The European Commission

United Republic of Tanzania

Evaluation of EDF Support to Human Resource Development in Tanzania 1990 - 1997

Contract No. HRDP/1

Final Report
Volume I

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Carl Bro Management

Table of Contents:

List of Abbreviations

ALAT	Association of Local Authorities in Tanzania
CAWM	College of African Wildlife Management
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi (the ruling party)
CIS	Confederation of Independent States
CLGF	Commonwealth Local Government Forum
DAC sectors	Development Assistance of Corporation
DED	District Executive Director
EASTC	East African Statistical Training College
EC	European Commission
ECU	European Currency Unit (EUR)
ESAMI	Eastern and Southern Africa Management Institute
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
FA	Financing Agreement (the EC)
FP	Financing Proposal (the EC)
GOT	Government of Tanzania
HRDA	Human Resource Development Adviser
HRDP	Human Resources Development Programme
HRDS	Human Resources Development Section (Ministry of Works)
IFM	Institute of Finance Management
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRP	Integrated Road Programme
LITI	Livestock Training Institute
MATI	MOA Training Institutes
MATPs	Multi-annual Training Programmes
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoSTHE	Ministry of Science, Technology, and Higher Education
MOW	Ministry of Works
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MTTTC	Mtwara Technical Teachers Training College
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NCTE	National Council for Technical Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PMT	Project Manager Tanzania
PMZ	Project Manager Zimbabwe
PSC	Project Steering Committee
PSU	Project Support Unit for HRDP
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAEU	Southern African Extension Unit
SHEP	Southern Highland Environmental Project
TA	Technical Assistant

TC	Training Co-ordinator
ToR	Terms of Reference
TREP	Tropical Resource Ecology Programme (University of Zimbabwe)
TTTC	Technical Teachers Training College
TZS	Tanzania Shilling
USD	US Dollars
UDSM	University of Dar es Salaam
WMTP	Wildlife Management Training Project

0 Preamble

0.1 Introduction

The object of this evaluation is the Human Resource Development (HRD) activities in Tanzania funded by the European Commission 1990-1997. The funding of the activities is derived from several sources. One source is the seventh EDF for Tanzania, which is based on the National Indicative Programme, signed in October 1990 under Lomé 4. The second source is the regional allocation for HRD projects. And the third source is the allocation in support of democracy and human rights. The projects evaluated in accordance with our terms of reference are set out in the following table.

The projects included in evaluation

	Title	Allocation ECU	Source	Brief description
1.	HRDP	7,623,000	NIP	Played a coordinating role in overall HRD programme, with full-time TA. Also contained 17 diverse sub-components (some with own TA) of which 6 were dropped in 1996, and new were added, including support to education sector development process.
2.	ESAMI	1,900,000	Regional & NIP	TA to institutional strengthening, incl. provision of computers, teaching materials, and refurbishment of hostels.
3.	EASTC	5,000,000	Regional & NIP	Institutional strengthening through provision of TA, fellowships, staff upgrading, equipment and the construction of hostels and cafeteria.
4.	Students in CIS	1,950,000	NIP	The purpose was to assist Tanzanian students stranded in Eastern Europe at the time of the collapse of the USSR in completing their studies and return home and become reintegrated. Implemented by IOM.
5.	Local Govt. training	215,287	Inter-regional PDHRE	On the occasion of the return to multi-party politics, local government councillors elected in 1994 were trained by distance learning methods to perform their roles under the new conditions.
6.	Mtwara TTTC	2,350,000	NIP (EDF 4 & 6)	Provision of buildings, equipment for technical teacher training college.
7.	SADC Roads	2,000,000	Regional	Training of senior road managers from the SADC region at ESAMI, incl. short-term TA.
8.	SADC Wildlife	5,500,000	Regional	In conjunction with University of Zimbabwe, to support the College of African Wildlife Management (CAWM) at Mweka near Moshi with fellowships, equipment and construction of lecture halls and staff houses.

The 7th NIP focused on the agriculture, transport, and social services as sectors of concentration, there is also an emphasis on capacity building of local manpower, i.a. through support to local training institutions. An annex to the NIP extends this assistance to regional training institutions.

The first six projects were to be fully evaluated in terms of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, whereas the assessment of numbers 7 and 8 was to be based on previous evaluations.

The nature of the evaluation is that of a *programme evaluation*, as opposed to project, thematic, or aid form evaluation. This implies that conclusions and lessons learnt are consolidated at the project level before they are taken to the more general level of the programme as a whole.

0.2   Methodology and the conduct of the field work

The fieldwork was conducted in two parts, the first part predominantly as a desk study including interviews in Dar es Salaam, while the second part included visits to IDM near Morogoro, Mtwara TTTC, ESAMI, Technical College Arusha, and CAWM near Moshi.

The evaluation was originally planned to have taken place as a mid-term review of HRDP in 1996. There were several reasons why it was postponed, the end result being that the HRD Adviser had left more than a year before it took place, and there was hardly any institutional memory left in the form of people directly having been involved in the implementation of the projects. Added to this, the filing system in the PSU was in a bad condition, and much time was spent on searching for documents and photocopying a selection of them.

In addition to meetings with officials in the concerned institutions, a number of tracer interviews were carried out to assist in the assessment of the usefulness of the training as seen by the beneficiaries. This included: local councillors in Morogoro, Mtwara, Arusha and Moshi; ex-students of IFM; financial sector recipients of overseas scholarships; ex-students of EASTC; current students of CAWM; course participants at ESAMI; ex-participants of SADC Roads courses (also at ESAMI); and retrenchees having participated in entrepreneurship training.

The last week in Dar es Salaam was affected by the national state of mourning that followed the sad departure of Mwalimu Nyerere on October 14th. Under the circumstances, a number of normal functions ceased to operate, and some appointments had to be cancelled. The Team is confident however that, at that advanced stage of the work, the cancelled interviews would not have led to significant changes in its conclusions.

0.3   Project Team & Timing

The Evaluation Team
Erik Lyby Chief Consultant CBM, evaluation specialist (Team Leader)
Roger Short Chief Consultant CBM, HRD specialist
Carsten Brønden, Senior Consultant CBM, HRD specialist

Prof. H Amani, Economist, local consultant
Eng. J.W. Lyatuu, structural engineer, local consultant

Planning Phase 23 - 29 August 1999

Mr Lyby (Team Leader) Mr Brønden and Mr Short of Carl Bro Management. During this period Mr Lyby undertook a mission to Brussels for consultations with the EC Evaluation Unit and the relevant desk officer. This was followed by a visit Luxembourg to interview the contractor for the ESAMI project. A further interview was conducted in Geneva with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the contractor responsible for implementing the project to repatriate Tanzanian from Central and Eastern Europe.

Phase 1 - Field Work 29 August - 19 September 1999

Erik Lyby Chief Consultant CBM,
Roger Short Chief Consultant CBM

Prof. H Amani, Economist, local consultant
Eng. J.W. Lyatuu, structural engineer, local consultant

Meetings with the EU Delegation, the PSU and "priority" projects for preliminary evaluation (IFM and EASTC): Desk research and location of all relevant materials

Phase 2- Field Work 27 September - 22 October 1999

All members of project team present. Mr Lyby included a visit to Kampala before his arrival on 4 October 1999.

Visits to project sites in Dar es Salaam, Arusha Mtwara, Moshi and Morogoro. Interviews with stakeholders and tracer interviews with participants of training programmes that formed part of the projects included in the evaluation

Phase 3 - De-briefing and Report Writing

A de-briefing meeting was held in the EU Delegation in Dar es Salaam 20 October followed by a similar meeting in Brussels on 22 October.

0.4   Acknowledgements and Disclaimer

We would like to acknowledge the fullest possible co-operation and assistance from officials in the Directorate-General for Development (DG VIII) of the European Commission in Brussels; the Delegation of the European Union to the United Republic of Tanzania (in particular Mr Baum for assisting the team in trying to fill in gaps where information was not available in relation to TA 034); the Project Support Unit; and numerous other individuals in government agencies, embassies and other offices of international co-operating partners and implementing agencies. Whatever the merits of this study, they are no small part due to the generosity and insight of our interlocutors.

Nevertheless, the opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this report are those of the consultants and do not necessarily represent those of the European Commission, The Government of Tanzania, or anyone else who assisted the team.

1 Summary

In accordance with our Terms of Reference, we evaluated the 'umbrella' HRD project containing seventeen sub-projects and seven other projects of national and/or a regional nature. The evaluation was undertaken according to six criteria: Relevance, Project preparation, Design, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability.

Our conclusions are as follows:

Relevance	All of the projects can be judged as being generally relevant to HRD in Tanzania and SADC *at the time of the projects originally being designed.* However, only few of the projects were demand driven and thus do not represent a coherent approach to a specific set of HRD needs and priorities
Preparation and design	Few of the projects evaluated had been prepared on the basis of a structured needs analysis in order to determine the appropriateness of the interventions. There was only limited, if any participation of stakeholders in the design. The Project Cycle Management methodology was not used in many cases and where it was, the designs were weak.
Efficiency	A considerable number of weaknesses were found in the managerial and financial control systems. These weaknesses appeared in overall project management, reporting, project review and monitoring mechanisms. Mechanisms, such as project steering committees, for disseminating project progress and results to direct and indirect stakeholders were established for a majority of the projects. A number of new approaches in an ACP context, were introduced and proved very efficient
Effectiveness	As a result of the weaknesses in the design methodologies adopted, it has been difficult to determine the effectiveness of many of the projects. Objectively verifiable indicators for measuring quantifiable and qualitative results did not exist for the majority of projects. Overall, about 50 % of the projects have produced the anticipated results.
Impact	Project impact has been difficult to assess as in most cases no base line data was available. There appears to have been very limited impact at Government and Administration levels. The major impact has been achieved in institutions where programmes have been designed to reflect a clearly defined demand or in cases where stakeholders at a community level have been involved. However, doubts remain as to whether a number of institutions are responding sufficiently fast to the needs of the changing environment (both nationally and internationally) in which they operate.
Sustainability	Few of the projects can be considered to be sustainable in a strict sense. This applies particularly to SADC regional projects. The changes in their national and regional operating environment will require a major re-think of the basis for their existence. Some of the national projects will clearly be sustainable in the medium-longer term. However, interim support will be required to ensure that the sustainability is achieved.

The majority of the projects evaluated have been completed. Mid-term evaluations or substantive mid term reviews were only undertaken for a small number of these. Thus few of the projects will reap the benefits associated with this evaluation, i.e. confirmation that the project is achieving its objectives within the context of pre-determined verifiable indicators of success. As mentioned above, the context in which the projects were originally designed has considerably changed. Thus in arriving at recommendations the Evaluation Team has attempted to place these in the context of the environment in which the projects exist today as well as what will be needed to be sustainable in the future The major part of the difficulties that had to be confronted in relation to the implementation and sustainability of the projects evaluated relate to:

Project Cycle Management: Are systems in place to manage the project cycle within the context of the measurable qualitative demands of the current and future context in which EU projects are funded? *The political and legislative environment*: Has the environment changed sufficiently at the Central Government and Administrative levels to make the assumptions that were originally included in some of the projects' LFAs? Have policies and legislation been introduced to reflect the demands of the new environment? If not, what should be done?, and *How are institutions and their training approaches meeting the demands of globalisation and achieving financial self-sufficiency* Globalisation places considerable demands upon institutions ability to upgrade their training as quickly as possible. This process involves ensuring that their services are relevant, value for money, sustainable in qualitative terms, and in some cases that institutions are sufficiently high profile to be recognised as providing training that will have international recognition

Accordingly, the following five point Action Plan (see Volume 1) is proposed

Recommendation 1. .	It is recommended that guidelines for designing, implementing and monitoring projects corresponding to those in use by EU Tacis and Phare by introduced, albeit adapted for Lomé conditions. These guidelines should also include models for preparing the Terms of Reference and personnel profiles for both the international advisers and beneficiary counterparts
Recommendation 2	Staff of key institutions in the beneficiary countries should be trained in all aspects of Project Cycle Management based upon the elaboration of guidelines stipulated in Recommendation 1.
Recommendation 3	Programmes are being conducted in the fields of good governance by a number of donors. Tailor made programmes should be developed to train senior officials in good governance, transparency and their roles and obligations in relation to EU sponsored projects.
Recommendation 4	In order to promote intra-regional and ACP-EU institutional linkages, it is recommended that the EU explores the possibility of introducing programmes such as Tempus on a pilot basis. The programme should be developed to ensure the exchange of staff and teaching materials over a minimum of five years.
Recommendation 5	A feasibility study should be undertaken to determine the potential of transforming the SADC regional centres into resource centres using modular approaches and distance learning technologies.

Further details of these Recommendations are provided in Volume 1

2   Relevance

This chapter examines the relevance of the projects in the context of the environment in which they were to be implemented and operate on the termination of EC funding. Relevance is determined by assessing the objectives set out in the projects against the problems to be solved, and their physical and policy "environment", i.e. the main political, social and economic factors and pertinent policies (explicit and implicit) of the various actors e.g. Government, EC, other donors, and interest groups. The evolution of the context over time and how the projects adapted to this are also reviewed.

2.1.   Introduction to the Economic Environment

After four decades since independence, Tanzania remains one of the poorest 10 countries in the world. This poverty is manifested not only in terms of a low per capita income but also by the low human development indicators defining the welfare. Almost fifty percent of Tanzanians today cannot acquire the daily consumption necessities. Despite progress Tanzania still remains behind other countries in the region and progress in improving food security in real terms for its inhabitants has been slower (UNDP 1999: 161) This situation prevails despite Tanzania being endowed with a rich natural resource base. Geographically it has easy access to the international market, and has had a peaceful and politically stable environment.

The international donor community has been active for many years in Tanzania and supporting a broad spectrum of sectors. In 1995 it received some 894 million USD in international aid representing 23.2 per cent of GNP (UNDP 1999: 175). The framework for co-operation between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the European Union (then the European Communities) within the Lomé IV Convention was specified in the National Indicative Programme (NIP) signed on 23 October 1993. The document included guidelines for European Investment Bank (EIB) support to development finance co-operation, the memorandum of understanding of counterpart funds and the governing principles for follow-up and monitoring of import support within the structural adjustment facility.

The National Indicative Programme supported the overall economic reform process undertaken by Tanzania and the adjustment programmes agreed on between Tanzania and the donor community, in particular the financial and banking sector reform and the reform of the public sector.

The NIP emphasised, as first priority, support to transport and agriculture and, as a second priority, assistance to the social sector. The Southern Highlands of Tanzania were identified as the main geographical area of intervention. Particular emphasis was to be paid to:

I.   Maintenance and rehabilitation operations
II.   Protection of the environment and the conservation of natural resources

III.   Development of locally available manpower by means of enhanced training of counterpart staff, development and use of local expertise and companies and support of local training institutions and institution building
IV.   Decentralisation of planning and implementation to local and regional government and non-government entities
V.   Involvement of the local community
VI.   Promotion of private sector involvement

2.2   Economic Overview

Tanzania has not been able to exploit its large potential growth. This is indicated in the tables 2.2.1 – 2.2.2. that illustrate the performances of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors respectively. This lack of sustained high growth is one of the main contributing factors behind the inability to reduce poverty in a significant way. Tanzania's income per capita today is only 30 percent higher after nearly four decades in contrast to some Asian countries (e.g. Indonesia and Korea). These countries had a similar level of income per capita at the time of independence but now enjoy levels of income per capita more than ten-fold higher than Tanzania.

During the first decade of independence Tanzania experienced relatively high growth. However, these early levels of growth were not sustained. In fact, despite reasonable levels of investment during the following three decades, average growth declined persistently implying a significant waste of resources. Simultaneously, a significant and unsustainable debt burden was incurred.

Table 2.1.1   Agricultural Sector Performance in Tanzania, 1986 – 1996 (%) (1976 prices)

Year	Agricultural GDP Growth	Agricultural Export Growth	Share in Total GDP	Share in Exports
1986	5.73	33.39	45.8	75.25
1987	4.40	-23.07	45.6	57.95
1988	4.48	11.43	45.8	60.28
1989	4.58	-4.91	46.1	56.10
1990	6.61	-5.60	47.0	51.16
1991	9.55	-1.72	48.7	55.16
1992	3.46	17.01	48.7	58.31
1993	6.86	10.67	49.9	58.32
1994	0.36	31.48	48.6	64.86
1995	5.50	13.87	49.1	56.16
1996	4.00	16.63	48.7	58.73

Table 2.2.2   Manufacturing Sector Performance in Tanzania, 1986 – 1996 (%)
(1976 prices)

Year	Manuf. GDP Growth	Manuf. Export Growth	Share in Total GDP	Share in Total Exports	Share in NT Exports	Average Capacity Utilised
1986	-4.05	19.21	7.9	11.29	45.45	
1987	4.52	61.13	7.9	18.14	42.96	
1988	7.06	14.44	8.1	19.38	48.79	
1989	7.68	26.76	8.4	24.04	54.77	
1990	-2.54	-2.94	7.8	22.54	46.15	
1991	11.51	-20.75	8.3	19.60	43.72	50
1992	4.30	-8.68	8.3	16.17	38.79	38
1993	2.06	-19.00	8.1	11.84	28.40	50
1994	-3.82	48.08	7.6	15.83	42.19	46
1995	1.5	41.88	7.4	16.0	36.49	
1996	4.7	1.43	7.5	14.55	35.25	48

Source: Shitundu 1999

A comparison of the respective sectors' share in total GDP illustrates the predominance of the agricultural sector in the Tanzanian economy. Agriculture also dominates the share of exports. The growth of manufacturing's contribution to the GDP has been slow through much of the 1990s although exports grew significantly in 1994-95. This must be seen against an existing low level of performance and a very low utilisation of capacity. The manufacturing sector is more capital intensive than agriculture and its under-performance indicates that a number of prerequisites for its development are not in place. These include access to finance and the general enabling legislative environment. The latter will in turn have a significant influence upon entrepreneurship development in general.

Since the mid 1980s Tanzania has undertaken serious policy and institutional reforms which have a direct bearing on investment. Key among such reforms include, (i) anti-inflation stance, (ii) elimination of price distortions by discarding the use of direct price controls, (iii) pursuit of higher economic growth and stable and sustainable macroeconomic fundamentals, (iv) financial sector reforms, (v) tax reforms, (vi) the establishment of the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) and the National Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 1992 - specifically to promote investment by providing investment incentives. Such incentives include tax holidays, accelerated depreciation for the cost of rehabilitating or expansion and remission of withholding taxes on interest payments, dividends, and royalties.

However, numerous factors continue to inhibit productive investment in Tanzania. Among them are a poorly functioning legal framework, administrative and regulatory complexities, poor infrastructure (roads, power and water supply), inefficient and unreliable transport and telecommunications, numerous taxes and inadequate human capital.

Despite the encouraging upturn in the GDP growth in the period 1995-97 (an average annual growth rate of 3.7%), real income growth is still too low to make any significant impact on poverty reduction. It is also low relative to the high performing economies in the region such as Uganda, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritius, Ghana and Botswana.

Higher and sustainable levels of growth are therefore imperative for Tanzania. This will involve ensuring higher productivity and efficiency of both existing and new investment. In terms of policy this implies that, in spite of the low level of income for Tanzania, higher investment rates will have to be generated from more zealous domestic savings mobilisation and continued opening-up of the

economy to private investment. There will be a need to, (i) innovate the most effective policy to achieve higher saving rates, (ii) attract private investment into areas/sectors that have the greatest potential of becoming Tanzania's pace makers for growth (e.g. mining, tourism and agriculture), and (iii) ensure that existing and new capital stock is utilised fully and efficiently.

2.3   Sources of Economic Growth in Tanzania

Growth accounting is an economic method to break down the growth rate of aggregate output into contributions from the growth of inputs, usually capital and labour, and Total Factor Productivity (TFP). It thus allows one to address the crucial question as to whether a country's growth performance is mainly driven by the accumulation of human and physical capital or by gains in TFP.

Table 2.3.1   Decomposition of Tanzania's Growth 1960-98 and various sub periods

	Output per Worker	Contribution of		
		Physical Capital	Education	TFP
1960-70	1.9%	0.4%	0.3%	1.2%
1970-80	1.3%	1.0%	0.1%	0.3%
1980-90	-0.3%	0.2%	-0.1%	-0.4%
1990-98	-0.2%	-0.2%	0.0%	0.0%
1960-98	0.7%	0.4%	0.1%	0.3%

Source: World Bank 1999

Table 2.3.1 reports the results of the growth accounting exercise for Tanzania. Increases in physical capital per worker contributed 0.4% on average to the increase in output per worker. The contribution of education per worker is even smaller, averaging only 0.1% for the period 1960-98, with the remaining 0.3% of annual growth being attributed to increases in TFP.

The most striking of the growth accounting results is the huge decline in TFP between 1960 and 1990. During the first decade after independence, increases in TFP were the driving force underlying economic growth, contributing 1.2 percentage points to an overall and annual growth rate per worker of 1.9%. The 1970s saw a decline in TFP to 0.3%, and during the 1980s Tanzania experienced a future decline in TFP, which in fact turned negative, reducing growth of output per worker by 0.4% annually. Underlying the decline in TFP are poor incentives for productivity under a socialist economy, poor macro-economic policies which led to foreign investment decisions by parastatal enterprises, which resulted in over-capacities. The economic reforms initiated in the 1990s brought a reversal to the declining trend of TFP. However, with an average contribution of 0% TFP is still low, pointing to the scope for relatively large gains in TFP in the future, both through enhancing the productivity of the existing capital stock as well as through the introduction of new technologies. Agriculture provides a good example for possible increases in factor productivity, considering that yields per hectare on farmed land are often 25 to 30 percent of the land's potential.

The contribution of physical capital accumulation to growth also varied significantly during the past four decades. It peaked during the 1970s when government introduced a new industrialisation strategy and invested heavily to establish key industries. However, the contribution of these new investments was severely hampered by low productivity, resulting in an overall decline in output per worker, instead of the expected accelerated economic growth. During the 1980s the contribution of capital accumulation to economic growth was only 0.2% and declining investment during the 1990s led to negative contribution of physical capital accumulation to growth.

The contribution of human capital to growth declined from 0.3% during the 1960s to -0.1% during the 1980s, despite the government's efforts to strengthen human resources and to increases access to school education. Although progress was made in expanding primary school enrolments, Tanzania's secondary school enrolment ratios are the lowest in Africa, which explains the marginal role education appears to play in the determination of economic growth in Tanzania.

Table 2.3.2 compares the results obtained for Tanzania to a sample of regional comparators and the performance of other regions of the world. The contribution of TFP to output growth for Tanzania lies well above the African average. In fact, only East Asia and the industrialised countries show, on average, higher increases in TFP than Tanzania. On the other hand, the contribution of education to output growth in Tanzania is below the African average and also below the average values of all other regions. Similarly, the contribution of physical capital to growth in Tanzania is also below the average for Africa, which is already at the lowest value for all regions.

Table 2.3.2   Source Growth – Regional and International Comparisons, 1960-94

	Output per Worker	Contribution of		
		Physical Capital	Education	TFP
Tanzania	0.7%	0.4%	0.1%	0.3%
Uganda	-0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	-0.8%
Kenya	1.5%	-0.3%	0.3%	1.4%
Ghana	-0.2%	0.4%	0.5%	-1.1%
Côte d'Ivoire	1.6%	1.3%	0.3%	0.1%
East Asia*	4.2%	2.5%	0.6%	1.1%
South Asia	2.3%	1.4%	0.3%	0.1%
Africa	0.3%	0.8%	0.3%	0.6%
Middle East	1.6%	1.5%	0.5%	-0.3%
Latin America	1.5%	0.9%	0.4%	-0.2%
Industrialized Countries	2.3%	1.1%	0.3%	0.8%

Source: Collins and Bosworth 1996

2.4   Human Capital

Besides physical capital, there is unanimity among development scholars that growth performance equally has to do with high rates of investment in human capital. Some authors have actually assigned more weight on the latter type of investment as the key behind the East Asian growth miracle. It is argued that investment in human capital drives the growth process to the extent that it impacts on the development of entrepreneurial, management and organisational skills, as well as innovation, learning and adaptation of new technology and modern practices. An exploration of Tanzanian data on investment in human capital indicates that this remains one important area of weakness. According to the World Bank Development data, Tanzania's public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP in 1987 was only 3.5 percent as against 4.0 percent for Botswana and 5.8 percent for Kenya. Moreover, Tanzania's public expenditure on education declined to 2.1 percent by 1989 but was turned around to 2.8 percent in 1993. Data on gross enrolment ratio for both secondary and tertiary education also reveals that Tanzania does not rank well when compared with the performance of strong performing economies in the region (Table 2.4.a and 2.4.b).

Table 2.4.a   Gross Enrolment Ration Secondary (Percent of Total)

Country	1980	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Botswana	18.8	29.0	42.7	52.2	51.9	56.6	55.4	62.6	64.6

Coted'Ivore	18.6	18.7	22.0	22.9	22.9	23.0	22.8	23.0	24.1
Kenya	19.6	21.3	24.1	24.1	27.9	25.7	24.8	24.4	..
Tanzania	3.3	3.3	4.9	4.9	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.4	5.3
Uganda	5.0	10.0	13.2	13.2	11.8	11.4	11.7	12.0	..

Table 2.4.b Gross Enrolment Ration Tertiary (Percent of Total)

Country	1980	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Botswana	1.2	1.8	3.1	4.2	5.1	5.6	5.6	5.3	5.8
Coted'Ivore	2.8	2.6	3.2	3.1	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.6
Kenya	0.9	1.2	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Tanzania	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5
Uganda	0.5	0.8	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.8

Source: The World Bank Africa Regional Database 1999

The gross enrolment ratio for all levels as a percent of children between the ages of 6 and 23 fell from 44% in 1980 to 34% in 1995 (UNDP 1999: 149). These combined indicators suggest that it will continue to be difficult for Tanzania to realise and sustain higher growth unless significant investment is made in education and particularly in technical and managerial skills. To this end, a number of interventions will be necessary. Key among such interventions will be appropriate funding mechanisms and related reforms to enable levels of public expenditure to develop a growing cadre of well-trained engineers and applied scientists and well-educated public and private sector managers.

As a result of the reform process the emerging private sector will also need to encourage and support educational attainment by employing and offering sponsorships to graduates from higher learning institutions. However, if the private sector is to play a proactive role in supporting higher investment in human capital development, it will be pertinent to revise the college curricula to reflect more and more the demands of the private sector, as the market for graduates in the government bureaucracy shrinks. For all these to happen, it will first and foremost require getting the prices right. Thus, Tanzania needs to implement and sustain the public sector reforms that are underway including the pay reform and rationalisation of the tertiary education institutions.

2.5   Structure of the Labour Market

Until the recent reform processes commenced, government employment dominated the formal labour market. The remainder of employment was in the agricultural sector. The large urban informal sector absorbed the large annual additions to the labour force. Since 1970 the population grew from an estimated 13.7 million to 30 million in 1995. Almost half of the population consists of children under fifteen. As a result of this rapid growth in the population the labour force is also becoming younger. Approximately one third are below twenty-five and half below the age of thirty (Dar 1995: 3). This has resulted in a surge of inexperienced and unskilled job seekers.

As was indicated above the low ratios of enrolments in education at all levels has resulted in a low level of education of the labour force: some 30 per cent have received no education at all, less than five per cent of the male labour force and 2.5 per cent of the labour force have been educated to more than primary level.

These aforementioned factors combined with the structural adjustment programmes have resulted in a rapidly growing informal sector. Statistics on a national level are not readily available. A 1995 study of the informal sector in Dar es Salaam indicates that the number of informal sector enterprises grew by almost 14 per cent and employment in the sector by 10 per cent (Table 2.5.1.)

Table 2.5.1.Dar es Salaam Informal Sector

Description	1991	1995
Number of Enterprises	211,142	228,637
Employment	315,958	345,869
Output (in Million Tshs.)	137,572	332,030
Value Added (in Million Tshs.)	41,840	205,203

Source: Wangwe 1999: 3

The main aspects of the informal sector in Dar es Salaam are indicated in table 2.5.2.. The statistics confirm that a large proportion of the employment of this sector is made of people under the age of thirty and that the majority have low levels of education.

Table   Main aspects of informal sector in Dar es Salaam

✓ Total number of enterprises in DSM – 1995   228,637

✓ Employment in Informal Sector – DSM   345,871
                              Women   124,872
                              Men   220,997
✓ IS employment as % labour force   30%

✓ Growth of IS employment (between 1991 and 1995)   2.4%

✓ Self-employment in the informal sector (64%)   222,915

✓ Employment by industry: Trade/Restaurants   62%
✓ Manufacturing   15%
✓ Agriculture   9%

✓ Employment by age:

Age	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	*Total*
Nos.	62	40,541	152,678	82,819	41,623	15,832	11,205	345,870

The overall mean age is 29 years indicating that MSEs are an important source of employment and income generation for the youth and have the potential to play this role in a more susbstantive way in the future.

✓ Employment in IS by education:

Level of education	*Numbers*	%
Primary School or with no schooling	312,654	90
Secondary School	32,454	9
Form iv + Form vi with prof. Training + University	1,868	1
Total	345,870	100

✓ Total output (Million Tanzania Shs.)   33,030
✓ Average output per establishment (Million Tshs.)   1.4

✓ Overall value added (Million Tshs.)   205,203
✓ Average value added per establishment (Million Tshs.)   0.9

✓ Total capital invested (Million Tshs.)   33,289
✓ Output per investment   10

✓ Value added per investment   6.2
✓ Enterprises which secured bank loans (out of 228,637)   1,841
✓ Enterprises assisted (by Government, NGOs etc.)   6,971

2.6 Conclusion

The dominance of the agricultural sector in the Tanzanian economy is reflected in the structure of employment. The sector absorbs some 80 per cent of the work force, most of which is found in subsistence agriculture. This is shown in the following table. Despite the fact that the agricultural sector employs such a high percentage of the work force only 38,900 were in wage employment in 1991 compared to 112,000 in manufacturing.

Table 2.6.1

Sector	GDP (1997) %	Wage Employment	
		Number (000s)	Percentage
Agriculture	50	38.9	4.6
Mining	2	3.2	0.4
Manufacturing	8	112.0	13.1
Public Utilities	2	12.3	1.4
Construction	5	61.3	7.2
Trade & Tourism	16	135.9	15.9
Transport	4	81.2	9.5
Financial Services	10	110.2	12.9
Public administration	8	299.0	35
TOTALS	100	854.0	100

Source: Shitudu 1999: 2

In addition to agriculture, the HRD projects addressed public sector reform, the roads sector, the financial sector and tourism. All of these sectors have significant levels of employment and contributions to GDP.

In terms of EC priorities at the time of the NIP support was being provided to the agricultural sector, the roads sector (Multi-donor Integrated Roads Programme) and to public sector reform and economic reforms through its structural adjustment programmes. The relevance of the different projects in relation to sector priorities, government of Tanzania & EC priorities are summarised in the following table. It will be noted that all of the projects have met one or two of the parameters concerning relevance. "Unclear" has been inserted primarily because events during the implementation indicate that some of the assumptions in the Financing Agreement were not fulfilled.

Table 2.6.2 Breakdown of relevance of projects

| Project | Sectoral Employment | | | Reform Process | | Priorities | |
	Agriculture	Construct	Finance	Public Sector	Education	GoT	EC
HRDP 1				Assist the Planning Commission in elaborating policies for reforming HRD		Assumed	EC supporting overall reform process and hence is interested in having appropriate HRD policies to support the reforms.
HRDP 2		Overall policies for HRD for roads sector		Strengthen the capabilities of MOW HRDS		This is assumed to be a priority as GoT recipient of donor aid for IRP	EC donor to IRP
HRDP 3		Improve quality of technical training			Contributes to assisting technical colleges to adapt to new environment		Ditto and also supports education reform process
HRDP 4		Ditto			ditto		ditto
HRDP 5		N/A					
HRDP 6	N/A			N/A			
HRDP 7	Provided input to MOA in order to restructure training for sector				Contribute to reforming and rationalising the provision of training for the agricultural sector	Unclear	The EC is interested in supporting reform in the education sector
HRDP 8	N/A						
HRDP 9	Environmental and gender issues					Unclear	NIP
HRDP 10			Reform process have left a gap in qualified persons to meet new demands		Upgrading of IFM to University status. Only such provider of financial management courses	Assumed as a result of the overall reforms	EC clearly supports the reforms in the financial sector

HRDP 11				IDM provides public sector training in particularly ministries. Develop cases related to reform process	Development of regional cooperation linkages for exchange of information on reforms	Ditto	EC is a donor that contributes to public sector reform
HRDP 12	N/A						
HRDP 13					Part of the University's transformation programme	Unclear	Assumed
HRDP 14			Need to have qualified people to operate in reformed financial sector	Yes		Assumed	EC clearly supports the reforms in the financial sector
HRDP 15	N/A						
HRDP 16				Contribution at high level to the reform process in the public sector		Assumed	EC is a donor that contributes to public sector reform
HRDP 17				Contributes to assisting retrenched civil servants laid off as a result of reform process		Assumed as also the World Bank is working with the Government on the Civil Service Reform	EC is a donor that contributes to public sector reform
HRDP 18				National Council of Technical Education to monitor quality of training provided			Viewed as one of the pre-requisites for EDF8 support to this sector
ESAMI							
EASTC			To a certain extent contributes to move towards providing more transparent information			Assumed that government requires statistical information to assist in decision making	CESD needs to have reliable statistics from governments in the region. Part of Lomé IV Priorities
Students in CIS						Need to have students return	EC is interested in retaining qualified people in the country
Loc. Gov't. Training						Government has introduced electoral reforms	The EC supports global reforms and democracy
Mtware TTTC						Unclear	
SADC Roads							
SADC Wildlife							

3 Project Preparation and Design

Within the context of sectoral priorities set out in the 1990 National Indicative Programme, the majority of the projects can be judged as having been relevant to the HRD requirements of Tanzania.

3.1 Preparation and Design

3.1.1 HRDP

The Financing Proposal for the HRD Project was prepared by LuxConsult in 1993. It was a freestanding HRD project in the spirit of Lomé III; it originally contained seventeen projects aimed at addressing a broad spectrum of issues and had been designed to respond to needs at four different levels, namely:

I.   Central Government Co-ordination level
II.   Administration level
III.   Institutional level
IV.   Professional Skills level

The logic of the original seventeen projects was to "cluster" these vertically in order to strengthen capacity at each of the four levels. This approach was adopted to address identified weaknesses in capacity at three levels, namely: policy/planning and co-ordination (i.e. in the Planning Commission); in the training departments of the sector ministries concerned with agriculture, finance management and transport; and in the training institutions relevant to these three sectors. These weaknesses included both a lack of capacity to train, and a shortage of existing skills in the sectors.

The project target groups were senior government officers involved in training related decisions, planning officers at regional and district levels, academic and administrative staff of training institutions, professional staff of finance institutions, contractors in road construction, and other private sector entrepreneurs and their staff, agricultural staff involved in crop marketing, and agro-forestry project staff.

The HRDP was developed in 1993 within the national context that existed at that time in which the reform process in Tanzania was beginning to gain momentum. Thus the logic of a holistic approach to achieve a synergy of top-down and bottom-up approaches through a series of inter-related interventions would appear to have been viewed as the best solution to address the situation at that time. Moreover, the interventions envisaged in the HRDP complemented priority sectors for EU support contained in the NIP.

Despite this apparent "internal logic" there were a number of shortcomings in the design. These can be summarised as follows:

I.   The pre-conditions for starting the programme were not clearly set out:
II.   The Government's obligations in ensuring the successful implementation of the programme were not agreed and established;
III.   The timing of a number of the proposed projects within the programme had been premature due to the lack of clarity of Government policies that would influence their successful implementation;
IV.   Despite the fact that the "Project Cycle Management" methodology had been introduced prior to the start of this programme, no LFAs were prepared for the individual original 17 projects. As a consequence, an effective monitoring mechanism for the various components of this substantial financial intervention by the EU did not exist throughout the life cycle of the programme. The lack

of such mechanisms created difficulties during the current evaluation, particularly in understanding the reasoning behind why certain projects were dropped from the programme;

V.   Whilst there appeared to be an "internal vertical" logic within the sectoral components, the timing of interventions (e.g. fielding of TAs) did not reflect the coherence that the programme proposal had originally sought to demonstrate;

VI.   Despite the intended sectoral approach, the design of the TA inputs did not facilitate effective inter-action between each component within the sector;

VII.   An HRD Project such as this does not solely address training issues *per se*. A number of the projects, particularly those at the central and administrative levels had to address important issues such as change management within the context of a volatile changing environment. No reference was made or guidance provided in the Project Proposal as to appropriate methodologies to be adopted for implementing critical components that demanded constant dialogue and inter-action with key stakeholders.

These fundamental flaws in the project design had, in varying degrees and impact on the other criteria used for evaluation purposes.

3.1.2   Regional Projects

None of the regional projects were prepared and designed in accordance with the PCM/logical framework methodology although the ESAMI institutional support project and the statistical training project did describe Overall Objective, Purpose, Result and Activities. The missing indicators (or targets), assumptions and preconditions are however critical flaws in the design, which hampers efficiency and effectiveness of project implementation.

3.1.3   Other Projects

None of the remaining projects were designed using the logical framework approach either. The CIS/EE project was seen largely as a relatively simple, logistical exercise, with some resemblance to emergency assistance. It turned out to be much more complicated than foreseen, and the time frame (by which 407 students and their dependants were supposed to have been repatriated within the first 18 months) was clearly unrealistic. Some of the eligible students still haven't finished their studies at the time of the evaluation.

Although without a logframe, the Local Government Training project had a matrix with a summary list of activities and corresponding outputs. However, the actual training of the councillors does not appear among the activities. Explicit assumptions and verifiable indicators were also absent. These issues were to a large extent offset by professional experience and careful piloting.

The design of the Mtwara TTTC project is strictly technical and, in the light of history, appears appropriate for the eighties when it was designed.

3.1.4   Conclusions on Project Preparation and design

The programme was characterised by poor planning. In the few cases where problem analysis had been carried out, with or without the use of the logframe format, it rarely was transformed into realistic planning. Some technical advisers have constructed post-facto project logframes in order to assist their planning and monitoring, but often at times when the course of a project was already fixed. As a rule, the problem analysis and the formulation of objectives should precede any other activity. In general, this did not happen, and a good number of intended outputs were never produced, without anyone

really noticing it. When it happened, the matrix would include unrealistic assumptions and the objectives tended to be phrased as activities.

The Logical Framework Approach is not the only valid tool for project design, but it does present some advantages for project managers who want to achieve a defined Project Purpose out of their efforts. The knowledge of LFA or other objective-oriented analytical tools has been low in the programme, and Technical Advisers have followed the natural tendency to "get the job done", however poorly the "job" may be described. On the side of the Delegation and DG8, the main interest seems to have been in financial monitoring, rather than monitoring of substantial progress toward the achievement of Project Purposes through the production of agreed Project Results.

It is recommended that a reinforced training effort be made to heighten the capabilities of national and international staff to enforce better project design. This will involve a targeted programme in: problem analysis; the internal logic of formulating objectives first and then move down in the hierarchy; how to make consensus among stakeholders; the meaning of capacity building and institutional development; and the basics of strategic planning.

It should be mentioned that the logframe approach is as relevant in sector support planning as in traditional project work. Without proper analysis there can be no professional monitoring either. More will be said about that below under *Monitoring and Evaluation*.

4   Efficiency

Fundamentally, this chapter is concerned with the transformation of means into ends – in particular, with the use of specific activities to achieve planned results. Thus, the chapter is focused on an assessment of the cost and time required to produce project results. In other words, have project inputs been used in the best possible way to achieve project results? Could the same (or similar) results have been achieved in other, cheaper or faster ways? Were activities carried out on time, within budget, and according to plan?

Thus, we discuss four broad aspects of efficiency in this chapter – financial efficiency, internal management efficiency, methodological efficiency, and external monitoring and evaluation. Financial efficiency deals with the fairly narrow issue of the relationship between financial costs and results. Did the transformation of inputs into results occur in such a way that costs were minimised and results were maximised? Were project resources realistic in relation to project outputs? For a number of reasons, it is often difficult to quantify results in monetary terms; but we can use the unit costs of training as an approximate measure of financial efficiency (or cost-effectiveness).

On the second point (internal management efficiency), we shall try to assess whether project management systems — i.e., the way in which projects are organised and the procedures that are used for planning, organizing, and controlling project activities — are appropriate and well chosen, and whether and how they could be improved. In particular, we will look at project-management structures (including steering committees), plans of operation, and coordination with other donors.

Methodological efficiency refers to the intervention methods – strategy and techniques -- that were used to achieve the desired results. In particular, we look at stakeholder participation and beneficiary analysis. How were stakeholders involved in the project and was this the best way to do so? Second, how were project benefits distributed among different target groups, especially men and women?

Finally, we will look at questions of external monitoring and evaluation. This includes: the use of objectively verifiable indicators (OVI's) to measure achievement of results, purpose, and objective; the role of project assumptions and whether appropriate baseline studies were carried out in order to monitor the validity of the assumptions; and the operation of the monitoring process, including preparation, submission, and feedback on monitoring and evaluation reports, and follow-up on implementation of any recommendations.

4.1   Financial Efficiency

Financial efficiency focuses on the relationship between financial costs and results: that is, on the question of cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit. We will also try to assess whether the resources provided by the project were appropriate to the activities and results they were expected to achieve.

Table 4.1 contains basic financial information on each project covered by this review. As is clear from this review, projects vary a great deal. In terms of scale, projects range from ECU 37,500 to ECU 8 million, with a median value of just over 200,000. Project duration also varies from a low of about one year to a high of over 4 years.

Clearly, duration and cost are related – in the sense that, other things being equal, longer projects will cost more. So if we divide total cost by the number of months each project is to run, it becomes apparent that there are 3 types of projects:

I.   Projects that cost about ECU 2-8,000 per month and which involve local capacity-building and training courses.

Table 4.1: Summary of Basic Financial Costs and Results

Project	Dates	Duration (Months)	Final FA Allocation (ECU)	Allocation per Month (ECU)	Notes
HRDP 1	Jan 94-Jun 98	54	842,500	15,602	
HRDP 2	Sep 95-Dec 97	27	320,000	11,852	
HRDP 3	Jan 95-Feb 98	30	1,278,000	42,600	
HRDP 4	May 95-Jul 96	15	140,000	9,333	Construction works & equipment
HRDP 5		12	185,000	15,417	Not implemented
HRDP 6	1994-96		290,000		Not implemented
HRDP 7	Jul 94-Jul 95	13	37,500	2,885	
HRDP 8	1995-96		37,500		Not implemented
HRDP 9	1995-96	24	225,000	9,375	
HRDP 10	1995-99	48	1,591,000	33,146	
HRDP 11	1994-96	36	135,000	3,750	
HRDP 12			150,000		Not implemented
HRDP 13	Jan 95-Jun 96	18	150,000	8,333	
HRDP 14	1995-96	24	945,000	39,375	
HRDP 15			56,000		Not implemented
HRDP 16	1994-96	26	120,000	4.615	Originally 48,000
HRDP 17	Aug 94-Oct 96	26	232,500	8,942	
HRDP 18	1997-98	12	500,000 (150,000m used)	12,500	
ESAMI		34	2,000,000	58,824	Incl. 0.9 mio RPR funds
EASTC	1995-		5,000,000		Incl. 1.5 mio RPR funds
Students in CIS			1,950,000		
Loc. Gov't. Training	1995-97	24	207,700	8,654	Excl. 54,692 other funds
Mtware TTTC	1983-92		1,400,000		Construction works; 1980 funds
SADC Roads		48	2,000,000	41,666	
SADC Wildlife	Oct 96 -		8,000,000		
Total			**27,442,700**		
Median value			**232.500**		

Note: the median value is the middle value; so half the values lie below the median and half the values lie above it.

I.   Projects that cost about 50% more than the first group (i.e., ECU 13-15,000) and involve long-term education programs.

II.   Projects that cost 4 times as much as the second group (i.e., ECU 50-60,000 per month) and include significant capital costs (for buildings, equipment, etc.)

Analysing the cost-effectiveness of HRD projects is difficult mainly due to the problem of quantifying the benefits from the different projects and estimating the number of people who benefited in each case. However, an attempt is made to calculate the unit costs of training and training-related activities, where the number of direct beneficiaries can be estimated more accurately. See Table 4.2 below.

Unfortunately, there is a lack of information in some projects regarding how much money went into training and even the number of people actually trained. For example, in HRDP 2, one project result was to provide short-term, in-country training for 20 new staff per month. But there are no data available as to how many staff were actually trained. Therefore, the data in Table 4.2 should be interpreted with caution.

Ideally, unit costs should be calculated by taking into account only those costs that are directly associated with the preparation and delivery of the training. Investment in facilities and major equipment should be excluded, as should costs related to institutional development of a general nature.

As a group, the nine projects for which data are available spent a total of ECU 5.2 million (in current ECU) on training. In total, just under 6,000 people benefited from this training. The average cost per participant was ECU 3,495. The average cost per participant per day is estimated at ECU 103.

Unit costs varied from a low of ECU 89 per participant to a high of ECU 15,750. The unit cost for the Local Government Training project was the lowest, thanks to its reliance on distance-learning methods. In other cases (such as HRDP 9), relatively low unit costs were achieved because of economies of scale. In the case of HRDP 9, for example, unit costs of ECU 375 were achieved because all project stakeholders were involved, including members of project committees, extension workers, and all the farmers and their families within the project areas.

In the case of the SADC Road Transport Managers Training project, the planned number of trainees was 375. However, after the mid-term review, there was a change in the training strategy. As a result of this change in strategy, some training took place at work-sites; this led to an increase in the number of trainees to 509.

High unit costs, on the other hand, were often due to the extended nature of the training. In the case of HRDP 14, for example, unit costs of 15,570 were in fact quite reasonable because participants were engaged in a full-time degree course in the UK. If those costs are adjusted for, say, 100 days of teaching, then the unit cost drops to only ECU 158 per participant per day. In fact, the most economical training on the basis of unit cost per day (only ECU 25) was HRDP 10, which involved another full-time, degree program.

Table 4.2: Summary of Cost-Effectiveness of Training-Related Activities

Project No. & Title	Estimated Total Training Costs (ECU)	No. of Trainees	Cost per Participant (ECU)	Cost per Participant-Day (ECU)
HRDP 2 (Ministry of Works)	275,000	41 *	6,707	
HRDP 9 (Southern Highlands Environment Project)	225,000	600 *	375	N/A
HRDP 10 (IFC MSc Programme)	275,000	110	2,500	25
HRDP 13 (University of Dar es Salaam)	150,000	350	429	214
HRDP 14 (Financial Institutions)	945,000	60	15,750	158
HRDP 17 (Enterprise Development – Retrenched Civil Servants)	309,000	1,210	255	51

Students in CIS	1,950,000	490 +	3,980	N/A
Local Government Training	207,700	2,324	89	N/A
SADC Road Transport Managers Training	1,881,600**	509	3,697	185
Total/Average	**6,218,300**		**3,754**	**127**

Note: In addition to teaching costs, total training costs may include related travel, accommodation, and meals, as appropriate (except HRDP 10). The number of trainees refers to the number who completed the course.

An asterisk indicates *estimated* data. For HRDP 10, 13, 14, and 17, costs per day are based on an average duration of 100, 2, 100, and 5 days respectively. For the Road Transport training project, courses averaged 20 days.

Two asterisks indicate that the figure represents the total allocation excluding the uncommitted balance and the allocation for the evaluation. The figure is probably overvalued, but a more accurate figure is not available due to the lack of detailed information on the break down of total costs.

In most of the projects, there were long delays in disbursing funds. In one project, it took almost 21 months between the signing of the Financial Agreement and the disbursement of funds. One reason for these delays is that, in many cases, the pre-conditions for disbursing funds are not clearly set out. This creates uncertainties and to some extent undermines the predictive value of implementation of projects. Adequate provision and disbursement of allocated funds would go a long way towards speeding up the implementation of the projects.

The primary concern in good financing procedures is to ensure that projects are costed properly both in terms of investment financing and implied future budget requirements for maintaining the level and quality of services provided from them. One would have liked to see the integration of recurrent and development budgets (for projects like Mtwara TTTC, EASTC, and SADC Wildlife) to allow budgeting and expenditure to be more responsive to the phasing and implementation of projects. This aspect was crucial for enhancing sustainability of budgets after the end of the project support. Unfortunately little consideration was given on this. Consequently, as we will argue in chapter 7 below, the financial sustainability of many projects is questionable.

4.2 Internal Management Efficiency

In this section, we try to assess whether project management systems — i.e., the way in which projects are organised and the procedures that are used for planning, organizing, and controlling project activities — are appropriate and well chosen, and whether and how they could be improved. In particular, we will look at project leadership, project-management structures, and plans of operation.

A subjective assessment of internal management procedures is given in table 4.3 below.

Among the 24 projects that we reviewed, 5 were not implemented at all. Of the remaining 19 projects, 12 were subjected to delays of more than a year between the date the contract was signed and the date when

the first disbursements were made under the contract. In fact, the average delay for all projects was just under 18 months. It is hard to accept that this kind of delay is either necessary or helpful.

As far as overall project management is concerned, it is clear that most of the sub-projects under the HRDP were managed in whole or in part by the HRD Adviser provided under HRDP 1. In other cases, projects were managed under contract, either by the beneficiary and/or a third-party collaborator.

As far as a management structure is concerned, it is surprising to see how many projects did not seem to have any formal management structure at all.

Similarly, most of the projects submitted plans of operation (work plans) on a six-monthly basis. The weakness in most cases was that the plans of operation replaced, rather than complemented, any focus on the LFA in general and, in particular, failed to refer to any objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs). See also section 4.4 below.

4.3   Methodological Efficiency

Methodological efficiency deals with the strategy and techniques used by the project to achieve the desired results. In particular, we look at the role of stakeholders and the social distribution of benefits.

Table 4.4 contains several indicators of methodological efficiency. Once again, these data are based on our review of 24 projects, of which 5 were never implemented.

Looking first at the concept of a project steering committee (PSC), we found that 7 projects had PSCs (or similar) and 12 projects did not.
Next, we consider the role of stakeholders. We found that 8 projects made ample provision for stakeholder participation, 6 projects made limited provision, and 5 projects made little or no provision.

As far as donor coordination is concerned, 9 projects were coordinated with the activities of other donors in a significant way, 3 projects involved limited or partial coordination, and 7 projects involved little or no coordination.

Finally, we looked at the distribution of benefits among beneficiaries, with particular reference to gender. In general, there is little information available.

Table 4.3: Indicators of Internal Management Efficiency

Project	Months to Start-Up	Overall Project Leadership	Project Management Structure	Plans of Operation
HRDP 1	8	Not attached to beneficiary designated in the FA; no regular, coordinated interaction with stakeholders.	No formal structure; LFA in FA not used; no indepen-dent review undertaken; HRD Adviser effectively acted as "free agent".	Not based on OVIs
HRDP 2	26	Led by HRD Adviser, due to lack of commitment of beneficiary	No LFA and no formal structure; regular reporting to HRD Adviser.	Not based on OVIs
HRDP 3	18	Jointly between HRD Adviser and beneficiary	No LFA; regular reporting to HRD Adviser.	Detailed quarterly planning schedules but not based on OVIs
HRDP 4	19	Provided by HRD Adviser	No formal structure	
HRDP 5		Not implemented	N/A	N/A
HRDP 6		Not implemented	N/A	N/A
HRDP 7	11	Provided by HRD Adviser	No formal structure; no LFA	
HRDP 8		Not implemented	N/A	N/A
HRDP 9	30	Provided by HRD Adviser	No formal structure; no LFA	Not based on OVIs
HRDP 10	18	Partners in twinning arrangements	No formal structure; no LFA	Not based on OVIs
HRDP 11	18	Beneficiary in cooperation with HRD Adviser	No formal structure; no LFA	
HRDP 12		Not implemented	N/A	N/A
HRDP 13	20	Beneficiary in cooperation with HRD Adviser	No formal structure; no LFA	Not based on OVIs
HRDP 14	10	NAO in cooperation with HRD Adviser	No formal structure; no LFA	
HRDP 15		Not implemented	N/A	N/A
HRDP 16	14	Beneficiary in cooperation with HRD Adviser	No formal structure; no LFA	
HRDP 17	14	Beneficiary in cooperation with HRD Adviser	No formal structure but two impact assessments done.	Not based on OVIs
HRDP 18	New 1996	Beneficiary in cooperation with HRD Adviser	Unclear structure	Not based on OVIs
ESAMI	24	Managed by beneficiary		
EASTC	?	Managed by beneficiary through cooperation with HRD Adviser	Formal project steering committee (6 meetings) and annual monitoring mechanism.	Based on LFA in FA and detailed project planning prepared by CESD.
Students in CIS	1	International Organisation for Migration (IOM)	Contract with University of Dar es Salaam.	
Local Gov't. Training	3	Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF)	Contract with Southern African Extension Unit (SAEU)	Prepared by implementer
Mtwara TTTC	30	Managed by beneficiary	Contract with construction company, under supervision of Ministry of Education	
SADC Roads	21	Managed by ESAMI, as training subcontractor	Implementing department	
SADC Wildlife	24	Centre for African Wildlife Management (CAWM) in Mtwara (Tanzania)	No formal structure for coordinating project in 3 countries	
Mean	**17.6**			

Note: Start-up refers to the time between approval of the FA and disbursement of the first funds.

Table 4.4: Indicators of Methodological Efficiency

Project	Project Steering Committee	Stakeholder Participation	Donor Coordination	Beneficiary Analysis (M/F ratio)	Beneficiary Analysis (Other)
HRDP 1	None	No	Yes	N/A	
HRDP 2	None	Limited	No	19M/6F	
HRDP 3	Yes	Yes	Limited	?	Student tracer
HRDP 4	None	No	Limited	?	
HRDP 5	N/A	N/A	Yes but failed	N/A	TNA
HRDP 6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
HRDP 7	None	No	Partial; ignored	No	
HRDP 8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
HRDP 9	None	Yes	Yes	No	TNA
HRDP 10	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
HRDP 11	None	Yes (*via* workshop)	Yes	No	
HRDP 12	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
HRDP 13	Internal through USDM PMU	Limited	No	No	
HRDP 14	None	Limited	No	No	
HRDP 15	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
HRDP 16	None	Limited	No	No	
HRDP 17	None	Limited	Yes	810/264	Pilot and two impact studies
HRDP18	Yes	Yes	Unclear/Friction with WB	N/A	
ESAMI	None	Yes	Yes	?	
EASTC	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not structured
Students in CIS	None	No	No	?	
Local Gov't. Training	Consultative Committee	Yes	No	80%/20%	TNA and piloting
Mtware TTTC	None	No	No	?	
SADC Roads	Yes	Yes	Yes	?	TNA as project activity
SADC Wildlife	Yes; rarely met	Yes	Yes	?	

As far as gender is concerned, only three projects referred explicitly to what they have been able to do in terms of men and women. Perhaps the most striking example is that of the Local Government Training project which provided training to officials of local governments. In this project, 20% of the participants were women -- *but these 20% represented 90% of all women councillors in local government in Tanzania.*

As far as other beneficiaries are concerned, there has been little systematic attempt to assess benefits. In cases where participant evaluations were solicited, many of these were not forthcoming. For those that were, there was little analysis and many have now been lost. In a few cases, training needs assessments (TNAs) were done but these were not used later on as a basis for evaluating progress.

4.4 External Monitoring and Evaluation

A fourth criterion of project efficiency is the way in which external monitoring and evaluation are carried out. According to the theory of project cycle management as practised by the EC, external monitoring is carried out by means of three key techniques or procedures. These are: (i) definition of objectively verifiable indicators (OVI's) in order to measure the achievement of results, purpose, and objective; (ii) identification of project assumptions and implementation of baseline studies in order to detect changes in those assumptions; and (iii) operation of the monitoring process, including preparation, submission, and assessment of progress and other reports, and follow-up on implementation of any recommendations. Note that we are looking here primarily at procedural issues. More substantive aspects of indicators, assumptions, and feedback will be discussed in the next chapter (on effectiveness).

In table 4.5 below, we provide an assessment of project monitoring in relation to the 24 projects we reviewed.

In general, the overall impression is one of inadequate monitoring. Among the general conclusions that can be drawn are the following:

Most projects (14 out of 20) appear to lack any system of objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs). Five of the 6 projects that do have OVIs have them defined in the Financing Agreement but make little further use of them.

As far as we can tell, none of the projects carried out any baseline studies, as a means of monitoring the validity of its project assumptions.

A majority of the projects (12 out of 20) do not appear to have had any formal system for submitting project progress reports on a regular basis.

However, most projects (14 out of 20) did provide some kind of substantive reports on project activities.

We were unable to find a single case in which progress reports were monitored against project commitments (as set out in the Financing Agreement and the LFA) and appropriate feedback provided to the project team.

In 4 of the 20 projects, external mid-term reviews have been carried out. In two other cases, such reviews were planned and budgeted for, but not implemented. In another case, a mid-term review is recommended for the year 2003.

In summary, project monitoring has been weak. This appears to have been due to the fact that project reporting has been inconsistent and that there has been no effort to apply any systematic criteria of evaluation to reports that have been produced.

4.5   Conclusion and Recommendations

Based on the data presented in tables 4.1 through 4.5 as well as the detailed findings in volume II, we find the efficiency of the various projects to be varied.

From a strictly financial point of view, many of the projects are cost-effective, in the sense that they are not over-priced in relation to what they deliver.

Table 4.5: Indicators of Monitoring Efficiency

Project	Indicators (OVIs) Defined	Baseline Studies Done	Formal Review System	Progress Reports	Monitoring System	External Review
HRDP 1	Only in FA	No	No	Quarterly financial	Not in accord with LFA	Yes (1996)
HRDP 2	Only in FA	No	Yes	Yes	Not in accord with LFA	No
HRDP 3	No	No	Yes	Semi-annual	No LFA	No
HRDP 4	No	No	No	Yes	No LFA	No
HRDP 5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
HRDP 6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
HRDP 7	No	No	No	Unknown	Unknown	No
HRDP 8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
HRDP 9	No	No	Yes	Yes	No LFA	No
HRDP 10	Yes	No	Yes	Semi-annual	No LFA	No
HRDP 11	Only in LFA	No	No	Activity reports only	Not in accord with LFA	No
HRDP 12	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
HRDP 13	No	No	No	Unknown	No LFA	No
HRDP 14	No	No	No	No	No LFA	No
HRDP 15	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
HRDP 16	No	No	No	No	No	No
HRDP 17	No	No	No	No	No	2 "impact studies"
HRDP 18	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
ESAMI	No	No	Yes	Quarterly	No LFA	No, even though planned
EASTC	Only in LFA	No	Yes	Yes	Not in accord with LFA	Recommended for year 2003
Students in CIS	No	No	No	Occasional	No LFA	Budgeted but not implemented
Local Gov't. Training	No	No	Yes	Yes	No LFA	No
Mtware TTTC	No	No	Yes	Yes	No LFA	No
SADC Roads	No	No	No	Only course evaluations	Not yet designed	Yes (1997)
SADC Wildlife	Only in FA	No	No	No	Not in accord with LFA	Yes (1997)

From the point of view of internal management, it is surprising to see how "informally" most of the projects are managed. Most projects submitted regular plans of operation, as they are required to do,

but these tended to replace rather than reflect or complement any broader or deeper kind of project planning.

From a methodological point of view, there is insufficient use made of mechanisms such as Steering Committees to promote stakeholder participation and coordination, including inter-agency cooperation and donor coordination. A few projects have been successful in attracting women's participation, but most projects pay little attention to this issue. Likewise, other special groups of beneficiaries receive little attention, except in cases where they are the specific target group for the project.

Finally, from a monitoring point of view, there is little evidence of either the desire or the capacity to establish a rigorous system of project monitoring. On the one hand, appropriate progress reports are rarely produced. On the other hand, there does not appear to be a mechanism for receiving, assessing, and providing feedback and following up on such reports, when they are provided.

Accordingly, we have the following recommendations regarding project efficiency:

I.   Even though it is sometimes difficult to identify and obtain the appropriate data, projects and mid-term reviews should be encouraged to report on cost-effectiveness.

II.   At the inception stage, projects should be encourage to pay more attention to establishing appropriate internal management structures, with particular reference to the division of responsibilities between the contractor (if any), the implementing agency, and the relevant national authorities. Particular attention should be paid to establishing and defining the role for a project steering committee, where that is appropriate.

III.   At the inception stage, projects should be required to refine and reaffirm their commitment to the LFA for their project. Particular attention should be paid to establishing appropriate OVIs, identifying and planning for any baseline studies that may be necessary,

IV.   At the inception stage, projects should be required to stipulate their plans for dealing with "cross-cutting issues" to the extent that that is appropriate. This includes issues such as women in development, environmental conservation, human rights and social justice.

V.   A special unit should be established for project monitoring. This unit should design and implement a standard system for preparing progress reports based on the LFA. It should establish a set of procedures for receiving and dealing with progress reports, including assessing them, providing appropriate feedback to projects, and then following up to make sure that comments and suggestions are acted on in an appropriate manner.

5. Effectiveness

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effectiveness of the projects under review, both as a group and individually. Effectiveness in this context refers to the relationship between the results (or outputs) of a project and its purpose (or immediate objectives). Thus, effectiveness provides a measure of the extent to which project results have contributed (or can be expected to contribute) to achievement of the project purpose.

In making this assessment, we will look particularly at five issues: (i) whether planned project results were achieved; (ii) the extent to which achievement of project results led to tangible benefits for the intended beneficiaries; (iii) whether the planned project purpose was achieved; (iv) whether project assumptions regarding the contribution of results to purpose were realistic; and (v) how far the project benefited from local support in the form of accompanying measures to be taken by the government, local authority, or other project partners.

A summary of our findings is given in Table 5.1 below. It should be noted that these findings are to some degree subjective. Details of the evidence and assumptions on which they are based is given in the corresponding chapters of volume II.

5.1 Project Results

One of the key criteria of project effectiveness is whether the results defined for the project were in fact achieved.

Among the 24 projects that we reviewed, 5 were not implemented. Of the remaining 19, we judge that 11 (58%) could claim that they had achieved their planned results. In the other eight cases, the results were either partly achieved or their status could not be verified.

On balance, a better outcome should have been expected at this level. It is true that development is not a precise science, and that a certain amount of "slippage" and even failure is inevitable. However, this is more likely to occur at higher levels in the LFA structure than the results. For example, you may have a project that relies on certain training (activities) to improve the professional standard of certain staff (results) in order to strengthen organizational performance (purpose) and raise the standard of resource management on a national level (objective). It is quite possible to have a successful project in the sense that staff performance improved and yet, for other reasons, to see little change in organizational or national standards. But a project that fails to achieve even its own results is harder to defend. If there is a "bottom line" in project management, it is the results. These are the "deliverables". If a project does not achieve its results, then it is hard to say it was successful.

5.2   Project Beneficiaries

Related to project results is the question of whether, and to what extent, project beneficiaries actually benefited in tangible ways as a consequence of the project.

Table 5.1: Summary of Indicators of Project Effectiveness

Project	Were Planned Results Achieved?	Did Beneficiaries Receive Benefits?	Was Planned Purpose Realized?	Were Relevant Assumptions Correct?	Was Local Support Provided?
HRDP 1	Activities carried out but hard to say if results achieved.	No, as HRD Adviser was relocated before able to have any impact on beneficiary.	No	Unlikely	None provided.
HRDP 2	Activities carried out but results only partly achieved.	Yes	Hard to say, as no impact assessment was carried out.	Assumption of counterpart commitment not fully justified.	None promised.
HRDP 3	Yes	Yes	Yes, although short-term financial position remains unclear.	None specified.	None promised.
HRDP 4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	None promised.
HRDP 5	No: project not implemented.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
HRDP 6	No: project not implemented.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
HRDP 7	Yes	Unknown	Seems unlikely, as institutional linkages not created and project not financially sustainable.	No	None promised.
HRDP 8	No: project not implemented.	No	N/A (funds were eventually allocated to IDM for marketing study)	N/A	N/A
HRDP 9	Yes	Yes	Yes, except that project is not financially sustainable.	Apparently, yes.	None promised.
HRDP 10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (note that IFM has applied for but	None promised.

Project	Were Planned Results Achieved?	Did Beneficiaries Receive Benefits?	Was Planned Purpose Realized?	Were Relevant Assumptions Correct?	Was Local Support Provided?
				not yet got University status).	
HRDP 11	Yes	Yes	Seems unlikely, as project not financially sustainable.	No	Participation of partner institutions in BOT, ETH, KEN, LES, and ZIM.
HRDP 12	No: project not implemented.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
HRDP 13	Yes, in full.	Yes	Hard to say, as many other factors involved.	None specified.	None promised.
HRDP 14	Activities carried out but hard to say if results achieved.	Yes	Hard to say, as there is little evidence on which to base an assessment.	Yes	None promised.
HRDP 15	No: project not implemented.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
HRDP 16	Activities carried out but hard to say if results achieved.	Yes	Hard to say, as there is little evidence on which to base a n assessment.	Yes	None promised.
HRDP 17	Yes	Yes	To a degree, but project was not supported by credit/extension services and scale was limited.	Yes, except that project was not integrated with other support mechanisms.	Project implemented within framework of WB project
HRDP 18	Only partly, relationship between NCTE and institutions not clear and its role appears to be ambiguous	Yes	Difficult to assess	None specified	None promised
ESAMI	Only partly. Some improvement in teaching and marketing, but less in administration	Yes, participants appreciate improved training methods	To a degree, but project needs more direct focus on organizational development and institutional change.	Not entirely, as willingness of ESAMI to take advantage of TA was inconsistent.	Yes: office space and counterpart support, with the latter somewhat inconsistent

Project	Were Planned Results Achieved?	Did Beneficiaries Receive Benefits?	Was Planned Purpose Realized?	Were Relevant Assumptions Correct?	Was Local Support Provided?
	& management.				
EASTC	Yes, except for two relatively minor items.	Yes	Little evidence of institutional change.	Not entirely.	Yes: office space and counterpart support.
Students in CIS	Yes	Yes: 58% of target group had been repatriated by Oct 98).	Hard to say, as no data available on how many repatriated students are still in Tanzania.	Yes	None promised.
Local Government Training	Yes.	Yes, 2,324 people completed training by Jan 98 (latest available data).	Yes.	Yes.	Yes: GOT provided venues; other donors provided funding.
Mtware TTTC	Partly: some vital facilities were not provided.	Yes	No: uncompleted results were related directly to capacity to provide teacher training.	None defined.	None promised.
SADC Roads	Yes.	Yes: 509 senior managers received training.	No assessment made, but project scale was probably too limited to affect sector as a whole (approx. 39,000 potential beneficiaries).	No LFA, so none defined.	None promised.
SADC Wildlife	Activities carried out but hard to say if results achieved.	Yes, participants have benefited.	No attempt made to measure achievement of purpose.	Basic assumption that training alone can solve wildlife management problems in Africa is probably not realistic.	None promised.

Among the 24 projects that we reviewed, 5 were not implemented. Of the remaining 19, we judge that in all but one case, project beneficiaries benefited from the various activities of the project. The project where we judge that this did not happen – HRDP 1 (HRD Adviser) – was something of a special case. In this case, the only direct beneficiary to be identified was the staff of the Planning Commission. However, the HRD Adviser was relocated to the Program Support Unit in the Ministry of Finance before he had any opportunity to work with staff of the Planning Commission.

This finding is more encouraging than the previous one, although it begs the question of how many beneficiaries were affected and at what cost – a question that is taken up in chapter 4 above. Nevertheless, it is clear that, at a very basic level, people are benefiting from almost all the projects that we have reviewed.

5.3   Project Purposes

Another key criterion of project effectiveness is achievement of its purpose. Essentially, if a project achieves its purpose, that suggests that not only were its results achieved but also its strategy was sound. In other words, not only were "things done right" but also the "right things were done".

Among the 24 projects that we reviewed, 5 were not implemented. Of the remaining 19, we judge that in 5 cases (26%), projects could be said to have achieved their respective purposes. The other 12 projects can be divided into those where the purpose seems to have been achieved to a limited degree (3 projects), those where it is difficult to determine what happened (5 projects), and those where it seems unlikely that the project did much to achieve its purpose (4 projects).

This outcome is also rather disappointing – although it must be recognized, once again, that this is a subjective assessment. Nevertheless, given that 11 projects are considered to have been successful at the level of results, fewer than half of them were able to translate this into success in terms of their purpose. This implies that even successful projects were either poorly designed at the outset (in the sense that the strategy was misjudged or inappropriate) or were unable to adapt to changing circumstances once they got underway. A key part of this process is, of course, specifying and monitoring project assumptions.

5.4   Project Assumptions

A project is designed on the basis that achievement of certain results will lead to realization of its purpose. That proposition may be based on a number of explicit assumptions. Thus, the relationship between a project's results and its purpose can be explored through an examination of its assumptions.

Among the 24 projects that we reviewed, 5 were not implemented. Of the remaining 19, we found that project assumptions appeared to be correct in 9 cases (47%). In the other 10 cases, project assumptions were probably not realistic in 5 cases and not specified in 5 cases.
On the face of it, this assessment is not too bad. However, it should be viewed with some caution, since (as noted in chapter 3 above) many projects did not have formal LFAs and, in those that did, the specification of project assumptions was not always very rigorous.

5.5   Local Support

In some projects, governments, partners, or other organizations are committed to providing certain counterpart staff, resources, facilities, or other inputs to the project. One criterion of project effectiveness is the extent to which a project is successful at mobilizing and deploying such local support.

Among the 24 projects that we reviewed, 5 were not implemented. Among the remaining 19 projects, there appear to have been only a few specific commitments of local support. In the case of HRDP 11, for example, various partner institutions in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe promised to participate in the project and did so, albeit to varying degrees. The ESAMI and EASTC projects specified that the host agencies would provide office space and counterpart staff and both did so, again to varying degrees. In the case of the Local Government Training project, the Government promised to provide hundreds of suitable venues for training and it did so. In short, when commitments were made, they were generally delivered. But in the majority of cases, no commitments were sought.

5.6   Conclusion and Recommendations

Based on the data presented in table 5.1 above and the detailed reviews in volume II, we find the effectiveness of the projects to be generally disappointing. About 58% of the projects achieved their results but fewer than half of those (26% of all projects that were implemented) achieved their purpose. It is true that there were some direct beneficiaries in almost all of the projects, but project assumptions proved incorrect more often than correct. Local support seems generally to have been forthcoming, when it was asked for. In most cases, however, no local contribution was specified.

Accordingly, we have the following recommendations regarding project effectiveness:

I.   More attention should be paid to specifying results that can be measured, monitored, and delivered. As noted in chapter 3, this includes providing objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) for each result.

II.   There should be more focus on the strategy implicit in the linking of results to purpose, and to the assumptions that underlie the strategy.

III.   More care should be taken to distinguish the various categories of project stakeholders, including partners, target groups, and beneficiaries – and to provide for their participation in the project in appropriate ways.

IV.   More attention should be paid to specifying local inputs, whether from government agencies, partners, beneficiaries, or other stakeholders.

6   Impact

6.0   Introduction

This chapter deals with impact evaluation, which means focussing on, in project design terms, the relationship between the Project Purpose and the Overall Objective. Impact evaluation involves analysis of the overall and more long-term effects that projects may have had, including positive or negative, planned as well as unexpected effects. Impact evaluation would usually only be carried out for completed projects or projects which have been operational for some years. [1]

6.1   Assessing impacts of HRD projects

6.1.1   General

Evaluation of impacts is probably the most intricate part of the evaluation process for a good number of reasons. Firstly, impacts of projects are part of a complicated causal relationship where it can be difficult or impossible to decide exactly why certain changes occurred in terms of ascribing them to specific projects or development efforts.

Secondly, the time factor poses dilemmas: How much time-lag do we allow before measurable impacts are expected? Do we expect immediate impacts or only after, say, 5-10 years? Sometimes both immediate and long term impacts are expected. The time frame will vary from one type of project to another.

Thirdly, impact assessments usually require analyses of 'before' and 'after' the intervention, or the use of control groups, i.e. comparison of groups/individuals who have been exposed to an intervention to similar groups/individuals who have not. However, for all practical purposes, such preparation is rarely made, so impact assessments carried out long after project start can usually not make use of such methods. This renders the evaluation of impacts less reliable in a strict scientific sense of the word. Nonetheless, qualified estimates of impacts, also for HRD projects, can often be made through "reconstruction" based on studies of available documentation, tracer studies and interviews, and simple observation. Particularly, if careful training needs analysis (TNA) was carried out at sector or organisational levels, this can often compensate for lack of baseline studies. However, TNA does not capture unpredicted impacts. Notwithstanding that we have consistently advocated the use of LFA throughout this evaluation report, we would nonetheless emphasise that it is also important to apply other methods when measuring impacts. For example, "Goal Free Evaluation" is a method sometimes applied in the evaluation of management training. It simply sets out to register what happened by asking open-ended questions without any pre-determined ideas of what should have happened. The answers are often surprising, thought-provoking and far more interesting than the standard/categorised ones. For example, an evaluation of management training for Tanzanians in Denmark (in which part of this Evaluation Team was involved) showed that the majority of participants had started or boosted small scale private businesses; and the majority of women now felt that they were "masters of their house". These impacts were by far the most import ones according to participants. (Danida Fellowship Programme,1991). These impacts had no correlation to the curriculum that was taught, but were attributed mainly to the savings that participants had been able to make from 3 months allowances. Whether these impacts are desirable or whether they were achieved in the most cost-effective manner is another matter for sponsors to consider.

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[1] In this chapter 6 we are in many ways applying the methodologies and considerations that we used for the "Evaluation of the HRD Component of the SADC Regional Indicative Programme" (1996). It is our view that the fundamental issues and problems pertaining to HRD projects and the evaluation of them have not changes since 1996, and they are well described in the 1996 report. Needless to say, the changes that have occurred since then as well as the differences in actual projects are reflected in the present report.

6.1.2 Parameters

We consider that the following parameters are important indicators of impacts in relation to HRD projects: (i) Multiplier effects/Training of trainers (ii) Institutional capacity building (iii) Sector performance improvements (iv) International co-operation and (v) Economic Development.

Regarding (i), Training of trainers, the biggest impacts are likely to occur when multiplier effects can be activated. When trainers are trained to train others, the reach of training programmes become much wider, and ideally, impacts will spread like ripples in water.

Training of trainers is usually also an element of (ii) Institutional capacity building in relation to HRD projects. The aim is normally to strengthen the institution's capacity to deliver quality training within various areas of study. Teaching staff are trained through staff development programmes, counter-parting with experts, twinning arrangements etc. in order to benefit and impact on a wider audience.

Regarding (iii), Sector Performance, HRD projects are usually intended to ultimately have positive impacts on the performance of specific economic sectors. For the kinds of HRD activities under evaluation, training needs are usually identified in relation sector needs, and programmes are designed accordingly.

International co-operation (iv) seems to us to be another important parameter. International exposure, co-operation and exchange of ideas can have significant impacts not only on individuals but on institutions as well in the rapidly increasing internationalisation of global economies.

The last parameter, (v) Economic development, is the ultimate purpose of almost all training activities, including the HRD projects evaluated here. Poverty alleviation is an integrated part of economic development in this context.

6.2 Findings and Conclusions

Given the lack of baseline studies and, in most cases, thorough Training Needs Analysis, the Evaluation Team has depended largely on tracer interviews, observations and studies of whatever documentation we could identify. Table 6.1 below is our indicative assessment of impacts of the evaluated projects against the parameters explained above. We have excluded those components of the HRDP, which were cancelled before implementation. The assessments should be taken with caution as our information has been limited in most cases. We have tried to substantiate the assessments with comments in the text below.

Table 6.1
Indicative assessment of impacts

	Training of trainers	Capacity building	Sector improvements	International co-operation	Economic development
HRDP1	-	-	1	-	-
HRDP2	-	1	1	-	-
HRDP3	-	3	-	2	1
HRDP4	-	2	-	-	1
HRDP7	-	-	1	-	-
HRDP9	3	-	2	-	-
HRDP10	-	3	3	3	2
HRDP11	-	2	-	3	1
HRDP13	-	2	1	-	-
HRDP14	-	-	-	-	-
HRDP16	-	-	-	-	-
HRDP17	-	-	1	-	1
HRDP 18	-	2	1	-	-
ESAMI	-	2	-	-	1
EASTC	-	1	-	2	-
CIS	-	-	-	-	1
LGT	3	3	-	2	2
MTWARE	-	1	1	-	-
ROADS	2	2	1	-	1
Wildlife	-	2	2	2	-

> *Notes: Impacts are graduated as follows: '3'= high, '2' = medium, '1'= low, ' - ' = no impact or no information available.*

6.2.1 Specific Comments on Impacts

HRD Advisor to the Planning Commission (HRDP-1). The highly needed HRD policy guidelines were not prepared and capacity within the Planning Commission was not enhanced. Impacts are therefore difficult to envisage. Centrally placed people working with the HRD advisor may have been sensitised towards HRD sector issues, but this could not be verified.

Support to MoW HRD Section (HRDP-2). The reason for assessing the impact as 'low' rather than 'none' is that the database is allegedly used for something (albeit apparently not the intended purpose). As for HRDP-1, some people may have gained from working with the TAs, but this was not verified.

The frequent transfers of staff makes it difficult to build specific professional capacity in an HRD section.

DSM Institute of Tech. and Arusha Tech. College (HRDP-3 & 4). The two institutions have strengthened their capacity and are now able to train personnel for the Interregional Roads Project (IRP). DSM IT is also able to provide commercial consultancy services.

The LITI/MATI master plan study (HRDP-7) may have had a positive impact on the sector in that some of the identified interventions have reportedly been considered by the MoA in their sector planning.

The Southern Highlands Environmental Project (SHEP) (HRDP-9) was a successful project with a substantial impact, primarily in terms of cost-effective multiplier-effects accrued by the methodology adopted.

Institute of Finance Management (IFM) (HRDP-10). This project scores high on most of the parameters. Though some impacts are long term and could not be verified presently by this evaluation, it is nonetheless our view that impacts will be greater when training address urgent needs (not just individual 'wants') like in this project. If 'brain drain' can be avoided, improved performance of the financial sector will also ultimately facilitate economic development.

Institute of Development Management (IDM) (HRDP-11). The international linkage to other institutes in the region (although not sustained) resulted in small research papers and case studies, which are being used to enrich current management training. Sharing experiences about the reform process with neighbouring countries may have impacts.

University of DSM Transformation Programme (HRDP-13). Some multiplier impact in terms of capacity building may occur. Fostering of experiental learning for academics may have long-term far-reaching impacts.

Financial Institutions training (HRDP-14). No reports were available, but our interviews indicated that the impact was limited. The causes is probably identical to those found in many other fellowship programmes: Inadequate assessment of needs and selection procedures. However, from other fellowship programmes we know that positive impacts often do occur, particularly unexpected impacts. Nonetheless our assessment of this programme is that it was an expensive programme which could have made wider impacts if designed differently and conducted in Tanzania.

Enterprise Development: Training of retrenched civil Servants (HRDP-17). Our interviews with trainees indicate considerable impacts at micro level. Considering the size of the problem at a national scale, the multiplier effect could however have been enhanced in the design. Impact could also have been improved through associated programmes of micro-credit, advisory services etc.

National Council for Technical Education-NCTE (HRDP 18) Support to established the NCTE was agreed at the 1996 Arusha meeting. Some 500,000 ECU were allocated to undertake the preliminary work to ensure the establishment and functioning of the NCTE within a relatively short time span. Whilst the Council has been established, from interviews with institutes that will fall under the auspices of this new body, it appears that it is not yet operational. This creating a void in decision making that is having an adverse effect on institutions, among others DSMIT (HRDP-3) in terms of building further upon the work of that project.

Local Government Training. This was a relatively cheap project with considerable impacts in terms of multiplier effects through training of trainers, capacity strengthening and contribution to local

economic development. (If local government had been a 'sector', the project would have scored top marks here too). Among the anticipated impacts recorded were better conflict resolution and respect for democracy. Some of the positive, unplanned impacts that we traced were the starting up of local development projects, and the success of women councillors, which was seen as very encouraging by key informants. Moreover, there was some useful exchange of ideas within the region.

Tanzanian Students in CIS. It is impossible to assess accurately the impact of this project because a planned evaluation by IOM was not carried out. Most of the students returned and are now in Tanzania, and some of them have jobs while others do not. There were no statistics and we were not able to trace any returned students. The reinsertion seminars had little impact if any on their job opportunities.

Mtware TTTC. The impact of the new buildings at Mtwara is felt by the students as well as by management. Contrary to what is too often seen in other projects, there seemed to be some pride in keeping and even extending the buildings, which appeared to be well maintained. However, since this is not capacity building in our understanding of the concept, we have only awarded low marks.

Regional Project (ESAMI, Wildlife, Road transport, and EASTC). Much of the training provided under the projects addresses training needs and topics at too low or too general levels to impact substantially on the Overall Objectives of the projects. This is true for the statistical training, and road transport management training (until the Mid-term review), and perhaps also the Wildlife Management College and for ESAMI in general. Moreover, since the institutes are still largely enrolling government officers, the impacts in terms of contributing to the reform processes, the economic development and similar tall order issues (as stated in overall objectives) are probably not impressive.

6.3   Conclusions and Recommendations

Overall our conclusions and recommendations in the relation to the impact parameters are the following:

I.   There is not necessarily any correlation between the size and price of projects and their multiplier effects. Two of the cheapest projects had the largest multiplier effects in terms of Training of trainers, i.e. Local Government training and the SHEP project.

II.   Capacity building has been one of the impacts in most projects, more so in some than in others. It can be argued that there will invariable be some impacts in terms of capacity building when funding, TA etc. is granted to an institution. Nonetheless, capacity building is most effective when there are specific, timed and agreed target to which all stake-holders are committed.

III.   Not surprisingly, impacts on sector improvements are far less obvious than institutional capacity in this evaluation. Nonetheless, it seems that when training relates to 'tall-order' needs identified for a sector, the likely impacts are more likely be tangible. The impacts of the IFM training could probably be verified in future in relation to the ongoing reform of the financial sector in Tanzania.

IV.   Six of the evaluated project established or strengthened international linkages through the project. The impacts of such linkages is perhaps less obvious now than they will be in future.

V.   It is impossible to say anything accurate about impacts on economic development without baseline data. We have nonetheless rated the Local Government Training and the IFM projects as having had some impact. In case of the former, because democracy and good governance are crucial to economic development and poverty alleviation.

6.3.1   Recommendations

I.   It is recommended that training of trainers activities are given a much more predominant place in future, particularly in large and/or regional projects.

II.   Ensure initial stakeholder involvement and commitment, and plan for specific targets of capacity building, i.e. capacity to offer a particular programme or service rather than e.g. 'strengthening of marketing'.

III.   Encourage institutional linkages within a cost-effective frameworks, rather than international exposure through 'individualised' fellowships abroad.

IV.   Prepare for impact assessment at the project planning stage, e.g. for the envisaged continuation of Local Government Training.

7   Sustainability

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the sustainability of the projects under review. The assessment of sustainability is more involved than simply asking whether project objectives have been achieved. It must also indicate whether project results and impacts can continue after external assistance comes to an end. According to the PCM Manual (1993), project sustainability is defined as follows:

> ***A project is sustainable when it can provide an acceptable amount [sic] of benefits to the target group during a sufficiently long period after the donor's financial and technical assistance ceases.***

According to this definition, the sustainability of HRD projects can be assessed in two different ways: (i) as whether the results and impacts of the training can be sustained after the training is completed , and/or (ii) whether the training can be provided on a continuing basis after external funding and assistance has ceased. The first criterion will likely be relevant to all projects, including "one-off" training events, where there is no intention of repeating it. On the other hand, the second criterion is, in our view, the more central issue to consider in an evaluation exercise like the present.

In this chapter, we will examine the sustainability of the projects according to the following criteria (see the EC "Guidelines for Evaluation Methodology", February 1999):

I.   policy support measures;
II.   economic and financial sustainability;
III.   socio-cultural embedding, including gender issues;
IV.   appropriate technology,
V.   environmental protection, and
VI.   institutional and management support.

These parameters are very similar to the issues, or development factors identified in an OECD evaluation study (1989) as being particularly important to ensuring project sustainability.

From a project design and preparation perspective, we have tried to assess the overall concern for sustainability in the projects under evaluation. We found that only two of the total of 24 projects that we evaluated reflected an obvious, explicit concern for sustainability in their design, including the necessary strategic measures. There was no concern for sustainability in four of the projects, whereas the issue is not applicable in three other cases. Thus, the majority of the projects (15) had what could be termed an implicit concern for sustainability. In other words, there was a presumption that providing technical assistance, equipment, and/or infrastructure would automatically contribute to strengthening and sustaining the beneficiary institutions. For example, training of trainers is typically considered as an *a priori* contribution to sustainability. In practice, however, incomplete designs, missing stakeholder analyses, or more generic problems in the intervention methods and strategies, have often meant that implicit mechanisms for ensuring sustainability have been less than effective.

7.1   Policy Support Measures

Historically, project designers have often been far too optimistic in assuming that policy changes and support measures would be implemented in order to render projects sustainable. For internationally aided HRD projects, a typical mistake has been to ignore the fact that beneficiary institutions are often subject to government rules in respect of matters such as policy-making and personnel policies. Thus, it is assumed, often wrongly, that policies will be put in place to allow for the timely hiring and firing of

staff, for merit-based reward and promotion, or for similar practices. If they had been implemented, such policies would have increased the effectiveness of training and hence of its sustainability. If they cannot be implemented, then they may turn out to be "killer assumptions".

In the present evaluation, we have found very few cases where policy support measures were considered. However, in the present socio-economic environment in Tanzania, many of the policy support measures regarding institutional autonomy that previously were missing have now been provided. Increasingly, institutions are expected to generate income and generally be responsive to their markets. To that end, they may have considerable liberty regarding how they operate. In fact, the purpose of ten of the 24 projects that we evaluated was to support the process of institutional modernisation in one way or another.

Nevertheless, despite a general trend towards decentralisation and delegation of powers to institutions, it is clear that appropriate HRD policies are still missing in most of the organizations involved in the projects we reviewed. For example, the HRDP 2 project (in the Ministry of Works) tries to address exactly that need - i.e., the need for an appropriate HRD policy – yet failed up to now to get it implemented. Presumably, that is at least partly because the Ministry was not yet prepared to accept the implications of such a policy.

Another consequence of lacking HRD policies is the award of training fellowships, which is not always consistent with priority needs. Considering the policies in Tanazania for the allocation of allowances (such as the so-called "sitting allowances"), it is not surprising that "wants" sometimes take priority over "needs". When participation in training courses offers the opportunity to earn considerable sums of money from these allowances, it is all too easy for training to become essentially "allowance-driven".

In summary, we think that more emphasis should be put on building appropriate policy commitments into HRD projects as "pre-conditions", as a means of ensuring the effectiveness, impact, and ultimately sustainability of training. Moreover, the EC could help to promote more appropriate allowance policies at national level. The present system is fuelled by the donor community (including the development banks) and could probably be changed through concerted action by donors. For instance, a national guideline could be issued, based on assessment of real costs. Financial support to the needy could then be provided in other ways. The present system is detrimental to training, as well as to training institutions.

7.2   Economic and Financial Sustainability

To be economically and financially sustainable in the long term, training must represent cost-effective solutions to real problems. Otherwise customers cannot be expected to continue paying for it. However, since training is seen as an investment, often with a long pay-back period, training is usually subsidised partly or fully by governments – on the grounds that individuals, employers, and even society at large are all beneficiaries. However, the ability of the GoT to make long-term investments is very limited, and the same is true for the embryonic private sector. It has to be recognized that, if the donor community were not willing and able to fund them, most training activities in Tanzania would simply cease.

Nonetheless, one of the dangers with "free" or subsidised training (as with other services provided free of charge) is that they may be perceived to be of inferior value by their beneficiaries and stakeholders. Since training is mostly seen as inherently 'good', it is difficult to complain or make demands, if you have not contributed financially, as and when training gets out of focus or becomes ineffective in other ways. A certain cynicism can also easily evolve: We are not paying for it anyway, so who cares? Contributing to such cynicism is definitely also the above-mentioned "allowance syndrome".

Whereas, in the past, much participant time and donor money has been wasted on ineffective training, there is now a noticeable positive move in Tanzania towards training that is more financially sustainable. Strictly speaking, it is unlikely that any the training projects we evaluated, except perhaps the Local Government Training project, is financially sustainable in the sense that they could continue without external funding. However, an increasing number of training providers are facing competition. This is partly because donor funds for training are given to beneficiary organisations and individuals, rather than directly to the providing institutions. In principle, this means that providers need to market their programs to potential customers and to offer professionally convincing or tailor-made programmes. For some types of management training in particular, private providers are also starting to make their presence felt in the market. The same is true in the case of computer training.

Training providers are, therefore, coming under growing pressure to develop new products and markets, and to reduce administrative and other overhead costs in order to become increasingly financially self-reliant and competitive This is true, at least to some extent, for all the evaluated institutions, viz. technical colleges, university, management institutes and others. This development is a serious challenge and not without problems. Not all institutions may be able survive the process. Nonetheless, the transformation is necessary, and if customers are able to distinguish between what is good quality and what is merely "popular", the change will be beneficial to all parties.

Three of the four regional projects (or national projects with a regional dimension) in our sample -- i.e., the ESAMI, EASTC, and SADC Mweka Wildlife projects -- all included relatively large investments in buildings and other infrastructure. However, the economic sustainability of these investments is uncertain. It is our assessment that the rehabilitated ESAMI hostel is unlikely to reach a sustainable occupancy rate in the near future – that is, a rate that would provide a positive return on the investment made. The financial viability of the college buildings provided to EASTC and Mweka is also uncertain, because it is doubtful that they can attract sufficient students to fully utilise the buildings. Provided that these institutions continue to improve their teaching capabilities, we therefore recommend that consideration should be given to providing student fellowships for another period.

7.3   Socio-Cultural Sustainability -- Embedding & Gender Issues

It seems obvious that projects must be embedded in social and cultural structures to be sustainable. However, culture is by no means static. It can be influenced and change over time. Projects even

sometimes more or less openly aim to bring about changes in social structures and culture. In terms of HRD, it can be argued that the purpose of all training is to cause change. Unless changes have occurred after training it has been without effect. Nonetheless, it is usually more acceptable to talk about development of skills or building of competencies, than it is to address issues of attitudinal and organisational changes. Simply put, talk of socio-cultural change seems more threatening to the integrity of the trainee.

The typical mistake, as evidenced by the legacy of failed HRD projects, is to ignore or overlook social values and structures. It is assumed that organisational changes will occur more or less automatically and will accommodate smoothly to the knowledge and skills gained by individuals. This danger is present in all kinds of training, but particularly in international management training for third-world countries. Key management concepts -- such as power, hierarchy, roles, and responsibilities -- may provoke quite different reactions in Africa than in western countries, where most management theories originated. These issues are often difficult to address openly and are hence put aside, thus risking that management training becomes somewhat superficial and has little, lasting impact.

Overall, this evaluation did not find evidence of serious clashes between the socio-cultural values of beneficiaries and those that were inherent in the projects. However, some of the management training that we evaluated did seem to illustrate some of the difficulties cited above. For example, ESAMI was apparently unwilling to change its organisation and power structure by delegating power to the Curriculum Development Committee, even though this was what the project aimed at. Similarly, as mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Works (HRDP-2) was seemingly also not willing to implement significant policy changes in relation to HRD, even though that was the purpose of the project.

Other projects have worked better, because they were better embedded in the current socio-economic structure and culture. One notable example is the Local Government Training project. After its first year of operation, this project was built entirely on local capacity and expertise.

As far as institutional changes are concerned, we feel that they cannot be sustainable until they are embedded in the culture -- i.e., in the attitudes, norms, and behaviour of key role-players. In many of the projects, one of the main problems was that the "host" institution was perceived as having a relatively weak corporate culture. Projects usually focus on strengthening infrastructure, systems, procedures, and products. But none of this can compensate for conflicts over institutional values, culture, and strategy -- at least, not in the long term. Without such shared values, organizations run the risk of following short-sighted agendas which lead to sub-optimum results. It is to be hoped that the growing need to face economic realities will encourage people to contemplate fundamental organizational changes.

Turning now to the particular question of gender, the EC policy is clear. According to the Lomé convention (Lomé IV, article 143, Title XI), the role and status of women shall be taken into account in the appraisal of all projects and programmes. In addition, easier access to training for women is stipulated (in Article 153, "Women in Development") as a crucial concern, which shall be incorporated in development programming from the very outset. However, in spite of this and other commitments in principle to gender and women's rights, we found little or no evidence of this concern in actual project designs.

Nevertheless, during implementation, some of the projects that we reviewed did succeed in attracting considerable female participation. For example, the Local Government Training project managed to reach 703 woman councillors. This number represented about 20% of all participants and about 90% of all women councillors in Tanzania. This access rate would never have been achieved if distance-learning had not been used instead of traditional methods that require physical displacement to attend centralized classroom sessions, workshops, seminars, etc.

ESAMI also has a significant number of women enrolled in its courses. Between 1992 and 1998, for example, ESAMI sold an average of 30% of its trainee-weeks to women (the actual number varied from 24% to 40%). On the other hand, it should be noted that the majority of the women coming to ESAMI enrol in a course for chief secretaries. Courses in WID and in health also tend to attract women, but these courses are generally not very popular compared to others at ESAMI. Courses in the core management subjects – finance, marketing, strategic planning, etc. -- are still attended almost entirely by men.

7.4   Technological Sustainability

In order to be technologically sustainable, training should be based on appropriate technologies in relation to the current or emerging needs of the beneficiaries. For example, it is not usually wise to use computerized training packages to train people who do not have, or do not expect to have, access to computers at their workplaces. This may sound obvious, but it is nonetheless a point that needs making. Similarly, when providing buildings, infrastructure, equipment, etc., it is important to determine that it can be maintained, serviced, and (if necessary) repaired locally.

We found no major problems regarding technological sustainability in the projects we evaluated. Most of the training was non-technical in nature. Nonetheless, the legacy of failed and under-utilised equipment (including advanced training aids and tools) that was found elsewhere in HDR projects is disturbing. Thus, it was encouraging to learn that co-operating partners, beneficiaries and donors may have learned lessons in this respect. Another factor contributing to technological sustainability (at least among the projects we reviewed) is that, thanks to globalisation, technology is simply becoming more widely available. "High tech" and spare parts are becoming more widely accessible.

7.5   Environmental Sustainability

The Lomé Convention emphasises protection of the environment by stipulating (Lomé IV, Article 36) that attention shall be given to incorporating suitable education and training in protection of environment and natural resources into the projects. It is further stated (in Article 37) that environmental impact assessments shall be carried out for large-scale projects and those posing significant threats to the environment.

In our view, none of the evaluated projects poses a direct threat to the environment. Therefore, only two of them had environmental concerns incorporated directly into the design of the project. These were: the Southern Highlands Environmental Project (HRDP-9) and the SADC wildlife project at Mweka. In the case of one other project (e.g., the Local Government Training project), environmental conservation was emphasised as one of the important responsibilities of project beneficiaries. Some trainees even recommended to give environment a more prominent place in their future training.

It should also be mentioned in passing that ESAMI has training programmes that deal with various aspects of the environment. However, these programs have not so far been supported by the EDF and are not among the most popular courses at ESAMI.

In summary, environmental sustainability is not a major issue for most of the projects we reviewed, because they have little to do directly with the natural environment. The provisions of Lomé IV were undoubtedly drafted with large-scale infrastructure projects in mind. Nevertheless, environment is as much an attitude of mind as it is a set of rules and regulations, and environmental conservation is a universal responsibility. So there are projects where we feel there may have been some missed opportunities for promoting environmental sustainability. For example, in the SADC Roads

Management Training project, there could have been some emphasis on environmental impact assessment and environmental management.

7.6   Institutional Sustainability

Institutional sustainability is closely associated with the policy support issues and cultural aspects discussed above. Whereas many reforms have been implemented granting more autonomy to institutions, the issue now is to learn to survive within the changing framework. As mentioned, most of the institutions being evaluated are involved in various ways in what could be termed "modernisation". This implies that, in order to be sustainable, institutions must learn to become responsive (in varying degrees) to market demands, rather than depending on a traditional, supply-driven approach to training.

Some of the project intervention methods applied to support this process were technical assistance (TA), staff training and development, and twinning/partnership arrangements with European institutes. The evaluation showed that there were big differences in how successful these interventions have been.

I.   The classical TA/counterpart model caused problems in some of the projects, particularly at ESAMI, where the co-operation and transfer of skills could not be established in the way it was intended. Whereas we are not able to assess exactly what went wrong, it appears that at least part of the problem is due to the confusing role of TA staff: are they advisors or consultants, or are they expected to have executive responsibilities? Despite relatively clear terms of reference, it often seems that both TA staff and their counterparts are able define/modify the role to suit the needs of the situation, as seen from their own perspective. Nonetheless, despite the lacking cooperation, it is our impression that the TA to ESAMI still caused changes by the reactions that were provoked.

II.   Whereas it is more difficult to assess the added institutional and management capacity in some projects, it is our opinion that the Institute of Finance Management (IFM) gained through the partnership arrangement with Strathclyde University. The specific purpose, to enable the IFM to offer a specific and highly wanted Degree Programme with accreditation from the European partner, seems to have been achieved. Technical advice, staff development, and other activities have been aimed at an agreed goal, and the added capacity has been visible.

III.   The twining/partnership model worked at the SADC Mweka Wildlife project and the EASTC project, but it was not quite so successful here for a number of reason. Nonetheless, it is our general assessment that the partnership model is effective, providing that a number of criteria are met. Most important is, as with other types of interventions, that there is a real need and willingness to change.

Finally, on the question of replicability, most of the projects has strengthened the capacity of the implementing institutions, enabling them to provide the training developed under the project also in future, provided that funding can be identified. However, there is also some evidence that HRD projects have been extended and "recycled". In part, this is because there are delays in start-up. But it is also partly a lack of imagination on the part of those who have conceived of the projects. There are some sparks of innovation among the projects we reviewed, such as the Local Government Training project, the IDM project (HRDP 11), and even the Tanganyika Farmers' Association project (HRDP 8) that was never implemented. But, in general, the projects we reviewed were not very different from HRD projects implemented in other countries all over Africa. There are many lessons to be learned from this evaluation, as we will describe in more detail in the next chapter, as well as from previous evaluations. It is to be hoped that evaluations like these will lead to some more fundamental changes in the scope and nature of HRD projects under Lomé V.

7.7   Conclusion and Recommendations

In summary, we find that there has been little explicit awareness of the need to design and implement projects in a way that is sustainable. There are a few notable exceptions – the Local Government Training project – where conscious efforts have been made to make the projects sustainable. By and large, these projects have been among the more successful projects because of that.

Accordingly, we have the following recommendations:

I.   There should be more emphasis on policy sustainability as a pre-condition to project implementation.

II.   Financial sustainability is bound to be problematic in low-income countries like Tanzania. In realisation of this, the EC should consider the medium and long-term likelihood for self-

sustained operation and look for ways of providing longer-term financial support in cases where that is found necessary in order to safeguard investments already made.

III.   Socio-cultural sustainability does not appear to be a major problem in the projects we reviewed. However, we believe that more could be done at the project-design stage to provide for differences in values and to promote access for women and/or disadvantaged groups.

IV.   Except for a few minor problems related to infrastructure and equipment, technological sustainability has not been a problem among the projects we reviewed.

V.   Environmental sustainability is not directly an issue for most of the projects we reviewed. However, we note the fact that several projects provided opportunities that were not seized for promoting environmental issues. This should be considered for future projects

VI.   Institutional sustainability is a major weakness among the projects we reviewed. not least because of the prevailing view that training and HRD are more or less the same thing. Therefore, we recommend that future HRD projects should put more emphasis on some of the other components of HRD, in order to support the emphasis on training.

8   Conclusions and Recommendations

8.1   Introduction

The majority of the projects evaluated were designed in the early 1990s when the economic reform process was still in its early days. This applies both to Tanzania and its neighbouring countries. The 1990s has been a decade that has witnessed dramatic global and political changes. These had, and will continue to have, a major impact upon the development of an individual country and the appropriate strategies to establish the enabling environment to stimulate sustainable growth.

The end of the Cold War has been the major factor is changing the political environment in which projects are both designed and funded. Apart from the overall objectives of building the foundations for alleviating poverty, donor country support was also a vehicle for maintaining political equilibrium (Evaluation of EU Aid to ACP Countries Managed by the Commission – Final Report, Phase I: Analysis of Existing Documents). As a result few pre-conditions were imposed upon beneficiary countries by donor countries. This was also the case in relation to ACP – EU collaboration under the auspices of the Lomé Convention. These changes in the political environment have resulted in donors increasingly demanding reforms as to how countries are administered both at the central and local level. There are demands for democracy, good governance and transparency, and self determination through decentralisation.

The economic environment in which projects have to operate have also changed during the 1990s. The term "internationalisation" of the 1980s has been transformed into "globalisation" with an implied vision of a unified economy in which eventually the "rules of the game" will be the same for everyone. Liberalisation through de-regulation, divestiture of state assets through privatisation, financial self-sufficiency and mobility are the economic parameters that have evolved rapidly during the 1990s. These all have a major impact on the enabling environment and context in which projects are implemented and have to be sustainable once donor support has ended.

These factors have wide-reaching implications for the Human Resources Development sector. Not least for Tanzania that, despite recent efforts in introducing reforms, remains behind many of its neighbouring countries in exploiting its indigenous capacities and potential both in terms of natural and human resources. A further factor that has had an impact on the selection of appropriate choices for HRD projects has been the rapid developments in information technology and telecommunication. These developments impose both threats and substantial potential to institutions involved in delivering training.

The majority of the projects evaluated have been completed. Mid-term evaluations or substantive mid term reviews were only undertaken for a small number of these. Thus few of the projects will reap the benefits normally associated with an evaluation, i.e. confirmation that the project is achieving its objectives within the context of preset verifiable indicators of success. As mentioned above, the context in which the projects were originally designed has considerably changed. Thus in arriving at conclusions and recommendations the Evaluation Team has attempted to place these in the context of the environment in which the projects exist today as well as what will be needed to be sustainable in the future. The parameters selected are as follows:

Project Cycle Management:
Are systems in place to manage the project cycle within the context of the measurable qualitative demands of the current and future context in which EU projects are funded?

The political and legislative environment
Has the environment changed sufficiently at the Central Government and Administrative levels to make the assumptions that were originally included in some of the projects' LFAs? Have policies and legislation been introduced to reflect the demands of the new environment? If not, what should be done?

How are institutions and their training approaches meeting the demands of globalisation and achieving financial self-sufficiency
Globalisation places considerable demands upon institutions ability to upgrade their training as quickly as possible. This process involves ensuring that their services are relevant, value for money, sustainable in qualitative terms, and in some cases that institutions are sufficiently high profile to be recognised as providing training that will have international recognition.

8.2   Project Cycle Management

The Evaluation Team found that in the majority of cases, effective Project Cycle Management tools were not in place. Project Cycle Management should commence from day one of the identification of a potential area for project support. The PCM tools should include:

Needs analysis
Few of the projects evaluated had been prepared on the basis of a structured needs analysis in order to determine the appropriateness of the interventions. Most of the projects were developed on the basis of requests from training supply institutions. The projects that have demonstrated considerable success in achieving their objectives were those that were clearly demand driven. Such examples are the Institute of Financial Management and Training of Retrenched Civil Servants under the HRD project.

Active participation of stakeholders in the design and implementation of the project
Project ownership by the direct and indirect project stakeholders is imperative to ensure commitment to longer term sustainability of the projects. One effective mechanism is that of involving the stakeholders in the design and in the implementation phases is that of establishing Project Steering Committees (PSC). The PSC should have clear terms of reference to define the members' responsibilities in ensuring the successful implementation of the projects. Few of the projects evaluated had such mechanisms in place.

Elaboration of logical framework project planning matrix (PPM)
The logical framework Project Planning Matrix is a vital tool for monitoring projects against a set of pre-determined measurable anticipated results. No LFA PPMs were prepared for the 17 individual projects of HRD TA 034. This created considerable problems, not only for the projects but also for the Evaluation Team. Regional projects contained PPMs as part of their respective Financing Agreements. However, these were not used as an on-going tool for periodic reviewing and monitoring by the HRD Adviser.

Preparation of terms of reference for the advisers to be assigned to the projects, including appropriate job profiles.
For projects of the financial magnitude included in this evaluation, in particular HRD TA 034, clear terms of reference and profiles should be established for all the advisers to be assigned to the projects. Recognising the importance of this aspect, such mechanisms are used by EU DG1. Moreover, where a multi-sectoral HRD project is being implemented, an appropriate adviser should be assigned to each sector to ensure efficient co-ordination both within sector projects and between sectors to ensure consistency.

Establishment of clear responsibilities of beneficiary counterpart staff
In virtually all cases, the responsibilities of the beneficiary organisations were either not stated or vaguely formulated. Projects proceeded despite the fact certain conditions were not being met. Counterpart staff, particularly at Ministry levels, were neither motivated nor informed of their responsibilities to ensure the successful implementation of the projects. Moreover, the preparation of many of the planned key project HRD policy outputs were not even embarked upon.

Establishment of clear rules for Mid-term evaluations in terms of timing and independence
The FA for HRD TA 034 stipulated that a Mid-term review be conducted in 1996. This was not undertaken using the criteria of independence and quality. The review was undertaken as part of a short mission by the desk officer from Brussels supplemented by inputs from the HRD Adviser. Neither of these could be termed as being independent. Not all of the project beneficiaries were met, and the output of the Mid-term review amounted to four pages. The report did not contain any analysis following the principles of reviewing projects i.e. measuring progress against objectively verifiable indicators. This was also not possible due to the non-existence of the appropriate tools to undertake such an exercise.

Recommendation 1

It is recommended that guidelines for designing, implementing and monitoring projects corresponding to those in use by EU Tacis and Phare by introduced, albeit adapted for Lomé conditions. These guidelines should also include models for preparing the Terms of Reference and personnel profiles for both the international advisers and beneficiary counterparts.

Recommendation 2

Staff of key institutions in the beneficiary countries should be trained in all aspects of Project Cycle Management based upon the elaboration of guidelines stipulated in Recommendation 1.

8.3 The political and legislative environment

Many of the projects, in particular HRD TA 034 did not achieve their planned objectives owing to delays in introducing appropriate legislation. Moreover documents that were elaborated were not endorsed. Other projects were implemented on the assumptions that that necessary changes would be introduced to improve the enabling environment. A thorough analysis of the extent to which such changes could be realistically expected was not undertaken. Project HRD TA 034 set out a series of policy documents that should have been prepared. These would have had an important impact upon the manner in which HRD policies should evolve in Tanzania. Where to apportion responsibility for this not having occurred is difficult. Some can be traced to areas described under 6.1 above. However, it is apparent that senior officials to not fully appreciate their responsibilities in ensuring the successful implementation of projects within the context of good governance and transparency. Conditions that are being increasingly imposed by donors, including the EU.

Recommendation 3

Programmes are being conducted in the fields of good governance by a number of donors. Tailor made programmes should be developed to train senior officials in good governance, transparency and their roles and obligations in relation to EU sponsored projects.

8.4. How are institutions and their training approaches meeting the demands of globalisation and achieving financial self-sufficiency

Institutional development projects that have achieved levels of success can be attributed to the interventions having been demand driven. Projects such IFM and to some extent IDM sought to upgrade their capabilities through external linkages and developing "state-of-the-art" training materials and programmes to meet the demands of the reform process. EASTC also has a linkage programme but its basis is still rooted in the conditions that existed some ten years ago. Other institutions such as Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology sought to build further upon an existing collaboration. The inherent weakness in all of these arrangements is however that they have not been provided with the basis for long term substantive collaboration, such as those that were introduced to facilitate linkages between institutions in EU member states, and later between institutions outside the EU. Such facilities could have ensured a rapid and continuous upgrading in the quality of training provided. Some institutions, such as ESAMI, have introduced an MBA programme. They are however doing this independently and thereby limiting their access to other international developments within this area. Many of the other regional institutions could also develop into regional resource centres that provide and co-ordinate distance learning programmes, possibly linked to institutions outside Africa with whom they currently have linkages. These linkages could be established on the basis of the philosophy of existing EU programmes that promote such linkages i.e. at least two Member State institutions involved.

Recommendation 4

In order to promote intra-regional and ACP-EU institutional linkages, it is recommended that the EC explore the possibility of introducing programmes such as Tempus on a pilot basis. The programme should be developed to ensure the exchange of staff and teaching materials over a minimum of five years.

Recommendation 5

A feasibility study should be undertaken to determine the potential of transforming the SADC regional centres into resource centres using modular approaches and distance learning technologies.