In response to information provided by the competent authority, any factual error noted in the draft report has been corrected; any clarification appears in the form of a footnote.
Executive Summary

This report describes the outcome of an audit in Hungary carried out from 25 to 29 March 2019, as part of the published Directorate-General Health and Food Safety audit programme.

The objectives of the audit were to assess:

- the effectiveness of measures and actions taken to prevent African swine fever from spreading outside the infected area via fresh meat, meat preparations or meat products from domestic or feral pigs and animal by-products;
- the effectiveness of measures and actions taken to prevent the spread of infection in case of outbreaks in domestic pigs; and,
- the supervision and verification of the effectiveness of the measures and actions taken.

The audit also followed-up the implementation of the proposed actions in response to recommendations from Commission's audit report DG(SANTE)/2017-6115-MR. All recommendations have been satisfactorily addressed by the Hungarian authorities, except one for which the process of implementation has been initialised.

Overall, the report concludes that Hungary has developed and implemented stringent national legislation concerning animal health control measures relating to African swine fever. In the case of certain requirements, these go beyond those set out in Commission Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU. For example, they also apply the animal health requirements for feral pigs in Part II areas in Part I areas, they systematically dispose of all wild boars in Part II areas after sampling regardless of test results and they have defined a new "middle risk" area as a buffer zone surrounding Part I areas.

As regards movements of live pigs, the Hungarian authorities have decided to apply the stricter criteria and not avail of some of the available derogations. All pigs moving from holdings have to be accompanied in all cases by an official certification. For holdings located in Parts I and II areas, the authorities only allow movements of pigs if the animals fulfil residence and standstill periods, they have negative test results for African swine fever and an official veterinarian has performed a clinical examination.

Pig meat and its products from Parts I and II fulfil the necessary requirements to enable them to be placed on the internal market. The authorities restrict the marketing of meat and meat products derived from wild boar hunted in Part I areas to the national market (trade of wild boar meat from Part II is not permitted). There are procedures in place for channelling such products, but the Hungarian authorities are not using any special national health mark for this trade.

National efforts in preventing and controlling the disease are weakened by unreliable data on the number of registered farms, lack of national guidance for the consistent classification of small commercial and backyard pig holdings, lack of structured and harmonized checklists with clearly defined standards. The authorities carry out yearly comprehensive biosecurity inspections in large commercial holdings, but not at smaller commercial holdings, backyard farms and hunting grounds.
Finally, Hungary allows rearing pigs in holdings with outdoor access in Part I and II areas.

The report makes recommendations to the competent authorities aimed at addressing areas in which further improvements are required.
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### Abbreviations and Definitions Used in this Report

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABPs</td>
<td>Animal by-products</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Swine Fever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF strategy</td>
<td>African swine fever strategy for the EU, summarised in Document SANTE/7113/2015 Rev 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATEV</td>
<td>Enterprise for the production of animal-protein-based feeding stuff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENAR</td>
<td>Identification system for animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIR</td>
<td>Animal Breeding Information System</td>
</tr>
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</table>
1 INTRODUCTION

The audit took place in Hungary from 25 to 29 March 2019. The audit team comprised two auditors from the Commission services.

An opening meeting was held on 25 March with all relevant Hungarian competent authorities. At this meeting the objectives and itinerary for the audit were confirmed by the audit team and the control systems were described by the authorities.

The audit team was accompanied by representatives of the central competent authority throughout the audit.

2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

The objectives of the audit were to assess:

- the effectiveness of measures and actions taken to prevent African swine fever (ASF) from spreading outside the infected area via fresh meat, meat preparations or meat products from domestic or feral pigs and animal by-products (ABPs);
- the effectiveness of measures and actions taken to prevent the spread of infection in case of outbreaks in domestic pigs; and,
- the supervision and verification of the effectiveness of the measures and actions taken.

The audit also followed-up the implementation of the proposed actions in response to recommendations from the Commission's audit report DG(SANTE)/2017-6115-MR.

The scope of the audit included:

- the controls on movement of domestic pigs to slaughterhouses, and the controls on pig fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products from the production to the sale to the final consumer. The scope did not include controls on passengers' personal consignments;
- the controls on movement of feral pig carcasses, and the controls on their fresh meat, meat preparations, meat products and hunting trophies;
- the controls on ABPs of domestic and feral pigs;
- the measures and restrictions in case of outbreaks in domestic pigs; and,
- the actions proposed by the competent authority in response to recommendations of the previous audit (DG(SANTE)/2017-6115-MR).
In pursuit of these objectives, the following sites were visited:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visits / meetings</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central authority</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>opening and closing meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional/county authority</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunting ground</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 hunting grounds, including 1 game collection centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic pig holding</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 Commercial farm. 1 back-yard farm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig slaughterhouse, cutting plant, meat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>preparation/product establishment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game processing plant, cutting plant,</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meat preparation/product establishment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3 LEGAL BASIS

The audit was carried out under the general provisions of EU legislation and in particular:


The audit criteria were the legal references contained in Annex I and, where relevant to reach the objectives of the audit, the African swine fever strategy for the EU (SANTE/7113/2015 - Rev 10), the Hungarian Programme for the control and eradication of ASF (approved by Grant Decision Number SANTE/VP/2018/HU/SI2.774134) and the eradication plan for African swine fever in wild boar in Hungary approved by Commission Implementing Decision 2019/471/EU.

4 BACKGROUND

Since January 2014, ASF has spread to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The Commission has audited these affected Member States. More recently, the disease has been confirmed in the Czech Republic and Romania (2017) and Hungary, Bulgaria and Belgium (2018). In 2015, the Commission developed an ASF strategy\(^1\) for the affected Member States and for those with a higher risk of introduction of the disease. This strategy aims at preventing the further spread of the disease and eventually at eradication from the affected

territories. The strategy has been updated taking into account the latest opinions from the European Food Safety Authority.

The first case of ASF in Hungary was confirmed in April 2018. Up until 6th February 2019, a total of 415 cases in wild boar have been confirmed (320 found dead, 85 healthy animals shot, and 10 found with clinical signs). No cases have been confirmed in domestic pigs up until the time of this audit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2017-2018 (up to 1st March 2018)</th>
<th>2018-2019*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wild boar cases</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic pig outbreaks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* cases until 06/02/2019

Commission Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU defines the infected areas in Hungary in which measures foreseen by EU legislation apply. For the purposes of ASF control, Hungary is divided into two areas:

- Part I - Area adjacent to the infection in the feral pig population (blue).
- Part II - Area with infection in the feral pig population (pink).

The regionalisation for ASF, as of 12 March 2019, can be seen on the following map:
5 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 TRACEABILITY AND TRADE RESTRICTIONS

5.1.1 Control of movement of pigs (to slaughterhouses/other holdings/areas listed in Part II and III of the Annex of another Member States)

Legal requirements


Findings

1. The identification system for animals (ENAR) and the holding registration system (TIR) are part of the central database of the Hungarian services. They act as the central database for holding registration, animal identification and movements. All movements of pigs should be included in the database, and there is a requirement for them to be reported within 7 days of taking place.

2. The authorities have started the process of upgrading and consolidating both sets of databases into a new one, which they hope will be fully operational by 2021. They have decided to incorporate into the new system all necessary upgrades, such as the geographic co-ordinates of all registered pig holdings and a field to record the sanitary information.

3. At the time of the audit, there were 1,036 large scale commercial holdings, 9,338 small scale commercial holdings, and 19,116 backyards holdings, averaging 2,527 pigs, 10 pigs, and 4 pigs per holding respectively. This is an overall decrease compared with holdings present in Hungary in 2017 (904 large commercial, 6,752 small commercial and 30,323 back-yard).

4. The competent authority has started to use the categorisation system for pig holdings as described in the ASF strategy, differentiating backyard holdings from small commercial holdings. The categorisation has been recently implemented, but, according to the central competent authority, will be carried out every year by the 31st of March. The audit team saw differences in the understanding between counties as how to categorise such holdings. This resulted in holdings with breeding sows being categorised as being small commercial holdings in certain counties or as backyard holdings in others.

5. To ensure that all holdings comply with registration requirements, the central competent authority had requested a new census survey, in order to remove registered holdings where no pigs have been kept for the previous three years and to register all new pig holdings or holdings that were previously unregistered. The Ministry of Agriculture is implementing a number of supporting actions to further improve the effectiveness and impact of this latest census (e.g. no fees for registering holdings, information campaigns, and enhanced cooperation with municipalities).
6. At one county visited, the latest census had incorporated around 300 new holdings and removed around 200 due to lack of activity. At another county visited, the new census did not bring important changes, as few holdings had been added or removed from the register. The audit team noted that counties did not perform a proactive and systematic search of un-registered holdings.

7. All herd owners have to keep a holding register. This must include the number of animals present on the holding and an up-to-date record of movements.

8. All farm movements to other farms or to slaughterhouses are recorded within the ENAR database and such consignments need an animal health certificate which is issued by the private veterinarian. This requirement applies to all pig movements in the country irrespective of the ASF status of the area. In the infected zone, this certificate is countersigned by an official veterinarian who must be present at the time of dispatch. The certificate, in the case of movements in Part I and Part II, confirms inter alia that, the pigs are clinically healthy, the laboratory results for ASF sampling are all negative, the residency and standstill periods have been met, pigs are eligible for transport and that there are no restrictions related to any infectious diseases. In short, that the requirements of Article 3, paragraph 1, and 2 of Decision 2014/709/EU were complied with. The audit team verified that such requirements were abided to in the documentation analysed.

9. Hungary signed an agreement with the Romanian authorities on 17th January 2019 enabling the movements of pigs from Part II areas in Hungary to Part II and III areas in Romania. Since the agreement was signed, only two such consignments have taken place. The audit team verified the documentation leading to the agreement, the compulsory notification to the Commission services and the information provided to the county offices to enable them to perform the certification procedure with all the appropriate supporting documentation.

10. The competent authority confirmed that all pigs slaughtered in Hungary are marked with an oval health-mark. This means that all the pigs originating in Hungary and moving to slaughter must meet the requirements of Article 3 or Article 3b of Decision 2014/709/EU. In the case of Hungary, the central competent authority decided that all pig movements need to fulfil the more stringent requirements of Article 3, paragraph 1 and 2 (see finding No. 8), and decided not to transpose into national legislation the further flexibilities and derogations provided for in Article 3, paragraph 3, or Article 3b.

11. Decree No. 41/1997 of the Minister of Agriculture on issuing the Animal Health Code gives details regarding the biosecurity measures that animal holdings have to implement. The requirements are stricter for large commercial holdings (> 100 pigs) and cover which facilities have to be available and the compulsory preparation of a biosecurity plan.

12. In the case of small commercial and backyard holdings, the authorities developed a specific guidance to inform pig keepers on the basic biosecurity requirements that need
to be implemented, at least in part I and II areas. The audit team confirmed that national requirements do not stipulate the need to keep pigs indoors. In the official inspection reports it was considered satisfactory when pigs had access to an outdoor yard, as long as this area was fenced.

13. The authorities allow commercial pig holdings with outdoor access (free range pig production) across the territory of Hungary. The audit team verified that such holdings were also located in Part I and II areas, and consisted mainly (although not exclusively) of holdings rearing the national "Mangalica" breed. The authorities took a number of measures to mitigate the increased risk, e.g. they require all such holdings to fulfil the biosecurity criteria expected in large pig holdings, irrespective of their size, double fencing throughout the perimeter and yearly official inspections.

14. Law number LV of 1996 defines how wild boars may be kept in fenced areas as farmed animals for food production. Decree 79/2004 of the Ministry of Agriculture laid down the requirements for keeping wild boar as farmed game. These game farms need to be specifically authorised and fulfil the following criteria: appropriate facilities for the breeding of animals, feed storage and drinking water supply and a designated area for quarantine. Double fencing throughout the perimeter of the game farm is compulsory in areas of Part I, II and in the designated "medium risk area" (which surrounds Part I areas and remaining parts of the border with Romania), and in the rest of the country which is considered a low risk area, it should be considered. Farmed game animals also need to be identified in accordance with the animal identification rules and the holding has to be registered in the TIR. In short, the requirements are similar to those expected at outdoor pig holdings.

15. According to national legislation, farmers have to mark pigs with an ear tag at the latest when they leave the holding where they were born. When pigs are moving directly from a farm to a slaughterhouse located in Hungary, holdings may be authorised to identify the pigs with a slap tattoo when they leave the farm. Identification of breeding pigs with a microchip is compulsory.

5.1.2 Control of fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products from domestic pig

Legal requirements


Findings

16. Farms in a Part I and II areas can only send pigs to slaughter if the conditions set in Article 3, paragraph 1 and 2 of Decision 2014/709/EU are met (see finding No. 8 and No. 10). Therefore, there are no restrictions to dispatch fresh pig meat, pig meat preparations and pig meat to another Member State.
17. The audit team visited one approved slaughterhouse in a Part II area with a cutting and further processing facilities. It received pigs from Part II. The official veterinarian at the establishment systematically checked the documentation accompanying the consignments of pigs, and their individual identification.

18. Decision 03/2018 of the Chief Veterinary Officer introduced the requirement to notify home slaughter of pigs in Part I and II areas to the official district office at least 48 hours in advance.

19. The district office decides, based on an epidemiological risk assessment (e.g. the distance to identified ASF cases) and on the availability of veterinary staff, whether they will perform an ante-mortem and/or post-mortem inspection. The audit team saw evidence (records) that between 50% and 80% of notified home slaughtering had ante- and/or post-mortem inspections. In one county, they used a comprehensive checklist for the ante- and post-mortem inspection which was combined with checks on biosecurity.

5.1.3 Control of carcases, fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products from feral pigs

Legal requirements


Findings

20. The competent authority has implemented national requirements for meat and meat products that are more stringent than those in EU legislation. For example, all wild boars within part II areas have to be sampled and immediately disposed of, regardless of ASF results. In Part I areas, all wild boars are also sampled for ASF, and carcasses can only enter into the food chain once a negative result is received and only when the original purpose for shooting the wild boar was hunting. Carcasses of animals shot for culling and diagnostic purposes have to be treated as in Part II areas.

21. The authorities highly encourage active searches for dead wild boars in Parts I, II and at in the designated "medium risk area" (which surrounds Part I areas and remaining parts of the border with Romania). There are significant financial incentives (e.g. 3 euro/hour paid for participants in active searches for carcasses, 50 euro for the management of sampling and 75 euro for the disposal of carcasses) for such searches. Active search for carcasses of dead wild boar is carried out in medium risk areas and higher risk zones.

22. Decision 03/2018 of the Chief Veterinary Officer set a procedure to ensure that only hunters that have been specifically trained on biosecurity requirements and have passed an examination can shoot wild boars within Part I and II areas. The trainings are organised by the veterinary authority, and the hunting authority takes part in controlling this requirement. It is also important to highlight the role of the official hunter within the
hunting ground: he/she has to accompany and manage the shooting of any game species within the hunting grounds in Part I and II areas, supervise any visiting hunters and, in the majority of cases, perform ASF sampling, dressing, disinfection, transport, identification and control over carcasses until negative results are received.

23. The number of wild boar tested for ASF surveillance were as follows:

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passive Surveillance</td>
<td>Tested</td>
<td>Confirmation</td>
<td>Tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Surveillance</td>
<td>8949</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Testing has mainly increased in Part I and II areas and in the "middle risk" area.

24. A unique serial identifier that is attached to the carcass and that is linked to the hunting log book and the official ASF sampling form ensure the traceability of the carcass and its samples. The ASF sampling form also includes the address and geographical coordinates, type of sample and the purpose of the shooting.

25. At the hunting grounds visited, the audit team saw satisfactory evidence of the traceability of ASF samples and laboratory results. The turnaround times were between 4-5 days between sampling and reception of test results. The authorities only released wild boar carcasses into the food chain once they had received test results negative to ASF.

26. Official veterinarians detain wild boar carcasses pending test results at designated chillers within the hunting grounds, or at chillers shared by a number of hunting grounds or at registered wild game collection centres.

27. All wild boar carcasses and fresh meat arriving from Part I areas are restricted to the national territory. The game handling establishment visited by the audit team had a channelling system in place, ensuring that wild boar carcasses from Part I area were processed at different times than those coming from unrestricted areas. They only accepted such carcasses into the establishment after an approved veterinarian had verified the negative test results to ASF.

28. The audit team saw evidence of how these products were limited to the national market via additional labelling and their labelling was solely in Hungarian. Such products bore an oval health-mark. This is not in line with Article 16 of Decision 2014/709/EU.

29. The authorities estimate the wild boar population in Hungary to be around 105,000. The hunting bag is calculated based on those figures. Hunters can shoot wild boar

² Data on active and passive surveillance until 31/12/2018 hence the difference on overall numbers of positive cases against previously provided figures.
throughout the whole year. Within Part I and II areas wild boar shooting has been increased for culling purposes, specifically targeting sows and young wild boars with less than a year of age.

5.1.4 Control of ABPs of domestic and feral pigs

Legal requirements

Articles 2 and 7 of Commission implementing Decision 2014/709/EU.

Findings

30. The competent authority has established and funds a national network for the collection and rendering of ABPs via a single publicly owned company (ATEV), which covers ABPs produced at slaughterhouses, hunting grounds and pig holdings within Part I and Part II areas. Disposal of ABPs at hunting grounds can also take place via the burial of carcasses and offal. At the time of the audit, around 50% of all ABPs from hunting grounds were buried on site, whilst the remaining 50% was managed by ATEV.

31. The audit team reviewed several files of ASF tested wild boar carcasses and controls over their disposal. There was ample evidence that all carcasses (diagnostic shooting, culling, positive results, and found dead) within Part I and II area were systematically disposed of. In the case of disposal via ATEV, there was a procedure to provide containers for category 1 ABP and to contact the company for prompt collection. All ABPs commercial documents reviewed were satisfactorily linked to the expected weights, the number of carcasses and the unique official identifier applied to the carcasses immediately after shooting, as recorded in the hunting log and the ASF laboratory sampling form.

32. Official inspections at hunting grounds also cover the appropriate disposal of ABPs when this is done via onsite burial. It covers condition of disposal, avoidance of cross-contamination and traceability checks.

33. At the time of the audit, Hungary had no areas listed in Part III of Annex to Decision 2014/709/EU. Consequently, there was no prohibition to dispatch consignments of ABPs from porcine animals. The authorities confirmed that no unprocessed ABPs leave the national territory, in line with Article 10 of Decision 2014/709/EU.

Conclusions on traceability and trade restrictions

34. The stringent procedures in place on pig holdings, hunting grounds, pig movements and products derived from feral and domestic pigs, ensure the traceability of samples, meat and ABPs.

35. There are official controls at pig holdings and they are effective. However, there are a significant number of un-registered backyard holdings and as demonstrated by the last ongoing census, counties do not apply a consistent classification of pig holdings and
there is outdoor access for pigs at small commercial and backyard holdings. This hinders the possibility to trace those animals, the likelihood to detect the disease at an early stage, and increases the risk of the infection entering into the herds.

36. There are good official controls over the movements of pigs between registered holdings and to the slaughterhouse within Part I and II areas, and to Part II and III areas of other MS. This should reduce the risk of spreading ASF through such movements.

37. The authorities are aware of pig home slaughter within Part I and II areas. The fact that not all home slaughter is officially inspected reduces the possibilities for the authorities to detect new cases of ASF in the most risky holdings.

38. The authorities have implemented an extensive and stringent system that is capable of sampling and testing all shot and found dead wild boar for ASF. This gives confidence that they will be likely to promptly detect future cases.

39. The traceability system used for wild boar carcasses ensures that the meat that is intended to be confined to the national market is separated from meat intended for intra-community trade. However, the use of the same oval mark for both categories of meat makes it impossible for the authorities and consumers to distinguish them once they are on the market.

40. The authorities are minimising and managing effectively the risk of the disease spreading through movements of ABPs of domestic and feral pigs.

5.2 MEASURES IN CASE OF SUSPICION/CONFIRMATION OF ASF IN DOMESTIC PIGS

Legal requirements

Articles 4-5 and 8-11 of Directive 2002/60/EC; Decision 2003/422/EC.

Findings

41. The Hungarian ministerial decree 98/2003 defines the actions to be taken in a case of suspicion of ASF in domestic pigs. These include an animal movement ban, official clinical examination and official sampling. Decision 3/2018 of the Chief Veterinary Officer contains the rules to strengthen passive surveillance and describes the obligation to take samples from domestic pigs and also to confirm if certain conditions are met (e.g. sudden death, fever over 40°C after three days treatment, or death despite treatment of pigs having fever).

42. The audit team saw records of the weekly submission of samples from dead pigs for ASF testing in conformity with the ASF strategy for the EU. The results arrived within 4-5 days. Currently, no pooling of samples takes place within Hungary.

43. ASF passive surveillance and suspicion in domestic pigs notified to competent authority were as follows:
### Conclusions on measures in case of suspicion/confirmation of ASF in domestic pigs

44. There is a good ASF surveillance system in domestic pigs. The regular sampling of sick and dead farmed pigs for ASF and the reasonable turnout times for getting the laboratory results contributes to the early detection of the disease.

45. The good system to deal with suspected cases of ASF minimise the risk of it spreading before confirmation by the authorities.

### 5.3 Verification and supervision

**Legal requirements**

Articles 4 and 8 of Regulation No 882/2004; Directive 2002/60/EC (Articles 15, 16 and 22)

**Findings**

46. The authorities confirmed that there is an ASF expert working group which actively supports the development plans for the eradication of ASF. This group, originally established in 2005 for the control of classical swine fever has evolved with the new emerging threat. Membership encompasses central official institutions, hunting authorities, local and regional competent authorities and it draws from individual expertise and universities depending on technical needs. Sub-working groups are also convened, the last of such meetings having taken place on 19th February 2019.

47. The national reference laboratory regularly participates in the intra laboratory ring tests organized by the EU reference laboratory for ASF. The latest test took place on 15th February 2019 and it got satisfactory results.

48. Competent authorities at county and district level should perform yearly controls at hunting grounds in Part I and II areas. These inspections focus on implementation of biosecurity rules e.g. management of animal-by-products, availability of demarcated dressing areas and chillers, procedures to deal with carcasses of wild boars found dead and hunting arrangements (hunting ban, diagnostic shooting). In 2018 the authorities inspected 82 out of 155 hunting grounds in Part I and 132 out of 260 hunting grounds in Part II areas.
49. The authority acknowledged the limited availability of dressing and chilling facilities (e.g. 556 chillers available for the 1,424 Hungarian hunting grounds), and the need to improve this, especially the availability of chilling capacity. To that effect, at the time of the audit they had a support scheme to provide chillers to hunting grounds, either individually or for collective use.

50. There is a ban to feed wild boars throughout the year. Baiting is permitted. At one county visited, the veterinary services and the hunting authority checked the feeding points and baiting in close cooperation to avoid duplication of efforts.

51. The county office veterinarian had inspected the game handling establishment visited by the audit team. The inspection report was satisfactory and it covered, amongst other areas, traceability of products from raw materials intake to commercial documents of outgoing products and covering the channelling of products intended solely for the national market. The products only intended for the Hungarian market bear an oval mark and not a special health-mark (see finding 28).

52. The Chief Veterinary Officer decree 3/2018, on the rules for the control of ASF, specifies the controls that the competent authorities have to perform to check the implementation of relevant measures at pig holdings (e.g. biosecurity measures, sampling of dead pigs within enhanced passive surveillance). It also requires the authorities to visit all pig farms located in Part I and II areas in the first half of 2019 for the census of herds of pigs, epidemiological surveillance, and training/information of pig holders.

53. Official veterinarians at district level generally perform the inspections to evaluate biosecurity at pig holdings. In one county visited, there were a limited number of joint inspections with county officials, whilst at another county such joint inspections had been discontinued due to staff limitations.

54. Approved veterinarians perform official controls to a limited extent, e.g. biosecurity, ante and post-mortem inspection at backyard holdings. The authorities confirmed that they supervise their administrative performance (e.g. whether documents were filed on time), they do not supervise their technical performance and there is no procedure for it.

55. The frequency of inspections at pig holdings varies depending on the type of pig holding and the ASF status of the area where it is located. Yearly inspections take place at large commercial farms and at commercial pig holdings with outdoor access. There is a lower frequency, depending on a number of risk factors for small commercial and backyard holdings. The audit team noted that:

- At large commercial and outdoor pig holdings the authorities used the generic cross-compliance checklist to record findings. The checklist is not tailored to this task and in various instances compliance with requirements being checked could only be indirectly implied. The county authorities were aware of this issue and had
on their own initiative started to develop their own supporting checklists or were using the checklist that had been developed for backyard holdings.

- At small commercial and backyard pig holdings, in two counties visited, the competent authority aimed for yearly inspections within the restricted area of Part II (described as "strictly restricted area" in the eradication plan for ASF in Hungary), followed by a lower frequency of inspections in the remaining of Part II areas and every two or three years in Part I areas, depending on available resources.

- A central checklist has been developed and implementation has started for small commercial and backyard pig holdings, together with guidance on expected standards.

**Conclusions on verification and supervision**

56. There is a good system to verify the implementation of ASF controls in hunting grounds and game handling establishments. Its effectiveness is weakened by the failure to carry out yearly supervisory inspections to all hunting grounds.

57. The inspections to evaluate biosecurity at pig holdings are a good tool to minimise the risk of ASF spreading to pig holdings. However, the lack of a harmonized and specific checklist and the reduced number of inspections at small pig holdings reduces the positive impact of this tool. The result is that, whilst deficiencies are found, it is not possible to have a comprehensive picture of current biosecurity levels or to know how official controls are driving improvements at pig holding level, or even whether any improvements are actually achieved.

58. There is a weak point in the verification of official controls in that the officials do not verify how approved veterinarians deliver their controls. This prevents the authorities from detecting possible inconsistencies and preventing their recurrence.

59. The lack of sufficient dressing and chilling facilities at hunting grounds increases the potential risk of spreading ASF infection through the handling of wild boar carcasses.

### 5.4 FOLLOW-UP OF PREVIOUS AUDIT

The table below summarizes the follow-up to the relevant recommendations made in the report of DG(SANTE)/2017-6115-MR (recommendations 1 -6, as numbered in the report), and DG (SANTE)/2015-7568-MR (recommendation 8, as numbered in the report).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>To ensure that official controls are regularly carried out in hunting grounds located in the High Risk Area in order to verify the correct</td>
<td>Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Based on conclusion No. 34 and No. 56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>implementation of specific measures. SANTE/7113/2015- Rev 7 – ASF Strategy for Eastern Part of the EU. Recommendations based on conclusion No. 23 Associated finding No. 13</td>
<td>Associated finding No. 20, No 24, No. 25, No. 26, and No. 48</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>To ensure that hunted wild boar do not leave the hunting ground in High Risk Area before rest results are available. SANTE/7113/2015- Rev 7 – ASF Strategy for Eastern Part of the EU. Recommendations based on conclusion No. 23 Associated finding No. 12</td>
<td>Addressed Based on conclusion No. 38 Associated finding No. 20, No. 23, No. 24, No. 25 and No. 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Practical arrangements should be put in place to increase the number of found dead wild boar samples across the whole territory of Hungary and in particular the High Risk Area. SANTE/7113/2015- Rev 7 – ASF Strategy for Eastern Part of the EU. Recommendations based on conclusion No. 48 Associated finding Nos. 34, 35 and 36</td>
<td>Addressed Based on conclusion No. 38 Associated findings No. 21, No. 22 and No. 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Practical arrangements should be put in place to increase the number of dead domestic pigs samples in particular in High Risk Area. 2017 EU co-financed veterinary programme Recommendation based on conclusion No. 48 Associated finding No. 43</td>
<td>Addressed Based on conclusion No. 44 Associated finding No. 41, No. 42 and No. 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>To ensure that the national database for animals contains all required information including the geographic co-ordinates of all registered pig holdings and a field where</td>
<td>Partially addressed, process has been started</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sanitary information can be recorded as required by Article 1 (1) (d) to Commission Decision 2000/678/EC.  
Recommendation based on conclusion No. 60  
Associated finding No. 52

**Based on finding No. 2**

| 6 | To ensure that domestic pigs are identified before leaving the holding making it possible to determine the holding from which they came, as required by Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/71/EC.  
Recommendation based on conclusion No. 60  
Associated finding No. 57 | Addressed | Based on conclusion No. 36  
Associated finding No. 15 and No. 17

| 8 | DG (SANTE)/2015-7568  
To verify that activities carried out in order to improve the level of compliance with registration of backyard holdings keeping pigs at national level have been effective, as required by Articles 3 of Directive 2008/71/EC and Article 4 (2) of Regulation 882/2004/EC.  
Recommendation based on conclusion No. 84  
Associated finding No. 44 | Partially addressed, process of verification has been started | See recommendation 1 of current audit report

### 6 Overall Conclusions

Overall, the report concludes that Hungary has developed and implemented stringent national legislation concerning animal health control measures relating to African swine fever. In the case of certain requirements, these go beyond those set out in Commission Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU. For example, they also apply the animal health requirements for feral pigs in Part II areas in Part I areas, they systematically dispose of all wild boars in Part II areas after sampling regardless of test results and they have defined a new "middle risk" area as a buffer zone surrounding Part I areas.

As regards movements of live pigs, the Hungarian authorities have decided to apply the stricter criteria and not avail of some of the available derogations. All pigs moving from holdings have in all cases to be accompanied by an official certification. For holdings located in Parts I and II areas, the authorities only allow movements of pigs if the animals
fulfil residence and standstill periods, they have negative test results for African swine fever and an official veterinarian has performed a clinical examination.

Pig meat and its products from Parts I and II fulfil the necessary requirements to enable them to be placed on the internal market. The authorities restrict the marketing of meat and meat products derived from wild boar hunted in Part I areas to the national market (trade of wild boar meat from Part II is not permitted). There are procedures in place for channelling such products but the Hungarian authorities are not using any special national health mark for this trade.

National efforts in preventing and controlling the disease are weakened by unreliable data on the number of registered farms, lack of national guidance for the consistent classification of small commercial and backyard pig holdings and a lack of structured and harmonized checklists with clearly defined standards. The authorities carry out yearly comprehensive biosecurity inspections in large commercial holdings, but not at smaller commercial holdings, backyard farms and hunting grounds. Finally, Hungary allows rearing pigs in holdings with outdoor access in Part I and II areas.

All recommendations from Commission's audit report DG(SANTE)/2017-6115-MR have been satisfactorily addressed by the Hungarian authorities, except one for which the process of implementation has been initialised.

7 CLOSING MEETING

A closing meeting was held with the central competent authority on 29 March 2019 when the audit team presented the main findings and preliminary conclusions of the audit to the competent authority. During this meeting the competent authority provided certain clarifications and did not indicate any major disagreement with the findings and preliminary conclusions.

8 RECOMMENDATIONS

The competent authorities are invited to provide, within 25 working days of receipt of the report, details of the actions taken and planned, including deadlines for their completion (“action plan”), aimed at addressing the recommendations set out below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>To ensure that there is an up-to-date list of all the holdings which keep pigs, as required by Article 3, 1 (a) of Directive 2008/71/EC. Recommendation based on conclusion No. 35 Associated findings No. 5 and No. 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>To ensure the correct and consistent classification of small commercial and backyard pig holdings and that the necessary biosecurity standards are applied</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Recommendation</td>
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<td>at such holdings, especially relevant being the banning of outdoor access in such pig holdings as provided for in the strategic approach to the management of the ASF for the EU, working document SANTE/7113/2015 Rev. 10. Recommendation based on conclusion No. 35 Associated findings No. 4 and No. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>To ensure that a special national health-mark is applied for fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products that are to be restricted to the national market, as required by Article 16 of Commission Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU Recommendation based on conclusion No. 39 Associated findings No. 28 and No. 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>To ensure that harmonized and effective biosecurity inspections take place at pig holdings and hunting grounds, with a minimum frequency of once per year, which should be further extended based on a risk assessment, as provided for in the strategic approach to the management of the ASF for the EU, working document SANTE/7113/2015 Rev.10. Recommendation based on conclusions No.56 and No. 57 Associated findings No. 48 and No. 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>To verify the effectiveness of official controls delivered by approved veterinarians as provided for in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No. 882/2004 Recommendation based on conclusion No. 58 Associated finding No. 53 and No. 54</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The competent authority's response to the recommendations can be found at:  
## ANNEX 1 – LEGAL REFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Reference</th>
<th>Official Journal</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulation/Decision</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Description</td>
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