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FINAL REPORT OF A MISSION

CARRIED OUT IN

HUNGARY

FROM 19 TO 23 JULY 2010

IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE ANIMAL HEALTH CONTROLS IN PLACE IN RELATION
TO CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER

In response to information provided by the Competent Authority, any factual error noted in the draft report has been corrected; any clarification appears in the form of a footnote.

Executive Summary

The present report concerns the outcome of a mission on classical swine fever (CSF) which the Food and Veterinary Office carried out in Hungary to follow up on a CSF mission from 2008. The objective of the mission was to review and evaluate the measures taken by the Hungarian competent authority (CA) in relation to CSF. In particular, attention was paid to action taken by the CA to control CSF outbreaks in feral pigs.

Although progress has been made in the eradication of CSF in wild boars, a certain level of uncertainty remains as to the likelihood of virus circulation within the wild boar population in Hungary. That cannot be definitively excluded at this stage due to the relevance of some epidemiological indicators, such as serological positiveness in a few young animals of ages far beyond the expected threshold of maternal immunity, whose origin cannot be unequivocally ascertained. A reasonable period of time, including at least the current hunting year, will be needed for both the adequate age-targeting of sero-surveillance in the young populations of wild boars and the ongoing virological investigation efforts, to produce the robust epidemiological data that should allow the CA to further elucidate whether the CSF virus is circulating or not in the wild boar population in Hungary.

Should an outbreak occur in domestic pigs, the data available would not allow all holdings and animals within the infected zone to be identified quickly. The fact that movement of animals is sometimes not documented and tracing of contact animals may be difficult if not impossible would hamper the application of control measures.

The report includes recommendations to the CAs addressing areas in which further improvements are required.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

Abbreviation	Explanation
CA	Competent Authority
CAO	Central Agricultural Office
CCA	Central Competent Authority
CSF	classical swine fever
DAHAW	Directorate for Animal Health and Animal Welfare
FVO	Food and Veterinary Office
HUF	Hungarian Forint
LVO	Local Veterinary Office
NRL	National Reference Laboratory
OV	Official Veterinarian
RVO	Regional Veterinary Office

1 INTRODUCTION

This mission was undertaken as part of the FVO's planned mission programme and took place in Hungary from 19 to 23 July 2010. The mission team comprised two inspectors from the FVO and a national expert. The mission was undertaken as a follow up to the audit on CSF in 2008 (SANCO 2008/7798) which may be found at

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ir_search_en.cfm.

2 OBJECTIVES OF THE MISSION

The objective of the mission was to review and evaluate the measures taken by the Hungarian competent authority (CA) in relation to CSF. In particular, attention was paid to action taken by the CA to control CSF outbreaks in feral pigs, measures taken to prevent its spread outside the infected area and contingency planning for CSF.

The following sites were visited:

Competent Authority (CA)	Central Competent Authority (CCA)	2
	Regional veterinary Office (RVO)	2
	Local veterinary Office (LVO)	1
Laboratory	National Reference Laboratory for CSF (NRL)	1
Pig holding		3 small holdings
Wild game collection centre		2
Slaughterhouse		1

3 LEGAL BASIS FOR THE MISSION

The mission was carried out under the general provisions of Community legislation and in particular Article 45 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules.

Full legal references are provided in the annex. Legal acts quoted in this report refer, where applicable, to the last amended version.

4 BACKGROUND

Due to the recent changes in the Hungarian government, an organigramme was not available during the mission. An overview of how control systems are organised in Hungary, based on information supplied by Hungary, is provided in the country profile for Hungary and is available under

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/index_en.cfm

Commission Decision 2008/855/EC of 3 November 2008 concerning animal health control measures relating to CSF in certain Member States includes "The territory of the county of Nógrád and the territory of the county of Pest located north and east of the Danube, south of the border with

Slovakia, west of the border with the county of Nógrád and north of the motorway E71, the territory of the county of Heves located east of the border of the county of Nógrád, south and west of the border with the county of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and north of the motorway E71, and the territory of the county of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén located south of the border with Slovakia, east of the border with the county of Heves, north and west of the motorway E71, south of the main road No 37 (the part between the motorway E71 and the main road No 26) and west of the main road No 26".

In Nógrád County, the last CSF case was confirmed on 23 February 2009 by the National Reference Laboratory (NRL). In Pest County, the last case was confirmed on 30 October 2009. Until March 2010, 268 cases were found in wild boars: Nógrád County: 120 cases (22 Jan 2007 – 23 Feb 2009), Pest county: 148 cases (10 Dec 2007 – 30 Oct 2009). The number of CSF cases significantly decreased in 2009 in comparison with 2008. During the first three months of 2010 almost 1400 wild boars were tested in Pest County without any virus being found.

5 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Detailed descriptions of legal powers and official controls on CSF are in the previous report (SANCO 2008/7798) and are unchanged.

5.1 RESPONSE TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE 2008 AUDIT

5.1.1 Recommendation 1

The Competent Authority of Hungary is recommended to define the size of the target wild boar population to be sampled in order to establish the number of samples to be taken as laid down by Point H (1) of Chapter IV of the Annex to Commission Decision 2002/106/EC.

CA response

The veterinary authority and the hunting authority undertook to review the estimated size of the feral pig population within the CSF infected area. The target population size serves as a basis for sample collection; it is calculated from the estimated number of sows and boars and adding 50 % as for their progenies. The Diagnostic Manual determines the size of each sample collection area. The minimum sample number, which was determined on the basis of the estimated size of the feral pig population in the particular sampling area, is calculated so as to detect a 5 % prevalence of the CSF virus with 95 % confidence (in accordance with point H of Chapter V of the Diagnostic Manual). The aim of the sample distribution is to take 50 % of all samples from pigs aged under 1 year. A clotted blood sample must be taken for serological testing, if possible from the heart, otherwise from the thoracic cavity. For the virological test, a tonsil or, if this cannot be provided, a sample from another lymphoid organ (spleen, lymphatic gland) must be sent to the laboratory. In case the number of feral pigs shot for commercial purposes does not reach the pre-determined sample number, the rest shall be shot with state compensation. The deadline for the determination of the sample number was 31 May 2009.

Findings

The cooperation between the CAs responsible for animal health and the hunters' associations is good. A high number of wild boar has been shot during the last hunting year (the hunting year starts on 1 March) to thin out the population and thus reduce the transmission of CSF.

The age group of the wild boar is categorised differently in different regions which makes a comparison between them difficult. According to the CA, in Nógrád county (one of the non-CSF

free counties) the use of three age groups was introduced since the first case in January 2007, but in other (CSF free) counties two age groups are used in the frame of the monitoring programme. According to the opinion of the CSF National Expert Group the collection of more detailed data would be better, but in that phase of the epidemic when a lot of CSF cases were found in wild boar the national experts thought that using two age groups would be enough as background of decisions. During decision-making the Expert Group had taken into account that it was more feasible to continue using two age groups in the newly declared infected areas, since it did not cause additional administrative problems. Nevertheless, there was no reason to change the former good practice in Nógrád county, because it is possible to create one age group from the animals aged between one and two years, and the ones over two years of age. Consequently, this is the only county where information on this age group can be nowadays accurately ascertained; moreover, the CA acknowledge that the use of three age groups provides more relevant information in the current epidemiological situation and from this reason it is planned to be introduced nationwide.

The mission team advised the CA of the fact that in order to draw conclusions on virus circulation, it is crucial to have information on the animals born after the last virus isolation was confirmed. In the case of Hungary, this would involve getting as much information as possible during the previous and the current hunting year on the age groups beyond the threshold of maternal immunity and, if possible, broken down in groups of animals below one year of age, between one and two years of age, and older than that.

According to the CA, the goal of achieving 50% of the sample size from the young animals under one year refers to the previously determined compulsory minimum sample size and not to 50% of all shot and tested wild boars. In reality, the aim regarding sample distribution is to take about 20-25% of samples of all shot wild boars from the young ones under one year, which has been consistently achieved in all counties under surveillance. The CA provided data proving that and indicating that the proportion of young wild boars under one year was above the goal (50% of the minimum sample size) in the 2009/2010 hunting year (starting in March 2009) and it is so far following the same trend in the current hunting year (started in March 2010). Results of the surveillance carried out during these two hunting years show:

- Of the test results available, no animals were virus positive. According to the CA, a very high number of wild boars are tested virologically with negative results; this would represent a very high percentage of the estimated wild boar population and would allow for detection of a very low prevalence of virologically positive animals;
- There were still a number of seropositive animals found, of which several were young animals, including some between one and two years of age (with the limitations above mentioned on the number of age groups in most counties); nevertheless, the level of seropositivity has gradually decreased over the two last hunting years.

Conclusions

Some information gaps still make difficult the analysis in depth of the current situation of CSF in the population of wild boars in Hungary. Even if the likelihood appears to be low, available data and some epidemiological indicators, such as serological positive in a few young animals of ages far beyond the expected threshold of maternal immunity, whose origin cannot be unequivocally ascertained, suggest that virus circulation can not be yet definitively excluded.

5.1.2 Recommendation 2

The Competent Authority of Hungary is recommended to ensure that the eradication plan contains information on the method of removal of feral pigs found dead or shot, which shall be based on processing under official supervision set out in Point 3 (k) of Article 16 of Council Directive

2001/89/EC and that the traceability of the wild boar carcasses is guaranteed at all stages of production, processing and distribution as required by Point 1 of Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002.

CA response

Compulsory complementary modifications in the eradication plan will be implemented. Compulsory registration will be introduced for all game collection centres. The following data will be recorded: game identification number: place and time of killing, name of the hunter, name of the hunting association/organisation, laboratory test results for CSF, reason for seizure (if happened), destination of transport, time of transport, transport ticket number (if transported to game processing company), stamp and signature of state official veterinarian.

Findings

Data on the game collection centres, their size and distribution were available to the mission team; however, representatives of the CA acknowledged that these data had not been updated since May 2009. At a game collection centre visited by the team, it was found that all relevant data on wild boar killed had been recorded and could be used for an evaluation.

At the other game collection centre visited, offal and carcasses being disposed of to a rendering plant had not been categorised. The CA stated that the material was understood by all involved in the operations to be category I. During the final meeting the CCA informed the team that corrective action had been taken.

Conclusions

The CA have satisfactorily addressed the recommendation of the previous report and available data collected by the hunters' associations through game collection centres would enable the CA to further analyse the CSF situation in the wild boar population.

5.1.3 Recommendation 3

The Competent Authority of Hungary is recommended to strengthen the efforts to CSF test all wild boars found dead as set out in the CSF-EP in accordance with Point 2 (c) of Article 15 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC.

CA response

All feral pigs found dead within the infected area must be taken to a certain place appointed by the competent County Food Chain Safety and Animal Health Directorate of the Agricultural Office. The virological tests of these corpses are compulsory. For each corpse found and taken to the Veterinary Authority, a special reward of 5000 HUF is given to the licensed hunting associations from the fund of epidemic affairs managed by the Food Chain Safety Deputy President of the Central Agricultural Office. The deadline for the organization was 30 June 2009.

Findings

No statistics on the number of wild boar found dead or information on samples of them being tested were available during the mission¹.

Measures introduced concerning the reward of 5 000 HUF had not been implemented at the time of the mission, 1 year after the promised deadline. According to representatives of the CA, they had taken all necessary measures to introduce the reward in question, but later the Government had to introduce restrictive economic arrangements. For that reason funding for this reward had been

¹ *In their comments to the draft report the CA provided up-to-date data on the number of dead wild boars sampled and virologically tested broken down by County. These data indicate that numbers of animals tested were still low, but all tested negative.*

blocked.

Conclusions

With very limited information available from the number of wild boars found dead that are tested, an important category of animals to determine the absence or presence of CSF virus in the area cannot be taken into account.

5.1.4 Recommendation 4

The Competent Authority of Hungary is recommended to ensure compliance with the Community requirements as set out by Point 1 (a) of Article 3 of Council Directive 2008/71/EC (requiring the CA to have an up-to-date list of all the holdings which keep pigs), Point 1 of Article 4 (requiring any keeper to keep a register stating the number of animals present on the holding including an up-to-date record of movements) and Point 2 of Article 5 of Council Directive 2008/71/EC (requiring pigs to be marked as soon as possible and in any case before they leave the holding, with an eartag or tattoo, making it possible to determine the holding from which they came).

CA response

The central database will be amended in order to be able to show the active pig keepers only when requested. Therefore, all pig keepers will receive written information (personally or via mayor's offices) about their notification and registration obligations. Beyond all these measures, official control of 1 % of pig keepers will be carried out annually based on risk assessment. The deadline for database supervision and for official control was 31 December 2009.

Findings

Upon several checks carried out by the mission team, the national database was found to have data that do not correspond to reality. Representatives of the CA acknowledged that a major data cleaning was needed in relation to the central database for registration of pig holdings. They added that some of the reasons for the discrepancies found would be:

- concerning the updating of the list of holdings, Council Directive 2008/71/EC lays down that the holdings must remain on that list until three consecutive years have elapsed with no animals on the holding, which makes it more difficult to keep the list of holdings accurately up to date;
- examples where discrepancies were found involving big differences between the number of holdings actually in operation in one municipality and the number currently registered in the database (much higher) were due to the fact that the latter includes all places where pigs are kept and not only 'holdings'. The list presented to the mission team contained all the geographic locations of the village where pigs had been kept since the introduction of the identification and registration system for pigs and, according to current national rules, places where pigs are kept have never been deleted from the database unlike to holdings.

Few official veterinarians (OVs) have access to the national database, so the local offices make their own statistics to fall back upon in case of CSF outbreaks. The CCA confirmed that they would also rely upon these statistics as the database is not operational ².

Concerning performance of the extra 1% controls of pig holdings that had been undertaken to be performed on a risk basis, according to the CA, firstly the selection of holdings for cross-

² *In their comments to the draft report the CA stated that, in general, the district offices have access to the national database, the visited one was an exception. They added that the mission team misinterpreted the statement made by the CA regarding the use of the central database in case of a CSF outbreak and that, indeed, it is a fact that the database will never be so up-to-date that only this could be the basis of the measures to be taken in case of a CSF outbreak.*

compliance checks is based on a risk assessment, even if not necessarily taking into account animal health risks. Since this applies to all holdings that are eligible for EU funding, small scale holdings are not excluded. Furthermore, in the frame of the multi-annual control plan, small scale holdings are also inspected based on risk assessment if they are part of the food chain. Lastly, according to the multi-annual control plan, 70 additional establishments which are not part of the food chain (including small scale holdings) have to be controlled in each County.

The mission team found that a back yard holding visited contained pigs that had been purchased through a market. These pigs had not been identified although they had been moved there from another holding. The OV responsible for official controls of the holding 4 times a year had not noticed the missing identifications. When the team brought the issue to the attention of the CA, both the representatives of the RVO and the LVO stated that Hungarian legislation does not require the keeping of a holding register, treatment records or movement records if the holding is non-commercial and has fewer than 100 pigs³.

In a different holding visited, the back yard farmer had sold animals to be slaughtered within the village that had been accompanied with an animal health certificate; however, the CA acknowledge that, as normal practice, these movements are not recorded into the national database because pigs are usually slaughtered immediately for own consumption in another backyard within the same village. If the destination backyards were registered as part of the list of holdings in the database, then the system should keep them for three more years, despite the fact that live pigs are usually only for a few hours at those yards.

Conclusions

Weaknesses identified in relation to the accuracy and updating of the national database could cause important delays and information gaps when forward and backward movement traceability of animals is needed within a short period of time and, consequently, complications are likely to arise if local information has to be gathered in case of a CSF outbreak.

Little additional information will be collected from the extra 1% controls as they were not targeted on an animal health risk basis as undertaken.

The neglect of the legislation on pig holdings by both regional and local offices shows that the system is not working correctly in at least one region.

5.1.5 Recommendation 5

The Competent Authority of Hungary is recommended to rigorously enforce and control Community requirements for cleaning and disinfection of animal transporters as laid down by Article 8 of Commission Decision 2006/805/EC and Part A, Point II, 4 (b) of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 and bio-security measures to be applied on pig holdings within in the infected area laid down by Point 2 (b) of Article 15 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC.

CA response

The official certification and registration of the cleaning and disinfection of transport vehicles will be regulated on national level In the CSF infected area, brochures will be distributed to pig keepers concerning their obligations, official controls and the importance of bio-security measures. These brochures will be distributed by the Veterinary Authority during the official control carried out according to the eradication plan. Furthermore, a circular letter will be sent concerning the detailed rules of cleaning and disinfection of transport vehicles. Loading of live animals can only be started

³ *In their comments to the draft report the CA stated that at the last CSF Expert Group meeting held in early September 2010, the CCA stressed that it can not be accepted that official veterinarians or district chief veterinary officers make statements contrary to legal requirements in force.*

after presentation of the certificate on disinfection of the vehicle by the person responsible for transportation (providing an official registry). The disinfection of the vehicle can only be carried out at a previously officially authorized or approved spot (e.g. on the territory of a slaughterhouse before leaving it, at an authorized vehicle disinfection station, or in other cases on the premises of the transport company). The registry must contain at least the following information: number of bill of delivery, species and number of the transported animals, time, place and method of the disinfection carried out following transport, name and signature of the person carrying out the disinfection, etc. The deadline for the circular letter was 30 June 2009.

Findings

The mission team met OVVs that were familiar with the requirements and where shown all necessary documents when visiting on the spot. Supervision of cleaning and disinfection is part of the OVVs checklist when visiting holdings or establishments.

Conclusions

Cleaning and disinfection are in accordance with the requirements of Council Directive 2001/89/EC on Community measures for the control of CSF.

5.1.6 Recommendation 6

The Competent Authority of Hungary is recommended to implement the CSF contingency plan correctly in accordance with Article 22 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC and conduct alarm drills regularly as required by Point (g) (ii) of Annex VII to Council Directive 2001/89/EC.

CA response

In Hungary, the last national CSF simulation training exercise was organised in December 2008. The simulation training exercises are compulsory and will be carried out in all counties by December 2010.

Findings

The outcome of the 2008 simulation training was reported as positive, and according to the CCA nothing had to be adapted or changed in the preparation for an outbreak.

Two of the 20 regions had performed the 2010 exercise at the time of the FVO inspection at the end of July, but results of the simulation exercises in these two regions were not available.

Conclusions

Weaknesses found during the current mission, in particular those related to animal identification and data on animal movements, should probably have been found during the simulation exercises already carried out. The fact that these obvious weaknesses in the event of an outbreak had not been identified, casts reasonable doubts on the adequate coverage of these areas during those exercises and on the effectiveness of the assessment of their outcome.

5.1.7 Recommendation 7

The Competent Authority of Hungary is recommended to urgently ensure that the regional laboratories which are carrying out the analysis of samples taken during official controls are accredited as required by Article 12 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 882/2004.

CA response

The accreditation procedure regarding CSF test has already been commenced in both regional divisions of the Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate of the Central Agricultural Office (in the laboratories located in Debrecen and Kaposvár) and was expected to be finished by 31 December

2009.

Findings

Documentation was seen showing that both Debrecen and Kaposvár have been accredited for the subject and the laboratory in Budapest has been re-accredited.

While checking results in the laboratory in Budapest, the FVO team found that the OIE Manual from 2004 was quoted as a basis for the testing and not its update from 2008; nevertheless, the quality management documents seen in the laboratories located in Kaposvár and Debrecen contain references to the OIE Manual from 2008. The CA added that updating of the one in Budapest has not been done due to financial reasons, but expect it will be done in 2010 if the financial situation of the Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate allows that.

Conclusions

The CA have addressed the recommendation contained in the previous report.

5.1.8 Recommendation 8

The Competent Authority of Hungary is recommended to provide the NRL for CSF with sufficient personal and financial resources in order to carry out all obligations laid down by Point 2 and 3 of Annex III to Council Directive 2001/89/EC as required by Point 2 (c) of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004.

CA response

Taking into consideration the size of the workload fallen on each laboratory in relation to the tests for CSF (sample numbers, test procedures etc.) and the present economical situation in Hungary, only those provisions can be applied which do not require greater financial input.

The daily routine capacity amounts to 200 samples for antigen detection and PCR, and 2000 samples for AB-ELISA. The virology department does the orientation of PCR samples. In addition, 40-50 virus isolations could be carried out if necessary. In general, staff carrying out CSF diagnosis are not dedicated to this task only but have many other duties. All ELISA tests are carried out manually. It was reported by the head of the NRL that a contingency plan exists that allows upgrading capacities at short notice. So far, no agreements exist with other laboratories to increase capacity in case of a contingency. Increasing the laboratory's staff would allow exclusive responsibility for CSF diagnostic work and monitoring by designated personnel. But this is prohibited by a freeze on hiring.

In accordance with Council Directive 2001/S9/EC, Annex III, serology ring trials were carried out for the regional CAO-DVD laboratories on a regular base. The routine frequency was once annually. No ring trials were performed in 2007 and so far in 2008. The report provided was of 2005 and showed that the performance of both laboratories was satisfactory. Regular performances of the ring trials require an increase of the number of people working in the laboratories.

It was explained that ELISA batch controls in accordance with Commission Decision 2002/106/EC. Chapter VII, paragraph B 6, could not be carried out due to shortage of staff. We need to have an increased number of staff for the validation of the ELISA tests. Under current circumstances we use inner negative and positive controls in our tests.

Checking sample handling, it was noted that traceability may not be completely ensured as only one tube per consignment receives the laboratory ID labelling. Samples were observed that did not carry any labelling at all. It was explained that arriving samples from wild boar should carry a unique number (applied by the hunter). There is no formal procedure in place to handle or reject unlabeled

samples. Quality and serviceability of incoming samples are always assessed but sample quality is only reported if inappropriate. We are in need of ID labelling for checking the samples, but due to lack of financial resources, this is not possible at this time .

In general, serum is not aliquoted but remains on the blood clot. It remains unclear whether a clean aliquot is kept till the final report is issued. Preparation and storage of duplicate samples would only be possible with an increase in staff and cooling capacity.

Findings

According to the CCA, the economic situation has not allowed for an improvement of the equipment of the laboratory. Moreover, the staff number has not been increased, but decreased by 10% since the last inspection in 2008.

Conclusions

In view of the reduction in the number of staff, it is questionable if a large number of samples could be processed without delay in the event of an outbreak.

5.2 ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

5.2.1 Legal requirements

Commission Decision 2008/855/EC of 3 November 2008 concerning animal health control measures relating to CSF in certain Member States includes areas in Hungary.

Commission Decision 2007/683/EC of 18 October 2007 approves the plan for the eradication of classical swine fever in feral pigs in certain areas of Hungary.

Council Directive 2008/71/EC of 15 July 2008 gives details on the identification and registration of pigs while Commission Decision 2000/678/EC lays down detailed rules for registration of holdings in national databases for porcine animals as foreseen by Council Directive 64/432/EEC.

Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever deals with both domestic and feral pigs.

Commission Decision 2002/677/EC of 22 August 2002 lays down standard reporting requirements for programmes of eradication and control of animal diseases co-financed by the Community and repealing Decision 2000/322/EC.

5.2.2 Findings

Although the CCA is responsible for the evaluation of the CSF situation and the planning of the eradication campaign, limited data were available at central level, in particular regarding:

- Wild boar mortality ⁴
- Division into age groups of the wild boar samples' test results ⁵
- Number of domestic pig holdings and number of pigs in the infected zone

4 *In their comments to the draft report the CA provided up-to-date data on the number of dead wild boars sampled and virologically tested broken down by County.*

5 *In their comments to the draft report the CA refer to their comments to the second paragraph of the findings in section 5.1.1 (see above) that provide additional clarification on the availability of data on the age groups of the wild boars shot and tested. In addition, the CA acknowledge that the use of three age groups provides more relevant information in the current epidemiological situation and for that reason this is planned to be introduced nationwide.*

- Pig movement data: Pigs arriving at a slaughterhouse may only have the identification of the fattening farm but not of their origin ⁶.
- Information on holding supervision
- Outcome of the extra 1% controls
- Outcome of the second round of controls in 2009 including clinical examination of pigs
- Identified illegal movement and other infringements ⁷

There are considerable discrepancies in the numbers reported to the Commission services and the numbers available in the country:

- Numbers of large pig holdings
- Numbers of domestic pigs
- Numbers of samples
- Numbers of test results

5.2.3 Conclusions

The CCA does not get sufficient reliable data and does not avail itself of all relevant data that is available locally; this could undermine their capability to effectively analyse the CSF situation in the wild boar population.

National arrangements in place that allow for pigs to leave their holding of birth without permanent means of identification, that would enable a reliable backward traceability, could undermine the setting up of a rapid and effective response in the event of a CSF outbreak.

Reports on numbers and data sent to the Commission services in relation to the CSF eradication programme lack accuracy and could hinder a proper epidemiological assessment of the progress made by the CA in that respect.

6 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Although progress has been made in the eradication of CSF in wild boars, a certain level of uncertainty remains as to the likelihood of virus circulation within the wild boar population in Hungary. That cannot be definitively excluded at this stage due to the relevance of some epidemiological indicators, such as serological positive in a few young animals of ages far beyond the expected threshold of maternal immunity, whose origin cannot be unequivocally ascertained. A reasonable period of time, including at least the current hunting year, will be needed for both the adequate age-targeting of sero-surveillance in the young populations of wild boars and the ongoing virological investigation efforts, to produce the robust epidemiological data that should allow the CA to further elucidate whether the CSF virus is circulating or not in the wild boar population in Hungary.

Should an outbreak occur in domestic pigs, the data available would not allow all holdings and

⁶ In their comments to the draft report the CA stated that in accordance with EU legislation, the system must enable the holding from which the animals came and the holding on which they were born to be identified. In the Hungarian system the holding in which the animals were born can be traced back using the register of the pig keepers provided they comply with national rules in that regard.

⁷ In their comments to the draft report the CA stated that the county veterinary authorities together with the police and the customs authority randomly stop and inspect vehicles carrying animals in the frame of in-depth controls. The county veterinary authorities regularly report the identified illegal movements and other infringements.

animals within the infected zone to be identified quickly. The fact that movement of animals is sometimes not documented and tracing of contact animals may be difficult if not impossible would hamper the application of control measures.

7 CLOSING MEETING

A closing meeting was held on 23 July 2010, at which the main findings and conclusions of the mission were presented to the competent authorities.

8 RECOMMENDATIONS

The Competent Authorities of Hungary are invited to present an action plan describing the action taken or planned in response to the recommendations of this report and setting out a timetable with a description of the actions taken to correct the deficiencies identified, within 25 working days of receipt of the report in Hungarian.

The Competent Authority of Hungary is recommended to:

N°.	Recommendation
1.	Urgently implement the outstanding action announced in response to the 2008 mission's recommendations.
2.	Ensure that all pigs are identified and registered according to Council Directive 2008/71/EC on the identification and registration of pigs.
3.	Ensure that all holding registers include: a) an up-to-date record of movements, stating as appropriate their origin or destination, and the date of such movements, in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 2008/71/EC, and b) information on the identification marks as laid down in Articles 5 and 8 of the said Directive.
4.	Base the eradication programme submitted to the relevant Commission services for financial support on accurate data in compliance with Commission Decision 2002/677/EC.

The competent authority's response to the recommendations can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ap/ap_hu_2010-8416.pdf

ANNEX 1 - LEGAL REFERENCES

Legal Reference	Official Journal	Title
Dir. 64/432/EEC	OJ 121, 29.7.1964, p. 1977-2012	Council Directive 64/432/EEC of 26 June 1964 on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine
Dir. 89/662/EEC	OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 13-22	Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 December 1989 concerning veterinary checks in intra-Community trade with a view to the completion of the internal market
Dir. 90/425/EEC	OJ L 224, 18.8.1990, p. 29-41	Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market
Dir. 92/102/EEC	OJ L 355, 5.12.1992, p. 32-36	Council Directive 92/102/EEC of 27 November 1992 on the identification and registration of animals
Dir. 96/93/EC	OJ L 13, 16.1.1997, p. 28-30	Council Directive 96/93/EC of 17 December 1996 on the certification of animals and animal products
Dir. 2001/89/EC	OJ L 316, 1.12.2001, p. 5-35	Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever
Dec. 2000/678/EC	OJ L 281, 7.11.2000, p. 16-17	2000/678/EC: Commission Decision of 23 October 2000 laying down detailed rules for registration of holdings in national databases for porcine animals as foreseen by Council Directive 64/432/EEC
Dec. 98/139/EC	OJ L 38, 12.2.1998, p. 10-13	98/139/EC: Commission Decision of 4 February 1998 laying down certain detailed rules concerning on-the-spot checks carried out in the veterinary field by Commission experts in the Member States
Dec. 2002/106/EC	OJ L 39, 9.2.2002, p. 71-88	2002/106/EC: Commission Decision of 1 February 2002 approving a Diagnostic Manual establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for evaluation of the laboratory tests for the

Legal Reference	Official Journal	Title
		confirmation of classical swine fever
Dec. 2006/805/EC	OJ L 329, 25.11.2006, p. 67-73	2006/805/EC: Commission Decision of 24 November 2006 concerning animal health control measures relating to classical swine fever in certain Member States
Dec. 2002/677/EC	OJ L 229, 27.8.2002, p. 24-32	2002/677/EC: Commission Decision of 22 August 2002 laying down standard reporting requirements for programmes of eradication and control of animal diseases co-financed by the Community and repealing Decision 2000/322/EC
Dec. 2007/683/EC	OJ L 281, 25.10.2007, p. 2-27	2007/683/EC: Commission Decision of 18 October 2007 approving the plan for the eradication of classical swine fever in feral pigs in certain areas of Hungary