

# **Sustainability Scenarios for a Resource Efficient Europe**

**Appendix D to the Final Report for the  
European Commission (DG Environment)**

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## Revision and Authorisation History

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Explicit focus on material resource efficiency

Focus on water

Long-term visions (2050) and broad resource spectrum



<b>Burden shifting</b>	TMR includes the indirect material flows (incl. unused extraction) of imports; therefore issues of burden shifting between Germany and the rest of the world are covered for material use.
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## DETAILED REVIEW

<b>Type of study</b>		
<b>Scenarios</b>	Baseline scenario	Baseline assumptions regarding exogenous variables are described in other publications presenting the INFORGE model. Modelling results from alternative scenarios are subtracted from baseline results, hence only the difference in the baseline and alternative input assumptions matters.
	Alternative scenarios	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Scenario I ‘The world as it is’</li> <li>- Scenario II ‘Societal consensus’</li> <li>- Scenario III ‘Price competition’</li> <li>- Aachener scenario</li> <li>- Material input tax (MIT) scenario</li> <li>- Combination of Aachener and MIT scenarios</li> </ul>
<b>Modelling</b>	Physical models	Physical IO model covering the used and unused material categories.
	Economic models	INFORGE, PANTA RHEI (extension of INFORGE to environmental economic aspects)
<b>Geographical scope</b>	Germany	Domestic used and unused extraction, as well as direct and indirect material use and unused extraction associated with imports are covered.
<b>Temporal scope</b>	Horizon 2020	
<b>Economic scope</b>	59 sectors in Germany + world market	Macroeconomic variables are built bottom-up from the aggregation of the detailed modelling results at the sectoral level. The interdependences between the 59 sectors are modelled.
<b>Resources covered</b>	<b>Materials</b>	Total material requirement (TMR) is calculated, which includes metals, construction minerals, industrial minerals, fossil fuels and biomass. TMR consists of domestic extraction (used and unused) and direct and indirect flows (used and unused) associated with imports.
<b>Environmental impacts considered</b>	The study looks at resource input indicators (TMR) and does not calculate output-based environmental impact categories.	
<b>Influencing factors identified</b>	Economic development	Economic growth, tax revenues, state budget
	Production patterns	Investments in consulting, engineering and equipment to increase material and energy productivity
	Institutions	Possibility to establish a societal consensus on the redistribution of productivity gains
<b>Baseline scenario</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Economic development	- Low economic growth between 1.8% and 1.5% per year
	Production patterns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Decision to phase-out nuclear power.</li> <li>- Decision to reduce hard coal production.</li> </ul>
	Institutions	- No new “ecological tax”

<b>Alternative scenario ‘The world as it is’</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the baseline scenario</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Resource use (TMR) increases in absolute terms despite low economic growth.</li> <li>- State budget remains</li> <li>- Nuclear power phase-out happens as was decided.</li> <li>- Kyoto objectives are reached in 2010, a further reduction of 780 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> until 2020 is decided.</li> <li>- Domestic production of hard coal drops from 26 Mt to 16 Mt between 2006 and 2012.</li> <li>- Domestic brown coal extraction remains constant.</li> </ul>
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic and abiotic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TMR reaches 6850 Mt per year in 2020 (up from 5800 Mt per year in 2000)</li> <li>- Resource productivity excluding fossil fuels remains constant</li> <li>- Resource productivity including fossil fuels increases slightly (0.8% per year between 2000 and 2020) due to decreasing domestic hard coal extraction.</li> </ul>
	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Production patterns	Investments in consulting, engineering (1/3) and equipment (2/3) necessary to decrease material and energy in the manufacturing and public sectors.
<b>Alternative scenario ‘Societal consensus’</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Material and energy productivity of the manufacturing industries increases as well as their profits; aggregate wages increase too; goods prices decrease; GDP increases by 10%.</li> <li>- Employment decreases (material and energy producers cut jobs; other industries also because the balance between job creation due to higher consumption and job destruction due to higher productivity – both labour and material/energy – leading to higher wages is negative)</li> </ul>
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic and abiotic	Material and energy costs decrease by 20% linearly over 10 years in the sectors considered.
	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Production patterns	Investments in consulting, engineering (1/3) and equipment (2/3) necessary to decrease material and energy in the manufacturing and public sectors.
	Institutions	Societal consensus to separate material/energy productivity gains from labour productivity gains
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Material and energy productivity of the manufacturing industries increases as well as their profits; aggregate wages increase too; goods prices decrease; GDP increases by 10%.</li> <li>- Employment increases, relieving the social system and hence the state budget.</li> </ul>
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	

<b>Alternative scenario ‘Price competition’</b>	biotic and abiotic	Material and energy costs decrease by 20% linearly over 10 years in the sectors considered.
	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Economic development	Productivity gains minus pay increases are fully passed on to the consumers in form of price reductions.
	Production patterns	Investments in consulting, engineering (1/3) and equipment (2/3) necessary to decrease material and energy in the manufacturing and public sectors.
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Material and energy productivity of the manufacturing industries increases as well as their profits; aggregate wages increase too; goods prices decrease; GDP increases by 14%.</li> <li>- Employment decreases (material and energy producers cut jobs; other industries also because the balance between job creation due to higher consumption and job destruction due to higher productivity – both labour and material/energy – leading to higher wages is negative)</li> </ul>
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic and abiotic	Material and energy costs decrease by 20% linearly over 10 years in the sectors considered.
<b>Alternative scenario ‘Aachener scenario’</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Production patterns	Investments in consulting, engineering (1/3) and equipment (2/3) necessary to decrease material and energy in the manufacturing, construction and public sectors.
	Institutions	Societal consensus to separate material/energy productivity gains from labour productivity gains
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Costs in manufacturing, construction and public sectors drop.</li> <li>- Suppliers of the resources that are saved see their turnover drop.</li> <li>- Sectors with reduced costs increase their profits while decreasing prices, which has a positive impact on the state’s tax revenues and people’s income, which in turn drives consumption, which increases turnovers, production and employment.</li> <li>- GDP growth is about 1% higher than in the baseline.</li> </ul>
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic and abiotic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Material and energy costs decrease by 20% linearly over 10 years in the sectors considered.</li> <li>- Resource productivity increases three times faster than in the baseline.</li> <li>- Absolute resource use remains constants.</li> </ul>
<b>Alternative scenario ‘Material input tax (MIT) scenario’</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Material input (incl. ecological rucksack, excl. water and fossil fuels) tax introduced from 2011 (1 EUR / t), linearly increasing to 10 EUR / t) in 2020.</li> <li>- Revenues from the MIT are compensated by a reduction in income tax.</li> </ul>
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b>

<b>Alternative scenario 'Combination of Aachener and MIT scenarios'</b>	<b>Outcomes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The material input tax (MIT) applies to the new material input (extracted in Europe or imported) in tonnes at each production stage (products and resources from previous production stages are not taxed twice).</li> <li>- Economic growth is 0.1-0.2% lower than in the baseline.</li> </ul>
	<b>Materials</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	biotic and abiotic	Total TMR is reduced by 5.5% compared to the baseline, by 10% if looking at minerals only.
	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Production patterns	Investments in consulting, engineering (1/3) and equipment (2/3) necessary to decrease material and energy in the manufacturing, construction and public sectors.
	Institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Societal consensus to separate material/energy productivity gains from labour productivity gains.</li> <li>- Material input (incl. ecological rucksack, excl. water and fossil fuels) tax introduced from 2011 (1 EUR / t), linearly increasing to 10 EUR / t) in 2020.</li> <li>- Revenues from the MIT are compensated by a reduction in income tax.</li> </ul>
<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b> <p>Combination and consolidation of both previous scenarios:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Revenues from the MIT are lower due to overall lower resource use.</li> <li>- Employment increases, GDP also (+12% in 2020).</li> <li>- The price level decreases (-6%) which increases available income.</li> </ul>	
<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>	
<b>Materials</b>		
biotic and abiotic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Resource productivity largely improves compared to the baseline.</li> <li>- Total resource use decreases by 20% in 2020, i.e. an absolute decoupling from the positive economic growth.</li> </ul>	



<b>Burden shifting</b>	<p>but not material use (due to fossil fuel use in power generation for rail transport).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Scenario on information and consulting program shows ‘Rebound effect’.</li> <li>- TMR includes the indirect material flows (incl. unused extraction) of imports; therefore issues of burden shifting between Germany and the rest of the world are covered for material use.</li> </ul>
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## DETAILED REVIEW

<b>Type of study</b>	Forecasting study, no backcasting. The study looks at selected policy instruments for resource efficiency from three groups of instruments. It does not aim at completeness. It has the character of a sensitivity study, i.e. modelling the effects of possible elements of a complete resource policy proposal.	
<b>Scenarios</b>	Baseline scenario	No particular resource policy is implemented
	Alternative scenarios	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Scenario 1: selected economic instruments are implemented.</li> <li>- Scenario 2: an information and consulting program is conducted.</li> <li>- Scenario 3: regulatory standards are introduced.</li> <li>- Scenario 4: the selected instruments from the three types of instruments are implemented together.</li> </ul>
<b>Modelling</b>	Physical models	A “material module” is added to the economic environmental model PANTA RHEI. The database for the material module is a data set of the Wuppertal Institute that links the different categories of material consumption with the economy in deep sectoral disaggregation.
	Economic models	PANTA RHEI (developed by GWS mbH): sectorally deep disaggregated economic environmental model that depicts the relations between economic development, resource consumption and emissions. The “economic core model” of PANTA RHEI consists of the macroeconomic input-output model INFORGE (also developed by GWS mbH).
<b>Geographical scope</b>	Germany	Domestic used and unused extraction, as well as direct and indirect material use and unused extraction associated with imports are covered.
<b>Temporal scope</b>	Horizon 2030	Modelling results for every year for the period 1995–2030.
<b>Economic scope</b>	59 sectors in Germany + world market	Macroeconomic variables are built bottom-up from the aggregation of the detailed modelling results at the sectoral level.
<b>Resources covered</b>	<b>Materials</b>	Total material requirement (TMR) is calculated, which includes metals, construction minerals, industrial minerals, fossil fuels and biomass. TMR consists of domestic extraction (used and unused) and direct and indirect flows (used and unused) associated with imports.
	biotic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Domestic extraction: biomass from agriculture, forestry and fishery.</li> <li>- Imports: products of agriculture, forestry and fishery, other products (food, tobacco, wood, paper etc).</li> </ul>
	abiotic	<p># Metals:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- domestic extraction: iron ores</li> <li>- imports: ores, semi-finished and finished metal products (iron and non-iron metals)</li> </ul> <p># Non-metallic minerals:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- domestic: stones, sand, clay, chemicals and mineral fertilizers, salt</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- imports: processed stones, ceramic, glass, non-metallic mineral processing</li> <li># Fossil fuels: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- domestic: hard coal, lignite, peat, oil and natural gas</li> <li>- imports: coal and peat, oil and gas, coking products, mineral oil products</li> </ul> </li> <li># Other products</li> </ul>	
<b>Environmental impacts considered</b>	Climate change	CO2 emissions	
	Resource depletion, water	No impact category but environmental pressure from total primary material requirement (TMR)	
	<b>Influencing factors identified</b>	Economic development	Development of the world economy
	Production patterns	Resource efficiency in the manufacturing sector	
	Institutions	Instruments of environmental policy, in particular German policies for climate protection	
<b>Baseline scenario</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	<p>There are actually three variants of the baseline scenario:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Variant I: moderate climate policy + strong world economic growth</li> <li>- Variant II: moderate climate policy + moderate world economic growth</li> <li>- Variant III: engaged climate policy + moderate world economic growth</li> </ul> <p>Variant III, described below, was chosen as reference against which to compare the alternative scenario.</p>	
	Economic development	- Moderate long run growth for the world economy which induces an avg. growth rate for German exports of about 3.2%/a.	
	Institutions	- Existing policy instruments to foster renewable energies and energy productivity in firms and households are further developed so as to reach the following climate target: -80% CO2 emissions in 2050 compared to 1990 (corresponds to -54% in 2030).	
	<b>Description</b>	<p><b>Summary of what happens in the baseline scenario</b></p> <p>World economy between 2009 and 2030: oil price (+50%) and that of other raw materials increase (metals +50%, food + 30%). Demand for German exports increase by around 4.1% / year.</p> <p>For Germany, GDP increases in average at 1%/a (so no negative effect of the strong climate policies), and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions decrease by 54% compared to 1990 level and by 39% compared to 2008.</p>	
<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>		
	<b>Materials</b>		
	biotic and abiotic	TMR decreases by 11.5% between 2008 and 2030. It should be noted that Variants I and II of the baseline scenario see TMR increase: +18.5% and +2.8%, respectively.	
	Energy	Strong reduction of end energy use (-19.5% between 2008 and 2030)	
<b>Alternative scenario: Economic instruments</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>		
	Environmental policy instruments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economic instrument: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># Value added tax rate for rail road transportation is lowered from 19% to 7%.</li> <li># Value added tax rate for air transport services is raised from 7% to 19%.</li> <li># A tax of 2 Euro per ton of extracted or imported building material is introduced in 2012 and increases by 5%/a (reaching 4.8 EUR/t in 2030).</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	

<b>Alternative scenario: Information instruments</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Income tax is lowered so that total tax revenue is unchanged compared to the baseline scenario.</li> <li>- GDP and employment slightly decrease (-0.06% and 0.01%) and disposable income slightly oncrease (+0.07%) compared to the baseline.</li> </ul>
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic and abiotic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Changed value added for transport services reduces oil use but also increases electricity use and hence coal and gas use.</li> <li>- Tax on building materials reduces use of non-metallic minerals by 15.6% and total domestic extraction by 9.7%. TMR is reduced by 1.5%.</li> </ul>
Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Changed value added tax for transport services reduces energy use (-0.3%) but not material use.</li> </ul>	
<b>Alternative scenario: Regulation instruments</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Environmental policy instruments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- All manufacturing firms participate in an information and consulting program: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># Each year, 5% of all manufacturing firms introduce best practice technology for material use (as a result of information provided by consultants etc).</li> <li># One time additional costs (1/3 consulting costs, 2/3 investments in equipment) arise for the manufacturing firms adopting best practice technology, which equal to one year of savings through material efficient production.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Material-efficient manufacturing firms reduce their production costs.</li> <li>- Producers of raw materials lose sales and production.</li> <li>- Lower imports of resources.</li> <li>- Value added rises in material-efficient firms (they do not reduce their price to the extent they have reduced their production costs).</li> <li>- Income and consumption rise.</li> <li>- International competitiveness improves: rising exports, falling imports.</li> <li>- Real GDP rises by 14.2% compared to baseline and employment by 1.9%, public debt is 10.2% lower than in the baseline.</li> </ul>	
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic and abiotic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TMR falls by 9.2% compared to baseline (resource productivity rises faster than GDP)</li> </ul>
	Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Energy productivity rises by 13.8% (indirect effect of material productivity)</li> </ul>
	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Environmental policy instruments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regulation instruments: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># A certain share of non-ferrous metals contained in all final products (incl. imports) has to come from recycled metals.</li> <li># The share of secondary metals rises from today's level linearly until 2030 and is multiplied by 3 in 2030 compared to today's level.</li> <li># Variant 1: substitution comes at a cost (econometrically estimated elasticity of substitution of non-ferrous metals by secondary products is about -0.4).</li> <li># Variant 2: thanks to learning and rising prices for primary materials,</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<b>Alternative scenario: Three types of instruments combined</b>		substitution comes at no additional cost (elasticity -1).
	<b>Description</b>	<p><b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In both variants economic effects on GDP and employment are positive (domestic value added replaces expenditures for imported resources).</li> <li>- GDP is 0.04% higher than the baseline and employment 0.03%, public is 0.1% lower.</li> </ul>
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	<b>Materials</b>	
	Biotic and abiotic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TMR is 8.9% lower than in the baseline.</li> <li>- TMR metals is reduced by 23.5% for a good part due to the avoided indirect rucksack of non-ferrous metals contained in imported goods.</li> </ul>
	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Environmental policy instruments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economic instrument: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># Value added tax rate for rail road transportation is lowered from 19% to 7%.</li> <li># Value added tax rate for air transport services is raised from 7% to 19%.</li> <li># A tax of 2 Euro per ton of extracted or imported building material is introduced in 2012 and increases by 5%/a (reaching 4.8 EUR/t in 2030).</li> </ul> </li> <li>- All manufacturing firms participate in an information and consulting program: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># Each year, 5% of all manufacturing firms introduce best practice technology for material use (as a result of information provided by consultants etc).</li> <li># One time additional costs (1/3 consulting costs, 2/3 investments in equipment) arise for the manufacturing firms adopting best practice technology, which equal to one year of savings through material efficient production.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Regulation instruments: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># A certain share of non-ferrous metals contained in all final products (incl. imports) has to come from recycled metals.</li> <li># The share of secondary metals rises from today's level linearly until 2030 and is multiplied by 3 in 2030 compared to today's level.</li> <li># Variant 1: substitution comes at a cost (econometrically estimated elasticity of substitution of non-ferrous metals by secondary products is about -0.4).</li> <li># Variant 2: thanks to learning and rising prices for primary materials, substitution comes at no additional cost (elasticity -1).</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<b>Description</b>	<p><b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Compared to the baseline scenario: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># +14% for GDP in constant prices, +1.9% for employment, -11% for public debt.</li> <li># Resource productivity doubles between 2010 and 2030.</li> <li># The positive economic effect and half the TMR reduction is due to the effects of information instruments.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic and abiotic	TMR sinks by 20% compared to the baseline scenario
	energy	CO <sub>2</sub> emissions remain at the low level of the baseline scenario despite the strong rebound effect.



		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- measures to improve water productivity</li> <li>- measures to change individual water-using economic activities</li> </ul>
<b>Modelling</b>	Physical models	A global water supply and demand model covering 154 basin and countries National water supply and demand models for scenario analyses in the case study countries
	Economic models	A cost-curve of incremental water availability to assess the potential and costs of a set of measures A payback curve to evaluate the returns that any given measure would generate against the capital needed to fund it
<b>Geographical scope</b>	World	Detailed at the country level, including case studies with focus on regions particularly at risk, such as India, China, Sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil etc.
<b>Temporal scope</b>	Horizon 2030	
<b>Economic scope</b>	Demand projections	made for four broad sectors: agriculture, industry, municipal and domestic demand.
<b>Resources covered</b>	<b>Water</b>	Water resource availability for consumptive uses at the river basin level
<b>Environmental impacts considered</b>	Resource depletion, water	Gap between water demand and supply
<b>Influencing factors identified</b>	Economic development	Economic growth
	Production patterns	Agricultural production, industrial production, electricity production
	Consumption patterns	Municipal and domestic water consumption
	Demography	Population growth
	Natural systems	Hydrology of the areas investigated, Climate change
	Institutions	Policy interventions
<b>Baseline scenario</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	Business-as-usual assumptions for population and economic growth which drive, under existing policy regime, increased agricultural and industrial production, and a wealth effect that entails greater water use by rising middle classes in emerging economies, whether for urban uses or for peri-urban agriculture.
	<b>Description</b>	<p><b>Summary of what happens in the baseline scenario</b></p> <p>Projection of what a country's or basin's water resource requirements would be if they were unconstrained and, under existing policy regimes, continued into the future at existing levels of productivity and efficiency. Comparison of this projection to the supply of reliable, accessible water available today.</p> <p>Projected future water demand and currently available supply, thus defined, will not match: a gap, or deficit, will arise from future demand exceeding today's supply.</p> <p>Assuming current levels of water efficiency, unconstrained global water demand will grow at around 2% a year</p>
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>

<b>Alternative scenario: increase supply and improve water efficiency</b>	<b>Water</b>	Water demand in 2030 will be close to double what it was in 2005—and 40% greater than the existing sustainable, reliable water supply.
	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Production patterns	- Mix of measures to increase accessible, reliable, environmentally sustainable supply - Mix of measure to improve water productivity: agricultural productivity (irrigation and crop yields on both rain-fed and irrigated lands) and industrial efficiency measures
	Consumption patterns	Mix of measures to improve water productivity: domestic and municipal efficiency measures
	Institutions	No explicit policy decisions influence the economic activities within the respective countries
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b>  The optimal solutions identified will close 100% of the gap identified, at an annual capital cost (across all the case study countries: India, China, South Africa and Brazil – Sao Paulo) of some \$19 billion in 2030. <sup>19</sup> When scaled to total global water demand, this implies a capital requirement of approximately \$50 billion per annum for integrated supply and productivity solutions to close the projected water gap—just one-quarter of the roughly \$200 billion per year that would be required for solutions built solely on an expansion of water supply.
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Water</b>	The gap between demand and supply is closed with an optimal mix of technical solutions.
<b>Alternative scenario: reductions in the water-using activities</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Institutions	Different economic development choices are decided by decision-makers and stakeholders. For example: - A shift towards renewable energy could dramatically change the need for water withdrawals from the power sector. - A rural development policy based on increased access to fertilizers and subsidies may be contrasted with a shift towards high-value agricultural products with low-water intensity, or greater reliance on agricultural imports.
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b>  Based on case studies, the demand-side approach taken in this set of alternative scenarios makes the case for intense stakeholder and decision-maker dialogue, using scenario tools and mixing demand-side decisions with technical solutions on the supply side.
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Water</b>	With such demand-side measures the base-gap is not “closed” but (at least in part) “avoided”.



<b>Geographical scope</b>	used the LISFLOOD model - a GIS-based hydrological rainfall-runoff-routing model - for their calculations.
<b>Temporal scope</b>	EU-25
<b>Economic scope</b>	Horizon 2071-2100 for the Model by Dankers and Feyen (2008) The impact on fisheries is considered, as changes in sea and river temperatures and levels change the geographic distribution of some commercially-relevant species. The adverse effects of changes in river flow and water availability on sectors such as water supply, energy production, agriculture and tourism are also mentioned. However, no economic projections are presented.
<b>Resources covered</b>	<p><b>Water</b></p> <p>Marine biodiversity and ecosystems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sea level rise</li> <li>- Sea surface temperature</li> <li>- Marine phenology</li> <li>- Northward movement of marine species</li> </ul> <p>Water quantity, river floods and droughts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- River flow</li> <li>- River floods</li> <li>- River flow droughts</li> </ul> <p>Freshwater quality and biodiversity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Water temperature</li> <li>- Lake and river ice cover</li> <li>- Freshwater biodiversity and water quality</li> </ul>
<b>Environmental impacts considered</b>	Climate change / water depletion: The whole report tackles the topic in how far climate change affects different environmental aspects in Europe.
<b>Influencing factors identified</b>	Climate change



		social equity and environmental protection through careful reform in water sector and sound government action.
<b>Modelling</b>	Partial equilibrium model	IMPACT: International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade; representing competitive agricultural market for crops and live-stock; demand is function of prices, income, population growth  WSM: basin-scale model of water resource use Integration => IMPACT-WATER: (1) incorporating water in crop area and yield function; (2) determining water availability, water demand and crop production
<b>Geographical scope</b>	World	Divided into 69 spatial units
<b>Temporal scope</b>	Horizon 2025	Domestic and industrial water demand is function of population, income, and water prices  Agricultural water demand is function of irrigation and live-stock production growth, water prices, climate, water use efficiency
<b>Economic scope</b>	Agriculture	The scenarios identify developments in water availability and water use efficiency in the agricultural sector (food and live-stock production)
	Industry	The scenarios identify developments in water use efficiency in the industrial sector.
	Domestic	The scenarios identify developments in water availability and water use efficiency in the domestic sector.
<b>Resources covered</b>	<b>Water</b>	Water quantities regarding availability and use efficiency
	<b>Food</b>	Food production in relation to water quantity; harvested areas
<b>Environmental impacts considered</b>	Resource depletion, water	The different scenarios identify scarcity problems and mitigation measures.
<b>Influencing factors identified</b>	Population	Influencing parameter of domestic and industrial water demand
	Income	Influencing parameter of domestic and industrial water demand
	Water prices	Influencing parameter of agricultural, domestic and industrial water demand
	Irrigation and live-stock production growth	Influencing parameter of agricultural water demand
	Climate	Influencing parameter of agricultural water demand
	Water use efficiency	Influencing parameter of agricultural water demand
	Government spending in irrigation / water rights	The different scenarios draw different pictures concerning water rights and responsibilities for operation and management of irrigation systems to communities and water user associations.
	Water management practices	...as a crucial issue, being strongly influenced by governmental/institutional intervention (see water rights above); at the same time influencing water use efficiency, application of new technologies, and environmental protection.
	Urban sprawl	...as important factor regarding domestic water consumption.
<b>Business as usual scenario</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	Current trends in water and food policy, management and investment remain the same. Governments and water users implement institutional and

		management reforms in a limited and piecemeal fashion. These conditions leave the world ill prepared to meet major challenges to the water and food sectors.
<b>Water crisis scenario</b>	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Water</b>	All users place heavy demands on the water system; water withdrawals 1995-2025 increase by 22%, in developing countries +27%, in developed +11%; global water consumption +62%; intensification of water scarcity for irrigation worldwide.
	<b>Food</b>	Slower growth of food production and change in location of food production; slowdown in cereal yield growth in developing countries; crop-harvested area grows slowly; prices for food commodities decline.
	<b>Assumptions</b>	A moderate worsening of many of the current trends in water and food policy and in investment could build to a genuine water crisis. Government budget problems worsen. Governments further cut their spending on irrigation systems.
<b>Sustainable water scenario</b>	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of alternative scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Water</b>	The developing world pays the highest price in this scenario. Global water consumption increases by 13%; largest consumer: irrigation, due to low efficiency; lower per capita domestic water consumption => less access to water; due to failed technology improvements increasing water demand in industrial sector; remarkably lower environmental water flows.
	<b>Food</b>	10% less food production than under business as usual; decreasing yields at irrigated and rain-fed fields; food prices increase between 40% and 120%; growing food insecurity.
	<b>Assumptions</b>	Dramatic increase in amount of water allocated to environmental uses; connection of all urban households to piped water; achievement of higher per capita domestic water consumption while maintaining food production at the levels described in the business as usual scenario; achievement of greater social equity and environmental protection through careful reform in water sector and sound government action.
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of alternative scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Water</b>	Lower water consumption, but greater benefits than under business as usual – 20% less; more water for environmental uses; high water prices and high water efficiency reduce water demand in the irrigation sector; improved domestic water supply; reduced industrial demand due to economic incentives and increased efficiency; transfer of 22% of the global withdrawal under business as usual to environmental uses.
	<b>Food</b>	Increased food production; less harvested area due to less water demand for irrigation; less reliable supply with irrigation water => slightly less yield; declining food prices.



<b>Modelling</b>	<p>A suite of advanced global and regional models, with output from one model being used as inputs to other models, all of the models are calibrated to historical data up to a common base year (2000 for most data).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- International Futures: provided population trends and the development in GDP and GDP per capita as well as additional information on value added, household consumption, health and education.</li> <li>- IMAGE (Integrated Model to Assess the Global Environment): provided estimates of energy use, land use, greenhouse gas emissions, and changes in temperature and precipitation.</li> <li>- IMPACT (International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade): generated projections for crop area, livestock numbers, yield, production, demand for food, feed and other uses, prices, trade and childhood malnutrition.</li> <li>- WaterGAP (Water – Global Assessment and Prognosis): provided estimates of water use (for irrigation and in the domestic, manufacturing, and electricity production sectors), water availability, and water stress.</li> <li>- EwE (Ecopath with Ecosim): provided estimates of catch, profits, and quality of marine fisheries.</li> <li>- GLOBIO: provided estimates of changes in mean species abundance for terrestrial ecosystems.</li> <li>- LandSHIFT: provided detailed estimates of land use change for Africa.</li> <li>- CLUE-S (Conversion of Land Use and its Effects): provided detailed estimates of land use change for Western and Central Europe.</li> <li>- AIM (the Asia Pacific Integrated Model): provided additional estimates of environmental change used in the development of the narratives for Asia and the Pacific.</li> </ul>	
<b>Geographical scope</b>	Global	With a regional differentiation (seven regions), apparent in the narratives and modelling exercise.
<b>Temporal scope</b>	Horizon 2050	
<b>Economic scope</b>	Results are not systematically detailed sector-wise, global trade development is analysed.	
<b>Resources covered</b>	<b>Materials</b>	
	Biotic	Food (highlight on cereals)
	abiotic	Fossil fuels through energy
	<b>Water</b>	
	quality	Water use (water stress)
	quantity	Wastewater treatment
	<b>Land</b>	
	land use	Land for agriculture, biofuels and forests
	land cover	Land degradation (incl. erosion risk)
	<b>Other</b>	
	Biodiversity	Terrestrial and marine biodiversity
<b>Environmental impacts considered</b>	Climate change	GHG emissions, atmospheric CO <sub>2</sub> concentration, sea level rise.
	Acidification	SOx emissions
	Resource depletion, water	Biodiversity loss (decline in mean original species abundance (MSA))
<b>Influencing factors identified</b>	Economic development	Economic demand, markets and trade

	Demography	Demographics
	Institutions	Institutional and socio-political frameworks
	Other	- Scientific and technological innovation - Value systems
<b>Baseline scenario</b>	<b>No baseline scenario explicitly developed.</b>	
<b>Alternative scenario: Markets first</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Economic development	GDP grows fivefold until 2050. GDP/cap more than triples. Significant growth of global trade (highest of 4 scenarios).
	Demography	World population reaches 9.2 bn in 2050.
	Institutions	Low mainstreaming of social and environmental policies, e.g. little or no specific climate policy, reactive policies with respect to local air pollutants.
	Other	# Scientific and technological innovation: - focus on economic efficiency for energy technologies; - access and availability of new technologies: What you can pay for, primarily through trade. # Value systems: - relative rank of conflicting priorities in fisheries: profits; - key priorities with regard to protected areas: "Sustainable use", emphasizing tourism development and some genetic resource protection; - resource demands shift, independent of changing prices and income: follow traditional patterns.
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the Markets First scenario</b>  The private sector, with active government support, pursues maximum economic growth as the best path to improve the environment and human well-being. Lip service is paid to the ideals of the Brundtland Commission, Agenda 21 and other major policy decisions on sustainable development. There is a narrow focus on the sustainability of markets rather than on the broader human-environment system. Technological fixes to environmental challenges are emphasized at the expense of other policy interventions and some tried-and-tested solutions.
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of alternative scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic	The increasing demands for food, along with greater investments in technology, result in the largest increases in cereal yields and overall food availability.
	abiotic	Rapid growth of oil and natural gas use worldwide.
	<b>Water</b>	
	quality	The total worldwide volume of untreated wastewater from the domestic and manufacturing sectors doubles between 2000 and 2050.
	quantity	- Better material standard of living implies a rapid growth in water use in all socio-economic sectors, resulting in a large increase in withdrawals from surface and groundwaters. - From around 2.5 billion people in 2000 to nearly 4.3 billion people in

		2050 living in river basins with severe water stress.
	<b>Land</b>	The growth in demand for land is partially compensated by technological developments. Small increases in forest area in North America and Europe.
	<b>Other</b>	
	Energy	From 200 EJ in 2000 to over 1000 EJ in 2050 (highest growth) due to rapid income growth and more material-intensive lifestyles.
	Biodiversity	- Terrestrial: highest losses (over -12 measured in MSA changes) with accelerating rate of loss. - Marine: decline due to increased pressure on marine fisheries to meet food demand.
<b>Alternative scenario: Policy first</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Economic development	GDP grows fivefold until 2050. GDP/cap increases 3.5 (highest of 4 scenarios). Significant growth of global trade.
	Demography	World population reaches 8.6 bn in 2050.
	Institutions	High mainstreaming of social and environmental policies, e.g. aims at stabilization of CO <sub>2</sub> -equivalent concentration at 650 ppmv, proactive policies on local air pollutant.
	Other	# Scientific and technological innovation: - Focus on general efficiency and environmental impact for energy technologies; - access and availability of new technologies: Promotion of technology transfer and diffusion. # Value systems: - relative rank of conflicting priorities in fisheries: Balance between profits, total catch and jobs; - key priorities with regard to protected areas: Species conservation and ecosystem services; Maintenance, then sustainable use, including benefit sharing; - resource demands shift, independent of changing prices and income: Follow traditional patterns for most resources, but some relative reduction in water use.
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the Policy First scenario</b>  Government, with active private and civil sector support, initiates and implements strong policies to improve the environment and human well-being, while still emphasizing economic development. Policy First introduces some measures aimed at promoting sustainable development, but the tensions between environment and economic policies are biased towards social and economic considerations. Still, it brings the idealism of the Brundtland Commission to overhauling the environmental policy process at different levels, including efforts to implement the recommendations and agreements of the Rio Earth Summit, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), and the Millennium Summit. The emphasis is on more top-down approaches, due in part to desires to make rapid progress on key targets.
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of alternative scenario from a resource perspective</b>
<b>Materials</b>		

	biotic	The increasing demands for food, along with greater investments in technology, result in the largest increases in cereal yields and overall food availability.
	abiotic	Moderate climate policies reduce growth of oil demand, bring down coal use, and stimulate the use of bioenergy and zero-carbon options, such as wind, solar and nuclear power.
	<b>Water</b>	
	quality	The level of wastewater treatment increases from around 50 to about 80 per cent between 2000 and 2050, but because of growing population, the total volume of untreated wastewater still increases by about 25 per cent during this time.
	quantity	- A change in water-use behaviour in households and industries, together with rapid improvements in the efficiency of water use in all sectors, leads to a decrease in water withdrawals in many industrialized countries, and a slower growth elsewhere. - From around 2.5 billion people in 2000 to nearly 3.9 billion people in 2050 living in river basins with severe water stress.
	<b>Land</b>	Total agricultural area is highest, due food availability concerns and higher population levels. Strong targets for the mitigation of GHGs add demand on land for the production of biofuel crops. Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa see significant declines in forest land, most notably in Africa where nearly all forests are lost.
	<b>Other</b>	
	Energy	Increases from about 400 EJ in 2000 to 600–700 EJ in 2030 and around 800–900 EJ in 2050, mainly due to income growth.
	Biodiversity	- Terrestrial: losses at -7 in MSA changes in 2050 with rate of loss stabilized. - Marine: decline due to increased pressure on marine fisheries to meet food demand.
<b>Alternative scenario: Security first</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Economic development	GDP grows threefold until 2050. GDP/cap less than doubles (lowest of 4 scenarios). Somewhat significant growth of global trade (lowest of 4 scenarios).
	Demography	World populations grows up to 9.7 bn people in 2050 (highest of 4 scenarios) and keeps growing.
	Institutions	Lowest mainstreaming of social and environmental policies, e.g. little or no specific climate policy, reactive policies with respect to local air pollutants.
	Other	# Scientific and technological innovation: - Emphasis on security of supply for energy technologies; - access and availability of new technologies: closely guarded. # Value systems: - relative rank of conflicting priorities in fisheries: total catch; - key priorities with regard to protected areas: Tourism development, and some genetic resource protection; - resource demands shift, independent of changing prices and income: Follow traditional patterns.

<b>Alternative scenario: Sustainability first</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the Security First scenario</b>
		Government and private sector compete for control in efforts to improve, or at least maintain, human well-being for mainly the rich and powerful in society. Security First, which could also be described as Me First, has as its focus a minority: rich, national and regional. It emphasizes sustainable development only in the context of maximizing access to and use of the environment by the powerful. Contrary to the Brundtland doctrine of interconnected crises, responses under Security First reinforce the silos of management, and the UN role is viewed with suspicion, particularly by some rich and powerful segments of society.
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of alternative scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic	Lowest cereal yield increase reflecting slower developments in technology and poorer land management practices.
	abiotic	Growth of oil and natural gas is reduced due to remaining tensions in international energy markets. This is replaced by an increase in coal use.
	<b>Water</b>	
	quality	The volume of untreated wastewater increases by more than a factor of three between 2000 and 2050.
	quantity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A growing population and neglect of water conservation tends to push water withdrawals upwards. Yet, slower economic growth tends to slow the increase.</li> <li>- From around 2.5 billion people in 2000 to over 5.1 billion people in 2050 living in river basins with severe water stress.</li> </ul>
	<b>Land</b>	Agricultural land expansion is the smallest, since low economic growth keeps the increase of human demands for land within limits.
<b>Other</b>		
Energy	Increases from about 400 EJ in 2000 to 600–700 EJ in 2030 and around 800–900 EJ in 2050, mainly due to population growth.	
Biodiversity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Terrestrial: losses over -10 in MSA changes with accelerating rate of loss.</li> <li>- Marine: decrease but lower than Markets or Policy due to lower average incomes as well as slower advances in technology that would allow for greater catches.</li> </ul>	
<b>Assumptions</b>		
Economic development	GDP grows fourfold until 2050. GDP/cap more than triples. Significant growth of global trade.	
Demography	World population at under 8 bn in 2050 (lowest of 4 scenarios) and flat trend.	
Institutions	Highest mainstreaming of social and environmental policies, e.g. aims at stabilization of CO <sub>2</sub> -equivalent concentration at 550 ppmv, proactive policies on local air pollutants.	
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># Scientific and technological innovation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Focus on general efficiency, environmental impact for energy technologies;</li> <li>- access and availability of new technologies: Promotion of technology transfer and diffusion, and encouragement of open source technologies.</li> </ul> </li> <li># Value systems:</li> </ul>	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- relative rank of conflicting priorities in fisheries: Focus on ecosystem restoration, but also emphasis on jobs and landings;</li> <li>- key priorities with regard to protected areas: Sustainable use, including benefit sharing, then ecosystem services maintenance and species conservation;</li> <li>- resource demands shift, independent of changing prices and income: Slower uptake of meat consumption, energy use, water use and other resource use with rising income.</li> </ul>
<b>Description</b>	<p><b>Summary of what happens in the Sustainability First scenario</b></p> <p>Government, civil society and the private sector work collaboratively to improve the environment and human well-being, with a strong emphasis on equity. Equal weight is given to environmental and socio-economic policies, and accountability, transparency and legitimacy are stressed across all actors. As in Policy First, it brings the idealism of the Brundtland Commission to overhauling the environmental policy process at different levels, including strong efforts to implement the recommendations and agreements of the Rio Earth Summit, WSSD, and the Millennium Summit. Emphasis is placed on developing effective public-private sector partnerships not only in the context of projects but also that of governance, ensuring that stakeholders across the spectrum of the environment-development discourse provide strategic input to policy making and implementation. There is an acknowledgement that these processes take time, and that their impacts are likely to be more long-term than short-term.</p>
<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of alternative scenario from a resource perspective</b>
<b>Materials</b>	
biotic	Slightly lower growth in cereal yields and food availability, but this is counterbalanced by a lower overall population. See also land.
abiotic	As a result of stringent climate policy not only is coal use reduced, but so is oil use. Oil is partly replaced by a strong increase in bioenergy use. While natural gas use increases, its consumption in the power sector is, after 2020, mostly combined with carbon capture and storage.
<b>Water</b>	
quality	Treatment capacity manages to keep pace with the increasing amounts of wastewater, such that the total volume of untreated wastewater has changed very little since the turn of the century.
quantity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Widespread adoption of integrated water management strategies, with strong emphasis on demand management and conservation. These developments, together with slower population growth rates, lead to slower increases in overall water use.</li> <li>- From around 2.5 billion people in 2000 to over 3.6 billion people in 2050 living in river basins with severe water stress.</li> </ul>
<b>Land</b>	Demand for land grows because technological developments are counterbalanced by greater concern for food availability. Due to strong targets for the mitigation of GHGs, there is an added demand on land for the production of biofuel crops (effect in the changes in forest land). Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa see significant declines in forest land.
<b>Other</b>	

Energy	Increases from about 400 EJ in 2000 to 600EJ in 2050 (lowest growth), due to a less material-intensive orientation and considerably higher efficiency – partly induced by global climate policy – contributes to the lower energy use.
Biodiversity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Terrestrial: lowest losses (-6 measured in MSA changes) in 2050 with rate of loss stabilized.</li><li>- Marine: decrease but less than other scenarios due to the smaller increases in population and shifting diets, is an attempt to fish lower on the food chain, reflecting the goal of maintaining marine ecosystems.</li></ul>



	<p>* In the energy system: governments must create the right conditions for people and organisations to make the transition towards a radically changed energy system, incl. taking into account:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- further needs for fossil fuels and linked dependencies</li> <li>- dependence on specific materials such as lithium</li> <li>- new emerging dependencies (e.g. solar from North Africa)</li> <li>- electricity infrastructure dimensioned for renewable energy sources.</li> </ul>
<b>Resource efficiency</b>	<p>“Resource scarcity”: in the context of this survey, scarcity means not only an observed shortage of natural resources, but also a perceived dependency on natural resources and fear of their global depletion, i.e. when there are concerns about the future availability, accessibility, utility value and distribution of resources.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b> (see also table below)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The study focuses mainly on the interrelations between food, water and energy scarcities (e.g. energy and food, water and energy).</li> <li>- Case of phosphate: food supplies rely on phosphate fertilizers that come from few countries and have an impact on the environment when drained away; growing biofuel crop production drastically worsens the issue.</li> <li>- Energy (fossil fuels) is also an input to agricultural production and the energy intensity of food of biomass production has increased, hence food prices impacted by energy prices.</li> <li>- Policies with compulsory levels of bio-ethanol use for transport have pushed to substitute maize for energy for maize for food.</li> <li>- Cattle meat gets expensive because of feed costs so demand for cheaper proteins such as fish increase, thus leading to scarcity and rising prices of the second source.</li> <li>- Minerals will have to be extracted from lower quality ores in difficult locations, leading to higher energy use: an energy crisis can then lead to a resource crisis and vice versa.</li> <li>- Competing land use for nature (biodiversity), agriculture or drainage.</li> <li>- Competing use of water for nature, food production, drinking, sanitation, energy generation, industry.</li> <li>- A shift in favour of renewable energy sources requires a system change, which in turn could have negative impacts on other resources (e.g. lithium for electric cars).</li> </ul>
<b>Burden shifting</b> (see also table below)	<p># “Solutions to scarcity are not only technological. In fact, in most cases, technological improvements lead to an increase in consumption instead of greater efficiency”.</p> <p># See from the cross-cutting issues above:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- substitution of biofuels for conventional fuel</li> <li>- substitution of fish for cattle meat</li> </ul>

Further cross-cutting / burden shifting issues from Appendix 1 of the report:

Alex Evans; biodiversity adapted by Hannah Koutstaal

## Samenhang tussen en invloed van schaarstevraagstukken

Table

Cause... ..effect	Climate	Energy	Land use	Water	Food	Biodiversity
Climate		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fossil fuel emissions drive climate change</li> <li>Some air pollution dampens climate change by reducing radiative forcing</li> <li>Energy security concerns may lead to more coal</li> </ul>	Deforestation leads to methane emissions as trees decompose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water a highly energy intensive industry (energy = 40% of water cost in developing countries)</li> <li>Groundwater depletion leads to higher energy use for extracting / desalinating water</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from agriculture energy use (cultivation, processing, refrigeration, distribution)</li> <li>Methane emissions from livestock, rice cultivation</li> </ul>	Loss of biodiversity (forests) is loss of CO <sub>2</sub> intake of ecosystems.
Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Climate change demands retreat from fossil fuels, investment in new energy systems.</li> <li>Extreme weather can impact oil production (e.g. hurricanes in Gulf of Mexico)</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water highly energy intensive industry (energy = 40% of water cost in developing countries)</li> <li>Groundwater depletion leads to higher energy use for extracting / desalinating water</li> </ul>	Agriculture a major consumer of energy, both directly (cultivation, harvest, processing, refrigeration, distribution) and indirectly (fertilizer, other inputs)	
Land Use	Desertification will increase with climate change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Biofuel cultivation leads to increase in demand for cultivable land</li> <li>Deforestation for firewood</li> </ul>		Changes in water management (dams, irrigation etc.) can affect land downstream	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased demand for agriculture land competes with alternative land uses</li> <li>Deforestation for agriculture</li> </ul>	Biodiversity competes with land use for food, feed, fuel

## DETAILED REVIEW

<b>Type of study</b>	Literature study and expert judgement to 1) develop knowledge on the interrelated problems of global scarcity of natural resources and changing global geopolitical relations, and 2) explore with narratives the ways to speed up the required transitions for the future from a realistic-constructive perspective.	
<b>Scenarios</b>	Baseline scenario	Baseline assumptions and outcomes from UN, OECD, FAO etc studies
	Alternative scenarios	No specific scenario. Instead, options for policy actions, areas where knowledge should be improved etc are delineated (see policies / strategies above)
<b>Modelling</b>	Economic growth and energy estimations from the International Energy Agency's World Energy Model; population, resource demand and global economic growth projections made by OECD.	
<b>Geographical scope</b>	Global	All resource (scarcity) issues are considered at the global level.
	The Netherlands	Resource policies and strategies are derived for NL within the global context.
<b>Temporal scope</b>	Horizon 2050	
<b>Economic scope</b>	Agriculture	Some discussion of the impact of desertification and water scarcity on agriculture.
	Energy	The impacts of high energy prices on economic growth and consumer prices, particularly in developing countries, are considered.
	Global partnerships	Effects of resource scarcity on global competition and cooperation, i.e. whether regions become more protectionist or whether they cooperate more closely.
<b>Resources</b>	<b>Materials</b>	

<b>covered</b>	biotic	Food
	abiotic	Minerals (e.g. phosphates), metals, fossil fuels
	<b>Water</b>	
	quality	Clean water can be scarce whereas water is not (utility value)
	quantity	Water availability
	<b>Land</b>	
	land use	Agricultural area
	<b>Other</b>	
	Energy	Mainly via scarcity of fossil fuels
	Biodiversity	‘New scarcity’: limited resilience to absorb attacks on nature, flora and fauna without irreversible destructive consequences
Time	“The greatest scarcity we are facing is time.”	
<b>Environmental impacts considered</b>	Climate change	‘New scarcity’: restricted capacity of the atmosphere to absorb GHG
	Resource depletion, water	‘Long-term scarcity’: gradual depletion of finite non-renewable resources
<b>Influencing factors identified</b>	Economic development	- economic growth, increased prosperity, large foreign exchange reserves, devaluations - investments in production capacities, in refining capacities, foreign investment - globalisation, global trade
	Production patterns	- production costs, production efficiency (e.g. unused extraction in fish catches and agriculture) - rapid expansion of production of new products (e.g. biofuels), technological development - water consumption for food production - large unused extraction (e.g. for food production, fisheries)
	Consumption patterns	- lifestyle, meat / dairy products / processed food consumption per capita - growing demand for food in developing countries
	Demography	population growth, urbanisation and migration
	Natural systems	- finite resources, geographical distribution of resources - adverse weather (possibly linked to climate change) - loss of biodiversity, soil fertility
	Institutions	- market factors/dependencies (e.g. quasi-monopolies), market mechanisms (e.g. high prices) - importer policies, exporter policies - institutional, political limitations (e.g. agricultural policies, energy subsidies, trade restrictions)
	Other	- time factor (e.g. time lapse between policy intervention or investment in a new technology and corresponding effects)
	<b>Baseline scenario</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>

Economic development	Global economy increases fivefold by 2050 (strongest growth in Asia, Africa and South-America)
Production patterns	Today's water consumption for food production: 5-6 t/d in OECD countries, 1-2 t/d in developing countries
Consumption patterns	50% of food produced is actually consumed
Demography	- 9 billion people in 2050 (strongest growth in Asia, Africa and South-America) - ratio urban:rural population: 2:3 in 2020, 4:3 in 2030
<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the baseline scenario</b>  A larger and richer population will need more food and energy (and hence also more water) at a rate that outstrips population growth. Greenhouse gas emissions increase due to worldwide deforestation and industrialisation.
<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
<b>Materials</b>	
biotic	- food: demand almost doubles by 2050
abiotic	- phosphate: different opinions (no physical scarcity but possible shortage due to lower ore quality and concentration of producing countries; or peak phosphorus in 2030)
<b>Water</b>	
quantity	- demand doubles by 50% by 2050 - physical water scarcity expected to rise further (result of increase in demand and changes in rain fall due to climate change) - floods in the seven major river systems in Asia due to melting glaciers.
<b>Land</b>	
land use	- more land need to be cultivated (1.6 billion ha more than today's 1.4 billion)
land cover	- deforestation
<b>Other</b>	
Energy	- demand doubles by 2050
Biodiversity	- loss of biodiversity due to the expansion of agriculture land



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The design and construction of Europe-wide networks for electricity and carbon dioxide (CCS) is a long process, requiring extremely large investments. Therefore, decisions made for the short-term have to be in line with long-term targets and a timely start needs to be made.</li> </ul> <p># Linked to the demand-side:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Without a reversal in the trends of increased meat consumption or in transport intensity in EU production, the vision outlined cannot be achieved, regardless of achievements in eco-efficient production.</li> <li>- The EU can help to structure public debate on consumption issues and to keep them at the forefront. It can use its comparative strength in initiating product standards.</li> <li>- The EU can also promote a sufficiently broad and visionary concept of competitiveness in the framework of the renewal of the Lisbon Strategy and the Sustainable Development Strategy. For example, a target could be to make the EU the world's most transport-efficient economy.</li> </ul>
<b>Resource efficiency</b>	Emphasis on the fact that biomass and in particular bio-energy has to be put to use where it is most efficient.
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	The three visions are manifestations of the same challenge, namely that global use of natural resources remains within long-term constraints. There is a need to transcend partial analyses, for example, between policies on land and water resources, and on energy and climate resources.
<b>Burden shifting</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A key challenge is to gain recognition of the existence of one global food system, linking national and local food systems and ecosystems. A 'hot potato' to be addressed in this arena is meat consumption.</li> <li>- Burden shifting across time: as land conversion is often irreversible, unnecessary and large-scale conversion of ecosystems. Should be avoided. Large parts of the agricultural expansion in the coming decades may not be needed after 2050. Thus, biodiversity loss due to temporary conversion of natural areas to agricultural land should be as small as possible.</li> </ul>

## DETAILED REVIEW

<b>Type of study</b>	Backcasting study (normative) looking at ways for the EU to participate to and gain from the achievement of three broad global visions regarding food production and biodiversity, energy systems, and transport.	
<b>Scenarios</b>	Baseline scenario	The 'no new policies' baseline in the 2008 'OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030' is used. Its core assumption is that rates of improvement in labour productivity in economies around the world will gradually converge. Baseline results from other existing assessments are used to show the need for action.
	Alternative scenarios	No internally consistent alternative scenario is being developed; rather possible or necessary strategies to reach the visions are described.
<b>Modelling</b>	The use of models is not detailed in the study.	
<b>Geographical scope</b>	Global	For the visions
	EU-27	For the policies / actions to be undertaken in the global context
<b>Temporal scope</b>	Horizon 2050	Long-term visions on the world

	Today + 5 to 10 years	Timeframe for decision-making at EU level in the short-term, necessary towards the long-term visions
<b>Economic scope</b>		Broad categories are considered, such as agriculture, industry, transport, private consumption
<b>Resources covered</b>		Land resources, water, energy, biodiversity
<b>Environmental impacts considered</b>	Climate change	A main component of the visions
	Resource depletion, water, land	Constraints on natural resources is the common denominator throughout the study
<b>Influencing factors identified</b>	Economic development	Economic growth “beyond GDP”
	Production patterns	Technological development
	Consumption patterns	Diet, transport intensity, energy and material intensity of consumer goods etc.
	Demography	Ageing population
	Natural systems	Climate change
	Institutions	Role and measures that the EU is willing to take.
<b>Baseline scenario</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	<b>Based on existing studies, including the ‘no new policies’ baseline in the 2008 ‘OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030’</b>
	Economic and demographic development	- EU makes up about 16% of world GDP in 2050 against around 21% in 2010. - Global per capita income more than doubles. - 9 billion people in 2050 (+50% compared to today).
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the baseline scenario</b>  By 2050, the EU will be equalled, economically, by new players and outgrown in terms of population. But as a major importer of goods and services from economic blocks such as India and China, the EU is likely to exert considerable influence on production standards worldwide. Furthermore, the EU’s global weight in 2050 could arguably include its ‘neighbourhood’, giving it greater leverage in issues such as agriculture. In addition, as one of the world’s most affluent regions, the EU will be a very desirable place to live, with a diversity of landscapes and cultures.
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective (literature review from existing studies, not own scenario development)</b>  # Biomass, water, land, biodiversity: Increased demand for agricultural products including food, feed and bio-energy will increase water consumption and agricultural land use worldwide by 2050, leading to significant additional loss of global biodiversity.  # Climate, energy, fossil fuels: Global use of fossil energy is expected to continue to increase rapidly. Without emission control policies, greenhouse gas emissions will further increase. The EU faces challenges with security of energy supply including availability of energy sources, energy prices and import dependency

<b>Alternative scenario</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Long-term coherent strategy for the EU;</li> <li>- Choices made in the short-term in order for the EU to get into the right lane.</li> </ul> <p>=&gt; With implications for all the other influencing factors.</p>
	<b>Description</b>	<p><b>Summary of what happens in the alternative scenario</b></p> <p>The future EU is a pro-active and consistent player on the world stage. The EU acts on the basis of values that go 'beyond GDP' and with a reputation for regional integration and global interest.</p>
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<p><b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b></p> <p>The suggested strategies are expected to have put the EU on the right lane with regard to achieving the three visions.</p> <p># Biomass, water, land, biodiversity:          The EU produces the same quantity and quality of agricultural products as today, but in more diverse landscapes that host more biodiversity. Crop yields have increased sustainably, worldwide, and human diets contain less animal products, making them also healthier. Furthermore, the EU has reduced its footprint – regarding land, water and energy use – on other parts of the world.</p> <p># Energy, fossil fuels:          A low-carbon energy system implies a considerable reduction in fossil energy use and an increase in security of energy supply through diversification of energy sources. The end-use of energy is based predominantly on non-carbon energy carriers such as electricity or hydrogen from low-carbon sources or biofuels.</p>



<b>Resource efficiency</b>	Not measured as such but addressed from the angle of increasing resource scarcity and environmental stress due to resource use. The question is whether the growth in material flows could remain within the limits for climate change and biodiversity loss, i.e. whether the collective outcome of such a world is indeed a continuing smooth increase in quality of life for the average person, or whether it will meet its limits.
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Co-benefits and trade-offs between climate system, land use, agriculture, energy and biodiversity need to be considered, in particular: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Implications for land use require a careful approach to bio-energy;</li> <li>- Preserving natural forests helps to protect biodiversity and limits climate change;</li> <li>- Intensification of agriculture requires consideration of possible trade-offs: a significant increase of agricultural yields is required, in order to avoid deforestation and to prevent further biodiversity loss as well as climate change; nevertheless, higher yields may imply increased use of energy (mechanisation) and fertilisers (may lead to higher N<sub>2</sub>O emissions from agriculture, contributing to climate change; potentially higher consumption rate of phosphor fertilisers, a non-renewable resource);</li> <li>- A less meat-intensive diet helps to avoid climate change and to protect biodiversity;</li> <li>- Raising food production to eradicate hunger would only marginally increase land use.</li> </ul>
<b>Burden shifting</b>	Although interim solutions may appear to form a bridge to fundamental restructuring in 2050, they may sometimes prove to be a dead end. For example, energy security considerations for the 2020-2030 period, when taken in isolation, could easily lead to investment in coal-based technology that would be long-lived and incompatible with the vision for a low-carbon economy, by 2050.

## DETAILED REVIEW

<b>Type of study</b>	Exploratory study based on one forecasting business-as-usual scenario and one backcasting exercise.	
<b>Scenarios</b>	Baseline scenario	“Trend” scenario: a smooth and business-as-usual continuation of past trends
	Alternative scenarios	“Challenge” scenario: fundamentally deflects from the “Trend” pathway, actually more a collection of various options to achieve the targets than a single scenario (backcasting-like approach)
<b>Modelling</b>	Physical models	IMAGE modelling framework: describes the chain of global environmental change for both climate and land use and includes world energy use and food production, as well as the planet’s biochemical cycles, climate impacts and land cover.
	Economic models	Agricultural demand, trade and production data are either obtained from an agricultural economy model linked to IMAGE, or included from other studies.
<b>Geographical scope</b>	Global	
<b>Temporal scope</b>	Horizon 2050 to 2100	
<b>Economic scope</b>	Focus on the agricultural sector (both in terms of how it is adversely effected by climate change, and also the extent to which it can aid the achievement of targets since it is a key contributor to GHG emissions), investment projections to achieve climate and biodiversity targets, estimates of GDP and employment impacts of environmental policies.	
<b>Resources covered</b>	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic	Agricultural production

	abiotic	Fossil fuel use
	<b>Land, soils</b>	In relation to agricultural production
	<b>Biodiversity</b>	In relation to agricultural production
<b>Environmental impacts considered</b>	Linked to fossil fuel use	depletion, climate change, air pollution
	Linked to agricultural production	deforestation, biodiversity loss, soil degradation
<b>Influencing factors identified</b>	Economic development	Economic growth, income level
	Production patterns	Energy mix
	Consumption patterns	Consumer preferences
	Demography	Growing / ageing population
<b>Baseline scenario: Trend scenario</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Economic development	- Economic growth higher in low-income countries than in high-income countries (rapid economic growth in some major world regions, notably China), but without this resulting in income convergence; - Strengthening of corporate capitalism and market mechanism, rapid globalisation of goods and financial markets, a new technological wave in the form of ICT.
	Production patterns	Continuing increase in material goods and services, driven by the same entrepreneurial and market dynamics which the world has experienced over the last decades.
	Consumption patterns	Increase in material welfare for billions of people (in OECD countries and outside), plethora of high-tech products enter the global market place, satisfying demand from the rich and the poor, but meanwhile, a huge and partly unsatisfied demand for low-tech elementary goods and services remains.
	Demography	Increasing to 9 billion around 2050, and slowly declining to around 8 billion by 2100.
	Institutions	No explicit policies to address main environmental challenges
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the baseline scenario</b>  With business as usual, fossil-fuel use will increase globally, over the next decades, to meet energy demand for human development. More people need more food and increased food demand is likely to lead to an increase in land use. Both climate and biodiversity targets are not met.
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	Linked to fossil fuels	Annual growth rates are projected to be in the order of 1% (oil) and over 2% (coal and natural gas). For oil and natural gas, depletion and resulting price increases around the middle of the 21st century are expected to lead to stabilisation or even a peak in production, with production concentrated in only a few resource-rich regions. For coal, however, resource scarcity is not expected to limit production or cause cost increases, in the foreseeable future.

		<p>As a result, it is likely that coal use will strongly increase. At the same time, non-fossil energy production will increase substantially, also under the Trend scenario, including nuclear, biomass and other renewables.</p>
	Linked to agricultural production	<p>Growth numbers in food production of between 50 and 65%, compared to 2000, in the period up to 2030 and beyond. About 70% of the production growth would come from yield increase, but cropland would still expand from 1.5 billion hectares today to more than 1.6 billion hectares, by 2050. This would be mostly due to a net expansion of cropland in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. During the same period, there would also be some decrease in agricultural areas in temperate zones.</p> <p>An expansion of the global area used for bio-energy of up to 2 million km<sup>2</sup> is assumed for 2050, which would account for around 10 to 15% of the total crop area. The increase in agricultural areas is projected to lead to a further loss of biodiversity. Moreover, other factors, such as climate change and infrastructure expansion are expected to increasingly contribute to biodiversity loss.</p>
<b>Alternative scenario: Challenge scenario</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Economic development	Economic growth assumed the same as in “Trend”
	Demography	Population growth assumed the same as in “Trend”
	Institutions	The mix of various options that would allow to meet the targets is actually the outcome of the backcasting exercise (see below under ‘Outcomes’).
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Summary of what happens in the Challenge scenario</b>
		The long-term targets on global warming and biodiversity loss are met.
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of alternative scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	Linked to fossil fuels	A low-carbon economy could be achieved with currently identifiable technologies. The first steps would be to improve energy savings, increase use of renewable energy and carbon capture and storage, reduce deforestation, and reduce non-CO <sub>2</sub> emissions. An attractive route is based on a further electrification of energy use. In that sense, considerable investments in the power grid would be needed. In the transport sector, energy efficiency could reduce emissions, in the short term. In the long term, however, a dramatic shift towards electric (or hydrogen) vehicles is required.
	Linked to agricultural production	<p>Expansion of agricultural land can be limited and biodiversity loss stopped by combining the following strategies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Protect valuable ecosystems and their goods and services;</li> <li>- Increase agricultural yields;</li> <li>- Reduce post-harvest losses;</li> <li>- Promote dietary change, away from animal products;</li> <li>- Manage bio-energy demand;</li> <li>- Accelerated productivity gains;</li> <li>- Develop a clear international strategy for biodiversity protection.</li> </ul> <p>These strategies require ambitious action at different levels of scale and different policies in different areas. For example to answer: Where to increase the yield to the maximum? Where to combine higher production with more biodiversity? And which areas to protect?</p>



<b>Type of study</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Projections (baseline scenario): benchmark against Europe's policy objectives, identification of main influencing factors;</li> <li>- Policy testing (alternative scenarios): identification of appropriate response options.</li> </ul>	
<b>Scenarios</b>	Baseline scenario	Differs from a business-as-usual scenario in that baseline assumptions reflect current expectations, including where these differ considerably from past trends (e.g. new technologies, commodity price changes).
	Alternative scenarios	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 'Extended CAP reform', 'Best practice scenario for fertiliser handling', 'A stronger Euro': for biotic resources (detailed) and mineral fertilisers;</li> <li>- 'Low GHG emissions' scenario: for resources 'fossil fuels', 'water' and 'biodiversity';</li> <li>- 'Low economic growth variant': for resources 'materials' and 'water';</li> <li>- 'Non-convergence of per-capita water use in the New-10': for resource 'water'.</li> </ul>
<b>Modelling</b>	Physical models	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PRIMES and POLES: for resources 'fossil fuels';</li> <li>- CAPSIM: for biotic resources (detailed), mineral fertilizers, land use;</li> <li>- a macro-econometric waste and material flows model: for resources 'biomass (aggregated)' and 'industrial minerals, ores, construction minerals';</li> <li>- WaterGAP: for resource 'water (quantity)'.</li> </ul>
	Economic models	Assumptions for population growth, macroeconomic and sectoral activity, household expenditure, energy flows and number of and average size of households developed through extensive stakeholder consultation for the DG TREN baseline projections 'Energy and Transport Trends to 2030'.
<b>Geographical scope</b>	EEA-31	- water abstraction
	EU-15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- biotic resources and mineral fertilisers</li> <li>- industrial minerals, ores, construction minerals</li> <li>- fossil fuels</li> </ul>
	New-10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- aggregated industrial minerals, ores, construction minerals</li> <li>- fossil fuels</li> <li>- water abstraction</li> </ul>
	New-8	- biotic resources and mineral fertilisers
	BG, RO, TK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- aggregated industrial minerals, ores, construction minerals</li> <li>- water abstraction</li> </ul>
	Northern Europe, Southern Europe	- water abstraction
<b>Temporal scope</b>	Horizon 2020	- biotic resources and mineral fertilisers, industrial minerals, ores, construction minerals (baseline scenario),
	Horizon 2030	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- fossil fuels (baseline and 'Low GHG emissions' scenarios)</li> <li>- water abstraction (baseline and 'Low GHG emissions' scenarios)</li> </ul>
	Horizon 2100	number of plant species (baseline and 'Low GHG emissions' scenarios)
<b>Economic scope</b>	Sectoral disaggregation for the driver 'economic development'	
<b>Resources covered</b>	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- biomass (aggregated);</li> <li>- crops: cereals, oilseeds and pulses, other arable crops, permanent crops and paddy, fodder;</li> <li>- meat: beef, poultry, pork;</li> </ul>

		- dairy products.	
	abiotic	- fossil fuels - industrial minerals, ores, construction minerals - mineral fertilisers (N, K, P)	
	<b>Water</b>		
	quantity	- water availability, water abstraction	
	<b>Land</b>		
	land use	- arable land: set aside and fallow, cereals, oilseeds and pulses, other arable crops, permanent crops and paddy, fodder	
	<b>Other</b>		
	Biodiversity	number of plant species	
<b>Environmental impacts considered</b>	Climate change	- midpoint: aggregated GHG emissions using GWP weighting scheme; - average temperature increase, frequency of extreme weather events, length of the growing season and biomass production; - endpoint: effects on ecosystem composition (number of plant species).	
	Acidification	- midpoint: acid deposition above critical loads (area of exceedances) for forests, semi-natural ecosystems, catchment areas of freshwater bodies	
	Eutrophication	- midpoint: exceedances of nitrogen depositions	
	Human toxicity	- endpoint: loss of statistical life expectancy (due to emissions of PM <sub>2.5</sub> ), premature deaths (due to ground level ozone emissions)	
	Ecotoxicity	- midpoint: excess ozone	
	Resource depletion, water	water stress approximated by the water exploitation index	
	<b>Influencing factors identified</b>	Economic development	GDP, income distribution, fossil fuel prices, market liberalisation
	Production patterns	- Overall: technologies for production (e.g. energy, transport), resource use efficiency (e.g. water, energy, land); - Energy and transport: primary energy supply, power generation, energy use in transport sector, industrial energy use (e.g. steel, construction sector), transport infrastructure; - Agriculture: crop and livestock production systems, manure management and fertiliser use, pesticide use, irrigation; - Forestry: timber production/forestation; - Service sector: energy use, water use, tourism;	
Consumption patterns	Households' Energy use, households' water use, tourism, diet		
Demography	Population (number, age), households (number, average size), geographical distribution of population		
Other	Waste management, waste water management		
<b>Baseline scenario</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	<b>Baseline assumptions expand on DG TREN baseline projections 'European energy and transport trends to 2030'</b>	
	Economic	- Sustained moderate economic growth: 2.4% /a for 2000-2030 in EU-25 (2,%	

development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>for EU-15, 3,5% for EU-10);</li> <li>- Further predominance of the service sector (70% of GVA in 2004, to continue growing at 2.7%/a);</li> <li>- At the global level, trade agreements underpin economic growth, productivity gains (physical and labour capital) and competitiveness.</li> </ul>
Production patterns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Moderate technological progress but essential in key areas (energy, agriculture, water), no technological breakthroughs;</li> <li>- No major alternative to liquid fossil fuel-based vehicles reaches a significant market penetration;</li> <li>- Learning rates assumed for power generation technologies, decreased capital costs for renewable energy sources;</li> <li>- Agriculture: significant increases in crop yields with large differences between EU-15 and EU-10 (+21% cereals, +17% oilseeds and pulses) and milk yields (+25% over 2001-2020), stable yields for meat and eggs production;</li> <li>- Any new power plant uses tower cooling (40 times less water abstraction than once-through cooling);</li> </ul>
Consumption patterns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Social and cultural values and preferences adjust to reflect the ageing population, and the further development of the service-oriented society (especially relevant for education and social mobility);</li> <li>- Assumptions on food, housing (incl. settlement patterns), personal travel and tourism (see EEA report 'Household consumption and the environment'), e.g.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># +53% km/cap 2000-2030</li> <li># shift from beef, potatoes and cereals to poultry, pork, vegetables and fish to continue</li> <li># consumption of pre-prepared and organic food is growing rapidly.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Demography	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Stabilising (migration first contributor to population growth): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># 2004-2030: +&lt;1% in EU-25, +1.5% in EU-15, -7% in EU-10, +3% in EEA-31)</li> <li># 2030-2050: -27 million inhabitants in EU-25</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Ageing: share of 65+ people in 2030: 25% in EU-15, 22% in EU-10 (up from 15% and 10%, resp.)</li> <li>- Size of households: &lt;2.5 people/HH in 2030. Leads to a marked increase in the number of households;</li> </ul>
Institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No shifts in sectoral or environmental policies targeted at European production and consumption patterns;</li> <li>- Decrease over time of subsidies for renewable energy sources;</li> <li>- Introduction of decoupling of payments associated with mid-term review of the CAP and overall reduction in the level of support of cereal production.</li> </ul>
<b>Description</b>	<p><b>Summary of what happens in the baseline scenario</b></p> <p>Follows the trend set by the DG TREN study.</p>
<b>Outcomes</b>	<p><b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b></p>
<b>Materials</b>	
biotic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Biofuels: 4.5% of transport final energy demand in 2030;</li> <li>- Biomass still a large contributor to material flows: 1.6 billion tonnes per year by 2020;</li> <li>- Crops 2002-2020 in EU-25: +20% for cereals, +31% for oilseeds and pluses, -4% in permanent crops and paddy.</li> </ul>

	abiotic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Gas makes 24% of final energy demand of EU-25 in 2030 against 20% in 2000;</li> <li>- Net imports of gas and solid energy carriers expected to more than double.</li> <li>- Mineral fertilizers in EU-8 2000-2020: +35% (N), +52% (P) and +41% (K).</li> <li>- Resource productivity (actually material productivity) to increase on average by 2%/a in EU-10: +50% in 2020 (+25% for EU-15);</li> <li>- Construction minerals still the largest contributor to material: 3.8 billion tonnes per year by 2020.</li> </ul>
	<b>Land</b>	
	land use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Relative stability of the area of arable and harvested land.</li> <li>- Slightly decreasing area for cereal production</li> </ul>
	<b>Other</b>	
	Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Total energy consumption to grow on average 0.6%/a until 2030;</li> <li>- Final energy demand: relative decoupling from GDP growth for all sectors but still absolute growth (especially for transport: +35% energy demand 2000-2030);</li> <li>- Household final energy consumption: +20% in EU-15, +40% in EU-10.</li> <li>- Energy intensity improves by 1.8%/a.</li> </ul>
<b>Alternative scenario 'Low economic growth'</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Economic development	+1.6%/a (EU-15) and +3.2%/a (EU-10) over 2000-2030
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of alternative scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	abiotic	Low economic growth: decrease on average of 15% of the material flows (and waste flows)
<b>Alternative scenario 'A stronger euro'</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Economic development	A stronger euro of 0.75 EUR/USD (instead of 0.9 EUR/USD in the baseline)
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic	Rather small effect in the short and medium terms on cropping patterns, herd sizes and environmental pressures because prices are stabilized between global and EU markets by import tariffs, level of administrative prices and quota regimes (milk).
<b>Alternative scenario 'Extended CAP reform'</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
	Economic development	Continued liberalisation in the context of WTO negotiations for animal product markets
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials, land</b>	
	biotic, abiotic, land	Prices for animal products adjust with the global market and herds adjust accordingly (-5% pigs, -11% poultry). The reduced herds lower demand for fodder and allow a reduction of fodder area (2%), which in turn leads to an expansion of other crops (1% cereals). N, K, P surpluses decrease by 4-5%.
<b>Alternative</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	

<b>scenario ‘Best practice for fertiliser handling’</b>	Production patterns	Ammonia losses cut by half; in crease availability of N, P, K from organic fertilisers by 80%; over-fertilisation rate decreased (5%)
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	biotic, abiotic	The use of organic fertilisers increases sharply (60-80%) substituting for mineral fertilisers (reduction of 30-60%)
<b>Alternative scenario ‘Low GHG emissions’</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	Compared to 1990 levels: -20% in 2020, -40% in 2030 and -65% in 2050
	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Main results of baseline scenario from a resource perspective</b>
	<b>Materials</b>	
	abiotic	-13% fossil fuel use in 2030 in EU-15, -30% in EU-10 compared with 2000, i.e. 23% and 28% less than baseline. -35% in domestic extraction compared to baseline, -20% of net trade