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FINAL REPORT OF AN AUDIT

CARRIED OUT IN

AUSTRIA

FROM 21 TO 29 JANUARY 2014

IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTINGENCY PLANS IN
RELATION TO ANIMAL HEALTH, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF
ANIMALS DURING DEPOPULATION FOR DISEASE CONTROL

In response to information provided by the Competent Authority, any factual error noted in the draft report has been corrected; any clarification appears in the form of a footnote.

Executive Summary

This report describes the outcome of a Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) audit in Austria carried out between 21 and 29 January 2014 as part of the FVO audit programme for 2014. The main objective was to evaluate the resources and arrangements put in place to implement the European Union (EU) requirements for contingency planning in the event of one or more outbreaks of epizootic diseases including the provisions on the protection of animals during depopulation. A secondary objective was to gather information and to identify best practice in relation to a number of issues relevant to epizootic disease control but not explicitly specified in EU legislation.

The report concludes that the competent authorities (CAs) have put in place an excellent early warning system that should contribute to the quick detection of outbreaks of highly contagious animal diseases. This, coupled with the availability of satisfactory emergency preparedness measures and arrangements, make the system in place in Austria suitable to manage the situation in the event of an epizootic disease outbreak, particularly if it is of limited geographic scope. This is due to:

- a satisfactory level of animal health surveillance, that should contribute to the early detection of any unusual disease event in domestic and wild animal populations;*
- the availability of adequate legal powers and financial provisions to cope with a disease outbreak;*
- the availability of contingency plans (CPs) providing most of the necessary instructions and guidance for staff involved in managing a disease outbreak;*
- the good levels of training and preparation amongst staff of all the CAs involved, and*
- the availability of adequate technical, diagnostic and epidemiological expertise and of effective data analysis and information management tools that facilitate the decision making process.*

However, the audit team identified shortcomings in the level of preparedness to deal with geographically widespread outbreaks, in particular if several Austrian Federal Provinces (hereafter, the Provinces) were involved, or outbreaks affecting several domestic and wild animal species, namely:

- The insufficient coordination by the central competent authority (CCA) of the development of operations manuals (OMs) by the CAs of the Provinces, in particular in relation to the availability of arrangements to ensure that:*
 - animal depopulation is carried out in accordance with EU requirements, and*
 - all necessary equipment and resources necessary in the event of an outbreak are readily available to all CAs involved.*
- Ineffective enforcement of EU requirements aimed at preventing the transmission and spread of infectious animal diseases that are applicable to assembly centres (ACs) involved in intra-EU trade of animals.*
- The CP for Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) does not provide for measures to be implemented in the event of a worst case scenario and it lacks detailed plans to enable the CAs to take well-informed decisions in relation to the need and extent of emergency vaccination against the disease.*
- The uncertainty about the rendering and incineration capacity available, and the lack of arrangements in the CP for FMD in respect of alternatives to ensure proper and effective disposal of animal carcasses and other animal by-products not for human consumption (ABP), in particular if it is necessary to bury or burn the carcasses of dead or killed animals on site.*

The report makes recommendations to the Austrian CAs aimed at addressing areas in which further improvements are required.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

Abbreviation	Explanation
ABP	Animal by-products not intended for human consumption, as defined in Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009
AC	Assembly centre
AGES	Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (<i>Österreichische Agentur für Gesundheit und Ernährungssicherheit GmbH</i>)
AHS	African Horse Sickness
AI	Avian Influenza
AMA	<i>Agra Markt Austria Marketing GmbH</i> (the cattle database)
ASF	African Swine Fever
BMG	Federal Ministry of Health (<i>Bundesministerium für Gesundheit</i>)
BT	Bluetongue
CA(s)	Competent Authority(ies)
CCA	Central Competent Authority
CP	Contingency Plan
CSF	Classical Swine Fever
CVO	Chief Veterinary Officer
DSR-AGES	Department for Data Management, Statistics and Risk Assessment (<i>AGES Bereich Daten, Statistik und Risikobewertung</i>)
DVS	District Veterinary Services
EHD	Epizootic haemorrhagic disease
ET	Expert group for animal disease control (<i>Expertengruppe Tierseuchenbekämpfung</i>)
EU	European Union
FMD	Foot-and-Mouth Disease
FVO	Food and Veterinary Office
HPAI	Highly pathogenic avian influenza
IVET-AGES	Institute for Veterinary Disease Control (<i>AGES Institut für Veterinärmedizinische Untersuchungen</i>)
KVG	Consumer Health Communication platform (<i>Kommunikationsplattform Verbrauchergesundheit</i>)
LDCC	Local Disease Control Centre
LPAI	Low pathogenic avian influenza
LFBIS	Information System for Agricultural and Forestry Holdings (<i>Land- und forstwirtschaftliches Betriebsinformationssystem</i>)
MS	Member State of the EU
ND	Newcastle Disease
NDCC	National Disease Control Centre

NRL	National Reference Laboratory
OM	Operations manual
OV	Official Veterinarian
Province(s)	Austrian Federal Province(s)
PVS	Provincial Veterinary Services
QGV	Poultry Health Service of the Austrian Quality Poultry Association (<i>Österreichischer QualitätsGeflügelVereinigung – Anerkannter Geflügelgesundheitsdienst</i>)
SOP	Standard operating procedures
SVD	Swine Vesicular Disease
TGD	Austrian Veterinary Health Service (<i>Österreichischer Tiergesundheitsdienst</i>)
TSchG	Animal Protection Act (<i>Tierschutzgesetz</i>)
TSG	Animal Diseases Act (<i>Tierseuchengesetz</i>)
VIS	Consumers health Information System electronic database (<i>Verbrauchergesundheits Informations System</i>)

1 INTRODUCTION

This audit took place in Austria from 21 to 29 January 2014 and was undertaken as part of the FVO planned audit programme. The audit team comprised three auditors from the FVO.

The audit team was accompanied throughout the audit by representatives of the Federal Veterinary Services of the Federal Ministry of Health (*Bundesministerium für Gesundheit* – BMG), which is the CCA within the scope of this audit. In addition, representatives of the Provincial Veterinary Services (PVS) of the Provinces visited accompanied the audit team during the time spent in their respective territories (see 5.1.1 for further details).

2 OBJECTIVES

The objective of this audit was to evaluate the resources and arrangements put in place to implement the EU requirements for contingency planning, including provisions on the protection of animals during depopulation, in the event of one or more outbreaks of the following epizootic diseases: FMD, Bluetongue (BT), Classical Swine Fever (CSF), African Swine Fever (ASF), Swine Vesicular Disease (SVD), African Horse Sickness (AHS), Avian Influenza (AI), Newcastle Disease (ND) and a number of other diseases.

A secondary objective was to gather information and to identify areas of best practice in relation to a number of issues relevant to epizootic disease control but not explicitly specified in EU legislation. Such issues include routine monitoring for epizootic disease, the deployment of risk analysis with subsequent determination of alert levels and Member State (MS) requirements for biosecurity measures on farms.

Whilst contingency planning for all of these diseases is included within the scope of this audit, the audit concentrated, in particular, on the evaluation of emergency preparedness in the event of an outbreak of ASF, FMD and AI.

- ASF is an emerging risk in the EU due to the recent confirmation of its presence in wild boar populations in some areas of Lithuania and Poland neighbouring the territories of the Russian Federation and Belarus, countries where the evolution of the epidemiological situation of the disease remains uncertain;
- FMD is one of the most difficult diseases to contain and affects several livestock species, and
- AI has been chosen as an example of a poultry disease where specific requirements for CPs are laid down in EU legislation.

In addition, attention was also paid to the state of readiness as regards early detection and crisis management in case of other emerging and re-emerging infectious animal diseases, in particular with regard to vector-borne diseases such as BT and AHS.

The requirements of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 are applicable since 1 January 2013 and the audit team carried out an evaluation of the implementation of the requirements of Article 18(1), (2) and (3) of this Regulation.

In pursuit of these objectives, the audit team visited three Provinces: Tyrol, Upper Austria and Styria, where the following sites were visited:

MEETINGS / VISITS		no.	COMMENTS
Competent Authorities	Central	2	Opening and closing meetings with representatives of the relevant Departments of the BMG and of the PVS
	Provincial	5	Meetings with three PVS and two district veterinary services
Laboratories		1	The national reference laboratory for epizootic diseases within the scope of this audit (IVET-AGES)
Holdings		3	Two cattle holdings and one free-range pig farm
Markets & ACs		3	Two ACs/animal markets operating with cattle, and one AC operating with pigs.
Slaughterhouses		1	One large pig slaughter / cutting establishment
Other establishments/operators		1	One category 1 ABP processing plant

3 LEGAL BASIS

The audit was carried out under the general provisions of EU legislation and, in particular:

- Article 45 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules.

Full legal references to EU legal acts quoted in this report are provided in Annex 1 and refer, where applicable, to the last amended version.

4 BACKGROUND

According to demographic and census data provided by the BMG for 2012, the following points are worth being mentioned in respect of the animal production sectors in Austria:

- As almost 60% of Austria's usable agricultural area is grassland; cattle farming and dairy farming constitute the most important lines of production in agriculture. Totally, some 69,000 farms keep approximately two million cattle, of which some 800,000 are cows. The average size of the holdings is small, with some 24 cattle kept in each farm.
- Pig keeping represents an important line of business in Austria's agriculture, with nearly 30,000 farms keeping about three million pigs.
- There are in excess of 420,000 sheep in some 16,000 flocks, and some 91,000 goats in approximately 10,000 flocks.
- Some 51,000 holdings keep some 12 million poultry, amongst which there is a significant number of turkeys (in excess of 500,000).
- Finally, there are approximately 74,000 horses kept in some 15,000 holdings.
- Upper and Lower Austria, and Styria (South-East) are the Provinces with the higher population densities of livestock and poultry; with the population of sheep and goats being more evenly distributed throughout the country.

Given the potential impact of outbreaks of epizootic disease, it is important that MS can react immediately and effectively in a coordinated manner and in co-operation with neighbouring

countries. EU legislation requires MS to have CPs in place to combat such outbreaks so as to reduce their adverse consequences.

Of critical importance to the suppression of an outbreak of epizootic disease, is the swiftness of initial diagnosis and the deployment of the first stages of the CP.

With regard to the historical situation in Austria as regards occurrence of epizootic diseases within the scope of this audit, the following is worth mentioning:

- Austria has been free of FMD since 1981 and free of CSF in wild boars since 2003 (last cases occurred in December 2000 and January 2001). The last cases in domestic pigs were in 1996.
- Highly pathogenic AI (HPAI) occurred in wild birds in the spring of 2006 (subtype H5N1). Low pathogenic (LPAI) was detected in wild birds in 2009 using PCR. Neither HPAI nor LPAI has been detected in domestic birds since the AI screening carried out between 2003 and 2013.
- The last cases of ND in poultry were detected in 1997, and the last cases in pigeons in 2012.
- After the appearance of BT in November 2008, the last occurrence of the disease was in July 2009; Austria was declared free of the disease in March 2011.
- Austria has been free of SVD since early 1979 and free of sheep and goat pox since 1954.
- AHS and ASF, as well as other exotic diseases such as epizootic haemorrhagic disease (EHD), Peste des petits ruminants, or Rift- Valley fever, have never been confirmed in Austria.

The last audit carried out in Austria on the same topic took place in 2003 (ref.: DG(SANCO)/9079/2003 – MR Final). The report of that audit is published on the following Website:

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/index_en.cfm

The outcome of that audit was largely satisfactory with some weaknesses highlighted, amongst which it is worth mentioning:

- the limited powers of the BMG to supervise and verify the activities of the Provinces in relation to emergency preparedness;
- the lack of guidance to ensure that the Provinces could prepare adequately at all levels to respond in the event of an epizootic disease outbreak;
- the lack of formalised arrangements to ensure that staff, facilities, equipment and materials would be available in case of an animal disease emergency, and
- the very limited consideration given to study and anticipate worst case scenarios and to organise simulation and real-time exercises accordingly.

The CAs provided satisfactory guarantees to the Commission that those weaknesses had been addressed. An updated situation in relation to those issues is described in various sections of this report.

5 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 COMPETENT AUTHORITIES

Legal requirements:

Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 lays down rules for the performance of official controls; in particular Article 4 requires the designation of CAs; co-ordination and co-operation between and within CAs and that sufficient legal powers are available to them. The availability of sufficient legal powers for the implementation of CPs is specified in most of the relevant Directives (see Annex 2). In addition Council Directive 2003/85/EC (Article 74 (3)(d), (g) & (i)) and Annex XVII (6) requires close cooperation with environmental authorities and enforcement bodies in relation to FMD control and Council Directive 2005/94/EC on the control of AI (Article 62 (3) requires close cooperation between the CAs responsible for the different sectors, particularly those in charge of animal health, public health, environmental matters and health and safety of workers.

Findings:

5.1.1 Structure of the CAs

Information on the structures of the Austrian CAs can be found in the country profile, which is available in the following Web Link:

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/last5_en.cfm?co_id=AT

The country profile (valid as of December 2012) provides detailed information on the responsibilities of the CAs under normal circumstances and a brief description of their activities in the event of a disease outbreak. In order to complete that description, it is worth mentioning that:

- The Federal Veterinary Services in the BMG comprise six Departments led by the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO), with Department 11 responsible for animal welfare, animal health surveillance, control and prevention of highly contagious diseases and zoonoses. These responsibilities include overall coordination of the drawing up of CPs which are required under EU animal health legislation. Departments 10 and 12 have related responsibilities on general animal health issues, including animal trade and veterinary legislation, and on food safety and ABP, respectively.
- In relation to animal health controls, each of the nine Provinces has its own PVS under the command of a Provincial CVO. The Provinces are further sub-divided into a total of 95 Districts, each with their own district veterinary services (DVS), which are managed and coordinated by a District Veterinary Officer and report to the Provincial CVO.
- In addition to the official veterinarians (OVs) working for the PVS and the DVS, there are some 1 000 veterinary meat inspectors, who, on top of their responsibilities for *ante-* and *post-mortem* inspection in relation to slaughter of animals, are available to assist the PVS in the event of a disease outbreak. The PVS must ensure that these veterinarians receive training in order to be fully operational in those circumstances.
- In some of the Provinces; e.g. Tyrol and Styria, the PVS have special arrangements with a number of private veterinary practitioners, which involve special contracts with some of them under the auspices of national law (see 5.1.2) that entitle them to obtain some pension rights from the State. They are responsible for delivering some services to farmers and municipalities in areas where OVs are not available, they help the PVS to implement disease surveillance programmes, and they are available to the DVS and the PVS in case of an animal disease emergency.
- The BMG, and also the other CAs in Austria involved in animal health controls, are advised and supported by the Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (*Österreichische Agentur für Gesundheit und Ernährungssicherheit GmbH – AGES*), which is a 100% State-owned organisation. It includes several Departments in its structure, some of which are directly

involved in emergency preparedness and management of outbreaks of epizootic diseases, such as:

- The Department for Data Management, Statistics and Risk Assessment (*AGES Bereich Daten, Statistik und Risikobewertung* – DSR-AGES), which has developed a number of tools that significantly contribute to facilitate the activities of the national disease crisis centre (NDCC) and the operation of all CAs, when they have to confront a disease outbreak, and it is also available to provide epidemiological and risk-analysis advise.
- The Institute for Veterinary Disease Control (*AGES Institut für Veterinärmedizinische Untersuchungen* – IVET-AGES), whose central laboratory in Mödling also includes all the national reference laboratories relevant for diagnosis of epizootic diseases (NRL). The IVET-AGES has three other laboratories (Linz, Graz and Innsbruck) that are involved in general diagnosis of animal diseases and that submit all samples to the NRL whenever there is any possible suspicion of an epizootic disease.
- In addition, the BMG coordinates development of the emergency preparedness and crisis management policy with the AGES and other CAs with responsibilities on public health in the Provinces, whenever the animal disease outbreak is caused by a zoonosis; e.g. AI, and also when investigations need to be carried out and actions taken along the food chain. Arrangements in that respect are ensured by a specific expert zoonosis commission that includes, amongst others, representatives of the BMG, the Provinces (the Heads of their own expert zoonosis commission) and the AGES.

In many MS, the development of CPs requires extensive cooperation within and between CAs and that responsibilities of the various CAs when dealing with an outbreak of epizootic disease are formally defined and agreed in advance. This often entails a change in the command structures of the CAs. Section 5.2.3 below outlines any such changes.

The audit team found that:

- The Provinces and the BMG have set up an internal auditing initiative that started to verify the implementation and enforcement activities of the PVS in 2006, and in relation to animal health issues in 2009. Some audits evaluate the performance of the overall official control system at central level in the Provinces, whereas other are thematic and focus on a specific control sector, such as food safety or animal health. Each province receives one general and two thematic audits during a three year audit cycle, with the animal health sector being audited at least once every nine years in each Province.
- The thematic audits for the animal health sector have incorporated provisions for verification of some areas related to the level of preparedness on and proper implementation of the rules on animal disease contingency planning, but they are not exhaustive in that regard, in particular in relation to animal welfare issues (see 5.5).
 - These audits are carried out by a group of specially trained staff from the PVS and the BMG; the representative of the latter being an observer during the process. According to representatives of the PVS met, additional specialised training on animal health and animal disease emergency preparedness is needed for the auditors in order to optimise the added value of the audit to their services.
 - Audits are well documented and reports are checked by a dedicated group from the BMG. Depending on the outcome of the audit, PVS are required to take action and implement corrective measures as appropriate, which is followed up by the auditing system until the issues are considered to be resolved.

- Four thematic audits have covered since 2009 the animal health sector in four Provinces, with one just finished at the time of this audit in one of the Provinces visited:
 - In comparison with documentation available in respect of audits carried out between 2009 and 2011, current guidance and check-lists available to the audit teams, as used during the latest audit, are more elaborated and targeted at checking issues related to emergency preparedness amongst the PVS and the DVS which, according to staff of the BMG allows for a more comprehensive and effective auditing approach.
 - Areas to be verified include availability of both the basic arrangements to react quickly and effectively to any suspicion or confirmation of an epizootic disease, such as the chain of command at provincial level, including other CAs and stakeholders, availability of proper documentation, adequate distribution of tasks and responsibilities and the level of training to obtain and manage epidemiological information, and of equipment for these emergency situations (e.g. clothing, material for sampling and killing of animals).
 - The audit team could not check the report of the latest audit as it was not ready yet; therefore, the way the evaluation of the systems in place was performed, its reach, and its possible impact, could not be assessed thoroughly. According to representatives of the PVS, the audits are positive as they encourage the review of the many components involved in this area, as well as the update and development of the OMs; however, they added that the nine years cycle is too long and that the audits pay little attention to gather evidence of the real level of preparedness in the field, as discussions and documentary checks mostly take place at central level in the PVS.
 - According to representatives of the BMG, the new approach to these audits will be slowly implemented, as new Provinces are audited in the near future (one per year), but they underlined that the audits will be just another component of the whole new reorganisation of the emergency preparedness system that is taking place in Austria (see 5.2).

5.1.2 *Legal powers available to the CAs*

Within the Austrian federal system:

- Direct federal administration applies to import controls where the federal government has direct control and staff of the BMG implements those controls.
- In relation to all other animal health controls, a system of indirect federal administration applies whereby the BMG keeps an overall planning and coordinating role, and adopts legislation and instructions. The latter are fully binding for the Provincial CAs and, therefore, implementation and enforcement must be ensured accordingly by the PVS.
- For animal welfare issues other than animal transport, the BMG has a coordinating role and adopts legislation, but the PVS have complete power in relation to the way it is implemented and enforced.

The following aspects are worth being underlined:

- The main overarching piece of legislation that regulates animal health issues in Austria, including in the event of an animal disease outbreak, is the Animal Diseases Act (*Tierseuchengesetz* – TSG) which, amongst other, has requirements for reporting any suspicion of disease, obliges certain stakeholders, including private veterinary practitioners, to provide assistance in case of epizootic disease and has requirements for the federal CAs

to pay compensation.

- A number of derived specific legal provisions (mostly Ordinances) are aimed at implementing specific EU legal requirements that set out measures to control and eradicate various epizootic diseases, such as FMD, CSF, ASF, AI or BT.
- In relation to animal welfare issues pertaining to depopulation of animals in the event of a disease outbreak, the main piece of legislation is the Animal Protection Act (*Tierschutzgesetz – TschG*).
- A specific Ordinance (ref.: BGBl II 2004/324) sets out since 2004 requirements for an expert group on animal disease control (*Expertengruppe Tierseuchenbekämpfung – ET*), who must advise the BMG and the Provinces in relation to contingency planning, animal health emergency preparedness and the early warning and disease surveillance systems.
- The Provinces can enact their own secondary legislation, whether in order to fully implement and enforce federal law (e.g. animal welfare) or just to better ensure proper functioning of the indirect administrative system in the area of animal health (e.g. in relation to management of private veterinary practitioners, whenever there are specific animal health surveillance initiatives at provincial level, etc.).

The combination of federal law and Provincial implementing legislation ensures that CAs at all levels have sufficient powers to: enter into all premises possibly involved in a disease outbreak, impose restrictions on animal movements, require application of the necessary cleaning and disinfection measures, impose protection zones and surveillance zones according to the epidemiological evaluation of the situation, order the killing of animals, etc.

5.1.3 Cooperation between and within CAs in development of CPs

The main mechanism to ensure that CPs are prepared and updated by the CCA in cooperation with the PVS and other stakeholders is the advisory role of the ET. The ET includes representatives of the BMG (the Head of the NDCC), of other relevant Ministries with responsibilities in areas such as Agriculture, the Environment or the Defence, and of all the Provinces. In addition, there are representatives of the IVET-AGES and of the Veterinary Faculty in Vienna (providing expert advice on risk analysis, epidemiology and virology), and representatives of the rendering industry.

The ET also has working subgroups, where other experts are usually convened, and who focus their activities on specific diseases; e.g. FMD, CSF/ASF and AI. Their role is to provide advice and support to:

- the NDCC and, if appropriate, to a local disease crisis centre (LDCC), in order to enhance emergency preparedness and in the event of a disease outbreak, and
- to the BMG and the PVS in relation, for instance, to surveillance of relevant diseases.

The audit team found:

- Evidence was seen on the activities of the ET facilitating a harmonised approach being taken in relation to preparation and drafting of CPs. This was particularly true at the time of this audit as the whole preparedness policy is being reviewed (see 5.2.1). Meetings of the ET and a number of working groups were taking place very frequently to discuss a variety of topics.
- It is the responsibility of the PVS to prepare OMs (see 5.2.1). Different initiatives were seen in the three provinces visited at addressing this area. Even though this is in accordance with the indirect administration policy, significant disparities were observed in the way the OMs were developed in the Provinces visited and a lack of coordination by the BMG was evident

in this regard (see also section 5.5). According to representatives of the BMG, this issue should be resolved shortly in the process of the ongoing reorganisation of the emergency preparedness system.

- The BMG and the PVS maintain a very active cooperation with both the DSR-AGES and the IVET-AGES, mostly through regular meetings, including those held in the context of the ET, and on a number of other topics, such as disease surveillance.
- In general, both the CPs available and the OMs seen in the Provinces visited contained specific details on cooperation and communication arrangements with other CAs (police, civil protection, environmental authorities, etc.). Additional efforts have been made by the Provinces visited with regard to cooperation with numerous stakeholders, mainly with associations of animal producers and food business operators.

Conclusions on the CAs:

In general, all designated CAs in Austria, including the BMG, the PVS and the DVS, have the necessary legal powers, adapted to their respective geographical responsibilities, to develop CPs and OMs, and to intervene in the event of an epizootic disease outbreak.

Many other CAs are involved in providing the necessary technical and logistical support, and to ensure the cooperation and availability of numerous stakeholders, whose contribution is vital in complementing the activities of the animal health services in the event of an outbreak of an epizootic disease. However, some shortcomings were still found, as:

- Coordination by the BMG of preparation of OMs by the PVS is not sufficient to ensure that all of them are adequately prepared to effectively tackle animal health emergency situations, in particular in the event of a large disease outbreak with a wide geographical scope affecting several Provinces. This is not in line with requirements laid down in Article 4 (3) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004.
- Internal audits have been carried out as required by Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 but they have not been utilised to their full extent in verifying that emergency preparedness and early warning systems are fit for purpose and that they are achieving the objectives of early detection and rapid response. Furthermore, the current audit cycle of approximately nine years provides only a very moderate rate of improvement allowing potential deficiencies in the system to persist for a relatively long time.

5.2 CONTINGENCY PLANS

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS:

Requirements for Member States to have contingency plans to control disease outbreaks are required for the following diseases: Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Council Directive 2003/85/EC), Bluetongue (Council Directive 2000/75/EC), Classical Swine Fever (Council Directive 2001/89/EC), African Swine Fever (Council Directive 2002/60/EC), Swine Vesicular Disease and a number of other diseases (Council Directive 92/119/EEC), African Horse Sickness (Council Directive 92/35/EEC), Avian Influenza (Council Directive 2005/94/EC) and Newcastle Disease (Council Directive 92/66/EEC). A summary of some specific requirements of each is provided in Annex 2.

Requirements relating to holding registration, animal identification and movement controls for cattle, sheep and pigs are laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000, Council Regulation (EC) No

21/2004 and Council Directive 2008/71/EC respectively, and associated implementing measures.

Findings:

5.2.1 Coverage & Approval

The audit team found that:

- In general, CPs have been drafted, and regularly updated for the major diseases as required by EU legislation, in particular for FMD, CSF, ASF, AI and BT. CPs for AHS and for other exotic diseases such as sheep pox and goat pox or Peste des petits ruminants have not been updated since 2003 or 2004, and the one for ND has not been updated since the year 2000. According to representatives of the BMG, the main reason for the latter was the constant updating of measures on AI, which would indirectly facilitate an effective response in case of a ND outbreak, and the lack of updating of the other CPs was due to the low perception of risk in relation to those diseases.
- Each CP includes general information on the specific disease, the legal basis for the control and for the financial compensation by the State, details on the chain of command and establishment of the NDCC and LDCCs, details on the intervention of the ET, co-operation arrangements with other CAs (e.g. the army), as well as general details on: human resources and equipment, basic instructions for OVs, sampling and diagnosis details, plans for emergency vaccination, public relations and disease awareness. In addition, two related manuals have been prepared, one on general measures to be considered in the context of any emergency vaccination, and another one on the operation of the NDCC.
- The process of development and approval of new CPs or their updates and modifications is spearheaded by the ET. Upon the advice of a working group of the ET specially set up for that purpose, the BMG, in agreement with the Provinces, has started in 2012 to introduce a generic Web-based CP, which is being further developed with specific technical and operational areas for each epizootic disease. In this respect, representatives of the BMG acknowledged that one of the main reasons for this change was the inflexibility of existing CPs, in particular when amendments are required and this has to be done in many documents by a variety of CAs. They added that the working group is meeting regularly; e.g. the next meeting was scheduled for February 2014 to discuss, amongst other issues, communication procedures to raise awareness about epizootic diseases in general, and in the event of an outbreak, and that this process is planned to be finished sometime in 2015, depending on availability of staff to develop the various modules of the Web-based CP.
- PVS must prepare OMs with all necessary generic instructions and guidance for dealing with epizootic disease outbreaks in the areas under their remit. Two of the Provinces visited have developed the OMs in order to adapt them to the local circumstances; the third was in the process of doing that (see 5.2.2 for further details). In the future, these OMs will also be included in the Web-based CP mentioned above.

5.2.2 Documentation

The audit team found that:

- The Website of the consumer health division within the BMG has an internal password-protected consumer health communication platform (KVG - *Kommunikationsplattform Verbrauchergesundheit*). The crisis plans for veterinary officers at all levels in the BMG are available there in electronic format, including all CPs described above. All OVs met were

familiar with the available CPs.

- The OMs seen by the audit team in two of the Provinces visited contained comprehensive and detailed instructions, including clearly defined command and control structures for dealing with epizootic outbreaks, as well as specific details on cooperation arrangements with other CAs and communication protocols with stakeholders and the general public. The OM seen in the third Province was not so formalised and organised; e.g. documentation relating to local contacts and competencies was not version controlled and well updated, but operational arrangements were in the process of development, as the PVS had decided to follow a similar approach to the BMG and set up a Web-based emergency preparedness system in cooperation with other CAs in the Province in the context of a generic Provincial crisis management system.

5.2.3 CA command structure during an epizootic outbreak – NDCCs and LDCCs

The audit team found that:

- In the event of an epizootic disease outbreak the NDCC will be established at the BMG where a room is available for this purpose with all necessary infrastructure and equipment. A specific OM has been prepared and agreed upon by the BMG and the PVS, which describes in detail the functioning of the NDCC and the chain of command and lines of communication and reporting that apply to those situations.
- Decision making during an outbreak is the responsibility of the NDCC other than decisions on the method of stunning and killing which are made by the PVS at the LDCC. The ET, counting on any additional animal disease expertise considered necessary for the occasion, is responsible for providing support to the NDCC and the LDCCs in the event of an outbreak.
- Two of the three Provinces visited had their LDCC integrated into their Provincial crisis management centres; the latter having all necessary infrastructure and information and communication equipment required to establish a LDCC in the event of an epizootic disease outbreak. The third Province was in the process of setting up a similar system.
- The activities of the NDCC and, as appropriate, the LDCC, are modulated by the availability of a number of interlinked information management systems and databases, that are aimed at easing up the CAs decision-making process in the event of a disease outbreak. As mentioned before, most of these systems are operating through the KVG, which includes access to:
 - Updated information on holding registration, animal identification and animal movements for all animal species, and establishments of the food chain, which is kept in the consumer information system electronic database (*Verbraucherinformationssystem* - VIS). The VIS is linked to the cattle database (*Agra Markt Austria Marketing GmbH* – AMA) and the information on the identification and registration systems for pigs, sheep and goats are directly integrated in the VIS.
 - Data on all animal health events occurring in the country, as recorded in the system by OVAs in the PVS, including details of all animal health control and surveillance programmes to be implemented in the country, the outcome of official controls on animal health, results of sampling and testing programmes, and the reporting and investigation of all animal disease occurrences.
 - The laboratory information management system (LIMS) database set up by the IVET-AGES with all data on laboratory analysis related to animal diseases.

- Results of all *ante-* and *post-mortem* inspections carried out in slaughterhouses.
- A geographical information management system that enable PVS, and the NDCC as appropriate, to handle the spatial epidemiological features of a disease outbreak and facilitates delimitation of the zones on the basis of tracking animal movements and other factors that could contribute to transmit the disease. The system can interact and easily retrieve information from the AMA and the other herd and animal identification and registration operational databases integrated in VIS.
- In addition, the CAs have access to other information management systems developed by the Austrian Veterinary Health Service (*Österreichischer Tiergesundheitsdienst – TGD*) and by the Poultry Health Service of the Austrian Quality Poultry Association (*Österreichischer QualitätsGeflügelVereinigung – Anerkannter Geflügelgesundheitsdienst – QGV*). Both organisations were created by farmers and private veterinary practitioners with an initial objective related to the better statutory management of veterinary medicines, and they evolved later on towards provision of all relevant animal health management issues for livestock species and poultry, including prevention of infectious diseases:
 - The TGD covers some 90% of pig holdings and some 60% of cattle holdings, with lower rates of coverage for sheep and goats.
 - The QGV covers largely 100% of the broiler sector and some 80% of the egg production sector.
 - The TGD for pigs keeps provincial databases accessible to the relevant PVS, whereas the one for cattle keeps data on a national database, accessible to all CAs. Likewise the QGV has only one national database accessible to all CAs. These databases provide extensive details on production records (e.g. data on each production cycle), regular health events and animal health preventive practices for each and every holding.
- The KVG is set up to be the main tool to manage all activities in real-time and to gather all details and information on the daily progress with the control and eradication of a disease. It is the communication platform to be used by staff in command of the NDCC and the LDCCs to circulate instructions and allocate tasks to the operational teams (mostly, but not exclusively, from the DVS), and to keep them registered and verify that all these activities are timely done.
- In general, the PVS are integrating their activities in relation to management of animal disease outbreaks in the provincial general crisis management systems, which incorporate their own information management platforms. Nevertheless, according to representatives of the BMG, the KVG will always prevail, and is going to be further enhanced, as the operational management tool in the event of an animal disease outbreak, notwithstanding the possible simultaneous use that the PVS wanted to make of the other available platforms, in particular, to facilitate coordination and communication with other CAs at local level.

5.2.4 *Financial provisions*

The audit team found that:

- In principle, according to provisions laid down in the TSG, the State must compensate those who, as a result of a disease, or regulations or decisions adopted on the basis of the said Act or EU legal requirements to be complied with in the context of a disease outbreak; for instance:

- lose their animals (e.g. dead or destroyed as a result of the disease or a vaccination policy);
 - incur in costs as a result of killing of animals and disposal of carcasses, or owing to disinfection and cleaning-up measures, and
 - as a general rule, compensation is not provided for production losses but, in case of FMD and HPAI outbreaks, compensation is provided for income losses incurred as a result of commercial activity being prevented through establishments being shut down.
- Representatives of the BMG and the PVS advised the audit team that in Austria, animal health funds are in place in seven of the nine Provinces. They are normally financed through mandatory levies on livestock operators and, in principle, they are not aimed at compensating animal keepers in the event of animal disease outbreaks, but rather to fund prevention and surveillance activities during 'peace' times. Nonetheless, they can be used immediately in anticipation of funding to be provided by the State. They added that these funds are not linked to farm biosecurity standards.
 - Even though no major outbreaks of epizootic diseases have occurred recently in Austria, staff of the PVS was familiar with compensation procedures as they had used them in situations where minor outbreaks of other diseases had occurred.

5.2.5 Establishment and enforcement of protection and surveillance zones

The audit team found that:

- Decisions on establishing protection and surveillance zones are taken at LDCC level in contact with the NDCC and, as explained above, KVG is used as a tool to delineate them. There is at least one person in each PVS who has overall responsibility for KVG in order to set and amend the zones.
- In all Provinces visited there was a variety of arrangements in place with other CAs, such as municipalities or the police forces, and private stakeholders to set up road control measures, in order to reinforce application of movement restriction measures, and cleaning and disinfection facilities for vehicles entering or leaving the zones, as appropriate.
- Regardless of the higher or lower level of formalisation in the OMs available in the Provinces visited, satisfactory arrangements were in place in relation to animal movement restrictions. Restrictions that can be initially imposed verbally by an OV upon suspicion of any disease event (always legally binding), will be subsequently followed up with an official written notification if the presence of the disease is confirmed or if further investigations are needed to exclude that possibility.
- Where welfare problems are identified within a protection or surveillance zone, live animals may be moved to slaughter, provided this transport is carried out under the control of an OV. Furthermore, special authorization for transport of animals for slaughter within the surveillance zone or outside the surveillance zone may be permitted, under certain conditions, by the local authority upon agreement with the PVS. According to representatives of the BMG, the overall priority is always to eradicate the disease as a matter of urgency and instructions in that respect require that, before any derogation can be granted, a comprehensive evaluation of all the animals of susceptible species present on the relevant holdings and of the epidemiological circumstances prevailing in the area must be made, so that the presence of infected or contaminated animals on the holding is excluded.

5.2.6 *Communication procedures during an outbreak*

The audit team found that:

- In all Provinces visited, the potential LDCCs were seen to have all necessary infrastructure and equipment required to facilitate communication both within and between CAs, and with external stakeholders and the media.
- KVG will be used during epizootic outbreaks as the central communications system to facilitate all the internal contacts between the BMG and the PVS and, in addition, provisions were in place in the OM of the NDCC and in those of the provinces indicating, for instance, that there must be at least one telephone conference per day between the NDCC and the LDCC.
- Provisions were also in place in relation to communications of the NDCC and the LDCCs with the media:
 - At central level, external communications must be done exclusively by a spokesperson of the Ministers' office after coordination with the members of the NDCC.
 - Press relation officers of the BMG and the Provincial administrations must participate in all internal and coordination meetings of the NDCC and LDCCs, as appropriate, so that they are always kept updated on the actual situation. In some cases, at provincial level, the Provincial CVO (or the deputy) takes the lead with the media.
- The current integration of activities in relation to management of animal disease outbreaks in the national and provincial general crisis management systems is also intended to facilitate communication with other CAs and stakeholders at local level, as both the BMG and the PVS will have access to more professional and experienced public relations, communication and media liaison services.

5.2.7 *Availability of Epidemiological expertise*

General information in this respect can be also found in sections 5.1.1, 5.1.3 and 5.2.1. In addition, the audit team found:

- Evidence of the use of the epidemiological expertise available to both the BMG and the PVS, such as activities of staff of the DSR-AGES (e.g. epidemiological data analysis and risk assessments, provision of updated statistics), the IVET-AGES (e.g. planning of disease surveillance, evaluation of risks related to wild animals in order to adapt surveillance initiatives thereto, diagnosis support on the phone to OVs, laboratory expertise) and the technical advice provided by the ET and its subgroups on a variety of topics, from the updating of chapters in the CPs (e.g. epidemiological investigations, sampling protocols, definition of protection and surveillance zones) to the design of a number of disease surveillance programmes (e.g. CSF, AI or BT).
- Additional epidemiological expertise has been identified by the PVS in some of the Provinces, and in one of the Provinces visited even operational expert groups have been defined for a number of topics and specific diseases. According to representatives of both the BMG and the PVS, these experts are available both at local level in their own Province and for the CAs of the other Provinces if necessary.

5.2.8 *Animal identification and movement control*

The audit team found that:

- Registration of holdings is done according to the pertinent EU legislation for the identification of bovine animals, sheep and goats as well as pigs. Animal holding numbers, or numbers of the Information System for Agricultural and Forestry Holdings (*Land- und forstwirtschaftliches Betriebsinformationssystem – LFBIS*), are assigned centrally via the Agriculture and Forestry Register kept by Statistics Austria, and these numbers must always be included in any animal movement document (see below).
- The cattle database maintained by AMA was put into operation on January 1998 and it was recognised as fully operational by the Commission in 1999. Reports from the individual livestock keepers are regularly checked for plausibility by AMA and record of individual animal movements, births and deaths therein is obligatory also from January 1998. Demands for outstanding reports and corrections are handled by an automated reminder system. In addition, at least 5% of all cattle holdings are checked annually during on-site official inspections.
- As mentioned before, VIS is the integrated platform for animal identification and the animal movement recording system used in Austria. Apart from the direct link to AMA database, VIS acts as a register of holdings for all farms, dealer's premises, slaughterhouses, ACs, and transporters, and contains all necessary details in that respect, including their geographical coordinates.
- Notification of animal movements to the VIS database is obligatory for pigs from April 2004 and for sheep and goats from January 2008; in both cases batch level recording of movements on and off farm must be notified. These notifications can be made directly by farmers or by authorised reporting points; e.g. slaughterhouses or ACs, and must be reported within seven days. Official inspections are also organised on holdings keeping pigs and sheep and goats. According to the OVs met in the Provinces, and as verified by the audit team on-the-spot, pig holdings are very compliant with these rules; whereas some problems are found in relation to timely notification of movements by keepers of sheep and goats.
- Checks carried out in the slaughterhouse and in the ACs visited showed, in general, a high level of compliance with obligations on notification of animal movements, including respect of the statutory deadlines; however, in one of the ACs a number of deficiencies was found:
 - Cattle were staying overnight on their way to national slaughterhouses, with those movements not being accurately recorded in AMA database, as movements were only recorded from the holding of origin to the slaughterhouse, without registering the stay in the AC. In addition, details of registration numbers of the transporters delivering or collecting animals from the AC were not held on record by the operator of the AC.
 - Those cattle stayed in the AC at the same time as those intended for intra-EU trade. The various stables available were not operated as 'independent epidemiological units' and risks of cross-contamination were present (e.g. sharing of the same tractors for bedding and removal of manure).
 - The policy for disinfection of the premises only contemplated doing it twice a year, and doing it before every intra-EU consignment was not considered necessary for the OV in charge of the AC.
 - Cattle intended for intra-EU trade had stayed in the AC for more than 6 days.

- Official controls (even if tools in the form of a good check-list for the OV were available), were not effective, as the outcome of the inspections was misleading, did not correspond to the reality, and did not contribute to identify and solve the deficiencies found by the audit team.
- Representatives of the PVS advised the audit team that their belief was that the high animal health status of the Province would prevent any disease from being transmitted; however, the audit team stressed that if any animal incubating an epizootic disease passed by the AC in those circumstances:
 - The disease would be easily transmitted to animals intended for intra-EU trade owing to the multiplying risk effect of the risk of cross-contamination in the premises (e.g. bad practice of sharing equipment, no disinfection) and that the animals are staying for too long in the AC, and
 - since movements are not registered in AMA database, any tracing back and forward exercise needed in such a case would be delayed and become more complex than it should be in normal circumstances.
- In any case, representatives of both the BMG and the PVS undertook to address the situation and take action immediately¹.

5.2.9 Availability of Equipment

The audit team noted that:

- In the three Provinces visited, there were basic logistic arrangements in place to ensure that the equipment and resources necessary in the event of an outbreak could be readily available for all CAs involved. Nevertheless, these arrangements had not been sufficiently evaluated to ensure that they would be sufficient to react effectively in the event of a widespread outbreak; for instance:
 - No contracts or agreements had been made with suppliers to anticipate shortages of the variety of basic equipment and material that would be needed in those situations and to ensure that this could be provided at short notice, such as protective clothing, pairs of boots, masks, goggles, disinfectants, sampling and vaccination sets, etc.
 - Arrangements for the supply of equipment necessary for depopulation, such as equipment for slaughter (e.g. captive bolts, electric tongs, containers for gassing), ranged from formal contracts with rendering companies for slaughter of poultry, in one Province, to only an oral agreement with a rendering plant in respect of collection and disposal of carcasses in another one.

5.2.10 Vaccination policy and availability of vaccine

The audit team found that:

- According to representatives of the BMG, vaccination against highly contagious diseases is not the primary option within the available CPs. They added that the decision whether to

¹ In their comments to the draft report, the CA provided extensive details on the action taken by the PVS responsible for the visited AC to address the deficiencies found by the audit team. That includes measures to address all non-compliances related to registration of animal movements, cleaning and disinfection, general biosecurity rules, duration of the stay of animals in the AC and, in addition, the intensification of official controls. These measures are supplemented with additional verification activities planned by the CA nationwide in response to recommendation number five.

vaccinate or not is highly dependent on the circumstances and any decision will be taken after consultation with, and advice from the ET, discussions with the Provinces, stakeholders and adjacent MS, and in coordination with the Commission and the other MS.

- They further acknowledged that despite existing provisions already contemplating the possibility for the use of vaccination in the event of an FMD outbreak, they need to carry out studies on a variety of scenarios in order to better inform the decision making process and weighing up of the criteria laid down in Annex X to Directive 2003/85/EC, and thereby anticipate options for pre-emptive culling and/or emergency vaccination in the context of a worst case scenario, as required by the said Directive. This is considered a weakness in the current CP and plans were already advanced to carry out some simulation modelling exercises in 2014 aimed at finding out what may happen in the event of a large outbreak of the disease, and how the many components of the current emergency preparedness system could be improved.
- No national vaccine bank has been set up for FMD and, should it be necessary, the BMG would need to resort to the common one available to all MS.

Conclusions on Contingency Plans:

The CCA has made significant efforts to ensure that CPs are available to all CAs with responsibilities in coping with an outbreak of an epizootic disease in accordance with the body of EU legislation regulating this area. The main pillars of the system in place are:

- Available CPs and some OMs are mostly fit for purpose and are in the process of being further adapted to the circumstances and responsibilities of all CAs in order to better define command and control structures, and reinforce the effectiveness of their operations in the event of epizootic disease outbreaks.
- All CAs have access to adequate information management tools that speed up and facilitate the evaluation of the crisis situation and contribute to the effectiveness of any response to a disease outbreak.
- Availability of satisfactory technical expertise in all areas involved in managing epizootic disease outbreaks.
- Financial provisions in place that should adequately contribute to cope with compensation of affected animal keepers in case of disease outbreaks and also provide additional resources for animal health prevention and disease surveillance activities.

However, in the event of a large scale epizootic disease outbreak, a number of shortcomings still undermine the robustness of the emergency preparedness system in place, in particular:

- The lack of fully functional OMs in all Provinces, which adds to the weaknesses identified in relation to the limited coordination performed by the CCA in that respect.
- The absence of sufficient assurances that all necessary equipment and resources necessary in the event of an outbreak will be readily available to all CAs involved.
- The insufficient attention paid to study possible worst case scenarios for the application of emergency vaccination in the event of an outbreak of FMD. As a consequence, the currently available CP for FMD does not include detailed plans for the CAs to effectively apply this measure in accordance with provisions laid down in Articles 14(3) and 72(3) of, and Annex XVII to Directive 2003/85/EC.
- Even though the animal identification and movement control systems in place can be

considered fully operative and largely reliable insofar as they need to be used for tracing animal movements in the event of an epizootic disease outbreak; insufficient enforcement of EU requirements laid down in Council Directive 64/432/EEC applicable to ACs involved in intra-EU trade of animals may contribute to facilitate the transmission and spread of infectious animal diseases in those situations.

5.3 PREPAREDNESS AND AWARENESS

Legal requirements:

For all epizootic diseases relevant to this audit, there is a requirement that any occurrence of the disease is notified to the CA. With the exception of EHD, notification of the European Commission is mandatory. Surveillance programmes and systems for early detection of disease are required for BT and AI. For some diseases, risk factors (e.g. areas of high animal density, worst cases scenarios) must be identified within the contingency plan. Specific preparedness and awareness criteria are specified for FMD; for most other relevant diseases, a communications strategy and appropriate communications training are required.

The organisation of real-time alert exercises is required for FMD and AI. Alarm drills are required for CSF and ASF.

Annex 2 to this report summarises relevant legislative requirements.

Findings:

5.3.1 *Epizootic disease risk analysis and alert levels*

The audit team found that:

- Communication within and between CAs in relation to animal health events is fluent; in addition to the vast updated information always available in KVG, for instance:
 - Three times per year, managerial staff of the Federal Veterinary Services in the BMG meets with Provincial CVOs and updates are provided on the animal health disease status in MS and third countries.
 - Monthly updates on animal health events are provided by the BMG via a publicly available official veterinary bulletin.
 - Whenever there is an animal health event bearing any possible risk on the animal health population in any Province, the BMG immediately channels that information to the relevant PVS. Likewise, PVS keep OV's regularly informed of animal health events of major relevance. Examples in those respects were seen in relation to forward tracking investigations carried out on animal trade as a result of LPAI incidents in Germany, or in relation to the recent confirmation of ASF in wild boars in Lithuania.
- In addition, the DSR-AGES and the IVET-AGES are responsible for doing more specific risk analysis exercises in order to better inform BMG policies and to prioritise animal health prevention and surveillance activities. As a direct consequence of these assessments, several initiatives have been organised over the recent years to raise awareness amongst all stakeholders of the importance of early detection and notification of diseases, such as AI, BT and ASF, and some policies have been modified, such as surveillance for CSF and BT in domestic animals, and for AI and ASF, in wildlife.

5.3.2 Notification requirements (peacetime)

The audit team found that:

- The TSG lays down the list of all notifiable diseases and requirements on their notification to the CAs by any person who has the expertise to identify them, including veterinarians, animal keepers, food business operators and laboratories.
- Farmers, food business operators, staff of the PVS and DVS, and veterinary practitioners met during the on-the-spot visits were fully aware of the above mentioned obligations to report suspicions of epizootic diseases.
- OVs of the PVS and DVS were well aware of their powers and responsibilities to impose restrictions on farms straight away in case of suspicion of any contagious disease, and private veterinary practitioners of theirs in respect of notifying any suspicion of an epizootic disease to the DVS or the PVS, as appropriate.
- The IVET-AGES could provide comprehensive details of all investigations carried out on suspicions and confirmed cases of notifiable diseases. Section 5.3.3 provides additional information on notification of suspect cases of epizootic diseases.

5.3.3 Monitoring and surveillance systems

The audit team found that:

- The BMG, in coordination with AGES, plans annually in accordance with the risk analysis exercises mentioned above a number of initiatives to be implemented by the PVS in the context of the early warning system for epizootic diseases. All the Provinces visited had received all the necessary documentation to organise the implementation of the disease surveillance initiatives; in all cases, the PVS had carried out detailed plans for that implementation and examples of their fulfilment in 2012 and 2013 could be checked.
- With regard to all exotic diseases, surveillance is first carried out by means of clinical surveillance and investigation of dead animals. According to representatives of the PVS met, the pillars of this approach are the constant training of private veterinary practitioners and staff of the DVS, and the campaigns aimed at raising awareness about a variety of exotic diseases amongst animal keepers and other stakeholders, such as operators of the rendering plants collecting and disposing of animal carcasses, hunters and managers of hunting grounds or ornithologists.
- At the IVET-AGES and with the relevant PVS, the audit team could review details of a number of investigations carried out on situations where a suspicion of a notifiable disease could not be excluded by the OV. This included investigations to exclude the presence of FMD, BT and AI in 2013, and of CSF and ASF in domestic pigs and, mainly, wild boars in 2012. The approach to these investigations was consistent and largely satisfactory, usually including the early involvement of expert staff from the NRL, who got in contact with the OVs in order to facilitate and speed up the proper selection and delivery of samples to the NRL, while an oral animal movement restriction had been imposed. The exclusion diagnosis was carried out immediately, as demonstrated by examples checked by the audit team, where presence of those diseases had been ruled out in most cases in less than 24 hours.
- According to representatives of all the CAs met, the long-standing good level of cooperation with the TGD and the QGV works out very well and the sensitivity of the system has repeatedly proved that farmers and veterinary practitioners responsible for provision of

animal health services are quick at reporting suspicions of unexpected health and production events amongst their animals.

- Surveillance for BT (including regular entomological surveillance), CSF, ASF and AI also includes active targeted pathological, virological and serological surveys; for instance:
 - With regard to BT, active surveillance is carried out nationwide once a year targeting animals which had been grazing during the summer/early autumn period, with the result that detection of any possible exposure to infected vectors is more likely. Comprehensive data on implementation of this approach could be seen in one of the Provinces visited.
 - An active surveillance programme designed by the IVET-AGES is implemented for CSF in domestic pigs in all Provinces. It includes adequately designed risk-based sampling activities in pig holdings, targeted sampling in rendering plants and slaughterhouses, and investigation by the NRL of suspicious samples submitted from the other regional IVET-AGES laboratories. Since 2011, surveillance for CSF in wild boars is mostly passive (see above for ASF).
 - In relation to AI, active surveillance is based on a serological survey carried out in slaughterhouses and designed to cover domestic poultry nationwide, including geese and ducks in the second half of the year. In addition, additional samples are taken regularly at a special sentinel surveillance station with ducks kept in Lake Constance and faecal swabs are investigated from water birds. Passive surveillance in wild birds includes virological investigation in birds found dead.
 - From 2012, a specially targeted active surveillance was introduced in respect of ASF in dead wild boars, so as to increase sensitivity of the pathological and virological surveillance to ensure early detection of any incursion of the disease.
- All those surveillance activities are further described in the veterinary report of the AGES which is published annually. The 2012 report is available at the following address:

http://www.ages.at/uploads/media/13-08-05_VETJB-2012.pdf

5.3.4 Public awareness activities in “peacetime”

The audit team found that:

- There is a high level of disease awareness amongst veterinary practitioners, farmers and other stakeholders, such as staff responsible for ABP processing plants, slaughterhouses or for ACs. This is regularly enhanced by all CAs through targeted campaigns and continuous training of veterinary practitioners and official staff.
- Websites maintained by the BMG, the AGES and the PVS, and by the TGD and the QGV, keep extensive information and good guidance in relation to epizootic diseases and to the actions to be taken in case of any suspicion. In addition, representatives of the industry participate regularly in simulation and real-time exercises organised by the CCA and by the PVS and, in most Provinces, staff of the DVS meet at least once a year with veterinary practitioners working in the geographical area under their remit.

5.3.5 Biosecurity measures in place on animal holdings

The audit team found that:

- Specific national legal requirements in relation to compliance with biosecurity provisions

only exist in the form of an Ordinance on hygiene for poultry, and it applies to holdings keeping more than a threshold number of animals (from 250 to 350, depending on the production).

- In addition, the TGD and the QGV operate numerous herd and flock health management programmes that, for instance, have raised significantly the levels of awareness in relation to biosecurity as they are aimed at preventing introduction of any animal disease and reducing the need for medication of animals intended for the food chain. Since farmers participating in these programmes are bound by the conditions for enrolment, they must follow the recommendations of private veterinary practitioners responsible for inspecting their animal health and production management activities. Check-lists used for this purpose include several aspects related to the levels of biosecurity and, according to representatives of the CAs met, compliance with them is high, in particular amongst pig and poultry producers.

5.3.6 Staff training

The audit team found that:

- In general, staff of all CAs met demonstrated having received adequate training to be prepared to act in the event of an epizootic disease outbreak according to their responsibilities. During the meetings held with staff of the BMG, the PVS and the DVS, and in the NRL, they demonstrated a high level of awareness, in particular, and as appropriate to each of them, in relation to:
 - Evaluation of suspicious symptoms and early detection of epizootic diseases, including on how to handle the case and liaise with other colleagues or other CAs, or on how to perform preliminary epidemiological investigations before the disease is confirmed or ruled out by laboratory diagnosis. For instance, some members of the staff of the BMG and some PVS had recently participated in international courses on emergency preparedness with regard to FMD.
 - Interaction with the available information management systems and databases in order to manage their activities in the event of an outbreak, to further investigate the epidemiological situation and to set up protection and surveillance zones.
 - The structure and content of both the national CPs and the provincial OMs. In the three Provinces visited, even if with different levels of intensity and planning; specific training has been provided to some members of the staff in areas such as epidemiological investigations, including specific ones in wildlife populations, valuation related to compensation payments, organisation of depopulation activities or liaison with and supervision of the activities of ABP processing plants in case of larger disease outbreaks.

5.3.7 Simulation exercises

The audit team found that:

- Simulation and real-time exercises in dealing with an outbreak of FMD have been organised by the BMG every five years; the last ones took place in 2004 and 2009, and the one for 2014 was already in advanced state of preparation. The one carried out in 2009 had a large component of activities in the field and involved several other CAs such as the armed forces (e.g. exploring their contribution to disinfection of all types of facilities and means of transport), the police (checking their operations with regard to enforcement of restrictions on

animal movements), fire brigades (reinforcement of personnel and equipment) and special teams for depopulation of animals. Communication within and between CAs was the main objective pursued.

- However, it was difficult to evaluate how CPs and OMs had been updated or modified as a result of the lessons learnt after the evaluation of the outcome of those exercises, as this was not clearly indicated in any of the reports or documents drafted at the end of the exercises. Representatives of the BMG emphasised the positive outcome of the exercises, in particular of the one organised in 2009, at proving the availability, cooperation and operability of the other CAs, but they also acknowledged the limited contribution of this exercises to the improvement of the CPs as it had been overambitious when conceived. They added that they were in the process of reorganising this policy as well, and that they had decided to opt for the system mentioned before (see 5.2.10), that will use initially a modelling approach to find out what areas to target afterwards with real-time exercises.
- Some of the Provinces have organised some alarm drills that usually do not target any disease in particular, event though CSF and ASF have been targeted in some cases. Evidence was present of the more direct and transparent impact that these exercises had had on the improvement of OMs; e.g. one of the Provinces had developed a spreadsheet based tool which can predict killing capacity during depopulation based on the animal species involved, the size of the outbreak and the method of killing.

Conclusions on Preparedness and Awareness:

The multi-component early warning system in place in Austria can effectively contribute to the prevention and prompt detection, control and eradication of outbreaks of epizootic diseases, in particular thanks to:

- Availability of regularly updated disease risk analyses and effective epidemiological advice.
- A satisfactory level of awareness amongst stakeholders in the animal production sector of the importance of preventive health care and biosecurity measures, and of the need to collaborate with the CAs in the investigation of the possible presence of epizootic diseases.

The CAs have organised several simulation exercises and alarm drills in dealing with epizootic disease outbreaks that have contributed to train personnel designated to be involved in such an emergency situation; however, these initiatives have had a limited impact on testing, critically reviewing and up-dating CPs, emergency preparedness arrangements in general and disease eradication strategies at national and Provincial level. This is not in line with requirements of the Council Directives laying down provisions for control measures and contingency planning for FMD, AI, CSF and ASF.

5.4 LABORATORIES

Legal requirements:

Articles 11 & 12 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 set out requirements in relation to sampling, analysis and official laboratories, including that laboratories must be accredited to and operate in accordance with norm ISO:17025.

Specific requirements relating to laboratories are laid down in the various Directives on epizootic disease control including the designation and functions of NRLs, the tests and criteria to be applied, and the provision of adequate diagnostic capabilities and capacity. Diagnostic manuals are provided

for FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD and AI (see Annex 2).

Findings:

As indicated above, the central laboratory of the IVET-AGES plays the role of NRL for all epizootic diseases relevant in the scope of this audit. The audit team found that:

- General procedures and most of the specific diagnostic tests for all epizootic diseases in the NRL are accredited according to norm ISO:17025. This process includes use of diagnostic techniques that have been validated both by the relevant EU reference laboratory and by internal validation procedures in the IVET-AGES. In addition, each year the IVET-AGES carries out an internal audit targeting diagnosis of some diseases; in those cases, they invite an external expert who further guarantees the quality of the procedures followed. Evidence in this respect could be seen in relation to recent audits on the diagnosis of CSF, ASF, FMD and AI.
- Well updated standard operating procedures (SOP) were in place for all those tests in the context of the quality management system set up by the quality department of the IVET-AGES, as well as an adequate and reliable laboratory information management system. The former follow the provisions laid down on EU diagnostic manuals, when available, or in other relevant international standards, as appropriate.
- The NRL participates regularly with satisfactory results in inter-laboratory comparison tests organised by the network of EU reference laboratories for all relevant infectious diseases. The only national inter-laboratory comparison test that needs to be organised by the NRL in relation to epizootic diseases verifies the reliability of BT diagnosis carried out by the three other IVET-AGES laboratories authorised to perform this testing.
- The laboratory has been developing recently its own laboratory CP, which includes an evaluation of their capacity to adapt and respond to the diagnostic demands of a large disease outbreak, upon which action will be taken to enhance their preparedness.

Conclusions on Laboratories:

The NRL of the IVET-AGES can guarantee that a reliable diagnosis can be carried out in accordance with relevant EU legislation for all the epizootic diseases covered by the scope of this audit. In addition, adequate steps have been taken in order to verify if any additional arrangement is needed, and what diagnostic overcapacity is in place, to ensure that the IVET-AGES can effectively adapt to and cope with unexpected large scale outbreaks of those diseases.

5.5 DEPOPULATION FOR EPIZOOTIC DISEASE CONTROL

Legal requirements:

Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 lays down rules for the killing of animals, including when this is performed for the purpose of depopulation. In particular, Article 18 of the Regulation requires that the stunning and killing methods planned and the corresponding standard operating procedures for ensuring compliance with the rules laid down in the Regulation shall be included in the contingency plans required under Union law on animal health and that, when implementing depopulation, the competent authority shall take any appropriate action to safeguard the welfare of the animals in the best available conditions.

Findings:

The audit team found that:

- The BMG was not fully aware of the extent to which the Provinces have introduced procedures within their CPs to implement Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009. According to representatives of the BMG, the internal audits are aimed at ensuring that such procedures are in place in the Provinces, but as pointed out before (see 5.1.1), examples of those audits showed that they had not included provisions laid down in that Article in their scope.
- In general, guidance on methods for killing different species and categories of animals had been produced as part of the OMs available in the Provinces visited:
 - In one Province, a series of modules relating to depopulation and SOP were available through a Website; besides, a spreadsheet had also been created to facilitate an assessment of each individual situation with regard to the number of animals that had to be killed according to a particular killing method. On this basis, the PVS can take decisions in relation to the personnel, equipment and materials needed, and the outcome can be written down in the required action plan.
 - However, in the two other Provinces, the SOP did not take fully into account all the key parameters set out in Chapter I of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009. In addition there was no process for developing an action plan for a depopulation operation linked to these procedures.
- In general, the equipment to apply the methods of killing is available either directly to the PVS, or through contracts with rendering companies (see 5.2.9 and 5.6). No major problem in this respect had been anticipated by any PVS, provided the disease outbreak is not a large one. Likewise, staff of the rendering plant visited confirmed that they had provided detailed training, in agreement with the PVS, to a number of staff to be used in such a situation.
- The BMG has issued an order which provides a template for reporting on each depopulation operation which follows the requirements of Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009. In the Provinces visited, the PVS had incorporated this into their procedures.

Conclusions on depopulation for epizootic disease control:

The PVS have taken some steps to ensure that guidance for killing different species in various circumstances is available, that methods of killing can be applied in compliance with Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 and that equipment and personnel would be largely available. However, reliance of the BMG on internal audits is not sufficient to ensure good coordination between all PVS, in particular in the event of a widespread disease outbreak, and that they fully comply with all the requirements of Article 18 of the said Regulation, because:

- SOP do not take into account the criteria in the Annex to the said Regulation, and
- there is no procedure in place for the establishment of the action plans required before the commencement of depopulation operations.

5.6 DISPOSAL OF CARCASSES

Legal requirements:

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 lays down health rules for animal by-products (ABP) and derived products, in order to prevent and minimise risks to public and animal health. In particular, Article 9 (f)(i) specifies that animals and parts of animals killed for disease control purposes, shall be considered as Category 2 animal by-products and therefore subject to the disposal methods specified in the Regulation.

In relation to FMD controls, Directive 2003/85/EC (Article 72 (1), (4) & (5) and Annex XVII Points 13 & 14) requires that the means of disposal of carcasses and animal waste does not cause environmental damage and that appropriate sites and undertakings for the treatment or disposal of animal carcasses and animal waste be identified in the contingency plan.

Findings:

The audit team found that:

- According to provisions laid down in the TSG, ABP processing plants are obliged to provide support to the CAs in the event of an epizootic disease outbreak, even if no contract has been agreed upon with them. In addition, fees paid to the processing plants by stakeholders include a part which is considered an advanced payment for the costs incurred if their participation is necessary in the event of a disease outbreak. Some of the Provinces have reached some kind of agreement to that effect with one of the three ABP plants approved for processing category 1 material (one with very low capacity) in Austria. One of the three Provinces visited could provide the audit team with evidence of an agreement to that effect with one of those ABP plants.
- As mentioned before, representatives of the rendering industry are part of the ET for contingency planning and emergency preparedness; therefore, the ET has received information from the processing plants in relation to the overcapacity in reserve in case of a disease outbreak. According to representatives of the BMG and the rendering industry, the overcapacity identified, some 30% over their standard operation, but for a short period of time, would make feasible the processing of material resulting from an average outbreak of an epizootic disease. The processing plant visited had an internal CP that had been discussed with the relevant PVS and operational arrangements were in place to facilitate their immediate intervention if and when necessary.
- However, and despite the role of the ET, the BMG had not set up any coordinated strategy for the nine Provinces for the operation of the system in case of a widespread outbreak, and each PVS has developed their own strategy within their own boundaries. Moreover, little attention has been paid to anticipate the possible occurrence of a larger outbreak and a worst-case scenario related to an outbreak of FMD, so that the CAs can ascertain whether the processing plants could complement each other in taking the responsibility of handling the ABP that are collected and processed routinely plus the higher risk material resulting from the emergency situation.
- Representatives of all CAs met acknowledged that in such a situation, it is likely that disposal capacities of the network of available processing plants in Austria were exceeded and, therefore, that the CAs would have to resort to the derogations on burning and burial of carcasses contemplated in Article 19 (e) of Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009. However, neither the BMG, nor the ET have carried out yet any formal evaluation of the options for using alternative disposal methods in accordance with environmental rules. Nevertheless, in one Province a legal opinion had been obtained indicating that animals could be buried after depopulation, but no further arrangement had been planned or added to the OM, and no

potential burial sites had been yet identified; whereas in another Province, potential burial sites have been established, even if the final decision to use them would have to be agreed upon with the local authorities.

Conclusions on disposal of carcasses:

The CAs have a well set up system for carcass disposal during peace time that should be able to deal adequately with small disease outbreaks. On the contrary, in the event of a major disease outbreak, in particular in case of FMD and when the disease involves several Provinces, the shortcomings identified prevent the system in place from being fully compliant with the relevant requirements laid down in Directive 2003/85/EC, in relation to FMD, or with the requirements laid down in Article 19(1)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 and Article 15(a) of Regulation (EU) No 142/2011, with regard to outbreaks of any epizootic disease.

6 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

The CAs have put in place an excellent early warning system that should contribute to the quick detection of outbreaks of highly contagious animal diseases. This, coupled with the availability of satisfactory emergency preparedness measures and arrangements, make the system in place in Austria suitable to manage the situation in the event of an epizootic disease outbreak, particularly if it is of limited geographic scope. This is due to:

- a satisfactory level of animal health surveillance, that should contribute to the early detection of any unusual disease event in domestic and wild animal populations;
- the availability of adequate legal powers and financial provisions to cope with a disease outbreak;
- the availability of CPs providing most of the necessary instructions and guidance for staff involved in managing a disease outbreak;
- the good levels of training and preparation amongst staff of all the CAs involved, and
- the availability of adequate technical, diagnostic and epidemiological expertise and of effective data analysis and information management tools that facilitate the decision making process.

However, the audit team identified shortcomings in the level of preparedness to deal with geographically widespread outbreaks, in particular if several Provinces were involved, or outbreaks affecting several domestic and wild animal species, namely:

- The insufficient coordination by the CCA of the development of OMs by the CAs of the Provinces, in particular in relation to the availability of arrangements to ensure that:
 - animal depopulation is carried out in accordance with EU requirements, and
 - all necessary equipment and resources necessary in the event of an outbreak are readily available to all CAs involved.
- Ineffective enforcement of EU requirements aimed at preventing the transmission and spread of infectious animal diseases that are applicable to assembly centres (ACs) involved in intra-EU trade of animals.
- The CP for FMD does not provide for measures to be implemented in the event of a worst case scenario and it lacks detailed plans to enable the CAs to take well-informed decisions in relation to the need and extent of emergency vaccination against the disease.
- The uncertainty about the rendering and incineration capacity available, and the lack of

arrangements in the CP for FMD in respect of alternatives to ensure proper and effective disposal of ABP, in particular if it is necessary to bury or burn the carcasses of dead or killed animals on site.

7 CLOSING MEETING

A closing meeting was held on 29 January 2014 with representatives of the CCA. At this meeting, the main findings and conclusions of the audit were presented by the audit team. The representatives of the CCA did not indicate any major disagreement with the preliminary findings and conclusions and provided additional clarification on a number of issues, in particular in relation to the ongoing initiatives aimed at restructuring the whole operation of the emergency preparedness system through the updating of CPs and OMs.

8 RECOMMENDATIONS

The CAs are invited to provide details of the actions taken and planned, including deadlines for their completion ('action plan'), within one month after receipt of the report, aimed at addressing the recommendations set out below.

N°.	Recommendation
1.	To ensure in accordance with Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 an efficient and effective coordination by the BMG in respect of preparation of OMs by the PVS so that all of them are adequately prepared to effectively tackle animal health emergency situations, in particular in the event of a large disease outbreak with a wide geographical scope affecting several Provinces.
2.	To ensure that internal audits include an element of verifying the suitability of planned arrangements in achieving the objectives as prescribed in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004, in particular, the suitability of CPs on OMs in dealing with large scale outbreaks should be evaluated and corrective action taken, as appropriate.
3.	To ensure in accordance with EU legal requirements on control of epizootic diseases that CPs allow access to facilities, equipment, personnel and all other appropriate materials necessary for the rapid and efficient eradication of a geographically widespread epizootic disease outbreak.
4.	To ensure that the CP for FMD provides for measures to be implemented in the event of a worst case scenario and it includes detailed plans to enable the CAs to take well informed decisions in relation to the need and extent of emergency vaccination against that disease in accordance with provisions laid down in Articles 14(3) and 72(3) of, and Annex XVII to Directive 2003/85/EC.
5.	To ensure compliance with requirements laid down in Directive 64/432/EEC applicable to ACs involved in intra-EU trade of animals so as to effectively prevent the transmission and spread of infectious animal diseases.

N°.	Recommendation
6.	To ensure that CPs are critically reviewed and updated in light of the outcome of real-time exercises and alarm drills in accordance with requirements of the Council Directives laying down provisions for control measures and contingency planning for FMD, AI, CSF and ASF.
7.	To ensure compliance with all the requirements laid down in Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009, in particular: a) that SOP take into account the criteria in the Annex to the said Regulation, and b) that there is a procedure in place for the establishment of the action plans required before the commencement of any depopulation operation.
8.	To ensure that, in cooperation with the environmental authorities, sites that can be used in case of an outbreak of an epizootic disease are identified for deep burial of carcasses as required by Directive 2003/85/EC (Article 72 (1), (4) and (5) and points 13 and 14 of Annex XVII) and Article 15(a) of Regulation (EU) No 142/2011.

The competent authority's response to the recommendations can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/rep_details_en.cfm?rep_inspection_ref=2014-7043

ANNEX 1 - LEGAL REFERENCES

Legal Reference	Official Journal	Title
Reg. 882/2004	OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1, Corrected and re-published in OJ L 191, 28.5.2004, p. 1	Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules
Dir. 2003/85/EC	OJ L 306, 22.11.2003, p. 1-87	Council Directive 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease repealing Directive 85/511/EEC and Decisions 89/531/EEC and 91/665/EEC and amending Directive 92/46/EEC
Dir. 2005/94/EC	OJ L 10, 14.1.2006, p. 16-65	Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 on Community measures for the control of avian influenza and repealing Directive 92/40/EEC
Dir. 2000/75/EC	OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 74-83	Council Directive 2000/75/EC of 20 November 2000 laying down specific provisions for the control and eradication of bluetongue
Dir. 2001/89/EC	OJ L 316, 1.12.2001, p. 5-35	Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever
Dir. 2002/60/EC	OJ L 192, 20.7.2002, p. 27-46	Council Directive 2002/60/EC of 27 June 2002 laying down specific provisions for the control of African swine fever and amending Directive 92/119/EEC as regards Teschen disease and African swine fever
Dir. 92/119/EEC	OJ L 62, 15.3.1993, p. 69-85	Council Directive 92/119/EEC of 17 December 1992 introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease
Dir. 92/35/EEC	OJ L 157, 10.6.1992, p. 19-27	Council Directive 92/35/EEC of 29 April 1992 laying down control rules and measures to combat African horse sickness

Legal Reference	Official Journal	Title
Dir. 92/66/EEC	OJ L 260, 5.9.1992, p. 1-20	Council Directive 92/66/EEC of 14 July 1992 introducing Community measures for the control of Newcastle disease
Reg. 1099/2009	OJ L 303, 18.11.2009, p. 1-30	Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing
Reg. 1266/2007	OJ L 283, 27.10.2007, p. 37-52	Commission Regulation (EC) No 1266/2007 of 26 October 2007 on implementing rules for Council Directive 2000/75/EC as regards the control, monitoring, surveillance and restrictions on movements of certain animals of susceptible species in relation to bluetongue
Dec. 2002/106/EC	OJ L 39, 9.2.2002, p. 71-88	2002/106/EC: Commission Decision of 1 February 2002 approving a Diagnostic Manual establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for evaluation of the laboratory tests for the confirmation of classical swine fever
Dec. 2003/422/EC	OJ L 143, 11.6.2003, p. 35-49	2003/422/EC: Commission Decision of 26 May 2003 approving an African swine fever diagnostic manual
Dec. 2000/428/EC	OJ L 167, 7.7.2000, p. 22-32	2000/428/EC: Commission Decision of 4 July 2000 establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for the evaluation of the results of laboratory tests for the confirmation and differential diagnosis of swine vesicular disease
Dec. 2006/437/EC	OJ L 237, 31.8.2006, p. 1-27	2006/437/EC: Commission Decision of 4 August 2006 approving a Diagnostic Manual for avian influenza as provided for in Council Directive 2005/94/EC
Dec. 2010/367/EU	OJ L 166, 01.07.2010, p. 22-32	2010/367/EU: Commission Decision of 25 June 2010 on the implementation by Member States of surveillance programmes for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds

Legal Reference	Official Journal	Title
Reg. 1069/2009	OJ L 300, 14.11.2009, p. 1-33	Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 laying down health rules as regards animal by-products and derived products not intended for human consumption and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 (Animal by-products Regulation)
Reg. 1760/2000	OJ L 204, 11.8.2000, p. 1-10	Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 establishing a system for the identification and registration of bovine animals and regarding the labelling of beef and beef products and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 820/97
Reg. 21/2004	OJ L 5, 9.1.2004, p. 8-17	Council Regulation (EC) No 21/2004 of 17 December 2003 establishing a system for the identification and registration of ovine and caprine animals and amending Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 and Directives 92/102/EEC and 64/432/EEC
Dir. 2008/71/EC	OJ L 213, 8.8.2008, p. 31-36	Council Directive 2008/71/EC of 15 July 2008 on the identification and registration of pigs (Codified version)
Dir. 64/432/EEC	OJ 121, 29.7.1964, p. 1977-2012	Council Directive 64/432/EEC of 26 June 1964 on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine
Reg 882/2004	OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p.1	Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules

ANNEX 2 - SUMMARY OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

RELATED TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR EPIZOOTIC DISEASE

Criteria	Disease & applicable legislation							
	FMD Dir. 2003/85	BT Dir. 2000/75 Reg 1266/2007	CSF Dir 2001/89 Dec. 2002/106	ASF Dir 2002/60 Dec. 2003/422	SVD Dir. 92/119 Dec. 2000/428	SVD Dir. 92/119 Dec. 2000/428	AI Dir 2005/94 Dec. 2006/437 Dec. 2010/367	ND Dir 92/66
Requirement for approval by Commission	Art 72 (6) – (9)	Art 18 (2)	Art 22 (3)	Art 21 (3)	Art 20 (3) & (4)	Art 17(2)	Art 62 (4)	Art 21 (3) & (4)
Requirement to update on 5 yearly basis	Art 72 (10)		Art 22 (3)	Art 21 (3)			Art 62 (5)	
Disease notifiable within MS	Art 3 (1)(a)	Art 3	Art 3 (1)	Art 3 (1)	Art 3	Art 3	Art 5 (1)	Art 3
Disease notifiable to Commission /other MS	Art 3 (2)	Dir. 82/894: Art 1 & 3	Art 3 (2)	Art 3 (2)	Dir. 82/894: Art 1 & 3	Dir. 82/894: Art 1 & 3	Art 5 (2) Annex II (details notification requirements)	Dir. 82/894: Art. 1 & 3
Co-operation with other CAs within MS	Art. 74(3) (d),(g) & (i) Annex XVII (6)						Art 62 (3)	
Co-ordination with neighbouring MS & TC	Art 72(2) Art 17 provides for co-ordination by Commission/ ScoFCAH					Art 8 (2)(c) (where PZ, SZ includes territory of other MS)		
Sufficient legal powers to control outbreaks	Annex XVII (1)	Annex III (10)	Annex VII (a)	Annex VI (a)	Annex IV (10)	Annex IV (10)	Annex X (13)	Art 26(1) (requiring transposition) Annex VII (10)
Chain of command	Annex XVII (3)		Art. 23(6) Annex VII (c)	Annex VI (c) Art 22 (6) (for NDCC, LDCC)				
NDCC / LDCC	Art. 74 – 77 Annex XVII (4) & (5)	Annex III (1) & (2)	Art 23	Art. 22(2), (3) & (4)	Annex IV (1) & (2)	Annex IV (1) & (2)	Art 62 (6) Annex X (1) & (2)	Annex VII (1) & (2)
Permanent expert group	Art 78 Annex XVII (7)		Art 23 (5)	Art 22 (5)			Art. 62(6)	

Criteria	Disease & applicable legislation							
	FMD Dir. 2003/85	BT Dir. 2000/75 Reg 1266/2007	CSF Dir 2001/89 Dec. 2002/106	ASF Dir 2002/60 Dec. 2003/422	SVD Dir. 92/119 Dec. 2000/428	SVD Dir. 92/119 Dec. 2000/428	AI Dir 2005/94 Dec. 2006/437 Dec. 2010/367	ND Dir 92/66
Information on personnel, qualifications, responsibilities		Annex III (3)			Annex IV (3)	Annex IV (3)	Annex X (3)	Annex VII (3)
Operational manual	Annex XVII (9)		Annex VII (e)	Annex VI (e)				
Instructions available to staff		Annex III (6)	Annex VII (e)	Annex VI (e)	Annex IV (6)	Annex IV (6)	Annex X (6)	Annex VII (6)
Questionnaire for epidemiological enquiry	Art. 13(1)		Art. 8	Art. 8			Art 6 (1) Annex X (3)	
Staff training	Annex XVII (11.1) & (11.3)	Annex III (7)	Annex VII (g) (i)	Annex VI (f)(i) & (f) (iii)	Annex IV (7)	Annex IV (7)	Annex X (7)	Annex VII (7)
Access to sufficient financial resources	Annex XVII (2)		Art 22 (1) Annex VII (b)	Annex VI (b)				
Availability of equipment and materials	Art 72 (2) Annex XVII (2) & (8)	Art 18 (1) & Annex III (5)	Art. 22(1) Annex VII (d)	Art 21 (1) Annex VI (d)	Art 20 (1)	Art. 17 Annex IV (5)	Art 62 (2) Annex X (5)	Art 21(1) Annex VII(5)
Diagnostic capabilities and capacity	Art 71 & Annex XVII (8)	Annex III (8)	Art. 17 (d) Annex VII (d)	Annex VI (d)	Annex IV (8)	Annex IV (8)	Annex X (8)	Annex VII (8)
Disease surveillance programme/ early detection		Art. 4 and Annex I & V to Reg 1266/2007					Art 1 (1) Art 4 (1) & (2) & Dec. 2010/367	
Definition of worst case scenario	Annex XVII (12)							
Areas of high population density identified	Art 72 (3)(b) Regions of densely populated areas Def: Annex X, (3)		Art 22 (1)(b) Regions with high density of pigs (higher level of awareness/preparedness)	Art 21 (1)			Annex X (12) Art. 62(2) Annex X (10) Registration of	

Criteria	Disease & applicable legislation							
	FMD Dir. 2003/85	BT Dir. 2000/75 Reg 1266/2007	CSF Dir 2001/89 Dec. 2002/106	ASF Dir 2002/60 Dec. 2003/422	SVD Dir. 92/119 Dec. 2000/428	SVD Dir. 92/119 Dec. 2000/428	AI Dir 2005/94 Dec. 2006/437 Dec. 2010/367	ND Dir 92/66
			Definition: Art 2(u) 300 pigs/km				commercial poultry holdings	
Vaccination requirements identified	Art 72 (3)(a)	Annex III (9)	Art 22 (1)(a)			Annex IV (9)	Art. 59(1) Art 62 (2)	Art 21 (1) Annex VII (9)
Availability of vaccine identified					Annex IV (9)		Annex X (9)	
Plans & procedures for emergency vaccination	Conditions and criteria specified in Art 49 – 58 & Annex X	Conditions and criteria specified in Art 5 & 6 (as amended by Dir. 2012/5)	Annex VII (f) Annex VI (criteria for deployment of emergency vaccination)				Annex X (9)	
Means of destroying carcasses		Annex III (6)			Annex IV (6)	Annex IV (6)	Annex X (6)	
Environmentally sound means of disposal of carcasses, etc.	Art 72 (1), (4),(5) Annex XVII (13) & (14)							
Real time alert exercises	Art 73 & Annex XVII (11.2)						Art 62 (6) (COM may make further rules)	
Alarm drills	Annex XVII (11.2.4)		Annex VII (g) (ii)	Annex VI (f)(ii)				
Co-operation with neighbouring MS in exercises	Art 73 (2) & Annex XVII (11.2)							
Communications strategy	Annex XVII (15) & (11.3)	Art 14	Art. 23(6) Annex VII (g) (iii)	Annex VI (f)(iii)	Annex IV (4)	Annex IV (4)	Annex X (4)	Annex VII (4) Art 13 (information to PZ, SZ)
Disease awareness and preparedness	Art 72(1) Annex XVII (11.3)		Art 22(1)(b) – regions with high density pig population					
Preventive vaccination							Dec. 2007/598 - in approved bodies, zoos (list)	

Criteria	Disease & applicable legislation							
	FMD Dir. 2003/85	BT Dir. 2000/75 Reg 1266/2007	CSF Dir 2001/89 Dec. 2002/106	ASF Dir 2002/60 Dec. 2003/422	SVD Dir. 92/119 Dec. 2000/428	SVD Dir. 92/119 Dec. 2000/428	AI Dir 2005/94 Dec. 2006/437 Dec. 2010/367	ND Dir 92/66
							Special identificatio n of vaccinated birds	
Diagnostic methods specified	Art 71 & Annex XIII		Diagnostic manual: Decision 2002/106/EC	Diagnostic manual: Decision 2003/422/E C	Diagnostic manual: Decision 2000/428/E C		Diagnostic manual: Decision 2006/437/E C	