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FINAL REPORT OF AN AUDIT  
CARRIED OUT IN  
FRANCE  
FROM 03 NOVEMBER 2014 TO 14 NOVEMBER 2014  
IN ORDER TO  
EVALUATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTINGENCY PLANS IN RELATION TO  
ANIMAL HEALTH, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF ANIMALS  
DURING DEPOPULATION FOR DISEASE CONTROL

*In response to information provided by the Competent Authority, any factual error noted in the draft report has been corrected; any clarification appears in the form of a footnote.*

## ***Executive Summary***

*This report describes the outcome of a Food and Veterinary Office audit in France carried out between 3 and 14 November 2014 as part of the Food and Veterinary Office audit programme for 2014. The objective was to evaluate the resources and arrangements put in place to implement the European Union requirements for contingency planning in the event of one or more outbreaks of epizootic diseases including the provisions on the protection of animals during depopulation.*

*The report concludes that the competent authorities have put in place an excellent early warning system that should contribute to the quick detection of outbreaks of highly contagious animal diseases. This, coupled with the availability of largely satisfactory emergency preparedness measures and arrangements, make the system in place in France capable to manage the situation in the event of an epizootic disease outbreak, in particular thanks to:*

- A satisfactory level of animal health surveillance, mainly founded on the excellent cooperation in that regard between the competent authorities and all relevant stakeholders, that can effectively contribute to the early detection of any unusual disease event in domestic and wild animal populations.*
- The availability of adequate legal powers and emergency financial provisions to cope with a disease outbreak.*
- The availability of outstanding technical and epidemiological expertise, in particular thanks to the network of national reference laboratories that can provide excellent diagnostic and epidemiological advice in the event of an animal health crisis situation.*
- The ongoing improvement and modernisation of the available contingency plans, and of the emergency preparedness system as a whole, due to be completed in 2015.*
- The organisation of numerous real-time alert exercises at local, regional and national level, that provide extensive feedback to all competent authorities, including the central competent authorities, and rightly point out areas where improvements can be made.*
- The development of decision-support tools mostly based on modelling and scenario simulations, that contribute to better inform decisions on the use of emergency vaccination in the event of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease.*

*The audit team identified some areas for improvement in relation to the level of emergency preparedness needed in the event of disease outbreaks that become geographically widespread, in particular if they occur in areas with high animal density or when several domestic and wild animal species are affected simultaneously. The central competent authority were already in the process of taken action in relation to those areas and new initiatives were already underway in order to address the weaknesses identified, in particular in order to:*

- Ensure the effective coordinated operation of the emergency preparedness systems set out by the regional and local competent authorities throughout the country.*
- Enhance the effectiveness of the information management systems currently available to the competent authorities to facilitate the aforesaid coordination and to speed and ease up the selection of actions to be taken in the event of an animal health crisis.*
- Ensure that the local and regional competent authorities select and avail of the most adequate options in relation to animal depopulation and disposal of dead animals in the event of a disease outbreak.*
- Enhance the completeness and reliability of available information on holding registration and animal movements for all animal species in order to improve the quality of the epidemiological data necessary to target and implement actions in the event of a disease outbreak.*

*The report makes recommendations to the competent authorities of France aimed at addressing those areas*

*in which further improvements are required.*

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

Abbreviation	Explanation
ABP	Animal by-products not for human consumption, as defined in Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009
AHS	African Horse Sickness
AI	Avian Influenza
ANSES	French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health & Safety ( <i>Agence nationale de sécurité sanitaire de l'alimentation, de l'environnement et du travail</i> )
ASF	African Swine Fever
BDNI	National animal identification database ( <i>Base de données nationale d'identification</i> )
BSA	Animal Health Unit ( <i>Bureau de la santé animale</i> )
BT	Bluetongue
CA	Competent Authorities
CCA	Central Competent Authority
CP	Contingency Plan
CSF	Classical Swine Fever
DD(CS)PP	Departmental Directorates for (Social Cohesion and) Protection of the Population ( <i>Direction départementale de (la cohésion sociale et) la protection des populations</i> )
DGAL	Directorate General for Food ( <i>Direction générale de l'alimentation</i> )
DG(SANTE)	Directorate General for Health and Food Safety
DRAAF	Regional Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Forestry ( <i>Direction Régional de l'Alimentation, de l'Agriculture et de la Forêt</i> )
ESA platform	French platform for epidemiological surveillance in animal health ( <i>Plateforme nationale de surveillance épidémiologique en santé animale</i> )
FMD	Foot-and-Mouth Disease
FVO	Food and Veterinary Office
GDS	Farmers associations for animal health protection ( <i>Groupements de défense sanitaire</i> )
GIS	Geographical information system
GTV	Technical associations of private veterinary practitioners ( <i>Groupements techniques vétérinaires</i> )
LDCC	Local Disease Control Centre
LIMS	Laboratory information management system

MAAF	Ministry of Agriculture, Agri-food and Forestry ( <i>Ministère de l'agriculture, de l'agroalimentaire et de la forêt</i> )
MS	Member State of the European Union
MUS	Task force for Sanitary Emergencies ( <i>Mission des urgences sanitaires</i> )
ND	Newcastle Disease
NDCC	National Disease Control Centre
NRL	National Reference Laboratory
OM	Operations manual
ORSEC operational plan	Operational plan laying down the organisation of the Civil Security response in case of emergencies ( <i>Dispositif opérationnel pour l'Organisation de la Réponse de Sécurité Civile</i> )
OV	Official Veterinarian
P(N)ISU	(National) Plan for Sanitary Emergencies ( <i>Plan (National) d'Intervention Sanitaire d'Urgence</i> )
SDSPA	Directorate for Animal Health and Welfare ( <i>Sous-direction de la santé et de la protection animales</i> )
SIGAL	Information system of the DGAL ( <i>Système d'Information de la DGAL</i> )
SOP	Standard operating procedures
VS	Authorised veterinarian ( <i>Vétérinaire sanitaire</i> )

## 1 INTRODUCTION

This audit took place in France from 3 to 14 November 2014 and was undertaken as part of the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) planned audit programme. The audit team comprised two auditors from the FVO and a national expert from Germany.

The audit team was accompanied throughout the audit by representatives of the Central Competent Authority (CCA), the Directorate General for Food (*Direction générale de l'alimentation* – DGAL) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Agri-food and Forestry (*Ministère de l'agriculture, de l'agroalimentaire et de la forêt* – MAAF), in particular, by representatives of:

- The Animal Health Unit of the Directorate for Animal Health and Welfare (*Bureau de la santé animale* – BSA, of the *Sous-direction de la santé et de la protection animales* – SDSPA).
- The Task force for Sanitary Emergencies (*Mission des urgences sanitaires* – MUS).

In addition, the audit team was accompanied during part of the audit by the national reference person for the (National) Plan for Sanitary Emergencies (*Plan (National) d'Intervention Sanitaire d'Urgence* – P(N)ISU).

In addition, during the visits at local level, the audit team was accompanied by representatives of the relevant Regional Directorates for Food, Agriculture and Forestry (*Direction Régionale de l'Alimentation, de l'Agriculture et de la Forêt* – DRAAF) and of the Departmental Directorates for (Social Cohesion and) Protection of the Population (*Direction départementale de (la cohésion sociale et) la protection des populations* – DD(CS)PP).

## 2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

The objective was to evaluate the resources and arrangements put in place to implement EU requirements for contingency plans (CPs) in the event of one or more outbreaks of epizootic diseases, including provisions on the protection of animals during depopulation. Specific CPs are required for the following terrestrial animal diseases: Foot & Mouth Disease (FMD), Bluetongue (BT), Classical Swine Fever (CSF), African Swine Fever (ASF), Swine Vesicular Disease, African Horse Sickness (AHS), Vesicular Stomatitis, Sheep and Goat Pox, Lumpy Skin Disease, Rinderpest, Peste des Petits Ruminants, Rift Valley Fever, Epizootic Haemorrhagic Disease, Avian Influenza (AI) and Newcastle Disease (ND).

A secondary objective was to gather information and to identify areas of best practice in relation to a number of issues relevant to epizootic disease control but not explicitly specified in EU legislation. Such issues include routine monitoring for epizootic disease, the deployment of risk analysis with subsequent determination of alert levels and Member State (MS) requirements for biosecurity measures on farms.

Whilst an overview of contingency planning for all of these diseases is included within the scope of this audit, the audit in France mainly concentrated on the evaluation of emergency preparedness in the event of an outbreak of ASF, FMD, AI and AHS:

- ASF currently represents a serious animal health risk for the pig population in the EU due to the presence of the disease in some MS and in the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus;

- FMD is one of the most difficult diseases to contain and affects several livestock species;
- AI was chosen as an example of a poultry disease where specific requirements for CPs are laid down in EU legislation, and
- AHS is an example of a vector-borne disease that represents a continuous risk for the horse population in the EU.

In addition, attention was also paid to the state of readiness as regards early detection and crisis management in case of other emerging and re-emerging infectious animal diseases.

As the requirements of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 apply from 1 January 2013, the audit team carried out an evaluation of the current state of implementation of the requirements of Article 18(1), (2) and (3) of this Regulation.

In pursuit of this objective, the following sites were visited:

MEETINGS / VISITS		no.	COMMENTS
Competent Authorities	Central	2	Opening and closing meetings with representatives of the relevant services of the DGAL
	Regional	4	Meetings with regional coordinators of the PISU of four DRAAFs
	Local (Departmental)	6	Meetings with representatives of six DD(CS)PPs
Laboratories		3	NRLs for AI and ND, and for CSF. One official laboratory at departmental level involved in serological diagnosis of some epidemic diseases
Holdings		1	One pig farm
Markets & assembly centres		2	Two assembly centres, one for cattle and one for sheep
Slaughterhouses		1	One pig slaughterhouse
Other establishments		1	One ABP processing plant.
Meetings with other operators and relevant organisations		10	Meetings with representatives of other stakeholders, such as the ANSES, one ABP processing plant, and national, regional and local associations of veterinarians and farmers. With the exception of one, all the meetings were held in the context of the other meetings organised with the CAs.

### 3 LEGAL BASIS

The audit was carried out under the general provisions of EU legislation and, in particular:

- Article 45 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules.

Full legal references to EU legal acts quoted in this report are provided in Annex 1 and refer, where applicable, to the last amended version.

## 4 BACKGROUND

France is one of the largest livestock and poultry producers in the EU, being the first producer of beef and poultry meat, the second producer of cow's milk and the third one for pig meat. According to data provided by the DGAL for 2013:

- There are in excess of 194,000 holdings keeping more than 19 million cattle; 32% of them are dairy farms. The northwest of France has a particularly high density of all types of cattle farms, with the centre and southwest having mostly beef and mixed farms.
- There are more than 82,000 holdings keeping sheep and in excess of 18,000 keeping goats. They are mostly concentrated in the centre and the south of continental France and in the island of Corsica.
- There are in excess of 20,000 holdings keeping pigs, with some 1,900 rearing pigs outdoors. The northwest of France, mainly Brittany, concentrates the highest density of holdings and animals.
- Nearly 81,000 commercial poultry farms keep in excess of 300 million animals. Again, the northwest of France, mainly Brittany, with another region in the east of the country, concentrate the highest density of animals, but a high concentration of smaller holdings occurs in the southwest (all types) and the east (laying hens) of the country.

Given the potential impact of outbreaks of epizootic disease, it is important that MS can react immediately and effectively in a co-ordinated manner and in co-operation with neighbouring countries. EU legislation requires MS to have CPs in place to combat such outbreaks so as to reduce their adverse consequences.

Of critical importance to the suppression of an outbreak of epizootic disease, are the swiftness of initial diagnosis and the deployment of the first stages of the CP.

With regard to the historical situation in France as regards occurrence of epizootic diseases within the scope of this audit, the following is worth mentioning:

- The last outbreak of FMD occurred in March 2001.
- CSF has not been confirmed in the domestic pig population in France since 2002. The disease was last confirmed in wild boars in May 2007 and the country is considered free of the disease in the wild population since 2011. The last confirmations of ASF and SVD in domestic pigs occurred in 1974 and 1983, respectively.
- The most recent case of highly pathogenic AI (HPAI) occurred in summer 2007 (subtype H5N1) and it was detected in wild birds; the last case in domestic poultry had occurred in February 2006. Low pathogenic AI (LPAI) was detected for the last time in 2009 (H5N1) as a result of the AI routine surveillance programme in place.
- The latest cases of ND were detected in 2013 in pigeons (Avian paramyxovirus type 1, pigeon variant). The last case in other poultry (Avian paramyxovirus type 1) occurred in 2005 in pheasants.
- The continental territory of France was declared free of BT in December 2012, where the disease had been confirmed for the last time in June 2010. The disease re-emerged clinically in Corsica in September 2013 (serotype 1) and vaccination in the island was compulsory at the time of the audit.

- AHS, as well as other exotic diseases such as Peste des petits ruminants, Rift- Valley fever or vesicular stomatitis, have never been reported from France.

The latest FVO audit carried out in France on the same topic took place in 2003 (ref.: DG(SANCO)/9151/2003 – MR Final). The report of that audit is published on the FVO website at:

[http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit\\_reports/index.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit_reports/index.cfm)

The outcome of the previous audit was largely satisfactory with some weaknesses highlighted, amongst which it is worth mentioning the need at the time to update the existing CPs, or to finalise the preparation of the outstanding ones, such as those for CSF and ASF, and the one for BT. Besides, the need for the adaptation of the measures laid down in the CPs to the local circumstances of each department in the form of operations manuals (OPs) was also underlined. The CCA provided undertakings to address all those outstanding issues after the audit. An updated situation in relation to those subjects is described in section 5.6 of this report.

## 5 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

### 5.1 COMPETENT AUTHORITIES

#### Legal requirements:

Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 lays down rules for the performance of official controls; in particular Article 4 requires the designation of competent authorities; co-ordination and co-operation between and within competent authorities, and that sufficient legal powers are available to the competent authorities. The availability of sufficient legal powers for the implementation of contingency plan is specified in most of the relevant Directives (see Annex 2). In addition Council Directive 2003/85/EC (Article 74 ( 3)(d), (g) & (i) and Annex XVII (6) requires close cooperation with environmental authorities and enforcement bodies in relation to FMD control and Council Directive 2005/94/EC on the control of avian influenza (Article 62 ( 3)) requires close cooperation between the competent authorities responsible for the different sectors, particularly those in charge of animal health, public health, environmental matters and health and safety of workers.

#### Findings:

##### 5.1.1 Structure of the CA

Information on the structures of the French CA can be found in the country profile (see [http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/country\\_profiles/](http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/country_profiles/)). This provides information on the responsibilities of the CA under normal circumstances and a brief description of their activities in the event of a disease outbreak. In addition:

- The lead authority for animal health control is the DGAL, which is responsible *inter alia* for overall coordination of the drawing up of CPs which are required under EU animal health legislation, and for policy and strategy making regarding animal disease outbreaks at national level. Further organisational arrangements for the implementation nationwide of that policy are the responsibility of the SDSPA (mainly the BSA, but also the animal welfare unit) and the MUS, as an interdepartmental body created in 2008 to coordinate the preparation and response to emergency situations.

- In relation to animal health surveillance and risk analysis, control and eradication of animal diseases, the DGAL receives technical and scientific advice mainly from the French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health & Safety (*Agence nationale de sécurité sanitaire de l'alimentation, de l'environnement et du travail – ANSES*). The ANSES also provides advice on the fitness for purpose of all animal health policy options put forward by the DGAL, including all tools, such as CPs, necessary for the adequate operation of the emergency preparedness system. Most national reference laboratories (NRLs) relevant for diagnosis of epizootic diseases operate under the auspices of the ANSES.
- The roles that the various structures of the MAAF have to play in crisis management generally are laid down since 2011 in an internal memorandum that concerns, amongst other things, the role of the DRAAFs and the DD(CS)PPs in operational preparation and crisis management at regional and departmental levels, respectively. Those roles in the context of the animal health emergency preparedness were already described in previous memoranda prepared, respectively, in 2006 by the SDSPA on contingency planning for major epizootic diseases, and in 2010 by the MUS on the organisation of the emergency preparedness systems in the fields of animal and plant health. Those documents include arrangements with regard to the setting up and operation of the national and local disease control centres (NDCC and LDCC).
- The DD(CS)PPs must implement at local level the CPs laid down at central level with the help of operations manuals (OMs) adapted to the local circumstances of each department. This has to be done within the framework of the operational plan laying down the organisation of the Civil Security response in case of emergencies (*Dispositif opérationnel pour l'Organisation de la Réponse de Sécurité Civile – ORSEC operational plan*) under the command of the departmental prefect, who is the maximum administrative authority in this respect. That process is carried out under the technical coordination of a regional coordinator for the animal health emergency preparedness system based at the relevant DRAAF.
- Many of the activities related to the early warning and emergency preparedness systems for animal diseases are carried out by a large network of authorised veterinarians (*vétérinaires sanitaires – VS*) who have been delegated a number of official tasks by the relevant departmental prefect.
  - Most VS have a number of general tasks related to prophylactic measures for animal diseases which are directly paid by the farmers. These activities are usually organised by the technical associations of private veterinary practitioners (*Groupements techniques vétérinaires – GTV*) in cooperation with the farmers associations for animal health protection (*Groupements de défense sanitaire – GDS*). The GDS main objective is to improve the levels of animal health and public health as a result of their animal production activities.
  - At national level, the GTV bring together more than 2,000 private veterinary practitioners who represent the large majority of those involved in large animal practice. The GTV ensure the continuous training of all those practitioners and act as their representing body.
  - As a general rule, VS have additional responsibilities under the direct mandate of the prefect which indirectly contribute to increase the level of animal health surveillance. Those activities include disease control and eradication

programmes (e.g. bovine tuberculosis), detection of large epidemic diseases and animal certification for intra-EU trade.

- Even if all VS regularly receive specific training related to epizootic diseases, a specific network specially trained to intervene at short notice in the event of an epidemic disease outbreak was under development at the time of the audit. The audit team could see evidence of the specific training initiatives performed in relation to both activities.

The development of CPs requires extensive cooperation within and between CA. Besides, responsibilities of the various CA when dealing with an outbreak of epizootic disease must be formally defined and agreed in advance. In most cases this entails a change in the command structures of the CA. Section 5.2.3 below outlines any such changes.

### *5.1.2 Legal powers available to the CA*

- The legal powers are defined by the Rural and Fisheries Code, which includes general arrangements for the prevention, surveillance and suppression of health hazards relating to animals and plants. The Code requires that the MAAF prepares specific legislation (a ministerial decree) setting out the PNISU, which must be then further developed by operational arrangements to be made by the departments (see 5.2). As exemplified by the memoranda mentioned in the previous section, the MAAF and the DGAL have developed an extensive range of derived legal (e.g. ministerial decrees) and implementing (e.g. service and circular notes, instructions, guidance) provisions that cover the broad scope of measures and actions related to prevention, control and eradication of animal diseases, including animal welfare aspects, as required by the various related pieces of EU legislation (e.g. development of CPs and measures to control FMD, CSF, ASF, AI, etc.).
- In general terms, the available legal framework provides CA at all levels, including VS, with sufficient powers to: enter into all premises possibly involved in a disease outbreak, impose restrictions on animal movements, require application of the necessary cleaning and disinfection measures, impose protection zones and surveillance zones according to the epidemiological evaluation of the situation, order the killing of animals, etc.

### *5.1.3 Cooperation between and within CA in development of CPs*

- All relevant departments within the DGAL cooperate in the development of CPs, with the BSA and the MUS paying a major role in setting up policy in this area. In addition, two particular consultative steps ensure that CPs are finally approved after a broad evaluation and consensus on their fitness for purpose:
  - As mentioned in section 5.1.1, the ANSES plays a major role in ensuring that all CPs proposed by the DGAL are adequate and incorporate all the necessary components intervening in an animal health crisis. The ANSES gives advice in particular on how to ensure that all necessary technical and epidemiological aspects have been taken into account and that all types of emergency responses in France have been sufficiently considered from the operational point of view (see 5.2.3).
  - In addition, the DGAL must also consult a special national advisory body on animal and plant health policy which is operational since 2012 and that

includes representatives of all relevant stakeholders from the public and private sectors. The opinion of this body is binding and must be taken into account before the CPs are approved and officially added to the French legal system in the form of a ministerial decree.

### **Conclusions on Competent Authorities:**

CAs have been designated and sufficient legal powers are available to develop CPs and to control epizootic outbreaks in accordance with the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 and the disease-specific Directives. Those fundamental strengths of the system in place are further reinforced by the comprehensive regulatory context that allows the CA to take any necessary measure in the event of a disease outbreak, including availing of any human or material resources of any type they may need, as well as of extensive emergency financial provisions. This is further reinforced by the fact that response to, and management of any animal health crisis situation is always done within the general crisis management system in place for any emergency situation in France.

## **5.2 CONTINGENCY PLANS**

### **Legal requirements:**

Requirements for Member States to have contingency plans to control disease outbreaks are required for the following diseases: Foot & Mouth Disease (Council Directive 2003/85/EC), Bluetongue (Council Directive 2000/75/EC), Classical Swine Fever (Council Directive 2001/89/EC), African Swine Fever (Council Directive 2002/60/EC), Swine Vesicular Disease and a number of other diseases (Council Directive 92/119/EEC), African Horse Sickness (Council Directive 92/35/EEC), Avian Influenza (Council Directive 2005/94/EC) and Newcastle Disease (Council Directive 92/66/EEC). A summary of some specific requirements of each is provided in Annex 2.

Requirements relating to holding registration, animal identification and movement controls for cattle, sheep and pigs are laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000, Council Regulation (EC) No 21/2004 and Council Directive 2008/71/EC respectively, and associated implementing measures.

### **Findings:**

#### *5.2.1 Coverage & Approval*

- The strategic and operational foundations of the official French animal and plant health control system are in evolution since 2010, when after a number of crises the CA decided to approach a vast reorganisation of the structures in place. In addition, an internal audit in the DGAL was carried out between 2007 and 2009 in order to evaluate the contingency planning system, including both the central government and the regional and departmental services. This audit resulted in recommendations which have been taken on board by the relevant services of the DGAL with a view to improving the national emergency preparedness and early warning systems.
- The first pillar of the new strategy to reinforce those systems is the risk categorisation. That implies ranking animal diseases according to their relevance and the inclusion of the large epidemic diseases in the PNISU programme by ministerial decree. This

process requires that the CPs developed some years ago by the SDSPA had to be reviewed in order to transform the system of individual CPs for each epizootic disease into a unique tool. The new PNISU will contain a generic section and a number of technical annexes and pre-set harmonised documents and forms for all CPs for animal diseases, and will be completed with specific technical plans for each disease, as required by EU legislation.

- The generic tool covers general aspects such as management of suspicions and confirmations, epidemiological enquiries, financial arrangements, options for animal depopulation and vaccination, etc.
- The redrafting process was still underway at the time of this audit, but the audit team could see evidence of the advanced state of this process:
  - The generic part of the CPs, including nearly all relevant annexes and working documents and forms, as well as the CP for FMD, had been submitted for consultation to the ANSES and the special national advisory body on animal and plant health policy in July 2014.
  - The specific CPs for AI and ND, ASF and CSF, BT, and AHS were in the process of being updated accordingly by the BSA.
- No specific CP has been drafted for the other diseases listed in Council Directive 92/119/EC, as the DGAL considers that provisions laid down in the new generic part of the CPs along with available epidemiological and diagnostic expertise, would guarantee an adequate management of the particular issues specific to each type of disease outbreak.
- These tools have to be incorporated into updated OMs at departmental level by the DD(CS)PPs, which need to confirm having done that as part of their business plans in the information system of the DGAL (*Système d'Information de la DGAL – SIGAL*) so that:
  - The updating and fitness-for-purpose of the OMs can be verified by the CCA, if considered necessary, in particular that they are integrated in the ORSEC operational plan, which needs to be elaborated by each department (see 5.2.3 below).
  - The regional coordinator of the emergency preparedness system at the DRAAF is responsible for following this process, more in a consultative than verification way, and for providing information in that respect at least twice a year to the MUS, so that staff therein in charge of the national coordination of the PNISU can get an idea of the state of readiness of the system nationwide.

### 5.2.2 Documentation

- In the context of the ongoing reorganisation of the CPs and OMs, the audit team could see numerous documents at all levels of the organisation of the CA. Documentation available to the DD(CS)PPs at the time of this audit covers all aspects of the emergency response system and should be adequate to address animal health emergency situations to be managed by a LDCC at departmental level (see below). However, this documentation was not yet fully updated in accordance with the new system and, therefore, not fully representative of the new operational tools that are going to be available soon to all staff of the CA.

- The OMs contain generic and specific arrangements; the first ones are common for all animal health emergencies (and mostly for all emergencies covered by the ORSEC operational plan) and the specific ones are more detailed for each animal disease. In all cases, the OMs must specify the allocation of responsibilities to all relevant official and private stakeholders, and define all necessary arrangements to ensure their effective coordination.
  - In the various regions visited and DD(CS)PPs met, the audit team found a number of disparities in the way the OMs had been developed and significant variation in the levels of coordination done by the DRAAFs, and the DGAL in general, in this respect (e.g. see also sections 5.3.7 and 5.5). For instance:
    - One of the departments visited had been involved in the FMD crisis in 2001; as a result of the lessons they learnt they had developed their OM significantly adding specific documents and practical tools other than those prepared from the central level, in order to make their response faster and more effective.
    - In one of the regions visited, an inter-departmental agreement was in place since 2006 ensuring the gradual harmonisation and coordination of the PISUs. This has been translated into common documentation developed at regional level (e.g. epidemiological investigations, guide on animal depopulation, and a video describing the process to manage an outbreak), training programmes, inventories of equipment to be shared, and shared simulation exercises.
- The arrangements found at local level in relation to the potential response to a localised outbreak by the specific DD(CS)PP were in general satisfactory, but weaknesses were found instead in relation to the inconsistent coordination of those departmental OMs in some regions. In these regions, the CA had not anticipated sufficiently the need for a coordinated response in the event of a large outbreak affecting several departments in the same region, or beyond, in particular in regions with a high animal density and frequent animal movements.
- The audit team could not find any evidence of the verification and/or auditing activities carried out by the DGAL in the context of their quality control system to ensure that the DD(CS)PPs visited had updated in a satisfactory manner their OMs and that sufficient levels of coordination are ensured at regional level.
- According to representatives of the DGAL, a better coordination will be in place shortly as a result of the ongoing reorganisation of the emergency preparedness system, in particular once preparation of the new tools described above is finalised and staff responsible for the MUS and the national reference person for the PNISU, with the help of the regional coordinators, can better coordinate their use by the regions and the departments.

### 5.2.3 CA command structure during an epizootic outbreak – NDCCs and LDCCs

- In the event of major animal health incidents that are beyond the scope of a standard animal health management procedure (e.g. a minor outbreak circumscribed to one holding and affecting just one municipality), the MAAF relies since 2005 on the ORSEC operational plan. Each department must develop that operational plan in order to manage emergency situations with regard to the safety of people, property and the environment. Under the sole leadership of the departmental prefect, the

organisational arrangements included cover all public and private stakeholders and, in the area of animal health, they must translate into practice the strategies and policies of the PNISU drawn by the MAAF.

- The audit team could see documentation and preparatory arrangements in relation to the process of alignment of the animal health emergency systems to be managed by the DD(CS)PPs with the emergency systems provided by other CA involved in the application of the departmental ORSEC operational plan under the command of the departmental prefect, who is always in charge of the LDCC.
- The higher levels of the administrative organisation must come into play to manage large emergency situations and those going beyond departmental boundaries. The ORSEC plan is a civil defence mechanism managed by the Ministry for Internal Affairs that is applied in the event of any major catastrophe. Hence, in such a case, the organisation of the chain of command follows the structure of the civil defence response system; i.e. the second level of command is organised according to the national defence zones, which are larger than the regions covered by the DRAAFs, and are under the command of a zonal prefect. Each pre-defined zone has specific staff permanently active who are responsible for the readiness of the generic and specific emergency preparedness systems, including some in charge of emergencies in the health and agricultural areas.
- The DRAAFs do not have responsibilities in the chain of command; i.e. they follow the instructions of the zonal prefects and the NDCC, but they must facilitate the coordination of the activities between the departments included in their regions (and keep the zonal level updated about that) and provide them with assistance, as appropriate.
- In many cases, and certainly in the event of a large outbreak affecting several regions, the DGAL runs a NDCC. The DGAL liaises in all cases with an operational inter-ministerial crisis management centre that coordinates the activities of all services in the event of any major emergency. Moreover, in a worst-case animal health scenario situation, the prime minister can activate an inter-ministerial crisis cell under the command of the MAAF.
- During the meetings with staff of the DRAAFs and DD(CS)PPs visited it could be verified that all OMs available to their staff; i.e. the instructions and guidelines on the operation of the LDCCs; contained very specific details clearly underlining the chain of command in case of an animal health emergency situation.
- The system above mentioned has shown to be very effective in the event of a variety of crisis and catastrophes that occurred in France in recent years, but it has never been challenged in the context of a large epizootic disease (see also 5.3.7). The main strengths of the system are the availability of numerous human and technical resources at all levels that are easily and quickly accessible to all CA, the specific training received, and experience on emergency management ensured by dedicated staff who, at least at zonal level, are permanently operational, and the powers given to the prefects at departmental and zonal levels. The prefects can allocate the necessary resources, regardless of their nature, to their best use upon advice by the technical staff relevant to the type of crisis; i.e. by staff of the DGAL, the DRAAFs or the DD(CS)PPs, in the event of an animal health crisis.
- The activities of the LDCC and, as appropriate, the NDCC, are modulated by the availability of a number of information management systems and databases, that aim

to facilitate the CAs decision-making process in the event of a disease outbreak, in particular:

- The SIGAL keeps all the information on the official control system run by all operational levels of the DGAL along the food and the feed chain, including animal health and welfare. It includes data on all investigations carried out in the context of any suspicion/confirmation of notifiable animal diseases.
  - After the experience learnt from a number of minor outbreaks of animal diseases in 2010, the DGAL recognised the need to reinforce the decision-making process related to the management of disease outbreaks and incorporated to SIGAL a geographical information system (GIS). The objective was to facilitate mapping of all animal holdings (the large majority already georeferenced at the time of the audit) and establishments in the food and feed chain. This system is considered a preliminary step before a more sophisticated GIS is put in place.
  - This system includes information on the results of official laboratory analyses sent by the laboratory information management system (LIMS) in real-time. However, all the categories of analyses are not yet integrated to this system and, for instance, the NRLs are not yet sending their results through it. This limits the quick (and more user-friendly) availability of those data in the event of large disease outbreaks.
- The national animal identification database (*Base de données nationale d'identification* – BDNI) with information on holding registration, animal identification and animal movements for cattle, sheep and goats, and pigs. Another database also available to the CA keeps information on horses (data on owners/keepers and horse identification, but not on movements).
- A database with all information on the sanitary events, including prophylactic and therapeutic activities performed by the VS, which occur in all animal holdings under the responsibility of the VS.
- Representatives of the DGAL advised the audit team that the whole information management system used by their services was in the process of being reorganised and modernised, and that a new system better interlinking all data and information sources will substitute SIGAL shortly. The audit team found that the current systems in place are not ideal with regard to facilitation and speeding up of the decision-making processes and actions to be taken in the event of a large animal health crisis. The compatibility and user-friendliness of the various databases in place can be already complex and slow for local staff handling a minor outbreak at local level, for instance, compatibility of the SIGAL and the BDNI is limited, and they will make even more difficult the analysis of data and information when it comes to manage a large disease outbreak.

#### 5.2.4 Financial provisions

- The Rural and Fisheries Code provides that the state is to contribute to the cost of compensating stakeholders whose animals have been culled and the other costs connected with elimination. These provisions are implemented through a Statutory Order enacted in 2001 on the occasion of the last FMD outbreaks that contemplates compensation for animals culled and products destroyed by order of the CA.

- Application of these provisions is done by a specific financial order for each disease enacted jointly by the MAAF and the Finance Ministers on the basis of the Statutory Order that determines the amounts of compensation that are payable and specifies the state's further financial involvement. These arrangements are set out in detail in various memoranda.
- The costs are met by the DD(CS)PPs, with the exception of orders for vaccines, which are subject to public procurement procedures conducted and paid for by the CCA. Contribution to compensation include fees for the services of VS rendered under the auspices of the CA, the cost of culling or vaccination carried out by order of the CA, compensation for animals culled and products destroyed by order of the CA, or 75% of the cost of disinfection.
- The state does not assume liability for other losses associated with the restrictions on trade incurred when an outbreak is suspected or during a confirmed outbreak or for ensuing consequential losses (e.g. access to markets, loss of premium payments or of quality certification labels).
- Another Statutory Order introduced in 2013 a national mutual fund for health and environmental risks in agriculture. This fund can help compensate affiliated producers who pay fees and have incurred financial losses as a result of a health or environmental incident.
  - The fund operates through specialised sections related to production sectors, which draw up the compensation programmes they intend to implement and communicate them to the MAAF. The MAAF then determines whether the programme is eligible with regard to the relevant regulatory provisions.
  - The substructures of this instrument were still in the process of being set up. To date, the fund contains only one operational specialised animal section, devoted to pig farming.
- The GDS have an assistance mechanism which used to be dedicated to FMD and has now been expanded into a mutual health fund managed by the national federation of GDS that can be used for any animal health related situation where direct or indirect production losses are incurred.
  - The system is based on contributions paid by farmers according to the number of animals they keep; e.g. they pay 10 cents per bovine and two cents per sheep or goat. As a result, some two million euros are accumulated annually by this fund.
  - During peace time, when no major disease outbreaks occur, the fund is used mainly to compensate farmers for indirect losses related to restrictions due to the presence of endemic diseases such as bovine tuberculosis. In addition, the GDS use the fund to promote and organise numerous animal health prevention initiatives.
  - The audit team was informed that this mechanism will most likely be incorporated shortly to the newly created larger national fund.

#### *5.2.5 Establishment and enforcement of protection and surveillance zones*

- Decisions on establishing protection and surveillance zones are taken at LDCC level in the context of the operation of the ORSEC operational plan and in contact, as

appropriate, with the NDCC set up at the DGAL. The audit team could see several examples of exercises carried out by staff of the DD(CS)PPs using the GIS incorporated in SIGAL in order to set and amend the zones depending on the evolution of the epidemiological information available. Training in respect of using this tool had been rolled out throughout France from 2012. Given the limited experience available in that respect, a more unclear situation exists when a large outbreak needs to be managed and the protection and surveillance zones can straddle several departments and regions at the same time.

- Given the nature of the ORSEC operational plan (5.2.3), in all the departments visited there was a variety of arrangements in place with other CAs, such as municipalities or the police forces, and private stakeholders to set up road control measures, in order to reinforce application of movement restriction measures, and cleaning and disinfection facilities for vehicles entering or leaving the zones, as appropriate. All those facilities are also available to be used at zonal level, and even elsewhere in France, if necessary.
- Satisfactory arrangements are in place in relation to animal movement restrictions. Restrictions that can be initially imposed verbally by a VS or an official veterinarian (OV) upon suspicion of any disease event (always legally binding), will be subsequently followed up with an official written notification if the presence of the disease is confirmed or if further investigations are needed to exclude that possibility.
- Where welfare problems are identified within a protection or surveillance zone, arrangements were in place in the DD(CS)PP visited to authorise live animals to be moved to be slaughtered, provided this transport can be carried out under official control.

#### *5.2.6 Communication procedures during an outbreak*

- Special arrangements are in place at the DGAL to address communication needs in the event of a large disease outbreak as part of the PNISU and detailed communication procedures are included in the context of the ORSEC operational plan at departmental level. The animal health services of the DD(CS)PPs can get access to staff with specific expertise on communication, public relations and media liaison in the event of emergency situations who is available within the structure of the departmental CA. Some examples could be seen of the tailoring of the information to be delivered to an animal health emergency (e.g. AI, BT).

#### *5.2.7 Availability of Epidemiological expertise*

- Extensive evidence was present of the epidemiological advice regularly provided by the ANSES to the DGAL, in particular on:
  - Risk assessments, evaluation of planning and design of disease surveillance programmes, evaluation of diagnostic techniques, and evaluation of risks related to wild animals in order to adapt surveillance initiatives thereto, etc.
  - Evaluation of the fitness for purpose and feasibility of legislative and policy initiatives related to the early warning and emergency preparedness systems; e.g. specific animal disease surveillance programmes (e.g. CSF in wild boars, AI in wild birds, BT, etc.) and evaluation of CPs.

- In addition, staff of the network of NRLs for animal diseases within the organisation of ANSES can provide excellent diagnostic and epidemiological advice in any animal health crisis situation, whether to the DGAL or directly to the relevant DD(CS)PP. The audit team could see examples in that respect where both activities; i.e. epidemiological investigation and advice, and disease diagnosis, had been carried by coordinated teams of the NRLs.
- In addition, the French platform for epidemiological surveillance in animal health (*Plateforme nationale de surveillance épidémiologique en santé animale – ESA* platform), provides expertise in relation to the planning and design of epidemiological surveillance programmes, and also tools to the regular evaluation of their operation (see also 5.3.1 and 5.3.3).
- In some cases, staff of the DD(CS)PPs visited had extensive epidemiological expertise enabling them to address the standard situations where minor disease outbreaks occur without needing additional support from the network of experts available at the ANSES.

### 5.2.8 *Animal identification and movement control*

The audit team found a number of weaknesses that could hinder the reliability and speed of the animal traceability exercises needed in the event of a large disease outbreak, in particular:

- Levels of compliance with reporting of movements of cattle, sheep and goats or with identification of pigs arriving at slaughterhouses were often insufficient, and the official control approach towards that was not effective to correct the situations.
- Inspections carried out by the CA in recent years to verify those levels of compliance, which are mostly targeted, had found a significant percentage of cattle and sheep holdings where non-compliances were present. In 2013, 6 073 of the 9 371 cattle holdings inspected revealed cases of non-compliance, i.e. abnormalities in the way movements had been notified and/or the way animals were identified, and of the 4 505 sheep and goat holdings inspected in 2013, 3 256 were found to be non-compliant. Despite the fact that the majority of the non-compliances were in general minor, the CA acknowledged the high percentage of problems found and, in particular, the difficulties for the sheep sector to comply with all the rules in that respect.
- They acknowledged that verification of full compliance in this area requires continuous efforts from their side, which are translated into numerous awareness campaigns, frequent controls and enforcement of the legal requirements, as appropriate. The audit team could see examples of all those initiatives and underlined the need for a critical review of the effectiveness of the official control system in place<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> *In their response to the draft report, the CA, while acknowledging that some of the deficiencies found by the audit team could have an impact on animal traceability, stressed the importance of a number of additional issues, in particular:*

- *They highlighted the adequate operation of the BDNI, as also underlined by a number of previous audits from the Commission services.*
- *They added that the fact that some operators are much more compliant with the notification of animal movements (e.g. slaughterhouses), compensates to a certain extent for the late notification from others (e.g. farmers or dealers).*
- *They associate the difficulties in achieving the accurate and fast traceability of movements in the sheep sector with the complexity of the legal requirements in force, which, unlike those in the cattle sector, do*

- The BDNI is updated daily at central level, but the consultation platform available to staff of the DD(CS)PPs is updated only twice a month with all new information reported by the stakeholders. This slow process generates a high number of 'floating' animals which have gone through animal markets or assembly centres, and whose actual origin and/or destination would very often have to be traced only on paper as it is not yet available in the BDNI<sup>2</sup>. According to staff of some DD(CS)PPs, this is even more complicated in the case of movements of sheep, as individual identification numbers are not included on movement documents and this makes more difficult the traceability of animals passing by dealers, markets and assembly centres.
- In addition, OV's at the DD(CS)PPs cannot have access to all information contained in the database, as this is restricted geographically to the area under their responsibility, and only some staff from the DGAL at central level can get access to the national picture. That may limit the options of OV's at local level to quickly investigate disease suspicions and performing epidemiological investigations<sup>3</sup>.
- Small holdings keeping sheep and goats, poultry (less than 250) and one pig (in accordance with the derogation in that respect laid down in EU legislation), of which there are numerous in some of the departments visited, are usually not registered and out of the official control system. In most cases, movements of animals thereto and there from are not registered anywhere and animal keepers do not interact with VS either.

#### 5.2.9 Availability of Equipment

The audit team could see evidence in relation to the availability of equipment to be used in the event of animal disease outbreaks. Logistical arrangements were in place to ensure that the equipment and resources necessary in the event of a minor outbreak could be readily available to staff of the DD(CS)PPs. The availability of sufficient equipment to react effectively in the event of a widespread outbreak relies on the functioning of the standard ORSEC operational plan and the powers of the departmental and zonal prefects to avail of all necessary equipment under civil protection provisions.

The audit team was informed about the availability at national level of equipment necessary for depopulation, such as equipment for slaughter (e.g. captive bolts, electric tongs, containers for gassing, etc.), and of equipment for cleaning and disinfection, which in many cases is kept by the GDS in some departments. Representatives of the GDS advised the audit team that they have contracts with some departments to ensure availability of those resources when necessary, and that despite the lack of a contract with the CCA, those resources can always be used by any CA nationwide upon request in the event of any crisis.

#### 5.2.10 Vaccination policy and availability of vaccine

- In relation to the possible use of vaccination in the event of an outbreak of FMD, the DGAL has promoted the development of decision-support tools, mostly based on modelling and scenario simulations, in order to better inform the decision making process and weighing up of the criteria laid down in Annex X to Directive

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*not require availability in the BDNI of detailed information on movements of individual animals.*

<sup>2</sup> *In their response to the draft report, the CA stressed the fact that the project underway to introduce a new information management system that will substitute SIGAL shortly, will allow all staff to access updated information immediately.*

<sup>3</sup> *Please, see the information contained in the previous footnote.*

2003/85/EC, and thereby anticipate options for pre-emptive culling and/or emergency vaccination in the context of a worst case scenario, as required by the said Directive.

- According to representatives of the BSA, further steps are needed to better rationalise the information obtained from that research in order to ease up the decision-making and implementation process in the event of an outbreak, in particular in order to prepare the decentralised services for the application of any necessary vaccination campaign. Nevertheless, they highlighted the comprehensive nature of the studies carried out, which had taken into account all possible factors that would intervene in such a situation, and that has contributed to better inform their future policy in that respect. They added that, in principle, the use of vaccination would not be the first choice unless in the very unlikely event that the outbreak grew out of control in very specific geographical areas of the country with a very high animal density; e.g. Brittany.
- The DGAL has not finalised yet the process to update the possible use of other emergency vaccination options, such as for CSF or AI, as they do not see those as feasible options for the time being. Nevertheless, they added that they have experience with vaccination and its follow-up in the event of CSF outbreaks in wild boars (North East of France) and that they will always consider the available options according to the advice they would request from the ANSES. Finally, representatives of the DGAL informed the audit team that they have asked two national consultative bodies on animal health and agriculture in general for advice on the future options for the vaccination strategies for animal epizootic diseases.

### **Conclusions on Contingency Plans:**

Available CPs and OMs are mostly fit for purpose and are in the process of being further adapted to the circumstances and responsibilities of all CAs in order to better define command and control structures, and reinforce the effectiveness of their operations in the event of epizootic disease outbreaks.

The CA can avail of outstanding technical and epidemiological expertise that can provide adequate diagnostic and epidemiological advice in any animal health crisis situation. This has, for instance, contributed to the development of decision-support tools, mostly based on modelling and scenario simulations, in order to better inform the decisional process on whether to opt for vaccination, or not, in the event of a large outbreak of FMD.

However, in the event of a large scale epizootic disease outbreak, a number of shortcomings still undermine the robustness of the emergency preparedness system in place, in particular:

- The insufficient operational integration between the systems established by the various CAs at departmental and regional level involved in the response to a disease outbreak.
- The absence of sufficiently compatible and user-friendly information management tools necessary to all relevant CA, at central, regional and departmental level, in order to speed up and facilitate the evaluation of the crisis situation, to manage all necessary activities in real-time, and to contribute to the overall effectiveness of any response to a disease outbreak.
- A number of deficiencies present in relation to the completeness and reliability of data on holding registration and animal movements may have a detrimental impact on the

availability of adequate information on animal traceability needed for the performance of the epidemiological enquiries and for the selection of the most effective actions required by EU legislation laying down provisions for control measures and contingency planning for FMD, AI, CSF and ASF.

The DGAL is in the process of reviewing in detail all components of the systems currently in place and provided the audit team with extensive evidence showing the good direction taken in that respect. Provided this process continues as planned, it is likely that the shortcomings identified will be properly addressed and that the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness system is significantly enhanced.

### **5.3 PREPAREDNESS AND AWARENESS**

#### **Legal requirements:**

For all epizootic diseases relevant to this audit, there is a requirement that any occurrence of the disease is notified to the competent authority. With the exception of AHS, notification of the European Commission is mandatory. Surveillance programmes and systems for early detection of disease are required for BT and AI. For some diseases, risk factors (e.g. Areas of high animal density, worst cases scenarios) must be identified within the contingency plan. Specific preparedness and awareness criteria are specified for FMD; for most other relevant diseases, a communications strategy and appropriate communications training are required.

The organisation of real-time alert exercises is required for FMD and AI. Alarm drills are required for CSF and ASF.

Annex 2 to this report summarises relevant legislative requirements.

#### **Findings:**

##### *5.3.1 Epizootic disease risk analysis and alert levels*

- The ANSES plays a major role in this respect as it provides comprehensive animal health risk analyses to the DGAL upon request. In addition, the French platform for epidemiological surveillance in animal health (*Plateforme nationale de surveillance épidémiologique en santé animale* – ESA platform) brings together all sources of standard epidemiological intelligence needed for the French early warning system for animal diseases (see 5.3.3), including since January 2013 a specific group of experts in charge of evaluating all possible animal health (emerging) risks, and factors related thereto (e.g. environmental or economic changes) coming from outside of France.
- The ESA platform prepares specific documents regularly in response to any incident or incoming risk; the audit team could see examples in relation to the recent FMD incursions in Northern Africa or the presence of ASF in Eastern Europe. Moreover, examples could be also seen of how these alerts had been followed by information and awareness campaigns organised by the DGAL, the GDS and the GTV.

##### *5.3.2 Notification requirements (peacetime)*

- On top of the legal references mentioned in section 5.1.2 and of the specific CPs available for epizootic diseases, the DGAL (BSA) has prepared, and regularly

updates, a specific comprehensive practical guidance addressed mainly to the VS that lays down all necessary legal and practical information with regard to the suspicion, investigation and confirmation of those diseases.

- Since the VS and the farmers; i.e. the GDS and the GTV, are considered the first line of defence and alert for the early warning system in France, major importance has always been given to the awareness and training of these stakeholders. The audit team could confirm the availability of numerous initiatives in that respect, both developed within those stakeholders' associations and other organised by the DGAL, the DRAAFs and the DD(CS)PPs. Farmers, food business operators and the VS met during the on-the-spot visits were fully aware of their obligations to report suspicions of epizootic diseases.

### 5.3.3 Monitoring and surveillance systems

- Detection of major epizootic diseases in France relies mainly on the passive surveillance system ensured by the farming and veterinary practitioners' community. The unique integration of both collectives in the GDS and GTV, respectively, contributes very significantly to ensure that those stakeholders assume their ownership and responsibility within the broad network of animal disease surveillance systems present in France for the various animal species. That network is spearheaded by the ESA platform, which brings together all stakeholders that can play a relevant role in relation to animal health surveillance (e.g. CA, laboratories, GDS and GTV, wildlife and hunting associations, etc.) and, thereby, facilitates the coordination of all activities between the CA, mainly the DGAL, who chairs a national committee overseeing the activities of the ESA platform, and all the other public and private players in the network. More detailed information can be seen in the ESA platform webpage:

<http://www.plateforme-esa.fr/>

- The DGAL regularly uses the risk assessments provided by the ANSES, together with other sources of information, such as input from the national centre for medical and veterinary entomology on vectors or the French agricultural research and international cooperation organization working for the sustainable development of tropical and Mediterranean regions (the CIRAD, in its French denomination), in order to put in place tailor-made risk targeted surveillance systems for a number of diseases, such as AI and ND, CSF, and BT, in wild and domestic animals.
  - Risk-based, routine statistically based and targeted surveillance programmes underway for those diseases in domestic and wildlife were presented to the audit team and they had been designed and were implemented in a satisfactory manner.
  - In addition, a number of other active and syndromic surveillance initiatives targeting the various domestic animal species and wildlife are underway or in the process of being trialled out; e.g. a surveillance network for wildlife, surveillance of abortions and other reproductive problems in cattle, monitoring of mortality levels in cattle and sheep by VS and ABP processing plants, use of the results of *post-mortem* inspection in slaughterhouses, surveillance of reproductive and nervous disorders in horses, etc.
- In the context of the ESA platform, the existing animal health surveillance systems are subject to a quality evaluation system developed by the ANSES, which regularly

evaluates in a very comprehensive manner how their conception and implementation contribute to their effective operation. The audit team could see several examples of the evaluations performed by experts associated to the ESA platform and how the outcome had been used to improve the operation of the surveillance activities.

- According to representatives of the BSA, inclusion of testing for major epizootic diseases as part of the routine differential diagnosis in situations where their presence may be difficult to unequivocally exclude; i.e. the so-called 'exclusion diagnosis', has not been so far a common practice, as any such testing can only be carried out once the notification of an official suspicion of a notifiable disease occurs; which happens infrequently.
  - At the DD(CS)PPs visited, the audit team learnt that in some cases that process actually happens and that OVs can discuss possible suspicions with VS on the phone; nevertheless, very limited documentation could be seen in that respect.
  - The representatives of the BSA added that since May 2014 they have improved the communication options for the VS to raise the attention of the DD(CS)PPs in relation to possible suspicions that would need a more technical and expertise-based differential diagnosis, before an epizootic disease is excluded. That process can be carried out directly by the OV or may require the participation of an expert from a NRL or another official service. They acknowledged that they were in the process of further formalising this activity, including on the ways to make it fully transparent and keep all details of the process in a database.
  - Finally, they acknowledged the relevance of this approach as it would facilitate a deeper investigation of the cases above mentioned, increasing the sensitivity of the surveillance system, and it may significantly contribute to the early detection of the incursion of an exotic or emerging disease. They added that this policy is being considered in the context of the current review of the early warning and emergency preparedness systems and that the ANSES has already been consulted on the matter.

#### *5.3.4 Public awareness activities in “peacetime”*

- There is a high level of disease awareness amongst veterinary practitioners, in particular the VS, farmers and other stakeholders, such as staff responsible for ABP processing plants, slaughterhouses and assembly centres. This is regularly enhanced by all levels of the CAs through targeted campaigns and continuous training of the VS and official staff (see also 5.3.6).
- Websites maintained by the DGAL, the ANSES, the GDS, the GTV, the ESA, and many more stakeholders, keep extensive information and good guidance in relation to epizootic diseases and to the actions to be taken in case of any suspicion (see also 5.3.7 in relation to participation of representatives of the industry in simulation exercises).

#### *5.3.5 Bio-security measures in place on animal holdings*

- The Rural and Fisheries Code includes specific provisions requiring all those who keep and handle animals to respect cleaning and disinfection rules in order to prevent

transmission of diseases; in addition, recent amendments to the Code introduce the possibility for the DGAL to pass additional legislation on preventive measures specific to each disease, but this regulatory structure has not yet been put in place. In the meantime, some specific provisions already exist for a number of production sectors:

- There are specific provisions for domestic pigs kept outdoors in relation to fencing and related biosecurity measures intended to prevent contact with, and transmission of disease from wild boars. In addition, further specific biosecurity measures were introduced in 2009 after the appearance of H1N1 AI.
- In relation to the poultry sector, specific biosecurity measures are in place to prevent transmission of *Salmonella spp.* According to representatives of the DGAL, a total of 95% of chicken and turkey breeding stock are kept in compliance with those measures, as are 80% of holdings with laying hens. In addition, a number of specific instructions that were laid down in accordance with related EU legislation, detail additional biosecurity measures aimed at preventing transmission of AI from wild birds.
- Although no official guidance has been prepared beyond the legal framework just mentioned, most production sectors have their own programmes promoting on-farm biosecurity measures. This is specially the case in the pig and poultry sectors, but also to some extent in the case of ruminants. In all cases the GDS and the GTV play a major role in raising the awareness and providing training in that area. The audit team could see numerous examples in that respect, most of them linked to the various animal health surveillance networks and endemic disease control and eradication programmes that are in place for the various production sectors.
- In addition, as part of the mandate of the VS, even if not considered as official controls by the DGAL, they have to perform compulsory visits to all cattle (annually, since 2005), poultry (bi-annually, since 2013) and (from early 2015) pig holdings, during which general animal health prevention and biosecurity measures are evaluated and discussed with the animal keepers. The DGAL has prepared specific detailed guidance and checklists to be followed and used, respectively, by the VS during those visits. The reports from the visits are uploaded to a dedicated database and the information is always available to the CA.

### 5.3.6 Staff training

- The DGAL has very formalised training programmes for staff operating at all levels of the organisation. The audit team could see examples of numerous initiatives related to the early warning and emergency preparedness systems for animal diseases addressed to staff of the DRAAFs and the DD(CS)PPs, and to the VS.
- Staff of all CA have to follow specific training sessions organised at central level, in a specific training centre of the MAAF, and by the French veterinary schools and the regional and departmental CA, to complete a comprehensive cycle that includes many sessions targeting the main areas related to the early warning and emergency preparedness systems. Since April 2013, 20 regions and 55 departments have organised sessions in those respects and more than 800 staff of the CA and VS have participated (see also section 5.5 on animal depopulation).

### 5.3.7 Simulation exercises

- The DGAL has established in an instruction a system that requires each level of the CA to organise/participate in a number of disease simulation exercises with a fixed frequency, requiring that the DD(CS)PPs participate in exercises organised at local and regional level within four years.
- Even though this was still under development, the regional coordinators of the PNISU are responsible for the overall coordination of the activities carried out by the DD(CS)PPs, including on the harmonisation of the reporting documentation prepared at the end of each exercise.
- Evidence was provided of the numerous exercises that are organised each year, mostly at local level by the DD(CS)PPs, but also some at regional level and a few at national level in recent years. In many cases, representatives of the GDS, the GTV and some other stakeholders had participated in those exercises. The DGAL provides annually an extensive summary to the Commission of the outcome of all those exercises.
- The audit team could see that, in general, the analysis made of the organisation and implementation of the exercises by staff of the administrative level involved was very critical, in a very constructive manner, and lessons to be learned were always pointed out in the summarised outcome from all of them. However, it was difficult to evaluate how the DGAL had taken on-board the lessons learnt from the exercises in order to update and improve the CPs, or how some of the DD(CS)PPs visited had updated or modified the OMs likewise, as this was not clearly indicated in any of the reports or documents drafted at the end of the exercises. Representatives of all levels of the CA advised the audit team that they do take those lessons on-board, but that the process is not documented in a way that makes easy linking the improvements currently made to the emergency preparedness system with the lessons learnt from all the exercises carried out annually. They added that the new tools to be introduced shortly in relation to contingency planning and the enhancement of the activities of the national and regional PNISU coordinators will improve the situation.

### **Conclusions on Preparedness and Awareness:**

The multi-component early warning system in place in France can effectively contribute to the prevention and prompt detection, control and eradication of outbreaks of epizootic diseases, in particular thanks to:

- Availability of regularly updated disease risk analyses and epidemiological advice that are used to:
  - prioritise allocation of resources to animal health prevention and risk targeting of disease surveillance systems, and
  - plan well-focussed training initiatives for OVAs and VSA and raise awareness amongst all stakeholders of the importance of early detection and notification of these diseases.
- A high level of awareness amongst stakeholders in the animal production sector of the importance of preventive health care and biosecurity measures as the main pillars of the high health status of the animal populations in France.

- The very satisfactory collaboration between the industry, including animal keepers; i.e. the GDS, the VSs, and private and official laboratories and staff of the CAs at all levels. This system facilitates prompt investigations in case of disease situations whose cause cannot be easily ascertained and thereby allow the CAs to adequately investigate the possible presence of epizootic diseases.
- Organisation of simulation and real-time exercises in dealing with epizootic disease outbreaks that take place regularly, and that effectively contribute to:
  - train personnel designated to be involved in an emergency situation related to the control of potentially rapid spreading animal diseases, and
  - testing, critically reviewing and up-dating CPs and emergency preparedness arrangements in general.

## 5.4 LABORATORIES

### Legal requirements:

Articles 11 & 12 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 set out requirements in relation to sampling, analysis and official laboratories, including that laboratories must be accredited to and operate in accordance with ISO 17025.

Specific requirements relating to laboratories are laid down in the various Directives on epizootic disease control including the designation and functions of National Reference Laboratories, the tests and criteria to be applied, and the provision of adequate diagnostic capabilities and capacity. Diagnostic manuals are provided for FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD and AI (see Annex 2).

### Findings:

- General procedures and most of the specific diagnostic tests for all epizootic diseases in the NRLs are accredited according to norm ISO:17025; the exceptions being the diagnosis of ASF, AHS and those related to the diseases covered by Directive 92/119/EC. In all cases, the diagnostic techniques used have been validated either by the relevant EU reference laboratory or by internal validation procedures carried out by the relevant NRL.
- Well updated standard operating procedures (SOP) were in place for the relevant tests in the context of the quality management system set up in the NRLs visited, as well as reliable internal laboratory information management systems. The former follow the provisions laid down on EU diagnostic manuals (e.g. for CSF, ASF and AI), or in other relevant international standards, as appropriate.
- In addition, the NRLs:
  - Participate regularly with satisfactory results in inter-laboratory comparison tests organised by the network of EU reference laboratories for all relevant infectious diseases.
  - Coordinate the activities of the network of departmental laboratories and other (public and private) laboratories authorised by the DGAL to perform some official testing in relation to some epizootic diseases, such as CSF, AI or BT. Amongst other requirements, those laboratories must be accredited and

perform their official diagnosis in accordance with the SOP provided by the NRLs, which was confirmed in the authorised laboratory visited by the audit team.

- Organise national inter-laboratory comparison tests for the laboratories above mentioned. Those tests are organised according to norm ISO:17043.
- The NRLs visited had developed their own laboratory CP, which includes an evaluation of their capacity to adapt and respond to the diagnostic demands of a large disease outbreak, upon which action will be taken to enhance their preparedness. In addition, additional arrangements were in place to avail of the diagnostic capability of some of the other authorised laboratories in the event of large disease outbreaks that required a sudden increase in the diagnostic throughput.

### **Conclusions on Laboratories:**

The NRLs can guarantee that a reliable diagnosis can be carried out in accordance with relevant EU legislation for the majority of epizootic diseases covered by the scope of this audit, but the absence of accreditation for some other, as required by Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004, could compromise the technical validity of the results obtained. In addition, adequate steps have been taken in order to verify if any additional arrangement is needed, and what diagnostic overcapacity is in place, to ensure that the laboratory network can effectively adapt to and cope with unexpected large scale outbreaks of those diseases.

## **5.5 DEPOPULATION FOR EPIZOOTIC DISEASE CONTROL**

### **Legal requirements:**

Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 lays down rules for the killing of animals, including when this is performed for the purpose of depopulation. In particular, Article 18 of the Regulation requires that the stunning and killing methods planned and the corresponding standard operating procedures for ensuring compliance with the rules laid down in the Regulation shall be included in the contingency plans required under Union law on animal health and that, when implementing depopulation, the competent authority shall take any appropriate action to safeguard the welfare of the animals in the best available conditions.

### **Findings:**

- The DGAL had recently prepared a technical guidance on depopulation methods to be used at local level by all DD(CS)PPs to produce action plans for the killing of animals and related operations in the event of a disease outbreak. Representatives of the DGAL noted that the guidance had been sent for consultation to the ANSES and the special national advisory body on animal and plant health policy and that their opinion was expected by January 2015. In the meantime, the version available during the audit (from October 2014) had been distributed to the DD(CS)PPs, and it was available and already used in the ones visited.
- The technical guidance contains criteria for selection of the most appropriate method for stunning and killing, but:
  - It does not cover options for adapting them to the size and location of suspected outbreaks and it lacks some details on key parameters for certain

stunning methods, as required by of Article 18 (1) of, and Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009.

- The methods mentioned therein do not identify all respective estimated maximum kill rates which would provide support for granting the possible derogations to some provisions envisaged in Article 18 (3) to the said Regulation for exceptional circumstances.
- In line with the rest of the arrangements to be included in the ORSEC operational plan, the DD(CS)PPs have to follow the technical guidance to identify all human and material resources needed for each stunning and killing method that could be used in the event of an outbreak.
  - The DD(CS)PPs are responsible for selection of the method for stunning and killing taken into account the species involved, the number of animals on the farm and the epidemiological constraints. In general, in case of a small outbreak the equipment for stunning and killing is available at departmental level, and regularly maintained, with the GDS also cooperating with human and technical resources. In case of a large outbreak in pigs and poultry, the DD(CS)PPs can refer to the DGAL and request a mobilisation of services provided by a private contractor (following public procurement procedures). A regular maintenance of the equipment is part of the existing contract between the DGAL and the contractor. Very limited resources, anticipation of options and experience were seen with regard to a possible large outbreak affecting cattle.
  - The audit team found in all the visited DD(CS)PPs a list of personnel that could be called in case of outbreak to stun and kill affected animals. In case of smaller outbreaks, the DD(CS)PPs rely either on trained slaughterhouse staff or on their own technicians working at them. In one of the DD(CS)PPs visited, the audit team was informed that the list of personnel responsible for stunning of bovines (by penetrative captive bolt guns) comprised only their own technicians, who were used to do that in cases of emergency slaughtered animals. The CA acknowledged that emergency slaughtering occurs sporadically and that their capability to efficiently and effectively carry out that activity in different, and more challenging, conditions on the farms (i.e. quickly, smoothly and avoiding unnecessary pain and suffering to the affected animals) had not been tested yet.
- Representatives of the DGAL and the DD(CS)PPs informed the audit team that all depopulation operations will be carried out under supervision of an OV to verify compliance with animal welfare requirements. Those tasks are established in the technical guidance. However, the audit team found that no other SOP or instructions supplementing and adapting the technical guidance to local conditions were available at the DD(CS)PPs visited. For instance, staff met at the DD(CS)PPs was not aware of any parameters that would apply if they had to oversee the activities of specific equipment to kill pigs that is used by contractors in charge of that task.
- Representatives of the DGAL noted that two culling/depopulation exercises took place since 2013; for instance, in July 2013, depopulation of a poultry flock was carried out with a standard gas method and the report on that activity with all the information required by Article 18 (4) of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 was sent to the Commission. They added that they had not studied yet the exceptional

circumstances that would permit to derogate from certain provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009.

### **Conclusions on depopulation for epizootic disease control:**

The DGAL has taken some steps to incorporate provisions laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 on animal welfare in the context of killing of animals for the purpose of depopulation related to animal disease outbreaks. However, all those developments are still insufficient to ensure that the system in place can guarantee an adequate level of planning and specific preparation (e.g. availability of SOP and experience to draw action plans), both at central and at local level, to integrate animal welfare properly into CPs and OMs for epizootic diseases in accordance with all the requirements of Article 18 of the said Regulation, in particular when a large disease outbreak occurs and it affects several animal species in a high animal density area.

## **5.6 DISPOSAL OF CARCASSES**

### **Legal requirements:**

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 lays down health rules for animal by-products (ABP) and derived products, in order to prevent and minimise risks to public and animal health. In particular, Article 9 (f) (i) specifies that animals and parts of animals killed for disease control purposes, shall be considered as Category 2 animal by-products and therefore subject to the disposal methods specified in the Regulation.

In relation to FMD controls, Directive 2003/85/EC (Article 72 (1), (4) & (5) and Annex XVII Points 13 & 14) requires that the means of disposal of carcasses and animal waste does not cause environmental damage and that appropriate sites and undertakings for the treatment or disposal of animal carcasses and animal waste be identified in the contingency plan.

### **Findings:**

- The operation of the ABP processing plants in France is regulated by the DGAL, which shapes up the range of the geographical coverage for each of them throughout the country in order to ensure that ABP can be collected and processed in accordance with national and EU legislation. Therefore, the DGAL has access to important information in relation to their activities and their potential throughput. In addition, in the context of the PNISU and the ORSEC plans, processing plants are obliged to provide support to the CA in the event of an epizootic disease outbreak, even if no contract has been agreed upon with them, and the LDCC and NDCC have powers to reorganise their activities accordingly.
- Representatives of the DGAL and the rendering industry acknowledged that they had not studied the overcapacity available in France, even though individual plants know it in detail. The processing plant visited did not have an internal CP to be used in the event of a large disease outbreak and this aspect had not been discussed with the relevant DD(CS)PP; nevertheless, that issue had been discussed in another of the departments visited.
- According to representatives of the DGAL, operational arrangements in this area are the responsibility of the DD(CS)PPs as part of the ORSEC plans, but the DGAL has

not set up a coordinated strategy for the whole country for the operation of the system in case of a widespread outbreak. Moreover, little attention has been paid to anticipate the possible occurrence of a worst-case scenario related to an outbreak of FMD, so that the CAs can ascertain whether the processing plants could complement each other in taking the responsibility of handling the ABP that are collected and processed routinely plus the higher risk material resulting from the emergency situation.

- The representatives of the DGAL highlighted the very unlikely occurrence of such an event as a result of the major emphasis put in France on the effective operation of the early warning system for detection and quick eradication of any epizootic disease, which had proved to be the right policy for many years now. They added though that the DD(CS)PPs have considered anyway options to resort to the derogations on burning and burial of carcasses contemplated in Article 19 (e) of Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 and Article 15 (a) of Regulation (EU) No 142/2011. They audit team could confirm in some of the departments visited that the CA had carried out evaluations of the options for using alternative disposal methods in accordance with environmental rules in compliance with the aforesaid requirements and with those laid down in Directive 2003/85/EC, in relation to FMD.

### **Conclusions on disposal of carcasses:**

The DGAL has a well set up system for carcass disposal during peace time that should be able to deal adequately with small and middle-sized disease outbreaks. In addition, despite some uncertainty with regard to the possibility that the carcass disposal system may be overwhelmed by the volume of ABP to be disposed of in the event of a major disease outbreak; the CAs have taken steps to anticipate possible alternative means of disposal that could be used in accordance with environmental rules.

## **6 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS**

The CA have put in place an excellent early warning system that can contribute to the quick detection of outbreaks of highly contagious animal diseases. This, coupled with the availability of largely satisfactory emergency preparedness measures and arrangements, should make the system in place in France capable to manage the situation in the event of an epizootic disease outbreak, in particular thanks to:

- A satisfactory level of animal health surveillance, mainly founded on the excellent cooperation in that regard between the CA and all relevant stakeholders, that can effectively contribute to the early detection of any unusual disease event in domestic and wild animal populations.
- The availability of adequate legal powers and emergency financial provisions to cope with a disease outbreak.
- The availability of outstanding technical and epidemiological expertise, in particular thanks to the network of NRLs that can provide excellent diagnostic and epidemiological advice in the event of an animal health crisis situation.
- The ongoing improvement and modernisation of the available CPs, and of the emergency preparedness system as a whole, due to be completed in 2015.
- The organisation of numerous real-time alert exercises at local, regional and national level, that provide extensive feedback to all CAs, including the CCA, and rightly point out areas where improvements can be made.

- The development of decision-support tools mostly based on modelling and scenario simulations, that contribute to better inform decisions on the use of emergency vaccination in the event of an outbreak of FMD.

The audit team identified some areas for improvement in relation to the level of emergency preparedness needed in the event of disease outbreaks that become geographically widespread, in particular if they occur in areas with high animal density or when several domestic and wild animal species are affected simultaneously. The CCA were already in the process of taken action in relation to those areas and new initiatives were already underway in order to address the weaknesses identified, in particular in order to:

- Ensure the effective coordinated operation of the emergency preparedness systems set out by the regional and local CA throughout the country.
- Enhance the effectiveness of the information management systems currently available to the CAs to facilitate that coordination and to speed and ease up the selection of actions to be taken in the event of an animal health crisis.
- Ensure that the local and regional CA select and avail of the most adequate options in relation to animal depopulation and disposal of dead animals in the event of a disease outbreak.
- Enhance the completeness and reliability of available information on holding registration and animal movements for all animal species in order to improve the quality of the epidemiological data necessary to target and implement actions in the event of a disease outbreak.

## **7 CLOSING MEETING**

A closing meeting was held on 14 November 2014 with representatives of the CCA. At this meeting, the main findings and conclusions of the audit were presented by the audit team. The representatives of the CCA did not indicate any major disagreement with the preliminary findings and conclusions, provided additional clarification on a number of issues and further details on the various initiatives underway aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness system in France.

## 8 RECOMMENDATIONS

The CA are invited to provide details of the actions taken and planned, including deadlines for their completion ('action plan'), within one month after receipt of the report, aimed at addressing the recommendations set out below.

<b>No.</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>
1.	To ensure in accordance with Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 an efficient and effective coordination in respect of the levels of preparation required from the DD(CS)PPs and the DRAAFs so that all of them are ready to effectively tackle animal health emergency situations with a wide geographical scope affecting several departments or regions.
2.	To take action in order to enhance the completeness and reliability of data on holding registration and animal movements available to the CAs in order to guarantee: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="464 853 1439 965">• Compliance with EU requirements on those respects, as appropriate, taken into account the deficiencies singled out by the audit team in relation to cattle, sheep and goats, and pigs.</li><li data-bbox="464 981 1439 1160">• Availability of adequate information on animal traceability necessary for the performance of the epidemiological enquiries and the selection of the most effective actions required by EU legislation laying down provisions for control measures and contingency planning for FMD, AI, CSF and ASF.</li></ul>
3.	To ensure that all laboratories designated for the diagnosis of epizootic diseases covered by EU legislation are accredited as required by Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 in order to guarantee that a reliable diagnosis can be carried out and that technically valid results are obtained in all cases.
4.	To ensure in accordance with Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 that on the basis of the various possible scenarios for the size and location of animal disease outbreaks, the system in place can guarantee an adequate level of planning and specific preparation (e.g. availability of SOP and experience to draw action plans), both at central and at local level, to integrate animal welfare properly into CPs and OMs for epizootic diseases.

The competent authority's response to the recommendations can be found at:

[http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/rep\\_details\\_en.cfm?rep\\_inspection\\_ref=2014-7044](http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/rep_details_en.cfm?rep_inspection_ref=2014-7044)



## ANNEX 1 – LEGAL REFERENCES

Legal Reference	Official Journal	Title
Reg. 882/2004	OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1, Corrected and re-published in OJ L 191, 28.5.2004, p. 1	Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules
Dir. 2003/85/EC	OJ L 306, 22.11.2003, p. 1-87	Council Directive 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease repealing Directive 85/511/EEC and Decisions 89/531/EEC and 91/665/EEC and amending Directive 92/46/EEC
Dir. 2005/94/EC	OJ L 10, 14.1.2006, p. 16-65	Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 on Community measures for the control of avian influenza and repealing Directive 92/40/EEC
Dir. 2000/75/EC	OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 74-83	Council Directive 2000/75/EC of 20 November 2000 laying down specific provisions for the control and eradication of bluetongue
Dir. 2001/89/EC	OJ L 316, 1.12.2001, p. 5-35	Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever
Dir. 2002/60/EC	OJ L 192, 20.7.2002, p. 27-46	Council Directive 2002/60/EC of 27 June 2002 laying down specific provisions for the control of African swine fever and amending Directive 92/119/EEC as regards Teschen disease and African swine fever
Dir. 92/119/EEC	OJ L 62, 15.3.1993, p. 69-85	Council Directive 92/119/EEC of 17 December 1992 introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease
Dir. 92/35/EEC	OJ L 157, 10.6.1992, p. 19-27	Council Directive 92/35/EEC of 29 April 1992 laying down control rules and measures to combat African horse sickness

Dir. 92/66/EEC	OJ L 260, 5.9.1992, p. 1-20	Council Directive 92/66/EEC of 14 July 1992 introducing Community measures for the control of Newcastle disease
Reg. 1099/2009	OJ L 303, 18.11.2009, p. 1-30	Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing
Reg. 1266/2007	OJ L 283, 27.10.2007, p. 37-52	Commission Regulation (EC) No 1266/2007 of 26 October 2007 on implementing rules for Council Directive 2000/75/EC as regards the control, monitoring, surveillance and restrictions on movements of certain animals of susceptible species in relation to bluetongue
Dec. 2002/106/EC	OJ L 39, 9.2.2002, p. 71-88	2002/106/EC: Commission Decision of 1 February 2002 approving a Diagnostic Manual establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for evaluation of the laboratory tests for the confirmation of classical swine fever
Dec. 2003/422/EC	OJ L 143, 11.6.2003, p. 35-49	2003/422/EC: Commission Decision of 26 May 2003 approving an African swine fever diagnostic manual
Dec. 2000/428/EC	OJ L 167, 7.7.2000, p. 22-32	2000/428/EC: Commission Decision of 4 July 2000 establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for the evaluation of the results of laboratory tests for the confirmation and differential diagnosis of swine vesicular disease
Dec. 2006/437/EC	OJ L 237, 31.8.2006, p. 1-27	2006/437/EC: Commission Decision of 4 August 2006 approving a Diagnostic Manual for avian influenza as provided for in Council Directive 2005/94/EC
Dec. 2010/367/EU	OJ L 166, 01.07.2010, p. 22-32	2010/367/EU: Commission Decision of 25 June 2010 on the implementation by Member States of surveillance programmes for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds

Reg. 1069/2009	OJ L 300, 14.11.2009, p. 1-33	Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 laying down health rules as regards animal by-products and derived products not intended for human consumption and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 (Animal by-products Regulation)
Reg. 1760/2000	OJ L 204, 11.8.2000, p. 1-10	Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 establishing a system for the identification and registration of bovine animals and regarding the labelling of beef and beef products and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 820/97
Reg. 21/2004	OJ L 5, 9.1.2004, p. 8-17	Council Regulation (EC) No 21/2004 of 17 December 2003 establishing a system for the identification and registration of ovine and caprine animals and amending Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 and Directives 92/102/EEC and 64/432/EEC
Dir. 2008/71/EC	OJ L 213, 8.8.2008, p. 31-36	Council Directive 2008/71/EC of 15 July 2008 on the identification and registration of pigs (Codified version)
Dir. 64/432/EEC	OJ 121, 29.7.1964, p. 1977-2012	Council Directive 64/432/EEC of 26 June 1964 on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine