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Brussels, 19 March
2001
Why is there
currently no vaccination in the EU against
FMD?
- Vaccination was
abandoned in 1991 because the EU had
successfully eradicated FMD. This decision
has saved over 1 billion and allowed EU
producers to export to countries which only
allow imports from FMD-free countries not
following a vaccination policy.
- However, the
Community does maintain a antigen bank with
up to 30 million vaccine doses of antigen
(8,5 million for the current O-1 strain
present in the UK and in Mayenne in France).
These are envisaged in a situation where
there is an outbreak of epidemic proportions
where the authorities must introduce
"preventive vaccination", i.e. action to halt
the spread of the disease pending the killing
and subsequent destruction of potentially
contaminated animals. However, following
first inoculation of the vaccine, it would
take some time to have a sufficiently strong
immunity.
Will the Commission
review its non-vaccination policy?
- Vaccinated
animals are not necessarily disease free -
the antigens build up through vaccination can
hide the actual presence of FMD in an
animal.
- There are very
significant logistical and cost implications
in vaccination, twice yearly, of a Community
livestock population of over 300 million
susceptible animals.
- Vaccination is
only effective in relation to the strain of
FMD concerned and offers no protection
against other strains of the virus. At
present 7 strains of the FMD virus exist with
around 80 subtypes. Every vaccination has to
target therefore carefully the correct
strain. Third countries which do vaccinate on
a preventive basis because FMD is endemic on
their territory do regularly see new
outbreaks of FMD due to the variability of
the virus.
- Finally, the loss
of the EU's non-vaccination status would
involve substantial losses in trade to third
countries which insist on imports from foot
and mouth free countries. The EU could only
export products which are treated against the
virus.
The status of
"FMD-free without vaccination" is attributed
by the International Organisation on Animal
Health (OIE) in Paris. Only 1/3 of the world
are approximately FMD-free. See also:
http://www.fao.org/ag/AGA/AGAH/EUFMD/fmdmaps/default.htm
In summary,
therefore, the disadvantages of vaccination
outweigh the benefits. Nonetheless, this
situation will be kept under review.
Is over-regulation,
forcing the closing of small abattoirs, a
factor?
Competitive forces
and especially economies of scale, are
recognised to be the major factor in
rationalisation in the abattoir industry. The
illegal import of contaminated meat remains
the most likely cause of the current
outbreak. More generally, the question of
hygiene regulation in abattoirs should take
into account that the current outbreak was
discovered through an ante-mortem inspection
by a well trained official veterinarian. His
presence in the abattoir is a requirement
under Community law and is designed to ensure
that diseases which are a potential threat to
human and animal health, including BSE but
also FMD, are detected. It would be dangerous
to abandon the principle of high and uniform
hygiene standards in abattoirs in all Member
States. Such an approach would be a backward
step in ensuring a high level of health
protection.
Is the large scale
transport of animals the cause of the current
outbreak?
Clearly, any
process which brings animals from different
herds together in a single place or exposes
them to large numbers of other animals
increases the potential for the spread of
disease. But:
- Most trade in
meat and meat products is in carcass form and
the number of animals in long distance
transport is in constant decline ever since
refrigeration allowed animal carcasses to be
transported over long distances;
- Regulations exist
to minimise the potential spread of disease
in transport, including "no-exit" provisions
on transport to abattoirs, tracability of
livestock movements through the ANIMO system,
disinfection of lorries and livestock marts,
health certification of animals etc;
- There will always
be a need for long distance transport of
specialised livestock (breeding stock,
racehorses etc.).
However, it remains
a Commission objective to further reduce the
level of long distance animal transport and
to improve the welfare conditions of animals
in transport. A Commission report on animal
transport was recently presented to the
Council and Parliament in this respect.
Is intensive farming
at the origin of the disease?
All contributory
factors must be considered but very simple
explanations for very complex problems should
be avoided. FMD was eradicated in the EU in
the late 80's which permitted an end to
vaccination in 1991. Since 1991, there have
only been outbreaks in Italy (1993), Greece
(animal incursions from Turkey) and now in
the UK. This is a very successful record
given that prior to 1991, FMD outbreaks were
commonplace with resulting huge trade, income
and vaccination costs. Moreover:
- FMD is most
prevalent in countries/regions where
agriculture is very "traditional" - Middle
East/North Africa/Turkey/South America.
Conversely, outbreaks are extremely rare in
the OECD countries which have the most
intensive agriculture;
- Similarly, FMD
was much more prevalent in the EU in the
past, when agriculture was less intensive,
than at present. There have only been a
handful of cases since 1991 - in Italy (1993)
and in Greece (2000) in most recent
years.
Is there financial
compensation available to producers?
Yes, the Commission
provides compensation, up to 60%, towards the
costs of animals destroyed, disinfection etc
under an Emergency Veterinary Fund. A total
of 41 million is available towards such
compensation in 2001. This is expected to be
fully utilised in relation to payments to
Member States in respect of animal disease
outbreaks in previous years, notably avian
influenza in Italy, bluetongue in Italy in
France and in Spain, classical swine fever in
the Netherlands and UK and FMD in Greece. Any
claims arising from the current outbreak
would, therefore, be likely to be reimbursed
only in 2002. However, based on the current
scale of the outbreak, the costs are not
likely to be significant.
Released on
20/03/2001
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