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# FINAL REPORT OF AN AUDIT

# CARRIED OUT IN

# SLOVAKIA

# FROM 19 TO 27 FEBRUARY 2014

# IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTINGENCY PLANS IN RELATION TO ANIMAL HEALTH, INCLUDING PROVISIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF ANIMALS DURING DEPOPULATION FOR DISEASE CONTROL

***In response to information provided by the Competent Authority, any factual error noted in the draft report has been corrected; any clarification appears in the form of a footnote.***

***Executive Summary***

*This report describes the outcome of a Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) audit in Slovakia carried out between 19 and 27 February 2014, as part of the FVO audit programme. The main objective of this audit was to evaluate the resources and arrangements put in place to implement the European Union (EU) requirements for contingency planning, including provisions on the protection of animals during depopulation, in the event of one of more outbreaks of epizootic disease. A secondary objective was to gather information and to identify best practice in relation to a number of issues relevant to epizootic disease control but not explicitly specified in EU legislation.*

*The competent authorities have the necessary legal powers, defined command structures, a reliable laboratory and sufficient numbers of trained official staff to handle a limited outbreak of an epizootic disease. However, the limited equipment for killing animals during depopulation, the absence of a formal agreement with the processing plant for animal by-products and the lack of preparation for using other means of disposal than rendering may slow down the measures taken to reduce the spread of disease in a major outbreak of a highly contagious disease such as FMD. In addition, the observed non-compliances with regard to notification of suspect cases and the low level of on-farm biosecurity may lead to unnecessary spread, in case an epizootic disease is introduced.*

*Comprehensive contingency plans are in place for the major diseases, containing most of the relevant animal health and animal welfare measures. The listing of staff with additional language skills is an example of good practice and facilitates sending capable staff abroad to assist in outbreak management or to participate in training or exercises. Expert groups are included in each contingency plan but these groups do not include all the expertise required under EU legislation. In addition, deficiencies in guidelines for certain measures in restricted zones may hamper the rapid demarcation of zones and controls on holdings and lead to an increased risk of spreading the disease. It is of concern that the fitness for purpose of the contingency plans have not been tested by use of the real-time exercises and alarm drills required under EU legislation.*

*There are official controls on all movements of animals between farms which to some extent compensates for the low level of biosecurity by preventing the movement of animals which are not clinically healthy. The level of cleanliness of the assembly centre visited and SVFA's own equipment indicate that peacetime biosecurity is an area where improvements are needed. The national database for animals, holdings and movements covers all relevant species and is an accessible and user-friendly tool for the competent authorities. However, not all movements are registered, which has an impact on the traceability of animal movements in an outbreak.*

*Active surveillance programmes are mostly implemented in line with the approved plans. However, the effectiveness of the national system for passive surveillance, i.e. the capability for early detection, is undermined by i) a lack of samples in the passive surveillance in domestic animals, ii) the low number of samples tested for AI in wild birds and iii) the lack of notification and measures when samples from clinically ill animals were submitted for testing for an epizootic disease (CSF).*

*The NRL has the capability to provide the competent authorities with rapid and reliable results for the main epizootic diseases. However the laboratory does not meet its full obligation as an NRL and no NRL has been nominated for certain epizootic diseases. The lack of a contingency plan in the laboratory and the lack of agreed procedures for up-scaling the testing capacity may slow down the sample analysis in a major outbreak.*

*Most of the requirements laid down in Article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 have been included in the contingency plans with the exception of hypotheses concerning the size and location of outbreaks, which is needed to identify those exceptional situations where a derogation under Article 18(3) of the Regulation might be necessary. Equipment and trained staff for killing operations are available. However, the monitoring equipment and staff instructions for the gassing of birds are inadequate for verifying that animal welfare requirements are met and no methods are available for the killing of large numbers of ducks or geese.*

*The report makes recommendations to the Competent Authorities aimed at addressing areas in which further improvements are required.*

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## Abbreviations and definitions used in this report

| Abbreviation | Explanation |
|---|---|
| AHS | African Horse Sickness |
| AI | Avian Influenza |
| ASF | African Swine Fever |
| BT | Bluetongue |
| CSF | Classical Swine Fever |
| CVO | Chief Veterinary Officer |
| DAHW | Department of Animal Health and Welfare (in DVFA) |
| DG(SANCO) | Health and Consumers Directorate General |
| DVFA | District Veterinary and Food Administration |
| EC | European Commission |
| ELISA | Enzyme Linked ImmunoSorbent Assay |
| EU | European Union |
| FMD | Foot-and-Mouth Disease |
| FVO | Food and Veterinary Office |
| ISO | International Organisation for Standardisation |
| LDCC | Local Disease Control Centre |
| LIMS | Laboratory Information Management System |
| LSD | Lumpy Skin Disease |
| MARD | Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Developments |
| MS | Member State |
| ND | Newcastle Disease |
| NDCC | National Disease Control Centre |
| NRL | National Reference Laboratory |
| PCR | Polymerase Chain Reaction |
| PPR | Peste de Petits Ruminants |
| RP | Rinderpest |
| RVF | Rift Valley Fever |
| SGP | Sheep and Goat Pox |
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedure |
| SVD | Swine Vesicular Disease |
| SVFA | State Veterinary and Food Administration |
| VS | Vesicular Stomatitis |
| | |

## 1 Introduction

This audit took place in Slovakia from 19 to 27 February 2014 and was undertaken as part of the planned audit programme of the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO). The audit team comprised two auditors from the FVO and one National Expert from an EU Member State (MS). The team was accompanied throughout the audit by representatives of the State Veterinary and Food Administration (SVFA) which is the central competent authority for the scope of this audit.

## 2 Objectives

The objective of this audit was to evaluate the resources and arrangements put in place to implement the European Union (EU) requirements for contingency planning, including provisions on the protection of animals during depopulation, in the event of one or more outbreaks of the following epizootic diseases: Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), bluetongue (BT), classical swine fever (CSF), African swine fever (ASF), swine vesicular disease (SVD), African horse sickness (AHS), avian influenza (AI), Newcastle disease (ND) as well as a number of other diseases listed in Council Directive 92/119/EEC. Whilst an overview of contingency planning for all of these diseases was included within the scope of this audit, the audit concentrated, in particular, on ASF and also looked at FMD and AI. ASF is considered a current risk due to the presence of the disease in wild boar and close to EU borders. FMD is one of the most difficult diseases to contain and affects several livestock species. AI was chosen as an example of a poultry disease with zoonotic potential and where specific requirements for contingency plans are laid down in European legislation.

As the requirements of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 have applied since 1 January 2013 an evaluation of the implementation of the requirements of its Article 18 (animal welfare at depopulation) was included.

A secondary objective was to gather information and to identify areas of best practice in relation to a number of issues relevant to epizootic disease control but not explicitly specified in EU legislation. Such issues include routine monitoring for epizootic disease, the deployment of risk analysis with subsequent determination of alert levels and MS requirements for biosecurity measures on farms.

In pursuit of this objective, the following sites were visited:

| MEETINGS / VISITS | | no. | COMMENTS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Competent Authorities | Central | 2 | Opening and closing meetings with SVFA |
| | Regional | 3 | District Veterinary and Food Administrations (DVFA) in Komarno, Topolcany and Lucenec. |
| | other | 1 | Central Livestock Register |
| Laboratories | | 1 | National Reference laboratory and control laboratory: State Veterinary Institute in Zvolen |
| Holdings | | 2 | One major cattle farm and one major pig farm |
| Other sites | | 2 | One processing plant for animal by-products<br>One assembly centre approved for bovines, sheep and goats |

## 3 Legal Basis

The audit was carried out under the general provisions of EU legislation and, in particular:

- Article 45 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules.

Full legal references to EU legal acts quoted in this report are provided in Annex 1 and refer, where applicable, to the last amended version.

## 4 Background

Given the potential impact of outbreaks of epizootic disease, it is important that the competent authorities in a MS can react immediately and effectively in a coordinated manner and in cooperation with neighbouring countries. Of critical importance to the suppression of an outbreak of epizootic disease, is the swiftness of initial diagnosis and the deployment of the first stages of the contingency plan. EU legislation requires MS to have contingency plans in place to combat such outbreaks so as to reduce their adverse consequences.

The most recent outbreaks of epizootic diseases in Slovakia were: CSF (domestic and wild) 2008; FMD 1973; Highly pathogenic AI (wild) 2006, ND 2007 (domestic) and 2005 (wild); sheep and goat pox (SGP) 1950 and Rinderpest (RP) 1881. Slovakia has never reported outbreaks of AHS, ASF, BT, lumpy skin disease (LSD), peste de petits ruminants (PPR), Rift valley fever (RVF), swine vesicular disease (SVD), or vesicular stomatitits (VS).

## 5 Findings And Conclusions

### 5.1 Competent Authorities

**Legal requirements**

Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 lays down rules for the performance of official controls. In particular Article 4 requires the designation of competent authorities, coordination and cooperation between and within competent authorities and that sufficient legal powers are available to the competent authorities. The availability of sufficient legal powers for the implementation of contingency plan is specified in most of the relevant Directives (see Annex 2). In addition, Council Directive 2003/85/EC (Article 74(3)(d), (g) and (i) and Annex XVII(6)) requires close cooperation with environmental authorities and enforcement bodies in relation to FMD control; Council Directive 2005/94/EC on the control of avian influenza (Article 62(3)) requires close cooperation between the competent authorities responsible for the different sectors, particularly those in charge of animal health, public health, environmental matters and health and safety of workers.

**Findings**

### *5.1.1 Competent authority structures in "peacetime" and during an outbreak*

Information on the structures of the competent authorities can be found in the country profile (DG (SANCO)/2012/6423 Final), valid as of January 2013. This provides information on the responsibilities of the competent authorities under normal circumstances. The country profile can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/controlsystems_en.cfm?co_id=SK

The SVFA is the central competent authority for controls in the field of animal health and animal welfare. Within the SVFA the Department of Animal Health and Welfare (DAHW) is responsible for the organisation and supervision of controls on animal health and animal welfare. Forty District Veterinary and Food Administrations (DVFA) are in charge of implementing these controls. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) is responsible for overall animal health policy and for the adoption of legislation drafted by the SVFA.

The FVO team noted that:

- in accordance with the "Detailed plan of measures in case of pandemics of influenza in the Slovak Republic" the Pandemic Commission of the Government of the Slovak Republic would take over the overall command in case of a pandemic influenza outbreak. The Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) would be a member of this Commission;

- except in the case of an influenza pandemic, the existing command structures would remain in an outbreak scenario. Staff from the DAHW would form the national disease control centre (NDCC). In all relevant DVFAs, where outbreaks have been confirmed or where parts of protection or surveillance zones are located, the departments responsible for animal health would be transformed into local disease control centres (LDCC);

- each LDCC would be responsible for dealing with outbreaks and measures within the borders of its district. Should the demarcation of a zone or other aspects of an outbreak involve more than one district, contacts and coordination between the LDCCs would be going through the NDCC;

- there is an agreement on cooperation signed by the SVFA, the Public Health Authority and the Slovak Trade Inspection, in which these authorities agree to exchange information and to cooperate in the adoption of measures for the protection of public health during an outbreak.

### *5.1.2 Legal powers available to the competent authority*

The Act on Veterinary Care (Act No 39/2007 as amended) is the main legal act in the context of this audit. It lays down *inter alia* the veterinary requirements on animal health and animal welfare, the rights and responsibilities in the veterinary field, rules on veterinary activities, the powers (including the right of entry) as well as the organisation of competent authorities. Among the veterinary requirements are rules on notification and control of animal diseases, contingency planning, health requirements for movement and import/export/trade, animal welfare, and veterinary controls in these areas.

This Act also obliges the police corps, the civil protection corps, the armed forces, and the customs authorities to provide assistance to the SVFA when requested for the eradication or control of certain animal diseases.

As described in the Country Profile for Slovakia there are legal powers to take enforcement measures or impose sanctions laid down in national legislation. According to the system in place under the Act on Veterinary Care each level of authority may act as an appeal body against enforcement measures taken by a lower level.

The FVO team noted that:

- the Act on Veterinary Care provides the competent authorities with the necessary powers to detect, control and eradicate epizootic diseases. Under this Act the CVO is empowered, in an emergency, to direct employees of public administrations and other persons whose activities are necessary to manage an outbreak and to directly manage any veterinarian practising in Slovakia;

- the Act on Veterinary Care also empowers the DVFAs to order and withdraw measures and to impose penalties and measures, *inter alia* linked to the control of epizootic diseases;

- each disease-specific EU Directive with relevance for this audit has been transposed into a national Ordinance. In addition, the "Ordinance (2012) on the protection of animals at the time of killing" includes the rules in Regulation (EU) No 1099/2009;

- article 10 of the Act on Veterinary Care lays down rules for professional veterinary activities, including the performance of state veterinary activities by private veterinary practitioners, under contract with a DVFA. The article also defines conditions, with regard to conflicts of interest, which would render a private veterinary practitioner ineligible for carrying out state duties;

- within the scope of this audit, private veterinary practitioners are routinely contracted to carry out sampling for the active surveillance programmes;

- there are no financial contracts or service level agreements between the SVFA/DVFA and e.g. the national reference laboratory (NRL), suppliers of equipment, the rendering plant or other establishments which may be called upon to provide staff and equipment. It was not clear to the officials interviewed (due to a recent reorganisation of the laboratory services) if the formal contacts, e.g. about prioritisation or up-scaling of the diagnostic capacity, could be taken directly between the SVFA and the NRL or if they should be taken via the laboratory now responsible for coordinating the activities of the four state laboratories.

#### *5.1.3 Cooperation between and within competent authorities in development of contingency plans*

All the national contingency plans are reviewed by the DAHW/SVFA once per year and amended to take into account e.g. changes to contact details and results of training activities and exercises. The SVFA stated that although the NRL and the relevant expert groups had been involved in the original drafting of the contingency plans these bodies are not routinely involved in the annual review of the plans unless specific issues require their input.

Once updated the national contingency plans are distributed to the DVFAs in January. Each DVFA amends its district contingency plan accordingly and amends the plans with local technical aspects, such as contact details for staff, stakeholders, local authorities and veterinary practitioners as well as details concerning the establishment of the LDCC. The amended plans are submitted to the SVFA

for approval and the DAHW carries our random checks of these district contingency plans during the approval procedure. These responsibilities are clearly laid down in the Act on Veterinary Care.

The FVO noted that:

- other authorities and services (environmental authorities, police corps, civil protection corps, armed forces, the customs authorities, veterinary practitioners, rendering plant), which would be involved in the implementation of certain measures in the contingency plans, had not been consulted when the contingency plans were drawn up or reviewed.

#### *5.1.4 Conclusions on competent authorities*

The competent authorities have the legal powers to carry out all tasks needed to handle and outbreak of an epizootic disease. The legal provisions for assistance from veterinary practitioners and other services provide the competent authorities with additional staff when needed for dealing with epizootic diseases. However, the lack of consultation with certain other authorities and services when drafting and revising the contingency plans may complicate the close cooperation which, in line with EU legislation, would be necessary in a crisis situation, particularly one where there is a high risk for a negative impact on the environment.

### 5.2 Contingency Plans

**Legal requirements**

Requirements for Member States to have contingency plans to control disease outbreaks are required for the following diseases: FMD (Council Directive 2003/85/EC), BT (Council Directive 2000/75/EC), CSF (Council Directive 2001/89/EC), ASF (Council Directive 2002/60/EC), SVD and a number of other diseases (Council Directive 92/119/EEC), AHS (Council Directive 92/35/EEC), AI (Council Directive 2005/94/EC) and ND (Council Directive 92/66/EEC).

**Findings**

#### *5.2.1 Coverage, approval and documentation*

There are separate national contingency plans for FMD, BT, CSF, ASF, AI, ND, AHS and SVD, all of which were last updated in December 2013. All the national and district contingency plans are available on the shared intranet of the SVFA/DVFA.

The FVO team noted that:

- the existing contingency plans cover most of the measures laid down in EU legislation. However in the contingency plan for FMD, the measures to be taken in a surveillance zone do not include the periodical veterinary inspections required under Article 37(1) of Council Directive 2003/85/EC. Instead, the contingency plan stipulated that owners/keepers in the surveillance zone must notify the DVFA of any mortality or disease in FMD-susceptible animals;

- the contingency plan drawn up under Article 20 of Council Directive 92/119/EEC covers SVD, but not the other animal diseases listed in Annex I to this Directive. This is not in line with the requirements in this Article;

- there are no separate staff instruction manuals with full and detailed task-related practical descriptions of the procedures, instructions and measures to be employed in an epizootic outbreak. Incorporated in each contingency plan are, *inter alia*, guidelines for staff which detail the legal requirements and other applicable rules and recommendations for the different steps in the investigation of a suspect case and the measures once the epizootic disease has been confirmed. Official staff, and additional staff called in for the outbreak, would have to identify and extract the part(s) of the relevant contingency plan that is relevant for their particular tasks;

- each DVFA FMD contingency plan must include updated contact details and practical experience of all official veterinarians and veterinary technicians who have received specific training on FMD and who would be available to assist LDCCs in an outbreak situation. This information is available to the SVFA;

- the DVFAs are obliged to list the language skills of trained staff, in particular with regard to the ability to work in, or understand, English, French, Italian, German or Spanish. Such lists were available in the district contingency plans checked by the FVO team;

- where necessary, the guidelines for staff and the contact lists would be amended during the annual review of the contingency plans;

- the contingency plans include instructions for sampling by the official veterinarian. In case FMD is suspected the initial investigation and sampling on farm should preferably be carried out by an emergency sampling team from the State Veterinary Institute (NRL) in Zvolen;

- certain contingency plans (AI, ASF, CSF) include templates for forms, which can be copied from the contingency plan, for the epidemiological investigation and for other reports during an outbreak but no such templates are included in the contingency plan for FMD.

#### *5.2.1.1 National and Local Disease Control Centres*

In case of an outbreak of an epizootic disease all or part of the DAHW will be transformed into the National Disease Control Centre, led by the CVO. Staff will remain at their desks and the communication systems and IT tools available in the office will be used to lead the management of the outbreak.

Each DVFA is obliged to have facilities prepared for an LDCC. The minimum quantities of equipment and stocks of consumables to be maintained are defined in each contingency plans.

The FVO team noted that:

- each contingency plan includes a clear distribution of tasks between the NDCC and the LDCC(s). These tasks are in line with those outlined in EU legislation. The SVFA/NDCC and the DVFAs/LDCCs share an intranet which may be used for shared logs and documentation during an outbreak. There is also a database in operation which is used, in "peacetime", to record official sampling and test results for each registered holding;

- the DVFA/LDCC can rapidly map all types of relevant holdings and establishments by using of the common central database;

- within each LDCC, staff will be grouped into a coordination team, an administration team, an epizootiology team, an eradication team (which includes an animal welfare inspector), a control team, and (where relevant) a vaccination team;

- staff from another DVFA may be re-deployed to the LDCC to assist in an outbreak, if requested by the LDCC and approved by the NDCC. Under national legislation the CVO may also make use of any veterinary practitioner in an outbreak. Each DVFA contingency plan comprises updated contact lists of private veterinary practitioners, relevant stakeholders, the police, the fire brigade and other local authorities;

- the dedicated room for the LDCC visited in one DFVA did contain sampling equipment, maps and a work space for one person and was not equipped to accommodate the LDCC staff as well as a flow of field staff for *inter alia* briefing, debriefing, delivering samples and reports, resting, eating and collecting additional equipment;

- the minimum emergency equipment to be maintained in a DVFA/LDCC includes adequate personal protection equipment, sampling equipment and disinfectants for a visit to one or possibly two suspect outbreak holding. Should several holdings simultaneously require visits by official veterinarians additional supplies would have to be purchased from retailers, borrowed from other DVFAs or obtained from authorised private veterinary practitioners;

- the emergency equipment in DVFAs is sometimes checked during audits by the SVFA which are carried out in accordance with a three-year plan;

- when the initial sampling and clinical investigation on the holding is carried out by an emergency team from the NRL this team will bring with them all necessary equipment for the visit on the holding;

- according to the contingency plans, the NDCC would have the main responsibility for contacts with the media and with agricultural trade organisations, whilst the LDCC(s) would have the main responsibility for the implementation of information campaigns for the general public and for liaising with stakeholders, farmers and other food business operators, the rendering plant(s) and the police;

- there are no provisions for dedicated telephone lines/mobile phones for communication between the NDCC and the LDCC(s) which are separate from phone lines where farmers and other rural residents can obtain recent information about measures taken (a requirement under Article 77(2)(a) of Council Directive 2003/85/EC). All the mobile phone numbers to officials at central and local levels are publicly available on the internet and are planned to be used *inter alia* for notification of disease suspicions, media contacts, communication with stakeholders and contacts with official staff as well as or communication between the NDCC and the LDCC(s).

### *5.2.2 Financial provisions*

Costs for control and eradication of epizootic diseases, including staff, equipment, transport, disposal etc. are covered by the state budget. Compensation for animals which are killed on direct order from the NDCC/LDCC is paid by the SVFA. The valuation of the animals is performed by the Animal Breeding Service of the Ministry of Agriculture, based on a list of animals, ages and classes of animals on the holding obtained by the LDCC from the central database. The LDCC staff on site

at the time of killing will verify the weights, categories and numbers of the animals that are killed.

Keepers of animals are required to have insurance for other costs and losses (additional staff, loss of income, cleaning and disinfection). The Ministry of Agriculture may compensate for costs which have not been covered by the insurance.

#### *5.2.3 Establishment and enforcement of protection and surveillance zones*

Each DVFA/LDCC has access to online maps which are linked to the central database/holding register. The LDCC are also obliged to have maps (scale 1:50,000 and 1:10,000) on paper.

The initial movement restrictions for a holding can be issued verbally by the official veterinarian, who responds to a notification, usually from a veterinary practitioner or an animal keeper, of a suspected disease outbreak. The official veterinarian would subsequently confirm the movement restrictions in writing. The LDCC is responsible for drawing up the protection and surveillance zones around a confirmed outbreak. Once the zoning has been approved by the NDCC the DVFA issues the written decision with the demarcation of the zones and the applicable restrictions.

The FVO team noted that:

- it is not clear from the contingency plans how and by whom the boundaries of the zones would be made visible. Nor is it clear which authority is responsible for implementing check-points and for monitoring and enforcement of the movement restrictions in these zones. The competent authorities stated that signs around the perimeter of the zones would be put up by staff of the DVFA under the responsibility of the administrative team and the police would be responsible for controls on traffic and movements in the zones;

- there were no pre-prepared signs available in the DVFAs visited and staff indicated that signs would be drafted and printed when needed;

- if a zone encompasses areas in two or more districts, separate decisions/orders on demarcations and measures in the zone would have to be issued for each district by the relevant DVFA, following guidance from their respective LDCCs. Thus two or more administrative procedures and publications may be needed to adjust one zone to local conditions and natural boundaries, define the zone and to publish the applicable restrictions therein;

- derogation for movements to slaughter, e.g. for animal welfare reasons, in surveillance zones can be granted by the NDCC and rules for this are included in the Act on Veterinary Care;

- there are no provisions in the contingency plans or in DVFAs to set up facilities (toilets, showers, disinfection, changing rooms, canteens) for staff working inside the outbreak holding, protection or surveillance zones;

- the contingency plans comprise staff guidelines for cleansing and disinfection of vehicles, waste and personnel on the outbreak holdings but there are no guidelines or staff instructions on how, when and by whom cleansing and disinfection of vehicles in the restricted zone should be checked.

### *5.2.4 Availability of epidemiological and other expertise*

Each contingency plan comprises names of expert groups. Each group comprises 3-4 members from DVFAs, SVFA (only CSF/ASF) and from the NRL. These expert teams are expected to assist the LDCC by carrying out the epidemiological enquiry of a primary outbreak and assess the risks, and by providing support and advice to the LDCC during an outbreak. The teams are also responsible for maintaining expertise in handling the relevant disease(s) and for providing training and advice to staff.

The FVO team noted that:

- the nominated expert teams comprise operational official staff and representatives from teh NRL but not the specialised competences required under EU legislation i.e. hunters and wildlife biologists (ASF, CSF) and epidemiologists (ASF, CSF, FMD) (Council Directives 2002/60/EC, 2001/89/EC and 2003/85/EC, respectively);

- there are standard questionnaires for dealing with an epidemiological enquiry in the contingency plans for AI, ASF and CSF;

- for suspected primary outbreaks of epizootic diseases, in particular FMD, the initial sampling and clinical investigation on the holding will be carried out by an emergency team from the NRL.

### *5.2.5 Emergency vaccination*

With the exception of vaccination of back-yard poultry and racing pigeons against ND, no routine vaccinations for other epizootic diseases are allowed. The FMD, CSF and AI contingency plans were checked by the FVO team.

The FVO team noted that:

- the contingency plans for FMD, CSF and AI include chapters on emergency vaccination, which comprise instructions and target time frames for the implementation of emergency vaccination;

- the FMD and CSF contingency plans state that a LDCC may propose emergency vaccination by submitting an action plan to the NDCC. However, the SVFA explained that, in reality, the decision would be taken by the NDCC (without a prior proposal from the LDCC) and the LDCC would be expected to provide a plan for the implementation of the emergency vaccination, indicating *inter alia* areas of high density of susceptible species as well as the number of doses needed as the contingency plans for FMD and CSF do not contain estimates of the number of vaccine doses which may needed.

- the AI contingency plan contains criteria for a decision by the NDCC to implement emergency vaccination, instructions for such vaccinations, and estimates of the number of vaccine doses needed for different categories of birds;

- in cases vaccination cannot be implemented by official staff the CVO can call in private veterinary practitioners to carry out vaccinations;

- no supplies of vaccines against epizootic diseases are maintained in Slovakia.

#### *5.2.6 Conclusions on contingency planning*

Although comprehensive and regularly updated contingency plans are in place for the major epizootic diseases they do not cover all diseases listed in Council Directive 92/119/EC and the nominated expert groups do not comprise the expertise required under EU legislation. In addition certain measures in the contingency plan for FMD are not in line with EU requirements. The command structures and communication channels remain the same in an outbreak as in "peacetime". The potential advantages of this model are mitigated by i) all communication and coordination between LDCCs dealing with the same outbreak having to go via the NDCC, ii) the limited amount of emergency equipment kept in each LDCC and iii) the lack of dedicated communication channels between the authorities. The procedures for demarcation and check points in zones are not clear which may delay the implementation of measures in such zones, particularly if larger areas need to be covered. The listing of staff with certain language skills is an example of good practice and facilitates the sending of capable staff abroad to assist in outbreak management or to participate in training or exercises.

### 5.3 Animal Movements and Biosecurity

**Legal requirements**

Requirements relating to holding registration, animal identification and movement controls for cattle, sheep and pigs are laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000, Council Regulation (EC) No 21/2004 and Council Directive 2008/71/EC respectively, and associated implementing measures.

**Findings**

#### *5.3.1 Animal identification and movement control*

There is one central database for registration of holdings, animals and movements. All types of animal holdings except back-yard flocks of poultry, must be registered. Registration is compulsory also for all holdings with equidae. A holding is defined as any establishment, construction or, in case of an open-air farm, place in which animals are kept, held or handled. Notification of movements are required for all types of movements, also when animals are moved between holdings with the same owner or moved to pastures outside of the holding.

The FVO noted that:

- the registration of a holding for animals remains indefinitely, irrespective of whether animals are kept there, unless the owner notifies the competent authority of changes to the activity. Thus, the current number of registered holdings is much larger than the number of holdings which actually contain animals. Each month all registered holdings with pigs, poultry and ratites must report the current animal stock to the central database. The existence of other types of animals on a holding is known from the movement registrations in the central database;

- movements between holdings are reported to the central database by the recipient of the animals by completing and submitting a form where the first part is filled in by the person dispatching the animals. Movements out of Slovakia are notified to the central database

from the dispatch holding in Slovakia;

- before live animals are moved from holding to holding the movement (indicating the receiving holding) needs to be approved by the DVFA and an official veterinarian needs to carry out a clinical inspection and be present at loading. Prior to the movement the DVFA checks the health status of the receiving holding;

- for movements between holdings with the same owner in the same district no official control is required. The keeper records the movements either on a form which is submitted in hard copy within seven days to the central database or electronically (mostly for bovines);

- for movements to slaughter, the DVFA issues a movement document after verification that all required monitoring tests have been carried out and that there are no movement restrictions on the holding. Such a document is valid for three months (unless revoked due to changes to the health status). On a copy of this document the keeper signs the food-chain information and the authorised veterinarian enters a statement that the animals were clinically healthy at loading;

- there is no notification to the database from a dispatcher of animals within Slovakia and the only way to detect if the recipient fails to report the movement is through official controls on site or by matching movement documents with the database entries.

The FVO team visited the central database and noted that:

- the database is accessible for the SVFA and DVFAs. It allows tracing of individual animals and groups of animals (depending on the requirement for individual or group identification) forwards and backwards. It is user friendly and allows the user to export data into Excel files or other formats for further processing;

- the application can list and plot on a map all registered holdings (or a subset of certain types of holdings) within set distances from a registered holding. The standard distances for protection and surveillance zones are pre-defined in drop-down menus;

- once a notification has been submitted to the database (within 7 days of the movement, in line with EU legislation) the information is available in the database within 24 hours for electronically submitted data and within 5-7 days for data submitted in hard copy;

- the application files an error report and blocks registration if it detects a mismatch between dates, if data are missing or if holding number/species on the report do not match existing information in the database. These error reports are sent to the person submitting the data. If no corrected data are submitted no further action is taken (such as informing the relevant DVFA) and the data remain as "missing" in the database;

- the software is not set to detect or "flag" breaches of the movement rules e.g. if animals remain in assembly centres or markets longer than legally allowed.

The FVO team visited one assembly centre, which regularly dispatched consignments of cattle and sheep to other MS and to holdings in Slovakia for slaughter, breeding and production. In this assembly centre the FVO team noted that:

- the assembly centre holding is also registered as a market (in operation one day per year) and a dealer's premises;

- two official veterinarian have been assigned to the assembly to deal with the official controls on the approximately 180 consignments dispatched each year and the controls related to the market. The same two official veterinarians are responsible for the official controls on the general operations of the assembly centre, which are carried out twice per year;

- according to the central database 50 cattle (arrived in September 2013) and two groups of seven (arrived in May 2013) and two (arrived in October 2013) sheep would still be present in the centre. However, no animals were present. When cross-checking was requested by the FVO team the data showed that;

    - during the most recent official control of the assembly centre on 3 October 2013 the extract from the database had indicated that 67 cattle and 110 sheep were still present, which was noted on the inspection report. Although the animals were not present, the official veterinarian had not verified the movement dates or tried to ensure that these movements had been reported to the database;

    - with regard to the 50 cattle: these animals had been transported 16 September 2013 to a holding in Slovakia in a lot of 60 cattle. Only one sheet (listing 10 animals) of the movement document appeared to have been submitted to the database by the buyer. This would not trigger an error report;

    - with regard to the seven sheep: these sheep had been moved to two holdings in Slovakia, none of which had reported the movement to the central database. This would not trigger an error report;

    - with regard to the two sheep: the official veterinarian and the operator had recently identified that a number of movements of 110 sheep in total during 2013 had not been reported to the database by the operator of the assembly centre. A notification of movements of 110 sheep to other MS had been submitted to the central database 20 February 2014, i.e. the week before the FVO visit. This notification had been dated in September. 108 of these movements had been entered into the central database before the FVO visit but there was a mismatch between the date on the report (September) and the movement date for two sheep (October), which had triggered an error report in the database and left the movements of these two sheep open.

#### *5.3.2 Biosecurity measures in place on animal holdings*

There are no requirements in national legislation for biosecurity measures on holdings in "peace time" with the exception of an obligation for all holdings to have contracts in place to ensure the safe removal of carcases and other biological waste within 24 hours.

Compulsory biosecurity measures would be imposed in line with the requirements in EU legislation in case an outbreak of an epizootic disease was suspected or confirmed.

The FVO team noted that:

- the pig farm visited (which had an integrated production) had facilities (tyre bath) for

disinfection of wheels of vehicles at the entrance to the farm area. However, the keeper stated that no disinfectants were currently used but could be used if a higher risk was perceived;

- the cattle farm visited had no facilities or routines for disinfection of vehicles, but kept records of all vehicles visiting the premises;

- both holdings had routines for daily removal of waste, and routines for temporary storage of such waste which kept the rendering plant lorry on the outside the holding;

- the gassing equipment (belonging to the SVFA) demonstrated to the FVO team contained feathers and faecal material and had not been cleaned and disinfected before being moved from the poultry holding where healthy birds had been killed;

- the assembly centre visited was empty and had been cleaned and disinfected in preparation for receiving animals. However, there was faecal material on the wall by the weighing crate (through which all animals were moved), the walls in the outside boxes were made of porous material which was unsuitable for areas expected to be cleaned and disinfected and the indoor area had cracks in the floor and in certain walls. The cleansing and disinfection was not documented, there were no written instructions and the official veterinarian was never there to supervise how it was done but trusted the operator to do what was needed to prevent the spread of diseases as it was in his own interest;

- none of the keepers or officials interviewed were aware of any industry-driven schemes which would require specific biosecurity measures;

#### *5.3.3 Conclusions on animal movements and biosecurity*

There are official controls on all movements of animals between farms which to some extent compensate for the low level of biosecurity by preventing the movement of animals which are not clinically healthy. However, cleaning and disinfection in the assembly centre visited had not been subject to effective official controls and the routines for cleaning and disinfecting SVFA's own equipment were insufficient. The national database for animals, holdings and movements covers all relevant species and is an accessible and user-friendly tool which provides the competent authorities with all necessary information for managing an epizootic outbreak. However, the information available in the database is not made full use of in "peace time" for the targeting of official controls. In addition, not all movements are registered, and official controls in the assembly centre did not include checks against the register, which may undermine the reliability of the database in a crisis situation.

### 5.4 Preparedness and Awareness

**Legal requirements**

For all epizootic diseases relevant to this audit, there is a requirement that any occurrence of the disease is notified to the competent authority. Notification of outbreaks to the European Commission and other MS is mandatory. Surveillance programmes and systems for early detection of disease are required for BT (under certain circumstances) and AI. For some diseases, risk factors (e.g. areas of high animal density, worst cases scenarios) must be identified within the contingency plan. Specific preparedness and awareness criteria are specified for FMD; for most other relevant

diseases, a communications strategy and appropriate communications training are required. The organisation of real-time alert exercises is required for FMD. Alarm drills are required for CSF and ASF.

**Findings**

*5.4.1 Epizootic disease risk analysis and alert levels*

There are no specific risk analyses or formalised alert levels in Slovakia. Risks are assessed and managed by the DAHW of the SVFA. Information or instructions to DVFAs, other services (such as border inspection posts and customs), veterinary practitioners, animal keepers and stakeholders are issued by the CVO when deemed necessary.

The FVO team noted that:

- following the recent developments regarding ASF in wild boar the CVO had issued instructions in mid February to the DVFAs to intensify the controls on movements of vehicles, people and animals and the separation of domestic and feral pig populations. The DVFAs were also asked to collaborate with the hunters' organisations to increase the monitoring of feral pigs and to raise the awareness among hunters, veterinarians and pig farmers of the risk of ASF.

- instructions had also been given to the NRL in mid February to test all samples from feral pigs in 11 districts along the border with Ukraine and Poland, submitted within the framework of the EU co-financed CSF surveillance, for ASF. In the letter the CVO requests serological analysis, although until now the laboratory has analysed such wild boar samples for ASF virus which is more appropriate for detection of wild boar infected with the currently circulating strain of ASF virus.

*5.4.2 Notification requirements (peacetime)*

The rules for notification are laid down in the Act on Veterinary Care. There have been no notifications of suspect cases of epizootic diseases in domestic animals during 2012, 2013 and 2014 to date. In 2012 one wild swan and in 2013 one starling and one urban pigeon were tested for AI as suspect cases.

The FVO team noted that:

- the rules in the Act on Veterinary Care for notification of suspected outbreaks are in line with the requirements in the disease-specific EU directives and the rules for notification of outbreaks are in line with the requirements in Articles 3 and 4 of Council Directive 82/894/EEC;

- no official interviewed in the three DVFA offices visited could recall a notification of a suspicion of an epizootic disease in the last five years;

- although there had been no suspect cases reported to the competent authorities for CSF sample submission forms for 2013 studied in the NRL (see chapter 5.5) showed that in at least four cases samples from pigs had been submitted to the NRL for testing for CSF virus by veterinary practitioners. The (negative) test results had been provided to the DVFA/SVFA

as required by the sampler. However, these suspect cases had not been notified to the competent authorities at the time of sampling as required under national and EU legislation and, pending the outcome of the testing, the holdings had not been subject to the measures required under Article 4 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC, national legislation and the contingency plan for CSF;

- there is no obligation for the NRL to notify the SVFA/DVFA when sampling forms requesting testing for epizootic diseases are submitted by private veterinary practitioners. Neither is the NRL obliged to notify the competent authorities of the results of such tests unless requested by the sampler.

### *5.4.3 Monitoring and surveillance systems*

During 2014 Slovakia is implementing EU co-financed programmes for AI (domestic and wild birds), BT (part of the territory) and CSF, and sampling programmes for these diseases were in place during 2012 and 2013. In addition a random selection of the CSF samples from wild boar were analysed for ASF virus. All sampling is carried out by DVFA staff and contracted private veterinary practitioners under the annual "Plan of veterinary prevention and control of the state territory of the Slovak Republic". During 2012 and 2013 samples were analysed as follows:

| **Disease** | **Type of test** | **Species** | **2012** | **2013** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BT | Serology | Cattle | 16,607 | 16,229 |
| | | Sheep | 0 | 1 |
| | PCR | Cattle | 18 | 2,818 |
| | | Sheep | 4 | 6 |
| CSF | Serology | Pigs | 17,629 | 17,770 |
| | | Wild boar | 21,610 | 21,848 |
| | Virus culture | Pigs (only those suspect + in serology) | 28 | 25 |
| | | Wild boar (routine) | 22,322 | 22,424 |
| ASF | Serology | Wild boar (subset of CSF samples) | 2008 | 1000 |
| AI | Serology | Poultry | 1,423 | 1,896 |
| | PCR | Poultry | 20 | 14 |
| | | Wild birds | 30 | 28 |
| ND | Serology | Poultry | 183 | 12 |
| | PCR | Poultry | 19 | 12 |
| | | Wild birds | 8 | 6 |

The FVO team noted that:

- in 2013, the bovine samples for BT serology exceeded the number indicated in the programme;

- in 2013, the pig samples analysed for CSF did not reach the target in the eradication and

monitoring plan (66% of the planned samples were tested) whilst the wild boar samples exceeded the targets;

- for for wild boar tested in 2012 and 2013, the SVFA did not have data on how many of the animals had been found dead (passive surveillance) and how many had been shot during hunting (active surveillance). The wild boar found dead would have been the most suitable for ASF testing but no such instructions had been issued to the NRL;

- in 2013, the passive surveillance for AI in wild birds resulted in 28 samples which is 7% of the samples estimated in the AI surveillance programme, whilst the surveillance in domestic birds met the targets in the programme;

- when samples for CSF virus culture are taken from pigs which have shown a suspected positive result in the serological test, these samples are not registered or handled as suspect samples;

- the passive surveillance for other epizootic diseases (e.g. FMD, SVD, AHS) had not resulted in any analyses in 2012, 2013 or 2014 to date.

#### *5.4.4 Public awareness activities in "peacetime"*

The SVFA has published information about epizootic diseases on its website, including descriptions of disease signs and all the national contingency plans are also made available on the website. Each year at the annual meeting of the Chamber of Veterinary Surgeons, representatives from the SFVA give an update of the animal disease situation, disease controls and preparedness to detect and deal with outbreaks.

Representatives from the media are invited to the training exercises in order to disseminate information to the general public via media about the importance to detect and control epizootic diseases.

The FVO team noted that:

- the DVFAs are required to forward relevant information to relevant local parties, such as veterinary practitioners, hunters and animal keepers. In the DVFAs visited this had been done through meetings, organised by the DVFA or stakeholder organisations, and through direct contacts.

#### *5.4.5 Staff training and simulation exercises*

The SVFA is responsible for organising targeted training activities in different locations for SVFA and DVFA staff as well as biannual meetings, for lectures and exchange of information, between the SFVA and representatives from all DVFAs in a central training facility.

The FVO team noted that:

- there have been no simulation exercises or alarm drills in Slovakia, where procedures laid down in the contingency plans have been tested in real-time. The most recent test of the CSF plan was during a limited outbreak in 2008. This is not in line with the requirements in Article 73 of Council Directive 2003/85/EC (real-time alert exercise FMD), Annex VII(g)

(ii) to Council Directive 2001/89/EC (alarm drills CSF), and Annex VI(f)(ii) to Council Directive 2002/60/EC (alarm drills ASF);

- the exercises referred to as simulation exercises by the SVFA have been planned training exercises comprising a morning of lectures on different aspects of contingency planning for a specific disease, followed by on-farm demonstrations of e.g. personal protection equipment, clinical examinations, sampling, sample packaging, handling of animals for depopulation and the use of the equipment in the mobile depopulation units. All participants receive (electronic) copies of the training material;

- training exercises for epizootic diseases have been organised on AI (2004), FMD and BT (2008), FMD (2011), anthrax (2012) and CSF/ASF (2013). Representatives from all DVFAs, other services and stakeholders were invited to these training exercises, which each had more than 100 participants. Although some of the experiences from these training exercises may have led to amendments to the contingency plans no written reports were available to describe the outcomes, or lessons learnt, from these training exercises;

- in recent years the SVFA has organised several training sessions for official staff on animal welfare at the time of killing, with special reference to the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009;

- staff from SVFA and DVFAs have regularly participated in training sessions and liaison exercises in a neighbouring MS and in relevant BTSF courses;

- there is a defined procedure for dissemination of learning within the organisation. Everyone who has participated in a training or exercise abroad writes a "report from a business trip abroad" which is submitted to the SVFA, signed by the CVO and usually made available to all SVFA/DVFA staff on the intranet. For specific exercises the participant would be invited to make presentation at the biannual meeting. Staff from DVFAs participating in national training activities or meetings are required to share the information and training material with colleagues in their DVFA.

#### *5.4.6 Conclusions on preparedness and awareness*

Official staff is appropriately trained for their tasks, there is a good system in place for dissemination of learning experiences within the services and the authorities have regular contacts with veterinary practitioners, farmers, hunters and other stakeholders. However, the last outbreak was in 2008 (CSF) and there have been no real-time exercises to test if the contingency plans are fit for purpose. Such exercises are not only required under EU legislation but also important tools for the competent authorities, especially in countries with few outbreaks.

Surveillance programmes are in place but do not always meet the targets laid down in the approved programmes. Of particular concern are the low numbers of samples for AI surveillance in wild birds and the lack of samples submitted under the passive surveillance for epizootic diseases in domestic animals. In addition, non-compliances with regard to notification, when samples from clinically ill animals are submitted for testing for an epizootic disease, weaken the passive surveillance system and may lead to unnecessary spread of disease.

### 5.5 Laboratories

**Legal requirements**

Articles 11 and 12 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 set out requirements in relation to sampling, analysis and official laboratories, including that laboratories must be accredited to and operate in accordance with ISO 17025.

Specific requirements relating to laboratories are laid down in the various Directives on epizootic disease control including the designation and functions of National Reference Laboratories, the tests and criteria to be applied, and the provision of adequate diagnostic capabilities and capacity. Diagnostic manuals are provided for FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD and AI.

**Findings**

The official laboratory network has recently been re-organised. Whereas before, all four laboratories (the NRL and three State Veterinary and Food Institutes) reported directly to SVFA and MARD, from 1 January 2014 all four laboratories report to SVFA and economic figures to the State Veterinary and Food Institute in Dolny Kubin which in turn reports to MARD. All four laboratories are accredited to ISO 17025.

The State Veterinary Institute in Zvolen is the NRL for FMD, AI, ND, ASF, CSF, AHS, BT and SVD. No other laboratory may carry out tests for the diseases within the scope of this audit, with the exception of serological tests for antibodies to CSF 21 days after abortions. Such tests may be carried out in three other laboratories in the official laboratory network- For FMD, the NRL may carry out serological tests and real time polymerase-chain reaction (PCR) tests for virus genome (on inactivated samples) but for tests which require the handling of live virus samples would be sent to the Friedrich-Loeffler Institute in Germany as indicated in Part A of Annex XI to Council Directive 2003/85/EC.

The FVO team noted that:

- the competent authority has designated a laboratory (the NRL) for SVD but not for the other diseases listed in Annex I to Council Directive 92/119/EC. Designation of a national laboratory (or a laboratory in another MS) for each of the diseases listed is a requirement under Article 17 of this Directive. Should testing for such epizootic diseases (e.g. PPR, SGP, LSD which have been detected in countries near the EU) be required, the NRL would refer the samples to other suitable laboratories in the EU. However, no prior arrangements are in place for such referrals;

- the laboratory is meeting its obligations as an NRL with regard to contacts with the EU reference laboratories, participation in comparative tests organised by those laboratories, provision of scientific and technical assistance to the competent authorities (e.g. by providing a representative in each expert team) and provision of training for sampling staff. However, the NRL is not meeting the requirements of points 3(b) and (c) of Annex III to Directive 2001/89/EC since it neither controls the quality of reagents used for CSF serology in the other three laboratories nor organises comparative tests for these laboratories;

- suitable methods for screening and confirmation for epizootic diseases are available in the laboratory, appropriate diagnostic pathways are applied, and the vast majority of these

methods are included in the scope of accreditation, including methods for detection of virus and detection of antibodies for all the diseases for which the laboratory is the NRL;

- the NRL has procedures in place for validation of in-house methods and for verification of diagnostic kits. In addition, the laboratory has regularly participated with satisfactory results in international comparative tests, provided by the EU reference laboratories, for all relevant epizootic diseases;

- the maximum capacity of the laboratory, which could be reached after approximately one week, are included in the contingency plans for CSF, ASF, AI and ND: 1200 samples per week for virus detection; 3000 pig samples/ 2000 bird samples per week for antibody testing. During the first week of an outbreak approximately 1000 samples could be processed for PCR and 1000 for serology;

- the FMD contingency plan states that after one week 3000 serological samples per week could be analysed, and that the capacity could later be increased to 6000 per week. The NRL explained that these data assume that all other similar activities in the laboratory are put on hold. During the first week the NRL could carry out approximately 1000 real-time PCR tests, 1000 serological tests for antibodies to structural proteins and 500 serological tests for antibodies to non-structural proteins;

- in the few cases, where virus testing had been required on the sampling form due to clinical observations, the laboratory had provided results via telephone after 24 hours for preliminary culture results and PCR. However, there is no written agreement between the NRL and the SVFA on the handling of (suspect) samples taken within the framework of the contingency plans (such as reporting routines or turnaround times);

- the same sample submission forms are used for all types of samples. This form, which has been designed by SVFA and is submitted in hard copy to the laboratory, does not provide the option to clearly mark if the sample is taken due to a suspicion of an epizootic disease. Such samples are defined as “other” and the request for testing for a particular disease is written in free text. Monitoring samples, e.g. for CSF, are also entered under the heading “other” on the submission form. No samples are identified as “suspect samples” in the laboratory information management system (LIMS);

- wild boar, which have been sampled, are registered in the LIMS as either shot (active surveillance) or found dead (passive surveillance). During 2012 and 2013 the SVFA had not requested the summary results to differentiate between the two types of samples but the system to do so is in place and was used prior to 2012. The SVFA stated that differentiation of data would be required for 2014;

- when the FVO team checked the sample results for CSF virus in the laboratory database it was not possible to differentiate between samples submitted for CSF testing by a veterinary practitioner due to clinical disease, pre-export samples and other routine samples selected by the laboratory for additional CSF testing. The sampling forms for all 55 pigs, from 17 small pig holdings, which had been tested for CSF virus in 2013 showed that in four cases samples had been submitted by a practitioner with the explicit request for testing for CSF virus due to clinical disease. There is no obligation for the NRL to notify the SVFA/DVFA when such samples arrive in the laboratory;

- there is no link between the LIMS and the veterinary information system used in the field and by DVFA to enter information on e.g. sampling and laboratory results. The NRL stated that they had requested such a link in order to receive sample information electronically;

- the NRL has lists of staff which are qualified to carry out the different tests for epizootic diseases, but it does not have a contingency plan, i.e. for how to prioritise (reduce or stop other testing), up-scale, obtain further equipment and consumables, and re-allocate staff and laboratory facilities in case of an outbreak. In addition, the SVFA and the NRL had not established any procedures for such decisions after the reorganisation of the laboratory network;

- the NRL has emergency sampling teams (pathologist, virologist, technician) on stand-by which would be sent out to holdings where there is a primary suspicion of FMD but these teams may also be called upon by the SVFA for primary suspicions of ASF, CSF and AI or other exotic diseases. There are no written instructions for these sampling teams and no lists of which equipment they need to the holding (depending on the disease and species).

#### *5.5.1 Conclusions on laboratories*

The NRL has the capability to provide the competent authorities with rapid and reliable results for the main epizootic diseases and provides assistance with appropriate on-farm sampling. However the laboratory does not meet its obligation as an NRL with regard to the quality and reliability of the limited number of serological tests for CSF carried out in other laboratories. No NRL has been nominated, and no arrangements are in place to handle samples needing analysis, for certain other epizootic diseases. This is likely to delay the initial diagnosis of such diseases. The lack of a contingency plan in the laboratory and the lack of agreed procedures for the decision-making, should the laboratory be required to increase its diagnostic capacity in an outbreak, may slow down the sample analysis in a major outbreak. Furthermore, the sample submission forms, the handling of suspect samples and the communication channels with the SVFA/DVFA are not optimal which may slow down or complicate the processing of large numbers of samples in an outbreak.

### 5.6 Depopulation for epizootic disease control

**Legal requirements**

Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 lays down rules for the killing of animals, including when this is performed for the purpose of depopulation. In particular, Article 18 of the Regulation requires that the stunning and killing methods are planned and that the corresponding standard operating procedures, for ensuring compliance with the rules laid down in the Regulation, shall be included in the contingency plans on the basis of a hypothesis established in the contingency plan concerning the size and location of suspected outbreaks. When implementing depopulation the competent authority shall take any appropriate action to safeguard the welfare of the animals in the best available conditions.

**Findings**

#### *5.6.1 Contingency plans and standard operating procedures*

The SVFA stated that the contingency plans have been reviewed and updated in order to include the standard operating procedures (SOP) and the planned stunning and killing methods, as required by

Article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009. The SVFA stated that all planned killing methods comply with this Regulation. The action plans before depopulation are co-produced by the LDCC and the NDCC.

The SVFA has its own "Mobile unit for eradication of animal diseases" (hereafter: the Mobile unit). The Mobile unit directly performs the killing of animals during the outbreak, it fulfils the orders issued by the NDCC and the CVO and its members are the employees of the SVFA. They form part of the LDCC eradication, team together with the local official veterinarian responsible for the control of welfare of animals at the time of killing. The Mobile unit normally comprises one manager and five staff when dispatched to the site of an epizootic outbreak but the SVFA stated that additional staff could be assigned to the Mobile unit if necessary.

The NDCC takes the final decision on the killing method of choice and on the back-up method, in cooperation with the DVFA/LDCC animal welfare specialist, taking into account the infectiousness of the disease (stunning with or without bleeding), animal species and categories, and the number of animals to be killed. Staff of the Mobile unit are consulted in this process. The order of killing of different animal groups is decided taking into account the different killing rates and limiting factors that have been worked out at central level.

The audit team noted that:

- the competent authorities have no contractual arrangements to obtain additional equipment to carry out killing, according to the methods listed in Annex I of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009, in case the capacity of the Mobile unit would be insufficient;

- together with the official animal welfare veterinarian from the DVFA the staff of the Mobile unit are responsible for meeting the animal welfare requirements during depopulation. However, the powers of the DVFA official animal welfare veterinarian (e.g. to stop or change procedures) during depopulation are not clearly defined in the contingency plans;

- the rules for animal welfare checks, stunning and killing methods, checks to ensure that animals are dead, as well as actions to take if animals are not dead were clearly laid down and references were made to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 in the contingency plans checked by the FVO team (AI, FMD, CSF and ASF);

- guidance on how to produce action plans for the killing of animals and related operations are included in each contingency plan. Guidance is provided on the preferred methods of killing, key parameters, order of killing, killing groups, different killing rates and limiting factors which have been worked out by the SVFA.

### *5.6.2 Methods of killing and availability of equipment*

The Mobile unit is responsible for maintaining equipment for handling, stunning and killing animals, for transport of the equipment, for making the equipment operational in the field, for cleansing and disinfection of equipment and vehicles, and for supplying staff to operate the equipment. Animal keepers are obliged to assist, where requested, in the handling of animals.

The SVFA does not expect to grant derogations for the use of methods of killing which are not included in Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009. If necessary, in very exceptional cases, derogations would be decided on a case by case basis and authorised by the CVO.

Electrical and carbon dioxide gas methods are the two main methods of killing in the Mobile unit, percussion methods such as captive bolt guns are used as back up. Further methods are firearm with free projectile and narcotising firearm followed by overdosing of anaesthetic. Lethal injection after sedation is the preferred killing method for small size outbreaks and neck dislocation may be used for poultry under certain conditions.

Electric tongs is the preferred method for killing adult cattle, the electrodes are applied first to the head for stunning and later over the heart and spine for cardiac arrest. The SVFA stated that pithing is not in use in Slovakia. With respect to killing methods for birds and piglets, carbon dioxide gassing in containers is the first choice and whole-house gassing is not an option.

The FVO team visited the site where the Mobile unit is kept at the SVFA headquarters, where a demonstration without live animals was organised, and noted that:

- The unit has two mobile handling units for large animals (20 metres fenced drive and a crate) and two sets of electrical units and generators. Thus, the Mobile unit can work on two holdings in parallel when electrical methods are used. For gassing, the Mobile unit can operate on one holding at a time;

- killing rates for one Mobile unit have been elaborated by the SVFA: 250 pigs or 133 sheep/hours with electrical methods; 1200 heads of poultry or 400 piglets/hour with gas. No killing rate has been established for cattle and no assessment has been made to determine if the established killing rates would be sufficient in a larger outbreak;

- no plan or hypothesis has been included in the contingency planning to establish how to proceed if depopulation needs to be carried out faster or on more locations, than those possible within the capacity of the Mobile unit, in order to avoid affecting human health and/or avoid significantly slowing down the process of eradicating a disease;

- two types of portable electric units and electric generators are available in the Mobile unit. One electric unit seen did not indicate the voltage and the current under load, positioned so as to be clearly visible to the operator, as required by Directive 93/119, Annex C, II, A, 2(c). At the closing meeting the CVO indicated that this device was no longer in use;

- the manufacturers' technical specifications are available to the Mobile unit staff. However, instructions (from manufacturers or from the competent authorities) to users, regarding the conditions under which the equipment should be used and maintained to ensure optimal welfare to the animals, are not available;

- SOPs are included in the contingency plans with references to animal welfare aspects *inter alia* during the introduction of animals into the portable restraining box or into the crates for the gassing unit, actions to take in case of failure of the killing, tasks for each operator position and specific instructions for the handling of different animal species and weight categories;

- the gassing equipment consists of one trailer with one container comprising two compartments. A heating device to prevent freezing of the equipment is located between the bottles providing CO2 and the container. Each compartment has the size and volume to permit the introduction of one four tiers pallet into which birds or piglets have been introduced by hand. The SVFA indicated that even in case of highly contagious zoonoses,

handlers with full protective clothing and masks will go inside the poultry houses to catch the birds;

- the method used is CO2 at high concentration, more than 40%, as required for method 1 of table 3 of Chapter I in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009. Welfare parameters that the Mobile unit has to meet are included in the contingency plans: a minimum of 80% CO2 within 3-5 minutes. No temperature gradients have been set and temperature and humidity are not monitored;

- there is no device to measure CO2 concentration inside the animals' compartment, but an O2 monitoring device instead. In the case of piglets the FMD contingency plan indicated that the minimum concentration of CO2 in the chamber shall be 80%, as required by Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009, and that during the killing O2 must be monitored and should not be less than 20%. Based on the assumption made by the SVFA that when the O2 concentration in the chamber is 20% the CO2 concentration is 80%, the correct sentence would be that the concentration of O2 should not be more than 20%. However, there was no evidence available to support the SVFAs assumption. At the closing meeting the SVFA stated that devices to measure CO2 would be introduced;

- this method cannot provide CO2 in two phases, which makes unsuitable for killing ducks and geese. Although lethal injection and cervical dislocation for poultry up to 5 kg (maximum 70 animals per operator) are indicated as alternative methods for small numbers of birds, no methods of killing for larger (or larger numbers of) ducks and geese are included in the contingency plan. Prior to the entry into force of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 ducks and geese would be killed with the same gassing method as for poultry;

Should there be animal welfare problems on a holding due to movement restrictions in protection and surveillance zones, such as overstocking or restrictions in the routine movement of animals for management purposes, the Act on Veterinary Care gives the CVO the right to order the culling of animals and economic compensation would given to the farmer. The CVO may also grant derogation for certain movements (e.g. to slaughter).

- there are no legal requirements for farmers to maintain animal spaces to cope with animal welfare aspects of epizootic emergencies, such as standstill periods;

- on the pig farm visited it was possible to cope with two weeks standstill by re-grouping and increasing the number of animals per pen. The local DVFA stated that although the CVO might grant derogation for transport to a slaughterhouse this may be complicated as the nearest slaughterhouse is in another district, which would require coordination (via the NDCC) with another DVFA.

#### *5.6.3 Reporting, supervision, training and scientific network*

Information on animal welfare during depopulation and the selection of methods to be used would be provided to the media either by a nominated spokesperson of the NDCC or by the CVO.

The audit team noted that:

- the SVFA had recently produced a form to be filled in after each depopulation operation that include the sections required in point 4 of the Article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No

1099/2009, such as number and species of animals, killing method used, difficulties encountered and solutions found to alleviate suffering. The required information has been entered in previous reports produced after depopulation and is also covered by a new check list for animal welfare to be completed after depopulation;

- animal welfare during depopulation would be supervised by the LDCC official animal welfare veterinarian, in cooperation with NDCC experts;

- veterinarians and Mobile unit personnel are regularly trained in the SVFA training system and the requirements of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 have been included in several training exercises and courses. To ensure that personnel who are be involved in handling and/or slaughtering animals are competent, the SVFA explained that all slaughtermen need to have a certificate of competence for the relevant equipment and duties. Training to animal handlers such as poultry catchers and pig handlers are also provided and certificates issued. Lists of trained slaughtermen and handlers are available. However, there are no procedures in place in the contingency plans for verification of the qualifications of non-official personnel called in to assist in an outbreak;

- the SVFA has not provided the Commission with information about the single contact point responsible for sharing technical and scientific information and best practices, as required by Article 20 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009.

### *5.6.4 Conclusions on depopulation for epizootic disease control*

The competent authorities have integrated the requirements of Article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 in the contingency plans and most relevant animal welfare requirements, including criteria for selection of the method of killing, are included in the contingency plans. However, the contingency plans do not include killing rates for cattle or hypotheses concerning the size and location of outbreaks, which should be the basis for identifying those exceptional circumstances when derogations may need to be granted in order not to affect human health or significantly slow down the process of eradicating a disease.

Equipment and trained staff for killing operations are available and standard operating procedures are included in the contingency plans. However, the equipment for monitoring CO2 gassing, and the corresponding staff instructions, are inadequate for checking if animal welfare requirements are met. In addition, the gassing system is inadequate for killing geese and ducks and no methods have been identified for killing large numbers of such birds.

There is equipment and trained staff available for killing of large animals at two holdings in parallel and for gassing poultry in one holding at the time, as well as legal provisions for requesting additional staff and equipment. However there are neither procedures in place for calling in and instructing extra staff, nor contracts or agreements in place for obtaining additional killing equipment from slaughterhouses. These weaknesses may slow down the depopulation in a larger outbreak and increase the risk for unnecessary spread of the disease.

There is a system in place for recording and reporting after depopulation. However, the contact point for sharing technical and scientific information with other Member States has not yet been provided.

### 5.7 Disposal of carcasses

**Legal requirements**

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 and Commission Regulation (EU) No 142/2011 lay down health rules for animal by-products and derived products, in order to prevent and minimise risks to public and animal health. In particular, Article 9 (f)(i) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 specifies that animals and parts of animals killed for disease control purposes, shall be considered as Category 2 animal by-products and therefore subject to the disposal methods specified in the Regulation, Articles 12 and 13 of the Regulation specify the disposal routes for animals and parts of animals killed for disease control purposes. By way of derogation from these rules, Article 19(1)(e) of this Regulation allows the disposal of these by-products by burning or burial on site. Article 15(a) of Regulation (EU) No 142/2011 sets out the special rules to be followed in case this derogation is used.

In relation to FMD controls, Directive 2003/85/EC (Article 72(1), (4) and (5) and Annex XVII Points 13 and 14) requires that the means of disposal of carcasses and animal waste does not cause environmental damage and that appropriate sites and undertakings for the treatment or disposal of animal carcasses and animal waste be identified in the contingency plan.

**Findings**

All contingency plans, except the one for FMD, indicate that the method of choice for disposal of carcasses from depopulation due to an epizootic disease would be in animal by-product (ABP) processing plants approved under Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009. However, for FMD the methods of choice in the contingency plan are burial or burning on site to further reduce the risk for spreading the disease.

There is currently one approved ABP processing plant operating in Slovakia. This plant has two lines on the same premises for Category 1 and 2 ABP and for Category 3 ABP, respectively. The plant operates two collection points (east and south) and has a contract with a transport company for collection of ABP. This company has access to 24 trucks with fixed containers and 60 loose containers which could be moved by 14 additional vehicles. The plant was recently involved in handling material from depopulations due to anthrax and was also involved in handling some of the ABP during the CSF outbreak in 2008. The maximum routine operating capacity is 120 tonnes/day for Category 1and 2 (250 adult cattle or 1200 slaughter-size pigs), and 180 tonnes/day for Category 3.

The FVO team noted that:

- in an emergency the plant could change its procedures and process ABP on both lines as Category 2, which would make it possible to process 300 tonnes ABP from a depopulation per day;

- there are routines, facilities and procedures in place for the movement, cleansing and disinfection of containers and transport vehicles. The drivers are responsible for carrying out these procedures, keep vehicle log books and are monitored by close-circuit television systems in the disinfection hall;

- although the Act on Veterinary Care provides the legal basis for the use of this rendering

plant in an epizootic outbreak there is no contract or written agreement between the plant and the competent authorities to define e.g. up-scaling of activities, costs and compensations and the operators expressed that they were not satisfied with the compensation for the anthrax outbreaks and may require advance payment in the future;

- there is no contingency plan in the ABP processing plant for how to up-scale activities or for when/how to re-direct / reject ABPs routinely delivered to the plant from establishments and farms in Slovakia and from neighbouring MS. The conversion of the category 3 processing to category 2 processing has never been tested and full compensation from the state would be expected by the plant;

- the responsibility for the quality and safety of the containers lies with the transporters. The FVO team was informed that the containers are made from stainless steel and sealed and that each new container is tested for leakage. The quality of the containers would also be checked by the DVFA officer at the depopulation site;

- the plant had amended its internal procedures based on experienced gained from the first of the two anthrax outbreaks. Drivers now have protective clothing available in each lorry and the rapid access to the plant and to disinfectants during weekends have been ensured. These actions had improved the plant's response to the second anthrax outbreak;

- DVFA would provide specific information and advise to the plant on risks for spread of infection and disinfection requirements, including the type of disinfectant to use, when the specific epizootic disease is known. Information of potential risks for workers and transporters would be provided by the public health authorities. This information would be included in an internal regulation in the plant for the specific outbreak.

- the plant organises health and safety training for staff once per year and personal protection equipment and routine disinfectants are available at the plant. Representatives from the plant had participated in the exercises/training sessions on contingency planning organised by the SVFA;

- recent official inspection reports were available where the routine cleansing and disinfection procedures had been checked.

- with regard to the handling of ABP for FMD outbreaks neither the SVFA, nor DVFAs, have made any contacts with environmental and other authorities in order to identify suitable sites for burial or burning of carcases, although all contingency plans are required to contain contact details for the relevant authorities. There are no guidelines in the FMD contingency plan or other instructions on how to proceed to identify suitable sites.

### *5.7.1 Conclusions on disposal of carcasses*

Provided that the ABP processing plan uses its maximum capacity there should be sufficient ABP processing capacity in Slovakia to dispose of animals that would have to be killed to control an epizootic disease even if the mobile unit killing teams work at the maximum estimated killing rate for 12 hours per day. However, the lack of a formal agreement between the competent authority and the ABP processing plant may slow down the conversion of the plant to its maximum capacity. The lack of preparation for alternative methods for disposal, in particular to meet the priorities in the FMD contingency plan, may delay the disposal of highly contagious carcasses and thereby increase

the risk of unnecessary spread of the epizootic disease.

## 6 Overall Conclusions

The competent authorities have the necessary legal powers, defined command structures, a reliable laboratory and sufficient numbers of trained official staff to handle a limited outbreak of an epizootic disease. However, the limited equipment for killing animals during depopulation, the absence of a formal agreement with the processing plant for animal by-products and the lack of preparation for using other means of disposal than rendering may slow down the measures taken to reduce the spread of disease in a major outbreak of a highly contagious disease such as FMD. In addition, the observed non-compliances with regard to notification of suspect cases and the low level of on-farm biosecurity may lead to unnecessary spread, in case an epizootic disease is introduced.

Comprehensive contingency plans are in place for the major diseases, containing most of the relevant animal health and animal welfare measures. The listing of staff with additional language skills is an example of good practice and facilitates sending capable staff abroad to assist in outbreak management or to participate in training or exercises. Expert groups are included in each contingency plan but these groups do not include all the expertise required under EU legislation. In addition, deficiencies in guidelines for certain measures in restricted zones may hamper the rapid demarcation of zones and controls on holdings and lead to an increased risk of spreading the disease. It is of concern that the fitness for purpose of the contingency plans have not been tested by use of the real-time exercises and alarm drills required under EU legislation.

There are official controls on all movements of animals between farms which to some extent compensates for the low level of biosecurity by preventing the movement of animals which are not clinically healthy. The level of cleanliness of the assembly centre visited and SVFA's own equipment indicate that peacetime biosecurity is an area where improvements are needed. The national database for animals, holdings and movements covers all relevant species and is an accessible and user-friendly tool for the competent authorities. However, not all movements are registered, which has an impact on the traceability of animal movements in an outbreak.

Active surveillance programmes are mostly implemented in line with the approved plans. However, the effectiveness of the national system for passive surveillance, i.e. the capability for early detection, is undermined by i) a lack of samples in the passive surveillance in domestic animals, ii) the low number of samples tested for AI in wild birds and iii) the lack of notification and measures when samples from clinically ill animals were submitted for testing for an epizootic disease (CSF) .

The NRL has the capability to provide the competent authorities with rapid and reliable results for the main epizootic diseases. However the laboratory does not meet its full obligation as an NRL and no NRL has been nominated for certain epizootic diseases. The lack of a contingency plan in the laboratory and the lack of agreed procedures for up-scaling the testing capacity may slow down the sample analysis in a major outbreak.

Most of the requirements laid down in Article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 have been included in the contingency plans with the exception of hypotheses concerning the size and location of outbreaks, which is needed to identify those exceptional situations where a derogation under Article 18(3) of the Regulation might be necessary. Equipment and trained staff for killing

operations are available. However, the monitoring equipment and staff instructions for the gassing of birds are inadequate for verifying that animal welfare requirements are met and no methods are available for the killing of large numbers of ducks or geese.

## 7 Closing Meeting

A closing meeting was held on 27 February 2014 with representatives of the central competent authority. At this meeting, the main findings and conclusions of the audit were presented by the audit team. The representatives of the central competent authority did not indicate any major disagreement with the findings and preliminary conclusions.

## 8 Recommendations

The competent authorities are invited to provide details of the actions taken and planned, including deadlines for their completion ('action plan'), within one month after receipt of the report, aimed at addressing the recommendations set out below.

| N°. | Recommendation |
|---|---|
| 1. | The competent authorities should ensure that the periodical veterinary inspections required in a surveillance zone are included in the contingency plan for FMD, in line with the requirements in Article 37(1) of Council Directive 2003/85/EC. |
| 2. | The competent authority should ensure that the contingency plan drawn up under Article 20 of Council Directive 92/119/EEC covers all diseases listed in Annex I to this Directive. |
| 3. | The competent authority should ensure that there are dedicated telephone lines/mobile phones in each LDCC for communication with the NDCC, which are separate from phone lines where farmers and other rural residents can obtain recent information about measures taken, in line with the requirement under Article 77(2)(a) of Council Directive 2003/85/EC. |
| 4. | The competent authority should ensure that the nominated expert groups are amended to include persons with the specialised competences required under EU legislation: hunters and wildlife biologists for ASF and CSF, and epidemiologists for ASF, CSF and FMD (Article 15 of Council Directive 2002/60/EC, Article 15 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC and Article 78 of Council Directive 2003/85/EC); |
| 5. | The competent authority should ensure that movements of animals are timely and accurately reported in line with the requirements in Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 21/2004 (sheep and goats) and Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000, in order to improve the traceability of animals in case of an epizootic disease outbreak. |

| N°. | Recommendation |
|---|---|
| 6. | The competent authority should ensure that every suspected presence of an epizootic disease is notified and that appropriate measures are taken on the holding until test results are available, in line with the requirements in the EU Directives for the epizootic diseases (as well as in national legislation and contingency plans). For CSF, which is most relevant for the findings described in this report (part 5.4.2), such requirements are laid down in Article 3(1) and Article 4 of Council Directive 2001/89/EC. |
| 7. | The competent authority should ensure that the requirements laid down in Article 73 of Council Directive 2003/85/EC (real-time alert exercise FMD), Annex VII(g)(ii) to Council Directive 2001/89/EC (alarm drills CSF), and Annex VI(f)(ii) to Council Directive 2002/60/EC (alarm drills ASF) are met; |
| 8. | The competent authority should designate a national laboratory (or a laboratory in another MS) for each of the diseases listed in Annex I to Council Directive 92/119/EC, as laid down in Article 17 of this Directive. |
| 9. | The competent authority should ensure that the NRL meets the requirements, with regard to the other laboratories carrying testing for CSF, to control the quality of all diagnostic reagents and to arrange comparative tests periodically as laid down in points 3(b) and (c) of Annex III to Directive 2001/89/EC; |
| 10. | The competent authority should ensure that hypotheses concerning the size and location of suspected outbreaks are established, as required by Article 18(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009, to provide the basis for identifying those exceptional circumstances when derogations in line with Article 18(3) of the Regulation might be necessary in order not to affect human health or significantly slow down the process of eradicating a disease. |
| 11. | The competent authority should ensure that the relevant contingency plans, and the available equipment, include methods for killing larger numbers of ducks and geese, which meet the requirements laid down in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009. |
| 12. | The competent authority should ensure that the equipment used for monitoring the gassing of birds and the instructions for personnel operating and supervising the system are adequate to ensure that key parameters, in particular the CO2 concentration and temperature of the gas, are met as detailed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009. |
| 13. | As burial or burning are the preferred disposal methods in the FMD contingency plan, the competent authorities should ensure that each local FMD contingency plan (i) includes the identification of appropriate sites and undertakings for the treatment or disposal of animal carcasses and animal waste as required in Annex XVII(14) to |

| N°. | Recommendation |
|---|---|
| | Council Directive 2003/85/EC and (ii) that each plan is prepared with a view to ensuring the disposal of carcasses and animal waste without endangering human health and without causing avoidable damage to the environment in accordance with the rules laid down in Annex XVII(13) to Council Directive 2003/85/EC. |

The competent authority's response to the recommendations can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/rep_details_en.cfm?rep_inspection_ref=2014-7046

## Annex 1 - Legal References

| Legal Reference | Official Journal | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Reg. 882/2004 | OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1, Corrected and re-published in OJ L 191, 28.5.2004, p. 1 | Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules |
| Dir. 2003/85/EC | OJ L 306, 22.11.2003, p. 1-87 | Council Directive 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease repealing Directive 85/511/EEC and Decisions 89/531/EEC and 91/665/EEC and amending Directive 92/46/EEC |
| Dir. 2005/94/EC | OJ L 10, 14.1.2006, p. 16-65 | Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 on Community measures for the control of avian influenza and repealing Directive 92/40/EEC |
| Dir. 2000/75/EC | OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 74-83 | Council Directive 2000/75/EC of 20 November 2000 laying down specific provisions for the control and eradication of bluetongue |
| Dir. 2001/89/EC | OJ L 316, 1.12.2001, p. 5-35 | Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever |
| Dir. 2002/60/EC | OJ L 192, 20.7.2002, p. 27-46 | Council Directive 2002/60/EC of 27 June 2002 laying down specific provisions for the control of African swine fever and amending Directive 92/119/EEC as regards Teschen disease and African swine fever |
| Dir. 92/119/EEC | OJ L 62, 15.3.1993, p. 69-85 | Council Directive 92/119/EEC of 17 December 1992 introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease |
| Dir. 92/35/EEC | OJ L 157, 10.6.1992, p. 19-27 | Council Directive 92/35/EEC of 29 April 1992 laying down control rules and measures to combat African horse sickness |

| Legal Reference | Official Journal | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Dir. 92/66/EEC | OJ L 260, 5.9.1992, p. 1-20 | Council Directive 92/66/EEC of 14 July 1992 introducing Community measures for the control of Newcastle disease |
| Reg. 1099/2009 | OJ L 303, 18.11.2009, p. 1-30 | Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing |
| Reg. 1266/2007 | OJ L 283, 27.10.2007, p. 37-52 | Commission Regulation (EC) No 1266/2007 of 26 October 2007 on implementing rules for Council Directive 2000/75/EC as regards the control, monitoring, surveillance and restrictions on movements of certain animals of susceptible species in relation to bluetongue |
| Dec. 2002/106/EC | OJ L 39, 9.2.2002, p. 71-88 | 2002/106/EC: Commission Decision of 1 February 2002 approving a Diagnostic Manual establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for evaluation of the laboratory tests for the confirmation of classical swine fever |
| Dec. 2003/422/EC | OJ L 143, 11.6.2003, p. 35-49 | 2003/422/EC: Commission Decision of 26 May 2003 approving an African swine fever diagnostic manual |
| Dec. 2000/428/EC | OJ L 167, 7.7.2000, p. 22-32 | 2000/428/EC: Commission Decision of 4 July 2000 establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for the evaluation of the results of laboratory tests for the confirmation and differential diagnosis of swine vesicular disease |
| Dec. 2006/437/EC | OJ L 237, 31.8.2006, p. 1-27 | 2006/437/EC: Commission Decision of 4 August 2006 approving a Diagnostic Manual for avian influenza as provided for in Council Directive 2005/94/EC |
| Dec. 2010/367/EU | OJ L 166, 01.07.2010, p. 22-32 | 2010/367/EU: Commission Decision of 25 June 2010 on the implementation by Member States of surveillance programmes for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds |

| Legal Reference | Official Journal | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Reg. 1760/2000 | OJ L 204, 11.8.2000, p. 1-10 | Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 establishing a system for the identification and registration of bovine animals and regarding the labelling of beef and beef products and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 820/97 |
| Reg. 21/2004 | OJ L 5, 9.1.2004, p. 8-17 | Council Regulation (EC) No 21/2004 of 17 December 2003 establishing a system for the identification and registration of ovine and caprine animals and amending Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 and Directives 92/102/EEC and 64/432/EEC |
| Dir. 2008/71/EC | OJ L 213, 8.8.2008, p. 31-36 | Council Directive 2008/71/EC of 15 July 2008 on the identification and registration of pigs (Codified version) |
| Reg. 1069/2009 | OJ L 300, 14.11.2009, p. 1-33 | Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 laying down health rules as regards animal by-products and derived products not intended for human consumption and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 (Animal by-products Regulation) |
| Reg. 142/2011 | OJ L 54, 26.2.2011, p. 1-254 | Commission Regulation (EU) No 142/2011 of 25 February 2011 implementing Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down health rules as regards animal by-products and derived products not intended for human consumption and implementing Council Directive 97/78/EC as regards certain samples and items exempt from veterinary checks at the border under that Directive |