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FINAL REPORT

MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE

FIRST REHABILITATION PROGRAMME (FRP)

FOR SOMALIA

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The views expressed herein are uniquely those of the authors

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A team of three consultants of QUEST Consult executed a mid-term evaluation of the First Rehabilitation Programme (FRP) in Somalia, funded by the European Commission. The findings of this evaluation will hopefully assist the Commission in optimising its Second Rehabilitation Programme (SRP).

The evaluation team, after preparatory study in Europe, spent twelve days with the EC-Somalia Unit in Nairobi. During 40 days of fieldwork in Somalia a sample of 70 projects was visited. A second visit was then made to Nairobi, discussing the preliminary findings with Staff of the Somalia Unit, the EC-Kenya Delegate and for debriefing the iNGOs, the members state representations and the UN. The first draft report, mainly focusing on the sectoral accomplishments, was written in October, followed by rounds of comments from Nairobi and Brussels. Some extensive re-writing led to the final draft in December 1997 and the final report was completed in March 1998.

The evaluation is particularly concerned with assessing quality of planning and implementation in linking relief, rehabilitation and development. A number of recommendations and comments are made by the evaluators in this report.

The civil war in Somalia left the country in an utterly devastated state, with a population lost in internal strife. Public services had entirely ceased to exist, the economy had come to a complete standstill. Numerous Somalis left the country during this upheaval, causing extreme difficulty to find sufficient capable and committed staff for relief and rehabilitation projects initiated in the early 90s. The programmes were ambitious, large scale and they often fuelled competition between rivalling groups, rather than reconciling them. The final impact of these large scale emergency projects during among others UNOSOM was that the Somali population had become totally depending on the aid system to which they felt they were entitled as beneficiaries.

It was in this environment that the FRP took off in 1994. The implementers of the programme had to work with the continuous risk of violence and in conditions of personal endangerment. Every step necessary for setting up projects took twice as long as normal. The results achieved by the FRP must be viewed against this background of enormous obstacles.

Somalia is in transition from a state of emergency to a state in which rehabilitation is possible and foundations for sustainable development can be laid. Different parts of Somalia are at different stages of this continuum. But beside progress in the

transition from relief to rehabilitation and development, there is also regression in some areas where, due to instability and resulting violence, project achievements can not be consolidated.

In moving towards rehabilitation and more sustainable development, important steps were made in planning and co-ordination. The establishment of the Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB) proved to be crucial in this context. Contacts were increasingly established with the local leadership in Somalia; with civil leaders, like Governors, finally resulting in several sectoral boards in the districts en regions becoming operational. However, due to the instability and insecurity in many areas, there is lack of overview in terms of planning, particularly in central and southern Somalia.

The FRP has seen a transition from initially isolated projects to some sectoral co-ordination and longer-term planning. Although this transition is as yet not completed and is somewhat unbalanced over the different sectors, it provides a good basis for continuation into the Second Rehabilitation Program.

The International NGOs (iNGOs) were at the start seen as the only alternative and they proved during the course of the FRP to be most appropriate implementers. The number of capable iNGOs in Somalia, which could take part in the implementation of the rehabilitation programme, was relatively small when compared to the need for rehabilitation. This coupled with the prevailing conditions in the country and the uniqueness of the nature of Somali people has led to a high workload for the EC Somalia Unit. During the initial phase of the FRP limitations arose from the fact that some iNGOs were typical emergency oriented, while recruiting professionals with rather low standards and inadequate experience, who often stayed for only short periods. Selection of iNGOs during the course of the FRP has enhanced the quality of operating iNGOs and on the whole, the iNGOs performed well. Improvement has also been achieved by offering better pay packages to NGO professionals. Continuous attention to the institutional capacity of iNGOs is however recommended, specifically in the light of evolving partnerships between iNGOs and local NGOs, demanding ample capability and time for skill transfer.

The introduction by the Somalia Unit of the logical framework approach in project planning and monitoring, followed by the training of iNGOs in its application, was an important step. Such investment builds iNGO capacity for self-monitoring, at the stage of planning and throughout the project cycle. The team has commented on how to strengthen the monitoring capacity of the Somalia Unit.

Areas that do require particular attention in the SRP are first and foremost the

sustainability of interventions, which includes budgeting for operation and maintenance; further the technology choice in projects; specific training requirements and the need for more investment in human resources and institutional capacity building, rather than investments in capital requirements.

A certain degree of sustainability and overall quality in project performance will therefore be essential indicators for the success of the SRP. Improvement in the quality of projects could be achieved by encouraging iNGOs to specialise in areas of their competence, while allowing for a longer project duration, with a minimum of two years. Further by harmonising contracts and standardising, as much as possible, the design for construction works, such as buildings, which in turn will also lead to easier monitoring.

Sustainability is seen as a crucial criterion in the logical framework. However, some of its prerequisites are getting more attention than others. Cost sharing is currently being explored in several sectors and results offer some promise. This despite the long history of free services in the country, first under the socialist government and later under UNOSOM. The privatisation of veterinary services has positive results regarding a change in dependency attitudes, although access might be limited to the ones who can afford the services. In the health service, use of the expression 'cost-recovery' rather than 'cost-sharing' seems misleading, as the amount of money that can be recovered will in no way be sufficient to cover all expenses. The scope for active beneficiary participation in the project cycle has not been fully utilised and will need further research. An enhanced beneficiary participation should lead in the SRP to lower costs for project implementation and a better sense of ownership among the target group. This combined with more priority for income-generating activities across all sectors in the SRP could create a higher level of sustainability.

The role of the Somalis in the programme has been highlighted in several sections of the report. The international community was at the start confronted with a country characterised by a considerable aid dependency and a tradition of community support that did not readily fit western ideas. The involvement of local expertise, the building of institutional capacity and the support to emerging local structures is an essential part of rehabilitation, as has been the case in the FRP. A further development of this foundation presents a challenge to the Somalia Unit and its partner iNGOs in the SRP. A challenge also to further foster the approach that projects be initiated through local initiatives with active community participation, resulting in sustainable local structures for operation and maintenance in order also to benefit from the investments in times to come.

There is therefore a need to increase the use of bottom-up approaches and involve more groups of the community, especially women, in order to enhance the sense of local ownership and to better safeguard sustainability. Initiatives to increase active participation of communities in the project cycle were found in many parent-teacher associations, local health boards and organisations of elders. These groups should increasingly contribute to the success of the SRP. Technologies, harnessing local labour, should be chosen, micro-project funds should be made available, all in order to allow local groups to do more in the construction of, for example, local schools and to create local fund mechanism to safeguard sustainability. Some projects have already been successful in developing such a community base, for instance the housing programme in Garoowe.

The experience gained in the FRP concerning the co-operation with the private sector in Somalia, like in tender procedures, should be further developed, in order to strengthen execution capacity of the private sector.

A more direct role for Somali NGOs in this regard seems inappropriate at present, not least because of a lack of legal framework for their activities; even so, perspectives in rehabilitation need to envisage five years ahead, when the Somali role must inevitably be much stronger. An increasing number of partnerships between international and local Somali NGOs in the SRP could form a worthwhile tool in this scenario.

The FRP had a double task in carrying out rehabilitation and in addressing the root causes of the problems in Somalia. The first task is probably much easier than the second one: it is extremely difficult for outsiders to address the root causes and to assist, for example, in the rebuilding of local government structures. Some of the EC initiatives, for example the preparation of the Menu of Options, are highly relevant and useful. The process of bringing the discussion to the level of local leaders and 'common man and women' is extremely worthwhile. It is however inevitable that most time, effort and money is devoted to rehabilitation. One recommendation for reducing this imbalance is to integrate the work of the Technical Assistants for Peace and Reconciliation and for Local Administration more into the other sectors.

The approaches in building local institutional capacity in order to guarantee more sustainability are not uniform and efforts vary therefore considerably. Several projects, particularly those in education, health, agriculture and some in infrastructure developed promising training and outreach activities. In other projects, however, there is not yet sufficient commitment in order to ensure that Somali counterparts can eventually take over in a good manner.

The EC-Somalia Unit has gradually built its organisational structure, while introducing more tailor-made procedures for its work. The importance of the development of the SACB needs to be mentioned in this regard. Since its start the SACB has gone through a process of earning its present credibility and developed an organisational differentiation, of which the sectoral committees in several sectors are an example. Decentralisation and co-ordination, considered by the SACB as important priorities for the near future, are fully supported by the evaluation team. Both, as it is hoped for, will lead to more activities implemented from the offices in Somalia. The role played by these offices in project monitoring and SME-rehabilitation could be much stronger. Co-ordination meetings are now beginning to be held within Somalia, which is considered a good practise. Sectoral committee meetings could also be held in Somalia, while allowing for a stronger Somali representation in order also to increasingly take responsibility for ongoing affairs.

Attention is also needed to the fact that, once decisions have been agreed upon by all actors, the implementation of such should be obligatory to all who were involved in the decision making. The health sector committee is considered a good example of a mechanism which strengthens co-ordination and improves standards through its increasingly public health approach. The appointment and funding of a Health Co-ordinator is applauded. Other sectors are making considerable progress in this respect.

The development of the Code of Conduct ensured the basic preconditions for implementation of programmes and has proven to be a practical tool in an environment which so far was probably unknown to any Lomé programme. The letter of the code of conduct should be applied with some flexibility with regard to local circumstances. It is however important to keep all INGOs in line with the spirit of the code, for sake of uniformity in the follow up by all implementers of guidelines and decisions issued by the SACB, a condition for the success of the SRP.

During the FRP Technical Assistants have shown great determination and they all have taken personal risks. Their caseloads are sometimes too heavy, especially if they are going to spend more time on project monitoring. However, some of the recommendations in this report will decrease the burden of monitoring through standardisation of procedures and designs and through the introduction of a micro-project fund.

The number of sectors within the FRP is high but justified, such in light of the great need for rehabilitation and the role the international aid community asked the EC to perform. There is need to strengthen intersectoral linkages as the health sector may

have a health post in the same village as where the school is being rebuilt under an education programme. The fact however that incentives paid to professionals or that working conditions for guards can be quite different in the same place should be rectified through co-ordination and introduction of uniform approaches for similar situations.

Various issues have been identified where the impact of projects could be improved; one concerns micro-projects: if micro-funds were available, this would encourage more community-based initiatives using simple low-cost technologies. Another issue concerns information: there is a need to use the results of studies and reports already made before the war. Further there is need to identify Somali sources and key information, such as information on ability to pay, to feed the cost-sharing debate in order to further improve project performance.

Two sectors are facing problems with providing national back-up services, namely essential drugs for the health sector and textbooks for the education sector.

Peace and reconciliation, which could run as a linking thread through all the sectors, could receive more emphasis. Teaching Somali people at every opportunity that there is no other future than to function better with each other and with their neighbours in the adjacent regions should be the focal point in this link.

The FRP had an important impact on normalising conditions in Somalia. The programme has been effective in establishing many rehabilitation projects and contributed considerably to the establishment of institutional structures above project level. More than any other international player attention has been paid to addressing the root causes of Somalia's problems. The team extends its comments to the strengths and achievements but also points at weaknesses in the programme.

The experience of the FRP certainly does justify a continuation of the programme into a second phase thereby applying the lessons learned in the FRP along the lines of comments of this report.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACORD	Irish Rehabilitation/Development Agency
ACP	Africa Caribbean Pacific
ADK	Acronis Consulting Engineers, Greece
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AET	Africa Educational Trust
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMA	Africa Muslims Agency
ANS	Action Nord/Sud
CBA	Cost-Benefit Analysis
CEA	Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
CEC	Commission of the European Communities
CEFA	Comitato Europeo Formazioano Agricola
CHW	Community Health Worker
CIF	Custom Import Freight
CINS	Cooperazione Italiana Nord Sud
CISP	Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo dei Popoli
CMS	Central Medical Store
CoC	Code of Conduct
COOPI	Cooperazione Internazionale
CR	Crude Rate
DPT	Diphtheria Polio Tetanus
DEO	District Education Officer
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
ECU	European Currency Unit
EDC	Education Development Centre
EDF	European Development Fund
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EPI	Expanded Programme of Immunisations
ESC	Education Sectoral Committee
EFAMS	EC Food Aid Monetization Programme for Somalia
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
EPI	Expanded Programme of Immunisation
EC	European Union
FEWS	FAO Global Early Warning System
FfW	Food for Work
FRP	First Rehabilitation Programme
FSAU	Food Security Assessment Unit
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	Geographical Information Systems
HCG	Health Co-ordination Group
HP	Health Post
IARA	Islamic African Relief Agency
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate
iNGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPM	Integrated Pest Management
IUCN/EARO	The World Conservation Union/Eastern African Regional Office
LAS	Local Authorities
LFA	Logical Framework Analysis
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
LVIA	Laymen Development Agency, Italy

MAPPS	Market Assistance and Product Promotion
MCA	Multi-Criteria Analysis
MCH	Mother and Child Health
MICS	Multiple-Indicator Cluster Survey
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MSE	Micro and Small Enterprises
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
OPD	Out-Patient Department
ORS	Oral Rehydration Solution
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PEER	Programme of Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction
PHC	Primary Health Care
PTA	Parent-Teacher Association
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PSF	Pharmaciens sans Frontières
REO	Regional Education Officer
RMS	Regional Medical Store
RRD	Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
SAACID	Somalian NGO
SACB	Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SIJU	Somali Independent Journalist Union
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SOLVA	Somaliland Veterinary Association
SOSALCO	Somali Saudi Livestock Company
SPDS	Somaliland Peace and Development Society
SRP	Second Rehabilitation Programme
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
TA	Technical Assistant
TB	Tuberculosis
TBA	Traditional Birth Attendant
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNA	United Nations Association
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDOS	United Nations Development Office for Somalia
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNOSOM	United Nations Office for Somalia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
W&S	Water and Sanitation
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Note: In the report the word "implementers" refers to (i)NGOs and UN agencies, involved with the implementation of the FRP/SRP.

SOMALIA, FACTS AND FIGURES

Population: Somalia has a land area of 637,600 sq.kms.. Population estimates vary, general consensus is somewhere between 5.5 and 6.5 million, of whom one million live in Mogadishu. The annual growth rate is 2.7% by 1995. The troubles had led to 300,000 people being displaced internally, and 490,000 gone abroad, mainly to Ethiopia and Kenya.

The climate is hot and dry, hottest in April. The rain is unreliable with the fear of drought ever present.

Population and livelihoods: density varies greatly but is on average only 12 per sq.km. 50% of the population is nomadic, mainly in central and northern areas. Over 30% of the country is semi-arid, and only fit for grazing. However the National Herd is approaching maximal use of grazing land and should not get bigger.

Agriculture: Crop raising and animal husbandry account together for 70% of livelihoods and 65.5% of GDP; services contribute 25% of the GDP, with small industrial and manufacturing sectors. The main exports are livestock, bananas and people. The fishing sector has potential for growth, with industrial catches currently taken by foreign boats with Somali licences. 13% of the land is cultivatable but only one-eighth is farmed on a regular basis. 28% of the population are settled farmers, mainly on the land between the Juba and Shabelle rivers in the south. The main crops are sorghum, maize and bananas, with some rice, sugar cane, beans and sesame. However, Somalia is structurally a food-deficit country.

Finance: The total external debt in 1994 was 2,616 million, plus interest arrears on long-term debt amounting to \$487 million. The ratio of external debt to GNP is 50 to 6. Official Development assistance in 1994 came to \$537.8 million

Health: According to the World Bank, health standards are among the worst in Africa. Life expectancy is only 47 years. Three groups have extremely high death rates - women giving birth (MMR is 1100 per 100 thousand whereas in industrialised countries it is 7) children under one (the IMR is 121 per thousand) and children under five, with a death rate of 211 per thousand. The Crude Death Rate is 19, the Crude Birth Rate is 50. People suffer from vector-borne disease such as malaria and water-borne problems such as cholera and diarrhoea.

Political system: A number of clans and sub-clans make up Somalia's social structure. They support different fighting factions, and as a result there has been no functioning central government since 1991. Peace accords formed in Nairobi and Addis Ababa are on, then off. Somaliland is doing better; by comparison it is peaceful and there is some structure to its government.

Education: 36% of adult males are literate and 14% of females. This represents a major decline from the mid-eighties. The secular school system collapsed totally during the troubles, although some Koranic schools stayed open. Current numbers of reopened schools and the proportion of children enrolled nationally are not known.

Human development: according to the UNDP Human Development index, which combines national income, female literacy and life expectancy, Somalia ranks 172nd out

of 174 poor nations.

(Sources: Country Report Somalia 1997, EIU; The State of the World's Children 1996, UNICEF)

BUDGETS FRP AND SRP

PHASE 1 OVERALL AND SECTORAL BUDGETS

METHODOLOGY

Methodology of the evaluation of the Somalia First Rehabilitation Programme

EC-Nairobi based evaluation: July 1 - 12, 1997

The evaluation team started by meeting and interviewing the staff of the EC-Somalia Unit in several rounds. An introductory meeting with all TAs was held to discuss the brief of the team and to agree on the general methodology of the mission. Subsequently, during the two weeks following, individual team members had one or more appointments with all TAs, the leadership of the Unit and the EC-Kenya Delegate. Numerous files and documents were consulted and discussed with those concerned.

The evaluation team assigned different sectors and topics that make up the totality of the FRP to each of the team members.

With the implementing agencies, iNGOs and UN-agencies, a joint meeting was held to introduce the terms of the mission and inventorise ideas as to how the fieldwork could be best organised and logistics set up. After that each of the team members had one or more individual meetings with the staff of the implementing agencies to go further into project and contextual detail. Key staff in WFP, UNDOS and SACB were also met.

During this period the team members met Nairobi-based representatives of the EC member states.

After the team returned, a round of visits was held in the headquarters in Brussels.

Fieldwork in Somalia: August 20 to September 28, 1997

The team selected a sample of some 70 projects, approximately half of the total number implemented or still under implementation, covering all sectors and major activities - education, health, infrastructure, SME, livestock, fisheries, agriculture, peace and reconciliation, environment. Other criteria for selection were security and logistics, and that the selected projects should be existing and operational or under implementation. There should be secondary data available on the project.

During the fieldwork, the number of projects per sector to be visited varied, depending on the heterogeneity in the context or the projects itself.

In principle therefore, all projects financed under the FRP had a chance of evaluation;

some were EC budget-line funded in order to get a broader-based sense of each sector.

Biases that could have influenced the evaluation findings included the travel distance and time, which determined whether isolated projects could be visited: trade-offs had to be made between contribution to evaluation findings and consumption of time. The security situation could further prevent us from visiting essential projects.

In the Somalia context it was not possible to select control areas to be visited since security did not permit it.

Project level evaluation:

Projects were visited together with implementer staff. If deemed necessary, interviews were held with stakeholders without the staff being present. Critical indicators were determined for each project, checked and counter-checked.

Tools for the collection of information during field work on several levels were: observations on project level, semi-structured interviews with individuals and with groups; these most often were beneficiaries, with an emphasis on the most vulnerable groups, local leaders and structures, staff of iNGOs and key informants relevant to but not directly related to the project, for example local leaders, traders, and important business men and women.

Additional data were collected with techniques that included consulting local reports, collecting market information, mapping, transect walking, and pair ranking.

Final dossiers, consultations, preliminary write-up and presentation of findings: September 28 to October 4, 1997

The team finalised its research into documents and through discussions with key personnel in the Unit and iNGOs.

A debriefing was held with the iNGOs; the principal findings and recommendations were presented and discussed. Representatives of the EC-member states in Nairobi were also debriefed.

An extremely useful, daylong participatory workshop was held with the staff of the EC-Somalia Unit, wherein the findings and recommendations were presented, their content discussed in detail and additional information provided for integration into the reports by the consultants.

Team draft report writing: October 9 to 24, 1997

The team wrote and finalised the Draft Report, which was sent to EC/DGVIII in Brussels and to the EC-Somalia Unit in Nairobi. Comments and additional reports were received, carefully studied and - where possible - integrated in the text of the final draft report.

Final report writing

After receiving verbal and written feedback from Brussels, the team reassembled for the final version.

...ancient water-well rehabilitated...

BACKGROUND AND EVALUATION ASSUMPTIONS

The teams' approach

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Mid-term Evaluation of the First Rehabilitation Programme (FRP) for Somalia. Agreement No. 4420/SO, Project Nos. 6 ACP SO 082 (36,292,000 ECU) 6 ACP SO 083 (1,708,000 ECU) (balance from 4th EDF transferred to 6th EDF) (SO 6029). Approved by EDF Committee November 1993.

The evaluation (July to October 1997) was carried out with emphasis on assessing the quality of output and processes of the projects funded through the EC-Somalia Unit and implemented by INGOs and UN-agencies. Along with its Terms of Reference, the team has based its work on the Commission's approach to rehabilitation as contained in COM (96) 153 final, entitled "Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (RRD)". The document recommends (pages i & ii): "... a co-ordinated approach (among Commission instruments) ... in order to strengthen linkages ... thereby improving ... complementarity, and ensuring global coherence in the most efficient way and with a view to achieve the greatest impact. Rehabilitation programmes are seen as progressively taking over from relief assistance to stabilise the economic and social situation and facilitate the transition towards a medium- and long-term development strategy".

The approach of the team is firmly based on this integrated approach and broad definition of rehabilitation as more than just physical reconstruction. In terms of sectoral expertise the team was conscious of its own strengths and limitations. Three men can be gender conscious; a development sociologist can look at other sectors in a logical way. However, some technical areas within the eight (sub) sectors in the FRP were too specialist for the team's expertise. For instance, the absence of a health economist meant that it was unlikely that new insights into cost recovery could be reached.

Somalia: post civil war era?

Elements of peace and stability have slowly modified the chaos in the country, fragmented and devastated as it still is. However normality as it was in the past is still far away, as was underlined by many of the interviewees. Violence is still a way to address disagreements; arms are still held by many. The situation in Somalia is still not yet "post-conflict". With the collapse of the previous over-centralised government all infrastructure collapsed; all state run basic public functions came to a standstill.

Most Somalis seem to oppose the revival of a centralised government that resembles the previous one and so threatens renewed dictatorship. Different forms of leadership and authority are coming up at regional and district levels, community members are

beginning to accept responsibility for ownership of schools, health posts and other assets: this process is in its infancy, diverse and yet unstable, but to some extent expressing the desire felt by many for a normal functioning society and the beginnings of some form of democracy.

As said by several of the many people met with in Somalia, a decentralised local governing capacity will have to be built in a complex and highly fragile socio-political environment. The meeting on National Reconciliation in November 1997 brought all Somali groups together for the first time since 1993. To go further, to reach any workable agreement on the future of the country will require high levels of sophistication and the determination of all involved, Somali groups and the international world.

The need for rehabilitation in Somalia

The EC-FRP began in an environment of total chaos, where ambitious international programmes had ceased to have any positive effects; subsequent achievements started under extreme difficulty and often with personal insecurity for the staff of the implementers and the EC-Somalia Unit.

The need for relief assistance to cover basic needs was gradually transformed into a need for rehabilitation of basic public services. It left the EC and the implementers with the key question as to who could claim a mandate to act. The Addis Ababa Declaration (December 1, 1993) defined the conditions under which assistance could be provided. These were peace, security and the presence of a responsible local Somali authority. This provided the EC and the implementers with a minimum tool to demand safe conditions as formulated by the SACB in the Code of Conduct.

The need for rehabilitation in Somalia is great. While rehabilitation raises living conditions for the direct beneficiaries, many others continue to live in poverty and do not have good access to services. This creates a need to find ways to broaden the scope and the output of the SRP in a realistic and responsible way.

Return

Hundreds of thousands left Somalia during the past years; large numbers became internally displaced. Some host countries are communicating with the self-proclaimed government in Somaliland about the return of refugees. The numbers that actually will return in the next years cannot be anticipated at this stage. Return of the internally displaced is happening in very limited numbers and it cannot be envisaged that this will change in the near future.

International aid

Establishment of the SACB structure has been of major importance for the donor and implementer communities and for Somalia itself. The SACB provided a platform for implementers and offered diplomacy, co-ordination and (inter-) sectoral planning.

Under the SRP the EC-funded programmes may continue to take a large share of the international assistance to Somalia, although bilateral aid from some countries will be increased, possibly as part of a package with intended repatriation programmes for Somali refugees.

The main constraints in the funding of the SRP arrangements of the EC are the lack of overview in terms of inventory and planning and the strictly sectoral organisation of the existing rehabilitation programme. These aspects have been given ample attention in the evaluation report.

SYNTHESIS REPORT

1 THE FRP IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The collapse of the Somali State had recognisable causes. In the post-independence years, General Siad Barre had established a centralised and oppressive government which was seen by the political leaders and their enemies as a chance to represent their lineages at the centre of state power and thus ensure their clan share of good things - civil service posts, foreign- or government-sponsored projects. As a result, political misconduct had become widespread. Matt Bryden, in his illuminating study and proposal to the EC-Somalia Unit concerning rehabilitation of the Local Authorities, sees this situation in its turn as deriving from the clashes that occurred when imported models of state government were imposed, first by colonialism, then by Barre, on a pre-colonial, acephalus Somali political culture, characterised by uncentralised political formations which, at first sight, lacked government in the conventional sense and had no specific political institutions.

The collapse of the state led directly to the disappearance of state infrastructure and public services such as health care, education, the judicial system etc. However, the quality of these services was already relatively poor. In terms of governmental presence and influence a skewed picture exists: although the majority of the population is rural based, the centralised government manifested itself mainly in the urban areas. Social development was not prioritised. To quote Bryden again: "... in the early 1980s Somalia could boast 'the lowest GNP, the lowest physical quality of life index, the lowest per capita public education expenditure, the highest infant mortality per 1,000 births, and the highest per capita military expenditure.'"

The process of state collapse was accompanied and gave way to severe civil conflicts that lead to displacement and destitution of the majority of the population, massive destruction of the public physical infrastructure and private property. This devastation caused the departure of many Somalis, those who could afford it, to overseas countries, and it brought collective and individual trauma that is recovered from only slowly, putting brakes on the processes of reconciliation.

As civil war erupted, large-scale international interventions were launched (UNOSOM 1 & 2, UNITAF). Most of the initiatives were focused on restoring the central government. In the international political processes it was not thought that a country could exist where no central government exists; the implementation of rapid relief interventions and the rehabilitation of governmental structures were deemed a necessity. In all this, legitimate local leadership, fragmented as it was, and people at local level, were largely

ignored and no solution or settlement of the conflict was reached. At that stage a limited number of iNGOs were working in the country providing humanitarian aid. As a result of the UNOSOM operation a large number of local pseudo-NGOs sprang into life, most of them private individuals and businessmen aiming solely at the seemingly unlimited aid funds.

Well before the withdrawal of UNOSOM (1995) the EC established a leading international presence and programme for Somalia. In June 1993 the Special Envoy for Somalia was mandated to re-establish the EC-Delegation in Nairobi, previously based in Mogadishu. Amongst the multitude of issues and problems to be dealt with by the EC, two were initially outstanding: i) a solution had to be found as to how to work in Somalia in the absence of a government, i.e. without a National Authorising Officer. This was resolved by transferring the powers, authority and functions of the National Authorising Officer to the EC; ii) As Somalia had not ratified the Lomé IV agreement and hence was not entitled to receive assistance from that convention, resources had to be made available in a different way. The main source of funding during the FRP has been from the unspent balances of the Lomé II and Lomé III Somalia National Indicative Programmes and other budget lines. In order to bring Somalia rapidly under to the Lomé IV arrangements a special clause had been introduced into the text of the convention.

The EC-Somalia Unit began its operations in a devastated country, politically and socially fragmented; security for staff and implementing iNGOs was a daily personal and operational problem. During the FRP, staff from iNGOs lost their lives while several others, including Technical Advisors of the EC-Somalia Unit, were kidnapped and held hostage. The Special Envoy for Somalia, the staff of the EC-Somalia Unit and the iNGOs and UN staff in the field deserve praise for their endeavours, their motivation and the endurance they displayed in the years that the FRP was implemented.

Fieldwork was made possible and supported by the existence of the SACB which grew from the Addis Ababa Declaration (December 1, 1993); instituted and chaired by the Special Envoy it has taken an essential and indispensable role in the steering and co-ordination of the major actors in Somalia.

The AA-Declaration has operationalised the conditions under which assistance in rehabilitation and development can be extended. It is based on the strong regional socio-political differences in Somalia and underscores that peace, security and the existence of responsible local authorities are a pre-requisite for the provision of assistance. In February 1995 these conditions were formalised as the Code of Conduct by the SACB, and its adoption by local authorities became a condition for EC-funded assistance.

The FRP has shown a transition from isolated project implementation towards, later, rehabilitation programming, with many projects now having longer-term developmental objectives, with a focus on sustainability. Much has been achieved during the FRP, taking into account the prevailing conditions and complexities in Somalia. Improvements and strengthening of the programme in the SRP can be based on lessons learned in the FRP, many of which are in the recommendations of the sectoral part of this report.

2 EC-REHABILITATION PROGRAMME AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF SOMALIA

Logical Framework

The European Community has developed an integrated approach and logical framework to learn from past experiences, in order to perform better in future. Evaluation, as one of the stages in PCM, is subject to guidelines of this logical framework. The sustainability of past interventions is one of the key elements to be judged .

Rehabilitation deals with the transition period from emergency towards development and is therefore by definition meant to be of limited duration. Rehabilitation often builds upon the achievements of humanitarian aid -as is the case in Somalia-. Thereby *"avoiding a deterioration in services and infrastructure and conserving and improving local expertise, while removing the economic substitution role of humanitarian aid, introducing a system of paying at minimum costs and supporting actions in favour of vulnerable groups with the aim of reinserting them into economic and social life"* (quote from discussion document "Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development - LRRD").

Although all items in the logical framework point at achieving a certain level of sustainability, rehabilitation in a strict sense is expected to build the foundation for such sustainable development, thereby avoiding any action which might provoke the opposite.

The guidelines for "logical framework and evaluations" under which this mid-term evaluation was executed, might have been too strict to allow for all aspects of the specific context in Somalia.

Non-tangible assets in the FRP and the logical framework

The often fluid security situation in Somalia, the legacy of aid dependency, combined with the absence of a central government created a far from ideal starting situation in 1994. The considerable achievements of the FRP towards normalising day-to-day life in many areas of Somalia, may not be adequately measured by the yardstick of the logical framework principles, with its strong emphasis on sustainability.

This evaluation focuses certainly on project implementation, on progress in technical delivery terms, but, it is hoped, will also point out more intangible achievements, in areas such as reconciliation, the decrease in dependency, changes in attitudes, in the perception that being different means being an enemy; such achievements will become more visible in the future. The Somali people are having to come to terms with themselves and their fellow Somalis, are resetting their core values and all this may be

expected to take a long time. But it is certain that such changes will be the most important asset for a really sustainable future in Somalia.

The Evaluation Team has taken this into account during its fieldwork and assessment of the FRP, which it would describe as a positive operation, well implemented in several respects, given the limitations prevailing in Somalia and it is right that it is now entering into its second term.

It is from this perspective that the findings and recommendations, which are in some cases accompanied by points of criticism and analysis, have to be considered.

Continuum

All areas in Somalia are at different points of the emergency-development spectrum, often in dynamic transition, sometimes regressing or collapsing. From the start, therefore, the FRP had elements of emergency, of rehabilitation and of development. The veterinary programme is an example of a programme with distinct development characteristics, while some health interventions had only just passed the emergency phase.

Specific Situation in Somalia

This LRRD discussion paper agrees that linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development are difficult to implement in practice. Somalia shows clearly that it is extremely difficult, particularly if to be based on an intersectoral approach. The absence of a central government in Somalia at the start of the FRP made this situation even more complicated. As the discussion paper rightly acknowledges, the components of the RRD linkage are highly situation-specific, and must depend on the realities of each country. The legacy of the huge humanitarian interventions in the early nineties had seriously limited the chances of a smooth transition from war to peace in many areas of Somalia. The FRP therefore had a difficult start in 1994, to put it mildly.

Towards a new Somalia

It is important to realise that rehabilitation is not a return to the previous situation, but preparation in a logical way for the resumption of sustainable development. In many countries, however, sustainability, is blocked by inadequate operation and maintenance requirements, facts which contributed to the emergence and extent of the disaster. The specific Somali context, without a government as a counterpart in rehabilitation and as a potential re-employer, makes a return to the previous situation in any case impossible. In line with the strategy of the LRRD paper a dynamic approach has been developed in Somalia with specific attention to the food crisis and with an emphasis on food security. The health, a sector at the centre of all emergency situations, has also received

attention right from the start of the FRP.

In the new Somalia, the legacy of a lost school generation will be felt: education rehabilitation and development -sometimes rather neglected in rehabilitation programmes -needs to continue as a priority, given the previous government's neglect of education and the high aspirations of both parents and children.

...damaged bridge near Berbera...

3 ASSESSMENT OF THE FRP RELATED TO THE FINANCING AGREEMENT AND EC-STRATEGY

3.1 Aid policy of the FRP

The basis of the FRP is the Financing Agreement (no 4420/SO)(VIII/1391/93-EN) which provides in overall terms the programme objectives and aspects of the programme implementation.

The "Helping Rebuild Somalia Paper" (March/April 1996) and "Orientation and Strategy of the European Commission in Somalia" (May/June 1997) documents have been provided as inputs in meetings of the EDF Committee. Both documents are congruent with the contents of the Financing Agreement but show a wider scope on the implementation of the FRP, hence reflecting the transition from basic rehabilitation to longer-term planning for rehabilitation and aspects of development.

It should be noted that at the stage of preparation of the financing agreement, little could be predicted in a country with high levels of violence in the different regions, disrupted leadership, profound distrust of community for community, community for foreign donor and severe material devastation and chaos. The programme had to start from scratch with only few staff in place; the achievements -which are considerable- upon the completion of the first phase must be seen in this context and applauded.

The policy of the FRP is based on the implementation of projects originating from local initiatives, in more or less stable regions where the Code of Conduct is applicable. While rehabilitation assistance remains an important component of the FRP, the programme aims to address in particular the root causes of the Somali conflict.

In planning and implementation, inter-sectoral co-ordination and sectoral policy development are principal objectives. The focus thereby is on transformation of the relatively large number of individual projects into coherent sectors working in close collaboration with the emerging authorities. The emphasis is therefore in particular on establishment and support to the local (emerging) administrative structures.

3.2 Assessment of the FRP programme in view of its policy as per the financing agreement and other documents

3.2.1 Implementation of sectoral projects originating from local initiatives

The FRP is operational in all relatively safe parts of Somalia - generally some 60-70% of the country. In areas where no FRP rehabilitation projects are implemented, ECHO can provide assistance.

The FRP is a multisectoral programme and covers the following activities and sectors, each of them headed by a Technical Advisor:

1. livestock
2. agriculture
3. fisheries
4. small and medium size enterprise
5. health
6. infrastructure, incl. water and sanitation)
7. local administration and institutional rehabilitation
8. peace and reconciliation.

A detailed study was made of each of these sectors by the consultants who visited over 70 projects out of just over 90 projects physically being implemented on the ground. The remaining part of the FRP (57 projects) has been spent on studies, technical and logistical support (e.g. ECHO-flights). For each of the sectors detailed findings and recommendations are presented elsewhere in this report.

In general terms it is noted that the programme covers a broad spectrum of sectors and projects. This is justified as the need for rehabilitation is profoundly felt all over the country and selecting core areas of concentration would be likely to upset local or regional balances. It is felt, rightly, that the EC has a special responsibility in Somalia, as it is the largest donor and has been entrusted with leading the co-ordination of the international aid to Somalia.

The findings of the evaluation however, point clearly towards a need for stronger intersectoral approaches. In this report, an overview has been made of cross-cutting issues as they are already and as they may develop in the near future. Some of these cross-cutting issues are already being worked at by the EC-Somalia Unit.

The evaluation and discussion regarding levels of output, impact and sustainability must be placed against the context of a FRP only shortly operational, and with a project cycle

of between 6 -12 months. Insecurity often deterred and sometimes discontinued the project implementation.

The output of the projects visited in quantitative terms generally meets with the objectives in the project proposals. The quality of the output was up to standard in many cases, but in some instances this aspect, for example buildings and infrastructure could be further improved by paying more attention to engineering standards, standardisation of technical design and appropriateness and choice of the technology deployed. Inconsistencies were for example found where -according to EC policy- sanitation development is a priority, but where little hygiene education took place and health units and schools lack pit latrines and water supplies. To strengthen operations on the ground it is recommended that the monitoring capacity of the EC-Somalia Unit be increased and the implementing capacity of the iNGOs and UN-agencies be strengthened, among other issues. For further details reference is made to the sectoral sections.

Local initiatives were found at the heart of many projects. Many schools have Parent-Teacher-Associations and health facilities are managed by -often rudimentary - district health boards and elders; local farmers groups are requesting agricultural support while the team spoke with a group of locals running their salt production project but seriously lacking tools and help with the marketing (El Dere). In a number of places those who took the initiative of approaching the FRP for assistance, basically wanted employment and were not interested in the service that the project would provide, let alone the question of sustainability.

The question of sustainability in the FRP is addressed in different ways. Financial sustainability or viability through cost sharing/cost recovery at the project levels is seriously being explored, particularly in health, education, water and sanitation and credit. In the field as well as in studies and in the SACB sectoral committees, cost recovery is often on the agenda. It is particularly in this area where the consequences of indiscriminate funding during the UNOSOM years is felt; generally people still expect free services from a central or external body. Many do not agree to or claim to be unable to pay, for example women visiting local health units with their children. There is a need to carry out a detailed study at household level to clarify questions related to willingness and ability to pay by the beneficiaries.

The sustainability of human resources is important, including strengthening the stock of Somali professionals and their capacity. In the education sector relatively few expatriate staff are employed. In the health sector some iNGOs are using an expatriate medical doctor to support more than one hospital specifically in administration and management aspects, while medical work and day to day management is the responsibility of the

Somali doctors. Several iNGOs however, are still employing many expatriates. It has been observed that the process of increasing Somali involvement is reinforced by the relatively high turn-over of the expatriate staff in the iNGOs and the difficulty of employing qualified expatriate staff for the longer term.

Other aspects of sustainability, e.g. human resources and in-service training, political aspects and technical approaches are dealt with in different ways in the FRP, depending on the prevailing conditions. Sectors do not perform equally well in this respect; generally more attention could be paid to considering alternative options, for example water supply constraints could be mapped out better to choose the best solution asking for instance the question as to how the Somalis used to solve their water problems in the past, when there was no external assistance.

Technical Advisors have shown great determination, and sometimes taken personal risks to achieve what has been achieved. The number of projects under their responsibility varies between 10 and 20; clearly a heavy task to administer, facilitate and co-ordinate with iNGOs, local actors and "Brussels". The tasks may become too great like in the case of health and education with one TA responsible for both, a situation that existed until July 1997. Several TAs also have additional responsibilities in the SACB, such as chairing or co-ordinating working groups or committees.

One of the key recommendations in this report -across the FRP- stresses the need to strengthen monitoring capacity in order to improve on aspects of quality and efficiency. A separate section on monitoring has been provided (section 6).

3.2.2 The implementing agencies in the FRP

iNGOs

iNGOs have been the principal field operators of the FRP. A number of them were already in the country before the civil war; some stayed on whilst others moved out but returned when it became more stable. Several of the iNGOs entered in the rehabilitation phase and although previously they had mainly been involved with relief, they had good knowledge and experience of the unique Somali features.

The achievements of the FRP have been realised through the operations of the iNGOs, with the profound support of the EC-Somalia Unit. iNGOs have shown overtime to be relatively well suited to working under conditions as have been and are still in Somalia. Comparison with any other situation is however difficult and suitability could only be judged upon by the fact that other organisations and bilateral programmes had difficulty to continue. Characteristics of iNGOs are their flexibility, network development in the

country and ability to deal with insecurity and risks, all of which has made them able to endure pressures and constraints. Most of the iNGOs and their staff wish to move nearer to the local communities and leaders. A relatively large number of iNGOs were working in the FRP programme. From the point of view of the FRP this had its pros and cons; it spread operational risks, but on the other hand the workload of the Unit and of the TAs was considerable especially as a TA-Finance and Administration only arrived in May 1997.

In the framework of this evaluation acknowledgement must be made of iNGOs staff who were victimised by the conditions in Somalia during the past years; some iNGOs lost staff following fatal insecurity incidents or had other kinds of casualties.

During the course of the FRP the iNGOs improved their operations, although it was generally hard to find professionals of good standards, able to stay for a considerable length of time, that is over one year. The high personnel turnover in the iNGOs was reduced by offering better remuneration packages. This resulted in more professional staff, stronger institutional memory and the accumulation of skills, expertise and experience. However the professional levels of the field staff still need further strengthening .

There is no doubt that the EC preference for working with iNGOs in Somalia was the right choice, also in the absence of any viable alternative, but further stabilisation is needed for the presence of the iNGOs and their staff. Only in 1996, at the end of the FRP, did the situation allow for some selection and direction. The following areas of attention are particularly relevant together with the remarks in the next paragraph: improved professional standards, selection of iNGOs for sectors where they perform best, ability to cope and work under stressful conditions, helping the iNGOs to adapt the administrative requirements of the EC, helping them to play their role in co-ordination and sectoral integration and seeing to it that the improved remuneration for EC/iNGO-personnel actually improved the working conditions of the staff in the field.

Local NGOs

A direct role of local Somali NGOs in the EC-funded rehabilitation programmes seems to be inappropriate at this stage. The Somali concept of an NGO is entirely different from the international definition and in addition, there is no legal base at the moment in Somalia -or elsewhere- to deal with disputes if they arose.

The policy of the EC rehabilitation programmes is underscored by the team as it says that "... most of the aid will be channelled through international NGOs, but community, bottom-up approaches will be promoted in order to increase the sense of ownership and sustainability: it is felt that working at the local level through emerging district and

regional administrations and with community groups, indigenous NGOs will have the most positive impact and will reinforce the emerging private sector in its role of bringing stability and normality in Somali society" (Quote from "Orientation and Strategy of the European Commission in Somalia" -page 4- paper to participants of EDF-meeting 1997). In the everyday reality in the field this points at promoting the partnership between iNGOs and local counterparts and, if possible, joint implementation, to promote the transfer of skills. The study on the selection of counterparts in Shabelle River area has recommendations on how to implement this.

The request of the iNGOs to have a joint support office in Nairobi, deserves constructive, though critical consideration by the EC. Working in Somalia brings hardship, both in terms of local operations as well as logistics. Improved mutual communication between the EC-Somalia Unit and the iNGOs may be in the interest of both.

UN-agencies

The operations of the UN in the framework of the FRP have shown some accomplishments but also quite a number of constraints. The difficulties relate to differences between both administrative and management systems and to the generally slow pace of implementation in the UN; clearly staff performance has been decisive and problems usually originated at headquarters elsewhere in the world. The relations between EC and UN in the FRP require a closer look in order to make the best possible decisions for co-operation in the SRP.

Specialist institutes

Professional institutes such as IUCN and IPGRI in the FRP have contributed to the overall quality of the activities and projects. Their continued presence in the SRP is recommended, thereby taking into account the comments in the different sectoral chapters of this report.

Private sector

The careful start made to having the private sector implement projects in the FRP framework has turned out to be positive. For example the co-operation in implementing the civil engineering works by a Greek engineering consultant and local subcontractors in the rehabilitation of the Berbera port have not only led to acceptable standards of work but also to a valuable transfer of skills. But surely it was not plain sailing.

3.2.3 Implementation in more or less stable regions where the Code of Conduct is applicable

The principle of a "Peace dividend" is operationalised by a Code of Conduct (CoC) that stipulates that projects will be funded only in secure and stable areas where a local leadership adopts the terms of the CoC. This policy and principle is appropriate and sound and puts the responsibility where it ought to be, with the Somalia communities and leaders. In interviews, iNGOs stated their support in principle to the CoC but stated at the same time that keeping to it was difficult. If the iNGOs were already operational before the CoC was introduced they may have elements in the working relationship with the local context that strictly could not be endorsed by the CoC. For instance an iNGO who rents a house and pays a private person can not change this following the principle that iNGO accommodation should be provided free of charge by the local leadership. It should be understood that changing such existing arrangements is highly upsetting to relations in Somalia, not to say likely to endanger the lives of the iNGO staff. Another problem mentioned was that a security incident leads to withdrawal of all iNGOs from a certain area. In compliance with the CoC all have to withdraw until the matter has been investigated by local authority and resolved.

In addition to these difficulties there is a risk of quasi-local structures being set up in order to be eligible in view of the CoC.

By and large the CoC has provided the implementers with a minimum tool to be able to work under the strenuous conditions in Somalia. Clearly the CoC is an important and indispensable tool and the SACB -on behalf of the international aid agencies- needs commendation for designing and upholding it. Concerning its weaknesses, continuous discussion and consensus seeking will be needed and has started to maintain the CoC as an effective instrument.

3.2.4 Relevance of rehabilitation assistance addressing specifically the root causes of the Somalia conflict

The FRP aims to focus on direct rehabilitation assistance as well as addressing the roots of Somalia's conflict.

Given the comments and recommendations on strengths and weaknesses in this report, the overall judgement of the team is that the FRP addresses adequately the rehabilitation financing agreement of the programme, taking into account the limitation of the Somali context.

Addressing the root causes of the conflict is an ambitious target; aspects of the root causes cannot be effectively addressed. Bryden in his LAS-study and proposal mentions that a historical process of imposing a state structure in a "non-state" community and the assistance available from the centre or the aid system are at the root

of the problem.

In the FRP the efforts of LAS are directed at the decentralised territorially based government. (Menu of Options, London School of Economics). In June and November 1996 two seminars were organised for Somali traditional and religious leaders, intellectuals, professionals, women and other representatives. During 1997 several workshops were held within Somalia whereby a much broader representation of the different groups in the country could participate. It provoked considerable debate and has increased awareness of and interest in the subject.

At the lower administrative levels the FRP aims at shaping coherent sectors from the projects implemented. Most projects visited have established, to varying degrees, communication with elders and the local governors. In several districts and regions sectoral boards are being set up, sometimes initiated by the implementers, sometimes purely as a local initiative. Often implementer staff have difficulty in assessing the legitimacy of those in the local structures; leaders and political balances are sometimes rapidly changing and it is hard for the implementers to accommodate these often intangible processes. Consequently few implementers have been able to get actively involved with establishment of local administrative capacity. The employment of a TA to deal with local administration rehabilitation and development of strategy as in the studies of London School of Economics and Bryden are important contributions towards effective LAS in the SRP.

An important element in addressing the root causes of instability and violence would be to relate the work of the TA-Peace Building and Reconciliation closer to the other sectors and thus regard it as a cross-cutting issue. Although the TA-PR has access to specific budget lines in the EC, for instance on human rights, it is recommended to allow in each project to spend directly on P and R activities.

3.2.5 Inter-sectoral co-ordination and sectoral policy development are principal objectives

(Inter-)sectoral co-ordination within the SACB structure

Co-ordination, including the co-ordination within sectors, is generally accepted as important. In practice the degree of co-ordination varies, some sectors having developed considerable sectoral co-ordination, for instance the health sector, characterised by a long-standing presence in Somalia, the involvement of many INGOs and actors used to the principles of co-ordination. A health sector co-ordinator has been appointed to take care of the co-ordination, a job done well. The veterinary sector has also done well, a sector with strong economic relevance and considerable expertise in the country. Others, newcomers, have just started sectoral co-ordination, let alone intersectoral co-ordination.

Co-ordination consists generally of information sharing, the development of policies and approaches, planning of projects, aspects of implementation, training needs, technical and conceptual standardisation. The SACB Steering committee deals with assessing and co-ordinating the sectoral activities. A task force has been established and an assessment made of the sectors and/or the sectoral working groups in June 1996. As the frequency of meetings of the Steering committee has been low during 1997 the initiative has not been sufficiently reinforced. The SACB in its Fourth SACB meeting (Rome, May 1997) has called for greater effort for co-ordination within and between the sectors. A greater decentralisation inside Somalia was emphasised as a strategy for the years to come.

(Inter-)sectoral co-ordination within the FRP and SRP

The FRP is implemented as a sectoral programme. Within the EC-Somalia Unit, TAs are divided into two groups; the TAs working in the sectors agriculture, food security and fisheries are co-ordinated by the Rural Development Advisor. The sectors Physical Infrastructure, Health, Education, Peace and Reconciliation and SME are under the Economic Advisor. The Economic Advisor and Rural Development Advisor are directly under the Special Envoy for Somalia. (This was the situation before the regionalisation of the EC presence in Northeast Africa took place) Intersectoral co-ordination within the groups and between the groups is informal. Regular meetings of the groups, under the chairmanship of the Economic and Rural Development Advisors, discuss the direction, planning and operational issues. Most of the sectors have written policy/planning notes, generally in a format decided upon by the TA. All sectors have done studies to resolve specific questions or problems.

It is recommended to formalise the planning work done in the EC-Somalia Unit in such a

way that sectors can be co-ordinated, the quality of the programme improved and made more efficient. It is emphasised that intersectoral co-ordination is not a must, but if strengthened it would increase the quality and consistency of the programme. It should be realised that the implementation of an integrated programme, notwithstanding its benefits, creates in the Somalia context an extra burden. The benefits would be that sectors will mutually strengthen each other in terms of planning, monitoring and implementation. Within Somalia, development of the local structures could be approached from different sectors and thus developed in a more balanced way. For instance if only one sector is implementing projects a single health board will be established. If more sectors implement their projects multiple boards will be established and jointly will form stronger local structures. If in a district several sectoral projects are implemented, a number of district boards can be developed jointly and be made more into a district local government.

In order to reinforce and strengthen inter-sectoral planning the following steps are suggested:

- i. at EC-Somalia Unit level, a policy document describes in clear terms the objectives of the sectors and the principal relationship between the sectoral objectives;
- ii. bi-annually, each sectoral TA produces a working document that briefly describes the major sectoral activities or projects envisaged;
- iii. the working document indicates linkages with other sectors. It tells in operational and measurable terms:
 - how the planned activities fit in with the EC-Somalia Unit planning;
 - which are the related sectors and what are the expected benefits of sectoral co-ordination;
 - how the intersectoral co-ordination can be operationalised; what needs to be done by whom and when.
 - how the intersectoral issues will be monitored;This is done by the TA in close consultation with the TAs of related sectors;
- iv. the working document will be circulated in the EC-Somalia Unit for comments and confirmed in staff meeting.

This is how intersectoral co-ordination and sectoral integration in the FRP programme can be looked at, at the level of the EC-Somalia Unit. Equally important is the role of the implementer as they are central players in the process of intersectoral planning. It should be noted that intersectoral co-ordination works best if the related sectors can be implemented by one (selected) INGO.

It is emphasised that intersectoral co-ordination can never be imposed, and is not a must per-se. Only if TAs and implementers see it as beneficial will it yield results.

Following intersectoral planning and co-ordination, monitoring procedures will have to be set. For an outline concerning monitoring, reference is made to section 6.

A general comment needs to be made about the composition of the two groups of sectoral TAs (productive and social) mentioned above. These groups seem to be the result of early developments in the programme and it is recommended that they be reviewed and a flexible system developed whereby TAs meet in ad-hoc groups with the composition most likely to be effective for the purpose of the meeting. In such a way co-ordination of the cross-sectoral issues (or cross cutting issues) will be more effectively dealt with.

The effectiveness of the support provided from EC-Somalia Unit

As a general recommendation the evaluation points at improving operational effectiveness from the EC-Somalia Unit. In that connection the following should be considered:

- i. The number of projects dealt with by one TA may have to be reduced, especially as some of them are very labour-intensive. Travel requirements and security aspects should not be ignored;
- ii. It should be made possible for TAs to provide more technical assistance during the project formulation and implementation stages. Time spent on monitoring of the projects also needs to be increased;
- iii. TAs act as generalists, and have to monitor a number of activities that are not in their area of expertise. There is a need to structure and standardise the existing intersectoral contacts by making it possible for TAs to advise each other and monitor aspects of each others' projects;
- iv. The TA spends proportionately too much time in the office in Nairobi with the implementers, preparing project proposals, to the detriment of field visits. The proposal writing capacities of the implementers could be strengthened, in order to relieve the TAs of line-by-line corrections and long discussions of the proposals;
- v. It is advisable to limit the number of sub-sectors dealt with by individual implementers. This can be achieved by defining the core objectives/ activities of each sector in the SRP to be implemented. Only implementers with a good track record in these core areas will be contracted while they would not be given contracts in other sub-sectors. This will increase specialisation and professionalism of the implementer. This is in particularly relevant since the staff turnover in the iNGOs in Somalia is high.

Sectoral policy development

Policy development and planning is to a large extent done within the SACB where the

international agencies, UN, EC and the INGOs are represented. Planning of political issues and sectoral planning are intertwined. Clearly in the context of Somalia, political issues cannot be separated from operational matters. For instance the implementation of the CoC requires formulation and agreement from all actors on all levels as it has a political and an operational bearing.

In the structure of the SACB the Executive Committee co-ordinates the policy and planning done by the sectoral committees and task forces. Sectoral policy and planning in the sectoral committees is done on the basis of consensus. Generally it takes a long time to reach agreement: the composition of the committees is quite diverse and interests differ, the turnover of implementer personnel is high and staff are often away. Notwithstanding, the principle of consensus as a basis of the planning process is the best possible mode of joining forces in a sector. It was found however that after agreements had been reached, they must be regarded as binding by all implementers, for instance the introduction or the level of cost-sharing in health on project level or the implementation of an essential drugs supply.

3.3 The Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body; its role and functioning

The Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB)

The Addis Ababa declaration, which was agreed upon at the fourth UN Co-ordinated meeting on humanitarian assistance for Somalia (December 1, 1993) paved the way for the establishment of the SACB (February 1994), as an instrument for the co-ordination of the international assistance to Somalia. The EC-Special Envoy was elected Chairman of the SACB and he has played a decisive role in developing the SACB into a credible institution, both in its relationship with the Somali-side and with the SACB members. Clearly, this has been an arduous task, given the complexities of the inter-agency relationships and the political and security problems the SACB had to handle and come to terms with.

The SACB during the past years has gone through a process of organisational differentiation. The Executive Committee is heading the Sectoral Steering Committee, Consultative Committee and UNDOS Advisory Committee. The SACB-Executive Committee deals mainly with the political, security and law-and-order matters and relates to governments and international bodies. The Sectoral Steering Committee co-ordinates the sectoral committees, the working groups and taskforces in the SACB and is directly related with the field. The establishment of these committees is a considerable accomplishment of the SACB. Some of the committees are still recent, e.g. education, and have to find their way. In addition to its work with the sectoral committees the Steering Committee has an advisory task towards the Executive Committee.

After the first years of groundwork, getting all actors together and defining policy and procedures which are sound for the conditions in Somalia, the SACB has proven to be an indispensable body in planning and co-ordination. In the Fourth SACB meeting (Rome, May 29-30 1997) the situation of the international aid involvement in Somalia was reviewed. The meeting, with broad representation from regional and other governments and agencies, reaffirmed the December 1993 AA-Declaration as the basis of the SACB. The main objectives of the SACB were identified and agreement was reached on a strategic framework. The strategic framework is based on i) the peace dividend approach, ii) increased decentralisation and co-ordination with the field, iii) financial resources development and iv) regional dialoguing and networking.

Peace Dividend approach

Concerning the Peace Dividend approach, which aims to ensure that international assistance is not only relevant to local reconstruction but also to peace building, comments have been provided in section IX, Peace Building and Reconciliation.

...one of Berbera town water supply water sources...

Decentralisation and co-ordination of the field operations

The element of "decentralisation and co-ordination of field operations", thereby maintaining the linkages with the SACB, points at the limitations of planning and co-ordinating a programme from the outside, from Kenya. The need to communicate with a large number of implementers in Somalia and with local leaders, the complex logistics and the difficulty in hearing the voices of those who really need to be heard -the grassroots and local leadership- all these impose limitations on the degree of co-ordination the SACB can achieve. In some cases it was found that implementers feel that co-ordination touches on their operational autonomy. A shocking example was the reluctance of an implementer to adhere to the stipulations of the Code of Conduct; after a serious security incident occurred, they were reluctant to withdraw from the area and eager to return after a short while.

Whether decentralisation and co-ordination within the SACB effectively happens depends on whether the sectoral committees -where all implementers in a particular sector meet- have adequate autonomy/authority, competence, mandate, guidelines and dedication to take sectoral decisions with continuous feedback with the other SACB organs. As discussed elsewhere, the process of decision-taking is on the basis of consensus, but beyond the point of decision-taking the implementation of the decisions taken by the Sectoral Committee is binding.

It is recommended that each sectoral committee take time to discuss these factors, notably: its autonomy/authority, competence, mandate, availability of guidelines and procedures and the dedication in the sectoral committee to strengthen decentralisation and co-ordination. The outcome should be discussed with the Sectoral Steering Committee to make sure it fits with the general policy of the SACB. It cannot be expected that the outcome of individual committees' discussion can be standardised or generalised to other committees, as all of them have their unique features.

The latter two aspects of the SACB strategic framework, being "financial resources development" and "regional dialoguing and networking" are not in the terms of reference of this mid-term evaluation and will not be commented on.

Future tasks of the SACB

Today, conditions in Somalia have a greater degree of normality. Although many parts of the country are still unstable and insecure, and working in the stable parts still poses many profound difficulties, the SACB will face a number of new tasks. The following are envisaged:

1. In Somalia, the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development is happening, while at the same time stagnancy or backfall can be identified. It is

recommended to have a person assigned, preferably in the Sectoral Steering Committee, to deal specifically with questions pertaining to relief, rehabilitation and development and policy implementation as worked out in the LRRD-document.

2. Capacity development of the implementing iNGOs as well as the collaborating local NGOs and emerging governing structures need to be dealt with the aim of improving the sustainability of the projects. Specific activities could be implemented for reinforcement.
3. Some time in the future, Somalia may be self-ruling again, under whatever governmental constellation that will resume a number of important functions itself. Given the conditions in the country and the capacities of any local structure there will be a strong need in the long term, for a body that will provide expert services and backstopping itself, to international actors as well as to local structures. Increasingly the SACB may focus on such a role in the longer term.

3.4 Relationship between FRP and the SACB

The relationship and ties between FRP and SACB are strong since the EC-Special Envoy for Somalia is chairing the SACB. The EC-Somalia Unit has also supported the functions of the SACB by making Technical Advisors and functionaries available for positions in the sectoral committees, working groups and Sectoral Steering Committee. Of course this has been an extra task for the staff of the EC-Somalia Unit. Arrangements were made to provide extra support to the SACB. For instance the position of the Health Co-ordinator -who is answerable to the health sector co-ordination committee- was funded by the EC as was the NGO-deputy chair in the Sectoral Steering Committee. Both contributed profoundly to shaping of co-ordination and planning functions of the SACB. Clearly, at the Nairobi level both are mutually reinforcing and supportive.

In the field, where the lack of security and problems are felt most severely, it was observed that iNGOs and their staff sometimes have a limited realisation of the relevance for their day-today operations. To improve the linkage between the field and the SACB the following practical steps are envisaged:

- i. implementers' staff in the field, iNGOs and UN, need more information about the role the SACB can play and how it would benefit their organisations, projects and profile of the international aid system for Somalia. It was astounding that the contents and implementation of the Code of Conduct was not clear to some of the staff;
- ii. research should be done as to whether and how the sectoral committees and working groups could meet increasingly in safe places within Somalia. This would lead to greater participation of the Somali side, who are not able to travel

- to Nairobi; happily, health committees are now beginning to meet in Somalia.
- iii. although the work done by the implementers deserves positive comment it was found that some iNGOs however implement decisions (taken after discussions in the sectoral committees on basis of consensus) in a different way or sometimes do not implement them. Reference is made to examples in the sectoral chapters. In order to improve on co-ordination, decisions of the sectoral committees, taken on the basis of consensus, should be regarded as binding;
 - iv. SACB has a balanced representation of different organisations in all levels. It was found that the Steering Committee, as a hinge point between the field/sectoral committees and the Executive Committee, operates at a rather slow pace, particularly because of infrequency of meetings; between March and September 1997 only 3 board meetings were held. As the Steering Committee has a key role to play with the field and the other organs in the SACB, it is recommended to assess how its functioning could be optimised.

4 SUMMARY PER SECTOR

Below the principal conclusions are presented on the activities and FRP delivery in view of the financing agreement and the documents mentioned above. In the extensive sectoral chapters elsewhere in this report, findings are presented and discussed in detail.

Education

Generally, education rehabilitation projects have been implemented well in line with the financing agreement. All priorities mentioned in the agreement have been implemented while changes were made if needed, e.g. the paying of incentives to teachers.

Human resources development by selecting and training Somali teachers, master-trainers and headmasters has been done to a good standard, and plans are in place to extend and expand this into the SRP. The provision of inputs, book production and distribution has run into many problems and needs thorough revision.

Roofing has been a priority in the FRP and the tender procedure applied has been instrumental in preventing friction on the local level. However, the tender process is time-consuming and has slowed down the rehabilitation of schoolhouses. In order to increase the delivery in the SRP it is recommended to prioritise selection and training of teachers and supply of school requirements over the construction of the buildings. Teachers and pupils can start in a makeshift setting, while the preparation for the rehabilitation of their school building is carried out at its own pace. This would increase the enrolment in primary education.

Building standards for main buildings are good but are generally inadequate in the small schools. The FRP has raised significant positive interest for assistance to the Koranic schools, which were found generally very co-operative with the secular schools. It is strongly recommended to increase support to the Koranic schools as an integral part of the package for secular schools and not as separate projects.

Rightfully, the FRP has not offered incentives to teachers as this would endanger sustainability. Considerable differences were found between the education section and the health sector as some implementers have different practices. Sometimes security guards and cleaners were treated differently leading to considerable friction.

It was found that the communities can be involved better in building and building costs, cash and kind if smaller village school buildings are constructed on a micro project community base, thus improving felt ownership. For microprojects no tender would be

required. Larger buildings should continue to be built on a tender basis.

In all cases the designs need to be standardised, although it is well understood that rehabilitation limits the standardisation.

A Technical Advisor has been appointed in July 1997, hence monitoring of the fieldwork may be better.

Health

Because of the numbers of projects and the model of service, the FRP has greatly increased the numbers of health care delivery points. This is providing more curative care and better EPI coverage to the areas reached. Other activities are still weak, notably reducing maternal mortality and under-five malnutrition and health education. Drug supplies need improving. The role of the community and its ownership of peripheral posts needs to be further defined, reconciled with the practices of the education sector, and made clear to all. Cost sharing also needs rationalisation following studies done and discussions held in several fora. It is recommended to collect detailed data from household level in Somalia to understand the dynamics of willingness and ability to pay. Central health planning and co-ordination has been well done in the health sector. The post of the Health Sector Co-ordinator needs support for continuation.

Infrastructure

In the water sector a good number of useful studies have been carried out. There is no co-ordinated reviewing of this vital resource. Activities concerned with water have included the repair of river dykes and construction of deep boreholes. In the planning process, the question as to whether the chosen options were feasible and sustainable was not raised.

The private housing project shows a good starting point for community inputs into projects, with great savings for donors and a good and wanted product. Some public buildings have proved expensive and unused, because of a lack of consultation and collapse of local administration and leadership. There is a need for a Micro Project Fund (as with health and water) to rehabilitate wells etc. in a way that decreases cost, establishes ownership and makes sustainability possible.

Agriculture

Priority was given to an improved food security. The Food Security Assessment Unit enabled the co-ordination of highly valued information on improved food aid interventions and subsequent actions.

Food security was furthermore promoted through initiatives to reduce free food distribution to the bare minimum, a pre-condition for increased food production. Other activities included the prevention of genetic erosion of staple food crops,

promotion of seed production, rehabilitation of irrigation canals, extension programmes and prevention of soil erosion. The FSAU contributed to a better understanding of areas at risk among the implementing agencies and to more effective and more cost efficient intervention programmes. In addition the forecasting of famine disaster improved.

The pressure to start with agricultural production resulted however initially in a learning-by-doing approach, delaying sometimes not only project outputs, but also causing re-design of projects and one project cancellation. This lesson led to the introduction of an ex-ante situation analysis before project implementation, which proved to be cost-effective. The introduction of more active beneficiary participation and the resolution of (potential) conflicts proved to be tedious and time consuming, while only some NGOs took the effort to gain institutional wisdom in this process.

The incorporation of IPGRI in the co-ordination and monitoring of all seed production programmes created good potential for the further reduction of genetic erosion, and for improved seed production and conservation.

The incorporation of marketing and distribution systems in the ex-ante analysis would have better identified local needs regarding seeds and seed-multipliers. Agro-processing and credit activities require experienced staff for their implementation. Credit components proved to be sometimes counter-productive, as recovery was negligible in many projects.

Project performance could further be improved through continued development of economic and marketing data, optimal incorporation of results from studies, improved demonstration plots and better use of visual aids.

The quebra quebra bird, a major pest for crops like sorghum, rice and sunflower, should have been included in the integrated pest management study.

It is further doubtful, whether rehabilitation projects in the riverine region will considerably contribute to development, as long as schemes run the risk of being flooded. The establishment of a River Authority for flood control and effective utilisation of the seasonal rivers is a prerequisite for irrigation development.

Livestock

This sector has taken the privatisation route. Veterinary professionals with mixed backgrounds have been recruited, trained and encouraged to set up practices. Some of them stay urban-based with assistants scattered in the rural areas; this model of service delivery is proving feasible, appropriate and should be encouraged. Initially cheaper drugs left over from free distribution days undermined their profits from drug sales. About 40% of people trained are staying in the profession. A TA is needed to develop policies for the sector, which cares for the animals that are the backbone of the economy. One of the TA's tasks would be to keep some control on this private sector, for retraining and quality assurance. It is also important to monitor for unplanned negative effects of privatisation.

Small and Medium Enterprise Development

Under the FRP the programme for SME has not become fully operational. Upon arrival of the TA for SME in 1996 the budget had been emasculated to a mere Pro Memory post limiting the scope for operations and achievements. It is necessary to further develop the programme under the SRP, based also on current SME programmes and project proposals. The development of a Chamber of Commerce programme should be postponed until conditions of economic development warrant a higher degree of relevance for SME development. The plan to include new micro-enterprises and the expansion of existing small businesses should be further developed. A distinction should hereby be made between rural/agro-based and urban-based SME. A higher priority should be given to the agricultural and fisheries sectors, including the Shabelle river valley. Viable credit schemes being planned in co-ordination with SME promotion programmes should be made operational. Relevant training materials from elsewhere, adapted to the specific Somali situation, could be incorporated in the programmes.

The offices in Bosaso and Berbera could take an important role in the operation of a decentralised SME programme, while the role of the Mogadishu office needs to be further detailed. SME should hereby be closely linked to other sectors in order to strengthen the much needed intersectoral linkages, and to counter-balance different interests.

Fisheries

In the SRP rehabilitation of the artisan fisheries sector will be started. Fish remain one of the few under-used resources in the country, although foreign ships are scooping up much of the total stock. The projects will create employment, often for women, and marketing of fish, including ice making will be dealt with. Although fish is not a staple food it is gaining popularity. Fish would be complementary to the general diet, particularly for children. The fishery sector projects had not yet commenced.

Environment

The plans made by IUCN -in support to other sectors in the FRP- need further thought before being put into place in the SRP. Projects are based on community management of natural resources and some efforts are made to reduce environmental degradation. However, concerning the former, communities may be too disrupted for people to give this priority or for a reasonable chance of success for such projects. A greater priority is to assess in advance environmental and ecological effects within existing projects or rehabilitate where there are already unplanned negative effects on the total ecosystem.

Peace Building and Reconciliation

Currently the programme facilitates direct peace building through the education of key

community groups, and indirectly through helping in the demobilising and retraining of militia. Here, too a Micro Project could help some to start new work. Several of the projects funded seem well targeted. What is not yet in place is a strong input into each sector, where conflict can happen daily and a bad programme can rekindle old grievances; some mechanisms for this are recommended, since a good idea is lost with neither budget nor commitment.

5 CROSS CUTTING ISSUES IN THE EC-REHABILITATION PROGRAMME

The FRP has from the onset adopted a multisectoral approach as a strategy to increase the economic welfare at family level and improve wellbeing by providing access to health services, education and water. In line with SACB policy recommends an integrated approach whereby sectors constructively relate to each other. During the evaluation in discussions with EC-Somalia Unit-staff and implementers a number of cross cutting issues were identified or brought in by the EC-Somalia Unit-staff and are described below.

Adopting the integrated approach and the cross cutting issues diminishes the strong sectoral shape of the FRP, whereby sectors are implemented in relative independence. At present, problems and challenges remain contained within the individual sector, although other projects across the sectors are experiencing comparable problems and sometimes finding solutions. Since many of these problems are fundamental, they should be dealt with in a unified way to replace gradually and carefully the sectoral approach, despite the fact that integrated programmes are hard to implement in a country like Somalia.

A number of these crosscutting issues will be discussed in the sectoral sections. The specificators of "how" can however not easily be dealt with in this context of this mid-term evaluation, with exception of an outline for a monitoring procedure, elsewhere in this report. The most relevant cross cutting issues are elaborated upon below.

Concerning Planning

1. Longer term project cycle

In a number of sectors, particularly education, health and agriculture, the project cycle of one year is too short to allow for the medium- and long-term planning that is required. For all sectors, longer-term planning should be considered. Longer-term planning however, implies longer-term commitment and responsibilities from both sides, the EC-Somalia Unit and the implementers. Clauses describing benchmarks concerning performance and project output levels against time frames need to become part of the contract, and would be binding for the implementer. From the side of the EC-Somalia Unit, clear arrangements will be made concerning disbursements of funds and interim approvals of operational changes within the contract.

2. Proactive longer term planning

Planning has to be pro-active and developed on a national or regional level. Based on detailed baseline studies, which are already in place in most sectors, all sectors are

moving towards Master plans and comprehensive longer-term plans. When a particular implementer is very capable, it could be contracted to develop long-term plans.

3. Studies

To avoid study results not being used, procedures for digesting them and applying the outcome, need to be firmer. Focusing the research question may also make the outcome more applicable.

The large quantities of reports and studies carried out before and after the civil war by national, international and commercial bodies contain undoubtedly important information not being used in the current process of rehabilitation and development in Somalia. An idea originating in the EC-Somalia Unit and underscored by the team is to develop a project to collect, consolidate, catalogue and disseminate this information, possibly of great benefit to all actors in Somalia, including the emerging national and regional authorities.

4. Integrated or intersectoral approach

At the EC-Somalia Unit level, the TAs should jointly discuss and develop policy and guidelines as to how sectors be linked and projects be integrated most effectively. The guidelines will be shared and discussed with the implementers and upon agreement they are binding. Project proposals, planning documents and monitoring reports will have a fixed paragraph in which the interlinkage and integration with other sectors is described.

5. Prioritising hardware and software

The balance between the different objectives and activities needs attention: in education, health and to some extent infrastructure, much emphasis is on hardware as a precondition for rehabilitation of the software components; buildings must be built before personnel can be re-recruited and trained. This bias is expensive and does not help with community participation and management. Reviewing the priority of hardware and software elements is recommended in all sectors.

6. Environmental impact

All projects need to plan monitoring of their impact on environmental and natural resources, by using the standard procedures of the EC and the expertise of the IUCN.

7. Peace and Reconciliation

Peace and Reconciliation needs to be a component of each project. This means that a reasonable percentage of each sectoral budget needs to be earmarked for Peace and Reconciliation activities as implemented by the TA-PR.

8. SME

Small and medium size enterprise development should also be planned as a component of each project across the sectors. It will continue to have its own budget. In some projects -for instance when the project period is long, or when the investment is relatively high- it may be advisable to have the sectoral budget match the funding from the SME budget.

9. Long delays in project approvals

The time required to process project applications has been very long in a number of cases. Although the majority of applications were finalised within four months, many applications take much more time and several were found to take six to nine months. Some iNGOs have contributed to the problem as they submitted follow-up proposals late. This disrupts iNGOs operations although retrospective funding appeared to be useful. The reasons for delay on both sides, applicant and EC-Somalia Unit, needs a more thorough internal analysis, in order to introduce procedural improvements.

Concerning Implementation

10. ECHO and EC-Somalia Unit: relationship and complementarity

Some iNGOs are unclear about the mandates, the relationship and complementarity of both organisations. One iNGO said that projects were submitted to both. There needs to be more clarity concerning mandates and (pragmatic) working relations between the two and between them and the iNGOs.

11. EC-Somalia Unit - iNGOs relationship

Over time, the iNGOs and the EC-Somalia Unit have developed a unique working relationship, based on acceptance of mutual roles and capabilities. When the established (financial) procedures are changed, spending time on clarification in dialogue is a good investment.

12. SACB, sectoral committees and binding decisions

The sectoral committees' valuable output has been achieved through consensus. This has been time-consuming and it has been recommended that the decision-taking procedure be rationalised. In some (sub-)sectors, e.g. health, education and food security, this process takes a long time and after the point of decision taking, based on consensus, not all participants in the committees regard it as binding.

There is a need to discuss with all in the committees the nature of the decisions taken in view of implementation.

13. Underestimation of regional expertise

The relatively low salaries of some groups of regional (Horn of Africa, Eastern Africa) experts point at an underestimation of their level of expertise. Although it is understood that EC does not want to attract regional expertise from other employers, it is recommended to compare salaries paid by EC with other large international agencies.

14. Implementers' capacity

The institutional capacity within most implementers to implement all planned activities in their projects is inadequate as there is still high turnover of staff and short-term contracting of expatriates. This situation can be helped by encouraging implementers to specialise, decreasing the number of sectors in which they are working, and facilitating acquisition of skills through training.

15. Local NGOs

The quality of the local NGOs in Somalia should not be overestimated. From the point of view of developing local capacity and sustainability iNGOs should be encouraged to team up increasingly with local NGOs.

16. Standardisation of technical designs

Technical designs, especially buildings and water supply hardware should be standardised as much as possible, in order to simplify supervision, monitoring, reduce costs and improve quality.

17. Choice of labour-intensive or labour-based approaches

Unemployment and poverty are serious problems in Somalia. In projects with a labour-intensive approach, local people are keen to be employed on a casual basis and labour-intensive approaches should be chosen rather than over-mechanised implementation.

18. Establishment of and support for local structures

Development of local structures does not happen by itself; it needs support from the EC. Elements from LAS approach, as highlighted in the Bryden report "Strategy and Programme of Actions in Support of Local and Regional Administrations in Somalia in the field of Institution-Building" should be made applicable for multi-sectoral use.

19. Budget changes

Micro Project fund

A Micro Project fund would enable communities to take responsibility for projects, increase their participation and begin the foundations for sustainability. Examples of activities that could be funded are: rehabilitation of small buildings, income-generating

projects to support schools and village water supplies. A Micro Project fund should exist in each sector.

Peace and Reconciliation

Each of the sectoral budgets should in principle include a certain percentage earmarked for Peace and Reconciliation activities. This could concern first and foremost the training of actors in conflict prevention, but also resolving episodes of conflict using the TA Peace and Reconciliation and/or the TA Local Administration, running workshops to build better working relations in teams, et cetera.

Concerning Monitoring and Evaluation

20. Monitoring

Monitoring by the TAs -with the exception of the TA for agriculture- from Nairobi is severely limited by a number of conditions. It is advised that each TA conducts 4-6 routine monitoring visits a year; co-ordination and supervision would be the responsibility of the co-ordinators in the EC-Somalia Unit, while information resulting from the standardised monitoring procedures will be explicitly fed back into the EC-Somalia Unit management and shared with the relevant implementers. (see section 6 on monitoring)

As has been clear from PCM/LFA training and application, monitoring capacity and procedures need to be developed in a way which fits with the EC-Somalia Unit and its set of implementers.

21. Evaluation

In projects with a duration of more than 12 months a mid-term review (minimum procedure) should be implemented. Final evaluations can be omitted provided mid-term reviews have been done, given the nature of the interventions.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROJECT MONITORING IN THE SECOND REHABILITATION PROGRAMME

In the debriefing meeting with the staff of the EC-Somalia Unit the need for improved project monitoring was discussed and an outline for data gathering provided by the team. After discussions it transpired that the outline could not be adopted. In order to further the matter, the team is suggesting a minimum procedure for project monitoring in the SRP, presented below. It is suggested that this outline be reviewed in the EC-Somalia Unit to see whether it fits into the routines and conditions of project implementation in Somalia. The proposal does not suggest that there is a blueprint for monitoring projects. It is rather meant as a starting point for discussions as to how monitoring during the SRP could be shaped.

6.1. Minimum procedure for monitoring project implemented in the SRP

Definition and purpose

Monitoring entails a continuous or periodic review and surveillance during the implementation of a project, in order to ensure that inputs, deliveries, services, work schedules and targeted outputs are proceeding according to plan or to contract. In each project implemented under the FRP, a contract between the EC and the implementer have been the basis for execution, so the contract could define the monitoring requirements as well. Implementing agencies would present monitoring results in their reports to the EC-Somalia Unit.

In terms of time range, monitoring deals with the present only and with a selected number of current activities from the many which constitute the whole project; not everything, therefore, need be monitored at the same time.

For clarity's sake this outline is a simplified version in which the principal elements are indicated. Detailed monitoring responsibilities of the implementing agencies and the TAs need further discussion, specification and agreement.

The following steps are to be discerned in establishing a monitoring procedure:

Step 1: Determining information routing and decision taking levels

Monitoring is a management tool. It relates progress in implementation with targets, timely identification and removal of constraints and corrective action, if required. In a full monitoring plan the management structure and the responsibilities at every level of management need to be worked out in practical detail; this would include the routing of

monitoring information and determine which level of decisions in management are to be taken by the different levels in the organisation and where superior levels should be called in.

For the purpose of this outline the responsibilities of the Functionary are taken to include -but are not restricted to- i) review of sectoral progress, ii) comparing sectoral progress to EC-Somalia Unit's - policies and iii) policy development. The Functionary reports to the Special Envoy for Somalia/EC-Delegate. The monitoring information and decisions related to it will be dealt with along the lines of responsibilities.

Step 2: Clarification of the project objectives

Activities, results, purpose and assumptions are described in the contents of the logical framework of the project. These need to be assessed and the most relevant activities be selected for monitoring. Decisions as to what precisely is being monitored are subject to conditions in the field and opinions in the EC-Somalia Unit and the implementer. See next paragraph.

Step 3: What to monitor

Day-to-day monitoring of activities is in general hard to do, and certainly in Somalia may not be possible. It is more appropriate to monitor the SRP deployment of resources and the resulting outcome. Aspects of an intersectoral approach should also be reflected in the monitoring.

The following aspects are relevant for monitoring in the SRP:

- *monitoring of input into the project: e.g. finance, equipment, materials, human resources and contributions in kind.

- *monitoring of the output of the project: output and delivery as described by the proposal

- *monitoring certain aspects of actual use of the project by beneficiaries during and after the construction period but also, for instance the level of active community participation and ownership.

- *monitoring of the context and aspects of change resulting from the project, including stability and reconciliation, but also environmental impact.

Undoubtedly, "change and impact" are hard to monitor as this requires reliable informants on the spot, a relatively long timespan and verifiable indicators. Nevertheless monitoring of change and impact is highly relevant, as the FRP/SRP aim principally at normalising relations in the Somali communities. Clearly, it is here that the linkage with the peace and reconciliation objective comes in.

In this area of information also the viability of assumptions can be monitored.

Some further notes concerning step 3:

i) It is crucial not to monitor too much: information that is essential must be selected out. As monitoring develops as a routine in the EC-Somalia Unit, other and additional information may be added.

ii) The implementer should not regard monitoring as inspection by an external agent but as a means to improve operations. Therefore, for the sake of transparency, certain information should be distributed horizontally within the EC-Somalia Unit and the implementer's organisation, more so if the information is directly relevant for day-to-day operations. Vertical distribution of information within the EC-Somalia Unit should only involve essential information for each specific management level and information should always be readily available for assembly into special reports when necessary. Such a system requires co-operation from all levels.

iii) Monitoring in the SRP can be distinguished on two different levels: the continuous monitoring by the implementing agency concerning the execution of the project and the periodic monitoring by the EC-Somalia Unit concerning the project and the performance of the implementing agency.

Although not all FRP contracts were scrutinised regarding monitoring, the team found that contracts were not uniform regarding monitoring requirements. Implementers were therefore not always sure about the minimum monitoring and reporting requirements.

Step 4: Definition of the information flow and responsibilities

The procedure and methodology of monitoring has to fit with the purpose as well as with the routines in the EC-Somalia Unit and the implementer. The following issues are crucial:

- method of collection
- how and when information comes in
- who will collect and process data
- who will report to whom, and
- who co-ordinates the information flow.

notes concerning step 4:

i) As implementing agencies have to present narrative and financial reports, according to their contracts but at least once every three months, it is recommended that the responsible TA visits all projects once every three months, at least during the period of full implementation of the project. This requires some four visits per year for a TA per project, during the full implementation of the project. Where possible, missions should

combine several projects visits. Needless to say that these guidelines should be approached with flexibility, as is the nature of guidelines.

ii) Suggestions for the collection of monitoring information were discussed in the debriefing of this mission at the EC-Somalia Unit.

Step 5: Feedback of the monitoring/management information to the field

Monitoring is a management tool. Only information that is useful in terms of management should be collected and one should be always aware of the risk of collecting too much information. The management response, resulting from project monitoring will have to be fed back to the implementers for action. This requires practical guidelines as to how the implementer will respond to the management decisions resulting from monitoring.

In order to have monitoring procedures designed and established in the SRP a training session with participants from the EC-Somalia Unit and the implementers will be necessary.

7 EMERGING LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND DEVELOPMENT OF SECTORS

During the implementation of the FRP two elements were central to help rehabilitate governmental structures, firstly, providing some assistance to the rehabilitation of governing structures at district and regional level and secondly, promoting a debate on the options of decentralised future government in Somalia.

During fieldwork the team assessed the conditions prevailing in the existing and emerging governing structures and the beginnings of a local administration of sectors above project level. Discussions were held with governors and district councillors, wherever they were available.

Governing structures

Most of the instability in the local governing structures stems from the intrinsic fragmentation of the society but is reinforced by the absence of mandate of the governing leaders and the absence of a functioning bureaucratic capacity, no matter how small. Although the implementers in virtually all places consulted well with governors and other leaders, projects did not in general directly contribute to capacity building or legitimacy of the governors and councillors. An exception here is the pivotal role of the local authorities in the tender procedures of infrastructural projects. They equated the implementers without exception with contractors.

Instability at the level of the governors and councillors is most often caused by the lack of political and material support from the section of the society they are governing. Matt Bryden in his report on a "Strategy and Programme of Actions in support of local and regional Administration in Somalia in the field of institution building" states that many members of regional and district authorities participate in community decision-making as members of their linkage groups rather than as representatives of an accepted administrative structure.

Although most districts and regions have development committees and sectoral boards, the governors lack an office with a minimum of basic tools, capacity et cetera to map out the community membership and hence are unable to exercise any direct/indirect taxation etc. As one of the Governors said: "I am unable to arrest thugs, as I do not have the means to bring them to court, and I would even have to feed them myself!". Another reason for weakness of local governance is that installation of a district council is sometimes seen as a condition in the Code of Conduct for "receiving projects", even though there might be situations which do not favour their installation.

As a result most of the governors rely solely on financial support from the business world, making themselves dependant and susceptible/liable to removal if they step out

of line. Strengthening the local technical administrative capacity and therewith the legitimacy of the governor's office would increase stability and local governance in some places.

It is recommended to provide assistance to a selected number of local public administrations. Assistance would particularly focus on making it possible to register populations and their movements and establish some kind of (in-)direct taxation system. Bryden claims that any federal system of government could not survive for long as a democratic institution unless it was timely based "... on self-financing, viable, functioning local governments which can provide public services". However the complex question of resource distribution will also need to be tackled as many established local authority structures in Somalia do not have access to such large revenue sources as there are such as airports, ports, and roads. The envisaged decentralisation in Somalia and capacity development at this level will enable the local authorities to reach some executive powers in the long term.

In line with the above, the often-used term "institutional support" seems to be too general in nature. Some governors said that they felt that they thought that consultants were collecting security information instead of providing support to their administration.

Areas where support was and will be needed are: reinforcement of the police, improvement of court operations and the physical rehabilitation of the administrative buildings. The volume of such support could quickly become too great, and without administrative support and access to relevant sources would become void.

Elders and local communities

Where the formal leaders suffer from a lack of mandate, the traditional leaders, with some exceptions, do not. They possess authority and power accorded to them by a mandate that rests with the community. The relationship is reciprocal: elders play the role of ambassadors and brokers for their group to achieve as much as possible in terms of external support. Political support by Elders of the formal leaders is often decisive for the latter's credibility and community support.

Emergence of sectoral authorities

Sectoral boards are present in many districts and regions, either on their own account or related to the development committees; some seem to be capable while others are rather embryonic. It was found that, with a few exceptions, projects in general have little contact with the boards.

As has been recommended and outlined in some of the sectoral sections of this report

and mentioned under the crosscutting issues, projects in the SRP should actively support establishment of the voluntary sectoral boards, alongside the implementation of the projects. This includes practical training and provision of basic "tools" as well as reimbursement of some expenses of the boards. The boards will be involved with operational issues and collaborate with implementers on planning and management issues. By no means they should turn into offices which only represent them selves and are not linked to the community.

It should however be stressed that support to local communities to develop structures which can reach to the whole spectrum of development, have priority in order to come to a successful cross-sectoral, community development approach.

... the age of the well can be seen by the way the rope has worn away the log ...

Dabagalo village

PART I EDUCATION

1 PREAMBLE

The civil war of 1990 devastated the entire formal and informal education system in Somalia. Almost all the primary and secondary schools and the institutions for higher education were closed; staff went elsewhere within Somalia or went abroad; buildings were damaged and destroyed and all that could be looted was looted. Secular education in most of the country ceased to exist, with the exception of some areas in Somaliland that stayed stable.

The international programmes implemented after the civil war, for example UNOSOM, were aimed at pacifying the country, but were overambitious and introduced confusion about the roles of the international and the Somali community.

According to UNICEF, before the war Somalia had 1,224 primary schools, with an enrolment of 10% of children, 13% of boys and 7% of girls. Education, except for religious education at the Koranic Schools and the Mosques, was not regarded as a priority by the previous government, in a society where over half of the population gained their livelihood from nomadic cattle owning.

The education that continued throughout was through the Koranic Schools using the Arabic script: in Somaliland prior to 1945, when the British Government introduced secular education, this had been the only system. It was only in the seventies that the Somali language was put into a written form. Koranic schools are the primary means of spreading and perpetuating Islamic principles and way of life, and such education is felt to be the responsibility of every good Moslem.

It was in an unstable and often insecure environment that the education rehabilitation projects of the FRP took off in 1993. The present demand for secular education exceeds by far the current enrolment, a situation which raises several questions concerning for example the lack of access for specific groups, such as girls and nomadic children, and how to increase the delivery of the programme given the scale of need.

2 PROJECT PREPARATION AND DESIGN

2.1 Identification and formulation process

Most of the education rehabilitation funds during the FRP have been channelled to the central, north-eastern and north-western parts of the country, which are regarded as

relatively secure. Projects fit into two categories. These are:

<i> projects at community and local level

These involve rehabilitation of primary education by physical reconstruction of schools, recruitment and training of teachers, supply of educational materials, payment of incentives, etc. These projects are mostly executed by international NGOs in virtually all secure areas of Somalia. Information and statistics on the output is given in section 5.

<ii> projects at regional and national level

This category involves textbook production and distribution, the running of workshops, strengthening school administration and management, and gathering information about transsectoral topics of education development. These projects are mainly implemented by UNESCO, UNICEF, AET and DSA.

Since 1993 the FRP has provided 2,635,000 ECU for rehabilitation of the education sector: 2,500,000 ECU for project implementation and 135,000 ECU for consultancies.

As a reflection of the growing recognition of the need to build up a more sustainable community-based strategy, the project proposals developed during the latter part of the FRP have emphasised community-based management and ownership in order to obtain more sustainability and development of local governmental structures or their strengthening where they exist.

During the FRP, all rehabilitation proposals were submitted piecemeal by the implementers, either NGO or UN-agency. Until early 1997 there was no uniform prescribed format and the implementers submitted in the format that suited them best. A workshop on PCM/Logical Framework Analysis, participated in by representatives of the implementers and the TAs, positively improved most of the proposals submitted to the EC-Somalia Unit, in terms of the consistency of the text of the proposal and subsequent monitoring of the projects.

What could not be consulted during the FRP was overall planning, as it was not yet developed during that stage. Later on in the FRP, useful data became available from the Multiple-Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) implemented by UNICEF in 1996 and the baseline study undertaken by UNICEF in the first half of 1997 (Survey of Primary Schools in Somalia)

The identification of schools for rehabilitation was not only determined by the need for schools. Equally important were:

- i. security conditions in the proposed area of operation;
- ii. the clan or sub-clan priorities within the limited areas where the implementer was operational;
- iii. the requirement of the implementer to have projects equally distributed over the

- area, in order to balance the interests of the families or sub-clans;
- iv. the presence of a school -and children- before;
- v. the opinion of the local elders and governors who were extensively consulted in all cases;
- vi. the capacity of the NGO to implement education rehabilitation projects.

However, since 1996, the Education Sectoral Committee of the SACB, composed of UN, EC, INGOs staff and Somali counterparts, has increasingly stimulated planning and coordination. Policy development in the areas of community-based primary education, curriculum review, regional planning, mapping of activities, and resources development, have all started to appear on the agenda of the ESC. It was increasingly felt that the project cycle of one year was not conducive to effective planning and implementation.

During the planning stage all projects involve Elders and Governors; Elders have a major say in issues related to organising work and the choice of the contractor via the tender procedure. They must also handle another scarce "commodity", namely security. There is a fragile balance between the power held by the Elders, who capitalise on it, and the leverage that is provided by the SACB to the implementers through the Code of Conduct. The latter is regarded as a minimum guarantee for the project safety.

2.2 Coherence and realism of project design

During the FRP, physical rehabilitation of buildings overshadowed teacher selection and the other necessary software, which includes training, improved curriculum formulation and delivery, and provision of inputs. This was partly because the Elders prioritised investment in buildings. Rehabilitation of the buildings was seen chronologically as a precondition to the training of teachers and the provision of books.

Technically, project designs are mainly low technology, consisting largely of repair of roofs, doors and windows. In some cases a whole new structure had to be built, but the technology choice is still fairly basic. All construction work is tendered and contracted out to a contractor, with little allowance for community input in the process. This may explain to some extent the high costs of physical rehabilitation of the buildings. (see also section 3.4)

Generally the implementers' reporting has been irregular and not in line with the requirements of the PCM/LFA. Some NGOs take their role in monitoring and evaluation seriously and implement their own external evaluations, for example CISP and its education operations in El Dere and Harardere.

In terms of the coherence of the project the main elements being dealt with (buildings, inputs, recruitment and training of teachers) are the most important ones, although the overall balance and priorities need to be reviewed and redirected. Elsewhere in the report the question as to whether the rehabilitation of buildings needs such high priority and whether schools should be community-constructed with local materials will be discussed; see also the section on Microproject Fund.

A positive development has been the increased attention to community-based ownership and community payment as guiding principles in the planning of the projects. Among the implementers there is a great difference in approach and implementation in the field; some are well on their way whilst others still have not yet started introducing cost sharing and community management.

Support to the Koranic schools is in the FRP implemented under a separate project agreement with UNICEF. As working relations between most Koranic schools and the secular schools are positive, there does not seem to be a convincing reason why projects are implemented separately. Integration of the support to both in one proposal is possible and desirable.

3 RELEVANCE OF THE PROJECT

3.1 General context

A generation of young people in Somalia has missed out on education, except for students at the Koranic Schools. The rehabilitation of the educational system and reactivation of schools in Somalia is a highly relevant operation. It contributes to normalising the lives of children. It confronts parents with questions concerning education and co-operation across the socio-cultural and political divides which have devastated the country. It is encouraging to see a high degree of co-operation and reconciliation between the secular schools and the Koranic schools in most places. The assistance provided by the EC to Koranic Schools is a positive contribution and deserves further elaboration, planning and if possible extension.

In Somalia, secular education was at first seen as a foreign intervention and then shaped and dominated by a dictatorial government; so it is not easy implementing a process which hands responsibility for education to parents and communities. Attention should be paid not to establish any governing structures that resemble those of the last government.

Selection, testing, retraining and partial re-employment of the teachers is a most important, though arduous process, and in some cases has led to violent responses and threats to the implementers. The strategy of having the PTA/CEC as the responsible body for hiring and firing is a sound one and appears to be successful particularly when pursued from the very beginning of the project.

Parents and local leaders have shown great interest in education during FRP: the UNICEF Primary School Survey in Somalia shows that 46% of the schools surveyed (n=609) are owned by Local Authorities, 20% by Private Individuals and 16% by Parents. The rest are owned by NGOs.

A new project to address the needs of students who have been unable to complete their education has been submitted by the African Education Trust. Such an initiative seems highly relevant.

3.2 Specific context

As indicated in the previous section, in all the schools visited, a PTA or CEC existed or was in the process of establishment. The UNICEF survey found that 42% of primary schools felt actively supported by their community. Almost everywhere the classrooms were packed with children, often fifty or more in a small classroom, demonstrating the pressure on enrolment. In a number of school projects visited, parents asked whether a makeshift school could follow the children who move with the family after the herd or to fishing points. These parents show their keenness for education and said they were positive about cost sharing as the ability of fishing communities is said to be considerable. Cost sharing is not yet standardised; some schools do and others do not implement it and the procedures differ greatly.

Fatima Khader is the wife of a fisherman and has five children, three girls and two boys. Non-literate herself, she is determined that they will all get a proper education. This will not be easy; she is part of a group of five related families, and important decisions are made by the older men. However she has convinced her husband and several of the other wives that education matters. Her husband thinks that, for little girls, a few years' schooling is fine if it costs nothing; however after that they should stay at home to help their mother. For the boys, if they know how to read and do sums they are less likely to be exploited by businessmen or government officials and more likely to start a business themselves. However, the family, like others, spends half the year at the coast, fishing through the night. If one of the two teachers from the village school would come with them and arrange a satellite temporary school at their coastal settlement, they could continue learning.

The relevance of buildings

While the team does not want to denigrate achievement, it was observed that the projects put too much emphasis on buildings. To start functioning, a school needs a teacher, a decent place to meet and some basic inputs. The insistence on permanent school building can delay educational activities for several months.

Rehabilitation of the buildings appears to be a slow process owing to the fact that it involves tendering -no matter how appropriate the EC-tender procedure is- and local negotiations. It retards the project delivery, does not allow for community involvement, is therefore expensive and puts the emphasis on the project hardware.

Concerning relevance of the education inputs and teachers' training reference is made to section 4.1.

4 EFFICIENCY

4.1 Means and costs

Physical rehabilitation of the buildings

In general, the quality of the rehabilitation work of the larger school buildings is up to standard. Smaller two-room schools in villages generally show a poorer standard of engineering. This may be because larger buildings are tendered out more formally while the small, faraway buildings are allocated to local self-proclaimed contractors. Monitoring of the remote village schools is also less adequate. Unit prices for school rehabilitation have gone down since the beginning of the FRP, but must still be regarded as high, considering the low technology building approaches. The building costs are relatively high mainly because of the powerful alliance that seems to exist between local contractors and Elders.

The communities participate relatively little during the planning and construction phase. To start project development from a Microprojects Fund is recommended, with money made available for small buildings such as two-roomed health units and village schools built by the communities themselves.

Small buildings and costs

At present, the rehabilitation of a two-roomed school or health unit in the villages costs between 8,000-12,000 ECU, depending on size and the degree of rehabilitation. The typical inputs needed for rehabilitating such a building and constructing a pit latrine are: cement (75 bags), gravel (6 loads), lime (180 kgs), roof sheets (40 m²), and timber (misc. sizes), nails and bars, and window/door frames; in addition some skilled labour to deal with specialist jobs is needed. Using a Microproject Fund, and with current market prices for imported items, the costs would be in the region of ECU 4,000 to 5,000. The community would give labour, transport and security free.

The evaluation team is well aware that the transition from the previous approach towards funding from the Micro Projects budgets may lead to difficulties at first. Communities will have to be involved in the planning of the technical work to a far greater extent.

Rehabilitation of the larger buildings is beyond the capability of the community and should continue to be funded according to the procedures used in the FRP, though modified by the comments made in this document.

In general, the supervision by the implementers and monitoring by the TAs of construction work is inadequate and needs improvement. The implementers do not always employ a building engineer but assign a logistics officer, who is not qualified and insufficiently experienced in buildings and constructions.

The monitoring of the construction of buildings is not an easy task for the TA-Education either as there are several projects under implementation at one point in time and he has no engineering background. To have the TA-Infrastructure monitor all structures in all sectors would overstretch him. It is therefore recommended to have an external agent to monitor a number of selected buildings. If more use were made of standardisation the cost of external monitoring would be relatively low.

None of the schools (nor health units) in the FRP have latrines despite the priority given to sanitation development in the FRP; children have to use places sometimes at some distance.

As water is a scarce commodity and, as a commodity, is being sold year-round, all school buildings should have a roof-rain catchment system or a well constructed at places where possible. Trees should be planted round every schoolyard.

Although most buildings are overcrowded, optimisation of use of some buildings is an issue; for example, the training centre in El Dere is seriously under-utilised, while the adjacent school is very short of classrooms. This is because the training centre belongs, according to the hospital, to them and is claimed for only some weeks a year.

Operation, maintenance and cost recovery

Schools have potentially considerable capacity to retrieve salary and O&M costs. Realistically, the supply of textbooks and the professional support and upgrading of teachers will continue to need funding by external aid bodies.

The topic of cost recovery has never been a neglected area in the SACB/ESC and has been discussed extensively; some strategies for cost recovery have been developed.

An extensive study on costing issues was carried out at the time of the evaluation and the outcome will hopefully provide further guidance as to how to steer the implementation of cost-recovery in education during the SRP. The implementation of the O&M arrangements and introduction of cost recovery varies from place to place; little has been done in some schools, whilst others are taking it seriously.

The ADRA-Adala school is in a fairly poor part of Middle Shabelle. It was started subsequent to a full household survey that looked at numbers and ability to pay. It charges just over \$10 per pupil per annum, and with about ninety pupils, grosses \$120 each year. This pays for teachers, cleaners and the guard, providing seven salaries. However, the fees for 40 of the pupils are paid by the NGO. And even so, 160 places in the schools are not filled - the parents cannot pay.

The school in El Dere does not charge fees; it was observed that several children transferred there from Mogadishu, where all the schools are fee-paying. The ESC needs to develop uniform and binding guidelines that will be followed by all involved.

The responsibility for maintenance after buildings are handed over, and for O&M generally, can be unclear and the cause of problems. A number of iNGOs have signed hand-over contracts, but still later on encounter disputes concerning maintenance, for example at Harardere Primary School where the PTA claim that the school was not completed according to their requirements, with, for example, wooden shutters instead of glass.

4.2 Selection, testing and training of teachers

Problems were created when teachers, either qualified or not, and attracted by the WFP-FfW arrangements, reactivated schools as a private enterprise to secure their daily livelihood. It was noted that the EC has had no involvement with the FfW projects of WFP in the education sector. In Garoowe teachers turned violent when the UNESCO project attempted to select, retrain and re-employ them (see also section 5.4). As in this project, all projects should place the responsibility of selection and re-employment of teachers clearly with the community.

Teacher training, a joint UNICEF/UNESCO operation, has generally been an effective component; teachers of grades one to four are especially in need of professional training. Other teachers in need of training are those who previously taught at secondary schools and are now at primary schools. Some participants of the workshops claimed that the applicability of some topics was limited and that follow-up and refresher courses were needed but not available.

The selection and training of Master Trainers in order to decentralise training capacity to

the regions in Somalia, has picked out the most qualified and competent Somali teachers. What is lacking as yet -at least in Bari region- is the further planning and coaching of these Master Teachers and an agreement on how they relate to the other implementing agencies in the region and to local authorities.

The courses for Headmasters, particularly those strengthening their managerial and administration skills, have revealed a need for extension and regular refreshment workshops.

Overall some 22% of teachers in Somalia and 20% of School Committee Members are female. Female participation in education is of high relevance, particularly as a role model for girls, still under-represented in grades 3 to 5. Checks need to be made to ensure that girls get all the subjects that boys do, including languages, science and religion. Retraining procedures and materials are geared to the needs of female teachers as well as those of men.

4.3 Provision of school supplies

Textbooks and teachers' guides are the main items for distribution. In all schools visited, the books available were insufficient. In El Dere nothing has been received from Nairobi, for example grade 4 has no textbooks for English, social studies, geography and history, Somali or Arabic! Some of the English books are inappropriate, for example "Essential English" which was regarded as too basic and not used. Books for grades 1, 2 and some grade 3 received from Mogadishu arrived late (science, Somali and Arabic language, maths, and health education). In schools under the UNESCO project in Garoowe, the percentage of books directly received via UNICEF at the time that classes started, was less than 10% of the requirement. Additional books were received via the UNESCO office in Hargeisa -books originally from Somalia that did not fit with the Somaliland political context.

All involved, the staff of the schools, implementing agents as well as UNESCO/UNICEF, expressed their dissatisfaction about the whole situation, with the stores full but the schools having completely inadequate supplies.

The cause of these problems is related to the failure of UNESCO to produce, supply and distribute the text books (contract 25-UNO-EO2-94) The explanations given to the team for this did not address the problem. UNICEF has now agreed to inherit this whole difficult problem of textbooks and is attempting to address it.

Concerning the question of costing it is recommended to have parents buy (and pay for) the writing books as preferences differ strongly, and for teachers' salaries and

maintenance of the buildings as this remains within the village micro-economy. As it may not be feasible to have the entire education system funded by the parents, it is suggested to subsidise the costs of text books, which should be preferably locally printed, to motivate parents to pay for the other expenses. Practically speaking, local printing costs are generally relatively easy to subsidise.

The role of UNESCO in future SRP educational projects could possibly be in rehabilitation of secondary education, especially teacher training, development of text books, education administration and curriculum development.

4.4 Organisation, management, monitoring

Educational Rehabilitation: Organisation and Management

During FRP there has been only one TA responsible for both Health and Education Rehabilitation: given the volume of the two sectors, and the fact that the programme has just taken off, it is certain that the TA has had too large a task. From July 1997 a TA-Education has joined the EC-Somalia Unit.

Since 1996, sectoral planning has taken place, particularly through the SACB-Education Sectoral Committee. Within the ESC six working groups have been developed to deal with specific issues.

The ESC in the SACB -established in 1996- has taken up planning and co-ordination a number of important areas. These are:

- Community participation in basic education rehabilitation and development;
Community based management and participation of the schools (17% of the Somali children were enrolled in formal schools and 60% at Koranic schools by 1997) and the relationship between both is in the centre of attention. Workshops are being held on key policy and practical matters, for instants on community ownership (October 1997).
Studies are being implemented, such as an assessment of the feasibility of community and external financing for primary education.
- Curriculum review for basic education;
Curriculum adjustment and development, reflecting the changes in the country was dealt with in a 4 day seminar, organised by UNICEF/UNESCO (November 1997) with 40 participants from Somalia, and further participation of UN, EC and iNGOs. According to the participants the workshop was very useful.
- Policy development for basic education in Somalia;

Policy development depends on the availability of reliable (as possible) data. Education planning and development of general policies is being dealt with. To remedy the lack of baselines and other data a Multiple-Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) was undertaken in north-west (Somaliland Administration/UNICEF 1996). An overall inventory survey, Survey of Primary Schools in Somalia (1997), has been carried out by UNICEF providing essential information.

Besides the involvement of the TA in the activities of the ESC, a daily preoccupation is his/her key role in the whole of the project cycle, from project identification by the iNGO to communicating with "Brussels" in order to apply for funding. It was apparent that at the Nairobi level the implementers have frequent contact with the TA; this flows from their joint interest in having the applications for funding well prepared and submitted to EC-Brussels as smoothly as possible.

The TAs themselves regard their field visits during preparation, monitoring and implementation of the projects as insufficient; some projects were not visited at all during implementation (Kandala water project) or only visited once (health projects in Bari and Awdal).

Several implementers did not feel that the TA should pay frequent routine monitoring visits. It would suffice if problem-solving missions were undertaken by the TAs; some stated that frequent TA visits would interfere with the implementation of the projects.

This all pointed at an obvious weakness in the programme, namely the ability and the capacity of the TA-Education to monitor ongoing project implementation. Clearly this has repercussions for the mode and quality of project implementation, and it seems to affect all of the TAs.

Increasingly, the Education Sectoral Committee has played its role in the steering and planning of the programme. Currently the ESC has six Working Groups covering the following areas: Donor Mobilisation, Community Ownership, Professional Development, Curriculum Development, Learner Assessment, Management & Information Systems. The membership of these working groups consists of iNGOs and UN-agencies.

A clear interest is shown by both implementers and donors in participating in the ESC and working committees. All resource people commented positively on the role it could play, providing that decisions lead to agreements that are binding on project implementers.

Educational Rehabilitation: Monitoring & Evaluation

As indicated in the previous section, monitoring of project implementation has been limited. TA-Education and TA-Infrastructure did not visit projects under implementation during the past year sufficiently. In addition, there is no standardised monitoring procedure in place. It should be noted however, that both the health sector and the education sector were under the responsibility of only one TA. It is understood that monitoring all projects -together with other functions in the SACB structure- is simply not possible. In the SRP, education will have a TA of its own and proper arrangements for monitoring and information management will have to be put in place. In any case a formalised monitoring procedure should be developed that fits the requirement of the individual TA and that allows for feedback of field monitoring information into the management of the EC-Somalia Unit.

Some of the expatriate staff of iNGOs supervise and monitor certain aspects of projects when they are not qualified. Often, no building engineer is employed and logistics officers are used as multipurpose supervisors. Hence they deal with many aspects of projects for which they are not qualified and their relationship with the local contractor is weakened as they cannot make their case strongly.

Generally the implementers' reporting has been irregular. Very little correspondence was found in the files to show that the TA was following up reporting. Mission reports of the TA-education were extensive and very informative.

Some iNGOs take their role in monitoring and evaluation seriously and implement their own external evaluations, for example CISP and its education operations in El Dere and Harardere.

5 EFFECTIVENESS

5.1 Achievements and functioning schools

As noted before, the task of rehabilitation of formal education in Somalia is huge. Effectiveness at the level of the individual schools has been basically achieved in that all schools rehabilitated are now open and providing some kind of education. Most of the schools are full. Overall, the need for primary education is much greater than the access provided by rehabilitated schools. By 1997, Somalia has 773 primary schools with an estimated enrolment of 153,335 pupils. (UNICEF 1997) This implies that some 10% of the schools have been rehabilitated/constructed enabling just over 10% of the children to get enrolled.

The projects implemented in the FRP delivered:

- schools rehabilitated/constructed	79
- schools equipped	39
- headmasters/teachers trained:	1,047
- number of students:	14,435
- establishment of Somali Open Learning Unit (Somolu)	
- establishment of Education Development Centre (EDC)	

Although the EC is not the only donor, it is by far the largest. The backlog in Somalia is great; each of the districts also need one or two schools with grades 5 to 8, not to mention the need for secondary education and vocational training.

Several factors decrease the effectiveness of the sector. They include: book shortages, teachers' limited capacities and the inadequate management capacity of some head teachers. Another is that different implementers have different approaches and this leads to controversy amongst the local communities. Examples range from paying of incentives to teachers, to attempting to influence the choice of subjects. These differences need to be evened out.

5.2 Rehabilitation of the buildings

After the physical structure, ownership becomes a key issue for ensuring sustainability. In all schools visited, communities and local leaders were involved with the school operations. In most places a PTA existed while other schools had Community Education Committees, being established. See also 5.3.

All buildings visited were technically rehabilitated; larger buildings were adequately done. Small village schools and classrooms were generally of lower building standards. All larger schools were operational in two shifts with classrooms having 40 to 50 children. Village classes were also well utilised, with generally one shift a day.

Lacking at all schools were low-cost sanitary facilities and water points, even in places where this was easy, for example at Budbud village.

5.3 Contribution to emergence of local education structures and development of local education planning capacity

*** Ownership**

All schools visited were under local ownership. This reflects the countrywide situation in 1997, according to UNICEF. It is the most appropriate form of ownership and a decisive

condition for sustainability. In varying degrees the ownership by parents and communities have been implemented. Although most schools exist under the ownership of local elders or parents' groups.

* Balancing input of Elders, NGOs and communities

During the planning stage all projects involve Elders and Governors, since in their capacity as local leaders they are responsible for the security in each area. The Elders have a major say in issues related to organising work and the choice of the contractor via the tender procedure. They must also handle another scarce "commodity", namely security. There is a fragile balance between the power held by the elders, who capitalise on it, and the leverage that is provided by the SACB to the implementers through the Code of Conduct. The latter is regarded as a minimum guarantee for the implementer to counterbalance the power of the local leadership.

* Cut-off point and handing over

Many implementers have difficulty in demarcating clearly the point of cut-off; some Somali communities are skilled in keeping the implementer involved, feeling that such an involvement is beneficial to them. In future, time-lines could be used, agreed to by both sides and using the stages of the management cycle. Each of the stages would have the dates of commencement and completion and a description of inputs from both the local community/leadership and the implementer. Clearly these stages should be made flexible when necessary.

An overall local administrative structure to govern the sector has not as yet been developed. Such a structure is a prerequisite for future sustainability. An example of one attempt is Garoowe where a Regional Educational Officer (REO) has been appointed along with four District Education Officers (DEOs). The REO acts as a counterpart to the UNESCO programme for project planning and is provided with some transport and office facilities. However he has no operational role. The four voluntary DEOs are highly motivated and competent headmasters and teachers who are very eager to get involved with rehabilitation of the local schools.

If conditions allow, implementers should support the establishment of district education structures with DEOs and REOs who are selected by the community. In meetings it was emphasised that many well-qualified persons, who were of high profile in the previous government are not means acceptable by the communities. Qualifications alone are therefore not sufficient. Given the circumstance that many teachers or headmasters would be interested in becoming DEO, there will have to be some kind of election process whereby the community singles out the one wanted most. Their initial task would be to restore local schools to normal functioning, through the training of teachers,

inventorising of materials in close co-operation with the implementers, but equally important would be to start planning for the future.

Such local governing structures can be strengthened by delegating and decentralising tasks to them and ensuring that they are operational rather than bureaucratic.

A central issue is whether to concentrate on strengthening Regional or District level. An important reason for strengthening Education at district level is the pool of expertise and wisdom in the head teachers and inspectors. In addition, it avoids any likeness to previous government structures.

5.4 Effectiveness in involving women and girls in education

22% of teachers in Somalia are women. The percentage of female heads is lower -only 7%, although in Mogadishu nearly one-fifth of operating schools had a female head. 20% of School Committee members are also female. (UNICEF 1997)

For the first four grades, 39% of enrolled students are female. There are regional variations, with Mogadishu showing the highest proportion of girls, and Northwest the lowest. By grade eight the number is reduced to 21%. There is drop-out of both sexes; overall grades five to eight only have one-tenth of the pupils enrolled in grades one to four. But girls drop out in larger numbers than boys do.

The UNICEF survey found that 41% of schools were carrying out other basic education programmes, and 79% of these were doing adult women' education.

The overall pattern therefore is positive, although there is still far to go. One encouraging statistic is that one-fifth of the volunteer school committee members are female. However, sometimes women in mixed meetings are not heard. The participation of women members during School Committee meetings should be monitored and where their voice is not heard, the women be helped to find strategies to change this.

5.5 Selection, testing and training of teachers

During these past years, teachers have been returning to their schools, either voluntarily or because of incentives from the communities, iNGOs or WFP-Food for Work. Because of this, particularly the Food for Work (FfW), some unqualified teachers claimed positions allegedly held in the past. These claims were not checked and some unqualified teachers tried to reactivate schools, in a spirit of private enterprise. When UNESCO and several iNGOs started testing teachers and selecting them for re-training

and re-employment, a number of teachers responded violently, creating a security risk for the aid workers, for example those in the UNESCO project in Garoowe. It was mainly through the Food for Work arrangements that these problems developed. FfW was a temporary solution and therefore unsustainable: when the scheme was stopped in Somalia it led to the immediate collapse of 32% of the schools (UNICEF 1997).

As noted before, the selection, testing, training and re-employment of teachers should be given more priority.

5.6 Provision of school supplies

Reference is made to section 4.1.

5.7 The effectiveness of technical assistance

The implementers provide technical assistance such as training of teachers, courses for headmasters and ad hoc support in matters of administration and management. Generally, feedback on the training was positive.

General technical assistance, including technical advice, rendered by the Nairobi-based offices is normally decisive towards the success and security of the staff of any project in the field. The implementation of the UNESCO Project in Garoowe region can be labelled as a very effective operation on the ground, thanks to the determination of the national and international staff; however, the project suffered from lack of support from UNESCO-Nairobi. It is strongly advised that UNESCO review its backstopping of the field programme in terms of moral and professional support, timely supply of inputs, logistics and communications.

Seraphatu Kadr is a Primary School Teacher in Shabelle. She and her husband have no children. They used to live in Mogadishu but in 1992 the level of violence became too great; her husband went to find work in Kenya and she came back to teach in her family village. She lives with an aunt. For three years the school did not function, and she survived on money from her husband and a little private coaching. She feels that she is only just emerging from a time of great personal unhappiness, like the country itself. Now the school is getting going and she feels better, and at the same time she is becoming more valued in the village; more girls are starting school and staying for longer.

6 IMPACT

6.1 Impact on physical structures and human resources development

There is an inherent limitation in rehabilitating buildings before the teachers are selected, children enrolled and input provided. The impact of the education rehabilitation sector is satisfactory, but could be considerably greater if priority would be given to software over hardware in combination with a microproject fund.

The training of teachers, head masters and master trainers has been done well and motivated the participants to perform well in their schools.

6.2 Impact on attitudes

As with the Health Sector, the restoration of schools has had a normalising effect on communities. Besides restoring daily routine and helping parents to look ahead in caring for their children, education has introduced concepts such as the beneficiaries taking responsibility, and the user paying; the actions of schools committees show already that these concepts are being put into practice.

6.3 Impact on education in Somalia

The quality of the package of education delivered within the projects is, overall, satisfactory, so within the areas served, some impact can be assumed. The limitations on quality are: the capacity of the teachers, the shortfall of books and the limited management and administrative capacity of head masters.

The extent to which the projects cover the total need of Somalia for education, means that in real terms, impact cannot yet be great.

A positive unforeseen result is the co-operation of secular education rehabilitation with the existing Koranic schools. This provides an opportunity for the EC to relate education rehabilitation in the SRP to a locally rooted educational practice and hence strengthen its local base and the likely appreciation of the projects.

Another is that Regional Education Centres such as that in Garoowe, besides potentially decentralising education to the regional level, and being part of the emerging local structures, can generate income from local printing (In Bari region, only Bosaso has printing workshops).

6.4 Establishment of local structures

Reference is made to section 5.2.

7 SUSTAINABILITY

7.1 Financial sustainability

There is potential for cost-sharing in education, and therefore for some financial sustainability. Even some of the nomads and fishing communities are now prepared to pay for education.

A key issue will be whether the implementers can agree on and standardise financial contributions, including the bill for the local community and the bill for the international community. Additionally there must be common pay scales for all.

In the UNICEF survey, 3% of the schools (18 out of 582) had an income-generating project to support the school. These included gardening and farming, exploitation of water points, and production of crafts. More could be encouraged.

7.2 Organisational/Institutional sustainability

The great majority of the schools visited have a firm base in the community; PTAs and CECs are in most cases in place. Many schools try to keep the implementing NGO involved after the actual completion of the rehabilitation.

7.3 Sustainability of Personnel

At community level, the relationship between teachers and the community/elders needs special attention. For the teachers who reactivated the schools to secure a livelihood, it is difficult to accept that in future the community can hire and fire them. This is a potential source of friction that also affects the implementers and needs to be addressed from the beginning.

Teacher training and decentralisation of training capacity by establishing Master trainers in the regions is of utmost importance.

8 LESSONS LEARNED

In the education projects visited, the objectives had been achieved to differing degrees but all projects visited were functioning well. The quality of the project proposals improved with time, and implementers became clearer about objectives and activities.

Another positive development is the increasing effectiveness of the SACB-ESC in terms of planning and steering of the programme.

The Koranic schools also showed the interest for education rehabilitation projects. These schools, which are at the heart of the Somali people and were never suspended during the war, have shown a lot of interest in co-operation with secular education and the F/SRP.

Other areas of attention are mobile schools for the nomadic and fishing communities.

An area not yet dealt with in the FRP is vocational training as an intersectoral activity. Formal and informal vocational training and education will have positive effects on employment.

Support to the school system needs to recognise that implementers should specialise in the area where they have their best expertise and experience. Some should concentrate on primary education or on secondary education. Others should deal with planning and management or alternatively with logistics, printing and distribution of text books. It is found that in general, technical operations carried from the centres in Mogadishu and Nairobi, for instance production and distribution of books, have been rather ineffective and should be decentralised as much as possible.

Training -in particular decentralised training within the country- including upgrading local Somali trainers to mastertrainers has been successful.

To summarise: encourage implementers to specialise in areas where they feel they are strong, decentralise activities and have local professionals, parents and elders central in the SRP-projects.

As has been mentioned in the text in this sectoral report the establishment of hardware, infrastructure and buildings over software produced considerable number of schools but has slowed down the provision of software. There is need to review policy in view of vocational training within the SACB-ESC.

9 RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations below -some of which were discussed in the EC-Somalia Unit already before the evaluation took place- are presented in the framework of the project cycle.

Concerning planning, implementation and monitoring it is recommended that:

-In the SRP a planning cycle for education of a minimum of 2 years is required. More attention should be given to planning and steering by the ESC concerning:

- * regional and national scale planning
- * improvement of school requirement input system
- * development of vocational training in Somalia, in conjunction with SME and other sectors;

-More clear and elaborate procedures for the establishment of ownership be developed and agreed upon, prior to the funds being made available;

-The implementers and the TAs should strengthen their supervisory and monitoring procedures and skills;

-SACB-ESC plan and balance the need for rehabilitation of primary schools, secondary and tertiary education and the roles of INGOs, UNICEF and UNESCO, in accordance with their best capacity or specialisation. UNESCO may be requested to focus on the rehabilitation of the secondary schools in collaboration with an INGO, while UNICEF can be asked to focus on planning, training and facilitation instead of on project implementation.

Concerning physical rehabilitation it is recommended that:

-Rehabilitation activities be re-prioritised, less in favour of buildings and more in favour of teacher selection, training and re-employment and supplies to the school;

-The volume of delivery of the rehabilitation programme be increased, by using Microproject arrangements to encourage construction and rehabilitation of small schools by their community;

-In order to control the building and rehabilitation costs of all structures, specifications be standardised, and tenders judged against them; unjustified higher tenders can be refused;

-All schools in the SRP be provided with a budget item to construct pit latrines according to the guidelines of the WHO and to develop a water source, if feasible. Use can be linked to hygiene and related subjects in the curriculum;

Concerning training and other inputs it is recommended that:

-Headmasters and selected senior teachers receive additional training to enable them to deal well with their responsibilities;

-The supplying of textbooks to the schools in Somalia be reorganised as a matter of urgency; a capable iNGO or private sector agency should be contracted for distribution of textbooks and teachers' guides;

Concerning conflict it is recommended that:

-Given the high turnover and the limited experience of some fieldstaff, implementers should be given the tools to work with their counterparts in a way that avoids conflicts and to deal with conflicts when they arrive.

Concerning institution-building it is recommended that:

-The ownership for schools be developed. This would include insisting on a community committee before the project is implemented;

-If conditions allow, the implementers support the establishment of district education structures with elected DEOs and REOs;

-It is recommended that secular and Koranic schools be supported by one project package.

Concerning cost-sharing it is recommended that:

In order to strengthen cost sharing in education

-The provision of textbooks should be free of charge, in order to motivate parents to pay for education;

-The schools should be helped to develop income-generating projects, e.g. sheep herding and water sales from rain catchment utilising the Microproject Fund if necessary;

-Because there is insufficient detailed information on household budgets and willingness/ability

-To-pay, a household study be carried out.

...back to school (El Dere) ...

PART II HEALTH

1 PREAMBLE

History of health problems and health care in Somalia

The traditional Somali way of life, semi-nomadic and with few safety margins, produces tough, healthy people, but many graves along the way. Health surveys show high mortality rates for mothers, babies and young children, with the latter group suffering from malnutrition and infections. Malaria and water-borne diseases are rife. Over half the children are malnourished in some regions during the hot season. Key health statistics can be found in the Fact Sheet.

During the eighties, some PHC programmes were started. Secondary and tertiary care was also gradually improving. After the civil war from 1994 onwards there were emergency interventions and subsequently projects for the improvements of hospitals and primary health care. Most of these repeated the pattern of primary health care found all over Africa whereby a hospital is a central point for referral and supervision. Nurses staff clinics and deliver EPI at fixed points; at village level a community health worker has a few basic drugs and a TBA is trained in hygienic practices. This pattern had strengths and limitations which already were being identified in for example "Better Health in Africa, 1994". (World Bank)

However in the situation of chaos and insecurity it is not surprising that this model was the only practicable choice available.

2 PROJECT PREPARATION AND DESIGN

2.1 Objectives and Budgets

The evaluation team has documentation on 17 health projects now in place. The health sector budget was 3.5 million ECU. (see Annexe 9). The project objectives/activities can be summarised from the project documents as follows: the physical rehabilitation of buildings, institution capacity building and community involvement in PHC, and cost recovery or sharing. Important objectives are set out and analysed in section 5.1.

2.2 The context of health care alternatives

Public health services do not have a monopoly; many people go elsewhere for good reasons. A large traditional health system has existed for centuries, applying curative

techniques such as scarification and herbalism. The traditional sector gives a good example of acceptability, so do the TBAs who are part of the sector.

In addition there is a big and growing private modern medical sector. Currently there is antagonism between the modern public and modern private sectors; many public doctors see the others as a threat to standards, contributing, for example, to inappropriate prescribing and drug resistance. Some have a more productive attitude and recognise that the sector provides an expanding number of outlets, and with certain conditions, such as STDs, it treats more patients than the public sector. However, this vision of the private sector means that it must be co-opted into partnership and acceptable standards, through certification and re-training, and be involved with drug procurement. It is also important that the really incompetent practitioners be screened out.

In the course of the SRP a clear vision of the relationship of public and private, traditional and western needs to be developed so that, if it seems appropriate, some funding can strengthen quality aspects in the private sector thereby learning from the experience of the livestock sector.

2.3 Proposal development

The makers of proposals were faced with a number of problems; an environment of massive insecurity, communities mostly unused to first line services, short-term thinking and high turnover among staff. The pattern of health services before the war had not been optimal, so could not be simply replicated. But the information which could be used for planning good coverage was not available during the first stages of the FRP (maps, population figures).

The type of services which was decided on performs some activities well, particularly basic curative care and EPI; other services are usually poor; maternal mortality is not reduced and health education leads to little behaviour change.

All implementers developed their proposals in consultation with the local Elders, since as they represent the community they must ensure security. However, this is a minimal form of community involvement; the projects did not seek to give any real say to the community over, for example, the type of services they were to get.

The issue of community involvement is not simple and is discussed further in 3.2.

The proposals originate from the implementers, either iNGOs or UNICEF; the task of the TA was reactive rather than proactive; this was not surprising given his workload.

Several studies were carried out to inform project proposals, notably on cost recovery. (see annexe 7)

The objectives in the proposals were generally consistent with each other but they are not comprehensive, being mainly limited to activities. See section 2.5.

2.4 Health sector co-ordination

Details of the co-ordination structures are given below. In summary, committees meet to plan, co-ordinate activities and implement decisions. A Health Sector Co-ordinator is now in place, with the task of establishing and co-ordinating strategies. He has a public health vision that considerably advances the sector. However his contract expires in a few months.

Since the HSC and Co-ordinator are now in place and functioning well the capacity at the tip of the iceberg is good and promises well for the future. This capacity needs now to trickle down; systematic training of iNGO and local counterpart managers should be the next step and in particular the establishment and training of District Health Boards should be systematically taken up. Training of all these actors together would be an effective contribution to Peace and Reconciliation.

2.5 The consistency of the objectives

The objectives are not comprehensive, although consistent as noted before. They are virtually all concerned with service delivery. As an example the rehabilitation of the Health System in El Dere District has as main project objectives: i) maintaining drug supplies, ii) providing referral facilities and improving laboratory capacity, iii) consolidating EPI, iv) upgrading personnel, v) strengthening management capacity, vi) increasing first line accessibility and instituting cost sharing. These objectives are consistent since they do not contradict each other and they hang together and make a good package, but they are not comprehensive. This conclusion can be generalised to the whole of the health programme.

If other kinds of objectives had been set, for example concerning responses to health need such as reducing maternal mortality or preventing malaria, then the output would have been different. Of the projects whose objectives were scrutinised by the team, only one had an objective concerned with quality; it has created a service where visitors comment on the quality of care.

Project activities have taken projects a certain distance: for the SRP, further questions need to be asked -will these objectives, if achieved, either attack the priority health problems, or meet the needs of the high-risk groups?

3 RELEVANCE OF THE PROJECT

3.1 The overall relevance and appropriateness of structures, especially PHC structures

The pattern of health service delivery before the war was rather poor and could not simply be replicated and rehabilitated. Four years ago the health sector was characterised by its emergency activities and short-term thinking; gradually it is moving to a public health approach. As part of this, the committees under the SACB are starting to develop an overall health policy. This will make projects increasingly relevant and allow for effective health programme development and implementation. This will especially be true if more Somalis are included in the process.

However, according to the Health Sector Co-ordinator's draft summary report: "nobody has the official mandate to receive all the information and to make any decision for action on the information provided". Certainly this is a perceived problem which has implications for sustainability. The approach for the SRP and after should be to establish and support with training in each district a district health board, that can provide the mandate from below to supplement the EC mandate given from above.

3.2 Building appropriate community structures

One objective in the PHC components is to build community involvement, through structures such as Village Health Committees. Although this is a sound approach, it may have been inappropriate in some places given both the starting point of violence and distrust where projects found themselves, and the short funding period. The concept of community involvement, as used normally in PHC, cannot be achieved in one or two years, in a few meetings with elders or by the appointment of a committee. Failures in understanding can be seen for example in places where Elders have "volunteered" people for guard duties who are neither paid nor motivated. Some committees supporting schools are now in place in the same communities, but ongoing support is needed to help communities to develop a structure based on their own needs, to coordinate, prioritise and control. When this stage is reached one can talk about community empowerment and ownership. Above the community level there are scarcely any effective structures.

In very few districts, District Health Boards are now in place, made up of three to four volunteers from the communities, for example in El Dere and Berbera. The team met with these and other boards and was impressed with their commitment though their capacity is limited. It was also observed that the iNGOs in the districts insufficiently involve the boards in their activities.

Since selection of the right board members is crucial, to ensure independence and relevant experience, selection strategies need to be developed, hopefully with input from the Peace and Reconciliation sector. The same type of development of boards is happening very occasionally in education.

3.3 Health sector co-ordination

Health sector co-ordination began in 1995. In that year, a task force committee was set up to tackle an outbreak of cholera; later it decided to continue with its much-needed co-ordination role, seen as a basic step for developing a PHC strategy. Under the SACB, and renamed as the Health Sector Co-ordination Group (HCG), it now meets once a month. These structures and processes are functioning and relevant but they are limited by meeting in Nairobi, which disadvantages the Somalia counterparts; however we have been informed that additional meetings are now beginning to take place at zonal level.

3.4 Whether it meets the pattern of need

Reaching the groups with the greatest needs

The team was told by many respondents that there are four main groups in Somalia whose needs are not being sufficiently met: nomads, under-fives, childbearing women and the disabled are under-served.

Nomads can be discriminated against by PHC systems developed for fixed villages only. Some practices in health programmes are likely to increase their use of the services. The nomads who travel with the whole family spend three months a year at a family well or other fixed point, and for the rest of the year travel on fairly well known routes -though this pattern has been seriously disturbed by the war. Projects can start adapting services to nomadic clients, building on mobile delivery, through volunteers from each nomadic group. They could be linked to the HP nearest the point where the family settles once in the year. The rest of the year, they would carry essential drugs and health education materials with them. They could also be linked to one of the trained veterinarians and carry remedies for animals as well.

Good planning of the placement of health posts and mobile clinics points is therefore crucial. This kind of thinking is beginning to be used in the health sector. Minor aspects can also help; having a patient-held record helps if you move between different health points. However, more needs to be known about nomad usage patterns and their movements through the year.

Mothers' pre-and peri-natal needs are great, as the maternal mortality rate demonstrates; one of its causes is the severe form of circumcision practised in Somalia. Problems of accessibility and acceptability were reported for pregnant and labouring women; in Jowhar hospital, for example, the MCH-clinic appeared to be under-utilised, because of distance and lack of understanding of services. Often staff does not perceive these barriers, so that one male doctor could say that there were no barriers between pregnant women and him.

*"It is what my grandmother called the three feminine sorrows.
She said the day of my circumcision, the wedding night,
And the birth of a baby is the triple feminine sorrows.
As the birth bursts, I cry for help,
When the tattered flesh tears...."*

From: "Feminine Pain" by Somalia poet Dahabo Ali Muse in an English translation

Under-5s are brought to the service in insufficient numbers, for the same kinds of reasons.

It is recommended that projects funded from the SRP should have specific objectives that address the needs of these vulnerable groups.

To tackle the problem of maternal mortality the following approach is recommended: short- and long-term actions at project level could improve women's health status and control over resources. Projects need to develop packages of such actions with input from Somali women. They could include: helping women to have access to projects to create income, strengthening anti-natal care with iron supplementation and malaria prophylactics and the training of TBAs to modify genital mutilation.

Meeting new problems

As yet, some services can only provide limited coverage, for example for tuberculosis. Some problems can only be solved long-term by other sectors; when water and sanitation is universal cholera will disappear. The need to work with other sectors is clear as is the need to develop more flexibility to meet new problems. AIDS is not yet visible in Somalia, but an epidemic may result from refugees returning from Kenya with

the virus. Clinics in the bigger towns should start developing pilot projects in IEC.

4 EFFICIENCY

4.1 Efficiency in physical rehabilitation

Generally hospital buildings have been well restored, but at relatively high costs for materials, labour etc. This amount covers not only the physical rehabilitation but also other expenses. Village health units generally show high costs (between 6,000 - 12,000 ECU) and low engineering levels. Some health units, for example Budbud, were not monitored enough during construction so the standard is low. The following were observed during visits: overdimensioned walls, poor roof construction; a very small MCH/OPD with an over-sized veranda; as a rule no facilities provided for health education; no latrines; no water even where it is available.

In line with comments made in other sections, the construction of village health units should be funded from a Microproject Fund. This would require and improve participation and reduce costs to about 5,000 ECU (see education section 4 and the Microproject Fund). However this requires the sector to decide on the ownership of peripheral buildings. In most villages the question of ownership has not yet been clearly discussed and is constantly disputed.

Construction of the larger hospital buildings is, and will continue to be, contracted out via a tender to a local contractor. In all cases of putting up or rehabilitating structures the technical plans and costs should be standardised as much as possible. Implementers need engineering capacity among the field staff in order to supervise and counterbalance the power of the contractors. This is often not in place.

4.2 Efficiency of essential drug supplies and medical stores

The efficiency of the Essential Drugs supplies is not adequate or acceptable: see section 5.2. The only Medical store visited by the team (Borama) met the essential standards of efficient stores (water- and mouse-proof, correct temperature, correct drug flow and appropriate recording system).

4.3 Cost recovery

In health as in other sectors, cost-recovery has been introduced without a clear contextual perspective. The sensible response of the EC-Somalia Unit was to

commission a study that covered the main issues. To date some implementers have implemented "cost recovery" while others have not yet even introduced the idea to local leaders. A number of issues present themselves:

Who should be charged? Rightfully exemptions are made for certain cases. One hospital lists pregnant women, children under twelve, TB cases, urgent and needy cases -and so excludes 60% of all patients. This seriously threatens cost recovery, but does not undermine the concept of cost sharing.

Can people pay? Who and when? In the last ten years virtually everyone has been touched by the money flow from international assistance, and from outside remittances. However, hardly anything is known about the amount of money available at household level for health care or schools, and therefore what it would be reasonable to charge.

Respondents pointed out that there are important gender differences concerning ability to pay. Since men control the household money, they can find cash if they themselves are sick; men also more often by-pass the first line of care to obtain a better service in the hospital. Women, responsible for the health of more people, including children, but with very limited cash, may face problems. One woman in a focus group discussion said "men have given up responsibility for their families and keep the money for chewing qat".

If cost recovery is insisted on, then there are alternatives to payment at point of need. In other African countries, payment is once a year, at harvest time, when people have money; this resembles a direct tax system. There is a tariff for each size family, which receives a card. In some places, at harvest time, education concerning budgeting and prioritisation is directed at husbands, reinforced by the mosque.

Cost recovery will mean that more people will get help outside the sector or self-medicate.

Is the health service ready to charge? Are there alternatives? There are also factors related to service delivery. Respondents who claim that health services in Somalia are not yet up to standard, think that it is too early to charge for services.

So far, user charges have led to problems that include inadequate management and accountancy, misappropriation of funds and the inappropriate use of technologies.

Would it be worth it? The introduction of fee-for-service is only partly about money. The team concurs with Mrs. Dellicour in her comments on the Health Financing in

Somalia/Development Solution for Africa in his correspondence: "... cost recovery is not an end in itself, it is a potential tool of health financing policy". It is also part of building attitudes in people about who is responsible and who owns services. In this light, low, standardised fees for first-line care have an important role.

CISP did an experimental assessment which led to the conclusion that in the best case scenario cost recovery would be approximately 7.5%, based on fees for small surgery, big surgery and OPD. If a 20% drop in users, then occurred, the CR would drop to 6.1%, a 40% drop would lead to CR of 4.5%, a 60% drop would recover only 3% of the costs.

Cost recovery is an issue that cannot be seen in a vacuum. Over the next ten years, some kind of zonal or regional government will struggle into life, especially if there is EC strengthening of public administrative capacity. Direct and indirect taxation may begin to yield revenue that can be invested in local health care.

The team's conclusion: Any fee-for-service system needs one set of tariffs applied everywhere and effective management capacity. Cost sharing is sensible. Cost-recovery is not feasible.

Judging by the above examples and other projects which have introduced cost-recovery in different ways, and from the feasibility study "Health financing in Somalia", unless the system can be improved on considerably -including support from local taxation- and can be shaped into a coherent and functioning whole, the whole issue should be reconsidered.

For the fifth time this year, little Meriam has a fever. Her father and grandfather are discussing what to do. The family has a small stash of money that the pair controls carefully. They have to; they have very little land, and sometimes the crops fail; they work as day labourers, and cannot be sure of work next week. If the child goes with her mother to the clinic eleven miles away, her mother will miss half a day's work grinding sorghum; there will be the cost of transport and the medicines. And everyone knows that hospital medicines are very fierce, too strong really for little girls. Maybe instead, they should visit the old Koranic teacher and get herbs and an amulet containing a verse from the Koran.

4.4 Monitoring

Monitoring and the quality of care

To reach any kind of effectiveness, a health service must deliver a certain quality of care. Poor standards serve as poor advertisements.

Most of project reporting and opinions gathered during the mission imply that standards are acceptable. The team saw no strikingly bad practices on their visits nor received any serious complaints. However some questions are posed elsewhere in the

documentation. In Somaliland in 1995, there was an absence of diagnostic skills and rational recording in hospitals and periphery. From background reading, a report (Jackson 1995) described non-EC hospitals and MCHs at Hargeisha and Boroma, where children with diarrhoea were receiving antibiotics; feeding bottles were dirty and there was no health education or use of ORS therapy. If such pockets of poor performance still exist, they need improved supervision and re-training.

Monitoring and documentation

During the FRP, the relationship between the iNGOs and the EC-Somalia Unit was cooperative and regular meetings and bilateral encounters facilitated exchange of information about the fieldwork. In the files reports were found but not of all projects. It would be extremely helpful if a simple monitoring system would be put in place, reflecting work done in the major activities. The reasons which caused the limited monitoring included the work burden of the TAs, their bureaucratic burden, the difficulties of travelling in Somalia, the priorities placed elsewhere, and the lack of a good, practical monitoring procedure.

Monitoring and supervision by the implementers

Implementers in the health rehabilitation sector were found to suffer from young and inexperienced staff with a high turnover. Often a required expertise is not available in the group, for example construction and management.

A workshop in early 1997, taught implementers about the Logical Framework, and now virtually all write their proposals in this way. This made monitoring easier. However good proposals cannot replace a standardised and usable monitoring protocol, which must be developed.

Projects should to some extent monitor their own progress. One limiting factor here is that few project documents are found in the field, so that staff was unclear about their own objectives. One mission member, in all the projects he visited, only found two time plans, no other documents. One reason is that staff fears rightly that if budgets become public it may cause problems. Nevertheless, the bulk of project documents minus the budgets should be available in the field and should be used.

4.5 The efficiency of training and health education/IEC

Staff training is a stated objective in many projects and therefore gets an adequate budget. The volume of in-service training is high and detailed in section 5. The impression of the team as well as the conclusion of some projects is that training for manual skills is being done adequately or well. The team considered as an indicator the

frequency of post-vaccination infection -this was low or said to be absent. Another indicator was the accuracy of screening all cases for referral or treatment- doctors in the hospitals found generally that patients were referred to them for the right reasons.

To judge the adequacy of training/supervision in communication skills, the courtesy with which patients were treated was considered to be good, in so far as it could be judged across language barriers.

Another area of training needs is management, administration and decision taking. Somali doctors and those in leading positions in hospitals were said to be reluctant to take decisions in contentious issues -not surprising given the patterns of power with local elders and expatriates. Decision-making skills need therefore to be built up in the context of local complexities of politics and powers.

It is therefore recommended for the SRP that the expatriate doctors concentrate on management, administration and decision-taking in the medium term, thereby counterparting with the Somali doctors. In the longer term, concrete arrangement need to be developed by each project concerning the Somalianizing of functions and positions in health.

Training is an activity where expatriates can make a good input; a number of the projects, e.g. CISP projects, have provided for an external consultant as well as project staff and the result for example in Harardere is comprehensive.

It is recommended that this approach be broadened and made more efficient by having the consultant deal with specialised aspects in more than one health programme and through different organisations.

Some projects have informally identified improvements in performance as a result of training, for example with laboratory technicians performing fewer unnecessary tests.

Health Education

Efforts have been made in every project to build health education into daily activities. However, it is an activity which, as elsewhere in PHC programmes, is not done well. The team observed that where health education was done it was a short lecture type of session, with no questions or audience involvement and no use of visual aids. This type of session has generally poor results; if a smoker is told to stop smoking for ten minutes, it is unlikely that he will stop.

To conduct better health education a number of things must happen. The implementers

need to have educators available, preferably peers of the group being educated so some of them female. The means must be available and the necessary skills must be taught, for example, helping wives to negotiate for more resources to pay for medicines or feed the children.

A more radical approach is to build on existing beliefs and practices and involve communities in identifying problems, messages, visuals and activities. This approach has worked well in W&S elsewhere in Africa.

It is recommended that through existing projects, better approaches to health education be developed; that a survey or inventory be made of health beliefs and practices and education developed from there. These projects could have a remit to develop methods to be replicated elsewhere.

5 EFFECTIVENESS OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES/ACTIVITIES

The selection of objectives given below are derived from all EC funded health programmes in the FRP. Any one project would not have and could not have all of these objectives.

In this section an evaluation of each of the main objectives is provided.

Objective: To restore health services, and create more peripheral delivery through PHC

A study of project documents reveals a striking number of first-line health delivery points now functioning. They have adequate buildings, drugs, and trained staff. A small sample of four projects (in Hardera, Gedo, and Awdal) shows that between them they are responsible for 56 professionally staffed points of service delivery, outside the hospitals (20 Clinics, 22 OPDs/MCHs, 14 points served by mobile clinics) and an unknown total of HPs, 25 in one project, with services from non-professional workers.

The referral system, for example from Budbud and Wawyene to El Dere, does not always work well, owing to distances and poor communications. For emergencies, radios and ambulances are now in place, and sometimes in reality this is successful.

In the SRP the referral system should be strengthened by:

- * analysis of the problem of limited functioning of the referral system, e.g. the medical staff mentioned in many cases the problem of high-risk mothers going into labour far from the hospital -and the failure of the health sector to address the

- problem of high maternal mortality in Somalia;
- * addressing the current lack of understanding by elders and communities concerning the referral system and its importance. In most projects visited the health staff did not have the time or means to address these issues in the communities;
- * establishing a district health board in each district (see elsewhere in this report).

Whether coverage is sufficient

Records of output were well kept in all places visited, but most staff felt that coverage was low. To facilitate improvements in the SRP, records that show populations need to be developed. Once projects start mapping the populations served, they can start estimating their coverage and then chose strategies to increase it.

The biggest complaint of users -with confirmation from the medical staff- was that services were too far. This is also one explanation of the underutilisation of certain services and variation in workload. Examples of underutilisation of are antenatal services such as the MCH at Jowhar hospital. It was said in the Jowhar case that distance and traditional healers caused low attendance. In such a case it is recommended to work with the local TBAs educating them in referral, and consider the feasibility of a mobile health unit to provide services away from the centres and providing transport in emergency cases.

To remove the access barrier there are alternative possibilities:

- projects can opt for more mobile outreach, as in Awdal; the main disadvantages are the geo-political boundaries that cannot safely be crossed, and the dependency on vehicles, fuel and armed guards;
- projects can multiply the number of fixed HPs. The problem here, according to respondents, was that the EPI cold chain cannot be stretched much further;
- suggestions for reaching nomads are in section 3.4.

There are some examples of overutilisation, for example, Harardere hospital with 107% bed occupancy rate. The hospital is said to be too small for its catchment area.

Objective: To build community involvement

The approach of the health sector is to establish health boards with district health projects. It takes time to encourage these health boards to take on increasing responsibilities. A signed "memorandum of agreement" between health boards and iNGOs is now a requirement. This still needs consolidation and further focus on questions concerning the capacity of the structures and what the role of the EC-Somalia Unit should be in that regard. In discussions with the district health boards, e.g. El Dere,

is transpired that better relations between the iNGO and the hospital are a necessity to develop a sense of direction and enable the board to act, as none of the representatives spoken with had a medical background. Capacity development of local boards -in general- is a must in order realistically to expect them to be able to provide local steering and direction.

In the early stages of the FRP, community involvement, not surprisingly in the circumstance that prevailed in most of the FRP, was done superficially and in too much haste. It was community involvement on the projects' terms, not yet focusing on community management and empowerment. Decisions about for example the type of services provided were made by the projects, not by the communities. In Somalia, most communities give priority to water, but even where PRAs picked this up, the health posts were not built with a water point, even if a water source was nearby. Another example of a problem given high priority by the communities in Bari region is malaria, while none of the health units visited carried out preventive activities.

When the projects began, the priority at the periphery was to construct buildings. It has been said in the section on education that buildings are less important at the beginning than trained people and key equipment. In similar vein, in the early stages of health care rehabilitation and development, vaccinations can be given under a tree while at the same time buildings and infrastructure are being worked on. If buildings have too much priority, efforts and time needed to prepare for and construct buildings may distract from other priorities that are less easy to count, such as selection of health personnel, provision of input and development of local structure.

Community and project responsibilities

Clear responsibilities are not being spelled out at the beginning of projects, nor put unambiguously in contracts. Ownership is still unclear. Inconsistencies create problems; the same iNGO may provide cleaners and security for some health units and not for others. (El Dere town hospital and school, Budbud clinic)

Objective: To build clinics, OPDs and Health Posts

The quality of building work is discussed in section four. In general, the peripheral buildings have low engineering standards. However, all visited are functioning.

Objective: To ensure Essential Drug Supplies and EPI supplies with its cold chain Essential Drug Supply

At least four geographical areas, including Awdal, Galgadud and Mudug, are now covered by some kind of essential drugs programme. Structures have been put in place and the system made operational; in Sanaag it was ready by 1995. However, problems

outside the country, or outside the health sector, have made the delivery of drugs to point of need a haphazard business. The key role-player UNICEF manifests problems in: Management, which seems to have been inadequate concerning logistics and administrative procedures; Delayed Deliveries -one hospital had several months-long delays twice in one year; Quality of the Drug Kits -kits were found to contain drugs of poor quality, large quantities expired or very close to expiry date, other drugs missing; poor packaging with many broken bottles and incorrect documentation; (reports from Central Medical Store, hospitals in Jowhar, El Dere and Harardere, and Boroma PHC project). Although the team understands that UNICEF is not EDF funded the spending of EDF funds by implementers by procuring drugs from UNICEF needs to be taken into account.

It is noted that all INGOs have access to EDF funding for drugs with the contracts and this facility is being utilised. An additional problem for them is the difficulty of ensuring safe cargo space for a relatively small quantity and the expense of air transportation.

Rationalisation could lead to better use of each flight; it is recommended to contract a regular special flight for cargo delivery at the hospitals. It is further suggested that PSF consider taking on this problem, given their experience in the Northwest.

Discussions in the SACB-essential drugs working group and a planned consultancy will be dealing with a number of these questions.

The level of consumption of drugs

This is a problem within the projects. Several hospitals (Jowhar, El Dere, Harardere, Berbera-non EC funded) are trying to rationalise drug consumption, which is too high. This is particularly a problem when supplies are unreliable. Some of this over-consumption feeds the private market. Initiatives so far to cure this in some hospitals are awareness campaigns for the staff, and extra training in diagnosis and prescription. Cost sharing may, to some extent, cure this problem.

Expanded Programme of Immunisation: establishment of the cold chain

The cold chain is in place and is reported to be functioning well. Budbud clinic -five hours by car from El Dere- is typical, with its solar-powered freezer and refrigerator, and a supply of vaccines coming quite regularly every month. A drawback is that solar equipment, when broken or poorly delivered and installed, is difficult to repair, as at Harardere hospital.

EPI coverage is unquantified but as yet inadequate, both because of access problems,

particularly for nomads but also because of acceptability problems, with insufficient trust by the consumers in the programme. It is admitted that the number of children reached and the proportion of all immunisations that most get, are not yet reaching WHO standards. Nation-wide, UNICEF estimates that for 1990-1994, 23% of children under one had full DPT immunisation, and 35% had immunisation against measles. The team found no specific coverage figures beyond the statistics of the health posts and hospitals. This is understandable given the absence of reliable demographic data.

Improving medical stores, strengthening management, planning and logistics

These prerequisites for good drug supplies and EPI, have been achieved to an acceptable level.

Objective: To rehabilitate and expand the Somaliland orthopaedic centre

This project seems effective and attractive. It has been functioning less than two years under its present NGO, sees 300 patients annually and an estimated 200 others per year through graduate trainees.

Characteristics, which have helped its efficiency and effectiveness, include:

- professionalism: workers are trained to international standards and paid well;
- careful costing: wheelchairs are sold for about half of their value, with crutches costing \$ 10 to make, and sold for \$ 2-3;
- environment building and public relations: an enabling environment is a project objective; positive messages are promoted through the mass media.

Objective: Hospital rehabilitation

This has been done to an acceptable level; in Bosaso hospital, for example the physical restoration was well done, the operating theatre is used for a good range of operations, although in terms of numbers of operations somewhat under-utilised; drugs and equipment enable the hospital to treat specialist cases. The Bosaso hospital however suffers a number of intangible problems related to rumours, its place in the local scene and stagnant supply of inputs from UNICEF (not EC funded). Despite apologies and promises from UNICEF the goods were still seen at the store during the time of the evaluation.

The hospitals in El Dere and Harardere have been well rehabilitated and functioning up to standard.

Objective: To train staff at all levels

In-service and training is done in all projects. Again, the total volume is impressive. In El Dere hospital, for example, in three rounds of training, 51 nurses were trained for nine

days each, midwives were trained for six days and 40 auxiliaries for five days. Reports to the team were that training is done sufficiently well in most places and very well in some.

Between the HCG and the various iNGOs, job descriptions have been made for the main health worker categories; they are an important training tool. Training materials and curricula have been developed by 21 iNGOs and shared through the committee. See section also 4.5 on training efficiency.

Objective: To establish a cost recovery system in collaboration with the local authorities

Cost recovery is discussed in section four; at present, it could not be described as effective.

Objective: To strengthen planning and co-ordination within the health sector by, among other strategies, the employment of a Somalia Health Co-ordinator

The health sector now has a functional structure within which co-ordination can take place.

A few factors make co-ordination less effective:

- some of the iNGOs commented that their autonomy is diminishing;
- some of the procedures are not optimal, mainly in terms of time. The HCG aims at consensus decision-making, but, to arrive at an Essential Drugs list that everyone agreed on, it took two years;
- agreement within the committee does not mean that decisions are regarded as binding and that all participants will comply;
- Public Health approaches are beginning to be used in the sector, but the priorities of the HCG, as reflected by the working groups, are still not the priorities set by the pattern of need such as under-five malnutrition. More effective interlinkage between the nutrition working group in the SACB Food Security Sectoral Committee and the health sector committees would most likely strengthen actions related to malnutrition.

In order to maintain its good levels of performance the team suggests that the working group, having inventorised its involvement with conventional services - which have been dealt with well, now start planning also with priority health problems as the starting point. Three problems already mentioned are the inadequate coverage of nomads, pregnant women and under-fives. Examples of issues at local level that often remain unresolved are the need for local arrangements to host women with nomad background for some days with selected families in towns during treatment or in the later stages of pregnancy, free malaria prophylactics for all pregnant women, malnutrition and remedial action for

small children, income generation for women in view of the introduction of fees for service in health, detailed analysis of the link between PHC and hospitals. If the working group has a clear picture about these issues that go more in-depth than the general service, then next steps and action can be discussed and decided upon.

District Health Boards

In a number of districts, District Health Boards have been set up and some were met. In the opinion of the team they should be regarded as representative committees. Currently they are not functioning effectively as they lack any means.

It is recommended that implementers actively help to set up the District Health Boards and treat them as counterparts for planning and operations. They need material support. Identification of these volunteers should be done carefully and transparently, to ensure representativeness, relevant experience and independence.

5.1 Other issues of effectiveness

In section two, it was noted that the type of objectives in the sector means that some health problems are not systematically tackled, and will not be dealt with effectively given the model of delivery. Two of these problems, both of them serious according to UNICEF statistics, are maternal mortality and under-five malnutrition.

Ways of tackling these problems are outlined elsewhere in this report.

5.2 Effective use of trained personnel

Somali doctors are available in good numbers; they are seen as being well qualified and competent. Expatriate doctors currently fill some posts providing routine care, that Somalis could usefully fill. Expatriates are expensive and should be used carefully, with specified functions such as management, tailor-made upgrading, training and monitoring and providing support to more than one hospital. Somalia is short of qualified nurses, particularly female nurses. The 51 nurses trained in El Dere included only five women. In 1995 in Somaliland nurses were described as demoralised and without support or direction. If this is still true it needs attention.

The development of a national training course for nurses is to be welcomed, as new blood is not coming into the profession. It is recommended the EC consider supporting attempts to establish such a school. It would be necessary to do the following:

- estimate the longer-term need for general nurses and agree on job descriptions for nurses to make the curriculum job-based;
- select primary school graduates with appropriate aptitudes and design a crash 1

- year course to bring them up to entrance level;
- ensuring staffing by experienced and qualified Somalis , by making sure that teaching staff and salaries are prepared for in time;
- design an institutional structure that provides for input from the iNGOs and the self-proclaimed Government of Somaliland-Ministry of Health;
- basing the school on a hospital whose practice is a good example.

Overstaffing is happening in some places, often inherited from the time of UNOSOM or Food-for-Work programmes. Examples are Hiraan Regional Hospital - since 1997, not EDF funded- and Bosaso Hospital, with 13 medical doctors. Information from the Somalia Unit shows that funding of only 5 doctors is included in the programme. The team got the impression however that a larger number were included. In some hospitals the numbers of Somalian and expatriate doctors need review, in combination with provision of refresher courses nor upgrading during the past years. Selected doctors, particularly those in hospital management positions need training in management and administration; they also need computer skills.

5.3 Increasing effectiveness by involving Islam

Support of health initiatives by Islam has been achieved elsewhere by requesting the most important religious leaders to find answers to problems. In Senegal, EC-funded workshops were held to consider the pending threat of AIDS. As a result of long discussion and study, Imams will now discuss sexual behaviour in the mosque, and even advocate the use of condoms as a last resort. Another issue where they have helped is in teaching the need to improve the care given to women within families (a better share of the family food, contraceptives) based on studies of the Koran.

This subject may turn out to be very relevant for Somalia if large numbers of refugees return from neighbouring countries where HIV is high.

6 IMPACT

Impact on health services

The projects have defined objectives that they are reaching to an acceptable level. All activities which result from the actions of professionals (building, training professionals) are more consolidated than those that need the community to be active (health education, functioning committees). This is normal for health, especially after a project life of only one or two years.

The impact on the totality of Somalia services has not yet been quantified.

Support of the work of the Health Co-ordination Group and its efforts to change the approaches to planning, may well have a long-term positive impact and deserves continued support. It has been suggested elsewhere in this section that their Public Health approach be strengthened by more analysis that starts with health problems (MMR, under-5 malnutrition) and with the problems of service delivery (links from PHC to referral level, improving accessibility to nomads).

Impact on health

Attempts to demonstrate that improvements in health services have had an impact of health, have frequently been doomed to failure. Too many factors, mostly outside the health sector, affect health too greatly -water supplies and income levels are two examples. Within the sector, while malnutrition remains so high in the Under-5s, then the effect of immunisations may be that children do not die of measles, but of something else. Normally, health managers use improvements in health services (an output) as a proxy for improvements in health (an outcome).

Impact on attitudes

Health rehabilitation, like schools rehabilitation, has had a normalising effect on daily life in the communities. The Health sector, along with other sectors, is attempting to build certain attitudes -that people and communities have to help themselves more, that services can no longer be free. The same efforts are being made in other sectors, and some results are already showing; for example the number of school being supported by their communities and the number of volunteers working in MCHs, OPDs and Health Posts.

7 SUSTAINABILITY

Financial sustainability

Cost recovery, at a level which will sustain the sector, seems unlikely to be achieved through fees at point of use. Other taxation routes, such as annual family payments or indirect taxes, need to be considered. This has to be done in a medium- or long-term time frame. The proposed employment of a TA-Local Administration by the EC can play an important role in getting the groundwork done to enable local structures to begin to administer and raise local revenue, either on a direct tax basis or on a cost-sharing basis.

Two important studies have been done on health financing, notably Health Financing in Somalia: A feasibility study (EC/DSA 1997) and Cost recovery in the Public Health Service in Somaliland (ScF-UK 1995). Both have addressed the main question and arguments provide useful suggestions and information.

Sustainability of community support

Primary Health Care envisages that communities take over the management of the most peripheral care; however this assumes a lot of input from a highly empowered community. In Somalia, community involvement has begun, but little community empowerment.

Replicability

The concept of replicability is not an appropriate one for Somalia; projects are basically orthodox in design, using ideas from elsewhere. Models of cost cutting may emerge over time, but as yet activities have not been long in place.

8 RECOMMENDATIONS

Concerning future planning and co-ordination, it is recommended that:

- The post of the Health Sector Co-ordinator be maintained with as much continuity as possible;

- At an appropriate point in the programme cycle, the process of rethinking priorities be given even more attention, through an analysis of needs, and identification of priorities, strategies and policies;

- To ensure that policies that have been jointly agreed upon and confirmed by all actors in the health sector co-ordination group are adhered to, future contracts with iNGOs should include clauses that make the implementation of these jointly agreed decisions binding;

- The EC should become more sensitive to group functioning in the HGC; the health sector being a sector with long-term involvement in Somalia from the early onset of the crisis. The implementers had already established its co-ordination group in Mogadishu - in those days particularly dealing with prevention of cholera- before it integrated into the larger assistance programming;

- More information be obtained on key matters, through studies or as part of routine

information gathering, including:

- * an inventorisation of traditional beliefs and practices, so that health services and interventions can be promoted
- * barriers to service usage for high risk groups such as nomads and mothers
- * a household level survey of ability and willingness to pay. Other, more indirect ways of measuring ability and willingness could be extracted from other studies already available.

Concerning community involvement, it is recommended that:

Ways are found to help communities develop structures that can react to the whole spectrum of development, not just to one sector.

Concerning implementation of projects, it is recommended that:

-Support be sought from important Islamic religious leaders concerning health problems, especially AIDS and the poor health of women;

-Supervision and monitoring by the implementer as well as by the TA-Health be improved with attention to construction work.

Concerning EPI/essential drugs, it is recommended that:

-UNICEF be obliged to review and improve its procedures for management, content and packaging of essential drug kits. It is suggested to have an experienced INGO or private sector involved with procurement and supply management, e.g. PSF;

-Cargoes required by a number of hospitals be combined and ECHO-flights contracted for special charters.

Concerning staff and training, it is recommended that:

-The setting up of a Nursing School in Somalia be encouraged;

-The private sector continues to be trained and involved in key health interventions.

Concerning development/strengthening of local institutions, it is recommended that:

-Institution strengthening be focused particularly on district level structures;

-Implementers in every sector be encouraged to communicate with District Boards, encourage their functioning while keeping clear their voluntary status.

PART III INFRASTRUCTURE

For the purpose of this study, infrastructure means the following sub- sectors:

- * Roads and Airstrips
- * Water Supply and River Embankments
- * Ports
- * Housing
- * Public Buildings

Where necessary, infrastructure will be discussed under sub-sector headings **Roads and Airstrips; Water Supply (including river embankments); Ports; Public Building and Housing.**

1 PREAMBLE

In the early seventies in Somalia, a political approach called "scientific socialism" advocated popular participation through local councils and worker-management committees. Most of the infrastructure of industry, services and land became nationalised. During the seventies Somalia enjoyed a relatively prosperous period with large investments in irrigation schemes, water supply and agro-business. Nearly all these structures remained government property, even after the political changes of the late seventies, when Somalia became an ally of the western block in the cold war. For more than twenty five years, infrastructure, even at the lowest level, was seen as belonging to the government, not to the people.

The government was often unable to find the cost of operation and maintenance (O&M). This lack of maintenance became chronic and structural. At intervals a fresh input from outside became essential, usually from a donor. Donors thus became part of the problem.

During the civil wars and turmoil of the early nineties, much of the frustration and anger became focused on Mr. Siad Barre and therefore on the infrastructure which belonged to that government. The result was looting and demolition, sometimes beyond repair.

Such local authority as kept going, including the elder committees, attempted to keep safe the most needed infrastructures, such as government stores and buildings, water supply systems and bridges. Sometimes they were successful, more often they failed.

The picture after the war was bleak. The destruction of river control structures led to flooding and the loss of large parts of the crops. The poor condition of some roads

connecting major trade centres seriously interrupted regional trading. Cargo handling equipment and storage facilities in ports were either looted or damaged, resulting in difficulties in the export of livestock, so vital for the foreign currency earnings. Poor, non-functioning or damaged urban water supply systems mean water-borne diseases such as cholera.

The need for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure at the start of the EC First Rehabilitation Programme was evident. However, unlimited humanitarian assistance in the early nineties under UNISOM created expectations of free assistance almost on request; this has led to attitudes of donor dependency among the Somali population.

2 PROGRAMME PREPARATION AND DESIGN

Several applications were submitted by international NGOs for the financing of rehabilitation works at the start of the FRP in 1994. Project formulation was done by the applying international NGOs, in some cases with the strong participation of a local Somali counterpart. The EC-Somalia Unit requested assistance in assessing the need for rehabilitation of infrastructure and external expertise was obtained under two contracts.

In most applications of the international NGOs there was not sufficient time for formal ranking of needs, due to the prevailing situation on the ground. However, priorities emerged. The identification of needs was first and foremost done by the iNGO, in some cases in strong co-operation with counterparts (ADRA - SAACID; Novib - SPDS) or with strong participation from the local authorities (LVIA - regional council Nugal). The identification approach was often a field investigation based on some kind of rapid rural appraisal using historical wisdom available within the international community as many secondary data within the country had been destroyed during the war. Security was often the limiting factor during field research. UN agencies such as UNICEF and UNCTAD, both with long-term valuable experience in Somalia, identified key areas in infrastructure for intervention: UNICEF for the rehabilitation of urban water supply systems, while UNCTAD had identified the management capacity and port handling capacity as a main area of attention.

A pragmatic analysis of the proposed projects by the external consultant Klauck resulted in late 1994 in several international NGOs receiving financial assistance for infrastructure rehabilitation works. The majority of these works were rehabilitation of water supply points -berkads (small underground water basins built of concrete), wells,

boreholes and troughs for cattle drinking. A study for the rehabilitation of infrastructure in the ports of Berbera, Bosaso and Kismayo by ADK Consulting engineering led finally to major rehabilitation works in the port of Berbera carried out by four local contractors under the supervision of ADK.

In some projects, not all the stakeholders, in particular the beneficiaries, were sufficiently consulted during the identification and appraisal of needs. This is evident in project documentation and from the fact that several structures are now complete but not being used; examples include a slaughterhouse in Garoowe and a laboratory in Berbera. Interviews with a quota sample of potential beneficiaries around several of these facilities, confirmed among other things the lack of sufficient target group consultation. Developments whereby groups, who had asked for the facility, desolve before completion should have led to questions if and how to continue with the project. An example is the slaughterhouse in Garoowe; women who make a living slaughtering small livestock are not using the facility because of the distance, which they consider being too far in order to properly look after their children during work. However there is also evidence that camels have been slaughtered just outside the fence, making the basket of reasons probably too complicated for outsiders to further judge upon.

...water supply: traditional and privatised (Harardere)...

Although planning in the infrastructure sector at the start of the FRP was often based on a piecemeal approach, it often also created quick solutions for burning problems. A problem emerged and a solution had to be found, if necessary with the help of external expertise from consultants. An example is the rehabilitation of the town water supply of Berbera, supplying again sufficient water to the urban population. Rehabilitation works of the town water supply system in late 1995 were completed by COOPI in mid 1997, while in the meantime a consultancy study on the water distribution network in Berbera town identified the main as a key problem in mid 1996. Much secondary data about the systems have been lost during the war and a masterplan on urban water supply is now clearly missing. In other regions a more coherent approach in a specific sub-sector was developed, such as the Bari water rehabilitation study .

The projects in the infrastructure sector funded under the FRP and a Budget Line are as follows (rounded off at 100 ECU):

Sub sector	Number of projects	Total costs of projects (ECU)	No of Projects Completed	Number of studies	Total costs of studies (ECU)
Water Supply	14 + (1)	5,372,100 + 1,301,700 ¹	11 ² + (1)	7 + (1)	394,500
Roads and Airstrips	2	116,500 + 357,000 ¹	2	1 + (1)	84,500
Port projects	6	1,629,700	0	2	108,600
Housing and Buildings	2 + (1)	1,006,200	1 + (1)	-	-
Overall Totals	25	9,783,200	15	11	587,600

Notes:

(1) = (combined) : project within sub sector combined with project in another sub sector

¹ = Budget Line funding

² = one project has been suspended due to mismanagement within the local counterpart of the implementing international NGO.

On average it took seven months more than anticipated to implement a project.

3 RELEVANCE OF THE PROJECT

At the start of the FRP, the focus of many international emergency NGOs in Somalia was still on health, nutrition, water and sanitation. Few of the international NGOs had

therefore any experience with infrastructure.

As the above table shows, FRP activities were in line with priorities identified in the discussion paper on linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. The emphasis was clearly on the provision of safe drinking water through the rehabilitation of water sources such as wells and town water supply systems; physical infrastructure such as roads and airstrips was given some priority. Ports became an important sub-sector because of their important role in trade. Some completed projects seem now less urgent than others that still need financing do. An example in the road sub-sector is the priority given to the road Jowhar - Mogadishu over the need for rehabilitation of the main access road South of Berbera town.

Implementation capacity among local contractors was limited due to the refugee brain drain and the fact that many companies had lost equipment. Partners for the implementation of the infrastructure works were as a result scarce.

This limited implementation capacity among local contractors, seriously reduced the number of projects done through works contracts between iNGOs and local contractors; some were; most projects were initially implemented under direct management of the international NGO.

More recently, the project saw the introduction of pre-qualification and tendering procedures for works contracts using local contractors as implementers; these procedures have also increased the transparency of the whole procedure for the local population. The start of most tenders is a pre-qualification meeting organised by a tender committee, with representatives from the local authorities and one of the international NGO or organisation. Selection of companies for the bidding procedure is the responsibility of this tender committee. The transparency applied in the tender (the opening of all bids in a public meeting), consultation with and explanation to all interested parties concerning the outcome of the decision by the tender committee has a stabilising effect on the local society. Works are awarded via a local tender procedure where the local authorities play a vital role. Tenders are normally only awarded for major works. Minor works are executed with daily labour.

In programmes with co-financing of the FRP, the objectives of the donors in the project do not have to be entirely the same. In the water supply project for Kandala town, the European Union has a special interest in the provision of safe drinking water for the population of Kandala town, while for the co-funding organisation Novib, the increased institutional capacity of the local counterpart SPDS is of greatest importance. The programme is therefore designed in such way that the two objectives can be

complementary to each other.

The objectives of the donors in other co-funding programmes such as the water supply of Jowhar town (UNICEF) and the technical assistance programme to the major ports (UNCTAD) seem also to be in line with each other. More information on the implementation of these projects is given in the following sections.

Although four projects have been funded under a Budget Line some conclusions refer to these projects, as there are lessons to be learned. It concerns three water supply projects and one road upgrading.

4 EFFICIENCY

In some instances there has been a clear lack of co-ordination in the past between actors in the same sub-sector preparing interventions in infrastructure. Regarding projects funded under the FRP, there are examples of interfering and contradictory actions on the ground in water supply projects, such as the situation in Burtinle village in Nugal region with ADRA drilling a new borehole and Christian Aid wanting to rehabilitate an old borehole, located at about 50 meter distance. However this situation was in the process of being resolved during the visit. In some regions, a start has been made with water and sanitation co-ordination meetings, as a result of co-ordination in the SACB water and sanitation sectoral committee. This has happened also in Nugal, where finally the actors were forced to modify their lack of co-ordination.

In most cases, the infrastructure, as part of wider projects implemented under the FRP, has been constructed up to standard, especially in the projects, which has been implemented by local contractors. The costs of the structures range from reasonable to expensive, also depending on the level of beneficiary participation during the execution of the projects.

Roads and Airstrips

Two projects have been funded, one airstrip upgrading under the FRP and one road upgrading under a Budget Line. Both projects have been implemented by local contractors using the tender procedure. Monitoring in both cases is executed by iNGOs, leading to acceptable standards of work. Although the tender procedure stimulates competition, it cannot guarantee it when there is only one company available with the capacity to actually execute the job, such as the El Dere airstrip.

Water Supply and river embankments

A total of 11 projects concern the provision of safe drinking water, in most cases through the rehabilitation of existing water supply systems. Three of such systems received funding under a Budget Line. The four other projects concern the rehabilitation of irrigation canals and water supply for livestock and crops, of which one combined with a construction project. Under the second rehabilitation programme a start has been made with the necessary rehabilitation of river embankments.

Many of the water programmes during the initial phase of the FRP were executed directly by an international organisation, using direct labour contracts or daily labourers; or executed in co-operation with a local counterpart.

The type of technology ranges from simple and appropriate for the target group (berkads, wells) to sophisticated (deep drilling to over 300 meter), technology beyond the comprehension of the average users. The latter is used where alternative sources for safe drinking water are very scarce, although it seems that deep drilling is too often considered the only option, without considering a combination of alternative sources. ETC in its report on the Evaluation of Water Projects and Assessment of Water Needs in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle Regions states that "like (in) many other developing countries, experts in Somalia used to be ahead of communities in the choice of technologies, design and even selection of sites". Rainwater catchment from roofs particularly is an alternative needing further exploitation. Community participation during implementation is in general very low, except for the Kandala water project (see box in part 7) and the Awdal water programme of COOPI. Detailed analysis of alternatives based on cost-benefit calculations is lacking in many water proposals, adding to costs of the projects.

If investment in rehabilitation in irrigation schemes is to be made sustainable, then engineering methods applied in the river embankment rehabilitation need to be kept up to standard and made cost-effective. The sustainability of all investment in irrigation schemes depends largely on the establishment of broadly representative river authorities. This applies in particular for the Shabelle River Embankment project, which did not have one during initial works prior to implementation.

Ports

The works proposed for the upgrading of Berbera harbour have been tendered via standard EC bidding procedures. The standard of the work of the four local contractors in general is good. Due to the absence of a banking system in Somaliland, the local companies had to pre-finance the start of the works. This did not cause many problems, as they could rely on relatives and business connections. The system, with overall supervision from ADK proved workable, as ADK also plays a pivotal role in the financial procedures and payment of the four local contractors. The supervision provided by ADK

is good and tailor made to contractors needs.

The tasks and mutual relations between UNCTAD and ADK are not made explicit in the service contracts of the EC with either contractor. So is the relation between UNCTAD and ADK ("the Supervisor") directed in the terms of reference for ADK by the statement that "payments against accepted works (following acceptance statements by the Supervisor, checked by the Port Authority with the technical assistance of UNCTAD) will be made directly by the Supervisor...". Further indicates the ADK contract only that UNCTAD will be "providing technical assistance and support during the implementation of the project". In the service contract of UNCTAD with EC it is only stated that 'the project will also assist the EC infrastructure rehabilitation, where possible with oversight and guidance'. The legal relationship between UNCTAD and ADK regarding the port programmes should have been detailed in a tripartite agreement between UNCTAD - ADK - EC, governing in turn the two separate service contracts.

The UNCTAD programme to assist the ports with the development of a sustainable management structure, is proving to be cumbersome. The situation at the start of the programme in the port of Berbera is said to have been extremely poor. Security was a daily problem and the port was in a state of chaos. After a short period governed by a board of directors, the port came in 1995 directly under the Ministry of Commerce. Unfortunately the port increased its workforce from around 180 in 1995 to over 200 persons in 1997, with labour already identified as an area of attention in the improvement of operation efficiency. In house training of local port staff on subjects such as cargo handling and registration receives continued attention from the UNCTAD staff. Training on international maritime law and regulations, in addition to training on piloting and computing, are identified as priorities in discussions with the Berbera port staff. The mechanics workshop, with its predominantly Russian equipment, has been repaired and rehabilitated up to standard, but is hardly used for maritime business work according to the logbook and jobcards. One year after the start of the management assistance programme for the Somali ports the progress in Berbera is far below the expressed target of an efficient and effective port operation; envisaged outcomes, presented in the project proposal as being realistic, are proving to be far beyond current reach. Port operations in Bosaso under the assistance programme give a more efficient impression, although the wharf is much more cramped than the one in Berbera.

There is urgent need to reconsider the whole assistance programme and have a separate mid term review to redesign this programme with more modest outcomes.

Public Buildings and Housing

The four public building projects in Bosaso have all been awarded via pre-qualification and normal tender, to four different local companies. The standard of work of the prison, police station and the administration block has been up to standard, also due to the

excellent supervision on behalf of UNCTAD. However none of the three completed public buildings had been used up to September, partly because of the claim by the relevant authorities that some essential services including water and electricity were still to be provided. The buildings have upon completion in mid 1997 been handed over to the main political faction in the region, awaiting a new authority to emerge.

The housing programme of Diakonia is an example of a project with relatively strong local community participation. The criteria for qualification under the programme for the potential beneficiary were as follows:

Being poor, a homeless, displaced or returning family; being a single parent family with children; being capable of contributing the local materials and the unskilled labour; not being owner of any other house in the North Eastern Region and having the intention of settling permanently. The contribution in cash for the construction fee of their houses is between U\$ 400 to U\$ 650 per family, mostly borrowed from relatives. The quality of the construction ranges from satisfactory to very good. An optimal use of locally available building materials has been made against low costs. While some alterations were made to individual houses, the basic design model, especially the size, remained fixed for all sites. The zinc roof is the weakest point in the design, due to winds prevailing in the area.

The costs of materials to be imported (cement, roofing sheets, planks etc.) as a percentage of the total direct construction costs are around 50%, twice the value found in other rehabilitation programmes. This low-cost housing is fully utilised and highly appreciated by the beneficiaries.

Conclusions

In the infrastructure projects, the level of beneficiary participation is generally low. This is not surprising since, in the proposals of many projects, items which could easily be contributed by beneficiaries, are budgeted to the project: Examples of such budget items are water, sand, gravel, unskilled labour, transport for local materials, storage and part of the security costs etc. In most proposals the costs for labour, storage of goods, security and transport are relatively high in relation to the costs for imported materials, going against the self-help principles usually introduced into micro-projects.

The costs of these infrastructure projects, therefore, range from reasonable to expensive, depending on the level of beneficiary participation.

The percentage of total project costs spent on imported materials offers here a clear indicator of the cost-effectiveness of different smaller infrastructure projects: the lower this percentage the more has been spent on locally available goods as water,

sand, gravel, unskilled labour, transport, storage and security; although all necessary items, not necessarily always donor contribution. The cost price of those materials not locally available, nearly all materials to be imported, is the cost at the harbour (CIF) plus transport costs plus a mark-up for the trader. Imported materials in Somalia include cement, iron sheets and bars etc. In most of smaller infrastructure projects, such costs for imported materials and non-local materials are normally the largest part of budget, given a minimum level of beneficiary participation in implementation. In the EC Microprojects concept this part of budget is often contribution of the donor and could be up to 75% of the total implementation costs. The contribution in kind or cash of the local community, covering the locally available materials, would be therefore at least 25%.

One example of a smaller infrastructure project in Somalia is well rehabilitation, in its essence a Microproject with scope for strong beneficiary participation. However in practice there was little beneficiary contribution except for some labour, provision of shelter for the work force and security in the rehabilitation projects for (shallow) wells, executed by among others iNGOs like LVIA, Africa 70 and Oxfam Quebec. These works resulted in rehabilitated wells where the costs of the imported materials as part of the overall rehabilitation costs only constituted around twenty percent. The remainder, also paid by EC, was spent on local materials like stones, sand, gravel etc.; on labour, skilled and unskilled, security and on transport. The consultant ETC calculates the capitalised actual community contribution in such rehabilitation and construction at only 4 to 5% of the total costs. (in "Evaluation of Water Projects and Assessment of Water Needs in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle Regions", 1996). It is no wonder that the village sometimes still considers the water point as "owned" by the NGO. Williams in his "Study for the rehabilitation of infrastructure water supply & sanitation in Gedo Region Somalia" states on the other hand that there "where the beneficiaries of a project provided real input, and especially where they were involved in the work, a superior standard of maintenance and pride of ownership exists". He continues with: "this observation does not extend to those projects which were given gratis or where the community contribution had no tangible value".

In contrast, a low-cost housing programme with considerable beneficiary contribution in cash resulted in a high percentage of 50% for the imported material component as part of the overall project costs, indicating low costs for other budget items. This reflects clearly one principle of Microprojects whereby self-help contributions in kind or cash reduce considerably the cost to be made on locally available (or non imported) project items, and therefore reduce total project costs. Such is further supported by ALPMAN's conclusion in his study in 1996 on "Water Supply and Sanitation in Awdal" that "total project costs were reduced by community participation in form of labour and the provision of some materials". The sense of ownership for projects can even be reflected in external costs for security. In well construction -with low beneficiary participation-

costs for security at the project site alone constitute at least 5% of direct project costs, while for the housing programme -with relatively high beneficiary participation- this percentage is only around 1.5% of direct project costs. Not surprising, if something is going to be to their benefit, people will protect it against looting.

Programme monitoring

Monitoring has been executed on two levels in this programme: by the NGO or the international organisation concerning the performance of the local contractor and by the EC-Somalia Unit concerning the NGO or international organisation, being the partner for the EC-Somalia Unit. The partners are obliged to present quarterly reports to the EC-Somalia Unit, consisting of narrative reports and financial reports. Given the volume of projects in infrastructure the responsible TA was not able to follow up on all the projects. Neither did any of the fellow TAs take over part of this monitoring, resulting in situations where completed projects were only visited once: during appraisal stage (Kandala water scheme).

The monitoring requirements of the EC-Somalia Unit during the FRP presented some problems:

- Instructions concerning financial and narrative reporting in project implementation, particularly during the first 2 years, were considered by the iNGOs as inconsistent and unclear. Recent guidelines have however improved this;
- Although many projects see the local authority as playing an important role, it is not obligatory for NGOs to report regularly on their activities to Somali local authorities, leaving local authorities not informed about progress. In some instances, like in Hiraan region, this even created a hostile environment.

5 EFFECTIVENESS

Roads and Airstrips

The rehabilitated infrastructure resulted in improved access for the towns El Dere and Jowhar. Although use is mainly by specific user groups such as businessmen, both projects increased access of the local population to goods like food and drugs.

Water Supply

Claims were made by implementers that the improved access to safe drinking water has resulted in the decline of water borne-diseases. This is probably premature; most systems have not been operating long, and water is only one element of the solution. All water projects visited have improved the access to water. However it is reasonable to

assume a contribution over time to better health.

Ports

Good progress has been made in the volume of cargo, manually handled, and the turn-around time for ships in Berbera port. Although the target is set at 1,500 tonnes per day, off loading of over 2,000 tonnes per day has been recorded this year. The role of Berbera port as a container terminal is however modest: the port handles on average 70 containers per month, according to statistics provided by the port manager. This low volume is according to the harbour staff due to a lack of spareparts for the cargo handling equipment.

Output of the whole assistance programme is not very quantifiable. The new accounting system for the port operations, introduced under the UNCTAD programme, is well received by the port staff in Berbera and has improved transparency of port operations. The fact that part of the workforce only exists on paper needs attention. There is in this respect clearly a difference in envisaged outcome of the programme between the regional authorities and the programme. Cargo handling is still not adapted to the type of cargo, leading to low handling efficiency and substantial percentages of damaged goods. This can only be partly debited to the lack of appropriate handling equipment. Piles of damaged sacks of Portland cement and sugar were found lying next to and over each other during the visit to the port. Privatisation of the stevedoring system seems to be out of the question. Changing the system in order also to create competition, is considered premature and by insiders a risk concerning security. The harbour still employs around 50% more people than is strictly necessary for an efficient operation. Despite this huge work force on the floor and the investment made in training, the port, with its chaotic cargo handling and untidy environment is nowhere near international standards, although competitive according to regional standards.

Conclusions

The fact that in some instances the local water committees and local authorities, even two years after completion, ask the international NGOs to carry out repairs, indicates clearly that a sense of ownership is still low.

On the other hand, those projects with a considerable contribution and participation of the local community in the project cycle, such as the housing scheme and some of the water supply systems, result in a high sense of ownership.

The cut-off point and subsequent handing over of the project to the user committees is sometimes unclear and so contributes to the dependency described above. The "Contract of Responsibility for the Water Well" of ADRA is somewhat weak on community participation during implementation but strong on cut-off point (handing over)

and responsibilities of the beneficiaries of the water point.

In general one can say that infrastructure projects, such as the continuous provision of safe water, lead to improvements in the health and social welfare of households. It is difficult to assess the contribution made by most projects to the economic well being of the beneficiaries, except for the savings a beneficiary makes on costs otherwise incurred, for example in acquiring a commodity such as water.

Projects that are implemented through local contractors using tender procedures need more on-the-job training and supervision than was anticipated during appraisal. The standard of workmanship, like in the harbour projects and the public building projects, is in general very good and the transfer of skills by an expert consultant improves the competence and capacity of local contractors considerably.

Development of institutional management capacity in the harbour project of UNCTAD is currently behind schedule and not in line with the project objective of creating management structures in order to operate at internationally acceptable standards. The latter is probably too ambitious and the main objectives should be reformulated in more modest outcomes. At best regional standards could be achieved.

The Addis Ababa Declaration made stability, security and an operational local authority conditional during the full duration of the project; however it would be too optimistic to assume that local communities continuously fulfil these criteria. In consequence, there have been some cases of interruption or cancellation of projects. The overall achievement regarding volume of construction in infrastructure is however to be applauded.

6 IMPACT

Many projects in infrastructure were either nearing completion, just completed or in operation for not more than a year, making it too early to measure full impact. More project operation time is needed to assess the contribution of the projects in a broader context.

The implementation of several infrastructural works via tender procedures definitely contributed to the further emergence and re-establishment of a civil engineering sector in Somalia, a sector that suffered heavily from the looting during the war. The transparency of the tendering procedure for infrastructural works encourages competition among the local companies and increases finally the competence of local

contractors. There is, however, a strong need for on-the-job training and supervision and this should be fully considered during future project preparations.

A total of eleven studies have been carried out, seven concerning the rehabilitation of water supply systems under the FRP, two on ports and two on roads and general infrastructure rehabilitation; this has contributed to the institutional wisdom in the sector. However, the development of sectoral and/or regional planning capacity is still an expatriate affair. Very few local authorities, such as regional and district councils, have developed a policy planning on infrastructure.

The impact of water and sanitation programmes on natural resources needs further investigation. More information is needed concerning the possible long-term depletion of valuable water resources through the drilling of boreholes up to 300 meter deep. This in turn has led to changes in grazing patterns by the livestock of the nomads, having now access to water in areas where technology in the past was not able to create such. There are areas in Somalia where natural resources such as rangelands are currently exploited beyond ecological carrying capacity. Insufficient consideration has been given to this issue which crosscuts the livestock sector and the water and sanitation sector.

7 SUSTAINABILITY

The sustainability of many projects is not given sufficient consideration during the appraisal of the projects. Although many interventions concern rehabilitation of infrastructure one should have expected that the attitude of donor dependency created in the early nineties as a result of free assistance almost on request, should have made all actors in the infrastructure sector particularly aware of this issue.

Roads and Airstrips

The two projects are both beyond the capacity of the local community in terms of maintenance. If no feasible maintenance for the structures is to be found, the investments is feared to be a write-off in less than four or five years. However some form of private management, already concluded during the appraisal stage and based on cost recovery, might sustain the investment over a longer period. If such can not be secured these projects are considered not sustainable and should not be repeated in this manner.

Water Supply

Water supply systems using a technology, which is within the technical capabilities of the target group, are reasonably sustainable. In all cases it remains necessary to train local committees on operation and maintenance of the system, to develop optimal institutional capacity for such and to train beneficiaries on sanitation awareness. Although Kandala water scheme has everything to become a success story with its active water committee, the need for training is still urgent and must be addressed by the donors EC and particularly by Novib.

The majority of the water points or schemes have local water committees, and it is encouraging that women are represented in these committees in increasing numbers, and although a minority actively contributing. In most projects, due consideration to the ownership issue and management of the water source has been given: in most cases there is public ownership and management but in some places a choice has been for private management of public goods (the urban water supply Jowhar). None of these factors, though, is a guarantee of sustainability in the long run. It is very doubtful whether water systems using capital-intensive methods such as deep drilling, or generator sets on boreholes with low yields (Christian Aid, Nugal region) are ever going to reach sustainability. There is no indication in these places that the beneficiaries are saving for future replacements. Such is supported by similar experiences concerning management of boreholes in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions, where an evaluation of water projects by ETC in 1996 revealed that "whenever break downs occur, they usually wait for a donor to provide funds for repair, and in the meantime revert to traditional sources" and that "in all cases, no money is set aside to cater for occasional repairs when breakdowns occur".

Ports

It is probably too early to comment on the sustainability of the investment in upgrading the management capacity of the ports. It is however hoped that the investment will lead to a sustained improvement of the port management capacity, given also a reformulating of envisaged outcomes. The future maintenance of the rehabilitation of the infrastructure in the port, as currently executed by the four private contractors, is therefore not yet guaranteed. A transparent and adequate tax system might be able to make reservations for such maintenance. This point needs attention in the future handing over of the infrastructure to the responsible authorities.

Public Building and Housing

There was serious doubt by the team during the visit as to whether the sustainability of the public buildings constructed under the UNCTAD programme in Bosaso could be assured. None of the structures completed and in July 1997 handed over to the SSDF, the main political faction in the region, were used: neither the prison, nor the

administration block and the police station. The collapse of local authority in Northeast Somalia, after approval of the projects by the EC, had seriously hindered the search for sustainable solutions. Since October 1997 Bari region has however a new governor, ensuring much needed continuity of local authority; the administration block and the police station have since started to be used. The problem of a generator for electricity for the prison is, according to latest information, being resolved. The slaughterhouse for camels in Garoowe and the veterinary laboratory in Berbera are unfortunately still not being used, however still in reasonable good state. If no alternative use is to be found, one may fear that the investments in some public facilities have been lost. The private housing constructed under the Diakonia programme however has generated a high sense of ownership and therefore made future sustainability most likely.

Concluding remarks

There is great need to build a sense of ownership, through beneficiary contribution and, in the long run, to build sustainability through good cost-recovery systems and/or private management of public utilities. The historic and structural lack of maintenance in Somali infrastructure -the tradition of non-sustainability- is behind much of the decay of facilities such as water supplies and tarmac roads. Users of such facilities will have to find ways for maintenance based on an enhanced sense of ownership.

In rural settings, local social networks could guarantee the sustainability of public utilities such as water supply. The water supply system of Kandala could become an example of this:

Kandala water supply system

Kandala is a small town of around 5,000 people in Northeast Somalia at the coast of the Gulf of Aden, situated in a very arid mountainous region.

In early 1997, a project was begun to improve its fragile water supply through the construction of a gravity system able to supply water for up to 12,000 people, and benefiting in addition the surrounding nomads and their cattle.

A gravity system of twelve kilometres has since been constructed using a natural spring as source, and has three drinking points for animals along the pipeline. The existing water tanks in the village have been rehabilitated and six public water taps constructed.

The local community, represented and co-ordinated by twenty elders, contributed significantly. They transported materials to the first camp in the mountains, using mostly lorries and camels. They provided the water for the construction. Further transport had to be done on foot and was paid for per item transported. Around 200 people were employed in the project. The local women' organisation played a crucial role in feeding the workers, sometimes in difficult spots in the mountains and providing basic medical services.

Responsibility for the water system has now been delegated to the water committee. This committee has been elected for two years and has sixteen members, of whom three are women. A technical subcommittee of seven people is responsible for maintenance and repairs of the system, and they have developed a good surveillance system to check the condition of the pipeline.

The system charges 10 Shs per litre, which is considered sufficient for funding operation and

maintenance, including payment to the members of the technical committee responsible for surveillance and repairs.

The local organisation SPDS, the initiator of the project, has gained considerable experience, partly through co-operation with an international water NGO during the project execution. It now has the confidence to embark on future development projects in the region. The community is very happy with its choice of gravity system, with its lower operation and maintenance costs, compared to the next alternative, a pump system. It also prefers this system because the technology is more appropriate to its own technical skills.

The training of the local water committee in operation and maintenance still has to take place. There is however some concern within SPDS that the momentum created with the completion in July 1997 will be lost if this is not taking place soon. This training should also strengthen the institutional capacity of this committee.

An important factor in this success of the Kandala scheme is without doubt the strong social cohesion within this village. During the years of trouble no government building was looted; local networks were kept intact and no one was allowed to act on his grievances.

An example of private maintenance of public goods is the urban water supply in Jowhar:

Jowhar water supply system

Jowhar is a town of around 20,000 people in the Middle Shabelle region in Somalia. The EC contributed ECU 700,000 in total towards the rehabilitation of the existing water supply scheme, this including equipment, personnel, works and overhead costs. The scheme is rehabilitated by UNICEF and is in operation since August 1997. A private company, Farjanno is leasing the water supply system of Jowhar from the local authorities.

The company consists of 14 representatives of elders and businessmen, selected by the local authorities and, on the whole, respected by the community.

Farjanno has an initial three years lease. In turn, it leases water points to private entrepreneurs, who operate 15 metered water points as private businesses. Operators are ex-employees of the Somalia Water Board, which ceased to exist in 1991, or relatives of those who died. Five of the fifteen are women. Farjanno charges the operators Shs 5,000 per cubic metre, or five Shs a litre; operators in turn charge the consumer around ten Shs per litre. To put these prices in context, market prices in the same town in 1997 show a litre of camel's milk costing about Shs 2,000, and a kilo of sorghum at between Shs 1,900 and Shs 3,600. By comparison, water is very cheap.

The company pays five- percent tax on profits to the local authorities; they, however, have no obligation to re-invest in the system. Farjanno is responsible for all maintenance of the system, future replacements and extensions of the system.

The weak point of this project is the difficulty of estimating the net profits made by Farjanno. A proposal to tax the total water yield failed because of resistance from Farjanno.

8 CONCLUSIONS

Beneficiaries

The policy and principles applied in selection of beneficiaries is an appropriate and sound one and puts the responsibility where it ought to be: with the local authorities and elders, this is despite the fact that identified groups of vulnerable people sometimes get added to: in the housing programme some families are included who could have afforded to build a house without the programme.

Outcome

The tendering procedures for works contracts, introduced at the end of the first year of the FRP, meant an increase in the transparency of project implementation and has had some stabilising effect on local societies. There is evidence that as the use of direct works contracts is replaced by the use of tender procedure, the conflict resolution capacity of local authorities gained as a result. By nature, every tender is a source of conflict. It also encourages professional competition among companies and increases the competence of local contractors, having a positive effect on the standard of work. The use of expatriate consultancy for supervision and on hands training of local contractors is contributing to the standard of work and competence.

Costs remained in general high in most of the sub-sectors during the FRP, although this is difficult to quantify. Ownership of rehabilitation projects has to be determined with all stakeholders in advance, in order to better guarantee sustainability in the long run. Projects with a significant beneficiary contribution in kind or cash, have better community ownership. There is evidence that with more community participation in the rehabilitation of simple water supply works, the same results are achieved but more cheaply. The same holds true in small infrastructure works in housing, education and health sector.

9 RECOMMENDATIONS

Expertise

It is recommended that expertise available within the EC-Somalia Unit regarding conflict resolution and institutional capacity building be integrated into the project cycle; the introduction of relatively capital-intensive projects into Somali society brings higher risks of conflict creation. This does not imply any external mediation role in conflicts.

Participatory Rural Appraisals need to be used more carefully, to ensure that all the stakeholders, including beneficiaries, contribute to the process of identification of needs, and the choice of technical design. The technology chosen should be the most

appropriate for the target group. The choice of Cash-for-Work should be applied only where appropriate, for example the rehabilitation of river embankments, rehabilitation of irrigation canals and simple road repairs. All choices must lead to the building of local ownership so that future sustainability is ensured.

The cut-off point and subsequent handing over of the project to the users' committees should be agreed upon in advance. This point needs to be clearly worked out in the handing over of particularly public infrastructure to the responsible authorities.

Sustainability

Strategies must be identified and implemented to change attitudes to infrastructure-the lack of ownership, the low commitment to maintenance, the use of replacement funds for O&M, this all needs the attention of all involved. If rehabilitation is to create a sustainable condition for structural development then a tailor-made strategy for each sub-sector should be developed in order not to repeat the mistakes of the (recent) past. Significant beneficiary contributions to planning and implementation (cash and kind) are one such strategy.

10 LESSONS LEARNED

To ensure this, a Microprojects Programme should be developed as an integral part of the Rehabilitation programme, following the experiences of other ACP countries. Proposed programmes should be thoroughly screened for the scope for applying the concepts of self-help. The regional offices of the European Commission in Somalia (Mogadishu, Berbera and Bosaso) could facilitate the execution of such programme. Decisions should however only be made in Nairobi in the EC-Somalia Unit (see further part X, Microprojects).

Programmes where there is not much scope for beneficiary participation should make as much use as possible of local contractors.

PART IV AGRICULTURE

For the purpose of this study, agriculture means the following sub-sectors:

* Food Security Assessment

* Agricultural Production, subdivided into:

seed production

extension including credit and agro-processing

irrigation and flood control management

erosion control including oasis agriculture

1 PREAMBLE

Somalia is heavily dependent on the agricultural sector. It provides the main source of income for more than 70 %of the population. Livestock and crop production, agro-forestry and fisheries represented over 65% of the GDP and 95% of export earnings in 1988 (FAO 1995). In times of crisis, the livelihood of the people depends entirely on what rural resources can offer.

Somalia has been a structurally food-deficit country since independence (EIU, 1997). Crops tend to fail once in every three to five years, primarily due to inadequate rainfall. The pre-war averages of cereal production covered only some 60% of total demand in the country and production per capita has diminished since then. The Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU) estimates the annual demand for domestic food at 650,000 tonnes of cereals. Despite imports, the estimated deficit for cereals in the period 1993 till 1996 ranged between 150,000 tonnes and 200,000 tonnes, having a severe impact on the nutritional status of the population.

It is strategically important, therefore, that the rural sector be supported, particularly in the context of food security, as was being done during the FRP. Insecurity compounds the problems of food security, especially in the south.

At the time of the famine in 1992/'93 massive food distribution took place, without having a possibility for assessing the real needs of the target groups. The emergency had forced most of the international agencies to concentrate on logistics. Little attention was paid to the negative impact of continuous food aid on agricultural production and markets.

The World Food Programme (WFP) started in late 1993, setting up strategies for food aid distribution, co-ordination of food security operations and monitoring systems for

crop production. The WFP agronomist led a Food Security Task Force, which aimed at co-ordinating surveys on food production and food aid information amongst major actors in emergency operations.

As a result of the success of this project, the EC expressed an interest in participating in a broader-based Food Security Assessment Unit in 1994, operating within WFP Somalia. The FSAU co-operated at the implementation level with, amongst others, the FEWS (Famine Early Warning System) Somalia. At the advisory level, the FSAU collaborates closely with the EC-Somalia Unit. As a result of this collaboration, the FSAU broadly reflects the food security policy of the EC. Through a FSAU analysis in 1995, a deeper understanding of food security in Somalia was achieved, allowing better efficiency and effectiveness of future food-aid interventions, focusing the EC policy on the issue 'that food security forms part of an overall policy within an economy, as greater food security is increasingly linked with wider economic growth and offsets the effects of poverty for the poorest' (quote 2nd phase FSAU).

Estimates on the area of potentially cultivable land in years with average rainfall vary between 5.1 million hectares (MoA 1988) and 8.2 million-hectare (FAO, 1989), while a total area of 28.8 million hectare (FAO) is suitable for productive grazing. Despite the potential for cultivation only one million hectare, or 1.6% of the total surface of Somalia, was under cultivation in 1988 (Ministry of Agriculture).

Crop production in the major areas is heavily dependent on the availability of water. It is concentrated in the south, in areas along the Shabelle and Jubba rivers and in the inter-riverine areas of Bay and the Bakool region. Less extensive pockets exist in the Northern Awdal and Galbeed districts.

Banana is still the major crop and the second export earner after livestock. Other cash crops, produced before the war in a highly mechanised manner, include sugar cane, rice, oil seeds, cotton, citrus, tomatoes and onions. The destruction of the irrigation infrastructure has however reduced the production drastically.

Crop production can be divided into the following three types:

Rain-fed crop production

Production of rain-fed crops is based on a shifting cropping system with sorghum as the main crop. About 400,000 hectares are sown annually using low levels of technology.

Rain-fed production, supported by uncontrolled flood irrigation

This is a system whereby supplementary water for irrigation enters the supply canals,

but only during flood periods. The major crops here are maize, sorghum and sesame, with a total of about 100,000 hectare under cultivation. The technology applied is low and relatively low yields are obtained.

Controlled irrigation

Approximately 50,000 hectares are under controlled irrigation, of which 35,000 hectares are situated along the Shabelle river and 15,000 hectare along the Jubba river. Maintenance was structurally neglected and systems were damaged as a result of the war. There is hardly any management of water supply systems.

2 PROGRAMME PREPARATION AND DESIGN

The identification and formulation process was in general led by the urgent need to stop the negative impact of free food distribution on agricultural production patterns. Regarding food security issues, the process happened in close collaboration with USAID Somalia. In March 1995 UNOSOM pulled out of Somalia. The turmoil in those days, with several expatriates either killed or kidnapped including a TA, limited however the possibility of an uniform project design.

From 1994 on considerable efforts were made by the EC-Somalia Unit to stop free distribution of seeds and tools by other donors. Instead priority was given to support the re-establishment of the productive sectors and to encourage emerging local authorities to operate in a sometimes rather fragile political and security environment.

A base survey, produced by the EC-Somalia Unit at the start of the First Rehabilitation Programme, had already identified priority areas of intervention in agriculture with an emphasis on an improvement of the food security.

Food security assessment

The first priority therefore was the provision of up-to-date and reliable information on food security issues in Somalia to all agencies and donors. This has been achieved through the monitoring of crop production; the registration of climatic conditions and fluctuation of market prices, the consumption patterns as well as the nutritional status of the population by the Food Security Assessment Unit. The overall objective of the FSAU is food security assessment and data dissemination. The EC and USAID, with WFP being the executing agency jointly finance the FSAU. The EC funded the first phase of the FSAU, starting in January 1995. After an extension period of two month, this phase ended in March 1996.

The second phase became operational in June 1997. The SACB Food Security Sectoral Committee has been created in order to facilitate the development of a common approach on allocation of available aid resources for food security and to co-ordinate rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in the country. The terms of reference for this committee were finalised in September 1997.

The objective of the food security assessment is to increase the depth, quality and timing of data collection and analysis in the field, and also the build-up of a network of Somali professionals in the field. Such build-up is considered opportune, given the still fluid security situation in Somalia and a decrease in international agencies operating within Somalia.

Agricultural production

Increased seed production for both maize and sorghum were identified as priorities. This had to be achieved through the prevention of genetic erosion of germplasm and through the production of improved seeds. The first seed production was introduced for maize, later followed by rice. Production of sorghum seed started only under the SRP.

Extension services, extension packages and demonstration plots were proposed to rehabilitate the agricultural sector. Seed production programmes and extension services all aimed at improved yields per hectare, targeting at pre-war levels.

Projects dealing with canal rehabilitation and soil erosion were proposed to add more productive land to the available production area for crop cultivation and an increased access to irrigation water. Preference was given to proposals submitted by international NGOs with experience in Somalia during the period of relief aid. The identification of needs in agriculture was done on the basis of the NGO' previous experience in the area proposed and on the historical wisdom available within the iNGO community. Project formulation was done by the applying iNGOs.

All project locations were visited and consultations with the local authorities took place, in order to have projects endorsed by the relevant local authority. Stakeholders were however not consulted in a systematic way in order to collect additional data, e.g. on marketing of input provision, which was therefore lacking. There is evidence for this in the first set of project proposals submitted.

Planning was governed by the project circumstances, especially with regards to security conditions on the ground. The policy chosen was therefore to get started with the proposals already submitted to the EC-Somalia Unit, with an emphasis on crop production improvement. The first area selected was the Shabelle river valley with its

large potential for crop production and its relative stable and secure conditions. Projects in the river valley were quickly expanded to include repair works of irrigation canals.

The only exception on this strategy was the North West, where, starting with the COOPI project, a more comprehensive approach was made which later paid off in better achievements.

Most projects could be classified as rehabilitation projects with development components. Insufficient attention however was paid to the institutional requirements of project implementation in the initial round of project proposals. Human resources necessary to implement the project activities and the specific qualifications of professional staff were underrated. This situation improved during the course of the FRP.

The narrative proposal of oasis projects was up to standard, indicating objectives and activities well. The technical part, including hydraulic calculations and designs is poor, as well as the technical designs later on prepared for by the contractor. (FRP financed, Africa '70)

The projects in the agricultural sector and funded under the FRP, are as follows (rounded off at 1,000 ECU):

Sub sector	Number of projects*)	Costs projects in ECU	Projects Completed*)	Number of studies	Costs studies in ECU
Food Security	2	1,526,000	1	1	31,000
Seed production	1+4	345,000	1 + 2	2**)	102,000
Extension projects	4+ 3	1,402,000	3+ 2***)	2**)	102,000
Combined Water and erosion management	3	1,313,000	3	3	520,000
Totals	16	4,586,000	11	6	754,000

Notes:

*) number is including Budget Line financed projects

**) studies, relevant for both programmes

***) one project has been cancelled due to insecurity

All budgets are excluding amounts under Budget Line funding

Further expansion of activities proposed was prepared by means of studies, which also contributed to know-how on project design and implementation. Subjects included range land management and fodder trees; flood control of the Shabelle river; integrated pest management and a programme on National Resources management for Somalia with the Participatory Rural Appraisal method.

3 RELEVANCE OF THE PROGRAMME

3.1 General Context

According to WFP, basic food production on a per capita basis has declined all over sub-Saharan Africa during the last twenty years. In Somalia, the decline has been more intense as a result of the civil strife. Food production per capita in Somalia had already decreased by 21% between 1975 and 1985 and since 1991 this decline accelerated. Estimates by the FSAU of the annual demand for domestic food are 650,000 Mt. of cereals. The pre-war averages of cereal production covered only some 60% of demand. The net deficit in 1993/'94 was estimated at around 150,000 Mt. while 200,000 Mt. for 1995/'96. It appeared that the agricultural year 1996/'97 was poor.

Mohamad Omar Abdulwaddid is the head of a household of eleven: his wife and their five children, one of his brothers with his wife and two children. They live in a village near Jowhar, and have three hectares of cultivable land. This is sown with sorghum and a bit of sesame during the major rainy season (GU). Sorghum is the only crop during the second rainy season (Deyr).

The seed is kept over from the previous year, and no fertiliser or pesticide is used. As the crops grow, the children have an important function as quelea quelea bird chasers and during these months they do not go to school. The harvest is not big, even in a good year – on average only 300 kg per hectare. And there have been four droughts in the last twenty years. The grains are stored in the ground in a secret pit, which Mohamad will only open at night. The stalks are kept for cattle fodder.

They have two lactating goats, which are herded by a daughter during the day and kept at the premises at night. And they have one cow in calf, now grazing with the village herdsman, who will bring it back, when the calf is due. Then there will be milk to sell. Omar's wife or sister-in-law will carry it daily into Jowhar. The money will be used carefully, for repairing clothing, medicine and other essentials. The calf will stay for a year and will then be sold in order to get the oldest son married – Insh'Allah; God willing: if nobody in the household falls sick and if the rains come...

Even with their resources, the family is not well off. If the rains fail, there is not enough food stored to see the household through till the next harvest. Mohamad's brother and his eldest son will have to work as casual labourers for a few months a year. When the son marries, there will be one more to feed, and soon after, perhaps more...

The structural characteristics of the crop production sector in Somalia could be summarised as follows: a dependency on rain, so producing relatively low yields, combined with low levels of inputs and technology. Most producers are agro-pastoralists.

It is therefore considered relevant to focus on these characteristics in the FRP, especially in areas with a high crop production potential with a relatively peaceful environment. These areas are also the ones with potential for a smooth transition from

rehabilitation in the FRP to more structural development in the SRP.

3.2 The specific context

3.2.1 The Food security

Widespread malnutrition as the country suffered in 1992-93 can be avoided, but only if a situation is adequately monitored. The FSAU is not an executing body but an assessment and analysis unit for Somalia, instrumental in providing information and advice related to food security and food aid interventions. This has led to a better understanding by implementing agencies of the areas at risk. With the information provided, more cost-effective intervention programmes can be achieved.

3.2.2 Improving seeds

The background of the programme for the prevention of genetic erosion and the production of improved seeds was the loss of the national collection of germplasm at the agricultural research and conservation centre in Baidoa; to this was added the need to counterweight the massive introduction of exogenous seeds during the emergency phase. Various international workshops and the FAO 'Global Plan of Action on Plant Genetic Resources' during 1995 and 1996 highlighted the fact that on-farm conservation is more important than the so called genebank approach. Conservation on-farm has to be linked with farmers' practice and their active involvement in seed improvement programmes.

IPGRI and the National Genebank of Kenya are involved in a multiplication and characterisation programme for sorghum and maize germplasm. The project, not financed under the FRP, is implemented jointly by CINS and IPGRI since 1997. It proposes to bring seed back to Somalia in order to further characterise and multiply it. As a large proportion of local land-races is assumed to have been lost during the war, it would thus restore local diversity. The project is trying to develop methodologies for on-farm conservation. It furthermore aims to enhance links between local, traditional and commercial seed production and supply systems in Somalia.

During field visits and consultation with farmers in villages around Jowhar the team found that there was no reason to assume that local varieties got lost during the war in that area and therefore the disappearance of local varieties had not occurred around Jowhar. Several farmers were interviewed who said that they cultivated the same two local varieties of sorghum as they did before the war. This finding was earlier confirmed by findings by a consultant of IPGRI in December 1996. He stated that only 'the intra-species diversity is low for both sorghum and maize. In the case of maize, two local varieties were cultivated, and one modern variety has been abandoned by farmers,

while they have adopted another modern variety, distributed as emergency relief seed by ICRC'. The final version of this report was not available during the evaluation.

The situation at Bulo Burti is reported to be different, though the final conclusion is still to be presented. Preliminary findings indicate that some genetic erosion took place at the upper part of the Shabelle river in Hiraan region. These findings are yet to be confirmed.

CINS started in 1995 with the multiplication of improved maize seed, while CEFA is involved in multiplication of rice varieties. A bulk selection of 10 sorghum land races was made in 1997, with help from IPGRI. It was reported that varieties of sunflower and sesame seeds are also being multiplied.

On-farm conservation and the reintroduction of plant genetic resources through active involvement of farmers to further diversity is considered relevant. Conditions for such approach will be continued supervision by an experienced institute of the implementation of the seed components, that lessons learned in similar projects in neighbouring countries be applied, and that the back-up of FAO and other international research organisations involved in conservation of Plant Genetic Resources will be continued.

3.2.3 Extension

The extension programme for seeds is considered relevant through aiming at higher production levels on the one hand and at improvement of the quality of the agricultural produce on the other hand. The extension packages around Jowhar and Balad were to a large extent directed at the Bantu ethnic minority, who are the traditional crop farmers in that area. The extension projects at Balad, at Hiraan and Bakool selected female-headed household as a special target group. These Somali female farmers were however mainly agro-pastoralists while the technological package in Deganley village in Balad district was for crop farmers producing maize. This part of the project was therefore not relevant to most of these agro-pastoralists and as a result 50 out of the 70 participants dropped out before harvesting time. In addition to this, the Somalia Unit noted that problems arose from the pressure exerted on the implementing NGO, by the community, in their attempt to influence the selection of beneficiaries.

Two studies, both just released, identify relevant Somali organisations in areas of intervention for rural rehabilitation projects in the Shabelle valley. Another study researched the need for Integrated Pest Management in order to reduce pre- and post-harvest food losses. Recommendations should be well integrated in the current extension programme. Unfortunately the major crop pest, the quelea quelea bird, was

not mentioned in the latter study. This bird is often responsible for crop losses of up to 25% of sorghum. It is also a major constraint for the introduction of a crop like sunflower. Further reference is made to GU-season Crop Assessment Highlight, September 5, 1996.

3.2.4 Irrigation and flood control

Canal rehabilitation

Some rehabilitated canals are part of systems with uncontrolled flooding. They therefore provide farmers with additional irrigation when the level of the Shabelle river is high enough.

The approach chosen in the Buray canal rehabilitation of ADRA is interesting in that it considers rehabilitation from the broader context of a local society and its conditions for sustained stability. Already during the design phase the interests of stakeholders became dominant for the final choice of technical layout. The basic principle here is that rehabilitation is not going to be sustainable if and when it does not also address potential conflicts concerning firstly, access to water for all potential water users, and secondly, the different interests stakeholders might have once access to water has been created.

Concerning the potential conflict between the nomadic people and the crop farmers, an improved layout of the canals has been designed. Water ponds have been constructed for livestock at the end of each tertiary canal, in such way that animals do not have to pass any plots with crops, decreasing considerably the chances of livestock encroaching on crop plots.

The other element of conflict resolution entails the training of the water committees in conflict management, focusing on the division of excess water between rice farmers and those with other crops. In addition, special attention was paid to the selection of respected committee members, many of them the canal-building pioneers of the 1970s.

Although works for canal rehabilitation can be executed to a large extent by manual labour, using among other techniques cash-for-work, most of the proposals did not take this as a guiding principle in the project formulation. The returned refugees in the rural areas and the youths looking for jobs could have been found opportunities for work, but were not.

Flood control

According to the "Middle Shabelle Flood Control Project document" (MacDonald), uncontrolled flooding is a feature of the Shabelle River. Projects within the flood plain -

with or without a component of canal rehabilitation— run the risk of being affected by floods. During the last five years especially, uncontrolled flooding has occurred with much higher incidence, damaging crops. Because of works for flood control being neglected and/or destroyed, the chances for uncontrolled inundation may have increased over the recent years. Over the last three years the area being flooded in the Shabelle Region has ranged between 2,000 and 4,000 hectares, often during the growing season. Because the average coverage of this area with crops has not been determined, the total capitalised loss is difficult to quantify. Under the present situation, flood defence is like a lottery, with no one knowing where the flood embankment might breach next. This will put an extra strain on sustainability of any rehabilitation in this sub-sector.

... desertification at Budbud village...

3.2.5 Soil erosion control and oasis agriculture

Erosion control

The soil erosion control programme consists of measures for soil protection against water erosion in Awdal district. A consultancy provided an update on techniques of physical control measures such as check dams, contour lines and earth embankments under prevailing Somali conditions. The programme involves major contributions from the local population, responsible for long-term maintenance. The local population had to contribute 20% of the costs of the implementation works. This requirement shifted the responsibility for the works more towards the local community, and some projects could not be started until full consensus on the arrangements and inputs had been reached with the local community concerned. This project and the back-up study were highly relevant.

A consultancy on management and development of rangeland and fodder trees produced recommendations on rangeland management, rehabilitation of eroded land, as well as on the establishment of tree nurseries and fodder production. The consultancy further addresses the problem of charcoal production, which all too often became the only source of income for returning refugees and other destitute people. Although in essence relevant, the report is weak on relevant cross-cutting issues such as the value of tree planting in relation to its demands on local water.

Oasis Agriculture

This programme aims at increasing agricultural production, mainly date production, in the oases in the semi-desert area south and south west of Bosaso. This is done through the rehabilitation of irrigation works.

There is provision for a contractor who constructs the well protection structures, berkads and concrete irrigation channels on a number of farms. The new system replaces the old structures, of which some are partially constructed by the farmers themselves in the past and some by a French NGO project some years ago.

The projects provide for upgrading of the existing system of irrigation canals, which are run down due to poor maintenance during the past years. Repairs were already needed in the past due to poor engineering during the construction phase. The works, contracted out to local contractors, will have an anticipated life-span of not more than five to seven years.

In conclusion: The project objectives are relevant as an upgrading project although it is benefiting a small group of beneficiaries only. The activities are limited to engineering,

no further employment or human resources development being involved, although badly needed in this marginal area.

4 EFFICIENCY

4.1 Food security assessment

Capacity building includes the training of Somali professionals for jobs currently held by expatriate staff. Such training will ensure that a future handing over to a government institution will include qualified manpower. Replacing expatriate staff with qualified local staff will also make the FSAU more cost-effective.

The first phase of the FSAU has been evaluated internally by WFP staff in 1996. The FSAU distinguishes structural bottlenecks -where medium and long-term development planning is needed- and acute food insecurity -where emergency relief assistance is necessary for a better understanding of food security. A map of the tentative food economy zones in Somalia has been developed in 1997 as a result of the co-operation between FSAU and FEWS (Annexe 9).

The FSAU monthly bulletins and the special issues enable the donors to monitor the achievements of the FSAU. The EC-Somalia Unit asks the FSAU to submit quarterly financial reports, an annual food security report and a financial final report at the end of the project period.

The EC-funded Food Aid Monetisation Programme for Somalia (EFAMS) is the operational part in the field, next to food aid programmes of WFP. EFAMS is budget-line funded and has not yet started. Different thinking by WFP and EFAMS has resulted in different policies on food aid. It is imaginable, that both programmes could have an antagonistic effect when operating in the same region. An example mentioned by the TA dealing with Food Security is the free distribution of food by WFP in Bay region, based on the criterion as to whether farmers still had a food stock or not. The fact that many farmers had just sold their stock at give-away prices at the Mogadishu market in order to be prepared for immediate evacuation in anticipation of an armed conflict was not taken into consideration. A monetisation programme, as planned by EFAMS¹), would have bought and stored this food offered for sale, in order to release it again into the market in times of need. Implementing both policies could jeopardise the effectiveness of both policies and lead to zero impact.

¹ The food distribution of WFP is coming largely from imported stocks, while EFAMS intends to intervene in the market mainly with the purchase of locally produced crops

It is therefore necessary to assess to what extent both programmes are complementary. This problem has already been discussed by EFAMS at SACB level, but needs attention and harmonisation at WFP–EC level.

4.2 Agricultural production

In most programmes the expected outputs were far too ambitious to be achieved in one-year programmes (Oxfam Quebec, COOPI, CINS, CEFA). This was especially true where institutional capacity had to be created, such as the formation of regional agricultural committees, women's committees at village level, or water committees. The expected outputs after one year in some documents included land preparation; input supply; provision of a rotating fund for credit; crop production; rehabilitation of an office; development of an extension package and technical support; agro-processing and marketing. In addition, some programmes suffered quite severely from insecurity, such as the two OXFAM-Quebec extension projects.

It is therefore recommended that the scope of intervention be limited to realistic targets.

The monitoring requirements, as in other sectors, were not always consistent and clear. Final reports over the first year of project implementation were of rather poor quality and not well structured. Institutional learning, as reflected in the final reports, was only found in projects of ADRA and COOPI where internal evaluations were executed for completed programmes. In other projects, (frequent) handover to a successor was poorly done, leaving the new expatriate staff with little institutional wisdom. As stated elsewhere in this report, for agricultural projects, monitoring should be conducted along standardised procedures.

The examples of Deganley, Berbera and Sheikh:

A survey by CINS in the Deganley programme revealed that there were nine operating oil presses in the village for which ownership could be established. But their capacity was already under-utilised. Introduction of the proposed six new oil presses under the EC-funded programme would therefore be counterproductive, unless they were to be used as teaching aids.

Similarly, there were five irrigation pumps available. They were not used, as they need to be overhauled. Overhauling and proper operation instruction might be more cost-effective and useful than the envisaged introduction of four new irrigation pumps under the programme.

The Berbera and Sheikh districts used to have a lot of irrigation pumps in the past. The ANS project has just started and was -among other things- proposing to grant 30 water pumps and to start a revolving fund for spare parts. As ANS is now aware, it might be better to find out what happened with the previous water pumping systems and spare parts and to see whether the rightful owners can still retain them in order to rehabilitate their schemes.

4.2.1 Seed production

In the 1994/'95 growing season, the aim was to produce 200 Mt. each, for two varieties

of maize. The total amount produced was 133 Mt. and 128 Mt., respectively. For the 1995/'96 season, the aim was to produce 1,225 Mt. of rice and 6,000 Mt. of maize; either for seed use or for human consumption. Results recorded for maize revealed that in three fields of demonstration plots the harvest was virtually nil on rainfed plots and less than 50% of the anticipated yields on irrigated plots. No records were available for five maize demonstration plots established in the 1996/'97 season.

According to the basic survey of the IPGRI-consultants (December 1996) in villages around Jowhar, maize varieties were available. An estimation of the total maize seed requirements was 402 Mt. for the Shabelle river region (Balad, Jowhar and Bulo Burti districts).

The former head of Afgooye research centre, cultivating his own seed multiplication farm of 10 hectare irrigated land in Jowhar, multiplied six modern maize varieties (five of Italian origin). He also multiplied 6 varieties of rice.

The stock of two varieties for the production of the targeted 1,225 Mt. of rice had to be procured in the Philippines, in amounts of approximately 1 kg each. Two production cycles were then required in Somalia, but this only produced a quantity of respectively 4.4 Mt. and 14.6 Mt., reflecting only 1.5% of the target of 1,224 Mt. During the 1996/'97 season two new varieties were introduced after advice from IRRI: starting with 0.6 kg and 0.8 kg in one growing season, this was multiplied to 80.6 kg and 25 kg respectively. IRRI releases only very small quantities of seed stocks.

An alternative and more cost-effective method might be the collection of resource material from research stations or commercial seed suppliers in Kenya and Ethiopia. According to the former head of Afgooye Research Station, the latter is possible. The actors involved in seed production should investigate this alternative.

4.2.2 Extension

Logistics such as setting up offices took in some cases a major part of time and energy, this to the detriment of extension work. During spells of drought it then was "all hands on deck" in order to assist in irrigation activities to save rice, to assist in maize multiplication activities and the demonstration plots.

Farmers selected to be trained in the seed multiplication programme in Balad were of the opinion that the crops chosen were not those with potential for maximum income. They indicated they would leave the multiplication programme, as soon as the opportunity for marketing more profitable crops arose. It is therefore extremely important to select motivated and preferably experienced seed multipliers for participation in seed

multiplication projects. Continuation of this currently applied selection approach is recommended.

There is an identified need for financing agricultural production schemes. But the existing initiatives run the risk of being short lived, partly because they are not tailor-made, partly because of lack of expertise. It is therefore recommended that specialists deal with credit schemes under a separate programme.

4.2.3 Irrigation and flood control management

The team noted that two sluices had been looted from the rehabilitated Buray canal. These parts were delivered as second hand to the local contractor of the waterworks in the nearby river embankment project. It is recommended to have material and equipment as much as possible locally produced. If this is not possible, imports should then be the only alternative to discourage looting.

4.2.4 Oasis agriculture

Major emphasis was placed on rehabilitation of irrigation supply in the project of Africa '70 in Bari region concerned with water and agriculture rehabilitation. The project was nearing completion when visited by the team.

Several changes were needed in the project proposal after the approval for financing was given, as a long time elapsed between application to the EC-Somalia Unit and approval by the EC. In the meantime another iNGO had become operational in the area, duplicating some proposed works. Although the changes in the proposal were well worked out and justified by the iNGO (Africa 70) the project design had too many berkads and the canal system was not designed in the most efficient way. Despite all the changes, that occurred in the early phases of the agricultural projects in Hill Qad and Baran villages, no standardised monitoring by the TA Infrastructure and TA Agriculture had taken recently place. Contacts with the implementing NGO at Bosaso level were well established.

There is no input or participation from the farmers in this rehabilitation programme; it is all being done for them. Hence, the contracted amount is high. As mentioned before the anticipated lifespan of the technical work is short (5-7 years) due to low standards of engineering, e.g. poor quality of concrete works. Other material for the piping of water (e.g. polythene instead of concrete pipes) would decrease the investment by around 10% and increase the lifespan to approximately 10 to 12 years.

5 EFFECTIVENESS

5.1 Food security assessment

The approval of the second year of the FSAU was delayed for over one year. One of the reasons for the delay of the second phase was reported to be a dispute over the control of the programme between the EC and the WFP headquarters. There was slow preparation on the side of WFP and non-acceptance by WFP headquarters of the contract format. It is not clear whether the problems encountered have been resolved, and whether this will be a recurrent affair every time the programme is due for extension.

This interruption in programme execution has resulted in loss of output quality and in discontinuity of data collection. Data were published in the FSAU monthly bulletin until the end of the first phase in March 1996. The FSAU has not disseminated any comprehensive analysis of food security information between April 1996 and the start of the second phase in June 1997. During this period, the FSAU continued operation with funds from WFP. The USAID financed bulletin of the FEWS was the only source of information during that period.

Financing the second phase has been approved for one year only. The Results of collecting, analysing and disseminating information however can only be seen in the long term.

The programme will stop when either the international community no longer accepts responsibility, or when this project can be continued by a relevant Somalian government organisation. It is assumed that both events will not occur within the next few years.

In order to maintain quality, and to reduce the number of possible delays between phases, it is recommended that the time horizon of funding be increased until the end of the SRP.

Although some organisations have persisted and continue to provide free food, the establishment of the SACB Food Security Sectoral Committee contributed to reduction of free food hand-outs and improved the effectiveness of food aid distributions.

EFAMS was founded to respond to the need of a flexible and decentralised food aid distribution through the Food Security Cell located in Nairobi. It executed a pilot project in Gedo region in 1996. The project was not a success. Lessons learned from the pilot project were that cereals can be supplied separately, but high value commodities like edible oils can only be delivered in a complete food package. EFAMS has opted for supply of cereals only. These lessons have been taken into account in formulating the country wide programme.

EFAMS' policy is based on the fact that markets of staple foods are characterised by price inelasticity and call for small scale interventions in order to avoid disruption of the market for agricultural production.

The implementation of EFAMS has not yet started. As a result of the delay, the iNGOs (Swiss Group and UNA) said to have lost their envisaged candidates for the posts in the projects. The long interval also prevented the start of micro-projects as a component to be financed from funds generated by the monetisation programme. It is recommended to implement EFAMS without further delay and to have a common approach adopted by WFP through the SACB Food Security sub- Committee.

5.2 Seed Production

The improved maize seed was sold at a loss of around 0.4 ECU per kg, without considering the overhead costs of the multiplication programme. The reasons mentioned for the low price were poor germination quality; high production costs for fertiliser of the variety multiplied and the poor fodder quality of the stalk. (IPGRI, 1996)

This lack in quality caused major problems in their marketing. Traders formed a cartel, bought the seeds at a subsidised price, and resold it to others at a much higher price. No evidence could be found that the seed was finally sold to growers in order to be used as improved maize seed for multiplication.

A market survey at the start of the programme would have identified the needs and preferences for seeds of the farmer-multipliers. Such a survey could have avoided many problems. Implementers are now aware of this and the team supports the more structural approach. CINS/IPGRI are now about to start an in-depth study on seed production and marketing systems in order to strengthen both. Access to seed for many farmers is to be improved, firstly through the introduction of community seed banks and secondly through training of farmers in seed conservation practices. The amount of farmers interested in participation is reported to be high. The farmers are now testing the seed quality before being distributed.

5.3 Extension and credit

Illiteracy is still paramount in rural areas, especially among women, and a basic knowledge of farming is still lacking in many areas. The amount of written extension materials in most programmes was limited to brochures on production techniques and on the storage of seeds. The illiteracy rate has been an indication that visual aids were

needed such as photos and drawings; in some centres they were available but not used as well could be.

Projects for market-oriented farmers should start with a situation analysis, including a market survey on crops. For agro-pastoralists with rain-fed crops, activities should still aim at packages for improved food- and seed security for the households.

It is therefore recommended to train extension workers in visualised presentations, audio visual aids, in documentation and in office lay-out and monitor the use of these aids in the extension process.

CEFA activities included the calculation of gross income and costs estimates for the production of maize and rice based on the demonstration plots. These calculations should be further elaborated with the following considerations: on the income side, especially in the case of agro-pastoralists, the value of the crop residue for animal fodder should be accounted for. On the costs side, the quantity of seeds required assumes one sowing, followed by a successful germination. In reality, seed requirements may triple in rainfed agriculture, as farmers will re-sow in case water availability does not allow the crop to establish itself. The manual labour requirements for flood control, irrigation and pest control (e.g. chasing birds) were not reflected in accordance with reality. The concepts of gross margins and family labour income per growing season could be included, if and when values for opportunity costs were agreed upon for credit, land tenure and depreciation costs of tools.

Applying a standardised approach for costs and income estimates on demonstration plots would make it possible to compare the impact on family labour and income of various cultivation techniques, under otherwise equal climatic conditions. It is recommended to improve income and cost estimate methods presently used in other seed multiplication and extension projects. Gross margins and family labour income could also be considered under different cultivation techniques for different seed varieties. Findings regarding the best option for a specific area based on such calculations should be included in extension messages. This information would be a welcome addition to the data and statistics currently available on agriculture.

5.4 Irrigation and flood control management

The anticipated contribution to increased production of crops through rehabilitation of the Bukural irrigation canal is grossly exaggerated. Supplementary irrigation water enters the supply canals only during a few weeks each flood season. The investment makes the land only suitable for rain-fed production, supported by uncontrolled flood

irrigation. The maintenance requirements for the canal will remain as high as those of a canal with controlled irrigation, providing water during the whole season. This makes these kinds of rehabilitation works not cost-effective.

5.5 Oasis Agriculture

The projects' main purpose includes three aims. These are: rehabilitation of the irrigation structures, enhancement of human resources and the conduct of agricultural activities. The objectives in the sphere of engineering have been reached. No human resources development (skills training, strengthening agricultural organisations, extension) nor other agricultural activities (survey, study, demonstrations, data collection) took place. Only the first project purpose, the repair and construction of the irrigation structures has been realised.

6 IMPACT

6.1 Food security assessment

The evaluation team found that the information disseminated and the working methodologies applied, have led to a better understanding of at-risk areas by the implementing agencies, resulting in more effective and cost-efficient intervention programmes. Therefore, food security and forecasting of a major famine disaster has been improved.

The data base on food market prices should be distributed to all projects involved in extension services and the processing of economic data. Such information can be used to demonstrate seasonal price trends in extension activities.

6.2 Seed production

The selection of woman agro-pastoralists near Balad as one of the specific target groups in the CINS programme proved in the end to be counter-productive. The CINS project was not designed for agro-pastoralists. But a package for maize seed production was developed for them, but proved not relevant to their specific situation, which was mainly sheep and goat rearing. As a result they dropped out before the harvest of the maize. They finally recovered only their costs and incurred a debt without having benefits.

6.3 Extension and credit

The introduction of agro-processing equipment, such as maize mills and oil presses; the stocking of maintenance and repair shops; the provision of irrigation pumps could prove to be counter-productive, when these activities are competing with households who make a living out of similar activities. This might become the case in the extension project in Balad district and the ANS project in Berbera and Sheikh districts. However, the organisations are now aware and are taking remedial steps to be included in the newly submitted projects.

Implemented credit schemes have had limited impact; recovery is not recorded. Project proposals which continue to have credit included in the package will be assisted by specialised organisations (e.g. K-REP). Backstopping from these experts will be a prerequisite for credit schemes in future.

The potential impact of the Integrated Pest Management study could have been much greater if the quelea quelea bird had been included.

Impact of the extension programme would have been better, if packages for maize and rice cultivation in the Shabelle valley included also product quality improvement through testing, sorting and grading. This is now being included in the IPGRI/CINS programme.

6.4 Irrigation and flood control management

It is doubtful whether the interventions made in irrigation rehabilitation will have a lasting contribution to sustainable socio-economic development of the riverine regions, as long as schemes run the risk of being flooded. The team therefore strongly supports the envisaged plan for the establishment of a management structure and the physical strengthening of the Shabelle river embankments.

6.5 Soil erosion and Oasis agriculture

The mechanical measures had a very positive impact as the beneficiaries maintained the works meant to control erosion and to improve the natural fertility of the land. Impact of biological measures could not be assessed, as these activities were just about to begin.

Although the project proposals claim to serve in the oasis projects several hundreds of people, there was no evidence that per individual irrigation scheme more than 20 to 50 persons actually benefited. As the project only upgraded the existing irrigation infrastructure, without addressing the other objectives of realising the agricultural support

systems, the impact must be regarded as limited.

7 SUSTAINABILITY

7.1 Food security assessment

Continuation of the FSAU depends on the willingness of the international community to accept responsibility for the food security of Somalia. In the absence of a Somali government, the international community will have little choice but to sustain an instrument that makes its interventions more cost-effective and efficient and that reduces the risk of another major famine disaster.

The structure set up by the project assumes a future handover to a government-based food security unit. The proposal for the second phase aims at the involvement of Somali expertise in data collection and analysis in the field. Well-qualified Somali professionals would be a welcome outcome of such strategy, as a smooth handover to a future Somali institution requires professional Somali staff, trained in all aspects of the FSAU.

7.2 Agricultural production

The study "Guidelines for Targeting Rehabilitation projects" provides good guidelines for co-operation between international NGOs and their Somali counterparts. The process to encourage the target group to take over and maintain the project is time-consuming. The only project that evaluates this process and the lessons learned was COOPI, while ADRA with its counterpart SAACID has built up valuable institutional experience to better guarantee the future operation of projects.

Financial (on income generation and gender)

iNGOs involved in extension activities included in their programmes a component of home gardening, grain milling, oil processing, bee keeping and other possibilities for additional income for women's groups. Most of those interventions were poorly planned with no marketing research on the viability of such activities. Staff, experienced in food technology and marketing, was lacking during the implementation of these components.

Institutional Capacity (on seed multiplication)

It is considered essential to continue the seed multiplication programme in Somalia, based on the professional organisation established in 1997. Experiences from comparable programmes executed in neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya could be included in this programme.

Given the fact that a ministry of agriculture is not foreseeable in the near future and the bleak outlook regarding an international research centre who could be (willing to be) a counterpart for building institutional capacity this programme will require financial and organisational support for a long time. Gradually increasing cost-sharing, together with gradually decreasing expatriate involvement, however, should be aimed for.

(on flood control management and credit programmes)

The non-repayment of rotating (credit) funds should be more strictly used as an indicator as to whether to continue or not. Beneficiaries should closely monitor non-repayments and stealing of construction parts. If a contractor is found guilty of knowingly purchasing looted material, then he should be blacklisted.

Security (on policy support measures)

The first indicator of project sustainability is security for project staff. The two extension projects in Hiraan and Bakool could not meet their objectives due to insecurity, which led in turn to frequent evacuations. One should be careful with projects with relatively large capital input components in areas with a high or increasing level of instability.

8 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

8.1 Food security assessment

The main weakness in the first phase of the FSAU was its inability to collect appropriate data in the field on a timely basis. It is planned to strengthen data collection and to enhance the analysing capacity at local level through increased participation of Somali professionals.

The Food Security Assessment Unit has contributed to an overall and better understanding of areas at risk by the implementing agencies. More effective and cost-efficient intervention programmes can be developed with the information provided. In addition, forecasting of famine disaster has improved.

8.2 Agricultural production

The pressure to get started without adequate knowledge resulted initially in a learning-by-doing approach. This led to one cancellation of a project, delays and reductions in outputs with others, project redesigns and re-formulations, but finally also to the application of situation analyses before implementation; and this proved to be a cost-

effective way to acquire better know-how on project design and implementation.

Development of ownership of the project by beneficiaries proved to be time-consuming. The only project that evaluated this process was COOPI. ADRA with its counterpart SAACID has built up valuable institutional experience to better guarantee future operations.

Mechanical measures for erosion control and canal rehabilitation have increased the area for agricultural production and access to water resources.

Seed production

Analysis of farming and marketing/distribution systems would have better identified local preferences regarding seeds of the seed-multipliers and have avoided initial problems.

The incorporation of IPGRI in all seed programmes and adequate monitoring has created a good potential for reducing genetic erosion, and has improved seed production and seed conservation.

Extension, including credit and agro-processing

Project results in general have been disappointing due to insecurity and lack of support from specialist staff. Agro-processing and credit activities especially require experienced staff for their implementation.

Project performance could further be improved through continued development of economic and marketing data, incorporation of results from studies, improved demonstration plots and a better use of visual aids.

Credit schemes have a counter-productive impact: Recovery seems to have been poor in many projects.

The study on integrated pest management should have included the quelea quelea bird.

Irrigation and flood control management

As long as schemes runs the risk of being flooded it is doubtful whether rehabilitation will have a considerable contribution to development of the riverine region. It is therefore important to pay attention to both flood control and institutional capacity to manage it.

Erosion control and oasis agriculture

Appropriate mechanical erosion control measures have contributed to good project results.

9 RECOMMENDATIONS

Food security assessment

It is recommended, as already partly envisaged in the proposal for the second phase, to focus on placing Somali professionals, within one or two years, in positions currently held by expatriate staff.

Funding for FSAU should be increased to the duration of the SRP.

It should be carefully assessed to what degree the programmes of WFP and EFAMS are complementary to each other.

Seed Production

Demonstration of improved technology by showing traditional cultivation practices and recommended cultivation practices on the same plot under the same conditions should be encouraged. The effect of the improved technology becomes very clear.

Local organisations need to be selected as counterparts to iNGOs, and their institutional capacity built up for eventual hand-over.

Extension including credit

Income and cost estimate methods presently being applied in other seed multiplication and extension projects could be used. Gross margin and family labour income should be considered for different cultivation techniques, including the selection of seed varieties. Findings should be included in extension messages.

Components of programmes regarding agro-processing, input delivery and credit should be brought under separate projects and be dealt with by organisations experienced in these fields.

Information on market prices could be included in extension packages.

Extension materials and audio-visual aids in the Somali language are proposed, in order to reach non-literate farmers.

The quelea quelea bird should be included in integrated pest management.

Irrigation and flood control management

The team supports the EC-Somalia Unit's intention to have a baseline study executed concerning management and flood control for an effective utilisation of the seasonal rivers. The establishment of a Shabelle River Authority, is a prerequisite for any further water and irrigation infrastructure development.

Use of manual labour can be considered as a guiding principle for canal rehabilitation and flood control projects.

Design of the canals should be scrutinised on cost effectiveness and contribution to conflict resolution. Water authorities and user groups should therefore be trained in conflict resolution, focusing on the division of water requirements between different crops, and between crops and other uses.

PART V LIVESTOCK

1 PREAMBLE

The agricultural sector, both crops and animals, provides the main source of income for over 70% of the population in Somalia. Within the agricultural sector, pasture-based livestock production is by far the most important sub-sector, occupying half of the Somalis in nomadic pastoralism. Livestock is the major export earner; over the 10 years preceding the war it brought in close to 80% of the country's foreign currency receipts. With other sectors of the Somali economy still in an early phase of post-war recovery, the role of the livestock sector is more dominant than ever before in Somali society.

Rangelands constitute 55% of the total land surface. Somalia is probably unique in the world, with some 42 million animals to a population of around 5 million people. The Somali herd is estimated to be around 6.5 million camels, 3 million heads of cattle, 15 million sheep and 17 million goats (1995 K.F. Löhr). Over the years, the frequency and extent of droughts have determined pastoral activities and herd size. Somalia experiences a moderate drought every five years and a major one every 10 years, causing range lands to deteriorate seriously and sometimes leaving livestock herds devastated.

In order to spread the risks, the previous government had agricultural settlement schemes established along the Shabelle and Jubba rivers for large numbers of nomads and their families, providing them with a new lifestyle and a more secure future. A smaller proportion was settled in various fishing communities along the coast.

Somali livestock has been bred for survival for centuries under harsh climatic conditions. The breeds are extremely hardy and not prone to the diseases often associated with higher yielding breeds. Therefore the disease spectrum and pressure in Somalia is relatively small and low. There are two main diseases that potentially threaten the export of livestock: Rinderpest and Brucellosis. Milk and meat are important staple foods for the population of Somalia.

2 PROGRAMME PREPARATION AND DESIGN

Under the previous regime, the veterinary services were government services, which collapsed with the onset of the war in early 1990. Two years later the international community launched an emergency relief programme in the livestock sector. Because of the importance of livestock, both culturally and economically, an emergency health

inputs programme with free vaccines and drugs was executed by the ICRC in 1992 and 1993 with funding from the European Commission and some co-funding by USAID.

The decision to stop free clinical services was made in mid-1993 in order to move away from relief towards rehabilitation, and this created room for the Private Sector Veterinary Programme of the European Commission. The EC became the leading agency in both financing and policy-making in the privatisation programme of the veterinary services, while USAID became responsible for the development of import and export. The essence of the privatisation programme was the provision of access to private clinical and laboratory veterinary services for all livestock owners throughout Somalia, the owners paying the full costs for all services and drugs. When USAID was unable to continue, the EC agreed to take over its commitments regarding import and export development. The start of the programme proved to be a turning point in convincing other donors to stop free distribution of drugs.

3 RELEVANCE OF THE PROGRAMME

The EC Private Sector Veterinary Programme, launched in 1994, is essentially a training programme for veterinary staff of the former Somalia Ministry of Livestock Range and Fisheries. A return to the subsidised system of veterinary services was not considered feasible or desirable. Experiences with privatisation programmes in other African countries supported such a policy. The objective of the programme was to be achieved through training animal health professionals such as veterinarians, veterinary assistants and auxiliaries. Training had to cover administrative and business-related subjects as well as veterinary matters.

The veterinary programme planned to cover the whole country except for two regions, Sool and Sanaag, where British-funded veterinary programmes were operational.

The long-term perspective would be to free any future government in Somalia from the financial constraints of operating an expensive clinical veterinary service. The decision to establish a private clinical veterinary service had been made in the absence of any logical alternative. However, no logical framework was developed to support such policy decision. The target set for the programme was to have 40% of the participating veterinarians and assistants permanently in a privatised veterinary sector in Somalia. The professionals had to compete with the existing drug distribution networks of importers, traders and animal owners having technical knowledge on diseases and drugs as their main asset in this competition. The distortion caused by the free distribution of drugs during 1992 and 1993 on drug prices went on until mid 1996, when

looted drug stocks dried up.

The privatisation programme had in fact no other choice in Somalia than to work with international NGOs as counterparts for the execution of the programme. Most iNGOs were flexible and were willing to take the risks. Although a number could not, most iNGOs adapted fairly quickly to the new circumstances after the war. Other organisations, like government organisations but also some iNGOs, both with an excellent record in pre-war Somalia, were not able to adjust and had to withdraw from the country.

Every international NGO present at that time in Somalia and willing to be active in the privatisation programme was invited to co-operate. Finally, thirteen international NGOs and one government organisation had their project proposals approved under the veterinary programme. The quality of some proposals had to be brought up to standard with the support of the EC-Somalia Unit.

4 EFFICIENCY

Implementation

Some NGOs had difficulties starting the programme. The combination of veterinary expertise, especially in African livestock, with experience in privatisation of government services, proved to be a rare combination and therefore difficult to recruit.

This resulted in an interval between launching the idea of a privatisation programme and its start. The short period of contracts for expatriates and their subsequent high turnover also caused interruptions in the execution of the programme. Deteriorating security in the region roughly west of the line Mogadishu-Belet Uen resulted in failure of the programme to gain full momentum there.

Training

Every Somali person who could prove to have had some sort of professional education in veterinary science could apply for training under the programme. Screening based on interviews and checklists were applied for the final selection of the trainees, although local pressure occasionally led to contamination of enrolment with laymen. The programme was a two to four days basic training course on administration and business-related subjects, with many NGOs adding some days on clinical subjects. All successful participants received a kick-start package of four to five different brands of veterinary drugs as a boost to their own businesses. The kick-start value was up to twice the value of their own drug stock: veterinarians received a maximum kick-start of

U\$ 1,000 and assistants up to U\$ 500.

For follow-up, veterinarians were assisted in advertising their services in the field to the nomads and given familiarisation with animals and field conditions. The transport was provided by the international NGO. The extent of this part of the programme varied widely with the iNGO, ranging from only a one-week training in the field to 4-5 days every month over nearly 2 years.

The initial phase after basic training was generally found to be the most difficult period, being the first time graduates were on their own as private entrepreneurs. They found the most important part of training was the business training -how to keep a stock register and cash book, how to make a profit-and-loss account and so on.

Around 60% of the participants joined the basic training course only to obtain the drugs. They joined the introduction courses, borrowed some drugs from established pharmacies, received the kick-start package and sold it immediately. The timing of the kick-start, therefore, seems wrong. They should have been distributed after the extensive in-field training, after identification of the people who really wanted to continue as professionals. The sales of these kick-starts added to the already difficult drug market in 1994 and 1995, flooded with looted drug stocks.

Very few of the dropouts found alternative income sources except for some Brucellosis testing and trading.

Monitoring

Monitoring has been executed on two levels in this programme: by the NGO concerning the performance of the professionals and by the EC-Somalia Unit concerning the NGO. The NGOs were obliged to present quarterly reports to the EC-Somalia Unit consisting of a narrative report and a financial report. Although the requirement of the Unit for narrative reporting was considered practical, the guidelines were seen as inconsistent, lacking standardisation. The NGOs considered that the financial monitoring requirements were also unclear during the first phase of the programme. Budget revisions were often necessary due to the ever-changing circumstances in Somalia and guidelines for this were not standardised. Advanced payments were to be processed after justification of the previous payment in quarterly reports. For the TA in the EC-Somalia Unit, this demanded much administration and put a strain on the time available for technical support.

5 EFFECTIVENESS

Results

The success rate of the privatisation process, given a certain degree of security in an area, proved to be particularly dependent on the performance of the international NGO. In some areas very little has been achieved during two years, although security has often been the main stumbling block.

So results vary considerably per region, adding to the overall costs of the programme. The privatisation programme has resulted so far in around 230 professionals being active across the country, offering reasonable access to clinical veterinary services for livestock owners. An outcome of the programme was the establishment of around 45 groups of professionals. Around 40 pharmacies are now operating in the country, either on an individual basis or as part of a group of veterinarian practitioners (see also Annexe 9).

In order to achieve this result the programme spent nearly 5.0 million ECU up to the end of the First Rehabilitation Programme. A per capita investment calculation arrives at an investment of over ECU 20,000 per professional for establishment in privatised veterinary services. These costs also include all overhead costs for the NGO such as security, transport, administration and housing, necessary to execute the training programme. The failure of some iNGOs to deliver results in the form of established veterinarians has increased the investment costs.

The three supporting consultancy reports on export marketing and transport alternatives for export were essential to the further development of the sector and cost ECU 93,000. The investigation into the commercial viability of air transportation of sheep and goats from Southern and Central Somalia airports to Berbera and Bosaso gave encouraging results. Provided that runways were extended such transport would be an alternative to overland transport. The deteriorating security around three vital airports, however, prevented further development of the idea.

The programme achieved its initial target of keeping about 40% of trained people in the sector after the end of the programme. The veterinarian programme was by nature basically a development programme rather than a rehabilitation programme with training, institutional capacity building of veterinarian groups and associations and privatisation components. Given this position the achievement of the programme can be considered acceptable, although the costs to achieve it have been high. No comparison could be made between the costs incurred to achieve the outcome of this programme and the costs of the previous emergency health inputs programme with free vaccines and drugs due to the fact that many different actors were involved. It is however well

known that the latter is far more expensive in the longer term.

Extract from an interview with one veterinarian and two auxiliaries of Middle Shabelle Region:

All seven districts in Middle Shabelle had been covered with the training programme with a first training of seven days in 1993 on administration and business related subjects and in 1996 with a 2nd course of three days on clinical subjects. A total of 64 persons received training: 7 veterinarians of which 3 were women, 35 assistants and 22 auxiliaries.

As per August 1997 only four groups for veterinarian services are still active in Middle Shabelle: 2 veterinarians, 8 assistants and 16 auxiliaries, in total 26. All 10 professionals (veterinarians and assistants) are scheduled to participate in the Terra Nuova course, the 2nd phase training programme started in 1997.

In Jowhar town there are six private veterinary service shops operating, in addition to the four traditional outlets. This group of traditional traders is having increasing difficulty in surviving, as livestock owners start to appreciate the importance of what qualified people can offer as back up to the sale of drugs.

The large majority of the 32 professionals who left the programme since 1993 immediately sold their kick start at the Barkara drug market in Mogadishu (auxiliaries were not eligible for a kick start). Most never intended to start in business. In order to fulfil the conditions, they rented a shop in their village of origin and borrowed a minimum quantity of drugs. As one veterinarian put it: "Most did not understand the concept of the programme". All 3 female veterinarians left the programme for Mogadishu. Some dropouts now regret their decision, lacking any other alternative source of income. None of the 38 dropouts were known to have developed any other business.

The programme reduced the vaccination overkill produced by the previous state-run veterinary services. The loss of livestock resulting from the absence of mass vaccination programmes has on a national level to be balanced against the savings made on such vaccination programmes. However some monitoring of this situation needs to continue to pick up any unexpected negative results.

Income of the professionals

Information has been collected in seven different regions for the calculations of income. Only in exceptional cases were professionals directly forthcoming with data. Most assessments on income are therefore derived from daily or monthly turnover and the mark-up on sales. In some instances the survey could make use of the monthly turnover and profit sheets which the training programme phase II continues to monitor.

After two years in the programme, most professionals in the rural areas now make a modest net income of between U\$ 250 and U\$ 600 per year. Most of them have some additional sources of income from agriculture or livestock. The net profit for the professionals in urban areas ranges from U\$ 1,200 up to over U\$ 2,500 per year. Most have some additional sources of income, mainly from the sales of medicines.

Professionals are making on average up to 95% of their net profit on the sale of drugs, the remainder being made on outreach services. The time spent on outreach services vary widely, but is in most cases taking from 10-35% of their time, and adding only between 5-20% to overall income. The assumption, initially dominant among expatriate veterinarians of INGOs, that the programme would help professionals make their profit mostly from outreach work, has proved so far to be wrong. On the other hand the programme did not intend to make outreach services accessible to all since outreach profits were never seen as big.

The majority of professionals consider themselves financially better off than they were before in government service. Even so, some would go back to government service if it were possible. In Northwest Somalia the programme "lost" some professionals in 1995 and 1996 to the newly established Ministry of Livestock, Forest and Range.

In trading areas like Berbera and Bosaso region the programme was not tailor-made to needs, simply because there is hardly any livestock. None of the Brucellosis testers in these trading areas joined the programme, or wished to establish himself as a private clinical service provider. A specific course was developed for the professionals working in Brucellosis testing to improve their performance.

Brucellosis tests are compulsory on animals being exported, so testing is a profitable business. This explains the following story:

The testing on Brucellosis in Berbera is monopolised by four private groups, who have agreed on uniform prices. The group SOLVA (9 persons) does up to 4,000 tests per day, receiving 300 Somaliland shilling per animal (0.1 U\$) providing that the livestock owner brings his own syringes and antigen. Otherwise the rate is 0.15 U\$ per animal. The group claims to test 33% of all exported animals in Berbera. Their annual turn-over is estimated to be between U\$ 70,000 and U\$ 75,000, of which between 85% and 90% is estimated to be profit; so the profit per person per year is between U\$ 6,500 and U\$ 7,500. The group does clinical work only occasionally.

Institutional Capacity Building

General

In several regions veterinary associations have emerged as a result of groupings formed under the programme. The reason for the creation of such associations is the need for exchange of information in their sector, not only within their region, but also inter-regional. Most regional associations however are still rather loose structures, with membership being free, and with little obligation for the members. Institutional capacity-building in the veterinary sector needs to put roots down into these organisations, which are the only organisations at regional level in the sector. It might be interesting to see where the training needs of animal health assistants in the livestock sector and those of

community health workers in the health sector on health and sanitation issues could be combined.

Ministry of Livestock in Somaliland

During the first phase of the privatisation programme, the Ministry of Livestock in Somaliland was not strong enough to take a leading role in this process. Recently however, the government has taken more responsibility. The private sector should, according to the Ministry, be responsible for provision of veterinary services, the marketing and distribution of drugs and the Brucellosis testing. The role of the Ministry should be to create the institutional framework to support the private sector, to control the import and marketing of drugs, and to regulate the private sector by issuing registration, certification and licensing. The joint proposal for guidelines on private veterinary services in Somaliland is a good example of co-operation between the veterinary programme and the ministry. A National Veterinary Board is currently being inaugurated to advise the Ministry on the privatisation process.

6 IMPACT

The programme is almost certainly having a positive impact on the quality of animal care; the professionals see the service they provide as better than the one they gave wearing a government hat; livestock owners are increasingly demanding not just drugs but the back-up service provided with the sales. It is said that the traditional traders of veterinary drugs are losing out on business. However the effect of privatisation on the animals of the very poor needs some monitoring.

Success is likely to mean that there is an impact on the total size of the herd, although availability of water will remain the overriding factor. There is legitimate concern that success in the livestock sector is also contributing to soil degradation and erosion of the rangelands, sometimes progressing at an alarming rate in the arid central and northern regions. This in return could finally be threatening the sustainability of nomadism and the viability of the livestock sector in Somalia as a whole. Research on the feasibility of introduction of controlled grazing schemes, proven to bring a halt to soil degradation in countries like Zimbabwe and Namibia, is recommended. The limiting geopolitical situation in Somalia, the costs of introduction of such pilot schemes and the fact that Somalia has a different type of animal husbandry should however be carefully considered.

This emphasises the importance of monitoring developments and their impact within sectors and also the cross-sectoral influences of developments. The size of herds, the

provision of drinking water, the growth of rural human populations, the grazing patterns of herds, are all factors which interact.

The programme has impacted on patterns of service delivery. Leading veterinarians in some areas have started to organise small veterinary support groups of three to four people in the rural areas in order to better service the livestock owners. This model is proving a good one. Transport is the major cost in the outreach services and the veterinarian needs to have guarantee of business once he is out in the field. So by providing a small group of auxiliaries and animal health assistants in the region with training and a basic drug supply and offering services on a fixed time schedule (e.g. once a month) he can finance perhaps the only effective model for veterinary services in the Nomadic areas. The veterinary programme uses in this respect the train-the-trainers concept, the veterinarian being the focal point in this concept.

... private veterinarian diagnosing goat (Harardere)...

One negative impact was that the transport provided during training created some dependency; after the termination of the field training some professionals experienced a loss of business. Transport is now being identified by many professionals as the most needed facility. Many professionals rely now on public transport if there is any, or they rent transport in order to reach clients and their animals. Quite often the herds are reached by foot, with walking distances as much as 20 to 30 kilometres.

Impact on exports: whether the increase in exports over the last years is due to the Private Sector Veterinary Programme could not be quantified, nor were there any other assessments available. The export of animals via the two major livestock ports of Berbera and Bosaso increased from around 1.3 million (estimate) in 1993 to 2.23 million animals in 1994, to 3.25 million in 1995 and decreased to 3.14 million in 1996. The total gross income for livestock producers in Somalia in 1996 were estimated at U\$ 108 million and the export profit for traders in the same year U\$ 77 million (K.F. Löhr, 1997). The impact of Brucellosis testing on the health of the population in the countries importing animals from Somalia is not clear, since animals testing positive are often exported anyway.

7 SUSTAINABILITY

It is estimated that the coverage of the country with outreach services is limited to around 40% to 50% of territory. These are the areas where there is potential for viable privatised veterinary services. The credit-worthiness of the professionals is still considered very low, lacking a proven prolonged profitability. There is even hesitation among direct relatives with viable finances, in the Somali context the traditional moneylenders, to provide them with credit. This lack of access to credit has much to do with mutual trust in the sector that will need to be developed over time.

Most professionals are now confident that they can continue as private entrepreneurs, although some still long for the security of the previous government system.

The programme not only created a sustainable source of income for a limited group of professionals but also initiated an important change of attitude, which according to some professionals is the biggest achievement of the programme.

The story of a veterinarian in Badan, Sanaag region is characteristic of the really successful ones in the sector:

Abdullahi claims to have a daily average turnover of around U\$ 20 to U\$ 30, making a profit of around U\$ 7 each day. His profit made on outreach services is around 3% of total income, although he devotes on average five days per month on outreach services. Outreach services are therefore considered financially as a back up, in contrast with drug sales. Total net profit per year is assessed as U\$ 2,000 to U\$ 2,500.

One female colleague, who left the programme in an early stage and therefore did not receive a kick-start, recently opened a pharmacy without any help. The fact that she is able to start in such an open market indicates the profitability of the sector.

Abdullahi never wants to go back in a government service: "My eyes are now wide open and I know now how to make a profit" and "When I was working for the government I only waited for my salary".

8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Outcome

The need to build the confidence of clients and gain a good reputation has been a very important component in the learning process for the veterinary professionals. Most have travelled a long way from their pre-war sinecures with the government, via the uncertain war period, to the challenging and demanding current era of being a private entrepreneur. Now they work in a very different setting of a Somalia without government and without, except in Somaliland, regulations and permits to protect the newly emerging sector.

In the beginning, the EC-Somalia Unit and most training programmes focused on technical issues such as administration skills and veterinary expertise, rather than on issues such as confidence-building. The in-field training programmes soon learned that unless the professionals could handle their clients properly, their businesses were doomed to fail. The biggest challenge for the programme in its follow-up phase is to further this change of attitude among the professionals. This will take more than the two years during which privatisation has taken place.

Sustainability of Services

The best model for the rural areas to survive is probably the urban-based professional, working with three to four rural-based auxiliaries or animal health assistants, while providing them on a regular basis with the most essential drugs. The provision of outreach services could then be arranged on a fixed schedule whereby the veterinarian visit every month or so to treat the most urgent cases of animal diseases. This arrangement might be the only viable and therefore surviving model in the nomadic areas. Transport such as motorcycles for outreach services on demand is probably only viable in peri-urban areas where livestock is part of agricultural activities.

The Nomadic context adds an extra dimension to privatisation. A recommendation would be to study more in-depth the sustainability of the privatised clinical services in the nomadic context of Somalia.

Institutional Capacity Building

Institutional capacity building in the veterinary sector needs to focus on the emerging regional veterinary organisations in Somalia. Training in organisation and management of leaders and members of district and regional boards is recommendable. The creation of databases and subsequent exchange of information needs to be prime areas of attention in such training. The Ministry of Livestock in Somaliland deserves support in similar projects such as the development of guidelines on private veterinary services, although it is acknowledged that the Ministry has not always fulfilled its obligations in FRP projects.

In order to stimulate the viability of the private veterinary service sector, the government of Somaliland and other regional authorities could contract out the operation of slaughter houses to the sector groups of professionals, and, if needed, the execution of vaccination programmes.

A policy has to be developed on meat quality control, including the training of relevant staff. The export of meat in Bosaso and home consumption in regions like the Northwest are proposed areas of attention.

Overall Orientation of Programme

The focus in the programme should be on strengthening the links and co-operation between the private and public sector in the livestock sector and to include the livestock owner as important actor in the health care of animals.

EC-Somalia Unit

It is recommended that the EC-Somalia Unit continue with a livestock TA among its experts. The task for this expert would be especially to further institutional capacity in the veterinary services in different regions in Somalia and study the sustainability of the services. Whatever the future developments in Somalia, this service will remain private. The Ministry of Livestock in Somaliland would be a specific area of attention. The TA's tasks would further include facilitating a code of conduct for livestock traders on testing, spraying of animals, tick treatment and the development of a policy on meat quality control. Research on the feasibility of introduction of controlled grazing schemes in Somalia needs to be initiated, including any other promising way of controlling soil degradation and erosion in Somalia.

9 EC PRIVATE SECTOR VETERINARY PROGRAMME PHASE II

Two international NGOs, UNA and Terra Nuova, continue with a countrywide programme, partly already funded under the First Rehabilitation Programme (UNA). The objectives of this phase II are twofold: firstly to continue to carry out on-the-job clinical and formal training sessions for private veterinary services, using participatory approaches to problem identification and problem solving. Secondly it envisages a development of a livestock certification process in exporting areas, to sensitise livestock traders to follow recommended practices in selection and shipment, to introduce health inspection certificates, regulations for inland transportation and to establish a port veterinary office.

These programmes have been under way since the end of 1996 and early 1997. The main activity in both programmes so far has been the continuation of the field training started under the First Rehabilitation Programme. It is recommended that in those regions where for one or another reason (security, or the performance of the NGO) the privatisation programme has not made sufficient impact on the veterinary sector, the inputs be made to bring them up to the norm.

The objective to improve nearly all aspects of the livestock chain from production to export is considered too ambitious for a one-year programme. The sudden collapse of the livestock export market in Bosaso in 1997 indicates for example how little influence can be effected on a macro level.

It is recommended that the contracts with both organisations should be at least two years in order to better monitor the already emerging effects in the Brucellosis and veterinary sector.

PART VI SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZE ENTERPRISES (SME)

1 PREAMBLE

In Somalia, the lack of sufficient employment is a major problem as well as a threat to peace, stability and development. An important provider in Somalia is the business sector; Somali people have a longstanding reputation as being excellent businessmen and women. The business sector has grown to such a degree that it ranks as the biggest employer in Somalia, alongside, and often interwoven with, other sectors such as the agricultural sector.

There are no enterprises that can fit within any accepted definition of a "medium scale" sized enterprise. The "M" of the SME sector as a term should therefore be understood as referring to micro enterprises. This particular category accounts for the majority of current business activities in Somalia. It is estimated that over 95% of all enterprises fall within the category of micro enterprises. Most enterprises are tiny, employing on average three people with a low volume of assets varying between ECU 300 and 1,600.

The sector is characterised by survival of the fittest and a high proportion of women. To be successful, they need a high degree of business motivation and determination to overcome constraints such as interference by their clan or family. Although they manage to survive, most of them lack basic know-how, ideas for product development, resources and security. To the owners of micro enterprises, outside intervention may have a catalytic effect.

This notwithstanding, the overall growth of the informal private business sector into a major economic force against all odds, has led to the view that support for the micro and small-scale business sector in Somalia is extremely important and that the sector offers the most suitable base from which to mount meaningful and sustainable interventions.

The point of departure for interventions are functional literacy and numeracy courses as a precursor to vocational and business skills training; and credit schemes for existing and starting SME..

2 PROGRAMME PREPARATION AND DESIGN

The first rehabilitation programme for Somalia allocated three million ECU to Creation of Employment. The SME sector was assigned half of that amount, plus 135,000 ECU for

consultancies. No commitment had been made for Creation of Employment. One commitment was made under SME for a workshop held in October 1994. The arrival of the TA for SME, gave her the chance to find out that the budget had been emasculated to a mere Pro Memory post. The only funds remaining were 135,000 ECU for consultancies. Cancellation of the major part of the budget for the SME sector made it hard to understand why a TA was appointed to develop the sector. This and possibly other conditions have taken away much of the vigour from the programme. It must be concluded, that the section has done relatively little during the FRP.

There is in the SACB no sectoral committee established, to co-ordinate efforts to create sustainable employment creation.

During 1995 a baseline study was done to identify specific opportunities for employment creation. The following areas were identified as having the greatest impact in terms of sustainable development and the creation of jobs in all productive sectors:

1. A programme for the formation of Chambers of Commerce/Business associations with the necessary skills and knowledge to promote and co-ordinate business development in their Region. The programme must provide training in economics and legal aspects to newly developing authorities, in order to prevent design and the implementation of prohibitive tariff barriers, taxes and laws.
2. A Marketing Assistance and Product Promotion Programme (MAPPS) designed to match local resources and demand with the potential for substantial business development and employment creation.
3. An enterprise development training programme, aiming at capacity building through training female community development workers working with micro and small-scale enterprises at grassroots level. The course manual includes training of different aspects of business skills. One component is skills development for youth and demobilised militia.
4. A programme consisting of the provision of credit to entrepreneurs and also capacity building.

"Our pride is very important to us. In the war we lost our dignity, our feeling of self-esteem and our trust in others. Now we learn how to get back our dignity and pride. We learn how to do it ourselves with working together, and with discussing in meetings, we have overcome greediness and jealousy, and replaced it by respect and trust in each other". These are the words of Adama, a Community Development Worker in Hargeisha.

She belongs to a group receiving a revolving fund and training from an EC-country. Adama and her colleagues work to help very poor women, widows and wives of disabled soldiers. Some have started successful soap businesses or are running street-corner stalls.

Adama and her associates now manage a revolving fund of \$3,500. Next month, at their request, a workshop will be organised on bookkeeping. The participants pay a small fee and bring their own food, being their contribution to the costs.

"We do not look anymore to what happens today; now our time horizon has increased tremendously and with our investments we look for over five years ahead".

3 RELEVANCE OF THE PROGRAMMES

The initiatives undertaken till July 1997, as pilots for SME development, are found in Annexe 9.

3.1 The formation of the Chambers of Commerce/Business associations

The primary objective of this programme is to contribute to the creation of a favourable environment for business development. The formation of Chambers of Commerce and Business associations, with the necessary skills and knowledge to co-ordinate business development in a region, are expected to achieve this. Through the provision of support mechanisms, the programme for the Chamber of Commerce seeks to create an enabling environment for the growth of medium and larger enterprises, which wish to reach new local and international markets. This in turn is assumed to have a spin-off effect on small and micro enterprises that are the customers and suppliers of the former. Reference is made to notes in the first round of comments.

The first proposal for a Chamber of Commerce at Bosaso formulates it as follows:

- a. to establish an institution at local level, capable of providing business support services to all levels of industry and commerce, ranging from the international livestock traders and the growing number of modern service infrastructure providers to emerging businesses within the refugee population.
- b. to establish the Bosaso Chamber as a member of the world-wide Chamber of Commerce network.

The Chamber would act as a representative and an example for local business; act as a catalyst in economic regeneration; as a focal point for advice and information; as an intermediary to promote good business; as a model of good practice, and to provide

business training.

The joint EC-FAO Livestock Export Market study (1995) supports the promotion of regional livestock traders associations, who are part of the Chamber of Commerce. The UNA project proposal "Livestock export-related veterinary project in North East Somalia" (February 1997), a follow-up of the former, also supports the formation of a Chamber of Commerce, and identifies the livestock traders as the key players.

The export trade of livestock is vital for the economy. It is done by large-scale enterprises and is entirely governed by commercial forces, controlled by a few families of the Warsengeli sub-clan. According to Marshall (1996), it is difficult to enter without the proper background. The traders from Bosaso have formed a joint venture with the Saudi Brothers Livestock company of Jeddah, called Somali Saudi Livestock Company (SOSALCO). Traders deal only with this company.

If clan imbalances are to be avoided in the interest of stability, then the Bosaso Chamber of Commerce proposal needs to be assessed in view of this.

The establishment of Chambers of Commerce may be relevant for the development of SME at a higher level of economic development elsewhere in Africa and Asia. But considering the present and foreseeable economic situation, together with the absence of a government; and the virtually non-existent economic transparency and accountability, with a culture of economic power-sharing based on clan loyalties, the team considers the proposed objectives to be of limited relevance to contemporary SME development.

A possible exception may be associations of SME, which are involved in import trade; the "modern service infrastructure providers"; the groups of frankincense and Arabic gum collectors, and fisheries. Such associations could not be traced in Bari region.

It is therefore recommended that this programme be postponed at this stage, until conditions of economic development suggest increased feasibility and relevance of the services of a Chamber of Commerce for SME development.

3.2 MAPPS - Marketing Assistance and Product Promotion

According to the MAPPS proposal, designed as a result of lessons learned from the 12 pilots, the results, though with 'varying degrees of success', gave positive indications of the relevance of this type of projects for the establishment and enhancement of micro and small enterprises in Somalia. The MAPPS proposal was approved in August 1997.

The overall objective of the programme is to generate income and to create employment for potential entrepreneurs. It will address the problems of product quality, knowledge of market outlets and sources of supply, new ideas for products, and basic business know-how, by thorough sector-based training in a straightforward, pragmatic, results-oriented approach. Short, tailor-made training courses are trying to match local resources with market opportunities.

The objectives of the proposal were well formulated but ambitious. First of all, the envisaged access to credit by the proposed credit scheme was not yet in place. (see box) The EC-Somalia Unit expects that credit will be made available within a short time, with the start of the proposed credit programme, still to be launched in 1997. Another reason is that the assessment of the viability of micro-enterprises to qualify for support by MAPPS has not yet been done fully.

In Garoowe a pilot-project was implemented with a women's group which was trained to produce "tie & dye" fabric. Local groups and NGOs each sent participants and 12 women joined the 7-days training. The leader of the course Miriam Ilkas said: "We expected a lot of training and we got it: we were trained for 7 days but felt as if it was for 7 years!!".

The produce was sold locally: later on many individuals and (market) salesmen placed orders with the group. A standard amount of fabric is produced in one-and-half hours and yields a profit of Shs. 9,000. (Around 1.2 US dollar)

Four new businesses were established as a result of the pilot tie and dye training programme. Beneficiaries were women from female-headed households who previously had no means of income. Notwithstanding the success of the project, and the enthusiasm of the group, it came to a halt, because the ferry from Dubai sank, carrying the materials for them to get started. All was lost and there is no activity at present. The local group and the supporting iNGO felt that the relations with the SME sector in Nairobi had grown cumbersome and delaying the process of recovery.

In order not to have all efforts wasted by such an unfortunate event, a solution could be to assist in the purchase of new materials. Costs could be shared between the iNGO, the group, and the Somalia Unit.

3.3 Grassroots training in vocational and business skills

The difference between this programme and the former is that this training in business skills is aiming at community development workers for woman groups, based on a Training the Trainers approach. In this way business training can be made available locally.

Curriculum development, so far, consists of the enterprise training manual called "The

Resource Pack". The team supports the idea to have this expanded and translated into Somali to increase impact. It is also recommended that the amount of training material available be increased and made more diverse by obtaining relevant resources from elsewhere, for example the MATCOM training material series developed by UNIDO in Vienna, and the training manuals developed by Small Industrial Development Organisations in Tanzania and Kenya. These could be adapted to the local Somali situation, and be translated into the local language.

The team also supports the strategy of the Somalia Unit to ensure that these projects co-ordinate and complement each other as appropriate. The MAPPS project document lays out the proposed business training as an integral part of the programme. It is intended to be in the form of brief localised interventions where local resources and market opportunities need to be matched. On the other hand the delivery of businesses and vocational training should be developed on a national scale but also remaining relevant to the local economy.

Training in vocational skills is aimed at youths and demobilised militia in vocational training centres. The pilot training initiatives undertaken have had a duration of between thirteen to thirty days. It is recommended that after the programme has been running for one year, its effectiveness be reviewed, since the learning objectives were not clear, and also its duration. Business and vocational training is intended to be on a national scale.

In order to become more effective, it is recommended to extend vocational skills training to more sectors. Broadening the scope to a fully fledged vocational training programme will help beneficiaries to generate income through self-employment, or through employment by others. These skills might include for example food conservation and other processing technology for agricultural produce and fisheries, making packing material from recycled plastic, processing frankincense and Arabic gum, maintaining and repairing grinders and other tools.

The vocational skills training component is delayed. No suitable implementers with a track record in enterprise development could be identified regarding the proposals submitted by INGOs.

One problem encountered by the SME programme was that no suitable implementers could be identified to implement the programme on vocational and business training. In order to avoid further delay it is advised that rigorous advertising be done to identify a capable organisation to implement the programme component. The failure to find interested implementers may indicate that the projects were insufficiently initiated from

the field by local groups with close involvement of potential implementers. This issue needs a much closer look at, as it will be decisive for the success of the projects.

Potentially the MAPPS and Enterprise development training programme are complementary and could be reinforcing each other's activities. The team supports the envisaged strategy, that these services be co-ordinated and complement each other as appropriate.

3.4 Credit and Training facilities for entrepreneurs: "Building a microfinance institutional capacity in Somalia"

The credit needs assessment report identified financial support for MSE development as perhaps the single most important intervention, which could have a substantial impact to improve food security.

The target programme areas selected by the technical assistance proposal are in the North West, the North East, and in Gedo. (K-Rep proposal; April 1997, page 7.) The relevance of the project could significantly be increased if the Shabelle river valley, with its enormous agricultural and agro-industrial potential, would be included as target programme area. It is therefore appropriate to include the Shabelle river valley area with a programme, suitable for rural and agro-based micro enterprise finance, in the opinion of the team and the EC-Somalia Unit.

4 SUSTAINABILITY AND REPLICABILITY

4.1 SME project development in general

As the SME sector is an informal sector, it suffers relatively little from the absence of formalised governmental institutions with their supposed measures of support. The SME intervention programmes are now on the verge of being implemented. Based on the experience gained through other successful programmes, it seems important to have participants contribute with a modest fee towards the cost of training. This will be a yardstick for motivation, and is expected to enhance active participation in training. Interventions in SME require a longer time period than two years, partly because training support and specific backstopping needs to extend over a longer period of time.

Local SME groups should be helped with training from the onset of their project. Groups selected should have a clear vision that management capacity and administration skills should be developed in such a way that the responsibilities for the enterprise stay where

they ought to, with the owners. Assets should be handed over to them under an agreement of the terms of responsibilities. The implementing iNGO and the TA-SME should be available to closely monitor and to provide back-up services.

4.2 Decentralisation of the SME programme

For a number of reasons the SME programme has not yet taken off in operational terms, nor even achieved some degree of consolidation at the end of the FRP. The team found some explanations as to why the sector did not thrive, but may not have found them all. In general, starting a new activity in Somalia is difficult and slow, especially when it is meant as a countrywide programme, likely to consist of a large number of micro-projects. Entering the (micro-)business world in Somalia and establishing reliable relations cannot really be done from Nairobi alone. It is certainly not possible at this stage given that implementers have not shown enough interest to hook up into the programme. In several interviews it was said that the vision in the SME programme did not provide the thrust and motivation needed to make the programme a success.

So problems lie in the nature and characteristics of the SME programme, the prevailing conditions in Somalia and the reluctance of implementers to take part in the effort to decentralise the SME programme. Decentralisation of the SME -just as with the other sectors- fits very well with into the policy of decentralising SACB activities into Somalia.

It is therefore recommended that a number of the activities of the SME sector be decentralised to the offices in Berbera and Bosaso. The team cannot make any judgement concerning personnel, but in technical terms it was observed that the job descriptions of the TAs in these two places could accommodate SME-related duties. It was also understood that the TA in the Berbera office spends much of his time on general matters such as travel arrangements, logistics and administration; work that could possibly be done by somebody else.

It is certainly not easy to transfer all skills and knowledge to the TSAO offices, as commented by the Somalia Unit. It is therefore realistic that the process should be slow and sensitive for the affects that it may have on all those involved. From these two offices, the activities in the relevant regions would be covered, with monitoring and backstopping done jointly with the implementers central in the job description of the TAs. The role of the Mogadishu office in decentralising SME needs closer study and also depends on the activities implemented from the offices in Berbera and Bosaso. Clearly, SME-related activities should not distort the implementation of other assignments to the northern offices.

Bringing SME-related activities into Somalia requires careful discussions in the EC-

Somalia Unit.

The TA-SME at the Nairobi office would be in charge of further SME/Employment creation development, overall co-ordination, training and supervision of the TAs, in Somalia, and the monitoring and follow-up of those programmes with a national character. The TA would also manage intersectoral issues, resulting from the second recommendation.

5 IMPACT

The SME programme has for a number of reasons and circumstances mentioned in the previous sections, not yet become fully operational. Consequently the impact can not be assessed at this stage.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS

As an overall conclusion, it may be stated, that the programme did not thrive and in terms of operations the achievements have been limited in the FRP.

The SRP however allocates two million ECU to SME/Employment creation. And in order to further develop the programme and its vigour, the following is recommended:

6.1 Concerning current SME projects and proposals

Development of the Chambers of Commerce

The support of the development of the Chambers of Commerce should be postponed, until the conditions of economic development warrant a higher degree of relevance for SME development.

MAPPS

Viable credit schemes should be provided in co-ordination with the implementation of the MAPPS programme, as envisaged.

Grassroots training in vocational and business skills

The amount of training materials available would become more diverse by getting relevant resource materials from elsewhere and adapting them to the local situation.

Vocational training of professionals

Vocational skills training should be extended to other sectors such as agriculture and

fisheries, and the duration of training should be assessed after one year's implementation.

Concerning building a microfinance institutional capacity in Somalia

The Shabelle river valley area should be included, with a programme suitable for rural and agro-based micro enterprise finance.

6.2 Concerning the place of SME/MSE in the EC-Somalia Unit and the SRP

For the SRP the Plan of Action should be further developed including the following elements:

- i) setting up of new micro-enterprises,
- ii) the expansion of existing small businesses,

A distinction will to be made between rural/agro-based and urban-based SME.

The study should be carried out, preferably by an external party with ample knowledge in the SME/MSE sector and familiar with prevailing conditions in Somalia.

The SME programme will be decentralised with the offices in Bosaso and Berbera taking an important share of the operational activities. The role of the Mogadishu office needs further scrutiny.

Considering the recommendation that SME should be closely linked with the other sectors, it is further recommended that the SME budget in the SRP be two-pronged:

- i) it will have budget (and policy) to develop projects on its own, as was intended in the FRP, and ii) it will now be linked to each of the other sectors in the SRP, for example in food/agro processing, rural projects in agriculture and livestock or in manufacturing roof tiles for a housing programme (semi-urban).

In order to strengthen the much-needed intersectoral linkages and to balance different interests, both budgets will co-fund the SME projects on a fifty-fifty basis or on any other basis seen as more relevant.

PART VII FISHERIES

1 PREAMBLE

The seas off the Somali coast are rich in fish, both inshore and offshore, about the only country resource that is under-utilised. Catches by foreign ships using Somali licences, legal at the time, amounted in 1987 to 11,300 tons. (EIU 97). This large-scale and uncontrolled industrial fishing by foreign fleets continues, both for white fish in bulk and

for high-value product such as shark and lobster. The fleets allegedly dump toxic waste in the water, further threatening the stock. Fishing by Somali at an artisan level has always brought in less; in 1989 only 8,500 tons (EIU 97). As a potential area of local income-generation, fishing has been studied and projects formulated during the FRP. Consultants carried out several studies in collaboration with IUC and Oceanic Research Institute, Durban.

On the basis of these studies, a number of proposals have been submitted and are pending approval. Although no recent stock assessment has been made, the basic assumption for these projects has been this under-exploitation of fishing.

2 PROJECT PREPARATION AND RELEVANCE

Identification and formulation process

The objectives of the fisheries programme as reflected by proposals (COOPI-Berbera, Africa'70-Kandala, CISP-Galgadud/Mudug) can be summarised as enhancing the livelihood of the fishing communities by:

- * capacity development and support to the local community in traditional processing of the catch;
- * market development: processing, conservation and transport of the catch to further up-country markets or exporters;
- * creating awareness of natural resources management.

iNGOs involved with fisheries, and met by the team, expressed their interest in assessing the feasibility of rehabilitating the fishing centres, including cold centres and workshops (Berbera, Bosaso, Kandala and Seylac). Project implementation is also under consideration by the Italian and Danish governments and FAO/UNDP.

The project proposals have been developed on the basis of studies done by EC-consultants with the above-mentioned iNGOs. The team observed that among the local leaders and communities, great interest for fisheries development was shown.

Coherence and realism of project design

The main objectives of the artisan fisheries proposals are well selected, with identified activities that would support the objectives. Concern exists as to whether the applying iNGOs have sufficient experience with fisheries rehabilitation and development in Somalia. Projects are implemented by Africa '70 and CISP in South America, West Africa and Thailand. CVs are submitted to EC-Somalia Unit and EC-Brussels.

The fishing centre at Berbera has been rehabilitated by COOPI to a good standard, and

is now operational under the ownership of the local leadership and community.

As a matter of urgency, the relationship between the local artisan fishermen, the often female processors of the fish and the traders needs to be studied. Normally in Somalia, traders hold far more powerful positions than the fishermen and processors, and this needs to be allowed for. Traders commonly pay the fishers and processors the minimum while enjoying high prices on the international markets. It is recommended that the fishermen (alone or in associations) are made capable of transporting the catch to Mogadishu, Bosaso or Berbera, independently of the traders.

The fisheries programme is aware of the risks of upsetting these relations in the community and the risks in terms of disturbing stability. An important element in the projects will be training of fishermen to work in co-operative organisations or associations.

Fish are not commonly eaten by Somalis. However, in other parts of Africa, dried and/or smoked fish plays an important and cheap part in the diet, providing protein for everyone, especially the small children who need it badly.

3 RECOMMENDATIONS

As the fisheries sector has just entered the application stage, other aspects of the project cycle cannot be evaluated.

FISHERIES PROJECTS

Implementing agency	Region	Project title	Remarks
Alessandro Lovatelli	Countrywide	Consultancy on artisanal fisheries in Somalia	Project completed on 22.12.95
Marcello Ottaviani	Countrywide	Consultancy on artisanal fisheries in Somalia	Project completed on 06.03.97
Marcello Ottaviani	Countrywide	Consultancy on artisanal fisheries in Somalia	Proposal submitted to EC-Somalia Unit
COOPI	Berbera	Rehabilitation of the fisheries sector in NW Somalia	Proposal submitted to EC-Somalia Unit
AFRICA '70	Kandala	Fisheries development in N.E.R. Somalia	Proposal submitted to EC-Somalia Unit
CISP	Galgudud and Mudug	Support to the rehabilitation of small scale fisheries	

...artisanal fishing equipment (Berbera)...

PART VIII ENVIRONMENT

1 PROJECT PREPARATION AND DESIGN

Identification and formulation process

The Natural Resources Management Programme aims at ensuring that the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources becomes an integral component of the EC Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia.

The World Conservation Union (IUCN) Eastern Africa Regional Office works alongside the EC-Somalia Office as a technical partner towards the following long-term objectives:

- * to establish a basis for the conservation of Somalia's natural resource assets from (further) deterioration;
- * to promote and consolidate the links between natural resources management and conservation and the improvement of welfare of the local communities in Somalia;
- * to provide guidance and advice to the EC Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia on natural resources and environmental matters.

The IUCN aimed at the following output during the first phase (September 1996 - September 1997):

- * a strategic framework for undertaking environmental activities in Somalia;
- * priorities for established geographical and thematic environmental operations;
- * a natural resources monitoring and evaluation system for Somalia's natural resources;
- * innovative methodologies for environmental interventions at community level identified and developed;
- * a community-based natural resources management programme elaborated;
- * specific studies, surveys, environment impact assessment and advice provided to the EC-Somalia Unit.

All of these are now been done, bearing in mind that the stated outputs are concerned with the planning stage of the management cycle, and the implementation stage is yet to come, in the second phase.

Coherence and realism of project design

The proposals are well formulated, in accordance with the format of LFA, and reflect the extensive experience of the IUCN. Approaches and principles underlying the strategic framework for the environmental activities are spelled out in good detail. Where possible the approach and methodology has been participatory; workshops have been held whereas inputs were obtained from participants from Somalia, iNGOs and donors. Great emphasis was placed on the role of the communities in management and monitoring the use, management and sustainability of the natural resources.

The IUCN input mainly opts for process-driven approaches. The key words in the approach and projects are i) integrated approach of different natural resources usage and management and ii) community-based management.

The approach and objectives are ambitious; it should not be overlooked that there is country-specific context, one without any governmental structure that can guide, structure and co-ordinate long-term developments. Experience in other countries have shown that an integrated approach in natural resources and environmental management needs central structures which extend beyond the scale of the projects. The principles of the IUCN are sound in themselves, but if enabling circumstances are not present, the projects may not fit.

Of the outputs listed above, five are process-driven; their place is much less limited than the one that is output-driven.

2 RELEVANCE OF THE PROJECT

General context

Owing to the war, a relatively high population growth and the return of people and livestock to ecologically sensitive areas in the Northeast and central part of the country, there was a rapid increase in cattle numbers, much greater than the limited carrying capacity. As a result, environmental degradation is severe.

In addition to these structural causes, sectoral relief and rehabilitation projects are frequently damaging to nature and environment, for example, water discharge from deep-lying aquifers with probably very little replenishment, and the nearly country-wide improved veterinary services, which may be leading to greater numbers of livestock and a subsequent decline of vegetation.

The activities envisaged for the second phase of the programme - from September 1997 onwards - address these problems in an indirect manner, as explained in the previous

section.

Specific context

The EC is funding a large number of projects that potentially bring environmental risks with them. It was observed that a number of these project proposals, and hence their implementation, fail to take into account the environmental risks and side effects, for example the implementation of the civil works in the Berbera Port, specifically the fuel storage and filling point. When these issues arose, projects had no satisfactory information concerning their environmental impact; Berbera claimed that they had the information, but it could not be found for the team.

Although there is little dispute about the need to assess the environmental effects of the projects, it is not being done sufficiently. According to the EC Users Guide to Environmental Procedures 1993, the following projects and sectors (of the FRP) require further environmental analysis: projects related to Rural and Urban Water Supply, Ports, Agriculture, Irrigation, Livestock and in some instances Fisheries. From the sample of project proposals looked at, none has been analysed in line with the Procedures.

In conclusion, the project for assessing the impact on natural resources and environment by the EC-funded projects is highly relevant. However there does not seem to be a need to replace the standard EC procedures of impact assessment, though they may need some fine-tuning to fit optimally to the Somalia conditions.

The project outputs, which focus on community-based management of natural resources, may seem less appropriate given the short-term presence of the implementers and absence of a governmental structure. It is also not certain that the communities will be able to perform as envisaged, given the degree of devastation and disturbance in most of them. The nature of the output 1-5 is also rather academic, although considerable time was spent in Somalia in testing the methods, both with the iNGOs as well as with leaders and communities.

3 EFFICIENCY

Means and costs

The first phase has largely been the development of strategies towards environmental conservation and sustainable natural resource management. The project has delivered the output as described in the first section and is in accordance with the output in the agreement with the EC. The project cost has been relatively high (450,000 ECU) but can be justified given the fact that little information existed and much work had been

done, with journeys into Somalia.

Organisation, management, monitoring

IUCN/EARO is not operational by itself; it provides technical assistance to the EC-Somalia Unit to assure that the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources becomes an integral component of the Rehabilitation Programme. By doing so, IUCN works closely with the implementers of the EC-funded programmes, for example with COOPI-Soil, Water Conservation Project and Africa '70 projects. The monitoring is therefore project-based and rests with the implementers and with IUCN staff. The way evaluations are being done after (some of the) workshops is interesting. It is not clear how the outcome of the workshop evaluations is fed back into the IUCN approach.

Several reports and papers have been written which reflect the works implemented.

...ancient water well; rehabilitated (Garowe)...

4 EFFECTIVENESS

The effectiveness of the activities: intentions versus output

Output 1: A strategic framework for undertaking environmental activities in Somalia

*A strategic framework setting out the rationale and direction for environmental and natural resources management activities. The framework is to be completed by November 1997;

The beneficiary is the EC-Somalia Unit who will use the framework's principles, long-term vision and planning.

Output 2: Priorities for geographical and thematic environmental operations established

*A number of rapid ecological assessments were undertaken, including Saard Ed Islands and at the Indian Ocean Coastal plains, Middle Shabelle, Galgadud regions;

*Workshops on setting priorities for natural resources management in Somaliland, Ministry of Environment, Range and Rural Development in Somaliland;

The beneficiaries are the Ministry of Environment, Range and Rural Development of the Government of Somaliland and relevant institutions. The effectiveness of the output will depend on whether the users will receive adequate support in using the information.

Output 3: Natural resources monitoring and evaluation system for Somalia's natural resources elaborated

*A two-pronged natural resources monitoring and evaluation system is developed: at macro level using GIS applications, and at micro level community-based participatory planning approaches;

*A guide for monitoring fish catches at landings has been developed with the Oceanographic Institute of Durban and Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Development, Somaliland;

The output aims at benefiting the natural resources of Somalia and therewith sections of the Somalia society that derive their livelihood from these natural resources. The short- to medium-term effectiveness cannot be assessed at this stage, as the output will be presented at a workshop in November.

Output 4: Innovative methodologies for environmental interventions at community level identified and developed

*Elaboration and testing of a method for participatory planning at community level;

The field-tested methodologies will be available to the iNGOs in northern and southern Somalia. In the unique situation of Somalia, with planning of community-based interventions (and monitoring of natural resources), but with no stabilising governmental structure in place, piloting will be required to understand the complexities and dynamics of the process.

Output 5: Community-based natural resources management programme elaborated

*Facilitating development of a community-based natural resources management programme;

In terms of benefit, the community-based natural resources development programme will be made available to EC-funded implementers, local emerging administrations and civil society institutions. The same comments apply as under output 4.

Output 6: Specific studies, surveys, environment impact assessment and advice provided to the EC-Somalia Unit

*Marine Ecological survey of the Saard ed Din Islands in NW Somalia;

*Ecological assessment of the coastal plains north of Middle Shabelle and Galgaduud regions for sustainable natural resource management;

*Assessment of the woodfuel dynamics and recommendations for practical measures and activities for improving production and consumption efficiency and possible introduction of alternative energy sources (draft report);

*Elaboration of practical and user-friendly EIA guidelines for the water sector (commencing October 1997);

Contribution of the output to achieving the (future) project purpose.

Given the all-embracing objectives of the project, clearly a long time will be needed to achieve the objectives and take care of satisfactory consolidation. At this stage the output is largely academic in nature and needs much more in terms of practical application. It is apparent that the priority has largely been with the outputs 1 to 5, while the major assistance of the EC in ongoing rehabilitation project implementation, has received relatively little attention. As said above, in the absence of thorough environmental analysis, the activities of IUCN seem to be somewhat isolated from the current FRP/EDF projects.

5 IMPACT

Contribution of the effective achieved Project Purpose to the Overall Objective

At this stage, the contribution of the outcome of the individual projects on the overall objective cannot yet be assessed. Most reports and documents have just brought out or are not yet circulating and the impact can barely be guessed at.

The operationalisation of the IUCN output items 1 to 5, and their integration into the programme of EC Rehabilitation, has yet to be accomplished. For example the project proposal "Capacity building for natural resource Management and Sustainable Land Use, Middle Shabelle Region, Adale district, August 1997" offers an integrated approach to communities of some 25,000 people, with the objective of "increased local capacity to plan and manage natural resources use and development in Adale district and sustainable land use practices developed and adopted". Although the project result are extremely relevant and important it is felt unlikely that the community will adopt the idea that their livelihood will be supported by a project that has no direct material benefits to them. This is not to say that the farmers do not support the goal and objectives of the proposal but, in the assessment of the team, it is not likely that the farmers will prioritise their involvement in the establishment of a "landcentre" over involvement in productive activities, as is implicitly presupposed by the project document. This may be illustrated by the letter, appended to the report, of the Middle Shabelle Region Regional Governor, who indicates that the areas of needs for which assistance is needed, are the productive activities.

Another example; the study "Innovative participatory methodologies for Environmental Interventions at the Community Level, February 1997" emphasises rightly the role and capacity of the communities; however the study does not offer the instruments with which implementers and communities can apply the methodologies in a practical and attractive manner.

6 SUSTAINABILITY/REPLICABILITY

The projects implemented by IUCN are implemented in conjunction with sectoral rehabilitation projects and hence no judgement can be made on their sustainability. The studies aimed at adding natural resources management aspects to the EC-project package are by nature not sustainable but can be implemented as long as the international community is prepared to finance them.

It needs to be stressed that the approach to greater capacity of the community towards management and use of the natural resources has been tried in other countries, and experience shows that a stable and supportive local governmental structure is a prerequisite for successful implementation. The likelihood of an immediate benefit for the participant seems also to be crucial.

Consideration therefore must be made as to whether the project objectives and the expectations of the local leaders are the same. In one proposal mentioned in the previous section there may be a difference between the project objectives and the expectations of the Governor.

7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall outcome

IUCN has delivered in accordance to the project objective, as far as could be judged by the team, within the planned time-span and budget. In addition to comments made in previous sections the question is raised as to whether the priority was rightfully placed on community-based use and management of natural resources instead of studying the impact of the large number of projects funded by the EC in Somalia. The operationalisation of the project outcome -the way the environment is protected or not in real situations - leaves in general much to be desired.

It is recommended that:

1. The projects of IUCN be reoriented in the SRP in such a way that priority is given to assessment of the impact on the environment and natural resources by the large stock of EC-funded projects.
2. provision be made for the funding of small-scale pilot project which aim at community-based environmental interventions and monitoring capacity. These projects should have

strictly practical approaches. Applications have already been submitted, particularly from areas prone to desertification, for example by the El Dere Youth Club.

8 LESSONS LEARNED

The agreement between IUCN and EC is that the former has a supportive role to the EC-funded projects and implementers. In monitoring and supervising the IUCN it is therefore recommended that the project be in a close relationship to the majority of the EC-funded projects.

PART IX PEACE BUILDING AND RECONCILIATION

1 PREAMBLE

Up to the end of the eighties in Somalia, the Elders had great influence and were the traditional forces of reconciliation. During the war this influence was diminished as the very young men banded in militia or "mooryaan", and these bands agreed to serve the warlords of their respective clans or sub-clans. They learnt early to look up to these warlords, and the Elders with a capacity for reconciliation lost much of it in many conflict areas. Some Elders, though had already become more "mooryaan" than the "mooryaan" themselves.

Since the departure of UNISOM in March 1995, the vacuum of state authority in the regions without regional and district representation has been filled by actors ranging from traditional leaders such as Elders, to (some form of) local administration, regional governments, fundamentalists or warlords reigning over their factions.

Throughout the country in the last years, there have been signs of war-fatigue among the population, resulting in an increased awareness that in this conflict there could be no winner. An erosion of the social status of the militia in some regions combined with the reduced incentives that the faction leaders could offer after the departure of UNISOM, has for the militia made any reasonable alternative look attractive. They are looking for a way out because they cannot foresee any positive future.

The Northwest of Somalia, known as Somaliland, could be characterised by relative stability, inter-regional trade and emerging commercialisation of sectors. Northeast Somalia is similar, but without a government with operational ministries. Since October 1997 there seems to be a representative authority in the Northeast again. Regional authorities exist in Nugal region. The South of Somalia is still in fluid transition ranging from instability in one region, to some form of normalisation with regional authorities in another with the possibility of rehabilitation programmes. What is encouraging is the emergence of fairly stable local administrations and local groups active in the field of reconciliation, conflict resolution, and income-generating activities.

Conferences on and Reconciliation in Somalia have pointed out that neither top-down nor bottom-up approaches to peace have been successful so far. Sadly, neither of these activities has been clearly linked to each other.

In order to establish long-term measures, the linkage of reconciliation to development is being pursued. In addition to this, civil society needs to be educated in human rights, conflict resolution and reconciliation processes.

The Addis Ababa Declaration of December 1993 defines the conditions under which assistance can be provided, rewarding those regions where peace and stability has been achieved with rehabilitation benefits. These principles have been formulated by the SACB in the Code of Conduct. Regions that do not fulfil the conditions of the Code of Conduct of ensuring relative peace and stability under an established local authority can only be eligible for emergency aid through the ECHO programme. In practice, these regions are in a sense punished for not having put their house in order. However it seems sometimes difficult to comply with all the objectively verifiable indicators, such as stability and security and some form of local government. Although the Merka area became relatively stable and peaceful after a period of turmoil with its last major incident in 1996, it took the district up to 15 June 1997 before it had an operational district council. This situation prevented the FRP from becoming operational in this region and it is still not operational. The fact that ECHO and budget line funding could support the required needs in health and desired developments in demobilisation is a clear example of complementarity between different programmes of the EC and shows the sometimes complex situations the SACB and ECSU have to deal with.

2 RELEVANCE OF PEACE BUILDING AND RECONCILIATION

The European Commission, through the EC-Somalia Unit and ECHO, has adopted a flexible approach which allows the provision of relief and rehabilitation for the peace process at the same time and if necessary in the same region.

The EC-Somalia Unit intends to support especially those Somali groups that are building peace and stability while working under rather difficult circumstances. This often involves regions which are still embattled in an emergency situation or which are in the transition phase from insecurity to relative stability. This support to groups would have to lead to the empowerment of a local civil society that is the foundation for democracy, good governance and respect for human rights.

Research on options for a future Somali state, and support to institution building on various levels of the Somali society, is to be encouraged. In 1995 therefore, the EC-Somalia Unit sponsored a study of decentralised political structures for Somalia, the so-called "Menu of Options". This study provided the different Somali groups with information on various possibilities of political and administrative decentralisation as an alternative to the previous centralised and unitary state. The study led to considerable debate among all layers of society in post-war Somalia. This momentum resulted in 1996 in the two EC-sponsored seminars on "Decentralised Political Structures for

Somalia", bringing together Somali intellectuals from all walks of life.

A long-term peace-building approach needs to focus not only on the strengthening of civil society and traditional reconciliation capabilities. It also needs to create alternatives for the militia, in the form of sustainable sources of income. At the moment there is a real chance of returning them to civil life, as they experience growing discontent with their leaders over their future. Unemployed youth, being potential militia, should also be seen as a target group. Providing sustainable alternative sources of income is the most critical step and will be decisive for the success or failure of any demobilisation project.

Finally the EC-Somalia Unit intends to create a linkage between all sectors by adding components to the rehabilitation projects.

Coherence of programme design

No Peace Building and Reconciliation projects were funded under the first rehabilitation programme. This was despite the fact that the identification and implementation phases of some projects under the FRP have created conflict situations, particularly those projects with relatively high capital input and with selected groups of beneficiaries. This is all despite the opinion of the EC-Somalia Unit, that project contributions to Peace Building is a most important.

At present, TAs are hesitant to make direct and indirect Peace Building a priority in their project budgets, and without any budget, the TA Peace and Reconciliation cannot make much use of her expertise. Support to the institutional capacity of the judicial system in north-east Somalia, through the construction and rehabilitation of a prison and a police station, is done by the FRP through purely technical projects and is therefore written about in the Section on Infrastructure. The collapse of regional authority in North East Somalia made it however very difficult to achieve the overall objective in the UNCTAD programme of an enhanced institutional capacity of regional authority institutions. The FRP has further financed five technical assistance periods in addition to the study on decentralised political structures.

A TA specialised in Peace Building and reconciliation has reinforced the EC-Somalia Unit for the second rehabilitation programme. The experiences gained and the expertise available within the EC-Somalia Unit regarding conflict prevention, conflict resolution and institutional capacity building could be utilised much more by the health, education, and agriculture and infrastructure sections, as compared to relatively capital-intensive projects.

The case of Rwanda:

Peace is not a value or asset per se for people. Experiences with reconciliation processes as part of rehabilitation projects in Rwanda have taught that people, victims and perpetrators alike, are willing to work at reconciliation if they (have to) work together on a common need. Rwanda was in an even greater need of rural housing than Somalia shortly after the return of refugees from Zaire and Tanzania in late 1996. Rural housing programmes need a great deal of unskilled labour for moulding bricks, collecting stones, providing water and sand and so on. Many building programmes in Rwanda are implemented through strong beneficiary participation, unlike most micro-types of projects in Somalia. People in Rwanda found in these projects a way to pay something back for the grievances they had inflicted, by helping others or helping relatives of the deceased.

Identification of the most needy families was based on objectively verifiable criteria and, as in the housing programme in Nugal region, only finalised after consensus among all community members. Transparency in using the guidelines to identify who was vulnerable proved to be extremely important. Village meetings using checks and counter-checks were part of the decision-making process, and therefore important components of the physical rehabilitation programmes. These components could be seen as elements of indirect Peace building.

Three essential projects in Peace Building and Reconciliation have been funded under the Budget Line. These projects will be briefly discussed here in order to draw lessons from their experiences.

COSPE (Italian NGO) operates a Peace Building programme through the Elman Peace Centre in South Mogadishu. The aim of the project is to offer youth and children viable alternatives in life and the labour market; they work to improve children's welfare, and offer vocational training and disarmament for young militia. Activities include: awareness campaigns on human rights for the population, a kindergarten for children between three and eight, adult recreation and sport activities, vocational training and development of income generation. The programme also provides electricity to some neighbourhoods of Mogadishu. The project started early May 1997 with a one-year financing.

COSV (Italian NGO) supports a demobilisation programme of IIDA, a Somali women's organisation, in Merka -Lower Shabelle region. Merka is characterised by a high number of militia, as well as being one of the most productive areas with its agriculture, fishery and trade. The main objective of the project is to create alternatives for 150 militia, through demobilisation and (re-)integration into the local community. The project links Peace Building, reconciliation and civic education with the educational and material needs of the target group, and it involves the local community. Education involves literacy, language and vocational training for selected jobs. A last phase of this programme entails the stimulation of job opportunities, to be supported by credit and

grant facilities. The project started on 1 May 1997 for one year.

Life and Peace (Swedish NGO) started a civic education programme in order to contribute towards awareness on Peace Building and human rights among key persons, and to strengthen the institutional capacity of key groups in Somali society. Training programmes are under way for nine out of the eighteen regions in Somalia. The training focuses on conflict resolution, training in basic democratic principles, human rights and leadership. The target groups are policemen, custody officers, judges, teachers, local media staff, traditional leaders, women and Somali training professionals.

Women are a specific target group in the programme so as to enable them to become more active in the process towards peace and democracy. The project started early May 1997.

3 EFFICIENCY

Three programmes are thus being implemented; the Life and Peace programme is more process oriented, focusing particularly on training of women in democracy and good governance, human rights, conflict resolution and Peace Building. By July 1997, a total of 132 women and 53 men had been trained in five seminars. The other two programmes are more project-oriented and focused round demobilisation. In Merka in July, 142 ex-militia started a three-month literacy and elementary training, as part of the demobilisation programme of one year. Due to insecurity the venue had to be changed and the current programme at the temporary Elman training centre in Mogadishu now has around 400 ex-militia of between fifteen and twenty-four years enrolled; in addition, 400 local youth and street children, many of them orphans are registered.

The provision of electricity to some neighbourhoods of Mogadishu, as part of the COSV programme and called "Light for Peace", is not cost-effective and needs rethinking; it is selective in its reach and probably also obstructing private initiatives in this direction.

The three projects report three-monthly to the EC-Somalia Unit.

4 EFFECTIVENESS

The envisaged results for the civic education project are to enable key persons in local Somali society to work on a transition of their region from a state of war towards an environment of peace and democracy. One encouraging development is that participants recommend that the workshops be extended to other sectors, including councils of elders and local authorities, to broaden the democratisation process.

The demobilisation programmes envisage the creation of sustainable alternative sources of income for ex-militia and youth. Although it is too early to comment on the final chances of success, it is a cause of concern that in both projects, the most vital part seems underrated, that is the preparation and execution of vocational training based on realistic market demand. In Merka, the vocational department had not even started to prepare itself for training for 142 apprentices; the identification of the potential for small local businesses has yet to be elaborated. A different kind of problem faces the Centre in Mogadishu; their mechanical workshop had to be closed because it was in the line of fire.

5 IMPACT

The contribution of the projects to peace and stability in the regions cannot be measured at this stage. There are, in principle, encouraging conditions built into the projects to enable some impact to be achieved, such as the strong linkage of the Merka demobilisation project with the local community, and the mixture of ex-militia and children from the immediate surroundings in the enrolment in Mogadishu. However, the key criterion remains: can these trainees, who all feel privileged in joining such programmes, find themselves after the course a sustainable alternative source of income in a fairly stable environment? The very short financial commitment of one year for these programmes makes it nearly impossible to fulfil this key criterion, especially considering all the other problems that the two projects are facing.

There are signs that the transparency in the implementation procedures applied under the FRP had a stabilising effect on local communities and may contribute to conflict resolution capacity of local authorities; however a lack of information means that it could also just be a question of sheer luck.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS

The team would like to make the following recommendations ranked according to priority:

Concerning the SRP it is recommended that:

In the SRP, peace activities be strongly linked to rehabilitation programmes. The financing agreement of the SRP has already made much more of a priority than the FRP with its emphasis on democratisation, decentralisation, peace culture and human rights activities in institutional building.

Concerning effective working relationships between the TAs, it is recommended that:

-TAs, where applicable, reserve a reasonable percentage of their sector budget. Money would then be available to train stake-holders such as iNGOs, local responsible groups, local authorities, water committees, parents teacher associations, contractors and districts boards in advance of the project on conflict resolution, human rights, transparency and accountability. The TA for Peace Building and Reconciliation and the TA for Institutional Capacity of Local Administrations will be involved in (parts of) this training process;

-The TA for Peace Building and Reconciliation and the TA for Institutional Capacity of local administrations be consulted, but only on critical stages of project planning concerning stakeholders' issues;

-In order to achieve the institutional framework required, all TAs in the EC-Somalia Unit be trained on participatory approaches in conflict prevention.

Concerning direct Peace Building through civic education projects, it is recommended that:

-These initiatives be continued while the impact of the current programme be evaluated in a mid-term review in 1998.

Concerning indirect Peace Building through demobilisation projects, it is recommended that:

-Vocational training, including two to three month apprenticeships to small enterprises of

their choice, should be intensified;

-Market research on realistic opportunities for ex-militia to start their own small-scale enterprises should be carried out;

-Monitoring of progress in the economic reintegration of ex-militia in civil society should be extended to one year after the training programme;

-Funding of the demobilisation programmes should continue and be for at least 2-year periods.

...local tea-shop near Harardere airstrip...

PART X MICROPROJECT AS A TOOL FOR REHABILITATION IN SOMALIA

Framework

The Microprojects Fund is a programme based on the Lomé Convention. The context of the programme is detailed in articles 252 and 253 of the 4th Lomé Convention.

For a full understanding of these two articles reference is hereby also made to an official communication of DGVIII to among others all ACP Delegations on the 23rd of December 1992: *“Note to all Services of DGVIII, Headquarters and the ACP Delegations: Articles 252 and 253 of Lomé IV on Microprojects - General Guidelines” no. VIII/6 – 07122/92.*

In order to respond to the needs of local communities with regard to development, support can be provided to microprojects at local level which (Article 252):

- * has an economic and social impact on the life of the people;
- * meet a demonstrated and observed priority need ;
- * will be undertaken at the initiative and with active participation of the local community.

Contributions to the micro project shall be made by the local community in kind, in services or in cash and be adapted to its capacity to contribute. The Fund could contribute up to three-quarters of the total cost of each project to a maximum of ECU 300,000.

The funds could be drawn from the grant allocation of the national indicative programme. Article 253 allows for NGOs of EC and Somalian origin to co-ordinate, supervise or implement individual micro projects and/or multi-annual micro project programmes on the request of the communities concerned.

Relevance

The objective of the Fund is therefore to support local communities in their efforts to develop and to improve their standard of living through the development of essential social services, improvement of food production and the capacity to generate income. Support given under the Fund is based on the principle of self-help, which means that the beneficiaries should also contribute towards the project, either in cash or kind. A possible contribution could be the payment of the contractor's fee; provision of unskilled labour and/or local materials such as sand, water, stones etc. The Fund contribution is

provided in the form of a grant.

Possible beneficiaries could include a women's group, an association, a village, or a co-operative. Although the project should have been initiated and actively supported by the local community, projects may also be identified through intermediate organisations such as an international or local NGO, association or local authority. The beneficiaries should present a comprehensive project proposal, if requested with assistance from relevant organisations, such as an iNGO. A project should be technically, financially and economically feasible in order to be eligible for consideration under the programme. The project must further show that it is able to operate with minimum financial input from external sources after implementation. The local community should contribute at least 25% of the total calculated implementation costs including the capitalised contributions in kind. Up to 75% could then be requested from the programme, while finance of training requirements could be part of the Fund's contribution. Experiences in other African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries indicate that the bulk of the programme contribution in most projects is used to finance capital requirements such as building materials and equipment. In the specific case of Somalia, the Fund contribution in Microprojects should include at least all the imported and/or not locally available materials and the transport, and also transport of goods which could not be provided by the beneficiaries.

Second Rehabilitation Programme

The proposed approach to include a Microproject Fund in the Second Rehabilitation Programme rests on the assumptions that:

- * Individuals know best how to use resources to satisfy their needs. Likewise, local groups and communities are in a better position to identify their needs and corresponding actions than iNGOs or higher administrative echelons.
- * At any point in time, communities are in various positions along the emergency-development spectrum. An overly generalised, more supply-driven approach such as sectoral programmes at national level cannot do justice to all the specific requirements of each individual community.

Many interventions funded under the First Rehabilitation Programme are by nature microproject interventions. However most construction work in the rehabilitation of schools, health posts and water wells is being contracted out to a contractor, not allowing for much community input. Other construction work is executed under direct supervision by the implementing international NGO. The latter allows for active beneficiary participation, but under the FRP this was partly fulfilled through unskilled

labour recruited from the local community and paid by the implementer. This resulted sometimes in a situation where the programme finally paid for all locally available materials, like stones for the foundation or walls, sand and gravel for the construction; paid for nearly all labour costs, skilled and unskilled; and all transport and security. This may explain to some extent the high costs of physical rehabilitation under the FRP, in addition to the fact that Somali people tend to highly overprice goods and services needed by outsiders. An essential difference in approach is the fact that in people's perception it is the NGO or the implementing organisation that initiates and executes the project with some marginal help from the local community during implementation. It should be the other way around, with the project initiated and actively supported by the local community, while projects may also be identified through intermediate organisations. It is therefore recommended that the delivery of the rehabilitation programme in sectors such as education, health, infrastructure and water and sanitation be increased by using a Microprojects Fund to encourage rehabilitation of small schools, health posts, water wells, irrigation canals etc. Executed by the community with technical assistance from NGOs. The technical project designs are mainly low technology. In some cases a whole new structure needs to be built, but the technology choice is still fairly basic. There is therefore sufficient scope for community participation and contribution in such smaller projects.

The introduction of a Microproject Programme will in addition stimulate the downsizing of expatriate presence in the rehabilitation programmes and allow for more involvement of Somali expertise in the project cycle management.

Sectors of Intervention

Projects, which could be considered under the SRP for Microprojects funding:

- Rehabilitation of tertiary irrigation canals;
- Revitalisation of the artisan fishery sector;
- Development of small-scale enterprises like cottage handicraft, carpentry, metal work, tie and dye etc.;
- Construction of low cost housing;
- Rehabilitation and/or construction of water wells, berkads and roof rain water catchments;
- Construction of slaughter houses and the rehabilitation of drinking troughs for cattle;

- Construction and/or rehabilitation of health posts in the villages ;
- Rehabilitation and/or construction of (primary) school buildings.

Regional support offices of the Somalia EC-Somalia Unit already operating in Somalia could facilitate the execution of the programme, but would not be responsible for execution. Decision-making processes in the programme will be dealt with at the level of the EC-Somalia Unit. The maximum financial contribution per project or set of projects under Lomé IV is ECU 300,000 nearing the financial support to many approved projects under the FRP. The responsibility for the execution of the programme normally lies with the receiving country. However in this particular case of absence of an internationally recognised government the EC-Somalia Unit could design a management and operation structure based on general guidelines applicable.

Integration of Microprojects Fund in current Somalia EC-Somalia Unit procedures

Appraisal

The two advisers and the councillor of the EC-Somalia Unit, would appraise community-based projects in co-operation with the responsible TA, and if needed with advice from the sectoral committee of the SACB. To facilitate such appraisal, a short project document would have to be prepared by the community group, if necessary with the help of the partner NGO. The project document would include information in the following areas: background of the project, summary of proposed activities and objectives, institutional capacity of the community based group and the participating NGO, financial analysis of the project, social appropriateness, technical feasibility, sustainability and environmental impact of the project and contribution to rehabilitation i.e. the broad objectives of the SRP. Field visits by the responsible TA should be made in advance of the appraisal meeting and a comprehensive paper should reflect the TA's opinion, local need for such project and market potential in the case of production projects. The appraisal meeting would further be responsible for the financial procedures and monitoring of the projects, in practise to be delegated to the TAs and the support offices.

The whole procedure from submission to final approval can be done quite quickly, thereby contributing to the momentum of community interest and involvement.

It is however important to reach a consensus in all relevant sectoral committees of the SACB, concerning a harmonisation in the funding approach for similar projects with sufficient scope for beneficiary participation.

Decision

A set of criteria for approving a project proposal has to be established. This set would

include standard criteria of project quality (including a cost recovery plan, if applicable) and beneficiary vulnerability that would be applicable to all districts. Projects would have in addition to be compatible with the local authority development plan, if any. Where possible such should be reflected by a letter of support of the local authorities. Furthermore, the TA of concern would identify further criteria that would ensure that a project is of relevance to the local situation e.g. security situation in relation to specific proposed activity etc.

The two advisers and the councillor would approve proposed projects during their regular quarterly meetings. However, special meetings may be called if deemed necessary. After approval, the meeting would inform the community based group, the NGO, and if necessary the SACB and relevant local authorities. Beneficiaries of projects that were refuted would be informed of the reasons for rejection and be encouraged to resubmit proposals with the necessary improvements.

Contracting

A standardised contract would be signed after approval of a community-based project with three signatories: the head of the steering committee, the representative of the community-based group and the iNGO assisting the group in implementing the project. Already existing procedures for finalising contracts between iNGOs and local communities in use for the execution of activities under the FRP and SRP could be followed. The contract would specify the rights and duties of each of the signatories regarding the project to be financed.

Procurement

Procurement will be necessary for all types of intervention. A restriction in the current situation in Somalia is the fact that there are only limited suppliers of goods and equipment. All related activities regarding procurement would be the primary responsibility of the implementers, i.e. the beneficiary groups with support of the NGO.

The procedure to be followed for simple infrastructure projects (where no import from outside Somalia is required) could be quite simple, on the assumption that all other items are available in-country. Once a project has been approved, the beneficiaries would submit at least two quotations for the goods and/or services required to the appraisal meeting. Bids should be based on a list of unit quantities for standard structures (classroom, health post etc.). Upon submission, the beneficiary group would also indicate the preference of the tender and the reason why. The bid chosen should adequately reflect costs for comparable goods and services in the area of concern in Somalia. The appraisal meeting would, based on the choice of the beneficiary group,

confirm the order with the selected supplier, or explain to the beneficiary group if deciding differently.

These responsibilities could by contract be delegated by the EC-Somalia Unit to local tender committees in districts where tender committees are already operational. On delivery of the goods and services, the recipient beneficiary, together with the iNGO, would declare by signatures on the bill that the delivery is according to specifications (both in quantity and in quality) and were received in good order, after which payment can be effected by the iNGO directly to the supplier. Upon justification by the iNGO of the previous advance with these bills, the transfer of the following advanced payment would be effected by the EC-Somalia Unit to the iNGO. The regional support offices of the EC-Somalia Unit could play an important role as a liaison office for correspondence regarding the execution of the programme and further monitor the micro project execution.

Bidding procedures for the supply of materials, which have to be procured from external sources (e.g. import of pipes for a water scheme), would have to be simple, transparent and could be copied from the existing tender procedure applied also under the SRP. Priority in imports should therefore be given to goods of EC or ACP origin.

The logic behind of the inclusion in the SRP could be summarised in the below logical framework matrix.

PROJECTS WITH SCOPE FOR BENEFICIARY PARTICIPATION	Intervention Logic	Objectively verifiable indicators	Sources of Information	Assumptions
Overall Objective	More sustainable use of implemented projects, rehabilitated infrastructure etc.	Higher percentage of projects operational without external supports 1- 5 years after completion	Reports of NGOs, UN agencies and operational local authorities	
Project Purpose	Increased sense of ownership among beneficiaries after implementation	Lower demand for external help from donor during operation of project	Reports of NGOs, UN agencies and operational local authorities	Reasonable level of stability and security in project area
Results	Low costs paid for local materials, transport and security during implementation	Reduced budgets required for local materials, transport and security during implementation	Applications of NGOs and UN agencies submitted for funding at Somalia Unit	Local materials like sand, sand, stones available within reasonable vicinity of project site.
	Maintenance of better infrastructure secured	Number of operating structures; 1 - 5 year after completion of project; increased	Reports of NGOs, UN agencies and operational local authorities	Materials necessary for maintenance available at local market
	Reservations made by beneficiaries for future replacements	Number of communities, able to self finance major repairs, increased	Reports of NGOs, UN agencies and operational local authorities, sectoral evaluation reports	Communities find ways to safely deposit reservations
	Major repairs organised by beneficiary communities	Number of cases whereby communities organise major repairs increased	Reports of NGOs, UN agencies and operational local authorities, sectoral evaluation reports	Equipment and spare parts necessary for replacement available at local market
Activities	Organise beneficiaries in more or less coherent self help groups			All donors adopt the same approach for the same type of projects
	Identify most suitable technology for the project			
	Increase involvement of local expertise in project identification and implementation			All donors pay the same salary for local expertise
	Facilitate the implementation of micro projects			
	Train local communities in management and operation	EC Somalia Unit contribution up to 75 % in cash of total capitalised cost of project	EC total contribution up to 15 % of SRP overall budget	
Local Communities contribution in cash and kind at least 25 % of total costs		Total value local contribution at least 2.000.000 ECU		All actors are familiar with principles of self help projects