EUROMOD: an integrated European tax-benefit model and indicators of work incentives

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Background and acknowledgements

- MICRESA (Micro-level Analysis of the European Social Agenda: combating poverty and social exclusion through changes in social and fiscal policy) FP5 Key Action Improving the Socio-economic Knowledge Base
- Drawn from work of Herwig Immervoll + colleagues
 - Immervoll, "Average and marginal effective tax rates facing workers in the EU. A micro-level analysis of levels, distributions and driving factors", EM6/04.
 - Immervoll, O'Donoghue, "Employment Transitions in 13 European Countries. Levels, Distributions and Determining Factors of Net Replacement Rates", EM3/03
 - Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, Saez, "Welfare Reform in European Countries: a micro-simulation analysis", EM1/04

www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emod.htm

Outline

- Using microsimulation to calculate indicators
 of work incentives
- Why EUROMOD?
- Examples of some indicators and what they show
 - Marginal effective tax rates (METRs)
 - "Participation tax rates"
 - Replacement rates
- What else could be done?

Tax-benefit models

- Calculate cash benefits and taxes and contributions for a (large) sample of households, representative of the population
- Focus on policies that can be straightforwardly assigned a monetary value.
- The main output from the model is household income.
- Consistent results for:
 - aggregates (budgetary effects)
 - distributions (poverty and inequality indicators)
 - individual cases (real and hypothetical)
 - indicators of incentives (NRRs METRs)
- and *changes* in these for alternative scenarios

EUROMOD - what is it for?

- Built with *comparability* as the main objective
- Cross-country comparisons
 - distributive impact of existing systems
 - "system swapping"
- Impact of common changes or changes with common objectives
- Analysis of national changes with an EU perspective
- National analysis for countries without national models
 - Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal
- What if questions about
 - existing policy instruments and sub-components
 - changes and reforms (actual, proposed, hypothetical scenarios)

EUROMOD - an integrated model

- Based on representative micro-datasets for each country (various types, various years)
- Original incomes taken from micro-data and updated to common policy year (1998, 2001 or 2003); tax liabilities and benefit entitlements are simulated using policy year rules ... and re-simulated for each new scenario
- Aiming to maximise comparability while maintaining transparency about real differences
- Flexibility and choice in many dimensions

EUROMOD – calculating indicators of work incentives

- Having established the infrastructure, we have a lot of choice:
- What incentive are we interested in?
 - Tiny, small or large changes in activity? Money or time?
- Whose incentives and in what context?
- The incentive effects of policy changes (alongside distributional effects)
- Examples are all for 1998 policies, most of EU15, assuming full take-up of benefits and no tax evasion.

Marginal effective tax rates

METR=1-[
$$(y_1+d)(1-t_2)-y_1(1-t_1)$$
]/d
= 1- $\Delta Y_{net}/\Delta Y_{gross}$

- 1998, EU14 (not Sweden), population aged 18-64 in employment or self-employment
- Effect on household income (after income taxes, social contributions and benefits); taking each individual in turn
- An increase in gross earned income of 3%

Average METRs faced by working population



Distribution of METRs 1998



Median METRs by earnings decile

High Tax Countries



Median METRs by earnings decile

Low Tax Countries



Median METRs by hhold income decile

Low Tax Countries



Median METRs by hhold income decile





Adults in paid work with high (> 50%) marginal effective tax rates 1998



Median METR by gender (men & women in same earnings decile group)



"Participation" tax rates ("Average Effective Tax Rates")

PTR= 1- $\Delta Y_{net} / \Delta Y_{gross}$ Where ΔY_{net} = net increase in household disposable income when individual enters work and

- ΔY_{gross} = gross earnings in work
- 1998, EU14
- In this example disposable income is net of employer contributions and imputed consumption taxes

Mean PTRs by earnings decile (1)



Source: EUROMOD (Immervoll, Kleven et al, 2004)

Mean PTRs by earnings decile (2)



Source: EUROMOD (Immervoll, Kleven et al, 2004)

Net replacement rates

 $\mathsf{NRR=Y}_{\mathsf{out}}/[\mathsf{Y}_{\mathsf{out}}+\Delta\mathsf{Y}_{\mathsf{net}}]$

- Depends on other household income as well as operation of the tax-benefit system
- 1998, EU13 (not Sweden, Finland), transitions from unemployment and inactivity to employment (using estimated earnings); transitions from employment to unemployment
- Effect on household income (after incomes taxes, social contributions and benefits); taking each individual in turn
- Here, shown for employment » unemployment (in initial period)

Distribution of NRRs 1998



Source: EUROMOD (Immervoll, O'Donoghue, 2003)

What else can be done?

- Decomposition by driving factors
- Account for work-related costs (childcare)
- METRS other margins
- Within household differences
- Update to 2001 and 2003 and beyond...
- EU25+
- Incentive effects of policy changes
- Modelling changes in behaviour (Bargain, Orsini, EM4/04)

Contacts

• Find out more:

www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emod.htm

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