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**Mid-Term Review of the EDF-Funded Project**

**Wildlife Conservation in Northern Botswana**

**(1993-1997)**

**Project N° 6 ACP.BT.040**

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**The authors accept sole responsibility for this report, drawn up on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.**

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BDF	Botswana Defence Force
BOPHA	Botswana Outfitters and Professional Hunters Association
BWTI	Botswana Wildlife Training Institute
CAWM	College of African Wildlife Management (Mweka)
CBPP	Contagious Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia
CE	Computer Expert
CHA	Controlled Hunting Area
CHLS	Computerised Hunting License System
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
CLCS	Computerised License Control System
CNP	Chobe National Park
CTO	Central Transport Organisation
DABS	Department of Architectural and Building Services
DAHP	Department of Animal Health and Production
DCSC	Departmental Computer Steering Committee
DDF	Domestic Development Fund
DEMS	Department of Electrical and Mechanical Services
DG	Directorate General (EC)
DPSM	Department of Public Service Management
DWA	Department of Water Affairs
DWNP	Department of Wildlife and National Parks
EC	European Community
ECU	European Currency Unit
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
FA	Financing Agreement
GCB	Government Computer Bureau
GIS	Geographical Information System
GOB	Government of Botswana
GR	Game Reserve
HATAB	Hotel and Tourism Association of Botswana
HDTZ	High Density Tourism Zone
IT	Information Technology
LAC	Limits of Acceptable Change
LACOM	Local Advisory Committee
MGR	Moremi Game Reserve
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NDP 7/8	National Development Plan 7/8
NDS	Ngami Data Services
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NP	National Park
NRMP	Natural Resources Management Project
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
PADUN	Protected Area Development Unit - North
PARRO	Parks and Reserves Reservations Office
PCG	Public Camping Ground
SACIM	Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing
SWB(AS)	Senior Wildlife Biologist (Aerial Survey)
SWPP	Senior Wildlife Park Planner
TA	Technical Assistance (EC)
TOR	Terms of Reference
ULG	ULG Consultants Limited, UK
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WCNB	Wildlife Conservation in Northern Botswana
WMA	Wildlife Management Area
WTS	Wildlife Tourism Specialist

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This mid-term review is based on a study of EC documents in Brussels and Gaborone and Government of Botswana papers, together with field visits and discussions with EC staff in Brussels and Gaborone, Government of Botswana Officials, EC technical advisors, staff of other donor agencies, NGO's and local communities. The review team would like to thank the Director of DWNP; DWNP staff in Headquarters and the Districts visited; the TA Team and counterparts; the EC delegation and the office of the NAO; staff of other government departments; ODA and USAID; NGO's; ULG staff in Britain and Harare; and, the many individuals who assisted the team in their work.

## 0 PREAMBLE

0.1 EC Aid to the wildlife sector in Botswana commenced under Lome I in 1978 and has continued under Lome II, III and IV. Assistance to the sector has included a Countrywide Animal and Range Assessment Project, assistance to the Wildlife Training Centre at Maun, aerial monitoring of wildlife populations, training for staff of the DWNP at the College of African Wildlife Management at Mweka in Tanzania, an NGO programme to conserve the Kalahari eco-system, and tourist related developments including the construction of Kasane International Airport. The Wildlife Conservation Project in northern Botswana is intended to “consolidate gains in wildlife management made by previous EDF investments and through this, further human resources in the Wildlife Management Areas”.

0.2. The project originated with an outline prepared by DWNP in late 1987. The Financing Agreement was eventually signed in January 1992.

0.3 The project was evaluated from 3 November to 22 November 1996. The Review Team supplied by MGM comprised the following consultants:

Dr. Martyn G. Murray - Wildlife Management and Tourism (Team Leader)  
Mr. James Aitken - Planning and Development of Institutional Structures  
Mr. Michael E.S. Flint - Economic Issues  
Mr. Gil C. Murray - Information Technology

In addition, Mr. Maurice Mogotwe, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, joined the review team in Gaborone for the duration of its stay in Botswana.

0.4 In compliance with the ToR (Annex 1) the evaluators have used the project framework approach in evaluating the project. This powerful analytical tool was not available to those who designed the project in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In accordance with the ToR, the evaluators were enjoined to take account of such factors as: the causation of successes and failures of the project; the involvement of local communities and the benefits brought to women and other disadvantaged groups; the availability of skilled counterparts for the project; and the role of NGOs. In addition to making recommendations for the remainder of the project, the evaluators were asked to identify possible objectives and parameters for a subsequent project in the wildlife sector, and to outline the framework and process that would be needed to put the project in place.

0.5 In the course of the evaluation, the review team attended meetings and held interviews in Gaborone, Maun and Kasane. These included: the EC delegation, the Director and senior staff of DWNP, the WCNB project team (Senior Wildlife Park Planner, Senior Wildlife Biologist, Wildlife Tourism Expert and TA Computer Expert), the ODA Institutional Strengthening consultant, Chief Kgosi Tawana II, and representatives from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Department of Tourism, the Government Computer Bureau, the Department of Architecture and

Building Services, the Central Transport Organisation,, BOPHA (Botswana Outfitters and Professional Hunters' Association) members, HATAB (Hotels and Tourism Association of Botswana), KCS (Kalahari Conservation Society), CI (Conservation International), NDS (Ngami Data Services), BWTI (Botswana Wildlife Training Institute), the Okavango Research Centre and ULG Consultants Ltd. The review team also held meetings with various tour operators, hotel owners, private tourists and local communities in the northern region.

0.7 Throughout the evaluation, the review team studied relevant documentation including: the project Financing Proposal and Financing Agreement, Inception Report, Consultant's Technical Proposal, TA team Quarterly, Annual and Final Reports and internal project reports, the Management Plans, Government policy papers on wildlife conservation and tourism, NDP7, and the economic review for NDP8. In addition the team examined computerised and manual systems and operational procedures, including: the CHLS (Computerised Hunting License System), the Hunting Card System, the Visitor Statistics Systems (old and new), and the Personnel, Ivory, Professional Hunters and Ostrich Farming databases.

0.8 To review the preliminary findings of the mission with the DWNP and TA team, a workshop was held on 7 November 1996 in the Department's headquarters in Gaborone. The team briefed the DWNP and representatives of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and EC Delegation on 22 November before leaving Botswana.

## 1 SUMMARY

1.1 The programme “Wildlife Conservation in Northern Botswana” (WCNB) is aimed at improving the conservation and management of the northern parks and reserves of Botswana and attaining more efficient management of resources outside of the parks and reserves, ensuring better returns for local people (Map 1). The purpose of the project is to strengthen the institutional base so as to achieve its aims.

1.2 The principle objectives of the mid-term review are stated in its terms of reference as follows:

- To assess the progress made towards achievement of the objectives of the project since its inception and to identify specific constraints affecting the efficiency of implementation and the effectiveness of the project (project design, organisational relationship, placement and performance of the technical assistance personnel as well as the personnel of the host agencies, funding/disbursement and organisational procedures).
- To draw conclusions and make recommendations towards removing or reducing identified constraints both within the lifetime of the existing project and in the planning of possible subsequent related projects.

### Design

1.3 The project originated with an outline prepared by DWNP in late 1987. The Financing Agreement was eventually signed in January 1992. Despite the length of time involved, the final project design was deficient in a number of respects. A detailed problem analysis was lacking, as were clear and precise objectives, and the identification of beneficiaries. The known institutional weaknesses in DWNP and in the critical service departments (DABS, DEMS, CTO) were not sufficiently taken into account. The EDF Committee requested that precise project objectives be defined in the first work programme. The Inception Report produced by the TA team in January 1994 went some way towards achieving this, and also amended the design to take account of the need for further management planning. Logical frameworks for most of the project components were included, as were verifiable indicators. However, no provision was made for the collection of baseline data, other than in the computer component. Most importantly, the project design remained unclear, diffuse, and ambitious.

### Implementation

1.4 The TA team and counterparts have worked hard to fulfill their terms of reference, and have contributed much of value to DWNP. However, the implementation of the project, and the effectiveness of the TA team, has been adversely affected by institutional weaknesses within the service departments and DWNP. The latter has been exacerbated by the absence of over 70 professional staff who have been on training courses during the life of the project temporarily weakening the capacity of the department. Only some of these 70 staff would have been directly

involved with the Northern Parks Project. Examples of difficulties encountered by the project include :

- the difficulty in obtaining support from DABS for the construction programme.
- the uneven provision of counterpart staff.
- delays within DWNP in providing adequate procedural, financial, and logistical support and backup for project activities.
- the shortage of community liaison skills within DWNP.

The DWNP recognises that manpower weakness is a primary constraint facing the Department, and the evaluators recognise that it is a priority for DWNP to develop human resources.

1.5 Implementation of project activities has also suffered from the significant involvement of the SWPP in non-project activities. This is understandable because of the SWPP's breadth of experience. While these have been of considerable value to DWNP, this diversion has inevitably limited the amount of time available for overcoming the delays in implementing what was already an ambitious and demanding project. The DWNP consider that all the activities of the SWPP can be related to his project responsibilities (see Annex 10). The fact that these responsibilities can be open to such a wide spectrum of legitimate interpretation emphasises the importance of making sure that all parties fully understand the implications of the terms of reference at the outset of the project.

1.6 The technical quality of the aerial survey work, and computer system development, and park planning is widely recognised. Regarding the latter, the DWNP has noted that substantial efforts have been made to consult with the private sector, and to accommodate their many wishes (see Annex 10). The Evaluation Team consider that the planning process would have benefited from a much greater social and economic input, and from a more systematic and consultative approach to tourism development. The justification for the large proposed investment in public campsites is, for example, questionable. Implementation of the management plans has been very limited to date.

1.7 Disbursement of the NGO support funds has been slow. The shortage of appropriate and capable NGOs, and of community liaison capacity more generally, has limited the supply of high quality applications. Only a minority of the projects likely to be approved will benefit communities in the vicinity of the northern parks and reserves. The DWNP has commented on the absence of specific resources for community liaison in the Financing Agreement (see Annex 10). While the Financing Proposal (points 2.2 and 2.3) specifically mentions local communities as intended beneficiaries, community liaison is not identified as a task in the terms of reference of the SWPP. This again points to the the importance of making sure that all parties fully understand the implications of the terms of reference at the outset of the project (see 1.5 above).

1.8 The project would have benefited from systematic internal and external monitoring. Formation of the Project Steering Committee (and the Departmental Computer Steering Committee) was delayed, and progress towards the outputs and purposes as specified in the Inception Report has

not been monitored or reported. This has allowed the project to be more activity- than objective-orientated. The task orientated content of the individual TA terms of reference, and the absence of a direct link with the logical frameworks, has reinforced this tendency. The DWNP has explained that internal project monitoring was not allocated any specific resources within the Financing Agreement (see Annex 10).

1.9 External monitoring by the NAO's office was more effective in drawing attention to the delays in the infrastructure component, and in promoting corrective action. Monitoring by the Back-Up Missions and by the Delegation was lightweight and of limited effectiveness. The format used in the project quarterly and annual reports, and the absence of data, has not facilitated monitoring.

## **Achievements**

1.10 The project has, or will in due course, achieve a number of the outputs specified in the Inception Report. This is a creditable achievement given the delay and frustration which has characterised implementation to date.

1.11 Significant achievements include :

- a direct improvement in certain staff skills.
- increased revenues from Parks and Reserves.
- improved visitor statistics and the establishment of the Parks and Reserves Reservations Office (PARRO).
- revised management plans for Chobe and Moremi.
- improvements to the aerial survey system; a series of effective wildlife surveys; and new quotas for the licensing system
- preventing the construction of additional concrete or masonry structures within Protected Areas by the private sector (if not by Government).
- establishment of the Computer Unit and of the IT Policy and Development Strategy.
- the provision of housing at BWTI.
- new water points at Nogatsaa. These have attracted wildlife populations in the dry season, and provided a new locus for tourism.

1.12 Other unplanned achievements include :

- increased acceptance within DWNP and DABS of the role and value of outside technical services.
- revised Parks and Reserves Regulations.
- drafting CITES proposals for the Government of Botswana.
- preparation of annual work plans and individual park budgets.

The DWNP considers that investment in public camp grounds will be recoverable in about 5 years, which is an acceptable rate of return on structures designed with a life of at least 20 years (see Annex 10).

1.13 A number of major achievements are expected in due course. Radio communication within and between the northern parks will be greatly improved when the new radio equipment is installed and operational. The much delayed construction of offices, houses, and camp sites in Chobe National Park should be completed by late 1997.

### **Shortfalls**

1.14 The project has been less successful in other areas. The near complete absence of monitoring and evaluation data makes assessment very difficult. It is not possible, for example, to judge whether visitor satisfaction has improved. However, on the basis of the information available to the review team, likely shortfalls include :

- limited improvements in staff performance and morale.
- management plans for CNP and MGR have been improved, but are not yet either feasible nor agreed by all the stakeholders. The management plans for Chobe NP provides for an ideal management system, rather than a set of achievable actions based on present and planned future capacity of DWNP (see 1.17, below).
- little or no effect on the frequency of patrolling, law enforcement, hunting licence controls, fire management or wildlife conservation.
- the project has succeeded in persuading the mobile tour operators to use a larger area of the parks and reserves but, due to lack of resources, has not yet provided additional access to the protected areas, nor reduced tourist numbers where it exceeds calculated carrying capacities (eg. HDTZ near Kasane), nor yet increased opportunities for local participation in the tourist industry.
- the project may have started to improve relations with some local communities around the northern Parks and Reserves. It has not yet reduced the wildlife-related costs borne by them, nor increased the benefits received.

### **Impact and Sustainability**

1.15 A significant number of the planned outputs of the project either have been or will be achieved, albeit later than intended. The extent to which these outputs will either contribute to the main purpose (strengthening the institution) and goal (improved management of the northern parks and reserves), or prove to be sustainable, is more in doubt. The lack of baseline data, clear objectives, appropriate indicators, and adequate means of verification also severely limits the extent to which evaluation is or will be possible.

1.16 The main doubts concern the extent to which the project achievements can or will, by

themselves, contribute to either a more effective institution or more effective park management. DWNP continues to face many fundamental institutional problems that have not been addressed by this project, and are only partially addressed by other programmes. New infrastructure alone is certainly not a sufficient condition for improving management effectiveness. This fact is widely recognised by DWNP.

1.17 The limitations of the management plans as currently drafted are less widely recognised. In the opinion of the review team, these need to be much more modest and realistic if they are to be of operational value. The views of the DWNP on this assessment are contained in Annex 10. The evaluation team welcome the decision taken at the planning workshop in April 1997 that two types of management plan are required: plans for the use of currently available resources; and plans which set out requirements for effective management.

1.18 The sustainability of some of the project achievements is doubtful. Since the aerial surveys have been completed, it has not been possible for the department to continue with the full programme. The momentum of the IT Strategy will also need to be maintained. The limits on the size and number of fixed lodges, and the proposed limits on day visitor traffic, may not be sustainable (or desirable) due to external pressures. This reinforces the case for an economic review of the management and tourism plans developed under the project.

1.19 The sustainability of some of the proposed management guidelines is also questionable. The fire frequency limits are not sustainable under current management capacity. The proposed limits on acceptable tree density will not be sustainable under current policy without a significant population reduction of elephants in the near future.

## **Conclusions and Lessons Learned**

1.20 The main component of the project (support to the northern parks and reserves) has made slow progress. This is largely attributable to the over-ambitious and confused nature of the project design; the lack of effective project monitoring and management; and to institutional constraints within DWNP and external service departments. It is not attributable to any lack of effort on the part of the TA staff and counterparts. The acknowledged lack of achievement in some respects should also not be allowed to obscure some of the less tangible achievements of the project, such as changes in attitude and procedures. Some components of the project have made a significant contribution despite the difficult circumstances.

1.21 A major conclusion of the review is nevertheless that the project could and will not, by itself, make a significant and sustainable contribution to the main purpose (strengthening DWNP) and goal (improved management of the northern parks and reserves). Improved infrastructure and (appropriate) management plans have a contribution to make but, in the opinion of the review team, the project does not address the main constraints to management effectiveness. Benefits for local communities, tourism, or wildlife are therefore likely to be limited without further and different support and change.

1.22 The most important lesson to be drawn from the WCNB programme concerns the planning of projects in the wildlife and environmental sector. The review team recommends that similar projects begin by addressing the following tasks within a discrete design phase:

1. Development of a strategy in the protected area region for the conservation and management of wildlife which both defines the framework of the intervention and identifies the problems and opportunities;
2. Review and analysis of relevant government and EC policies and regulations;
3. Assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the host institution and other parties involved;
4. Analysis of problems to be addressed, possible objectives and strategies for intervention in the intended project;
5. Preparation of a project design document and a draft Financial Proposal.

1.23 This design process would be best undertaken by a multi-disciplinary team working closely with the host institution and the EC within a structured programme, with strong inputs from an economist and a wildlife planner, with additional technical assistance in community development, policy and legislation, institutional strengthening, workshop facilitation, and others as appropriate.

1.24 Other particular lessons may be drawn from the WCNB programme as follows:

- a) the need for a project framework with clear and agreed objectives and verifiable indicators of achievement;
- b) the need for a rigorous problem analysis as the basis for the project design;
- c) the need for the careful assessment of risks and assumptions outwith project control (such as the capacity of the Department as a whole, or the provision of technical services);
- d) the importance of effective internal and external monitoring throughout the project cycle;
- e) the need to strengthen management systems before supplying sophisticated technical services;
- f) the drawbacks of an activity- rather than objective-orientated approach;
- g) the importance of providing counterpart staff; of not overloading TA staff with non-project duties; and of not placing TA staff in line positions to strengthen departmental management;
- h) the importance of ensuring that the TA team can operate as a team;
- i) the importance of providing realistic terms of reference for the TA team which are not overly ambitious in the context of the resources available to DWNP;
- j) the need for substantial community liaison inputs if community participation in management planning is to be realised;
- k) recognition that improvements in the performance of individual Parks or units will be difficult to sustain without concurrent improvements in the institution as a whole.

## **Recommendations - Current Project**

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1.25 There are four main priorities for the remainder of the project:

- i. the production of summary documents of the three Management Plans. These should a) present an outline of the zonation and management principles; b) list priorities for action within current resources; c) contain a prioritised list of unresolved issues; d) detail the recommended approach for resolving these issues;
- ii. ensuring an early start to the infrastructure construction programme;
- iii. contributing to the project design process (see below);
- iv. increasing the support provided to local communities in order to facilitate their participation in management planning and resource management within and outside Parks and Reserves;

1.26 To facilitate the completion of the above tasks, the review team recommends that the SWPP relinquish all non-project duties during this period, that DWNP make available additional staff for community liaison, and that consideration be given by DWNP and the EC delegation to including other donors and NGOs on the Project Steering Committee, as envisaged in the original Financing Agreement.

### **Recommendations - Project Preparation**

1.27 The summary management plans would provide a good starting point for a 3-6 month design phase, the main outputs of which would be (a) a project design document and (b) a draft Financing Proposal. It is recommended that technical assistance be provided to facilitate a participatory design process involving DWNP, district government and institutions, and local communities.

1.28 The early appointment of an economist to work with the SWPP in the preparation of the summary management plans, and to contribute to the design process, is recommended. Additional short-term technical assistance (community development; policy and legislation; administrative and financial management; institutional strengthening; workshop facilitator) will be required to assist the design process. The SWPP will be an important resource person for this process. A logical framework should be produced as part of the project preparation.

1.29 Further investments in the infrastructure of the northern parks and reserves are clearly required. However, the experience of the project to date strongly suggests that the following priorities also need to be considered during the design phase if an effective and widely acceptable project is to result:

- a. The need to develop a regional strategy for wildlife conservation in northern Botswana which takes account of the following steps:

- b. Possible EU support for the ODA-funded institutional strengthening project in headquarters (especially divisions responsible for personnel and financial management), and/or at District/Park level. This could include financial and management training for professional staff and training in the use of logical frameworks for project management.
- c. The need to increase the extent to which local communities participate in, and benefit from, the management of northern Parks and reserves. This will require a major expansion in community development and liaison capacity, and improved collaboration with USAID's community programme.
- d. The need to encourage and facilitate local private sector involvement in the provision of park services and the maintenance of park infrastructure.
- e. The need to increase the technical services capacity of the Department in order to enable it to plan and supervise technical works.
- f. The need to prepare terms of reference for counterpart staff which will both define work responsibilities and ensure sustainability of project inputs.
- g. The need to address the gender issue, particularly in relation to staff serving in the parks and reserves.

1.30 A number of policy issues should also be clarified and resolved during the preparation phase :

- the financial and economic framework and objectives for Protected Areas including the creation of a separate vote and budget for the Parks and Reserves;
- the social framework and objectives for Protected Areas, particularly in relation to groups negatively affected by the existence or management of Parks and Reserves;
- consultation with the EC on any sensitive management programmes that are being considered within National Parks during the period of EU financial assistance.

## 2 PROJECT PREPARATION AND DESIGN

### Identification and Formulation

#### Background

2.1 EC Aid to the wildlife sector in Botswana commenced under Lome I in 1978 and has continued under Lome II, III and IV. Assistance to the sector has included a Countrywide Animal and Range Assessment Project, assistance to the Wildlife Training Centre at Maun, aerial monitoring of wildlife populations, training for staff of the DWNP at the College of African Wildlife Management at Mweka in Tanzania, an NGO programme to conserve the Kalahari ecosystem, and tourist related developments including the construction of Kasane International Airport. The Wildlife Conservation Project in northern Botswana is intended to “consolidate gains in wildlife management made by previous EDF investments and through this, further human resources in the Wildlife Management Areas”<sup>1</sup>.

#### Origins of the Project

2.2 The project originated with a package of six discrete components prepared by the DWNP which was sent to the EC Delegation in Gaborone in December 1987 (See project chronology, Annex 5). The Commission considered that the proposal put too great an emphasis on infrastructure and suggested that it should reflect policy issues including the use of tourism revenues to benefit local people, private sector investment in wildlife, and community participation in wildlife conservation and utilisation. Between December 1987 and October 1990 there were a series of exchanges between Brussels and Gaborone, in which the DWNP put forward additional components, the EC Delegation pressed for progress and DG VIII continued to have reservations about the absence of specific measures to benefit local people in the project area. At a meeting in November 1990 between officials from the Ministry of Finance, DWNP and the EC Delegation, it was agreed that DWNP should produce a final version of its proposals which would be the basis of an EDF Financing Proposal to be prepared by external consultants. The DWNP request, finalised in December 1990 provided for:-

- I) Construction plant and the upgrading of roads in Chobe National Park, Moremi Game Reserve, Nxai Pan National Park and Makgadikgadi Game Reserve;
- ii) Fencing in Chobe and Makgadikgadi; the construction of new office blocks in Chobe and at Maun;
- iii) Construction of 36 houses in the four Northern parks together with ten houses at the Botswana Wildlife Training Institute, Maun;

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<sup>1</sup> EDF Financing Proposal: May 1991

- iv) Construction of fourteen public camp sites in the four northern parks;
- v) Six PC's with associated software and peripherals;

The proposal also included TA support of:

- i) a team leader (expert in construction);
- ii) a computer specialist;
- iii) a wildlife biologist (aerial surveys);
- iv) a senior wildlife resource economist;
- v) a senior wildlife biologist;
- vi) a senior wildlife management officer;
- vii) a pilot; and,
- viii) a tourism expert.

The TA requested amounted to 31 person years and, in addition, consultancies in architecture and construction, together with back up missions were proposed. A training component was also included with external training in Tanzania for game wardens and middle management training in wildlife monitoring and conservation education, and computer studies. The total cost was estimated to be 6.5 million ECU.

#### The EDF Funding Proposal

2.3 The project design was finalised and an EDF financial proposal was prepared after a one week visit to Botswana by a wildlife management consultant provided by the International Foundation for Conservation of Game and an Associate Professor of Wildlife Management at the University of Pretoria. The EDF project was costed at 6.8 million ECU, and consisted of the following components:-

- i) Road construction equipment;
- ii) Two administration offices (Maun and Kasane);
- iii) Thirty seven staff houses in four northern parks;
- iv) Ten houses at BWTI;
- v) Fourteen public camp sites;
- vi) Twenty PC's and laptops plus peripherals and software; and,
- vii) NGO conservation projects.

A TA team comprising of:-

- i) Senior wildlife planner (team leader);
- ii) Wildlife biologist (aerial surveys);
- iii) Tourism expert;
- iv) Computer expert;

- v) plus backup missions and local supervision for civil works.

#### Cost Estimate and Financing Plan

<b>Grant: 2.8m ECU</b>	}	<b>6.8m ECU</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>ECU</b>
<b>Loan: 4.0m ECU</b>				
Infrastructure			29	1,960,000
Capital Investment			22	1,527,000
Technical Co-operation			39	2,650,000
as - TA (24%)				
as - NGO (4%)				
as - Training (11%)				
Contingencies			10	663,000
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>100</b>	<b>6,800,000</b>

2.4 Despite the length of time between the original approach by the DWNP in December 1987 and the decision to use consultants to formulate an EDF financing proposal in November 1990, the actual design process was rushed and prepared by specialists in wildlife management rather than a multi-disciplinary team. The resultant project design was deficient in a number of respects. A detailed problem analysis was lacking, as were clear and precise objectives, and the identification of beneficiaries. The design predated the adoption of the logical framework and did not clearly distinguish between activities, outputs, purposes and goals. The seven components did not form a cohesive approach to dealing with a specific problem. Known institutional weakness in the DWNP and in the service departments responsible for construction and maintenance (DABS, DEMS, CTO) were not sufficiently taken into account. Although DWNP had decided to ask USAID to take responsibility for funding the management plans for the four northern parks, this was not made clear in the Financing Proposal. Institutional weaknesses in the DWNP were recognised explicitly in the DWNP proposal and implicitly in the EDF proposal but there was no recommendation for a separate institutional analysis. The design did not consider how the project would be implemented in the context of the existing DWNP organisational structure and its management and financial systems.

#### The EDF Committee

2.5 The EDF committee discussed the project proposal in July 1991. Members states raised questions about economic sustainability, the balance within the project between infrastructure and training, potential conflicts on land use, and participation by local people. Personnel weaknesses in the DWNP were not referred to in the EDF financing proposal but a number of member states suggested that more resources should be devoted to training. No tangible results came from these comments; and no provision was made for an institutional analysis or a training needs assessment within the project. The EDF committee requested that precise project objectives be defined in the first work programme to be prepared by the TA team.

2.6 The terms of reference for the TA team were based on the design contained in the EDF financing proposal and consultancy companies were invited to bid for the project management contract in November 1991. The contract was not awarded to ULG Ltd until June 1993, due to delays in the tendering process. In August 1993 the TA team leader assumed his duties. The Financing Agreement was finalised in July 1993. (A copy of the technical annex to the Financial Agreement is at Annex 6).

### The Inception Report

2.7 The inception report produced by the team leader in January 1994 rationalised the EDF financing proposal into eight components:-

- i) Support to the Northern Parks and Reserves;
- ii) Support to the Research Division Monitoring Unit;
- iii) Support to the Computer Unit;
- iv) Support to the Botswana Wildlife Training Institute;
- v) Support to the DWNP regional offices, Maun and Kasane;
- vi) Support to community based wildlife projects through NGOs;
- vii) Training;
- viii) Backup missions and evaluation.

2.8 The inception report proposed the creation of a new structure within the DWNP specifically for the project - the "Protected Area Development Unit (North), PADUN" to encompass project operations in the four northern parks and reserves. Two of the TA posts (the Senior Wildlife Parks Planner and the Wildlife Tourism Expert) would be located within PADUN and the unit would report to the Assistant Director of Parks.

2.9 The Senior Wildlife Biologist (Aerial Surveys) would report to the Head of Research Division while the Computer Expert would report to the Deputy Director.

2.10 As a result of this proposal, the two TA staff in PADUN were located in Maun while the Senior Wildlife Biologist and the Computer Expert was located in Gaborone (Figure 1). The role of the Team Leader outside his task in PADUN was reduced to dealing with the relationship between the TA team and the firm of consultants who employed them. The report recognised that this meant that the four TA personnel were "not, therefore, seen as a team in the accepted sense".<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Inception Report

**Figure 1** Components of the Project

2.11 The Inception Report signalled that further work on the management plans for the Northern Parks was required and foresaw an open-ended process that would require the project objectives and timetables to be updated, but did not explain the implications of this for the project achieving its purpose.

2.12 Weaknesses in the technical services department were recognised and the report stated that PADUN had been instructed by the DWNP Directorate to ensure that appropriate architectural services were secured. If DABS was unable to supply such services, PADUN was also authorised to negotiate with DABS on the procedures for securing such services in the private sector. Construction of major works could be contracted to the private sector in liaison with DABS. If lack of capacity in DABS became a bottleneck, the required services could be contracted in the private sector (i.e. architectural services, contracts supervision). A similar commitment was made to enable the project to use private contractors if the Department of Water Affairs was unable to provide the necessary services.

2.13 Logical frameworks for most of the project components were included in the Inception Report (Annex 7), as were the verifiable indicators. However, no provision was made for the collection of baseline data, other than in the computer component. Most importantly, the project design remained unclear, diffuse and ambiguous, to the extent that staff in DG VIII and the project TA team had differing perceptions of the project's main objectives (Figure 2).

2.14 The inception report went some way towards achieving the clarification of project objectives requested by the EDF committee and member states indicated that they were content with the proposals. Neither the DWNP, the EC Delegation nor the TA team leader considered that the terms of the EDF financing agreement agreed between the community and the Government of Botswana enabled them to undertake a problem analysis which would have led to a fundamental redesign of the project. The point of departure for the design in the inception report was the objectives stated in the EDF financing proposal and the terms of reference for the individual members of the TA team who had already been recruited by the consultancy company which had the contract to manage the project.

## **Coherence and Realism of the Project Design**

### **A Fragmented Design Process**

2.15 The six years which elapsed between the original request from the Government of Botswana in December 1987 and the project design finalised in the January 1994 Inception Report saw an incremental process of modification in which the DWNP, the EC Delegation, DG VIII in Brussels, the external design consultants and, finally, the TA team dropped, or added, components and subjected the proposal to piecemeal modification. At no time does there appear to have been any analysis of the realism of the resultant design either in the context of its internal consistency or its relevance to the external environment in which it would function.

**Figure 2.** Project Objectives.

2.16 It is not surprising that in this fragmented approach some elements of the proposals which were there to overcome weaknesses in the DWNP and the service departments were overlooked. For example, at one point it was suggested that the team leader should have an engineering background seen as necessary to manage the infrastructure component. This was subsequently changed to a wildlife parks planner at the behest of the Delegation, although no thought appears to have been given as to whether the TA team might still require some engineering skills to deliver the project.

### Problem Analysis and the Design

2.17 In the absence of a problem analysis, such analysis as there was looked at symptoms rather than causes, or focused on the lack of human and financial resources in DWNP, without placing these in the context of the achievement of the project purpose or the project goal. For example, the project included construction of the roads and housing for DWNP staff but these are only two factors in improving the efficiency of the Department in managing the parks. In discussion with the evaluation team, DWNP staff identified the absence of transport, budget constraints, unfilled vacancies, the reluctance of staff to accept posts in remote areas, and resentment against the Parks in local communities, as factors which also inhibit effective management.

2.18 Similarly, while the design provided for a computer specialist, there was no analysis of whether the management systems in DWNP were sufficiently robust at that stage to make computerisation cost-effective. The aerial survey component was included without any analysis of whether the Department would have an appropriate level of staffing to maintain the survey work once the EC project had ended.

2.19 The division into components designed to deal with both national tasks (aerial surveys, computers and staff training) and those aimed at the Northern Parks (infrastructure, tourism and the senior wildlife planner) with separate reporting lines through different departmental officers, weakened the thrust of the project and reduced the practical authority of the team leader. This weakness was exacerbated by the lack of focus on achieving the project goals in the Terms of Reference for the TA team, which emphasised activities rather than the outputs and the purpose of the project. An examination of the project documents up to the Inception Report suggests that the design was activity based and more suited to providing general support to the Department, rather than targeting identified problems.

### Human Resources in DWNP

2.20 The design does not appear to have taken account of the staff weaknesses in DWNP. The human resources problems in the Department seem to have been thought of solely in terms of professional training for staff. No thought seems to have been given to the need to provide management and financial training for staff destined to take on managerial responsibilities. The implications of sending large numbers of staff on training courses simultaneously also appears to have been overlooked (Table 1). The inception report did show how to get round the weaknesses in the service department through the use of private contractors, but the absence of any detailed

explanation of how this process might function or a consideration of the organisation of the Department could be seen as another design weakness. The DWNP recognises that manpower weakness is a primary constraint facing the Department, and the evaluators recognise that it is a priority for DWNP to develop human resources.

**Table 1**

<b>DWNP Staff on Training 1993 - 1998</b>					
<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>
7	44	72	64	24	1

*Source: DWNP*

### The Administrative Environment

2.21 The design was predicated on the project working within the existing DWNP administrative structure and procedures, and the broader procedures of the Government of Botswana. However, the project documents do not suggest how this might work out in practice.

Within the Parks Division, the project dealt with four parks and reserves in four DWNP field operation districts (see Map 2). The creation of PADUN cut across the existing financial and management systems in the Department. PADUN was created as an administrative unit without any financial autonomy, yet the relationship between PADUN and the Regional Wildlife Officers in the Districts, who were responsible for financial management, was not clearly defined at the start of the project. While the SWPP and the tourism expert reported to the Director via the Parks Division, the Senior Wildlife Biologist reported through the Research Division and the computer expert reported direct to the Deputy Director. Thus the TA team leader had no direct authority over the actions of two thirds of his team.

### Management Plans

2.22 With hindsight, the reliance on management plans designed by a separate USAID project introduced an additional risk both in terms of delay and the possibility of professional disagreements between those responsible for designing the plans and those in the EDF project responsible for their implementation.

### Unrealistic Targets and Ambitious Timetable

2.23 The inception report set very specific targets and an ambitious timetable for the project. It is not clear to what extent this was under-pinned by an analysis of the ability of the DWNP and the proposed project structure (i.e. PADUN which consisted of the SWPP, the TA tourist expert, their counterparts and line staff; and the individual posts for the aerial survey specialist and the computer expert) to meet these targets and deliver the project outputs. In particular, the combination of the professional and administrative responsibilities given to the team leader and

the way in which the divisions between his TA advisory role and a line management position were blurred in PADUN introduced a high risk that he would find it difficult to focus his efforts on achieving the project purpose.

### Monitoring and Evaluation

2.24 All these design flaws can be seen as significant inhibitions to effective implementation, but they could to some extent have been overcome by effective monitoring and prompt remedial action. However, a robust monitoring process was not included in the design. The TORs for the back up missions were cast in very general terms and the potential rigour of using the project framework for monitoring was not considered. With hindsight, the monitoring arrangements did not take a realistic view of the DWNP or the administrative environment in which the project had to function.

### Logical Frameworks

2.25 Reference has already been made to the lack of clear objectives within the Financing Proposal, and to the absence of a Logical Framework at this stage. The former deficiency was recognised by the EDF Committee, and the TA team was therefore requested to define precise objectives for the project in the first work programme.

2.26 The Inception Report (IR) produced by the TA team in January 1994 did succeed in clarifying the component activities and outputs to some extent. Logical Frameworks for four of the eight components - support to Northern Parks and Reserves; Tourism; Research Division; and Computer Unit - were included in the IR. Copies of these are contained at Annex 7.

2.27 These Logical Frameworks are less helpful than they might have been, for a number of reasons. The logical reasoning within the framework was often weak or confused; the relationship (or difference) between the outputs and 'component purposes' was unclear; the verifiable indicators were poorly defined; the means of verification bore no relation to the resources likely to be available; and none of the frameworks appear to have been used in the subsequent management or monitoring of project implementation.

2.28 Most significantly, a Logical Framework for the project as a whole was not produced. The central Purpose and Overall Objective (Goal) of the project was therefore never clearly defined. The component Logical Frameworks in the IR did include a common Project Goal: 'to assist GoB/DWNP to implement its policy of wildlife conservation through sustainable use of wildlife resources'. However, this formulation was neither particularly clear nor useful, nor was it obviously consistent with the objectives as stated in the FA. The predictable result is a divergence of opinion over what the project was aiming to achieve, and a corresponding problem for the evaluators: as predicted by one of the members of the EDF Committee in 1991, the lack of clear and quantified objectives was bound to make the assessment of success or otherwise extremely difficult.

2.29 The evaluators were therefore faced with two, broadly different, sets of objectives : those in the FA for the project, and those in the IR for the components. No Logical Framework for the project (as opposed to the components) exists, nor was it possible to create one given the disparate design of the project. The solution adopted by the evaluators is necessarily something of a compromise. The **Overall Objective** and **Purposes** of the project have been derived from the FA, and are presented below together with indicators (Table 2). More than one purpose was required in order to accommodate the diverse nature of the outputs and activities. The ‘component purposes’ and ‘outputs’ as contained in the IR Logical Frameworks (Annex 7) are taken as the intended **Outputs**. These objectives together provide the basis for the discussion of effectiveness and impact (sections 5 and 6 respectively).

**Table 2**

DERIVED OBJECTIVE	VERIFIABLE INDICATORS
<b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b>	
Protection, conservation and management of Northern Parks and Reserves improved.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Incidence of poaching reduced.</li> <li>- Populations of vulnerable/endangered animal species stable or increasing.</li> <li>- Frequency of wild fires reduced.</li> <li>- Vulnerable tree species and plant communities regenerating.</li> <li>- Incidence of invasive exotic species reduced.</li> <li>- Number of tourist infringements reduced.</li> <li>- Number of visitors within defined carrying capacities.</li> <li>- Visitor satisfaction increased.</li> <li>- Attitude of adjacent communities towards wildlife and parks/reserves improved.</li> <li>- Incidence of livestock grazing in parks and reserves (Makgadikgadi Pans NP) reduced.</li> </ul>
<b>PURPOSES</b>	
<p>1. Institutional base of DWNP strengthened.</p> <p>2. Income of local communities increased.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of staff with professional, technical and management qualifications increased, and effectively deployed.</li> <li>- Improved welfare of staff in northern parks and reserves.</li> <li>- Implementable management plans for northern parks and reserves agreed by primary stakeholders.</li> <li>- Effective and sustainable wildlife monitoring and management information systems in place.</li> <li>- Increased wildlife-related income for households in WMAs adjacent to northern parks and reserves.</li> </ul>

**Figure 3.** The Project Environment



2.30 The evaluators have not produced a ‘current’ Logical Framework as suggested in the TORs. However, a draft Logical Framework for the remainder of the project is presented in Section 9, Conclusions and Recommendations.

### The Overall Design Process

2.31 In summary, the design process was both long, drawn out and lacking in focus. In the opinion of the evaluators, too great a stress was laid on producing a proposal which would pass through the EDF committee and insufficient emphasis was placed on producing a robust project design. The actual design which emerged was unrealistic in terms of both the internal environment within the Department and the reliance on external Departments which were known to be weak. The goal, purpose and outputs of the project were never clearly defined nor was sufficient consideration given as to whether the implementation process would be compatible with the financial and management systems of the DWNP. In the view of the evaluators, insufficient attention was paid to monitoring arrangements in the project design process. The checks and balances provided by the EDF committee procedures and the EC Delegation do not appear to have been sufficiently effective to remedy the design weaknesses and there was not a robust monitoring process to act as a safety net (Figure 3). The DWNP fully agrees that major difficulties experienced by the project stemmed from problems of project design. At the time of project preparation, the Department had little experience of design of a project of this magnitude, so that design was undertaken by a consultant commissioned by the European Union. Furthermore, logical frameworks were not a standard feature of project design, as they are now. The Consultants understand and sympathise with these comments.

### 3 RELEVANCE OF THE PROJECT

3.1 Relevance may be defined as the extent to which the aid activity is consistent with the priorities and policies of the sector, target group(s), recipient, and donor. The first part of this section considers the general sectoral and policy relevance of the project. The second part considers its relevance to specific potential beneficiary groups.

#### General Context

##### The Contributions of Wildlife to the National and Local Economy

3.2 There are two main reasons why development assistance for the wildlife sector is highly relevant in economic terms. The first concerns the significant and growing economic importance of the wildlife-based sector in Botswana. The most comprehensive study to date (Tyler, 1996) estimated that, in 1992/93, the wildlife sector contributed around 2.4% of GDP (P 197 million), 4.1% of export earnings (P 159 million), and accounted for 7-8,000 jobs (including informal earnings employment equivalent). Wildlife-based tourism has increased substantially since 1992/93. These figures are therefore likely to under-estimate the contribution of the sector.

3.3 Government has increasingly recognised the diversification, rural income, and growth potential of wildlife-based tourism. It also recognises that this depends on an abundant and well-managed wildlife resource, which in turn depends on the quality of management within parks and reserves. The overall objective of the project is thus highly relevant. The project is also fully consistent with the Natural Resources Management Policy, the Tourism Policy, and with the National Conservation Strategy.

##### Relationship Between the Wildlife and Livestock Sectors

3.4 The second main argument for supporting the wildlife sector relates to the need to balance the emphasis which has been given to the livestock sector in Botswana. The livestock sector is and will remain extremely significant. Although the cattle, meat and meat products sector now only accounts for around 3.1% of GDP, the sector is a major employer, and there are as many as 126,000 cattle owning households (Deloitte & Touche, 1996). The distribution of livestock is highly skewed, but this does not negate the wide and crucial importance of cattle to large numbers of rural households. It is estimated that up to 70% of the rural population depend on cattle for at least part of their income (D&T, p.76). The hardship that has resulted from the recent slaughter of the entire cattle herd in Ngamiland - necessitated by an outbreak of Contagious Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia (CBPP) - is testament to the very real importance of cattle to rural communities. The cost of controlling and compensating for this CBPP outbreak has been estimated at P500 - 1,000 million.

3.5 The economic and cultural importance of cattle to rural Botswana does, however, need to be tempered by three observations. The first is that the expansion of the cattle industry (and

associated veterinary fencing) has contributed to the decline of many wildlife species. Over hunting is probably the other major cause. The second is that, in large parts of the country, wildlife utilisation has a comparative economic advantage over commercial livestock production as a form of land use (Barnes). Cattle keeping need not be more profitable than wildlife utilisation provided individuals can capture the full value of the wildlife resource, as they can for privately owned resources such as cattle.

3.6 The third observation is that the wildlife-based sector has been subsidised to a far lesser extent than has the livestock sector. The recurrent expenditure of DWNP in 1994/95 was P 19 million, or 0.4% of total GoB recurrent expenditure. Recurrent expenditure by the Department of Animal Health and Production was P 80 million in the same year<sup>3</sup>. Given the approximate economic equivalence of the two sectors, it is reasonable to conclude that the wildlife-based sector is under-supported by comparison. The environmental benefits associated with the wildlife sector, and the environmental costs associated with the livestock sector, provides a further justification for increasing support to the former. Note that this is not the same as saying that the livestock sector is necessarily over-subsidised by government. This is a separate, and complex, question which is beyond the terms of reference of this evaluation.<sup>4</sup>

#### The Role of EC Subsidies on Livestock Exports

3.7 The evaluators were asked to consider the role of EU beef subsidies in relation to the balance between wildlife and livestock as competing forms of land use. The support provided to the cattle industry via the Beef Protocol has been the subject of a recent study (Metroeconomica, 1996). The draft report of this study concluded that the phasing out of the beef subsidy provided by the EU under the Lome Agreement would result in a relatively small fall in the total cattle population, would increase unemployment among the unskilled, and would worsen the distribution of income. The report further concluded that impact on wildlife and range ecology of the slight fall in cattle numbers was difficult to predict. The implication of the Metroeconomica study would appear to be that, although the Beef Protocol has contributed to the expansion of the livestock industry, and therefore in part to the decline in wildlife numbers, the phasing out of the

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<sup>3</sup> This excludes other direct government recurrent expenditure on the livestock sector estimated at P 33 million in 1994/95 (D&T, p.75).

<sup>4</sup> The livestock sector remains extremely important to rural households. Recurrent and development expenditure on the livestock sector are less than 2% of total government expenditure, and less than the sector's contribution to GDP. This does not, however, take account of the environmental externalities associated with the livestock industry which, depending on their magnitude, might argue for lower or even negative subsidies.

Beef Protocol may not, by itself, greatly improve the situation from the point of view of wildlife.

3.8 The WCNB project has not been directly relevant to the issue of competing land uses, nor to the debate over the Beef Protocol. However, as in the case of GoB expenditure, it may be argued that the level of EU assistance for the wildlife sector has been very low in comparison with average beef subsidy payments of ECU 24 million per year. Support for the WCNB project was therefore consistent with the need to redress an apparent imbalance in EU assistance for the wildlife and livestock sectors.

#### The Non-Economic Significance of Wildlife Resources in the Project Area

3.9 The remote landscapes and wildlife-dominated ecosystems of northern Botswana have an intrinsic value which is hard to measure in direct economic terms. Traditionally, all groups in Botswana formerly hunted animals both for meat, trophies and social purposes, and wildlife featured strongly in their folklore, rock art, medicinal practises, magic and supernatural beliefs. At this time, wildlife was revered, and hunting played a central role in ordering social relations. Today, attitudes have changed and people usually hunt for personal gain. However on a broader scale, the unique importance of Botswana's northern ecosystems has become widely recognised in recent times, both within the country and at the global level, and a drive for effective conservation has arisen based both on the long-term benefits accruing from development of a sustainable tourism industry, and on the recognition that Botswana's wildlife and landscape resources constitute a valuable national heritage.

3.10 The objectives of the WCNB programme (as stated in the Financing Agreement) address both the national priority given to developing a sustainable tourism industry and the needs of local communities outside of the parks and game reserves for a sustained utilisation of wildlife resources. Furthermore, the objectives given in the Inception Report also provide for the long term survival of plant and animal species and the maintenance of ecological communities and landscape aesthetics. Thus the programme has direct relevance to conservation of the natural resources in the programme area both in terms of their economic and non-economic values. The programme objectives do not however address the need for a better understanding of the ecology of the northern parks and game reserves, or the need for greater environmental awareness in schools, local communities, and other sectors of society. The significance of this omission is embodied in the words of the Senegalese conservationist, Baba Dioum: "*In the end, we will conserve only what we love. We will love only what we understand. We will understand only what we are taught*".

### Specific Context

#### Relevance of Project Design to Specific Problems

3.11 In the specific context of the acknowledged weaknesses in the DWNP and the need to improve conservation and management in the Northern Region, the project goal of "the protection, conservation and management of the northern parks and reserves and the maintenance

of natural eco-systems” to be achieved by the project purpose of “strengthening the institutional base of the DWNP” was a realistic response. However the effectiveness of this response was weakened by the absence of any problem analysis or institutional study and the consequential absence of an assessment of the capacity of the institutions. The EDF proposal stated that “the Government of Botswana will be a close partner in this programme. It has the ability to provide manpower and ensure the maintenance of all inputs”. There is no evidence that this assertion was the result of detailed analysis and the difficulties related in the project reports undermine its accuracy.

3.12 The diffuse focus of the design lent itself to general institutional strengthening of the Department in the broadest sense, rather than to project delivery. There was no provision for an overall strategic framework for the Northern Region covering such major issues as land use and the comparative economic advantage of cattle and wildlife. As a result, the project goal of improved conservation was subsumed in the detailed work on the management plans for the individual parks, thus reducing the relevance of the project in overall strategic terms.

3.13 It is not realistic to expect an operationally oriented project to tackle the structural weaknesses within the Department or strengthen the government machine overall. It is impractical for individual projects to create their own administrative and financial structures and the project quite rightly was planned to work within the existing administrative framework. However, the project design process did not consider how this should take place and the creation of PADUN which cut across existing administrative and financial systems gave the TA team operational roles which diverted them from project implementation. The project design was not meant to be relevant to solving broader issues of government management system but it is not clear to what extent these issues were recognised to exist by those designing the project.

3.14 The conditions agreed by the EC and the Government of Botswana in the Financing Agreement are shown in Table 3. The absence of an institutional analysis in the project design process meant that institutional weaknesses in the DWNP were not highlighted and the Government of Botswana made commitments in the Financing Agreement which were unrealistic in terms of what the DWNP could be reasonably expected to deliver.

#### Relevance of Project Design to its Beneficiaries

3.15 The main beneficiaries of the project are as follows :

- the general public of Botswana
- local communities
- DWNP
- tour operators and visitors
- natural resources (incl. wildlife)

It is important to distinguish between the relevance of the project as designed, and its relevance as implemented. The latter is covered later in the report.



### ***The general public of Botswana***

3.16 The relevance of the project to the general public was addressed in the discussion of the general context : the project may be assumed to be consistent with the priorities of the general public insofar as these are reflected in GoB policies and programmes.

### ***Local communities***

3.17 The relevance of the project to the problems and priorities of the local communities in the areas adjacent to the northern parks and reserves is more doubtful. The project design suggested that local communities would benefit from (a) improvements in the management of wildlife resources in WMAs around the parks and reserves, and (b) from assistance provided to local communities for wildlife utilisation and tourism development. However, no attempt was made to consult with local communities or to analyse their problems during the project design stage. Such a consultation might, for example, have highlighted the issues of resource rights and problem animal control, both of which are scarcely addressed by the project.

3.18 A small NGO component was included in the project at the instigation of the EC. The objective of this component is nowhere clearly stated, but the intention was clearly to benefit local communities via NGOs. The extent to which it has done so is discussed elsewhere. That aside, the inclusion of this component increased the potential relevance of the project to local communities. The downside of such a separated component was that it ignored the relevance or otherwise of the other (more important) components for local communities. These components were not necessarily neutral or irrelevant to local communities, given the history of resettlement, exclusion, conflict and land alienation associated with the northern parks and reserves.

### ***The Department of Wildlife and National Parks***

3.19 The DWNP should benefit directly from the training funded by the EDF, but it is still too early to judge the impact of this training, as most of the staff involved have only just resumed their duties or are still undertaking training. The training provided by the EDF has been in wildlife management and conservation. The Department and individuals might have gained more benefit if training options had been defined and candidates selected after a formal training needs assessment. In the opinion of the evaluators, more benefits would have accrued to the Department if some training in management skills had been given to professional staff.

3.20 The department has also benefited directly from the skill transfer from between the TA staff and their counterparts, although this has been weakened in some cases by the long term absence of counterpart staff. Another direct benefit, not envisaged in the programme design, has been the contribution of TA staff to the discussions within the department on management systems and financial procedures. The TA staff have also given valuable assistance to the department in the preparation of the Government of Botswana's position for CITES meetings.

### *Tour operators and visitors to the wildlife areas*

3.21 Tour operators and visitors were intended to be the major beneficiaries of the project, after DWNP. Given the importance of the northern parks and reserves to the tourist industry, support for their improved management was highly relevant, as well as long overdue.

### *The natural resources of the project area*

3.22 Many of the threats to wildlife in the northern region cannot be adequately viewed within the context of individual management plans for each park or reserve. Those project components concerned with wildlife monitoring and tourism benefitted from a regional perspective, but generally the design of the reveals the lack of an overall strategy for the conservation and management of wildlife resources in the northern region. Problems associated with land-use conflicts, habitat fragmentation, wildlife migrations and corridors, and water, elephant and fire management all require planning at regional, district and individual land unit levels. This issue will be taken up in more detail in Section 6 & 9, Impact and Recommendations.

3.23 The Financing Agreement does not specify proposed management developments and could not therefore be used as a basis for planning management actions to conserve wildlife and natural resources in the project area. The Inception Report does provide a detailed schedule of activities which include such component outputs as: management plans, trained staff, improved roads and firebreaks, improved management of wildlife and natural habitats, improved relations with local communities, tourism carrying capacities, aerial surveys and technical estimates of offtake quotas. All these planned activities are relevant to, and stand to benefit, the natural resources and wildlife in the project area.

### *Gender Issues*

3.24 There is a policy of equal opportunity in the Botswana Public Service but this has not yet been introduced in the form of a specific code of conduct for the DWNP. The project has not made any specific provisions to provide opportunities for female staff and address their special needs in isolated stations.

### *Conclusion*

3.25 The overall conclusion is that the project was and is relevant to the problems and opportunities of the wildlife sector in **general** terms. However, the lack of a detailed problem analysis in the context of an overall strategy for conservation and management in the northern region, and the failure to involve potential beneficiaries in the design process, has led to a project whose **specific** relevance to the problems and priorities of the sector and its stakeholders is only partial. The evaluators are not convinced that the components as designed and implemented represent an effective response to the specific problems and priorities of the major beneficiaries (DWNP and tour operators), let alone to those of the local communities adjacent to parks and reserves.



## 4 EFFICIENCY

### Means and Costs

4.1 Cost-efficiency is the relation between the costs (inputs) and the results (outputs) of a project. A project is cost-efficient when it achieves its outputs at the lowest possible cost compared with alternative methods of delivery. This is distinct from cost-effectiveness, which is the relation between the costs and the impact of a project. Cost-effectiveness is discussed in section 8.

4.2 The costs of the project are not easy to ascertain. Financial reporting by the project has been very limited, and detailed statements of actual and projected disbursements of EC funds were difficult to obtain. Table 4 below represents the best estimate of EC expenditure based on the information made available to the evaluators.

**Table 4**

ITEM	FINANCING AGREEMENT ESTIMATE	INCEPTION REPORT ESTIMATE	AMOUNT COMMITTED <sup>5</sup>	AMOUNT PAID	ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES
<b>Infrastructure</b>	1.96	2.21	0.27	0.27	2.39 <sup>6</sup>
<b>Capital equipment</b>	1.53	1.28	0.02	0.02	
<i>sub-total</i>	3.49	3.49	0.29	0.29	
<b>Technical cooperation</b>	1.63	1.65	1.74	1.12	
<b>NGO component</b>	0.27	0.25	0.03	0.02	
<b>Training</b>	0.75	0.75	0.66	0.43	
<i>sub-total</i>	2.65	2.65	2.43	1.57	
<b>Contingencies</b>	0.66	0.66			
<b>TOTAL</b>	6.80	6.80	2.72	1.86	

<sup>5</sup> According to Project Cards at the Delegation.

<sup>6</sup> Estimated construction cost at 26/8/96 = P 10,759,000. Exchange rate of P 4.5 = 1 ECU.

4.3 The Financing Proposal only contained one itemised GoB contribution to the project : the running cost of the earth-moving equipment used for track construction (P 3.1 million over 4 years). The contribution of GoB to the ‘overall conservation of the country’s wildlife resources’ was estimated at P 175 million (ECU 70 million at 1991 exchange rates), but this is not a particularly useful or accurate estimate. It includes (i) the total value of the NDP7 projects, including EC and other donor contributions; (ii) the total DWNP recurrent budget for 4 years; and (iii) P 6.1 million in ‘programme’ recurrent costs (such as earth moving equipment running costs), which could only be met from within (ii).

4.4 The actual GoB contribution to the project is even harder to fathom. No records of GoB recurrent funding for (a) the WCNB project or (b) the northern parks and reserves as a unit were provided to the evaluators by the TA team or the Department. These records do not appear to be readily available.

4.5 DWNP is implementing six NDP7 projects. The WCNB project forms part of at least two of these, as does the EC-supported Southern Botswana project. However, the implication of the FP and FA is that the GoB contribution to WCNB is solely in the form of recurrent funding. Any DDF expenditure on the northern parks and reserves is, therefore, part of a NDP7 project, but not part of the WCNB project. Details of Domestic Development Fund (DDF) expenditures on the northern parks and reserves were, in any event, not available to the evaluators.

4.6 In summary, only the EC costs can be ascertained with any accuracy. The GoB recurrent contribution is unknown. GoB development fund expenditure on the northern parks and reserves is also unknown, but is in any case not part of this project as designed and agreed.

4.7 If total project costs (ie. EC and GoB) by category are difficult to ascertain, costs per unit output are even more so. Many of the major outputs of the project - such as the infrastructure and management plans - have yet to be achieved. However, it appears likely that, in both these cases, outputs could have been achieved at lower cost (and sooner) if a different specification had been used. For example, pre-fabricated housing (as built at BWTI and MGR) represents a cheap and rapid method of providing infrastructure. Similarly, the 'ideal' form of management plans which are being developed have proved to be very expensive and time consuming. A more cost-efficient (and effective) approach to the development of management plans should have been possible. The research monitoring and computer components appear to have been reasonably cost-efficient.

## **Organisation, Management, Monitoring**

### The Organisational Framework

4.8 An organogramme showing the reporting structure for the DWNP is at Table 5. It was recognised in the inception report that the TA experts would not function as a team in **Table 5**

professional matters. In practical terms this has meant that the team leader has no authority and consequently no responsibility to deliver the overall outputs of the project. It is not clear to what extent his employers consider that in these circumstances they should assume this role. The split deployment of the TA staff without a team leader with a project management remit, and the way in which individuals looked to their ToRs for guidance in the absence of a robust project document, did not provide a sufficiently strong focus on the purpose and goal of the project. This separation of individuals relying on activity based terms of reference and their location in separate Divisions also made it more difficult for them to retain their TA advisory role and to avoid undertaking line management duties.

### Project Steering Committee

4.9 The Financing Agreement committed the Government of Botswana to establish a project steering committee “of all relevant institutions, donors, NGOs, etc concerned by the present programme”. Understandably, as this was a Government of Botswana responsibility, its establishment was not included in the project timetable contained in the Inception Report, although the delays in establishing the Committee were referred to in the project annual report for 1994. It was only after the delays were raised by the Ministry of Finance at the February 1995 meeting of the Quarterly Interministerial Review Committee, chaired by the NAO that the first meeting of the Steering Committee took place in April 1995, eighteen months after the project had commenced. The composition of the committee, as established, did not include any representatives from the NGOs or other donors although both the work of the USAID Natural Resources Management Project and, subsequently, the ODA institutional strengthening project have an impact on the EC project. After the establishment of the EC funded southern parks project, the Steering Committee Meetings have covered both projects.

4.10 The Steering Committee minutes show that it deals with the details of project management, including major delays to the infrastructure programme, but also going down to the level of problems with stationery. The TA staff told the evaluators that they saw this committee as a way of “shaming” the Department into action on outstanding issues. The Committee does not appear to take a strategic view of the project by extending its remit to consider whether project activities will produce project outputs and lead to project goals being met. At the time of the mid-term review (November 1996) the committee held its fifth meeting (the role and utility of the committee is also discussed under Section 4, Monitoring and Evaluation).

### Summary of achievements against targets

4.11 The expected results (outputs) of the project were outlined in the Inception Report. As discussed above, this evaluation has considered both the ‘outputs’ and ‘component purposes’ contained in the IR Logical Frameworks as **Outputs**. Tables 6-10 below presents the objectives and indicators as worded in the IR, together with the actual (and/or likely) level of achievement. This provides the background to the discussion of intervention methods below. Achievements at the **Purpose** and **Overall Objective** level are discussed in sections 5 and 6.

**Table 6**

<b>COMPONENT 1 : SUPPORT TO NORTHERN PARKS AND RESERVES</b>		
<b>OUTPUTS</b>	<b>VERIFIABLE INDICATOR</b>	<b>ACHIEVEMENT</b>
Finalise management plans for northern parks and reserves with consensus of interested parties.	Production of management plans acceptable to interested parties.	Will not be achieved by 7/97, although draft MGR and CNP plans are more acceptable.
Identify components of management plans that can be implemented with available resources.	Production of action plans and budgets within ceilings of available resources.	Annual plans produced. These were more realistic than m/plans, but still exceeded resources available.
Implement above components of management plans	Completion of outputs as specified in action plans.	Some progress.
Put in system of adaptive management for monitoring, review and modification of management plans	Presence after project completion of capability for planning, budgeting, monitoring, review and replanning.	Not achieved.
Operative management plans subject to periodic review.	Regular production of m/plans, annual w/plans, budgets, progress rpts., monitoring rpts. and evaluations.	Partial achievement.
Trained staff.	Completion certificates etc. as per quantities, locations and standards set out in management plans.	Partial. Not focussed on northern parks.
Improved staff housing and office space.		To be achieved for CNP in 1998. Some houses also built in MGR.
Improved staff performance.		Not achieved.
Improved water for wildlife.		Installed with DDF funds.
Improved tourism facilities.	Improved visitor satisfaction.	No data. Improved CNP camping facilities due 1998.
Improved relations with local communities.	Measurable improvement of community attitudes towards parks/reserves.	No data. Some progress reported.
Improved wildlife and habitat management.	Populations within LACs set in management plans.	Not achieved.
Reduced illegal activity.	Illegal activity reduced by 75%	No data. Low levels to begin with.
Increased revenues.	Revenues increased by 25%	Revenues increased from P3.44m (91/92) to P4.5m (94/95)
Increased political support for parks and reserves.	Reduced pressure for incompatible land uses; increased GoB funding.	No evidence of increased support or reduced pressure. DWNP still underspending budget.

Table 7

<b>COMPONENT 1b : TOURISM</b>		
<b>OUTPUTS</b>	<b>VERIFIABLE INDICATOR</b>	<b>ACHIEVEMENT</b>
Improve tourism facilities in northern parks and reserves in line with GOB/DWNP tourism policy ie. high quality/low volume maintaining aesthetic experience.	Attitudes of GoB/DWNP staff, Botswana public, international visitors, NGOs, etc. towards tourism developments.	Policy not clearly articulated. Improved tourism facilities in pipeline for CNP.
Within limits of above policy, improve access to northern parks and reserves to Botswana and international public.		Not achieved.
Within limits of above policy, increase revenues to northern parks and reserves.	Revenue levels	DWNP revenues increased from P3.44m (91/92) to P4.5m (94/95)
Within limits of above policy, increase opportunities for local involvement in tourist industry.	Numbers, status and earnings of Botswana in tourist industry.	No data. Unlikely to have been achieved.
Improve image of DWNP with public.	Public attitudes.	Not achieved.
Improved and diversified tourism facilities in northern parks and reserves.	Number, quality, type and location of visitor facilities.	In pipeline for CNP.
Defined and implemented tourism carrying capacities.	Numbers of facilities, numbers of vehicles and visitors using facilities.	Carrying capacities defined, but subject to continuing discussion. Exceeded in N.E. CNP.
Booking system for tourism facilities in northern parks and reserves.	Booking system in place.	Booking system operational.
Improved information available to tourists and visitors.	Numbers of brochures, newsletters, etc.. Response of tourists and operators.	Improved information available at PARRO (but not at gates). Responses not monitored.
Improved liaison with tour operators.	Response of operators.	Liaison improved. Response not monitored.
Improved tourist statistics.	Data on visitor use of facilities	Visitor statistics improved and available for 1995.
Well trained and motivated tourism related DWNP staff.	Supervisor reports, visitor reports, state of facilities.	Staff trained but not motivated.
Improved visitor satisfaction.	Ratio of positive vs negative reports.	No data. Questionnaire now in use.

<b>Increased opportunities for local participation in tourist industry.</b>	<b>Numbers, status and earnings of Batswana in tourist industry.</b>	<b>No data. Community run Public Camping Grounds?</b>
Increased revenues	Revenues increased by 25%	DWNP revenues increased from P3.44m (91/92) to P4.5m (94/95)

**Table 8**

<b>COMPONENT 2 : SUPPORT TO RESEARCH DIVISION MONITORING UNIT</b>		
<b>OUTPUTS</b>	<b>VERIFIABLE INDICATOR</b>	<b>ACHIEVEMENT</b>
Design and coordinate standardised surveys of wildlife and habitats	Reports on surveys.	Achieved for wildlife. Not achieved for habitats.
Analyse and report on results of surveys	Reports on surveys.	Achieved.
Provide technical input into determination of offtake quotas	Reports containing technical inputs.	Achieved.
Identify needs for corrective management of wildlife and habitats	Reports indicating that wildlife or habitats are/are not undergoing unacceptable changes.	Not achieved.
Wet and dry season aerial surveys according to agreed system of priorities	Reports	Achieved.
Habitat surveys according to agreed system of priorities	Reports	Not achieved.
Reports on surveys carried out.	Reports	Achieved.
Technical estimates of offtake quotas.	Reports	Achieved.
Training of monitoring unit personnel.	Training materials and improved staff performance	Achieved.

**Table 9**

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<b>COMPONENT 3 : SUPPORT TO THE COMPUTER UNIT</b>		
<b>OUTPUTS</b>	<b>VERIFIABLE INDICATOR</b>	<b>ACHIEVEMENT</b>
Develop a comprehensive Wildlife Management Information System	Production of detailed needs assessment	Partially achieved. DCSC and IT Strategy sub-committee established.
Continue development of CHLS	CHLS operational, new features	CHLS developed, but use limited.
Expand computer facility	Production of operating systems and procedures, staffing and equipment plans	Computer Unit established; some operating procedures produced.
Select and train counterpart	Offer and acceptance of employment; employment contract.	No counterpart for most of TA contract. Insufficient training time with final counterpart.
Train staff	Production of plan outlining internal training; selection of external courses.	Training space not made available at BWTL. 60 staff sent on external 2-week course.
Assist in establishment of GIS facility	Production of implementation plan; prioritise application; data input.	Not achieved.
Operational CHLS	Retrieval of management information and wildlife usage statistics.	CHLS operational, but under-utilised ?
Computer Unit operating procedures	Production of operating procedures document	Document produced.
Counterpart in service	Employment contract	No counterpart for 18 months
Trained staff	Completion of internal and external courses	60 wildlife officers trained (2-week course).
Installation of equipment	Supply contract	Equipment installed.

**Table 10**

<b>COMPONENTS 4 - 8 : NO LOGICAL FRAMEWORKS IN INCEPTION REPORT</b>		

4.12 The implementation and achievements of each of the components are discussed below. Two general points on the results of the project can be made. First, it is evident that the results specified in the IR were, in general, over-ambitious. Many of the results were not deliverable by the project. Second, the absence of baseline and monitoring data means that it is extremely

difficult to say what has or has not been achieved. The proposed means of verification were often appropriate, but either could not be, or were not, implemented by the project team. The project design did not provide for the resources required, nor did the TA team make monitoring a priority.

## **Intervention Methods**

### Support to Northern Parks and Reserves

4.13 The main purposes of this component of the project (as stated in the Inception Report) were firstly to complete the management plans that had been prepared for the northern parks and reserves and adjacent areas by way of a full consultation process, and secondly to implement, or facilitate implementation of those plans.

#### ***A. Development of Management Plans.***

4.14 Three management plans for Chobe National Park had been prepared prior to the WCNB project<sup>7</sup> and a revised version of the Deloitte & Touche MP has subsequently been prepared by the project<sup>8</sup>. This version has not yet been approved by the Director of DWNP to go to Draft 3. Two management plans for Moremi Game Reserve had been prepared prior to the WCNB project<sup>9</sup>. Several revisions to the 1991 MGR Management Plan have subsequently been prepared by the project. Version 4 was approved by the Tawana Land Board with minor exceptions (incorporated into version 5). A further draft (Version 6) has subsequently been prepared but has not yet been approved by the Land Board or by the local communities. During the course of the project, a management plan for Makgadikgadi Pans and Nxai Pan National Parks was prepared on behalf of the DWNP as part of the NRMP/USAID project<sup>10</sup>. This management plan has not yet been approved by any of the parties concerned.

4.15 It is unclear as to why the various management plans have not been fully adopted and implemented by DWNP, but some of the main reasons put forward include:

- Insufficient consultation with all stakeholders;

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<sup>7</sup> Anderson, J.L. (1985). Chobe National Park and Moremi Wildlife Reserve. Immediate Development, Management and Planning Requirements; FGN-Kronberg Consulting and Engineering GMBH (Spinage) (1988). Chobe National Park Management Plan; Deloitte & Touche (1993). Chobe National Park Management Plan.

<sup>8</sup> DWNP (1996) Chobe National Park Management Plan, Second Draft.

<sup>9</sup> Anderson, J.L. (1985). Chobe National Park and Moremi Wildlife Reserve. Immediate Development, Management and Planning Requirements. DWNP (1991). Moremi Game Reserve Management Plan. KCS, KGS.

<sup>10</sup> IUCN (1995). Makgadikgadi Pans Management Plan.

- Insufficient time allocated by authors to the consultation process;
- Insufficient funding and staffing in DWNP to implement the recommendations.

4.16 Whilst the project has been unable to finalise any of the management plans so far, it has developed many useful management principles and practises in the course of the revisions. The Draft 2 management plan for CNP contains many improvements over previous versions: it includes a new chapter on the management of natural resources which defines how management objectives are to be achieved in terms of Limits to Acceptable Change, and another on infrastructure and equipment which provides more adequate plans for office and housing developments. It also contains extensively revised sections on staffing and organisational structure and on tourism, the former addressing key issues such as job descriptions and technical services, and the latter containing a detailed tourist development plan. In addition, the revised management plans for Chobe NP and Moremi GR have been written in conjunction with the current draft of the National Parks and Game Reserve Regulations.

4.17 Nevertheless, the current management plans remain incomplete in several key areas: there is insufficient planning for participation by local communities who are not adequately identified as beneficiaries of protected area conservation; a socio-economic analysis is needed in order to underpin the creation of a separate vote and budget for the parks and reserves in order to assist DWNP's overall management of natural resources; and recommendations are required for the provision of baseline surveys and studies to enable DWNP to monitor progress in the implementation of management plans. A more fundamental problem has been the attempt to prepare management plans in the absence of a strategic plan for conservation and management of wildlife in northern Botswana. This has meant that the management plans have been prepared with insufficient understanding of the major threats to wildlife in each area and their underlying causation. (The need for a strategic plan is discussed in more detail in Section 9, Conclusions and Recommendations).

4.18 As mentioned above, the revised management plans make use of Limits to Acceptable Change, to provide guidelines for management interventions. Several consequences arise from these limits which may not be immediately apparent. For instance, in order to keep vehicle numbers within the proposed LAC for the high density tourism zone (Chobe National Park), it will become necessary to close entrance gates at Kasane or Sidudu, with implications for both visitor satisfaction and revenue generation. In order to maintain mature tree density within the proposed LACs, it will be necessary within the framework of policy outlined in the management plans to instigate a programme of elephant reduction in the near future. The utility of this and other means of vegetation management (such as fire management, and construction of enclosure witness stands) are not adequately explored within the management plan. More detailed recommendations are required for the provision of baseline research and monitoring to investigate and substantiate the present Limits to Acceptable Change which are arbitrary and may well require adjustment in the future.

4.19 It can be seen from the above comments, and the preceding history of frequent revision to draft management plans, that the process of developing a final and agreed upon set of plans might continue indefinitely. A primary difficulty arises from DWNP's wish to produce management plans which present an ideal set of management goals, and the required resources to achieve those goals, without recognising the real weaknesses in the present management system. The resulting plans are useful for negotiation with government and potential donors but less so as practical guides to present management (see 1.17, above). A second difficulty arises from the desire to specify in advance detailed solutions to the utilisation of natural resources by all parties.

4.20 These two ambitions (above) inevitably give rise to long delays, and frequent revisions of management plans. In effect the process of writing management plans becomes open-ended due to the difficulties of obtaining agreement over every detail and the unrealistic assumptions concerning management capabilities. As an alternative, the production of working documents which recognise actual budget allocations and real manpower constraints, which also prioritise activities, and provide mechanisms for addressing unresolved issues in future phases, would provide a planning structure that encourages immediate implementation of feasible priorities. It would also furnish a planning process that allows for future improvements and modifications in management. By their working nature, such documents will be less contentious giving greater scope for agreement amongst stakeholders.

### ***B. Implementation of Management Plans***

4.21 The absence of approved management plans at the start of the WCNB programme imposed a major additional task on the TA team (finalising the management plans) that was not foreseen in the Terms of Reference. Nevertheless the team did initiate actions in the following main areas:

- production of annual work plans and budgets;
- high quality design work and architectural drawings for the main construction programme;
- construction of prefabricated housing for staff at Xakanaxa (MGR);
- design work for upgrading the road system (CNP);
- design and construction of artificial water points (CNP);
- through liaison with the Research Division, design and implementation of a monitoring programme for woodland structure near to artificial water points;
- research and modelling of the elephant woodland interaction;
- purchase of management equipment;
- provision of boreholes to supply water to staff camps (CNP);
- formulation of a detailed tourist strategy for CNP and MGR;
- establishment of the Parks and Reserves Reservations Office;
- establishment of a booking system for tourism facilities;
- productions of tourist information materials;
- establishment of a manual system of data collection for visitor statistics;

- designation of HATAB campsites;
- inspection and renovation of visitor facilities (CTS);
- design of public camp grounds (CNP, MGR);
- construction of a temporary public camp ground (CNP);
- repairs to a temporary public camp ground (Nxai Pan);
- construction of scavenger-proof litter bins (CNP, MGR).

4.22 The TA team have experienced serious difficulty in fully implementing several important development programmes as specified in the management plans, including the following:

- almost all development programmes for MGR, Makgadikgadi Pans and Nxai Pan NPs, predicated by a DWNP policy decision to focus all efforts on CNP;
- the construction phase of the building programme (including staff housing, park entrance gates, camping ground reception offices and ablution blocks, administrative offices at Maun and Kasane, and the Kasane anti-poaching unit);
- an increase in number and quality of staff in parks and reserves;
- an improved coordination of all divisions of DWNP;
- the implementation of road improvements (CNP);
- an effective system of fire management (CNP);
- the monitoring of woodland dynamics (CNP);
- an inventory of plant communities (CNP);
- an inventory of animal species for which aerial census is not possible (CNP);
- improved management programmes for migratory populations (CNP);
- improved management and control of visitors in the HDTZ (CNP).

4.23 The problems encountered by the TA team in implementing management plans efficiently are fully detailed in the Annual, Quarterly and Backup Mission reports, and the final report of the wildlife tourism expert, but some of the principal constraints on the project were (are) as follows:

- the low frequency of meetings by the project steering committee;
- a significant portion of SWPP's time devoted to revising management plans;
- an excessive administrative burden on the SWPP (absence of a project administrator);
- a further significant amount of the SWPP's time devoted to non-project activities at the behest of DWNP;
- serious capacity problem at DABS;
- delays and inappropriate administrative procedures at head office (DWNP);
- withdrawal of the SWPP's counterpart for further training to MSc level;
- low staffing levels and lack of staff skills within the protected areas;
- requisition by DAHP of heavy plant machinery (graders, bulldozers, etc.) used by the northern parks and reserves to assist in controlling the outbreak of contagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia in Ngamiland.

4.24 With regard to the serious delays experienced in the construction programme, it was

recognised in the Inception Report that it might be necessary to contract out architectural services in the private sector, in liaison with DABS. In retrospect, it is clear that the amount of time taken up with this long, drawn out procedure constituted a serious distraction for the SWPP. Information in the project reports suggests that the delays attributable to DABS were compounded by delays within the project. For example, the location of staff housing and selection of campsites was part of the process of producing management plans which was itself delayed. The delays encountered were by no means inevitable and if an efficient solution for the process of producing architectural designs had been developed at the outset, these delays and frustrations might have been avoided.

### ***C. Tourism Sub-Component***

4.25 The results of the tourism sub-component are summarised in Table 7, above. The establishment of the Parks and Reserves Reservations Office (PARRO) represents one of the major achievements. PARRO opened on schedule on 1 June 1995 and, according to the TA team, has had the desired effect of reducing overcrowding in the public camping grounds (PCGs) during peak periods. Its effect on total visitor numbers and revenues is not known, but it is probable that the growth of both has been reduced. A comparison of the visitor and revenue statistics for the period January-May 1995 and 1996 should, when available, answer this question.

4.26 Opinion on the efficiency of the reservations system is very mixed. Some tourists and tour operators consulted by the evaluators were satisfied with the system. Others were highly critical. The most common complaint was that PARRO booking information did not match the situation on the ground - for example, people might be told that a PCG was fully booked when there were in fact many vacancies. The lack of reliable radio communication between PARRO and DWNP staff on the ground is probably partly to blame. Whatever the reason, the reservation system does appear to have created some visitor dis-satisfaction as well as approval. The booking procedures employed in the Parks and Reserves Reservations System are illustrated in Figure 4.

4.27 Communication between the tourist industry and DWNP has been much improved as a result of the project. Real efforts were made to consult with tour operators and to accommodate their interests where possible. Less effort was made to determine the needs of visitors in general, or to monitor their satisfaction. A Visitor Critique questionnaire is now in

circulation, but this will not generate reliable information on visitor satisfaction. DWNP needs to understand visitor needs and priorities, and to monitor their satisfaction or otherwise, if it is to improve the level of service provided. The project has not made a significant contribution in this area.

4.28 The tourism component raises two other issues of wider concern. The first concerns the respective roles of DWNP versus the private sector. Services such as PCGs can be provided either by DWNP or by private operators. The WCNB project has sought to improve DWNP's ability to provide such a service but, in doing so, has highlighted the fact that a lack of high quality infrastructure may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for improving the quality of service. The quality of management is the key factor. The case for increasing the role of the private sector has been strengthened by the experience of this project.

4.29 The second issue of wider concern relates to the tourism policy. This tourism sub-component has been implemented in accordance with 'high quality/low volume policy'. The evaluators were not able to ascertain exactly where this policy is stated or justified. The precise meaning and definition of this policy has major implications for tourism planning. This is discussed further in section 7.

4.30 In general, implementation of this sub-component has encountered a familiar set of problems. DWNP has had difficulties in providing adequate recurrent funds and materials to support tourism-related activities; the first WTS counterpart left for training and was not immediately replaced; staff supervision and motivation remains weak; and the sustainability of many of the systems established is uncertain given the institutional context. A tendency to establish elaborate systems may exacerbate these sustainability problems.

#### Aerial Surveys - Research Division Monitoring Unit

4.31 In considering the efficiency of the support provided to the Research Division Monitoring Unit by the Senior Wildlife Biologist (Aerial Surveys), it will be helpful to begin with an assessment of whether it was reasonable to expect one person to undertake both aerial surveys and other types of survey. The Terms of Reference for this post, as given in the Restricted Tender Dossier are set out in Annex 8. They specify duties relating to planning, administration, implementation, analysis and reporting of aerial surveys, and the provision of training and advice concerning aerial survey techniques.

4.32 The contract for the SWB(AS) commenced in August 1993 and her inception report produced at the end of October 1993 listed the objectives contained in the TOR (above). By January 1994, the Principal Wildlife Biologist (DWNP) had decided that the SWB(AS) should lead the newly formed "Monitoring Unit" within the Research Division, thus expanding her duties. The WCNB programme Inception Report produced in January 1994 contained more extensive objectives and outputs for the SWB(AS), including the following:

- other types of wildlife surveys (i.e. non-aerial surveys) according to the agreed

system of priorities.

- habitat surveys according to the agreed system of priorities.

4.33 The Inception Report of the SWB(AS) stated that these broader objectives of the Monitoring Unit might not be possible to achieve because of limitations of personnel, equipment and funds. By November 1994, responsibility for habitat monitoring had been turned over to one of DWNP's Senior Wildlife Biologists working within the Monitoring Unit, but the SWB(AS) retained responsibility for the "other types of wildlife survey".

4.34 The aerial survey method is highly efficient at estimating population sizes of large animals over extensive regions of open country: there is no other way to survey large mammals on a country-wide basis. However, certain large mammals are poorly sampled in aerial surveys so it is not desirable to direct all monitoring efforts into this one technique. For species such as bushbuck, kudu, sitatunga and the large carnivores, it is necessary to consider alternative direct methods, such as ground surveys, or indirect methods such as the analysis of hunting effort in relation to success. The SWB(AS) investigated the possibility of conducting ground surveys of lion and leopard using individual photographic files and concluded that this task in itself would require a major team project. No further action was taken to implement ground-based surveys. The review team concur that this was a realistic course of action, given the original terms of reference for the SWB(AS) and the prevailing capacity of the Monitoring Unit.

4.35 In addition to species counts, information for setting quotas can be obtained from data obtained from hunters on trophy quality, age of trophy animals at death, and hunting effort in relation to success. This type of monitoring was not attempted, nor was it included in the terms of reference of the SWB(AS), but it should be considered in future monitoring programmes.

4.36 Prior to the WCNB project, aerial surveys were conducted in the 1992 dry and 1993 wet seasons, but their quality was rated as poor. The SWB(AS) participated in the dry season survey of 1993 in the northern region, and in the country-wide aerial surveys in the wet and dry seasons of 1994. Map 3, derived from the aerial surveys, illustrates the divergence of wildlife and livestock distributions in Botswana. Country-wide aerial surveys require a high level of skill, motivation and endurance in the crews and efficient logistical support on the ground. They were conducted competently using the correct methodology and the data were fully analysed and reported. Results from the surveys formed the basis for calculating the 1994 and 1995 hunting quotas. In general, the aerial surveys were well supported by DWNP although there were logistical problems in the supply of fuel, and with the discipline and level of prior training amongst the junior staff. The success of the programme owes much to the technical expertise, dedication and long hours invested by the SWB(AS).

4.37 It is questionable as to whether the work load expected of the pilots and observers during country-wide aerial surveys would be sustainable in the long-term. It has been

suggested that the work load on the individual could be reduced by doubling the number of aircraft taking part in surveys. This measure fails to address a major constraint in the availability of experienced and well-disciplined crews. A greater number of aircraft taking part in the survey operations may also increase the risk of mid-air collision.

4.38 The computer programs developed by the previous SWB(AS) were suitable for data analysis, but they were modified during the project to make them more user friendly and to facilitate data checking, analysis and presentation. The present package is much improved but would benefit from a menu style interface.

4.39 Training of observers was successfully combined with data collection. A counterpart was supplied by DWNP during the whole period of TA input. The counterpart (Ms. R. Masoga) was shown how to conduct each stage of the planning and operations. She was given charge of the team in one of the aircraft and took part in all of the surveys. The 1995 wet season survey was left in the hands of Ms. Masoga who was solely in charge of its organisation and execution, and the reporting of results. The SWB(AS) remained available for advice if needed.

4.40 Before the end of her contract, the SWB(AS) produced a comprehensive manual of aerial census techniques, including sections on data entry, analysis and mapping. The manual is clearly written and provides an excellent means of transferring knowledge. With assistance from the counterpart and another SWB (DWNP), the SWB(AS) also produced a useful report on trends in wildlife population numbers for Botswana.

#### Computer Unit

##### *Counterpart and Support Staff*

4.41 A Counterpart was assigned to the Computer Expert at the start of his contract, and they worked closely together on the day-to-day operation of the Computer Unit. After six months however, she departed on three months maternity leave, and following this the department sent her overseas on a degree course in Geographic Information Systems. The Computer Expert was then left without a counterpart for the remainder of his two year contract, having been unable to impart any substantial or sustainable skills during the short period of overlap.

4.42 At the beginning of his one-year contract extension, the department employed a new Computer Unit Head, Miss Leburu, and assigned her to the Computer Expert as his counterpart. Miss Leburu was recruited immediately after completing her Diploma in Information Technology at the University of Botswana, and had no previous work experience. She therefore did not meet the DPSM's specific requirement of a B.Sc. in Computer Science with a minimum of two years experience in Management Information Systems, computer programming and programming languages. The Computer Expert worked with her for some ten months in all, giving hands-on instruction on the diagnosis of hardware faults, explaining the department's systems and operational procedures, and involving her in the Computer Steering Committee and in discussions with the Government Computer Bureau.

4.43 Although she is bright and willing, it is clear that Miss Leburu has not assimilated sufficient skills and experience to be able to keep the Computer Unit functioning in the absence of the Computer Expert. It is also evident that she lacks the confidence to represent the Unit in managerial discussions, and is in no position to sustain the Computer Expert's drive for a departmental IT Strategy. Had she been appointed a year earlier she would have been in a much better position to keep the Computer Unit operational. It is concluded that the Computer Unit will not remain fully functional for long in the absence of the Computer Expert. Day-to-day operations may continue in the short term, but the Unit as it is today will not be able to meet the growing IT requirements of the Department.

#### ***The Information Technology Steering Committee***

4.44 During the first six months of his contract, the Computer Expert conducted an initial assessment of the divisional activities within DWNP, both at Gaborone and in the District offices. In September 1994 he published the "Information Technology Policy and Development Strategy Report" which listed the various activities and management responsibilities for each Division/Unit, and identified the IT applications already in use at that time.

4.45 In this report, the Computer Expert described the inherent risks of developing computer applications in isolation with no overall control or standards, as had been the practise thus far. Although the various Divisions were keen to start implementing IT solutions without delay, he advised the department to establish a clear overall IT development strategy before any further IT projects were begun. To drive this process, he recommended the creation of a Departmental Computer Steering Committee (DCSC), to be composed of senior DWNP staff, and representatives of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Government Computer Bureau.

4.46 The Directorate acknowledged the Computer Expert's recommendations and the first DCSC meeting was held in May 1995 with the Deputy Director as chairman. An IT Strategy sub-committee was formed to develop the IT strategy and by February 1996 had produced its first reference document "The IT Strategy Business Statement" which detailed the department's divisional responsibilities and information requirements. The DCSC is a cross-departmental committee which is playing an important role in establishing a clear overall IT development strategy. It is considered to be an efficient and effective development which ultimately will collectively define the Department's Wildlife Management Information System (Annex 9).

#### **Housing for BWTI**

4.47 Ten medium-cost staff houses for the BWTI were constructed in 1995. Water and electricity have been connected and the houses are now occupied by BWTI staff. By choosing prefabricated modular housing, the design process involving DWNP, DABS and the EC was greatly simplified.

4.48 In November 1996 these houses were in good condition and were well liked by staff. The

designs are uncomplicated, but their non-traditional appearance may be considered in some circumstances to limit their use in visually sensitive areas of the park.

#### Office Construction (Maun & Kasane)

4.49 This component comprises the construction of an 18-room office block at both Maun and Kasane as part of the Phase 1 construction programme. The design briefs and architectural drawings were passed to DABS in July 1994. There was apparently no further action until January 1995, when a project co-ordinator was appointed. In February 1995 DABS indicated that it did not have the in-house capacity to carry out the design and consultants would have to be contracted from the private sector. In October 1995 consultants were appointed. Some of this delay might have been avoided if there had been closer liaison between DABS and project staff at an earlier stage. The location of the TA team leader in Maun made close liaison with DABS staff based in Gaborone difficult.

4.50 Working in association with DABS, Mosienyane & Partners, a private firm of architects, has now produced an attractive and functional design for the offices. Particular care was taken in choosing the setting of the Kasane building to ensure a minimum of disturbance to mature trees during construction of the office and access roads. It is anticipated that the phase I construction programme will be completed by the end of 1997.

#### Community Projects - through NGOs

4.51 This 'community' component was included in the project at the instigation of Brussels. According to the FA, the aim of the NGO component was to "develop community based wildlife projects so as to generate employment, raise incomes in rural areas, promote rural development, stimulate the provision of other services in remote areas and to educate and raise wildlife conservation awareness of resentful communities living in or near the reserves, and to educate and raise wildlife conservation awareness elsewhere in the country". This was an ambitious and unfocussed objective, particularly in view of the limited funds allocated (ECU 250,000), the stipulation that the funds should be spent via NGOs, and the fact that no TA or DWNP staff time was budgeted.

4.52 A panel consisting of representatives from DWNP and NRMP, the Adviser to the NAO, the EC Rural Development Adviser, and the SWPP, was established to evaluate proposals for funding. This panel has now met six times, but has made limited progress. Only a small proportion of the funds have been disbursed. Table 11 below summarises the current commitments as at November 1996.

**Table 11**

<b>NGO COMPONENT : COMMITMENTS, November 1996</b>	<b>PULA</b>
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BALANCE AVAILABLE (ECU 244,200 @ P 4.4)	1,074,480
Khama Rhino Sanctuary Trust - Business plan	30,000
Khama Rhino Sanctuary Trust - Developments	130,000
Conservation International - Community facilitator	150,000
Chobe Enclave Trust, Karimba	150,000
Okavango Community Trust	90,000
Sankuyu electric fence	150,000
sub-total	800,000
BALANCE UNCOMMITTED	274,480

4.53 The main reason for the very slow disbursement under this component has been the lack of appropriate proposals from NGOs. This in turn reflects the limited number of experienced NGOs within Botswana able to design and implement community-based wildlife and community development projects. The design assumption that local communities could be effectively supported via NGOs has been found to be mistaken. NRMP was originally based on a similar assumption, and came to a similar conclusion at its mid-term review. There is now a recognition that a direct investment in community facilitation is required if communities are to participate and benefit from wildlife-based developments. There is also a recognition that DWNP needs to increase its community facilitation capability if it is going to be able to meet the growing demand for support.

4.54 The project has responded to this situation in two ways. First, there is now a greater acceptance on the evaluation panel that community facilitation is an appropriate activity for support under this component. Second, in conjunction with the Southern project, TORs have been drawn up for a Community Liaison Specialist (CLS). The main objective of this post will be to encourage and facilitate community development and community consultation for management planning purposes with people in and around parks and reserves. The evaluators agree that the appointment of a CLS is a high priority and should be supported by the EC, subject to clarification of the objectives and institutional arrangements for the post.

4.55 There is also scope to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the application process. The funding criteria, guidance for applicants, and evaluation criteria could all be made clearer. This would save time for both applicants and the evaluation panel. It should not be necessary, for example, for the panel to spend time discussing the financial viability or otherwise of a proposal which contains no information on this aspect - applicants should be informed that proposals should include an analysis of financial viability, and this should be appraised by one or more panel

members in advance of the meeting.

4.56 The composition of the evaluation panel might also be improved by a greater representation of DWNP staff and outsiders with economic and social development experience and skills. The composition and operation of the panel is not, however, the main constraint. The main constraint is a product of poor design : the assumption that the best way to benefit communities was via a separate NGO programme. Community participation and benefits should be central to the planning and management of parks and reserves. Communities can and should benefit directly and mainly from wildlife-based activities in and around the parks and reserves, not via separately funded 'community projects'. The DWNP comments on the community project fund are given in Annex 10.

### Training Programme

4.57 The training programme envisaged in the Financing Agreement was to have included first degree level and postgraduate training in addition to training at the College of African Wildlife Management (CAWM) at Mweka, Tanzania. However, the training provided under the project was seen as a continuation of existing EDF training which had funded places at CAWM. By the time of the Inception Report, it had already been agreed that 10 staff members should be sent to CAWM. This was subsequently raised to 13. The control of training funds rests with the DWNP training panel. A balance of 100,000 ecu has been kept under the control of the Assistant Director, Parks, to meet the costs of study tours and other training related to the project.

4.58 The training programme under this project has to be considered in the context of the total number of training places available to the DWNP. Training at first degree and postgraduate levels has been funded by both USAID and the Government of Botswana. This additional training has probably balanced out the loss of flexibility which occurred at the project level.

4.59 Staff returning from CAWM reported that they had been exposed to a wide variety of wildlife habitats, protected areas and management practises. They found the training to have been worthwhile but complained that the instruction was overly academic and weak in practical instruction. Improvements in training at Mweka can be expected in the near future as a consequence of a recently initiated EC project which aims to upgrade teaching and research accomodation at CAWM, and to support a programme of staff development via an inter-institutional twinning arrangement with a counterpart European training institution.

4.60 The use of CAWM for middle-level training has apparently proceeded without any significant complications or delays. In the longer term it may be possible for the BWTI to develop the capacity for middle-level training of DWNP staff, but it will remain beneficial to expose staff to the management problems and practises of neighbouring countries.

## Monitoring and Evaluation

### The Structure of Project Monitoring

4.61 The structure of project monitoring is shown in Table 12. Internal monitoring is provided by the Project Steering Committee, the Quarterly and Annual reports by the TA team, and the annual back-up missions. (The back-up missions have been treated as internal monitoring because the ToR's were prepared by the TA team leader and the monitors were selected and employed by the consultants managing the project). External monitoring takes the form of the Interministerial Project Review Committee chaired by the NAO, the Annual Project/Programme Component Monitoring Report prepared by the Delegation and the Annual Report on Co-operation between the EC and the Republic of Botswana also prepared by the Delegation. Neither the external nor internal monitoring process used the project framework prepared in the inception report as part of the monitoring process.

#### Internal Monitoring

4.62 The effectiveness of the Project Steering Committee has been limited because of the nature of the problems brought to the agenda. It has concentrated its work at the activity level rather than focusing on the project purpose and goals. It does not appear to have been particularly successful in overcoming delays in the construction programme, which have been resolved in bilateral discussions with DABS. The project Quarterly and Annual reports are detailed and have drawn attention to delays. As with the Steering Committee, the reports focus on activities rather than the project purpose or goals. The details in the report can unintentionally conceal significant issues. The summary pages do not clearly indicate significant developments, issues and responsibility for action in a way which facilitates their easy use by busy staff in the Government, Delegation or DG VIII in Brussels.

4.63 The inclusion of a project framework in the reports might have resulted in a focus on the project purpose or goals. The TA team have told the evaluators that they did not receive any feedback from the EC Delegation or Brussels on their reports, including the Inception Report. The evaluators found that when the Delegation forwarded reports to Brussels they provided written comments, but the evaluators could not find any written record of these comments being passed on to the TA team. Although there were discussions between the TA team and the Delegation, the Delegation noted that the TA team leader does not call in to see them on a regular basis, and there does not appear to be any formal or informal system which would regularly bring together the Delegation and EC TA team leaders as a matter of course.

4.64 The back-up missions are intended to evaluate the implementation of the project and to advise on its progress. They are undertaken by consultants external to the project and originally were planned to take place every six months, but by mutual agreement between

ULG and the Commission the frequency was reduced to once a year. The back-up reports suffer from similar weaknesses to the Quarterly and Annual project reports. The terms of reference direct the assessment to consider progress on activities and catalogue events rather than to look at the attainment of the project purpose or project goals. The report summary does not lend itself to an easy identification of the main issues. The TA team leader considered that they had been helpful to him in drawing attention to specific problems and many of the recommendations in the reports point to necessary actions, e.g. the need for secretarial assistance for the team leader, and the need to ensure that the team leader was not asked to take on assignments not directly related to the objectives of the project<sup>11</sup>.

4.65 It is disappointing, however, that on some significant issues, the reports did not take a more strategic view of project activities, e.g. the slow progress on completing the management plans and whether a different approach is required.

4.66 The evaluators were told that the decision to reduce the frequency of the back-up missions was because the Delegation took the view that six-monthly reviews were not cost-effective in terms of the value of the reports. It is not clear whether there might have been an opportunity to revise the terms of reference for the back-up missions and thus make the reports a more effective monitoring tool.

#### External Monitoring

4.67 The quarterly interministerial project review committee chaired by the NAO was more effective than the Project Steering Committee at progress chasing. Discussions in the committee identified the high proportion of the time spent by the TA team leader on non-project duties (September 1994); the need to establish a Project steering committee (February 1995); delays in preparing an equipment list (May 1995); and, the need to hasten the preparation of ToR's for the mid-term review (November 1995). However, the Committee does not appear to have taken a strategic view of whether the project is likely to achieve its purpose or goals.

4.68 The instructions issued to Delegation staff and staff at Headquarters requires the Delegation to provide Brussels with annual project/programme monitoring reports in which the Delegation are asked to complete a proforma which covers progress towards achieving project objectives, progress with individual activities, and sustainability. The evaluators could find no example of proformas relating to this project in either Brussels or the Delegation in Gabarone. The evaluators were informed by the Delegation that they did not complete the proformas for this project on a regular basis as "no-one read them". This is unfortunate for two reasons. Firstly, completion of the proformas might have provided a much needed focus on the achievement of project objectives as distinct from simply monitoring project activities. Secondly, and more importantly, it might have helped to resolve the apparent gap in perception of the project objectives between the TA team and DG VIII in Brussels. Staff in DG VIII told the evaluators

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<sup>11</sup> Back-up report, April 1995.

that they considered the main objectives of the project are to benefit local people particularly poor local people in rural areas; income generation; and, institution building. The TA team leader sees the main purpose of the project as “maintaining the structure of ecological communities and landscape aesthetics within defined limits of acceptable change”. This concept is referred to in the project framework which does not include income generation for poor people as either a project goal or a project purpose.

4.69 The annual reports on co-operation between the community and the Republic of Botswana prepared by the Delegation do contain an outline of project objectives and a summary of progress. However, these are not sufficiently detailed to be of practical use for monitoring purposes.

#### The Effectiveness of Monitoring

4.70 The monitoring process overall has been weakened by the failure to use the project framework prepared in the inception report for monitoring purposes, or to collect any data to support the objectively verifiable indicators in the framework. This has undermined the other elements in the monitoring system since in the absence of the framework there is no clear datum against which progress can be measured or the relevance, accuracy and timeliness of the information judged.

4.71 Potentially, the project framework offers the external monitors a better monitoring tool than the project reports. In their current format, the latter do not present information about the project in a clear or easily assimilated form and, because of this, the reports inhibit effective monitoring.

4.72 Follow-up action to effective monitoring is important. On this project, action on external monitoring generally took place within the Project Steering Committee or the Interministerial Review Committee. With hindsight, it might have been more effective if the Delegation had also expressed its concerns in writing to the Government of Botswana and the consultancy company managing the project.

## 5 EFFECTIVENESS

*What Results have been achieved, and how have these contributed to the (assumed) Purpose?*

### Achievement of Objectives

5.1 Tables 6-10 above listed the results achieved against the objectives as specified in the IR. Table 13 below identifies the main achievements of the project as measured against the (assumed) Purposes derived from the FA.

**Table 13**

DERIVED OBJECTIVE	VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	ACHIEVEMENTS
<b>PURPOSES</b>		
1. Institutional base of DWNP strengthened.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of staff with professional, technical and management qualifications increased.</li> <li>- Improved welfare of staff in northern parks and reserves.</li> <li>- Implementable management plans for northern parks and reserves agreed by primary stakeholders.</li> <li>- Effective and sustainable wildlife monitoring and management information systems in place.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Achieved</li> <li>- Not yet achieved.</li> <li>- Not achieved, and will not be achieved in present form by end of project.</li> <li>- Effective, but not sustainable, systems put in place.</li> </ul>
2. Income of local communities increased.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased wildlife-related income for households in WMAs adjacent to northern parks and reserves.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Not achieved.</li> </ul>

#### Purpose 1

5.2 The project was intended to provide specific elements to strengthen the institutional base of DWNP in conjunction with other efforts to address the constraints faced by DWNP, e.g. USAID's assistance for management plans, personnel management and staff training. The partial nature of EC assistance was not made clear at the project design stage and joint efforts of the EC and other donors did not address every constraint, e.g. provision of transport. Thus it is no surprise that by the end of this project it is likely that this purpose will only have been partially achieved. The department will have benefited from the staff trained under the project and the

transfer of skills between TA staff and their counterparts. In a very localised manner, staff will have benefited from the provision of better housing and office accommodation. However, the other constraints to strengthening the institutional base will remain and it is these constraints which limit the effectiveness of the project.

## Purpose 2

5.3 The project was intended to increase the wildlife-related income for households in WMA's adjacent to the northern parks and reserves. The direct means to achieving this was via the NGO component. As discussed above, this component is unlikely to achieve any significant impact for local communities. Only one of the proposals (the Sankuyu electric fence) has any prospect of significantly increasing incomes in the project area in the near future. (This fence will reduce wildlife-related costs rather than increase wildlife-related benefits, but this is a detail.) The other proposals are either more long-term (eg. community facilitation) or geographically distant from the northern parks and reserves (eg. the Khama rhino sanctuary).

5.4 The project might also be expected to (eventually) increase incomes indirectly via the management planning process. The project has not, however, yet been able to consult and involve local communities to the extent necessary. This is partly due to a lack of project staff time and skills, and partly because community benefits do not appear to have been an important objective of either the parks or the planning process. The prospects of the management planning process as currently implemented leading to significant improvements in the welfare and attitudes of local communities are not good. The draft plans may, nevertheless, be more likely to lead to 'people-friendly' policies - or at least less people-unfriendly policies - than might otherwise have been the case.

## Constraints Experienced in Achieving Objectives

5.5 The project has experienced a number of constraints including inadequate office accommodation for the TA team, the uneven provision of counterpart staff, problems in dealing with administrative procedures in DWNP and problems with the provision of technical services by other departments (DABS, CTO, DWA). These have all in different ways constrained or delayed the project and, in particular, they have been blamed for delays in the infrastructure programme.

5.6 These constraints are not unique in development projects and to a greater or lesser extent have been experienced by other projects. In some other cases they do not appear to have become such significant obstacles of progress as they have been portrayed in this project.

5.7 Some of the constraints were identified from the outset. The Inception Report suggested ways of overcoming delays in the service departments by using private contractors. However it was well into the project before this strategy was implemented. After the event, it is hard to establish why this should be so. It may be partly associated with the location of the team leader in Maun, away from the headquarters of the technical departments in Gaborone, and partly

connected with the workload of the TA team leader which means that he spends, by his own estimate, approximately 40% of his time on non-project duties.

5.8 So far as the constraints caused by management and budgeting systems in the DWNP are concerned, reference has already been made to the problems caused by overlaying the administrative structure of PADUN on existing Departmental structures. The emphasis within the project appears to have been that these Departmental structures should be changed and project time has been devoted to suggesting new approaches. This is very commendable, but a more pragmatic approach which focused on how the existing system could be used rather than attempting to bypass it might have produced better results in the time frame of the project.

5.9 Some constraints have been outwith the control of the project, particularly in relation to internal staffing issues which reflect the role of DWNP and do not lie within the scope of the project. These relate to defining staff responsibilities, filling vacancies and the institutional structure of DWNP. The current project was not designed to tackle these issues although they have been addressed by both the USAID Natural Resources Management Project and the ODA Institutional Strengthening Project. A more rigorous problem analysis at the start of the project would have identified these institutional issues and enabled those designing and funding the project to decide whether or not they could be tackled within the project design or whether they would require a redesign or even the abandonment of the project.

5.10 The project has already identified stratagems to overcome the constraints it has encountered, but the success of these stratagems will depend upon the extent to which they can be adopted within the project and the extent to which they depend upon change within the whole of DWNP. Thus any subsequent project should be better integrated with the other donor activities to strengthen DWNP.

## 6 IMPACT

*What lasting effects, positive or negative, planned or unforeseen, have resulted from the project?*

### Contribution of the Project/Each Component to the Overall Objective

6.1 Table 14 below summarises the likely achievement of the project as gauged against the indicators given. As with achievements at other levels, the major problem faced by the evaluation was the lack of data which would allow this to be objectively assessed. Notwithstanding this constraint, in the opinion of the evaluators there is little prospect of the project contributing significantly to the achievement of the overall objective.

**Table 14**

DERIVED OBJECTIVE	VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	ACHIEVEMENTS
<b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b>		
Protection, conservation and management of Northern Parks and Reserves improved.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Incidence of poaching reduced.</li> <li>- Populations of vulnerable /endangered animal species stable or increasing.</li> <li>- Frequency of wild fires reduced.</li> <li>- Vulnerable tree species and plant communities regenerating.</li> <li>- Incidence of invasive exotic species reduced.</li> <li>- Number of tourist infringements reduced.</li> <li>- Number of visitors within defined carrying capacities.</li> <li>- Visitor satisfaction increased.</li> <li>- Attitude of adjacent communities towards wildlife and parks/reserves improved.</li> <li>- Incidence of livestock grazing in parks and reserves (Makgadikgadi Pans NP) reduced.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No data. Reduction as a result of the project unlikely.</li> <li>- No data specific to parks and reserves. Buffalo, hippo, lechwe, &amp; sitatunga declining in the North. More data required on roan &amp; sable</li> <li>- No reduction.</li> <li>- No data. Little regeneration?</li> <li>- No data. Little impact?</li> <li>- No data. Slight impact possible?</li> <li>- Carrying capacities c/c generally set to accommodate visitor numbers, not vice versa? Some reduction in visitor numbers due to PARRO? Visitors still exceed c/c in N.E. CNP.</li> <li>- No data. Visitor satisfaction unlikely to have increased.</li> <li>- No data. Attitude of adjacent communities unlikely to have improved.</li> <li>- No impact?</li> </ul>

## Support to Northern Parks and Reserves

6.2 In order to further evaluate the impact of the WCNB project on its overall objectives, as stated in the Financing Agreement (Annex 6), it will be helpful first to place the project within the context of the major wildlife conservation issues of the northern region.

6.3 The region is characterised by two fundamental and contentious issues: a conflict over land use, and a growing conflict over water use. The conflict over land use is largely a matter of competition over rangeland for utilisation by cattle versus wildlife. The conflict over water use concerns the competition over water destined to flow into, or already flowing within the Okavango Delta, on the one hand for consumption by municipalities and potential irrigation developments and on the other for maintenance of the wetland ecosystems.

6.4 These two sources of conflict give rise in turn to two primary categories of threat to wildlife in the northern region. A. The threat posed by fragmentation of major terrestrial wildlife areas either directly through the spread of cattle and associated settlements or indirectly through the construction of veterinary fences. B. The threat to the wetland ecosystems of the Okavango Delta. The Delta contains five dominating habitats - streams, lakes, perennial swamps, seasonal floodplains and the associated savanna woodlands - which support a wide diversity of plant and animal species including a number which are uncommon, rare or endangered. Depending on the nature of water abstraction, this threat might extend to the entire ecosystem but the seasonal floodplains are especially vulnerable. In addition, a third category of threat arises as a consequence of frequent fires and the impact of elephants on woodland habitat within the wildlife areas.

6.5 Responsibility for wildlife conservation and management in the northern region falls principally on DWNP with assistance from other government departments, local communities, various NGOs and the private sector. At the present time at least three elements of wildlife management require support: 1) development of the wildlife-based economy as a balance to the cultural strength of the cattle-based economy and the growing national requirement for water; 2) establishment of a fully functional research and education service to provide essential baseline information on the region's ecology, coordinate socio-economic studies, monitor the environment and increase public awareness of conservation issues; and 3) strengthening of the wildlife management institution (DWNP).

6.6 The initial design of the WCNB programme was handicapped by the absence of a fully developed regional strategy for wildlife conservation in northern Botswana. In aiming primarily to strengthen the institutional base, the WCNB programme focussed on the third element of support, but through its inputs to tourism, the Research Division Monitoring Unit and the community-based wildlife projects, it also addressed aspects of the other two elements.

6.7 The WCNB component of support to the northern parks and reserves provided for inputs into developing and implementing management plans, infrastructure and tourism. The project has now produced revised management plans for Chobe NP and Moremi GR which have considerably

improved the planning of management in the two areas, and if fully implemented they stand to make a substantial and beneficial impact on conservation. However it is anticipated that extensive further consultations and revisions will be needed before the plans can be finalised and approved. The review team are of the opinion that the current protracted nature of the planning process arises from a perceived need to resolve every conflict and specify in advance every detail of management. It is also apparent that the plans have come to serve a double purpose: as a means for negotiating with government and donors over support; and as a planning instrument for management. Consequently they do not provide realistic plans for phasing in improved management, based on the real constraints of the department and its resources.

6.8 When completed the building programme will make a positive contribution to staffing problems in the protected areas, but in itself it does not constitute a panacea for all the site problems, as some Departmental staff appear to believe. The project has helped to identify many of these other outstanding problems: staff discipline and motivation; training in financial and personnel management; the need for a separate budget and vote; the overcentralisation of decision making; the need to provide more efficient technical services and the question of privatisation; the requirement for greater participation by local communities in management; and the need for local people to obtain increased benefits from the parks and reserves.

6.9 The tourism sub-component has delivered several significant benefits including: improved and diversified tourism facilities (currently in the pipeline); improved liaison with tour operators; new limitations on tourist carrying capacities; new restrictions on permanent structures within parks and reserves; and a booking system for tourism facilities with trained staff. The provision of artificial water points in the Nogatsaa area (CNP) will help to spread out the use of the park. However, the problem of tourist congestion in the Kasane high density tourist zone, especially by day visitors, has not been alleviated by these measures. It is likely that growing commercial pressures will increasingly conflict with the Department's goal to restrict vehicle numbers entering the high density tourist zone. The situation might be ameliorated by improvements in the access to other parts of the park, but the project has not yet been able to deliver an improved road network.

6.10 The project has been unable to deliver improvements in wildlife and habitat management, fire control, law enforcement or in the image of DWNP with the public.

### Manpower Development

6.11 To date the project has funded training for 13 DWNP staff at the College of African Wildlife Management in Tanzania and there are plans to fund 20 more places. The initial assessment of this training is given in Section 4, Efficiency. While this training alone cannot ensure that the project will achieve its purpose, it has made a significant improvement to the levels of trained staff in the DWNP and will have a positive impact in improving staff effectiveness. Where counterpart staff have been able to work alongside a TA adviser there has also been a worthwhile transfer of skills.

6.12 With hindsight, some flexibility has been lost by leaving the selection of training priorities in the hands of the DWNP headquarters training panel without the close involvement of the project TA staff. Difficulties over the availability of counterpart staff might have been avoided if TA staff had been consulted in more detail about the training schedule. In retrospect, the impact of training might have been increased if some staff had been given management training in addition to their professional training in wildlife management.

6.13 Overall, the effectiveness of training will depend upon the extent to which the organisational structure and management systems of the DWNP permit staff to use their new skills.

#### Impact on Local Communities

6.14 The impact on local communities around the northern parks and reserves could be of two main forms : attitudes and material benefits. No data is available on either.

6.15 For reasons already outlined, there is little likelihood of any significant change in the material benefits (or disbenefits) received by local people. The Sankuyu electric fence is the one exception. The main reason for this is simple : the project was neither designed or implemented with this as a significant objective.

6.16 The importance of this conclusion, if correct, is not simply that local communities are unlikely to benefit. More importantly, several communities will continue to experience significant disbenefits from the existence and management of the parks and reserves. Elephants and other problem animals originating in the parks/reserves have significantly reduced the agricultural income of some communities, such as Sankuyu and Mobabe. The Mobabe community has also suffered badly as a result of an earlier extension of CNP and remains understandably disaffected as a result. The project has not and will not do anything significant to reduce these very real costs borne by poor people. Indeed, there is a risk that the effect of strengthening the capacity of DWNP in the ways envisaged by the project might even worsen the situation for some communities. For example, the proposed new CNP entrance gate near Mobabe will, if unaccompanied by progress on resource rights for the community, only exacerbate the situation. The more effective exclusion of livestock grazing from within Makgadikgadi NP would have a similar effect.

6.17 The attitude of people towards DWNP and the parks could improve as a result of changes in material benefits (or disbenefits). Such changes are judged unlikely as a result of this project. Attitudes could also change if it was felt that, as a result of the project, DWNP and government more generally, seriously intended to take account of the needs and priorities of local communities. The SWPP is of the opinion that the attitude of communities towards DWNP has started to improve for this reason. While this may be the case, it seems unlikely that the limited community consultation carried out by this project has had more than a very limited effect on attitudes.

### Support to the Research Division Monitoring Unit

6.18 The quality of aerial surveys, and their reporting, has been greatly improved during the course of the project. The DWNP and the project's SWB(AS) have compiled a unique country-wide dataset of large animal populations going back over a number of years. The data could be further improved by implementing a photographic coverage for buffalo and hippopotamus which are poorly censused by the standard aerial techniques.

6.19 There is some doubt over the present sustainability of the aerial surveys. The method is extremely demanding on crews and organisers, and since the end of this component's intervention there has been a reduction in the number and extent of surveys, and delays in the analysis of data and production of reports. The situation has not been helped by the recent promotion of the counterpart of the SWB(AS) to other duties. Given the technical difficulties and the high level of precision demanded in conducting aerial surveys, consideration should be given to contracting all or part of this service to the private sector.

6.20 One of the most important outputs from the RDMU is information on the status and trends of animal populations in WMAs, from which recommendations are made for setting hunting quotas. The recommendations are used by the Licensing Unit to set the actual quotas. At present this information has only minimal impact on the conservation and management of wildlife in WMAs due to the widespread misuse of the licensing system. Control of this system could easily be tightened up, but any improvements are currently awaiting the outcome of an ongoing review.

### Support to the Computer Unit

6.21 The most significant impact of the IT component has been the establishment of a departmental IT policy and development strategy, laying a strong foundation for the further development of IT in DWNP. Another important impact is the recently commissioned Licensing Review Project which has the potential to make real contributions to the conservation of wildlife. The formal recognition by DPSM of the Computer Unit and its staff has also been a crucial step in establishing the department's IT presence.

6.22 The IT component has made some progress towards strengthening the DWNP institutional base. At the inception of the project there was little if any use of IT. However, during the course of the project, staff were provided with basic IT training and equipment, and made aware of the available benefits. There has been an increased use of IT which has brought about some improvement in productivity, although this is hard to quantify.

6.23 Information Technology is now in use across the department, and a forward-looking budget has been submitted for major IT expansion in NDP 8. The most important achievement of the Computer Expert has been the formation of the departmental Computer Steering Committee and its commitment to define and oversee an IT Policy and Development Strategy for DWNP. This gives the department a solid foundation on which to build an empowering and cost-

effective IT base.

6.24 Beyond this it is apparent that while the facilities have been in place, their use has largely been restricted to word processing and spreadsheets. Data are being captured and a valuable information resource built up, particularly in the case of the initially non-operational CHLS, but staff are not utilising this information to the department's advantage. Until staff play a more active role in employing the available resources, the IT component of the TA project will not make any significant impact on the project's ultimate objectives of conservation and management of wildlife resources (Annex 9).

## Conclusions

6.25 Thus the extent to which the project's outputs will either contribute to the main purpose (strengthening the institution) and goal (improved management and conservation of the northern parks and reserves) remains in doubt. The project's impact on objectives has been limited by the failure of its design to address directly the major conflicts and problems in the project area. This has been compounded by slow progress internally within the project particularly in preparing management plans, implementing the construction programme and in community support. External factors have also inhibited progress including the staffing problems at DWNP, weaknesses in financial and administrative management within the Department, and weaknesses in the supply of technical services. Furthermore due to the lack of a detailed problem analysis at the outset, it is doubtful whether the project's outputs, even in the areas where the project is making satisfactory progress, will contribute significantly to the project's intended goal and purpose. There is nevertheless scope for better progress in the future arising from the project's influence in raising awareness of the benefits arising from: (1) the use of a more consultative approach to planning and implementing management; (2) the utility of contracting management services to the private sector; and (3) the preparation of dedicated budgets for individual parks and other land units.

## General Development Objectives

### Poverty Alleviation

6.26 The project was neither designed nor implemented to impact upon poverty. It is expected to be broadly neutral with respect to poverty in the vicinity of the parks and reserves. The project may have a small positive impact on poverty as a result of at least one of the projects supported by the NGO component : the electric fence for Sankuyu. Such projects are, however, only expected to benefit a few hundred households in total. The revised management plans may also result in more people-friendly policies than would otherwise have been the case.

### Integration into the World Economy

6.27 No significant impact expected.

## Sustainable Economic and Social Development

6.28 The project is not expected to have a significant impact.

## Institutional and Administrative Reforms in Support of Democracy and the Rule of Law

6.29 By introducing a greater element of participation in the management of wildlife in the Northern Region, the project has contributed to this general development objective.

## Development of Human Resources

6.30 The project has made a significant contribution to the development of human resources in the DWNP both through the formal training funded under the project, and through the exposure of DWNP staff to the improved management and professional procedures demonstrated by the TA staff.

## Environmental Protection

6.31 The main impacts of the project on environmental protection in general are to be found in the increased level of awareness in the region concerning the acute conservation problems facing the wildlife resources of northern Botswana, and the nature of the required solutions. If continued the project may demonstrate the effectiveness of contracting essential wildlife services to the private sector (see below). This may potentially have a valuable knock-on effect in the region.

## Development of Private Initiatives

6.32 The project was not designed with this objective in mind, and has not been particularly active in this area. It has nevertheless encouraged the greater use of the private sector (including local communities) in some instances (eg. architects), if not in others (PCGs, computers, etc.). DWNP has, independently of this project, set up a working group to examine the potential for increasing the use of the private sector.

## 7 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

### Financial Analysis

#### Project costs

7.1 The available information on EDF expenditure was given in Section 4. Information on expenditure for each year of the project to date was not made available to the evaluators. It is not therefore possible to compare rates of expenditure with those projected in the project planning period. Disbursements are clearly running far behind schedule. In October 1996 the project had committed only ECU 2.7 million out of a total allocation of ECU 6.8 million, with only eight months to run.

#### Revenues

7.2 Reasonably reliable data on the revenues from the northern parks and reserves is only available for 1995, when P 5.6 million was collected. This was 34% higher than the figure reported for 1994. Data for 1996 has been collected but not yet reported.

7.3 Revenue data for the entire country are available. This indicates that 'game camp fees' (Item 72/201/1) have increased from P 3.44 million in 1991/92 to P 4.5 million in 1994/95. Figures for 1995/96 are likely to show a further increase in view of the 1995 figure reported above. Over 95% of this revenue is generated by the northern parks and reserves.

7.4 It seems likely that the project has led to an increase in the collection and reporting of revenue. Visitor numbers have also increased over the last few years, although reliable data are again lacking. The contribution of the project to this rise in visitor numbers is uncertain. According to the WTS Final Report, the project has increased the revenue from tour operators by increasing the number of HATAB sites, but has limited the number of campers in PCGs through the introduction of the booking system (WTS,1996,p.23). However, according to the draft NDP 8, the introduction of the booking system has contributed to a marked increase in the number of visitors and revenue collected. A comparison of the 1995 and 1996 visitor and revenue statistics, when the latter are available, should be informative.

7.5 Projected earnings from the protected areas following completion of the infrastructure development and tourism management plans are difficult to predict. The WTS Final Report suggests that these development will significantly increase revenues. Unless fee rates increase, this implies an increase in the number of visitors to the parks and reserves. It is difficult to see how this is consistent with adherence to stated 'carrying capacities' or with PCGs of the same size as now.

7.6 The most likely outcome is that the infrastructure developments and management planning supported by the project will have little effect on visitor numbers or revenues. Most of the infrastructural development relates to staff housing and offices, and will have little impact on

visitor numbers or satisfaction. Improved PCG facilities are only planned for CNP, and do not involve an increase in capacity. Day visitor numbers in the Kasane area are likely to increase regardless of the project and are, in the opinion of the evaluators, unlikely to be constrained by the 'carrying capacities' in the draft CNP management plan.

#### Cost-effectiveness

7.7 Cost-effectiveness is the relation between the costs and the impact of a project. In other words, could the impacts of the project have been achieved at lower cost?

7.8 The evaluation has concluded that the project has had, and is likely to have, limited impact in terms of either the institutional strength of DWNP or the incomes of adjacent communities. Two conclusions are possible. The first is that these impacts are inevitably difficult and expensive to achieve, and that a more cost-effective alternative did not exist. According to this interpretation the project was relatively ineffective, but still cost-effective.

7.9 The alternative conclusion is that greater impact could have been achieved with the same resources had the project been designed and implemented differently. The evaluators do not believe that there are any cheap and simple solutions, but tend to favour the second conclusion. This would imply that the project has not been cost-effective.

#### Economic issues

7.10 The design and implementation of the project raises a number of economic issues. These include the financial realism of the management plans; the economic justification for the proposed infrastructural investments; and the financial and economic objectives of parks and reserves.

7.11 The fact that the management plans have been drafted as 'ideal' plans has been mentioned elsewhere. The operational utility of plans which bear little or no relation to the capital and recurrent resources likely to be available in the short-medium term is highly questionable.

7.12 An economic justification for the type and specification of the proposed infrastructural investments is lacking. The proposed investments in PCGs in CNP are the most questionable of these. As currently costed, the project is proposing to invest P 1.6 million in a new camping ground at Ihaha for which campers will pay a maximum of P 20 per night. A similar (DDF-funded) investment of P 0.9 million is also proposed for Savute. By way of contrast, the temporary campsite at Savute cost only P 9,000 and earned over P 70,000 between June and December 1995. Visitors were reported to be satisfied with the basic facilities offered (standpipe and pit latrines).

7.13 The reasoning behind such a disproportionate investment for the least valuable type of visitor (self-drive campers) is not clear, and does not appear to have been based on a detailed survey of visitor preferences. It is also not clear why the prohibition on permanent structures does not apply to government infrastructure, nor why the project has not explored private sector

alternatives to government-run PCGs. The experience of this project suggests that achieving sustained improvements in the management of government-run PCGs is not straightforward.

7.14 One of the most important issues raised by the project concerns financial and economic objectives. Mention has already made of the 'high-quality/low volume tourism policy' which has guided implementation. Visitors, revenues, and local involvement are all permissible provided 'carrying capacities' or 'limits to acceptable change' are not exceeded. The problem is that these capacities and limits are merely a matter of opinion. A range of options can be considered which have potentially far-reaching social and economic implications.

7.15 In the opinion of the evaluators, the concept of planning on the basis of capacities and limits needs to be reassessed. The reality of park planning is that there are trade-offs to be made between competing values and interest groups. For example, limiting visitor numbers in the interest of conservation may limit park revenues and tourist income. Maximising non-consumptive benefits for visitors may reduce consumptive benefits for local people. Given the existence of these trade-offs, the purpose of planning is to explore these, to make them explicit, and to analyse the implications of different management options. The current draft management plans have not done this. If 'high quality/low volume tourism' (and the primacy of conservation objectives) is the policy, this needs to be clearly defined and explained, and its financial and economic implications need to be explored and made explicit. The allocation of costs and benefits between different groups also needs to be explored. Reliable data on this are lacking.

7.16 The experience of this project strongly suggests that park planning and management should not be carried out in the absence of an economic objective and perspective. A social objective and perspective is equally important. Both conclusions would argue for a significant economic and social input to any future project and park planning process.

## **8 SUSTAINABILITY/REPLICABILITY**

### **Financial Sustainability**

8.1 Data on the recurrent costs of each activity, component or park/reserve are not available. It is not therefore possible to analyse the financial sustainability of each project component as required by the evaluation TORs. The major sustainability risks are in any event more related to institutional, rather than financial, factors.

8.2 The financial sustainability of the housing and office infrastructure (when completed) will not present a significant problem for DWNP. The relatively small recurrent costs of the proposed new PCGs should also not be a problem in theory. Providing an adequate flow of funds in practice at the park/reserve level may be more problematic due to administrative and accounting constraints.

8.3 The management plans as drafted do imply a very substantial increase in recurrent funding. However, as these plans are unlikely to be implemented because of current restrictions on recurrent funding and staffing, the problem of maintaining recurrent expenditure after the project is unlikely to arise. Affordability is more of a problem than is sustainability. The challenge for DWNP is how to provide improved management and services given the overall constraints on the growth of government expenditure and personnel. This is encouraging DWNP to consider a greater role for the private sector.

### **Sustainability in Terms of Manpower and Skills**

8.4 On current plans, by October 1998, 78 trained staff will have returned to the department. Of these, 50 will have undertaken the diploma course at CAWM, 20 will have studied to first degree level and 8 will have completed post-graduate study. Although courses in management studies and financial management do not appear to be included in the training programme, nevertheless, this should provide the department with a pool of skills which has the potential to maintain the initiatives and developments implemented by the project. However, the extent to which this can be achieved will depend upon the effective deployment of these staff and the extent to which the organisation structure and management systems will permit them to use their skills.

8.5 Another factor which has to be considered is the level of staffing (Tables 15-17). The TA team leader has already pointed out that the level of staffing in the northern park and reserves is approximately 1 staff member per 125 square kms (Annual Report for 1995). This figure is reported to be below the norms for the Southern Africa region, but this staff to area ratio will show some improvement when staff are posted to the northern region on return from their training.

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### **Table 15**

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<b>DWNP Staffing: November 1996 Permanent and Pensionable Staff</b>			
<b>Compliment</b>	<b>Staff in Post</b>	<b>Of which on Training</b>	<b>Vacancies</b>
755	644	64	111

Source: DWNP

**Table 16**

<b>P and P - Staffing in Parks Division: November 1996</b>		
<b>Compliment</b>	<b>Staff in Post</b>	<b>Vacancies</b>
165	120	45

Source: DWNP

**Table 17**

<b>P and P - Staffing in Northern Parks: November 1996</b>		
<b>Park</b>	<b>Compliment</b>	<b>Staff in Post</b>
Chobe	49	25
Moremi	39	30
Makgadikgadi/Nyai	41	36

Source: DWNP/Project

## **Replicability**

8.6 Replicability may be defined as the extent to which an activity, output or impact can be reproduced in other places or circumstances. Financial constraints within NDP 8 might limit the extent with which the infrastructural improvements proposed for CNP (P 17 million from EDF and DDF) can be replicated in Moremi GR and Makgadikgadi NP, but the amounts involved are not unaffordable. The more pertinent question, however, is whether the infrastructure, management planning, and TA should be replicated elsewhere. This evaluation suggests that the project should not be replicated in its current form if the Overall Objective and Purpose are as stated.

## **Project Design**

8.7 The weaknesses identified in the project design by this review suggests that in its present form the design is not suitable for replication. A detailed problem analysis is lacking as are clear and precise objectives and the identification of beneficiaries. The design does not clearly distinguish between activities, outputs, purposes and goals. The known institutional weaknesses in DWNP and the service departments have not been taken into account. No provision has been made for the collection of baseline data other than in the computer component. The design was unclear, diffuse and ambitious. Up till the time of this review there existed a significant difference in the perception of the project objectives by officials in DG VIII and the project TA team. Most important of all, the analysis in this mid-term review suggests that a different set of actions are required if the outputs are to achieve the project purpose and the project goals.

#### Constraints Imposed by the Institutional Weaknesses

8.8 Institutional weaknesses in the DWNP and the service departments have had a negative impact on the project. To counter this it is likely that any subsequent design will require a different mix of TA skills to include infrastructure design and works supervision. The training element in any future project will also need to address management and financial weaknesses in DWNP as well as improving staff skills in wildlife management.

#### Appropriate Technology

##### *Physical Developments*

8.9 The designs for new infrastructure have been drawn up by a reputable company of architects in association with DABS. After the construction, the maintenance of buildings will be the responsibility of DABS who have a district office in Kasane. It is doubtful whether this small office has the capacity to provide an efficient maintenance service for the whole district.

8.10 The majority of artificial water points at Nogatsaa were constructed by WMA but two were constructed by the private sector. Their maintenance rests with the respective organisations. In practice the maintenance of the WMA water points will depend on the effectiveness of park management in ensuring prompt attention when faults develop.

8.11 A modern system of HF and VHF communications will shortly be established in the Northern parks and reserves. It is not clear yet what the arrangements will be for maintenance, but given the problems in the Service Departments it is advisable that arrangements are made to ensure maintenance is carried out by the manufacture or their appointed agents.

8.12 The Government Computer Bureau has a dedicated hardware maintenance contract with a distributed local company which will cover the Computer Unit's PCs and printers. Should any servicing problems arise, the head of the Computer Unit can obtain the assistance of the GCB.

##### *Administrative Procedures*

8.13 The project was not expected to create its own administrative and financial structures, however the TA staff have made a useful contribution in discussions with the department over management systems and financial procedures. The review team is of the opinion that the department will benefit substantially from management and financial training

8.14 The parks and reserves reservations system is currently being operated satisfactorily by DWNP, although site-related problems persist. Maintenance of public camp grounds is the responsibility of DWNP who will station game scouts on site once accommodation has been provided by the building programme. There have been many complaints about litter collection and the maintenance of ablution blocks at public camping grounds and there remains some doubt about the effectiveness of maintenance in the future. Consideration should be given to contracting this service to the private sector.

8.15 Despite continuing problems with the integrity of captured data, the system for collecting and processing visitor statistics is now more streamlined and can continue to be operated by DWNP.

8.16 The SWB(AS) counterpart has been trained in all aspects of aerial survey techniques and data processing, however she has recently been given new responsibilities and the department has been unable to maintain the frequency of aerial surveys attained by the project, and reporting has been slow.

8.17 The Computer Unit will not survive long in the absence of the computer expert supplied by the project. Day-to-day operations may continue in the short term, but the Unit as it is today will not be able to meet the growing IT requirements of the department. The computerised hunting licensing system in its present form is being operated effectively by the Computer Unit staff, however its value to the department is questionable without further improvements in the control and management of the licensing system.

#### Environmental Protection

8.18 The project has provided a rigorous technical system within the management plans for protecting the environment based on the concept of "Limits to Acceptable Change". However the project has been unable to overcome the financial and management constraints which limit the capacity of DWNP to implement this system. For example the proposed limits on vehicle traffic in the High Density Tourist Zone at Kasane will be difficult to sustain, given the poor state of road access to other scenic areas and the likelihood of strong commercial pressure for increased access to the riverside roads. The proposed limits on fire frequency are not sustainable given the current limitations on management. The proposed limits on tree density will not be sustainable without population reductions of elephant in the near future. This situation is compounded by the inadequate state of fire protection as wild fires prevent the regeneration of young trees in the woodlands.

## Institutional Management Capacity

8.19 The uneven availability of counterpart staff will mean that the DWNP has not been able to take full advantage of the skills of the TA team. Only the Senior Wildlife Biologist (Aerial Survey) has had full counterpart cover for the duration of her appointment. She has been able to transfer her skills to her counterpart, but the impact of this has been weakened by the posting of the counterpart outside the survey unit. The counterpart for the Wildlife Tourism Expert has been unavailable for a large part of the project and although there has been a transfer of skills between the WTE and staff in PARRO the absence of the counterpart has meant that the skill transfer has been limited. Similarly, the absence of counterpart staff has limited the effectiveness of skills transfer by the computer expert. The picture in relation to the SWPP is more positive and although there have been gaps, there have been suitable opportunities for skill transfer.

8.20 The Government of Botswana has every intention of making an appropriate commitment to current budgets to operate and maintain the infrastructure and equipment provided by the project. However, weaknesses in the Service Departments, particularly the lack of skilled staff may make it difficult to realise this commitment under the present system. Plans to privatise parts of the Service Departments and allow greater use of private contractors may ease the situation and increase the likelihood that infrastructure provided under the project will be adequately maintained.

8.21 It is too early to judge whether the project has operated in such a way that its activities have engendered a sense of ownership within the DWNP. The creation of PADUN, which cuts across existing administrative systems, has to some extent the potential to produce an enclave which may not survive the end of the project. The extent to which it will survive will be dictated by the success of the TA team in integrating PADUN with the operations of the department.

## 9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Conclusions

9.1 The main component of the project (support to the northern parks and reserves) has made slow progress. This is largely attributable to the overly ambitious and fragmented nature of the project design, the institutional constraints within DWNP and external service departments, and the lack of effective project monitoring, evaluation and management.

9.2 A piecemeal planning process extending over 7 years (1987-1993) without any adequate analysis of problems left a confused design: activities operated at both national and regional levels; main technical inputs (support to the northern parks and reserves, the computer unit, and the Research Division Monitoring Unit) lacked any coherent interrelationship; and the TA team was dispersed both geographically and in its reporting lines. Furthermore the project design appears not to have taken account of the weaknesses in both human resources and the administrative environment of DWNP. The consultants recognise that the Department is rightly taking every opportunity for manpower development. However there remains a need to provide management and financial training for staff destined to take on managerial responsibilities. The implications of sending large numbers of staff on training courses simultaneously, not least with regard to the availability of counterparts, also appears to have been overlooked.

9.3 In the absence of either a problem analysis or a critical appraisal of human resources in DWNP, the project commenced with an overly ambitious objective and without an effective strategy for achieving its purpose. It operated within a weak administrative environment and lacked an effective monitoring and evaluation system. In combination these factors blunted the thrust of the project and reduced its resultant impact.

9.4 Despite the problems of design, the project has made some notable achievements in the supply of technical systems. However, the impact and sustainability of the high quality technical systems are limited by their reliance on weak underlying management systems. For instance, the usefulness of the hunting quota recommendations arising from aerial surveys depends on the effectiveness of the licensing system; the utility of the visitor reservations system depends on the quality of campsite management; and the degree to which the infrastructure programme solves staffing problems in the northern parks and reserves depends on the strength of the district and park management and financial systems.

9.5 A major conclusion of the review is that the project will not, by itself, make a significant and sustainable contribution to the main purpose (strengthening DWNP) and goal (improved management and conservation of the northern parks, reserves and natural ecosystems). Improved infrastructure, appropriate management plans, technically trained staff, better wildlife monitoring, and computerisation of systems, all have a contribution to make but, in the opinion of the review team, the project does not address the main constraints to management effectiveness. Benefits for wildlife and natural resources, local communities or tourism are therefore likely to be limited without further and different support and change.

## Recommendations - Current Project

9.6 Table 18 identifies the objectives and expected results for the remainder of the project.

**Table 18**

### OUTLINE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR REMAINDER OF PROJECT PERIOD

OBJECTIVE	VERIFIABLE INDICATORS
<b>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</b>	
Protection, conservation and management of Northern Parks and Reserves improved.	(unchanged)
<b>PURPOSES</b>	
1. Capacity of DWNP to manage northern parks and reserves strengthened.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 17 staff with enhanced professional, technical and management qualifications in post.</li> <li>- Improved housing constructed for staff in CNP and MGR.</li> <li>- New offices constructed for staff in Maun and Kasane.</li> <li>- Annual work plans and NDP 8 projects guided by agreed summary management plans .</li> </ul>
2. Capacity of local communities to participate in management planning and resource management within and outside northern parks and reserves increased.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local communities informed, trained, and able to participate in management planning as major stakeholders.</li> <li>- Viable community-based wildlife projects approved for communities adjacent to northern parks and reserves.</li> </ul>
<b>RESULTS</b>	
1. Summary management plans for CNP, MGR, and MNP.	- summary management plans (incl. future planning process) drafted by SWPP and agreed by DWNP, tour operators, Land Board, Local Government, and local communities by end June 1997.
2. CNP construction programme appraised and in progress.	- economic appraisal of construction programme pre-tender; construction of CNP programme commenced by end June 1997.
3. Initial wildlife planning contribution to Phase II design process.	- participation of SWPP in Phase II planning process agreed and commenced by end June 1997.
4. Consultation and training programme for local communities in progress.	- community consultation and training programme drafted by CLS, agreed by DWNP, and in progress by end June 1997.

There are four main priorities to be addressed:

- i. the production of summary documents of the three Management Plans. These should a) present an outline of the zonation and management principles; b) list priorities for action within current resources; c) contain a prioritised list of unresolved issues; d) detail the recommended approach for resolving these issues;
- ii. ensuring an early start to the infrastructure construction programme;
- iii. contributing to the project design process (see below);
- iv. increasing the support provided to local communities in order to facilitate their participation in management planning and resource management within and outside Parks and Reserves;

The DWNP's comments on the recommendations in relation to the remainder of the project period are given in Annex 10. In considering these comments, the evaluators would wish to distinguish between the priorities for the project as a whole, those priorities that are to be addressed by the SWPP, and those which require actions by others. It should be noted that the logical framework deals with the project as a whole.

9.7 In addition, the reporting and monitoring systems should be strengthened. The quarterly and annual reports should include a one-page summary covering:-

- Significant Developments Since the Last Report;
- Issues;
- Action Required and Responsibility for Action.

The next report in the sequence should contain details of the action taken on the issues identified in the previous report. The report should also contain the revised project framework with a clear indication of the progress made towards meeting the outputs and completing the activities.

9.8 To strengthen monitoring by the Commission, the decision by the Delegation not to complete Annual Project/Programme Monitoring Reports should be re-examined by the Delegation and DGVIII in Brussels. If it is decided to institute reports, then the Delegation should complete the 1996 report in consultation with the TA team leader by 31 January 1997. The guidance to Delegations using the monitoring report states that "this yearly interval represents the minimum necessary frequency for the needs of Brussels departments. Nothing however precludes the sending to Brussels of an interim report in the interval between two reports - as a form of alarm signal - if new developments have taken place which seem, in the Delegation's eyes, likely to put the future of the project in jeopardy". To ensure that monitoring is further strengthened, it is recommended that the Delegation should produce reports on a

quarterly basis for the first three quarters of 1997. If progress is satisfactory, then with the agreement of DG VIII the reports could revert to an annual basis.

9.9 To facilitate the completion of the above tasks, the review team recommends that the SWPP relinquish all non-project duties during this period, that DWNP make available additional staff for community liaison, and that consideration be given by DWNP and the EC delegation to including other donors and NGOs on the Project Steering Committee, as envisaged in the original Financing Agreement.

### **Recommendations - Project Preparation**

9.10 The summary management plans would provide a good starting point for a 3-6 month design phase, the main outputs of which would be (a) a project design document and (b) a draft Financing Proposal. It is recommended that technical assistance be provided to facilitate a participatory design process involving DWNP, district government and institutions, and local communities. A draft terms of reference for the project preparation mission are provided at Annex 8.

9.11 The early appointment of an economist to work with the SWPP in the preparation of the summary management plans, and to contribute to the design process, is recommended. Additional short-term technical assistance (community development; policy and legislation; administrative and financial management; institutional strengthening; workshop facilitator) will be required to assist the design process. The SWPP will be an important resource person for this process. A logical framework should be produced as part of the project preparation.

9.12 Further investments in the infrastructure of the northern parks and reserves are clearly required. However, the experience of the project to date strongly suggests that the following priorities also need to be considered during the design phase if an effective and widely acceptable project is to result:

- a. The need to develop a regional strategy for wildlife conservation in northern Botswana which takes account of the following steps:
  - inventory of ecosystems, wildlife populations and natural resources;
  - analysis of ecological requirements for conservation;
  - preliminary assignment of Limits to Acceptable Change;
  - hierarchical analysis of external threats;
  - review of government and EC policies which have relevance to wildlife conservation and management in the region;
  - analysis of management weaknesses;
  - identification of opportunities;
  - formulation of the regional strategy.

The strategy should provide a framework which outlines broad options rather than a

detailed plan specifying individual actions. Its purpose is to guide the design of further interventions in parks and reserves and the production of summary management plans.

- b. Possible EU support for the ODA-funded institutional strengthening project in headquarters (especially divisions responsible for personnel and financial management), and/or at District/Park level. This could include financial and management training for professional staff and training in the use of logical frameworks for project management.
- c. The need to increase the extent to which local communities participate in, and benefit from, the management of northern Parks and reserves. This will require a major expansion in community development and liaison capacity, and improved collaboration with USAID's community programme.
- d. The need to encourage and facilitate local private sector involvement in the provision of park services and the maintenance of park infrastructure.
- e. The need to increase the technical services capacity of the Department in order to enable it to plan and supervise technical works.
- f. The need to prepare terms of reference for counterpart staff which will both define work responsibilities and ensure sustainability of project inputs.
- g. The need to address the gender issue, particularly in relation to staff serving in the parks and reserves.

9.13 A number of policy issues should also be clarified and resolved during the preparation phase :

- the financial and economic framework and objectives for Protected Areas including the creation of a separate vote and budget for the Parks and Reserves;
- the social framework and objectives for Protected Areas, particularly in relation to groups negatively affected by the existence or management of Parks and Reserves (see Annex 9);
- consultation with the EC on any sensitive management programmes that are being considered within National Parks during the period of EU financial assistance (see Annex 9);
- livestock policies, including animal disease control measures (the fences), land use, grazing rights, taxation, and participation of local communities;
- forestry policies in relation to future protected area management.

## 10 LESSONS LEARNED

10.1 The most important lesson to be drawn from the WCNB programme concerns the planning of projects in the wildlife and environmental sector. A high level of analysis and technical assistance is warranted at this stage because of a) the complexity of natural ecosystems, b) the strength of underlying conflicts over the use of land and water and other natural resources, and c) the implications of governmental and EC policies on wildlife utilisation, conservation and management. The review team recommends that similar projects begin by addressing the following tasks within a discrete design phase:

1. Development of a strategy in the protected area region for the conservation and management of wildlife which both defines the framework of the intervention and identifies the problems and opportunities (see Section 9);
2. Review and analysis of relevant government and EC policies and regulations;
3. Assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the host institution and other parties involved;
4. Analysis of problems to be addressed, possible objectives and strategies for intervention in the intended project;
5. Preparation of a project design document and a draft Financial Proposal.

10.2 This design process would be best undertaken by a multi-disciplinary team working closely with the host institution and the EC within a structured programme, with strong inputs from an economist and a wildlife planner, with additional technical assistance in community development, policy and legislation, institutional strengthening, workshop facilitation, and others as appropriate.

10.3 Other particular lessons may be drawn from the WCNB programme as follows:

- a) the need for a project framework with clear and agreed objectives and verifiable indicators of achievement;
- b) the need for a rigorous problem analysis as the basis for the project design;
- c) the need for the careful assessment of risks and assumptions outwith project control (such as the capacity of the Department as a whole, or the provision of technical services);
- d) the importance of effective internal and external monitoring throughout the project cycle;
- e) the need to strengthen management systems before supplying sophisticated technical services;
- f) the drawbacks of an activity- rather than objective-orientated approach;
- g) the importance of providing counterpart staff; of not overloading TA staff with non-project duties; and of not placing TA staff in line positions to strengthen departmental management;
- h) the importance of ensuring that the TA team can operate as a team;

- i) the importance of providing realistic terms of reference for the TA team which are not overly ambitious;
- j) the need for substantial community liaison inputs if community participation in management planning is to be realised;
- k) recognition that improvements in the performance of individual Parks or units will be difficult to sustain without concurrent improvements in the institution as a whole.

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