

Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (CPPB)



Evaluation for the European Commission

Dissemination Seminar

Brussels, 7 November 2011

Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (CPPB)

A consortium of
Particip-ADE-DRN-DIE-
ECDPM-ODI



Development
Researchers'
Network



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Agenda

- **Evaluation approach**
- **Conclusions**
- **Recommendations**

Agenda

- **Evaluation approach:**
 - **Presentation of the inventory**
 - **A challenging evaluation**
 - **Main lines of the proposed approach**

- **Conclusions**

- **Recommendations**

Evaluation subject, purpose and scope

Subject

Commission's support to CPPB as defined by the 2001 COM
(Only activities under first EU pillar)
→ **an evaluation at strategy level**
(not a project evaluation or an admin/management audit)

Purpose


- **Provide an overall independent assessment** of Commission's past and current support – for internal services and wider public
- **Identify key lessons for improving** current and future Commission strategies and programmes

Scope


- **2001-2010**
- **All third countries (ACP, ALA, ENP)**, except countries under DG ELARG
- **Community thematic and geographical BL, EDF, other financial instruments**, except humanitarian relief (DG ECHO)

Over the 2001-2010 period the Commission support to CPPB has increased significantly to reach levels close to 1bn/year

Funds contracted by the Commission to CPPB (2001-2010)




4 countries, major recipients of Commission's funds for CPPB interventions, received 54.5% of the funds



Source: CRIS and ADE analysis


ACP, ENP-MEDA and Asia received each ~30% of CPPB funds



Source: CRIS and ADE analysis


Note: **ACP**: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries ; **ASIA**: Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam ; **ENP - MEDA**: Jordan, Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel, Algeria, Egypt, Lybia, Morocco ; **ENP - TACIS**: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tadzhikistan, Ukraine ; **MULTI REGION**: covering several regions or unspecified location

51% of the funds were channelled through international organisations (mainly UN and WB)



Remaining (1) : Other (€0.07bn) ie. universities, research centres, media organisations, not identifiable etc.; Not specified in EC database
 CRIS (€0.04bn); Individual experts, (€0.002bn).
 Source: EC database CRIS and ADE analysis

Commission's CPPB funding: rapid intervention (23%) and interventions aiming at projecting stability (77%)



A subject with a specific complexity in itself

Behind the concept of CPPB are different sub-categories that constitute sectors / themes in their own right, receiving substantial funding

The 2001 Communication from the Commission participates to a “paradigm shift”: a close interaction between CPPB and development cooperation


Support to CPPB becomes virtually all encompassing

The context is key:

- Conflict (prone) and post conflict situations are often very different;
- Strategies need to be responsive to specific and often changing situations
- Difficult to reflect sensitive, rather implicit, political objectives


One size fits all does not work

Two key features of the approach




Focusing the evaluation on what is at the heart of the Commission's strategy to CPPB: having an **integrated approach towards CPPB**:

- To what extent was this implemented and with what results?
- What means were made available by the Commission to have such an integrated approach




Build to a large extent the evaluation around **country case studies** complemented with other sources of information

The key dimensions of the “integrated approach”



Coverage of the dimensions of the Integrated Approach by Evaluation Questions



The above was developed in the preparatory phase

Two preparatory studies

Preliminary study


- Inventory and typology of Commission funding in the field of CPPB;
- Regulatory framework;
- Reconstruction of the intervention logic.

- Focusing the evaluation on the examination of the Commission integrated approach towards CPPB
- Building the evaluation around country case studies

Concept study

- Clarification of the concept of the integrated approach (the “what” and the “how”);
- Set of 8 Evaluation Questions;
- Specific evaluation approach to structure the EQs;
- Methodology for the evaluation;
- Selection of countries for case studies.


The evaluation process consisted of distinct phases, each with specific activities and deliverables




RG: Steering Committee meeting in Brussels ; DS: Dissemination Seminar

⁽¹⁾ Bolivia, Central African Republic, Georgia, Ivory Coast, Kyrgyz Republic, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, and WB&GS


Information collection through a variety of sources and tools



Overall 75% of CPPB funding was covered by the main evaluation tools



Conclusions and Recommendations are based on a strong analytical and factual basis



Agenda

- Evaluation approach – *reminder*

- Conclusions

- Recommendations

11 Conclusions in 4 clusters



***Overall Commitments
towards CPPB***

C 1: Importance of CPPB within Commission

C 2: Integrated approach

Strategy issues

C 3: Commission's role in conflict contexts

C 4: Commission's reactive approach to CPPB

C 5: Alignment with national authorities

C 6: Use of Channelling

Results & Impacts

C 7: Commission Value Added

C 8: Overall impact of Commission support on CPPB

C 9: Commission role in CPPB hampered by its mandate and differing positions with EU MS

Means & Implementation


C 10: Gap between policy commitments and means

C 11: Timeliness challenged by conflict context

C1: Since 2001, the Commission has operated a substantial shift towards support to CPPB by developing its funding, policy framework and instruments (1/2)

Based on Inventory, Regulatory framework, EQ1,2,3,7

Commission's financial support to CPPB significantly increased over the period



Commission considerably strengthened its policy framework in CPPB

- 2001 COM: introduction of the objective of **mainstreaming conflict prevention** into all development programming
- After 9/11, **security** issues took on higher profile, impacting the agenda of CPPB: link between security and development, new approaches focused on SSR, SALW, DDR, etc.
- 2007: **fragility** agenda

C1: Since 2001, the Commission has operated a substantial shift towards support to CPPB by developing its funding, policy framework and instruments (2/2)

Specialised sectoral assistance

- Instruments targeting CPPB-related matters (food security, EIDHR, etc.)
- Design of one specific ST instrument with simplified procedures (RRM, then IfS)

Possibility to use flexible procedures in crisis situations

Long-term geographical assistance that could be used to address both ST and LT prevention although its **appropriateness** for conflict-affected countries **sometimes questioned**

Wide range of instruments

Non-financial instruments (with the **Council**): political dialogue, high-level mediation through EU Special Representatives, deployment of EU observers, deployment of civilian crisis management missions (E/CSDP missions), and use of preventive sanctions

C2: There was a gap between the Commission's policy commitments towards an integrated approach for CPPB support and the actual implementation of this approach

Based on Concept Study, EQ1,2,3,4,5,7

Commission has taken initiatives to ensure that 4 dimensions of integrated approach were taken into account, but with varying degrees of success and globally not to the extent to which it committed itself.

Conceptual orientations at policy level have generally not been appropriated at operational level and were not always univocal and shared at strategic level

What?

Approach to conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and mainstreaming was not systematised or structured (no documented conflict analyses, awareness of “do no harm” but not formalised)

When?

Often quick reaction to conflicts that had broken out, but challenges remained for transition to long term prevention (weaknesses of local capacities, premature transition to development)

Where?

Attention to geographical features of conflict, but synergies between different levels of intervention (local, national, regional) remained underexploited

Who?

Initiatives to enhance coordination at different levels (e.g working groups), but this resulted generally more in exchange of information than in enhancing complementarities

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Means & Implementation

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C3: The ambition of the Commission regarding its role in conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries and regions was not always clear and its support often remained wedded to a developmental perspective rather than operating a shift towards a genuine CPPB perspective with a clear and prioritised strategy

Based on EQ 2

***Spirit of 2001 COM:
CP should be at the
heart of the
strategy....***

***... But precise role of EC in conflict
countries was to a certain extent blurred***

- **Mainstreaming was not widespread and CPPB not at the heart of the strategy**

→ In most cases, support aimed at best at mitigating the consequences of conflict or at addressing more development-related needs in a specific conflict context

**Not yet in line with the
paradigm shift required to
address the challenges of a
conflict (-prone) or post-conflict
context**

C4: The Commission generally had a reactive rather than a pro-active approach to conflict

Based on EQ 1,2,3

Lack of proper and documented conflict analysis

Limited structured EC knowledge of conflict + extent to which EC support was properly informed by conflict context

Approach to structural stability

EC support aimed more at mitigating consequences of root causes rather than at directly tackling them

EC early warning system: not sufficiently comprehensive and operationally useful

Existence of several EC early warning mechanisms but either not known about or widely used to plan and implement responses

Reaction mostly after eruption of conflict, but often quick

- Combined various financial and non-financial instruments in rapid response to crisis situations;
- Designed specific ST instruments and procedures but flexibility and appropriate speed of these questioned in a number of cases

C5: The conflict (-prone) or post-conflict context challenged the relevance of the alignment of Commission support on the strategies and policies of national authorities

Based on EQ5

2005 Paris Declaration:
commitment to align with partner countries' strategies

Posed specific challenges, which were accentuated or typical in a conflict (-prone) or post-conflict context:

- **National development strategies did not always exist ;**
- **Capacities of national partners** were often weakened;
- **Not always clear with whom to align;**
- **National authorities sometimes a major party to conflict;**
- For political reasons, **in some cases national authorities considered that the conflict context was part of the past and that it was necessary to enter into a developmental phase**, whereas the Commission (and other actors) considered this was too early

EC decided in some countries not to enter into a logic of mere alignment (out of line with the needs of the country which rather required sustained support for CPPB)

C6: The Commission channelled half of its financial support through international organisations, allowing it to intervene in a coordinated manner in contexts where otherwise it would not have been present, but which also made it vulnerable to the drawbacks of the use of this aid modality

Based on Inventory, EQ5

Commission channelled 51% of its CPPB funding

- *Mainly WB and UN*
- *3 countries (Afghanistan, WB&GS and Iraq) accounted for 60% of the total amount channelled*

+

- **Intervene in countries where going alone would have been difficult and risky;**
- **Adopt a coordinated approach** with the international community to conflict affected areas;
- **Provide a critical mass of funding** to support reconstruction and rehabilitation;
- **Re-start its cooperation** with countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

-

Perception of a **donor driven approach** and **impaired efficiency** under specific circumstances (e.g weak government capacities)

11 Conclusions in 4 clusters

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Means & Implementation


C 10: Gap between policy commitments and means

C 11: Timeliness challenged by conflict context

C7: Through its support in conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries and regions the Commission provided different types of value added that differentiated it from most other actors

Based on EQ6

6 types of Commission's added value



C8: In some cases the Commission played a key role in mitigating the impact of root causes, notably through a largely integrated approach. The Commission's support also generally had a positive contribution to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. But the overall impact of its support in terms of CPPB remains impossible to predict.

Based on EQ 2,3,5

**ST
support**

Significant financial resources (23% of total CPPB contracted funds) + **political dialogue**

Generally, positive contribution to reconstruction and rehabilitation, peace consolidation, stabilisation

**LT
support**

Generally not geared to working "on" the conflict and to tackling the root causes as such

Cases of clear contributions in terms of mitigating the consequences of root causes, notably through a largely integrated approach

- WB&GS
- Ivory Coast (election process)
- Sierra Leone (contribution to GoSLe efforts to create bureaucracy and macro stability (parallel DFID/EC involvement); positive transition through LRRD;

Taking into account of each one of 4 dimensions with varying degrees

- WB&GS (IA)
- Ivory Coast & Sierra Leone: no explicit conflict sensitive approach and tackling of root causes

C9: The Commission was hampered in the role it played with respect to CPPB by its mandate and differences in priorities among the EU MS

Based on EQ 2,5,6,7

... but role it could play on the international political scene limited by:

Commission played an increasing role in the international scene in the field of CPPB.....

- **Absence of mandate** to intervene in CPPB (unlike the UN) and no clear-cut competence-sharing between Commission and Council
- **Differing positions among EUMS** in some cases, although generally they broadly took the same approach
- **No sufficient exploitation of the leverage offered by the critical mass of financial resources**, notably due to the lack of or difficulty of having a common European voice on foreign policy matters

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Means & Implementation

C 10: Gap between policy commitments and means

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C10: The Commission's institutional set-up, its human resources policy and its tools and guidance for CPPB were not commensurate with its policy commitment and the level of its funding for CPPB (1/3)

Based on EQ 5,7

Institutional
set-up

Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's approach to CPPB were challenged by the complexity of the EU's institutional set-up in the area of external affairs.

- **No clear-cut competence-sharing** between the Commission and the Council in the area of external affairs;
- **No clear division of roles** between the Commission and the Council and between the Commission and the EUSR;
- **Fragmentation of CPPB issues across the various Commission DGs.**

C10: The Commission's institutional set-up, its human resources policy and its tools and guidance for CPPB were not commensurate with its policy commitment and the level of its funding for CPPB (2/3)

Human Resources policy

Commission did not have a human resources policy that was designed to govern interventions in conflict (-prone) contexts

- **no dedicated human resources policy favouring the hiring of specialised and experienced CPPB staff to work on conflict issues or in conflict countries;**
- **no specific pool of CPPB experts** that the Commission could easily and rapidly mobilise;
- **training** in HQ in various CPPB-related fields (**not compulsory, generally not attended by staff from EUD and from geographical units in HQ**).

CPPB was insufficiently considered in the career development of officials (performance review, promotion and incentives)

Knowledge management in CPPB within the Commission has been poor

C10: The Commission's institutional set-up, its human resources policy and its tools and guidance for CPPB were not commensurate with its policy commitment and the level of its funding for CPPB (3/3)

Tools and Guidance

Commission had limited operational tools and guidance for interventions in post-conflict or conflict (-prone) contexts and these were used only rarely

- **EC developed a series of tools and guidance for CPPB**
 - Country Conflict assessments and Country Conflict indicators;
 - EC Checklist on root causes of conflict;
 - guidance from the inter-Service Quality Support Group (iQSG) to give CSPs a conflict focus;
 - set of guidelines on CPPB-related sectors.

- **Toolbox did not allow EC to bridge gap btw high-level policy commitments and their concrete implementation:**
 - lacked **operationality**;
 - lacked **clarity and comprehensiveness**;
 - **not widely used or known of** within the Commission.

C11: The timeliness of the delivery of Commission CPPB support has often been impaired by insufficient anticipation of difficulties specifically related to the conflict or conflict (-prone) context, as well as by heavy Commission procedures, although at times the latter were also appreciated for their “protective” function.

Based on EQ 8

Delays have often been recorded



Usual explanatory factors (e.g defects in design, lengthy preparatory phase, etc.)

+

Specific challenges posed by conflict situation often underestimated / not well anticipated (e.g difficulties of working in a conflict situation; sensitivity of some CPPB projects)

Timeliness also impeded by heavy Commission procedures, though appreciated at times for their “protective” character

- Multi-annual programming does not allow rapid adaptation
- Length of decision-making procedures for programmes (even through IfS)

But

Stringency of procedures appreciated in conflict context (accountability, control and transparency requirements)



In some cases, deliberate choice of implementing aid through centralised management to remain owner of implementation, control and audit of funds

Agenda

- Evaluation approach – *reminder*
- Conclusions
- Recommendations

8 Recommendations in 3 clusters

Commission's overall role and approach

R 1: Strengthen Commission position as key player in CPPB

R 2: Strengthen the integrated approach

Specific strategy issues

R 3: Clarify role to play in conflict countries by focusing on crisis management efforts and on tackling directly the root causes

R 4: Leverage Commission's financial weight with non-financial support

R 5: Relevance of alignment

Means & Implementation

R 6: Make appropriate means available

R 7: Maintain "protective" character of procedures but make them swifter

R 8: Better anticipate conflict-related challenges

Recommendation 1

(Commission's overall role and approach)

Overarching Recommendation

R1: Commission should strengthen its position as key player in CPPB

- *Why?*
 - EC accumulated **substantial experience** and ensured its **policy and instrumental framework** increasingly fitted
 - EC has **assets to offer** in the field of **CPPB**;
 - EC can make **successful contributions**
- *How?*
 - **Further develop** its **support** to CPPB

See further recommendations

Recommendation 2

(Commission's overall role and approach) (1/2)

R2: Strengthen the Integrated Approach

- Ensure **clarification and common understanding of concepts** among EEAS and Commission staff, including at operational level:
 - Consult and then **provide a set of clear univocal definitions of key concepts** in a single document
 - Ensure **dissemination** of these definitions to all actors concerned
- Develop and implement a **systematic and structured approach to conflict analysis, mainstreaming and “do no harm”**:
 - Develop a **brief and user-friendly *vademecum*** (e.g specific guidance on how to ensure conflict sensitivity, “do no harm” approaches and mainstreaming)
 - Make **use of guidance compulsory** in EEAS and EC support in conflict countries
- Create a **comprehensive, easy and flexible early-warning system** and make sure it is **used**:
 - **Rationalise current early-warning mechanisms**, in particular decide which early-warning mechanisms are critical and useful
 - **EEAS: potential platform** to create a comprehensive EWS

Recommendation 2

(Commission's overall role and approach) (2/2)

R2: Strengthen the Integrated Approach

- **Strengthen the synergies** between the different geographical levels of intervention
 - Analyse where the support could benefit from such synergies as part of conflict analysis, inform programming and monitor results at various levels
- Make sure that **coordination mechanisms** at all levels, but especially between the Commission, the EEAS, the EU Council and EU MS, **go beyond a mere exchange of information** and aim at enhancing complementarities at strategy and implementation levels **and** that they **allow** :
 - **Clear division of roles btw actors** (based on respective added value);
 - **Coherent political positions of partners, no duplication of support, maximisation of synergies**

Commission HQ, EUD and High Representative

Recommendations 3, 4 and 5 (Specific strategy issues)

R3: Clarify the role to be played in conflict countries by focusing on crisis management efforts and on tackling the root causes directly

- Sustain crisis management efforts; and
- Tackle directly the root causes of conflict through a clear and prioritised strategy geared to CPPB going beyond mere “classic” development

Commission HQ, in coord.
with High Representative

R4: Leverage Commission’s financial weight with non-financial support

EEAS and EUD representing the EU = potential positive developments

- Leverage existing capacities and entry points for EC/EEAS to be more proactive and take the lead
- Active engagement in coordination structures and strategies of the international community
- Join up national efforts with dialogue and participation in global/regional fora (AU, UN)
- Concerted dialogue and mediation strategies with national authorities & CSO

Commission HQ, in coord.
with High Representative

R5: Relevance of alignment

- Examine on a case by case basis **how far EC should align its activities with national priorities**
- **Reserve the right to distance itself from such priorities**
(dialogue with civil society and other country actors important)

Commission HQ and
EUD

Recommendations 6, 7, and 8 (Means and implementation)

R6: Make appropriate means available

- **Design and implement a specific human resources policy** for intervening in post-conflict contexts (recruitment policy in EUD; training and sharing of experiences -with conduct of political dialogue by senior staff-)
- **Provide mechanisms to ensure effective knowledge management** (institutional memory: archive of files and hand-over of responsibilities; lesson-learning btw EUD)
- **Provide a focused set of workable tools and guidance** (limited in number; clear and practical; drawing on existing best practice; used)
- **Develop and implement monitoring frameworks** (define specific indicators to monitor effects of programmes on conflict situation)

Commission HQ, EUD, High Representative

R7: Maintain protective character of procedures but make them swifter

- **Maintain protective character of procedures**
- **Smooth out procedures and methods of aid implementation** (use of annual programming, change of focal areas, reallocation of programmed funds; use of flexible procedures for programming ; speed up decision-making for IfS)

Commission HQ

R8: Better anticipate conflict-related challenges

- **Adopt a conflict-sensitive approach**
- **Adapt expectations** with respect to **timeliness** and **rapidity of disbursements**

*Commission
HQ, EUD*

Additional information and contact details

Available material:

- **Preliminary study** to the Evaluation of the European Commission's support to conflict prevention and peace building :
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2009/1266_docs_en.htm
- **Concept study** of the European Commission's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building :
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2010/1277_docs_en.htm
- **Thematic evaluation** of of the European Commission's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2011/1291_docs_en.htm

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