reported in a comprehensive manner in respect of each outbreak using the forms set out in the contingency plan;
- the CSF contingency plan contains a section on the procedures to follow by the SFVS when CSF is suspected. These procedures were only implemented on the arrival of the NDCC emergency team on what would become the primary outbreak holding (see section 5.4.1.2 for details);
- local CSF contingency plans were in place at both of the territorial offices visited and contained information applicable to the local territory. A small emergency store of equipment that could be used to investigate suspect cases of epizootic disease was present in both of the territorial offices visited.

5.4.3.3 Conclusions

Although a contingency plan specifying the national measures to be taken in the event of an outbreak of CSF is in place as required by Article 22 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC this plan was not activated during the initial stages of the first outbreak. The national contingency plan has been adapted to the local level in the territories of the SFVS.

A NDCC and a LDCC were established to deal with the CSF outbreaks and an operational expert group is in place to assist the competent authority in dealing with outbreaks of CSF as required by Article 23 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC.

5.4.4 Epidemiological enquiry, lessons learned and actions taken following the outbreaks

5.4.4.1 Legal Requirements

Article 8 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC requires an epidemiological enquiry to be carried out on suspected cases or confirmed outbreaks of CSF. Questionnaires based on the CSF contingency plan should be used. Article 22.3 allows the amending of contingency plans to take account of developments in the disease situation.

5.4.4.2 Findings

The expert group was established in accordance with the CSF contingency plan and carried out epidemiological enquiries relating to the outbreaks. The epidemiological enquiry did not come to a definite conclusion as to the source of the CSF outbreaks in 2011. However, the audit team was informed that there had been instances of vehicles that had not been properly cleaned and disinfected arriving from a third country to collect pigs for slaughter. Such dirty pig transport vehicles were considered by the competent authority to be the most likely means by which CSF infection entered Lithuania in 2011.

The CSF virus responsible for the outbreak was genotyped in the NRL as being genotype 2.1. This is the same genotype as CSF virus that was responsible for the outbreak of CSF in Lithuania in 2009. The audit team was informed that there were small differences observed in segment E2 of the viral genome but that these changes were not of a magnitude that would resolve the question as to whether the virus responsible for the 2011 outbreak was a separate re-introduction of CSF virus from the same source as the 2009 outbreak or a recrudescence of the CSF virus strain that was responsible for the 2009 outbreak in Lithuania.

Carry over of CSF infection in the wild boar population from the 2009 CSF outbreak was not considered to be a possible source of infection as extensive surveillance sampling of wild boar in the protection and surveillance zones of the 2011 outbreaks revealed no evidence of infection. In addition the competent authority stated that there was no evidence for carry over of infection in back yard holdings.

The competent authority consider that illegal use of CSF vaccines and deliberate introduction of the virus can be excluded.

The audit team noted that:

- following the eradication of CSF from Lithuania in 2011 there was no comprehensive epidemiological report produced giving an epidemiological overview of the outbreak;
- the short document giving an analysis of how the 2011 CSF outbreaks were handled, which was provided to the audit team at the closing meeting, outlined the course of the outbreak and highlighted some problems that were identified during the outbreak. Examples of these problems included: poor biosecurity in many commercial pig farms; shortages of veterinarians and equipment sufficient to deal with several outbreaks at the same time; poorly developed contingency plans at the territorial level; problems with journalists interfering at outbreak holdings; difficulties in getting small scale pig keepers to cooperate with clinical and sampling procedures in the surveillance zones and incomplete registration of small scale pig holdings prior to the outbreak. According to the same analysis things that went well included: the fact that CSF has been eliminated from Lithuania; there was a well developed national contingency plan for dealing with CSF in place, the media handling strategy at national level worked well; there was good cooperation of managers and staff on commercial pig holdings with the culling procedure; there was good cooperation with police, environmental agencies and private veterinarians; the cleaning and disinfection of outbreak farms went well and much experience was gained in dealing with epizootic outbreaks;
- following the outbreaks of CSF the competent authority introduced legislation in respect of the biosecurity of pig holdings (Order No. B1-384); amended the CSF/ASF contingency plan in the light of lessons learned; intensified registration of pig farms (see section 5.3.2); held training sessions to improve the awareness of CSF amongst SFVS staff, private veterinarians and pig keepers;
- coloured leaflets have been produced setting out the clinical signs of CSF and giving farmers and veterinarians information on who to contact should they suspect the disease to be present.

5.4.4.3 Conclusions

Comprehensive epidemiological enquiries were carried out on each of the outbreak holdings in accordance with Article 8 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC. However, the source of the CSF virus for the 2011 outbreaks has not been determined.

The awareness campaigns and training sessions organised by the competent authority should reduce the risk that suspicion of CSF will be overlooked in the future.

5.4.5 Establishment of and measures taken in protection and surveillance zones

5.4.5.1 Legal Requirements

Articles 9, 10 and 11 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC set out the requirements for the establishment of protection zones and surveillance zones around confirmed CSF outbreaks and the measures to be taken in these zones. The zones must be established taking epidemiological and geographical considerations into account. Measures to be taken in the zones include: a census of all pig holdings; restrictions on pig movements; disinfection of vehicles and equipment used for pigs and general controls to limit the spread of CSF including the steps that must be taken before allowing any movement of pigs from a holding.

5.4.5.2 Findings

The audit team noted that:

- once the primary outbreak of CSF was confirmed a 3km protection zone and a 10km surveillance zone were set up. These zones were quickly enlarged due to the confirmation of outbreaks 2 and 3.
- in local contingency plans draft protection and surveillance zones were already prepared in relation to large pig farms.
- on confirmation of the primary outbreak (1 June 2011) the Director of the SFVS published order B1-232 which required veterinarians to examine all commercial pig holdings in Lithuania to rule out CSF. If there were any suspicions then sufficient samples had to be submitted to the NRL to be 95% confident of detecting CSF virus if present at 10% prevalence. In addition, the order required all wild boar found dead in Lithuania to be submitted to the NRL to rule out CSF. In the case of infected territories, samples from all wild boar shot had to be submitted to the NRL for CSF testing. Evidence was seen that these measures were implemented.
- Pig farms in the protection zone and surveillance zone were inspected by veterinarians. The restrictions on farming activity required in the protection and surveillance zones were communicated to farmers and the general public by means of information leaflets, posters displayed at local level, and advertisements in the local press. There was also media coverage by national TV.

A specific authorisation by means of an order from the Director of the SFVS was required in cases where pigs were to be moved from holdings in the surveillance or protection zone (to specified slaughter houses) in cases where pigs were moved to slaughter from farms in the surveillance zone. Prior to movement from the holding the pigs had to be clinically examined including the taking of temperatures so that there was a 95% confidence of detecting a fever if 20% of the pigs had a fever (or 5% in the case of sows and boars). The pigs had to be transported to the slaughter house in sealed transport and sampled at slaughter to rule out CSF.

The audit team noted that:

- Two of the farms in the surveillance zones of the first three outbreaks were later confirmed as outbreak holdings due to surveillance activity. Outbreak 4 was detected as a result of surveillance samples taken on the holding. Outbreak 5 was detected as a result of samples taken from pigs sent for supervised routine slaughter.
- several consignments of slaughter pigs had left these holdings in contravention of the movement standstill that should have been in place on 1 June 2011. Many of the consignments were of individual pigs to named individuals. The competent authority informed the mission team that the surveillance zone in the district of Jonava was declared on 3 June 2011 which was the day following the movement of pigs to slaughter from the holding that would become outbreak 4. The competent authority also informed the audit team that an inspection was performed at the slaughter house on 7 July 2011 and it was confirmed that the meat from these pigs had been used to manufacture heat treated products that were intended only for the Lithuanian market.
- with respect to the consignments of individual pigs to named individuals documents provided by the competent authority showed that these were consignments of pig meat moved to the home premises of individuals working on the holding. These movements were in contravention of the restrictions in place in the surveillance zone. Once the illegal movements were detected (in July), officials of the competent authority seized remaining carcasses and meat products which were destroyed by rendering along with other culled pigs from outbreak 5. However, documents were not provided to the audit team to confirm that meat from some of the slaughter pigs had been traced (consignments to individuals from the holding which would become outbreak 5 on 1st & 2nd June 2011 - immediately prior to the extension of the surveillance zone to cover that farm).

5.4.5.3 Conclusions

Measures taken in the protection and surveillance zones were in largely in compliance with the requirements of Articles 9, 10 and 11 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC. However, unauthorised movements of pigs to slaughter and pig meat to named individuals from holdings in the surveillance zone remained undetected for a month. These holdings were later identified as outbreak holdings so these movements could have had the potential to spread CSF to other holdings.

5.4.6 Re-population of pig holdings following outbreaks

5.4.6.1 Legal Requirements

Article 13 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC and point E of Chapter IV of Commission Decision 2002/106/EC sets out the steps to be taken before holdings that were CSF outbreaks are re-populated with pigs. If less than six months have elapsed since the completion of cleaning and disinfection the pigs in re-populated herds must be subject to serological sampling no earlier than 40 days after the arrival of the last pig on the holding.

5.4.6.2 Findings

At the time of the audit, none of the holdings that had been CSF outbreak holdings during the CSF outbreaks of both 2009 and 2011 had been repopulated with pigs. The audit team were informed that some of these holdings intended to restock with pigs in the spring of 2012. The competent authority indicated to the audit team that, despite the fact that the holdings had had final cleaning

and disinfection completed more than six months previously, they intended to subject pigs arriving on the holdings to the serological testing envisaged in Article 13 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC.

5.4.6.3 Conclusion

Restocking of holdings following the 2011 outbreaks of CSF will be compliant with the requirements of Article 13 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC.

5.4.7 Controls over animal and product movements following confirmation of CSF

5.4.7.1 Legal Requirements

In addition to the measures required in Council Directive 2001/89/EC protection measures relating to the CSF outbreak in Lithuania were adopted by the Commission in Implementing Decision 2011/508/EU of 16 August 2011. It prohibited the dispatch of pigs from Lithuania to other Member States and third countries, extended conditions on the movement of pigs relating to pig holdings in the districts of Jonava, Kaišiadorys, Kaunas and Kėdainiai in Kaunas county and the districts of Ukmergė and Širvintos in Vilnius county and allowed the dispatch of pig meat and pig products from SZs to other Member States under strict conditions including official certification. Decision 2011/508/EU was repealed by Commission Implementing Decision 2011/546/EU on the 16 September 2011.

5.4.7.2 Findings

In cases where pigs were to be moved from holdings in the surveillance or protection zone to specified slaughter houses a specific authorisation by means of an order from the Director of the SFVS was required. Prior to movement from the holding the pigs had to be clinically examined including the taking of temperatures so that there was a 95% confidence of detecting a fever if 20% of the pigs had a fever (or 5% in the case of sows and boars). The pigs had to be transported to the slaughter house in sealed transport and sampled at slaughter to rule out CSF.

The competent authority informed the audit team that the derogation allowed in Article 6 of 2011/508/EU (relating to not having to use the special health mark and not having to heat treat pork meat) was not used during the 2011 CSF outbreak in Lithuania.

5.4.7.3 Conclusion

The measures taken in Lithuania during the outbreaks of CSF in 2011 were compliant with the requirements of the temporary protection measures set out in Commission Decision 2011/508/EU.

5.4.8 The diagnostic manual and laboratory diagnosis of CSF

5.4.8.1 Legal Requirements

Article 17 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC establishes the diagnostic procedures for CSF. It requires Member states to have a national laboratory for CSF. Article 17.3 provides for Commission Decision 2002/106/EC which establishes Community level diagnostic procedures for CSF. Article 1 of Commission Decision 2002/106/EC sets out the principles for confirmation of CSF based on the detection of clinical signs and post-mortem lesions of disease, the detection of virus antigen or genome, and the demonstration of specific antibodies In accordance with its

annexed CSF diagnostic manual. The diagnostic manual also sets out the procedures for checking and sampling on suspect holdings, sampling culled pigs from outbreak holdings, pre-movement sampling in surveillance or protection zones, sampling prior to re-population, sampling prior to lifting restrictions in surveillance or protection zones and sampling of feral pig populations.

5.4.8.2 Findings

The audit team noted that:

- Commission Decision 2002/106/EC has been implemented in Lithuania by means of SFVS Order No. B1-579 of 2003;
- the NFVRAI acts as the NRL for CSF in Lithuania. Laboratory tests for CSF are carried out at the Vilnius Centre only. The NRL is accredited to ISO 17025 and the relevant analytical methods for detection and surveillance of CSF are included in the scope of accreditation;
- the NRL has participated regularly in proficiency tests for CSF diagnostic techniques. The audit team saw the results of recent tests which had been completed to a satisfactory standard with any minor deficiencies identified being immediately addressed.
- The veterinary post mortem facility (which is not part of the NRL) that carried out the initial post mortems on the first pigs submitted from the holding, that was later confirmed as outbreak 1, described post mortem signs which were indicative of CSF but did not submit any samples to the NRL for detection of CSF.

5.4.8.3 Conclusion

The NRL for CSF operates in accordance with the requirements of Article 17 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC and Commission Decision 2002/106/EC. However, the veterinary post mortem facility that carried out the post mortem investigation of diseased pigs prior to confirmation of disease in the first outbreak did not follow the diagnostic procedures set out in Commission Decision 2002/106/EC in that samples for virological tests were not submitted to the NRL for virological examination thereby missing an opportunity to detect the outbreak of CSF at an earlier stage.

5.5 FOLLOW UP OF AUDIT FVO REPORT 2009/8265 RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING

As the main objective of this audit is an assessment of the measures taken to control the CSF outbreaks of 2009 the audit team visited pig holdings only. However, the recommendations relating to contingency planning in report 2009/8265 covered all livestock species. To follow up recommendations relating to species other than pigs the audit team asked the CCA to provide documentary evidence of how they had been addressed.

5.5.1 Animal identification, holding registration, movement controls and traceability

Recommendation 6 of report 2009/8265 stated that the competent authority should ensure that all horses in Lithuania are identified and registered in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No. 504/2008 and, in particular, that unidentified horses born on or before 30 June 2009 are identified and registered by 31 December 2009 at the latest, as required by Article 26 of that Regulation.

Recommendation 7 of FVO report 2009/8265 stated that the competent authority should establish procedures for the use of the animal health information that Council Regulation (EC) No. 21/2004 and Commission Decision 2000/678/EC require for each holding registered in the central database as a means to control the movement of animals in the event of major animal disease outbreaks.

5.5.1.1 Findings

At the AIRBC the mission team were informed that approximately 14 000 horses are now registered in Lithuania and 10 700 of these have passports (approximately 77%). The competent authority estimate that the registered horse population represents about 85% of the horse population in Lithuania. Consequently 65% of the equine population in Lithuania are estimated to have passports.

Order 3D-105 of 14 February 2012 of the Minister of Agriculture has amended Order 3D-234 and introduced the requirement for horses being issued with passports to be micro-chipped.

The audit team noted that:

- although horses are not permitted to be slaughtered for human consumption in the absence of a passport, passports are still being issued for horses born prior to 31 December 2009, some only a short time before slaughter.
- the CDB contains fields that can be used to indicate when restrictions are in place for animal health purposes as required by Council Regulation (EC) No. 21/2004 on the identification of small ruminants and Commission Decision 2000/678/EC on the identification of pigs. These fields were used to indicate the restrictions in place on the 2011 outbreak holdings.

5.5.1.2 Conclusions

Progress has been made with the identification and registration of horses in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No. 504/2008. However all unidentified horses born on or before 30 June 2009 were not identified and registered by 31 December 2009 at the latest, as required by Article 26 of that Regulation. In addition as horses could be issued with passports within a short time period prior to slaughter, the accuracy of treatment records, as required by Article 20 of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 504/2008, could not be verified in respect of medicines that are not permitted for use in horses intended for slaughter. Thus the actions in response to **recommendation 6** in FVO report 2009/8265 are still ongoing.

The competent authority has established procedures for the use of the animal health information that Council Regulation (EC) No. 21/2004 and Commission Decision 2000/678/EC require for each holding registered in the central database as a means to control the movement of animals in the event of major animal disease outbreaks, satisfactorily addressing **recommendation 7** in FVO report 2009/8265

5.5.2 Contingency Plans

Recommendation 8 of FVO report 2009/8265 stated that the competent authority should establish contingency plans for African Swine Fever (ASF) and African Horse Sickness (AHS) in accordance with the requirements of Article 21 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC and Article 17 of Council Directive 92/35/EEC.

Recommendation 9 of FVO report 2009/8265 stated that the competent authority should develop more detailed guidance and plans for activating contingency plans, killing animals, disposing of carcasses and for the cleaning and disinfection of holding, vehicles and equipment in the event of a major disease outbreak so as to ensure the prevention and rapid and efficient stamping out of possible outbreaks, as foreseen in Community legislation, including Article 62 of Council Directive 2005/94/EC, Article 21 of Council Directive 92/66/EEC, Article 72 of Council Directive 2003/85/EC, Article 22 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC and Article 18 of Council Directive 2000/75/EC.

5.5.2.1 Findings

A single contingency plan for CSF and ASF was last amended in December 2011 and is now in place. The December 2011 amendments reflect the lessons learned from the outbreaks of CSF that occurred in 2011. An AHS contingency plan is now in place and was last amended in November 2010.

The internal audit unit of the SFVS has carried out an audit of contingency plans in three territories in 2010 and three territories in 2011. In the 2010 audit ASF and AHS contingency plans had not been locally adopted in all three of the territories. The bluetongue contingency plan had been adopted in one of the territories visited by the SFVS auditors. In the 2011 internal audit, all territories audited had all required contingency plans in place but some of them had not been fully updated with contact information following the reorganisation of the SFVS in July 2011.

The competent authority stated that they were still in discussions with the environmental agencies to locate sites which could be used for the burial of large numbers of carcasses should the need arise in future outbreaks of epizootic disease.

The audit team noted that:

- updated local contingency plans for CSF and ASF were in place in the two territorial offices visited.
- the competent authority held a training session for staff from all territorial offices in December 2011. The course covered all aspects of dealing with the various epizootic diseases. The information from this training session was cascaded to staff and private veterinarians at territorial level. At the local territorial offices visited the agenda of the training sessions organised by the territorial SFVS as well as records confirming that private veterinarians had attended this training were presented to the audit team.

5.5.2.2 Conclusions

The competent authority has established contingency plans for African Swine Fever (ASF) and African Horse Sickness in accordance with the requirements of Article 21 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC and Article 17 of Council Directive 92/35/EEC thus satisfactorily addressing **recommendation 8** of FVO report 2009/8265

The competent authority has developed guidance in contingency plans, relating to killing animals, disposing of carcasses and for the cleaning and disinfection of holding, vehicles and equipment in the event of major disease outbreaks as required by community legislation and addressing most of the aspects of **recommendation 9** of FVO report 2009/8265. However, difficulties remain in

identifying sufficient outlets for the rapid and safe disposal of carcasses in the event of major epizootic disease outbreaks.

6 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

In respect of the 2011 CSF outbreaks: The competent authority took effective measures to eliminate CSF in line with the requirements of Council Directive No 2001/89/EC. However, there were delays in implementing diagnostic requirements and in treating the initial disease situation as a suspect CSF outbreak on the first infected holding. In addition the rate at which pigs could be killed on infected farms was limited by the capacity of the rendering plant to dispose of them. There were also delays in imposition of movement restrictions on the first outbreak and on enforcement of restrictions on movements in the surveillance zone. The delays in initially recognising the disease as suspect CSF and the delays in imposing movement restrictions could potentially have led to the spread of the disease. The NRL for CSF operated in accordance with the requirements of Council Directive No 2001/89/EC and Commission Decision 2002/106/EC.

In respect of follow up of audit FVO report 2009/8265 recommendations on contingency planning: The competent authority has largely addressed the recommendations of this report in that there are now satisfactory contingency plans in place for all the major epizootic diseases. However, work is still required to ensure that all horses are properly registered and identified and that horses entering the food chain are eligible to do so.

7 CLOSING MEETING

During the closing meeting held in Vilnius on 2 March 2012, the audit team presented the findings and preliminary conclusions of the audit to the competent authority. During this meeting, the competent authority did not indicate any major disagreement with the findings and preliminary conclusions.

8 RECOMMENDATIONS

The competent authority is requested to provide the Commission services with an action plan, including a timetable for its completion, within one month of receipt of the report in order to address the deficiencies identified in the report and in particular, the following:

N°.	Recommendation
1.	In order that any suspect CSF outbreak is quickly reported and dealt with in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of 2001/89/EC, the competent authority should take action to ensure that farmers, private and official veterinarians are aware of the possibility of CSF when investigating production problems on pig farms.
2.	In order that the presence of CSF can be quickly detected in veterinary post-mortem facilities and reported as a suspect as required by Article 3 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC the competent authority should put in place procedures to ensure that such facilities send appropriate samples, without delay, to the CSF NRL when CSF cannot be eliminated as a differential diagnosis at post-mortem.

N°.	Recommendation
3.	The competent authority should put in place a system to ensure, that as soon as the possibility of a holding being a suspect CSF outbreak is considered, restrictions on the movements of pigs, humans and materials, to and from the holding, are put in place in accordance with the requirements of Article 4.2 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC.
4.	Immediately after establishing the protection and surveillance zones as required by Article 9 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC, the competent authority must enforce the restrictions on movements set out in Articles 10 and 11 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC.
5.	Where the epidemiological enquiry of an outbreak in accordance with Article 8 of Directive 2001/89/EC indicates movements of potentially infected pigs or pig meat, from a holding that subsequently becomes an outbreak premises, to other holdings, the competent authority must ensure that all such holdings are investigated in accordance with Article 4.1 of Directive 2001/89/EC.
6.	The competent authority should take action to ensure that the process of issue of passports to registered horses is completed. To comply with Article 20 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 504/2008 the practice of issuing passports shortly before horses are slaughtered for human consumption should cease as such horses cannot be considered to have a comprehensive treatment record ensuring that they have not been treated with medicines that exclude them from the food chain.

The competent authority's response to the recommendations can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/rep_details_en.cfm?rep_inspection_ref=2012-6386

ANNEX 1 - LEGAL REFERENCES

Legal Reference	Official Journal	Title
Dir. 2001/89/EC	OJ L 316, 1.12.2001, p. 5-35	Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever
Dec. 2000/678/EC	OJ L 281, 7.11.2000, p. 16-17	2000/678/EC: Commission Decision of 23 October 2000 laying down detailed rules for registration of holdings in national databases for porcine animals as foreseen by Council Directive 64/432/EEC
Dec. 2002/106/EC	OJ L 39, 9.2.2002, p. 71-88	2002/106/EC: Commission Decision of 1 February 2002 approving a Diagnostic Manual establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for evaluation of the laboratory tests for the confirmation of classical swine fever
Dir. 2008/71/EC	OJ L 213, 8.8.2008, p. 31-36	Council Directive 2008/71/EC of 15 July 2008 on the identification and registration of pigs (Codified version)
Dec. 2007/19/EC	OJ L 7, 12.1.2007, p. 38-40	2007/19/EC: Commission Decision of 22 December 2006 approving contingency plans for the control of classical swine fever pursuant to Council Directive 2001/89/EC
Reg. 504/2008	OJ L 149, 7.6.2008, p. 3-32	Commission Regulation (EC) No 504/2008 of 6 June 2008 implementing Council Directives 90/426/EEC and 90/427/EEC as regards methods for the identification of equidae
Dir. 64/432/EEC	OJ 121, 29.7.1964, p. 1977-2012	Council Directive 64/432/EEC of 26 June 1964 on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine
Reg. 21/2004	OJ L 5, 9.1.2004, p. 8-17	Council Regulation (EC) No 21/2004 of 17 December 2003 establishing a system for the identification and registration of ovine and caprine animals and amending Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 and Directives 92/102/EEC and 64/432/EEC

Legal Reference	Official Journal	Title
Dir. 2002/60/EC	OJ L 192, 20.7.2002, p. 27-46	Council Directive 2002/60/EC of 27 June 2002 laying down specific provisions for the control of African swine fever and amending Directive 92/119/EEC as regards Teschen disease and African swine fever
Dir. 92/35/EEC	OJ L 157, 10.6.1992, p. 19-27	Council Directive 92/35/EEC of 29 April 1992 laying down control rules and measures to combat African horse sickness