I. Cross-border spillovers in the euro area

The recent crisis has underlined that the cross-border transmission of shocks can be rapid and powerful in the euro area, where trade and financial interlinkages are strong and where confidence effects have been shown to be an important transmission mechanism.

This article analyses the issue of cross-border spillovers in the context of the euro area. Close linkages imply that macroeconomic policies can have significant spillover effects. Cross-border spillovers from fiscal policy measures, for example, can be sizeable, with our model simulations showing that an increase in public investment in countries with fiscal space would generate significant positive spillovers to the rest of the euro area.

Spillovers from structural reforms are generally found to be positive but small. However, our simulations also show that the simultaneous implementation of structural reforms throughout the euro area would have a bigger effect on output than they would if implemented by countries in isolation, highlighting the benefits of coordinated policy action.

A review of the literature on spillovers from financial shocks shows evidence of contagion effects in general; spillovers between banks and between banks and sovereigns; and spillovers emanating from 'core' as well as 'peripheral' countries.

An analysis of sovereign co-risk measures in the euro area shows that spillovers across Member States are heterogeneous and asymmetric. Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, for example, appear to be a source of spillovers among themselves but are also vulnerable to spillovers from a number of 'core' countries. Some 'core' countries, by contrast, appear to be a source of sizeable spillovers to other Member States without being considerably affected in return. (1)

I.1. Introduction

The crisis highlighted that cross-border spillovers in the euro area can be large and pervasive. In particular, cross-border bank holdings and sovereign markets were powerful vectors of contagion during the crisis. A good understanding of cross-border spillovers within the euro area is therefore essential for policy coordination and design. This focus section discusses how various types of shocks propagate through the main spillover channels, with a particular focus on the euro area.

Section 2 presents a conceptual framework for the analysis of spillovers and discusses the main stylised facts regarding trade and financial interlinkages in the euro area. Section 3 reviews the evidence on the cross-border transmission of fiscal policy shocks. Section 4 focuses on international spillovers from the adoption of structural reforms, while sections 5 and 6 analyse respectively the transmission of financial and confidence shocks. Section 7 looks at interactions between different shocks, while Section 8 concludes.

I.2. A framework for the analysis of spillovers

I.2.1. What are spillovers?

In what follows, cross-border spillovers are broadly defined as the result of a shock in one economy which is transmitted through any number of a variety of channels to another economy. This definition implies that the qualitative and quantitative nature of spillover effects depends on several dimensions:

- the transmission channels;
- the type of shock;
- the amplification or stabilisation mechanisms operating in the originating and receiving economies.

These elements are reviewed in the remainder of the section.

(1) Section prepared by Francesca D’Auria, Staffan Linden, Daniel Monteiro, Jan in ’t Veld and Stefan Zeugner.
I.2.2. Transmission channels

Trade channel

Trade linkages are a key transmission channel of several shocks. In simplified terms, trade spillovers can be seen as a result of two distinct effects:

- **A demand effect.** Any shock yielding changes in income is likely to translate into changes in demand for imported goods and services, generating spillover effects whose magnitude tends to increase with the intensity of the trade linkages. The size of the demand effect depends on factors including the monetary reaction to the demand shock, import propensity, and on the composition and value added embodied in trade partners’ exports.

- **A competitiveness effect.** Shocks that affect the competitiveness of a country are likely to lead to changes in their terms of trade with an impact on import and export flows. These shocks can be the consequence of structural reforms or the endogenous response of firms and the economy as a whole to changes in the economic context.

These effects can have different time profiles and can be mutually reinforcing or go in opposite directions.

Trade flows in the euro area intensified in the pre-crisis years, reflecting both global trends and increased economic integration. The sum of total exports and imports of the euro area countries increased from 75% of their aggregate GDP in 2000 to 84% in 2008. After a dip in 2009, export and import trade flows were back to 85% of GDP by 2013. The weight of intra-euro area trade in the GDP of euro area countries also increased during most of the 2000s, with total exports and imports of goods within the euro area growing from 31% to 36% of GDP between 2000 and 2008.\(^{(2)}\)

However, the importance of intra-euro area trade has decreased somewhat since the crisis, falling to 32% of GDP in 2013.

The observed increase in the degree of economic openness is partly the result of an increase in the integration of international value chains. In fact, from 2000 to 2011, the import content of the exports of euro area countries is reckoned to have risen by some 4 pps. Therefore, the observed increase in gross trade flows during the 2000s corresponds in part to an increase in the complexity of trade interlinkages. Overall trade linkages and the potential for related spillovers appear to have been strengthened during most of the 2000s in the euro area, although this trend is less clear for intra-euro area trade linkages, especially when accounted in value-added terms by deducting the import content of exports.

Nevertheless, trade linkages among euro area countries remain comparatively important, as evidenced by their propensity to export among themselves. In fact, the share of euro area-bound exports in the total exports of euro area countries is much bigger than could be expected from the relative economic size of the euro area (Graph I.1), as measured by its share in world GDP. In line with the literature on gravity models of trade, this can be understood as a consequence of several factors, including shorter physical distances and therefore lower transportation costs, absence of currency risks, a high degree of economic and institutional integration, and cultural and linguistic aspects.

In contrast to what can be observed in financial flows, the crisis did not entail any marked attenuation or reversion of the preference of euro area countries to trade among themselves. It is true that there is a slight weakening of this propensity over the past few years and in particular during the crisis period. However, the relative economic

\(^{(2)}\) The figures for intra-euro area trade do not include services due to data issues.
weight of the euro area also diminished during this period, which could explain the decrease in the share observed.

**Financial channel**

The financial channel operates through changes in cross-border financial flows and balance sheet exposures. Several transmission mechanisms can be identified:

- **Spillovers via financial prices.** This is the standard channel through which financial shocks are transmitted across borders, according to interest parity and via risk premia effects. Since financial markets are globally integrated, changes to prices on any asset market usually transmit quickly into asset prices in other economies. This does not necessarily depend on the existence of shared fundamentals, but can be driven by portfolio rebalancing of investors active on several markets.

- **Spillovers via cross-border balance sheet exposures.** The financial crisis raised awareness on the importance of effects that go beyond the transmission of changes to asset prices and affect balance sheets in other economies. For households holding assets abroad, such wealth effects can affect consumption levels, while for corporations balance sheet effects can impact on domestic demand via investment and wage levels. In the case of banks, a balance sheet weakening can affect lending capacity.

- **Information spillovers.** Information spillovers are often based on the market participants’ perception or anticipation of changes in economic fundamentals rather than on the actual materialisation of these changes and can be engendered by policy announcements. Information spillovers may be very relevant for explaining contagion effects, in particular in the context of ‘wake-up call’ effects, which occur when new information concerning a country leads to a reassessment of the vulnerability of other countries.

- **Financial flows are notoriously more fickle than trade flows, allowing for rapid transmission and amplification of shocks through large changes or reversals.** Graph I.2 depicts the average difference in net investment in euro area and non-euro area countries for euro area economies. As expected, euro area-bound net investment flows tend to be larger than net flows to non-euro area economies, notwithstanding the larger aggregate size of the latter, denoting a ‘home preference’ among euro area countries. From a net investment viewpoint, euro area countries were, on average, more bullish (or less bearish) on the euro area than on the rest of the world.

**Graph I.2: Average net foreign investment of EA 17 countries**

(2002-2012, bn EURs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average net investment: in EA17 minus in non-EA17 (exc. official flows)</th>
<th>Average net investment: in EA17 minus in non-EA17 (exc. official flows)</th>
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This trend came to a halt in 2008 and, in the following years, a preference for the euro area is much less apparent, especially when official flows are excluded. When compared with the in-period average difference in net flows, there is evidence of a reversion in the positive home bias. Box I.1 illustrates a paradigmatic case of a reversal in funding flows in the post-crisis period. As discussed in the box, France acted as major funding intermediary for the economies of southern Europe, but was pressured to disinvest in 2011. The resulting external funding gap was subsequently bridged by official flows.

**Confidence channel**

The confidence channel involves a direct transmission of changes in consumer and business sentiment in one country to confidence in another country. Given the strong correlation between confidence and economic activity, this is likely to have an impact on consumption and investment.
Box I.1: The financial intermediation role of France

Capital flows from and to France played a central role throughout the crisis. Before the crisis, France acted as an intermediary between euro area debtors on the one side, and creditors from outside the euro area on the other side. Apart from Japanese and UK investors, French bonds were particularly sought by foreign central banks, presumably as a reserve asset. At the eve of the crisis, (2007), France found itself in a net debtor position (which was mostly in debt instruments) to non-EU countries, while French investors were in a net creditor position on most of the euro area, in particular Italy, Spain and Greece, but also Germany (see Chart 1a).

During the first stage of the crisis until 2010, French bonds were sought after as a safe haven asset. Foreign central banks increased their holdings of French bonds considerably. At the same time, German investors shifted out of Italian and Spanish debt, and used part of the proceeds to purchase French debt assets, turning the French net asset position on Germany from positive to negative until 2010 (see Chart 1b). In return, French investors had to invest their savings into assets abroad, and significantly increased their exposure to Italian and Spanish debt (from which German investors retreated at the same time). At the same time Italian and Spanish investors sold off their holdings of French debt, which compounded the increase in net French exposure to those two countries. Consequently, France intermediated financial flows and financial risk from Germany and outside the euro area to Spain and Italy, which still ran sizeable current account deficits at the time (see Chart 2a).

In late 2011, the situation changed. There were market concerns about the exposure of French investors to Spain and Italy. In response, foreign central banks followed investors based in the US and the UK in selling off their holdings of French assets. German investors continued to buy up French debt, but that did not suffice to relieve pressure on French bonds. Consequently, the French financial sector had to reduce its exposure to Italy and Spain, which it did by selling of its bond holdings there (see Chart 2b). With that, the euro area periphery countries lost the last large scale investor willing to refinance their external debt. Market participants from outside the euro area periphery were unwilling to purchase Italian or Spanish bonds during late 2011, and 2012. In the wake of the French retreat from the periphery, Spanish and Italian financial sector had to rely on central bank funding, in order to cover their own refinancing needs, but also to purchase domestic bonds. The French retreat from periphery bond and interbank markets, forced by international capital markets, was therefore instrumental to the emergence of TARGET2 net liabilities of the euro area periphery.

(Continued on the next page)
I. Cross-border spillovers in the euro area

Institutional interlinkages and political economy effects

Alongside the ‘traditional’ transmission channels, shocks can forcefully transmit through the sharing of common institutions or common policy frameworks. This channel includes peer effects, mutual learning from best practices or sharing of common institutions or resources. These effects are hard to measure but can play a key role in the transmission of shocks, in particular in the context of a monetary union, as for example in the case of fiscal policy shocks or those resulting from the adoption of structural reforms.

In the euro area in particular, the single monetary policy, the common external exchange rate and the related absence of bilateral nominal exchange rates can strengthen spillover effects across euro area countries.

I.2.3. Shocks

The way the various transmission channels are affected depends on the nature of the shock at the origin of cross-border spillovers, implying that different types of shocks can have very different spillover effects. The next sections discuss how a number of key shocks spill over internationally via the various channels. The focus is on the cross-border transmission of fiscal policy shocks, implementation of structural reforms, financial shocks and confidence shocks. Given the need to restrict the analysis to a limited number of shocks due to space constraints, the choice is motivated by the fact that these shocks have played a key role in the euro area economy since the global financial crisis. Obviously, this does not exhaust the range of shocks that are of possible interest in the context of the functioning of the euro area.

I.2.4. Factors amplifying or mitigating spillovers

Various conditions relative to market structures and policy regimes can either amplify or mitigate spillover effects. For example, a high degree of trade openness facilitates the propagation of shocks across highly integrated economies. Nominal and real rigidities also play an important role in determining the amplitude and persistence of spillover effects, affecting the adjustment to shocks.

Box (continued)
• The magnitude of financial spillovers depends on several factors, such as the degree of international portfolio diversification, the degree of prevailing risk aversion, the size and activity of multinational banks, access to funding, the degree of financial market integration and the nature of financial market regulations.

• Finally, a key role is played by the prevailing governance structure and fiscal regime (and in particular by the existence or absence of supranational risk sharing mechanisms) and by the monetary policy regime.

I.3. Spillovers from fiscal policy

Fiscal policy shocks, like other demand shocks, spill over to other countries mainly via the trade channel, with the demand and the competitiveness effects going in the same direction. An expansionary fiscal policy shock is likely to boost demand for goods and services produced abroad and lead to increases in prices and wages and an appreciation of the real exchange rate, implying a deterioration in competitiveness which benefits the exports of competing economies.

On the other hand, fiscal consolidations have a negative impact on the demand for imports and tend to improve competitiveness, with negative repercussions on competing economies’ exports. Moreover, fiscal policy shocks can be accompanied by interest rate effects due to the response of monetary policy, which partially counterbalance the spillovers from the fiscal shock.

To the extent that fiscal policy decisions affect sovereign risk premia, the shock can also transmit internationally via the financial channel. Changes in fiscal policy and the perceived credibility of the measures announced can significantly affect financial market confidence and, in turn, sovereign risk spreads and the size of spillovers.

The operation of the various channels has been analysed in a number of modelling exercises, delivering mixed results. The response of monetary policy plays a crucial role. For example, Bénassy-Quéré (2006) finds that, in a monetary union, fiscal expansions accompanied by an accommodative monetary policy have, in most cases, positive spillover effects, but that if the common central bank does not accommodate the shock the effects on foreign countries are generally negative. Similarly, Cwik and Wieland (2011) simulate the effects of the 2009-2010 German stimulus plan on France and Italy and conclude that these were negligible, due to the negative effect of euro appreciation engendered by higher interest rates.

Spillover effects also depend on the nature of the consolidation plan following a temporary fiscal expansion. For example, in a multi-country model with independent monetary policies, Corsetti, Meier and Muller (2010) find that a fiscal stimulus accompanied by a medium-term consolidation plan involving some reduction in spending generates positive spillovers, unlike a fiscal expansion based exclusively on future tax hikes, which yields higher long-term interest rates.

Econometric studies also reach mixed conclusions, but generally find some evidence of fiscal spillovers. Several papers estimate positive spillover effects from fiscal expansions in the euro area, with particular attention to the effects of a German stimulus, for example Bénassy-Quéré and Cimadomo (2006) and Beetsma, Giuliodori and Klaassen (2006), although these results have criticised by Wieland (2006) on the grounds that the analysis includes periods of flexible and fixed exchange rates. Hebous and Zimmermann (2013) also estimate positive spillover effects from expansionary fiscal shocks in the euro area and find that euro area-wide shocks have larger output effects on individual countries than similar-size domestic shocks.

An important related issue is whether spillover multipliers vary over the business cycle. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) estimate multipliers of government spending spillovers for several OECD countries, finding that multipliers are larger during

recessions, supporting the case for coordinated fiscal stimulus during economic downturns. They also find that multipliers are smaller in countries sharing a fixed exchange rate. (8) Spillovers of fiscal policy can be particularly large when interest rates are constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) and several countries take measures simultaneously (see Goujard, 2013, and in ’t Veld, 2013). (9) Finally, several studies argue in favour of fiscal policy coordination in order to maximise the benefits or minimise the negative effects of fiscal shocks (see, for example, Bénassy-Quéré, 2006, and Hebous and Zimmermann, 2013).

Overall, the review of the available empirical literature indicates that cross-border spillovers of fiscal policy can be sizeable in the euro area, especially when cyclical conditions are weak and/or monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound.

This conclusion is particularly relevant when assessing fiscal policy in the euro area at the current juncture. The Commission’s recent assessment of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States indicates that the fiscal stance for the area as a whole is currently broadly neutral but that several Member States are not expected to meet their obligations under the Stability and Growth Pact. (10) Preserving a neutral stance while ensuring full compliance with the SGP would require a rebalancing of fiscal policies across countries so as to exploit the fiscal space available under the rules in some countries. The empirical literature reviewed in this section suggests that, in the current situation of negative output gap and monetary policy operating at the ZLB, such a rebalancing could be associated with significant positive spillover effects.

These spillovers can be illustrated using the European Commission’s QUEST model (see in ’t Veld, 2013). The version of the model used includes seven countries separately (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece) and the rest of the euro area (REA) as an aggregate block. The simulations consider the effects of a temporary two-year increase in government investment in Germany and in the REA (as many of these countries are assumed to have fiscal space) of 1% of GDP. Graph I.3 reports the GDP effects by country/region.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Graph I.3: Fiscal stimulus in core euro area countries: GDP effects (1)</th>
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(1) First and second year GDP effect (% difference from baseline) for a temporary increase in public investment of 1% of GDP in Germany and rest of EA.

**Source:** QUEST simulations, in ’t Veld (2013).

The impact multiplier in the Member States which carry out the increase in investment is not particularly large (between 0.8 and 1) due to the relatively high degree of openness of these countries. But the GDP effect is persistent even after the stimulus is discontinued, as productivity is higher. Import leakage leads to relatively high spillovers to other euro area countries, boosting GDP by between 0.2 and 0.3%.

**I.4. Spillovers from growth-enhancing structural reforms**

Similarly to fiscal policy shocks, structural reforms generate cross-country spillovers mainly through the trade channel. However, in this case, the demand and the competitiveness effect tend to counterbalance each other. Structural reforms stimulate growth and therefore generate positive demand effects for partner economies but also increase domestic competitiveness, with a negative effect on competing countries.

Modelling exercises assessing the effects of structural reforms generally find positive but small spillover effects. Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti...
Given the key role of innovation for growth, structural reforms which aim to increase investment in R&D and the analysis of knowledge spillovers deserve particular mention. For example, Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (2009) find that foreign R&D has an important effect on domestic productivity and that the impact increases with the degree of openness of a country. Bottazzi and Peri (2007) estimate elasticities of the domestic stock of knowledge to international knowledge for fifteen OECD countries, finding values which range between 0.2 and 0.5.

In conclusion, the literature finds limited spillovers from structural reforms, except for the potential spillovers from policies promoting innovation. However, there is still a strong case for taking into account potential spillovers from structural reforms and for considering the implications of (a lack of) coordination across countries, in particular within the euro area. The synchronisation of reforms offers leeway for an easing of monetary policy, resulting in faster adjustment and a reduction of transition costs (see e.g. Everaert and Schule, 2006, and Forni, Gerali and Pisani, 2010).

The spillover effects from the adoption of structural reforms in the euro area have also been analysed using a semi-endogenous growth version of the Commission’s QUEST model. For the purpose of the simulations discussed in this section, it is assumed that Member States reduce by one-half the gap vis-à-vis the three best performing countries in the EU for a set of structural reform indicators covering a wide range of areas. This makes it possible to assess the effects of a comprehensive reform package, while previous studies mostly focused on the impact of specific measures, such as reductions in price and wage mark-ups.

Graph I.4 shows the GDP effects of structural reforms in the euro area after 5, 10 and 20 years when acting alone and in the event of simultaneous reforms. In the second scenario, the growth impact per Member State is therefore composed of growth spurred both by domestic reform and by a ‘spillover’ component resulting from other Member States reforming at the same time. The adoption of structural reforms has a positive effect on growth and leads to competitiveness gains vis-à-vis other Member States and countries outside the euro area.

GDP effects are larger when all countries implement reforms jointly, as shown by the difference between the two bars in Graph I.4.


(12) These include market competition and regulation, R&D expenditure, skill structure, tax structure, labour market participation, unemployment benefit ‘generosity’ and active labour market policies.

(13) The model allows for positive confidence effects as it captures the effects of higher expected permanent income due to higher growth and assumes a large share of households can borrow and consume more today in anticipation of higher income tomorrow.
I. Cross-border spillovers in the euro area

Spillovers are modest, due to partly counterbalancing demand effects (which boost exports in other countries) and competitiveness effects (which operate in the opposite direction). However, they tend to be positive and overall output gains are about 10% larger than in a scenario where each country acts alone. The presence of positive GDP spillovers illustrates the benefits from coordination, as the adoption of joint reforms boosts GDP more than in a situation in which each country acts alone.

Graph I.4: GDP effects of structural reforms: acting alone vs simultaneous reforms (1)

(1) Percentage deviation from baseline
Source: QUEST simulations, Varga and in ‘t Veld (2014)

I.5. Spillovers from financial shocks

I.5.1. The evidence on financial spillovers

Cross-country financial spillovers and contagion have been at the core of policy discussions since the onset of the financial crisis. Financial market shocks transmit to other countries via the various transmission mechanisms identified in Section 2.2, i.e. via financial prices, balance sheet exposures and information spillovers.

A key distinction when discussing the transmission of financial shocks is that between interdependence, which refers to the correlation across financial markets during normal states of the world, and contagion. While there is no full agreement on the definition of contagion, most studies define contagion as the spillover effects taking place beyond the linkages explained by fundamentals or as the extreme amplification of spillover effects. (20)

The evidence in support of contagion during the crises preceding the global financial crisis is mixed. (21) On the other hand, most studies provide evidence of a considerable increase in interdependence over time. Empirical evidence of contagion effects is generally restricted to the recent crisis.

For example, Forbes (2012) analyses correlations in stock market returns since the 1980s to mid-2012 and concludes that interdependence increased considerably over the period, especially in the euro area. Alter and Beyer (2014) find evidence of growing interdependence between euro area sovereigns and banks over the period 2009-2012. (22)

Contagion effects in the euro area have been documented by several studies. Many of these focus on the transmission of financial shocks across sovereign bonds. For instance, Missio and Watzka (2011) find evidence of contagion during the period 2009-2010 and observe, in particular, a strong link between Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and Belgian yield spreads and Greek spreads. (23) Claeyts and Vasicke (2014) analyse the bilateral linkages between EU sovereign bond markets over the period 2000-2012, estimating significant spillover effects which have increased substantially and permanently since the start of the financial crisis. However, they find that contagion during the crisis has been limited to the occasions of request

(21) For example, King and Wadhwani (1990) find evidence of contagion during the 1987 stock market crash. However, Forbes and Rigobon (2002), after correcting for heteroskedasticity, find no evidence of genuine contagion for the 1987 stock market crash, the 1994 Mexican crisis and the 1997 Asian crisis, but only of higher correlation due to increased volatility. Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) find evidence of contagion caused by the Asian crisis but not by the Mexican crisis.
for financial assistance by Greece, Ireland and Portugal. (24)

Favero (2012) uses a Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) model to analyse the co-movement of bond spreads within the euro area. The paper finds a significant non-linear relationship between spreads and fiscal fundamentals and evidence of contagion effects during the financial crisis. (25) Similarly, De Santis (2012) develops a vector error correction model applied to the period September 2008-August 2011 and finds that developments in euro area long-term government bond yields are explained, beside the country-specific credit risk and an aggregate regional risk factor, by a spillover effect from shocks to the Greek credit rating, which appears to have considerably affected spreads in countries with weaker fundamentals. (26)

In a recent paper, Lucas, Schwaab and Zhang (2014) estimate euro area joint and conditional sovereign default probabilities using data on prices of credit default swaps (CDSs) over the period 2008-2013. (27) The paper finds evidence of spillover effects influencing the likelihood of sovereign default and of significant time variation in risk dependence (which increases in times of stress) between countries.

The literature also provides evidence of significant spillover effects between sovereign and private risk and across equity markets. For instance, de Bruyckere et al. (2012) focus on the risk spillovers between European banks and sovereigns in both directions over the period 2006-2011, using CDS spreads and finding significant evidence of spillover effects. As expected, risk spillovers are found to be stronger between banks and their home country and linked to bank capital adequacy. (28)

De Haan and Mink (2013) analyse the effect of, respectively, news about Greek public finances and news about the Greek bailout on bank stock prices in 2010 for 48 banks included in the EU stress tests. (29) They find that news concerning a bailout (but not news concerning public finances) have a significant effect also for those banks with little direct exposure to Greece. This is interpreted as an indication that financial markets consider news about the Greek bailout as a signal about governments’ willingness to use public funds for financial sector rescue operations. In addition, Portuguese, Irish and Spanish sovereign debt prices, which are included in the analysis, respond also to news about Greek public finances. (30)

Ludwig and Sobanski (2014) analyse banking sector fragility linkages between euro area Member States over the period 2007-2010. (31) They find that spillover risks across national banking sectors increase markedly during periods of financial instability and that the epicentre of risk in the period before the crisis was the banking sectors of the periphery (mostly Portugal and Greece). As the crisis unfolded and stability measures were introduced, however, the banking systems of core countries increasingly became sources of fragility spillover. (32)

Bekaert et al. (2014) analyse the transmission of the 2007-2009 financial crisis to 415 country-industry equity portfolios. They estimate statistically significant but small contagion effects from the US and the global financial sector across 55 countries. The paper also finds substantial contagion from domestic markets to individual domestic portfolios, with its severity inversely related to the quality of countries’ economic


(30) The distinction between ‘wake-up call’ effects, which occur when new information concerning a country leads to a reassessment of the vulnerability of other countries, and ‘pure’ contagion, which is not linked to fundamentals, assumes particularly relevance in the context of the analysis of the sovereign debt crisis.

(31) Fragility linkages are assessed by applying Granger causality tests to daily values of Average Distance to Default (ADD), which is an equity-market based banking sector fragility indicator.

One method to extract this information consists of monitoring bilateral risk spillover effects of sovereign credit risk in extreme market conditions. The analysis in this section presents a tool for tracking the market’s view of how the credit risk of one sovereign affects other sovereigns, when it is in trouble. Such a co-risk model helps in disentangling common risk factors.

One method to extract this information consists of tracking the market’s view of how the credit risk of one sovereign affects other sovereigns, when it is in trouble. Such a co-risk model helps in disentangling common risk factors.

Although there is a growing literature on spillovers across sovereigns, the severity and the source countries of contagion are not well established. The analysis in this section presents a tool for monitoring bilateral risk spillover effects of sovereign credit risk in extreme market conditions.

The main variable of interest is sovereign credit risk for the economies of 11 euro area Member States (see Table I.1), as represented by daily changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads of five-year maturity. The CDS spreads adjust to reflect new information that may have an impact on the credit risk of the economy. As CDS are primarily concerned with the situation when default occurs, which is an extreme and rare event, they are particularly useful in the present context, studying spillover effects in extreme market conditions. In addition, a set of common risk factors are used to control for changes in market and economic conditions that may affect the credit risk of a Member State other than the shock from the troubled Member State.

The results of the analysis are presented in Table I.1, where each cell contains the bilateral conditional co-risk at the end of October 2014. Co-risk is measured by excess CoVaR in basis points, which is the additional risk a Member State incurs above its own unconditional risk, the VaR. For example, if one Member State has a VaR of 10 bps., and a CoVaR vis-à-vis another Member State of 15 bps., the excess CoVaR is 5 bps. Thus, each row in the table features the change in the conditional credit risk borne by a Member State, which is induced by ‘source’ countries listed in the columns.

The co-risks are illustrated for when CDS spreads are high, i.e. at their 99th percentile. For example, Table I.1 shows that when the change in the CDS spread of 10 bps., which is induced by Greece, the excess CoVaR is 5 bps. Thus, each row in the table features the change in the conditional credit risk borne by a Member State, which is induced by ‘source’ countries listed in the columns.

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(1) Countries are listed in descending order of their average bilateral conditional co-risk. (36) Credit default swaps are financial instruments that allow taking or transferring credit risk from one party to another. Credit default swaps are over-the-counter (OTC) products and are quoted in basis points per year — the so-called CDS spread. The CDS spread indicates the cost per year to either buy or sell exposure to the possibility of a default or restructuring of an underlying debt security. Thus, a buyer of a CDS contract incurs a yearly cost, an insurance premium to be paid, to hold the contract.
**Box I.2: The CoVaR methodology**

From a macro-financial stability and a sovereign risk management perspective, it may be critical to assess direct and indirect linkages at the country level. Doing so may help in understanding the systemic importance of individual economies. One way to uncover the bilateral linkages is via co-risk measures that capture the increase in risk of one country when another country falls into distress. Conditional value at risk (CoVaR) is one such measure that captures the degree of intensification of the risk, which was first developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008). It takes into account the non-linear properties of risk, as correlations and the risk measure may change with the level of risk.1

Value at risk (VaR) is a common risk measure used in risk management, which tries to quantify the risk of loss on a portfolio. For example, the VaR of a portfolio of assets refers to the potential loss the portfolio may incur, over a given time horizon and at a specific confidence level. In this section, the context is somewhat different; the VaR of a Member State’s economy is in terms of the probability of a sharp deterioration in its credit risk.2 However, the VaR focuses on the economy concerned in isolation, and does not take into account the effect of other economies.

Using conditional value at risk (CoVaR) is one way of assessing the risk spillover effect that one Member State may have on another, i.e. the conditional risk of the economy. The CoVaR for one Member State is defined as the VaR of the economy conditional upon the VaR of another Member State’s economy.3

A non-linear approach to estimate the conditional risk, the CoVaR, is to use quantile regressions. Quantile regressions extend the standard regression intuition – ordinary least squares – beyond the mean of the conditional distribution.4 It allows the analyst to slice the distribution at the quantile of interest and obtain the corresponding cross-section of the conditional distribution.5 This is particularly useful in the present context as the quantile regressions allow for estimating the CoVaR more or less directly, as the confidence level of the VaR corresponds to the quantile specified in the regression technique.

Following Wong and Fong (2010), the model estimated relates changes in the credit-default-swap (CDS) spread of one euro-area Member State with another’s, using quantile regressions:6

\[ \Delta \text{CDS}_i = \alpha_i^{ij} + \beta_i^{ij} \Delta \text{CDS}_j + \sum_{k=1}^{N} \gamma_k^{ij} F_k + \epsilon_i^{ij}; \]

where \( \Delta \text{CDS}_i \) is the change in the CDS spread of country \( i \), expressed as a function of the CDS spread of country \( j \), \( \Delta \text{CDS}_j \), and a set of common risk factors \( F_k \). The equation is estimated at the 99th quantile, denoted by \( q \). The estimated coefficients, \( \alpha_i^{ij}, \beta_i^{ij}, \) and \( \gamma_k^{ij} \) provide a measure of how the credit risk of one country affects another at the 99th quantile of the distribution. The choice of quantile is arbitrary, but follows the examples of other researchers, which makes the results comparable across studies.

The set of common risk factors are used to control for changes in market and economic conditions that may affect the credit risk of a Member State other than the shock from the troubled Member State. The independent variables are represented by indicators that are commonly used in research and analysis of financial risk and stability: the business cycle, liquidity situation, risk aversion, general sovereign default risk, the risk premium, and the default risk in the interbank market.

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1 Adrian T. and M. Brunnermeier (2011), ‘CoVaR’, NBER Working Paper, No. 17454, NBER.
2 VaR is defined as the daily change in a certain variable associated with the economy at a confidence level of \((1 - q)\). The statistical representation is: \( Pr(\Delta X \leq \text{VaR}_q) = q \), where \( \Delta X \) is the change of the of the concerned variable in the economy and \( q \) is the probability of observing such an extreme change.
3 CoVaR\(_q^{ij} \) is the VaR\(_q^i \) of Member State \( i \) conditioned upon the VaR\(_q^j \) for Member State \( j \). Statistically it can be written: \( Pr(\Delta X \leq \text{VaR}_q^i | \Delta X \leq \text{VaR}_q^j) = q \).
4 Standard regression analysis focuses on the mean relationship between variables and thus fails to provide a complete picture of what happens in periods of stress. In stressed periods, changes in a particular variable are by definition far from the mean, e.g. events occur in the tail of the distribution.
5 Quantile regressions was first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978).

*Continued on the next page*
Belgian sovereign CDS spread is at its 99th percentile, this implies a 32 bps. increase in the change in the Spanish CDS spread, a rise by 120% compared with its unconditional VaR, estimated at 26 bps. Similarly, the table shows that the credit risk of Belgium conditional on the risk of Spain is 4 bps. higher than that corresponding to the 99th percentile of Belgium’s own CDS distribution, i.e. 27% higher. The co-risks are thus not necessarily symmetric and one country may have a greater impact on others. The shadowed cells contain each Member State’s change in the CDS spread at the 99th percentile of the respective distribution, i.e. the unconditional VaR.

For most Member States, the conditional co-risk is higher than the unconditional risk in the shadowed cells along the diagonal of the table. On average, the VaR of the euro area at the 99th percentile increases by 8 bps. (the lower right corner in the table), or 38%.

The right column presents the average co-risk for each Member State in the sample, which can be interpreted as its ‘vulnerability’ to stress in other Member States. Member States that are more vulnerable, i.e. have a higher average CoVaR, are more likely to experience a negative impact because of others. Unsurprisingly, beside Greece, the most vulnerable Member States are Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. If the relative increase is taken into account, Austria could also be considered as sensitive to stress in other Member States.

The last row in the table shows the average increase in the co-risk measures of other Member States at their 99th percentile when the economy is under the same stress, i.e. it measures how much impact one Member State has on the others, or how much risk originates from one country. Belgium, Finland, and France are found to be the Member States that have the highest impact on other Member States. One interpretation of these results is that Member States that commonly are counted among the ‘core’ euro-area Member States, but have high debt levels or very weak growth, have a relatively strong negative effect on the weaker economies in the euro area. However, these ‘risk spreaders’ are not themselves sensitive to events in, e.g. programme countries. Thus, spillover effects are asymmetric.

The averages hide several interesting bilateral relationships between euro-area Member States. First, Finland seems to be relatively unaffected by the performance of other Member States; the conditional measure of co-risk is rather similar to the unconditional one. However, developments in Finnish credit risk exert pressure on several other Member States. Finland is a strong proponent of the fiscal rules, but is in a long-lasting recession, with continuous budget deficits. A possible interpretation of this observation could be that if Finland were to experience a significant amount of stress in the future, this could induce renewed stress on sovereign debt markets. The results for France display similar features, although to a slightly lesser degree. Second, Ireland is mainly affected by events in the big core euro-area.
Member States, like Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. However, in September 2011, at the time of the restructuring of Greek debt held by private creditors, Ireland was the Member State most severely affected by the Greek event. Third, Spain and Portugal seems to be clearly linked to other programme countries, but also other Member States. Interestingly, however, Portugal is less affected by Spain than Spain is by Portugal.

Time series of excess CoVaRs can be generated by estimating the model recursively at the end of each month starting in January 2010. The approach is static in the sense that the dataset used for estimating the model each month is the same except for an additional month of observations. However, these approximately 20 additional observations each month are sufficient to generate significant variability in the co-risk measure. The time-series analysis illustrates the persistence of the findings in Table I.1 and serves as a consistency check.

Graph I.5 shows the average CoVaR over time for two groups of Member States labelled core and periphery. It shows how Member States are affected by large changes in CDS spread of other Member States, i.e. how their vulnerability change over time. A fist observation is that the average CoVaR for core countries is relatively stable over time. A second observation is that CoVaR for the periphery countries is significantly higher for the whole period, and that the sharp falls in co-risk are coincident with important events signifying the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. In the graph, the first large fall of the periphery series followed the agreement to bailout Ireland in November 2010. The second large fall in co-risk came after the agreement of a second bailout package for Greece in October 2011, which included a default on Greek sovereign debt vis-à-vis the private sector. Yet co-risks started to mount again afterwards. The stress period peaked in July 2012 when Draghi, President of the ECB, announced that the ECB was ready to do whatever it takes to solve the situation. With the formal announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) at the beginning of September 2012 co-risk fell sharply.

For policy makers, the illustrated use of co-risk measures can be used to assess financial interconnectivity in the euro area, in particular how the risk of one Member State may change when another country comes under stress. In terms of complementary background analysis, the tool offers at least two insights to policy makers, as it gives an indication of which Member States are vulnerable and it may show which Member States have a higher impact on others. Although the results presented in this section do seem to be consistent with actual events and often are in line with intuition, the results should be interpreted with caution. The analysis is based on a methodology that is relatively complex and requires a certain amount of assumptions that may affect the results, and make them difficult to interpret. For example, Table I.1 shows the outcome of 110 bilateral regressions; some are bound to be difficult to explain. The econometric results should therefore be considered with caution particularly when looking at individual countries.

**Graph I.5:** Member States’ vulnerability to shocks-Average excess CoVaR  
(Jan 2010-Oct 2014, basis points)

![Graph I.5](image)

(1) Core is AT, BE, DE, FI, FR and NL. Periphery is ES, IE, IT and PT.  
Source: Bloomberg, Datastream and own calculations.

### I.6. Confidence spillovers

The recent crisis has been characterised by a significant decline in consumer confidence in the euro area. There is some evidence that changes in confidence in one country can spill over to other countries affecting confidence and ultimately real consumption abroad. Dées and Soares Brinca (2011) find evidence of confidence spillovers from the US to the euro area on the basis of regression analysis and of a two-region vector autoregression.
I. Cross-border spillovers in the euro area

(var) model (while shocks to euro area confidence do not appear to have an impact on confidence and consumption in the US). (38) Fei (2011) uses data for G7 countries and Spain and finds evidence of a confidence transmission channel from large countries to smaller countries. (39) Déés and Gunner (2014) analyse the propagation of confidence shocks across the US, the euro area and four EU countries taken individually in a factor augmented VAR (FAVAR) model. (40) They find that, in most cases, the transmission of confidence shocks is significant for foreign consumer confidence, lending support to the hypothesis of a confidence channel in the international transmission of shocks.

The role of consumer confidence spillovers in the euro area can also be analysed by making use of consumption and confidence regressions. Analysis has been carried out for a panel of euro area Member States over the period 1999-2012 (see D’Auria for a detailed discussion). (41).

Consumer confidence is measured by the Consumer Confidence Indicator developed by the European Commission as part of the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys. The model includes a set of economic fundamentals as explanatory variables in order to isolate the role of consumer confidence and includes consumption and confidence equations. The results suggest that foreign confidence has a significant effect on domestic real consumption through its impact on domestic confidence, thereby lending support to the existence of confidence spillovers across euro area countries.

I.7. Shock interaction and spillovers

The previous sections analysed the cross-border spillover effects of different shocks separately in order to better focus on their transmission mechanisms. However, these shocks rarely occur in isolation, implying that there can be important interaction effects ultimately affecting the size and direction of the spillovers. Further work is needed to better understand these interactions and their implications for spillovers.

The main challenge for the EU and the euro area in particular, is currently to put in place policies to close the output gap while increasing potential output. This requires both demand and supply-side measures and a three-pronged strategy encompassing fiscal, structural and monetary policies. In this context, spillovers originated by policy decisions in these areas should be considered within an integrated approach, taking into account potential synergies and reinforcing/counterbalancing effects.

For example, the adoption of structural reforms, by making the economy more flexible and boosting growth, can facilitate fiscal consolidation. However, net cross-border spillover effects from reforms in different areas are likely to be dependent on the size and features of the specific measures considered. For instance, Weyerstrass et al. (2006) simulate the effects of combined structural and consolidation policies in the euro area and find that spillover effects depend on the relative importance of the different transmission channels. (42) Coordinated policies are also found to deliver more beneficial effects than non-cooperative policies.

Important interactions also occur between fiscal policy shocks and financial reforms. For example, in the context of the euro area, improved access to long-term financing and a complete Banking Union, by addressing financial fragmentation and ensuring financial stability, can strengthen positive spillovers from measures supporting productive investment. Furthermore, there are also interactions between financial shocks and macroeconomic policies. By improving an economy’s fundamentals, fiscal and structural policies can reduce its exposure to financial contagion (in the form of wake-up calls) or help it adjust to contagion if it occurs.

Confidence effects can also interact significantly with other shocks. For instance, the adoption of structural reforms is generally accompanied by an

improvement in expectations regarding future economic prospects, potentially leading to larger positive spillovers.

I.8. Conclusions

This article reviewed the evidence on cross-border spillovers resulting from a variety of shocks, with a particular focus on the euro area. Trade and financial interlinkages between euro area countries are strong and larger than could be expected given the relative economic size of the euro area. Since the onset of the crisis, there is evidence of a partial reversion of this ‘euro bias’ for financial flows but a marked attenuation of the trend is not observable for trade linkages.

Cross-border spillovers from fiscal policy measures can be sizeable, but this depends on several elements, such as the response of monetary policy and the composition of the intervention. Model simulations show that an increase in investment in countries with fiscal space would generate positive spillovers to the rest of the euro area.

Spillovers from the adoption of structural reforms are generally found to be positive but small, with the exception of the long-run effects of policies promoting innovation. Simulations with the QUEST model show that the simultaneous implementation of structural reforms in the euro area would lead to larger output gains than they would if adopted by countries acting alone, highlighting the benefits from coordination.

The crisis was characterised by large financial spillovers. The literature estimates significant spillover effects across sovereign bond markets and between sovereign and private risk. The analysis of bilateral spillover effects of sovereign credit risk in the euro area shows considerable heterogeneity across countries, with Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland being the most vulnerable to stress in other Member States and some ‘core’ countries having a large impact on other Member States without being considerably affected in return. Finally, there is also evidence supporting the existence of a confidence channel in the transmission of shocks across euro area countries.