Humanitarian Protection

Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises

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DG ECHO Thematic Policy Documents

N°1: Food Assistance: From Food Aid to Food Assistance
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1. Background

The current Funding Guidelines on Humanitarian Protection were released in 2009, and complemented the framework for the European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) support for protection activities, including the type of partners and the kind of activities it could finance. During the period 2011–2015 DG ECHO funding towards protection increased from 88 million EUR annually to 113 million EUR annually.

Since the release of the Funding Guidelines, humanitarian protection has gained increasing attention and importance, and simultaneously the demands to demonstrate protection needs and results have augmented.

Globally, the past years have demonstrated a growing awareness of the importance of protection as an essential part of humanitarian action. The Human Rights up Front (HRuF) initiative was launched by the UN Secretary-General in late 2013. Its purpose is to ensure the UN system takes early and effective action, as mandated by the Charter and UN resolutions, to prevent or respond to large-scale violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. It seeks to achieve this by realizing a cultural change within the UN system, so that human rights and the protection of civilians are seen as a system-wide core responsibility. It encourages staff to take a principled stance and to act with moral courage to prevent serious and large-scale violations, and pledges Headquarters support for those who do so.

In relation to this initiative, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Principals adopted a statement which affirms that “protection of all persons affected and at risk must inform humanitarian decision-making and response, including engagement with states and non-state parties to conflict. It must be central to our preparedness efforts, as part of immediate and life-saving activities, and throughout the duration of humanitarian response and beyond”. Earlier in 2013 the IASC Principals, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had stated that humanitarian actors “need to apply a framework of context and risk analysis, needs assessments and a rights-based approach that helps to identify threats and vulnerabilities and their causes as well as violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, and to establish appropriate responses”.

2 - Data from DG ECHO, it includes all protection funding, including child protection, mine action and Gender-Based Violence (GBV).
3 - In accordance with Article 214(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, there is an obligation to ensure that the Union’s humanitarian aid operations are consistent with those of international organisations and bodies, in particular those of the UN system; http://www.un.org/sg/rightsupfront/.
Also in 2013 the IASC endorsed Protection as a key priority and developed a work plan whose implementation has been delegated to the Global Protection Cluster (GPC), and which includes the development and implementation of an “appropriate and comprehensive policy framework on protection, including with a view to preventing and responding to violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law, in consultation with the GPC and building on the initial IASC Principals statement on protection and the findings of the Whole-of-System Protection Review”. The development of this policy commenced in 2015.

On a more operational side there have been also important developments. The mainstreaming of protection into humanitarian action has benefitted from a number of manuals and a final training package endorsed by the GPC. InterAction is facilitating a collaborative effort to develop and promote a results-based approach to protection in crisis situations. UNHCR and partners have developed a Guide for Protection in Cash-based Interventions. All of these initiatives have been supported financially by DG ECHO.

Yet, reports suggest that protection issues are still not systematically identified and addressed in humanitarian response and advocacy. The “Scoping Study” stated in 2013 that “incorporating protection perspectives into the design and delivery of relief programs is regarded as a minimum obligation by most humanitarian organizations but there is also a growing recognition that only a limited number of actors have the experience and will to engage primary duty bearers (i.e. state forces and armed groups) in a protection dialogue”. And in 2015 the “Independent Whole of System Review of Protection” criticized that “in the absence of empowered, field level humanitarian leadership, capable of formulating appropriate and strategic approaches to patterns of harm that endanger lives, the humanitarian system is condemned to persist with perspectives and practices that are not conducive to the realisation of protection outcomes”, and provided recommendations to improve strategic approaches to humanitarian protection, as well as responses and resource allocation, among others.

Lastly, various consultations leading up to the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) have highlighted the importance of putting protection at the centre of humanitarian action. As such one of the action areas identified by the European Commission in its plan “A global partnership for principled and effective humanitarian action” is putting protection at the heart of humanitarian action by ensuring that protection is systematically integrated into humanitarian action and by reinforcing cooperation between humanitarian and human rights communities.

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2. Introduction

Based on these developments and accumulated experience, it is appropriate to update the 2009 Funding Guidelines. This document outlines the definition and objectives of humanitarian protection from the European Commission’s perspective, and positions humanitarian protection vis-à-vis international normative frameworks and the European Commission’s humanitarian mandate. It provides guidance on programming of protection in humanitarian crises, on measuring the effect of the interventions, and sets the framework for the European Commission’s capacity-building of the international humanitarian system regarding protection in humanitarian crises. The document does not intend to provide a binding, predetermined list of protection interventions or types of activities that may or may not be supported, as this is dependent on the specific context and would appear overly prescriptive.

The document views protection as a single sector, encompassing all aspects of protection, including e.g. child protection, Gender-Based Violence (GBV), Housing, Land and Property (HLP) and mine action. This stems from the perspective that a comprehensive analysis is needed in order to determine the most appropriate response “package” in a given context. The document does not deny the need for specialised protection services and knowledge on e.g. refugees, child protection or GBV, but refers to existing reference documents regarding these. Likewise, the document acknowledges the important role of specifically mandated agencies such as e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in the provision of protection, but equally claims that all humanitarian actors need to take into account protection in their programming – in line with the IASC Principals’ statement on the centrality of protection.

The protection of humanitarian goods and personnel referred to in Article 2(c) of the Humanitarian Aid Regulation is not within the scope of this guidance, which focuses on the protection of the crisis-affected population. The logical overlap between the two – i.e. where meeting the basic needs of an affected population is put in peril due to deliberate targeting of humanitarian personnel – is however relevant and will be covered in part 8.

The guidance builds on existing recognised reference documents on humanitarian protection, the materials developed for the series of the European Commission’s workshops on humanitarian protection, on-going since 2012, and concrete experiences from protection interventions funded by the European Commission since 2009.

While the document itself does not aim at defining detailed best practices to engage in practical programming or at replacing detailed operational guidance produced by other actors, some practical guidance on programming is reflected in annexes 10.5-10.8. In addition, useful documents, including policy papers, (inter-)agency guidelines, complementary reading materials, and normative frameworks are listed in annexes 10.3-10.4.

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14 - See Annex 10.3.
16 - See list of reference documents in Annex 10.3.
3. The Concept of Protection – Definition and Objectives

3.1 The broad concept of protection

The definition of protection, resulting from a series of ICRC-convened seminars (1996-99), and formally endorsed by the IASC, states that protection encompasses "all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law)."[17]

While generally accepted, the definition has continued to cause debate and criticism for being too open to interpretation and for not providing a clear, common and operational framework. At the time of this writing, this definition is being further challenged by the report of Independent Whole of System Review of Protection in the Context of Humanitarian Action, which concludes that "The official IASC definition is very broad and does not facilitate a clear, operational and robust system level approach to protection deficits", and recommends that "The existing IASC definition should be unpacked so that it is accessible to all humanitarian actors and other stakeholders."[18]

3.2 Protection in humanitarian situations: the European Commission’s definition and objectives

Ensuring protection of populations is a core objective of humanitarian action. In humanitarian crises, people need material assistance, such as food, water, shelter and medical assistance, as well as physical integrity, psychological wellbeing and dignity. When needs arise as a consequence of violence, deliberate deprivation and restrictions of access, the European Commission aims to ensure that the projects it funds look beyond the mere material needs to the broader issues of personal safety and dignity.


[18] - This recommendation is being acted upon with the development of an IASC protection policy (expected to be adopted in 2016).
Hence, the fundamental purpose of protection strategies in humanitarian crises is to enhance physical and psychological security or, at least, to reduce insecurity, for persons, groups and communities under threat, to reduce the risk and extent of harm to populations by seeking to minimise threats of violence, coercion and deliberate deprivation, reduce vulnerability to such threats, and strengthen (self-protection) capacities as well as enhancing opportunities to ensure safety and dignity.

The European Commission’s humanitarian mandate – as defined by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation\(^\text{19}\) and confirmed by the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid – calls for a definition of protection that is more clearly linked to humanitarian crisis situations and which seeks to address fundamental protection needs, rather than the broad spectrum of political, economic and social rights, without denying that these are all of the utmost importance.

Hence, for the European Commission humanitarian protection is defined as addressing violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation and abuse for persons, groups and communities in the context of humanitarian crises, in compliance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and within the framework of international law and in particular international human rights law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Refugee Law.\(^\text{20}\) By humanitarian crises, the European Commission understands events or series of events which represent a critical threat to the health, safety, security or wellbeing of a community or other large group of people.\(^\text{21}\) A humanitarian crisis can have natural or human-made causes, can have a rapid or slow onset, and can be of short or protracted duration.

The principal objective for the European Commission in humanitarian protection is thus to prevent, reduce/mitigate and respond to the risks and consequences of violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation and abuse for persons, groups and communities in the context of humanitarian crises.

This can be pursued through three specific objectives:\(^\text{22}\)

A. To prevent, reduce, mitigate and respond to protection threats against persons, groups and communities affected by on-going, imminent or future humanitarian crises;
B. To reduce the protection vulnerabilities and increase the protection capacities of persons, groups and communities affected by on-going, imminent or future humanitarian crises;
C. To strengthen the capacity of the international humanitarian aid system to enhance efficiency, quality and effectiveness in reducing protection risks in on-going, imminent or future humanitarian crises.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^{19}\) Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 defines in its Art. 1 the scope of the Community’s humanitarian aid as follows: «The Community’s humanitarian aid shall comprise assistance, relief and protection operations ...» Article 2 refers to the objectives of humanitarian aid actions, including explicitly protection.

\(^{20}\) As defined in section 2.1 of the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.

\(^{21}\) Defined as such in a number of DG ECHO Thematic Policies.

\(^{22}\) The concepts of threats, vulnerabilities and capacities are further defined in part 5.1.

\(^{23}\) This objective is further explained on pp. 13-14.
The framework for the protection of populations is enshrined in international law, which defines legal obligations of states or warring parties to provide assistance to individuals or to allow it to be provided, as well as to prevent and refrain from activities that violate the rights of individuals. These rights and obligations are contained in the body of IHRL, IHL and refugee law. IHRL recognizes that all people have certain fundamental rights that must be protected at all times, even in conditions of war and emergency; these include the right to life, the right to legal personality and due process of law, the prohibition of torture, slavery and degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment and the right to freedom of religion, thought and conscience. These fundamental rights may never be waived. States bear primary responsibility to protect the people under their jurisdiction. In situations of armed conflict, all parties to the conflict, including non-State actors, have formal legal protection obligations for the people within the territory under their control. International law, as well as, in some cases, national legislation sets the applicable normative framework humanitarian protection interventions, setting benchmarks for the treatment populations can expect, showing who is responsible, and articulating the obligations of duty-bearers. Those suffering insecurity are not just victims, they are rights-holders whose rights are being violated and whose national authorities are unable and/or unwilling to fulfil their obligations to protect them. Protection actors should engage with and reinforce the protection work of local actors, including promoting and enabling compliance with international and national norms and standards. The relevant national legislation might consist of e.g. Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and refugee legislation, Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) legislation, legislation on nationality and documentation, land and property rights, or legislation dealing with natural disasters, among others. Humanitarian actors should always examine the national legal environment and institutions with respect to the particular issues being addressed (not limited to displacement, legal identity and property). Likewise, there are an increasing number of relevant regional normative frameworks which should also be considered as important tools and frameworks in programming and advocacy.

24 - See Annex 10.4 for a non-exhaustive list of IHRL instruments.
25 - See sources listed in Annex 10.4. For further explanations about what each of these bodies of law covers see Chapter 4 of the ICRC Professional Standards for Protection Work on https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0999.htm
27 - See Annex 10.4 for examples of such regional frameworks.
It is fundamental that humanitarian actors are fully familiar with human rights and respect them, and in any case never consciously violate them or do so due to negligence and lack of accountability. Humanitarian agencies have the obligation to provide assistance in a manner that is consistent with human rights.

The concept of protection is firmly embedded in the European Commission’s humanitarian mandate as defined by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation and confirmed by the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. At its core are the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Coherence with thematic European Commission policies is equally important, and the European Commission considers aspects of gender and age particularly interwoven with protection as natural disasters and human-made crises have differing impacts on women, girls, men and boys. Many international standards and best practices are likewise relevant for humanitarian protection – e.g. that programming must be needs-based and non-discriminatory; adherence to the do-no-harm principle; focus of achieving results; implementation in accordance with internationally recognised standards (particularly Sphere and its companion standards); having the interest of the affected population at the centre of interventions (Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) and Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) standards); allowing for unhindered objective and independent monitoring; and reflecting the principles of LRRD/resilience.

The European Commission’s support for protection has to be seen in a wider context. In practice, the European Commission recognises that protection cannot be a matter of concern for humanitarian actors alone; protection issues imply much longer timeframes and financial means than those available to humanitarian budgets, and multiple facets require multiple responses, and a number of EU instruments for crisis management, to promote human rights and democracy, to improve good governance and rule of law, and to set up a sustainable framework for long-term protection, are complementary to the European Commission’s humanitarian efforts.
5. Programming Protection in Humanitarian Action

This part outlines the aspects and considerations that should be reflected in proposals submitted to the European Commission informing first the problem, needs, risk and response analysis, and subsequently the logic of the proposed intervention. While the tools proposed are optional, the elements outlined should come out clearly with the ultimate purpose of ensuring that programming reflects the context-specific needs and priorities and is based on demand, rather than supply-driven approaches. The links between the different steps and suggested tools can be seen in Annex 10.8.

5.1 Protection risk analysis as a framework for decision making on protection programming

Since the launch of the pilot Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) booklet on humanitarian protection in 2004, the “risk approach” to humanitarian protection has been adopted by many organisations and has become one of the standard approaches to a protection-sensitive context analysis. Risks are understood wider than something that may happen; it also implies what is happening, has happened or might happen repeatedly. By applying this approach, protection needs of a given target population are presented as risks, so that the protection needs may be determined by assessing the threats faced, and the vulnerabilities and capacities possessed in relation to those threats. In this analysis, threats (against an individual or a group) are posed by actors who – with a purpose of pursuing their own interests – either target or negatively affect the analysed population.

The interrelatedness of these factors can be illustrated through the following equation:

\[
\text{RISK} = \frac{\text{THREATS} \times \text{VULNERABILITIES}}{\text{CAPACITIES}}
\]

This is not a mathematical equation; it is merely a tool that serves to illustrate that the protection risk faced by a given population is directly proportional to threats and...
to vulnerabilities, and inversely proportional to capacities. The protection needs of a given population depend on 1) the level and nature of the threat; 2) the vulnerabilities of affected persons; and 3) their capacities to cope with the threat – all in a given situation at a given point in time.

The results of the risk analysis will serve as entry-points in order to design interventions: risks are mitigated by reducing threats and vulnerabilities and increasing capacities, or a combination of these. Threats can be reduced by either achieving changes in the behaviour of the perpetrators or improving the compliance of duty-bearers, while vulnerabilities are reduced and capacities increased through direct changes in the lives of the beneficiaries.\(^\text{37}\)

Risk analysis must always be context-specific, examining each situation individually and avoiding generalisations or assumptions. It should also be conducted, as far as practicable, from the perspective of the affected population ensuring – as much as possible – their engagement in analysis and decision-making. The analysis should

**Table 1: Definition and examples of the components of the risk equation**\(^\text{38}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat</strong></td>
<td>Violence, coercion, deprivation, abuse or neglect against the affected population/individual. It is committed by an actor (note that perpetrators and duty-bearers are sometimes the same actor).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerability</strong>(^\text{39})</td>
<td>Life circumstances (e.g. poverty, education) and/or discrimination based on physical or social characteristics (sex, disability, age, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, etc.) reducing the ability of primary stakeholders (for example, individuals/households/community) to withstand adverse impact from external stressors. Vulnerability is not a fixed criterion attached to specific categories of people, and no one is born vulnerable per se.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacities</strong></td>
<td>Experiences, knowledge and networks of primary stakeholders (e.g. individuals, households, communities) that strengthen their ability to withstand adverse impact from external stressors. Capacities represent the opposite of vulnerabilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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37 - This does not negate the importance of the self-protection strategies and capacities of the affected population; see part 5.2.5.

38 - For suggestions of issues to consider in identifying threats, vulnerabilities and capacities please refer to Annex 10.5.

39 - Please refer to part 5.2.4 for more on vulnerability definition.
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identify vulnerability with respect to specific threats, in order to generate information that is precise enough to inform programming decisions. Furthermore, each component must be disaggregated to a detailed level, to inform understanding of the specific dynamics of the situation and help identify how to reduce the associated risk. Analysis should be a continuous process, rather than taking place only at fixed points within the programme cycle. This can take the form of ongoing monitoring against the initial disaggregated risk analysis, thereby supporting continual adaptation of responses.

Certain issues, such as displacement, could be considered a threat, vulnerability, or a capacity depending on the scenario, the population concerned and the moment in time. While being displaced is most often considered as a vulnerability, the ability to remove oneself from a threat could also be considered a capacity, and likewise the danger of displacement, including arbitrary displacement, can be a real or perceived threat before it happens or during the actual displacement.

The risk analysis process allows to determine protection needs (based on risks), and it should be informed by the relevant legal/normative frameworks applicable in the given scenario, to ensure that all relevant aspects are covered in the analysis, as otherwise poorer results may be achieved when designing the subsequent response.

The risk approach to protection offers several advantages:

- It facilitates a multi-disciplinary and integrated approach that incorporates different perspectives and promotes the involvement of a wide range of actors.
- It allows tailoring the protection interventions to the specificities of each crisis, as the entry points for action are the protection risks rather than the type of crisis or perpetrator.
- It allows interventions to be targeted on the basis of reducing the risks experienced by specific individuals or groups of people, taking into account factors that may make certain individuals/groups inherently more vulnerable to identified threats.

Hence, according to the risk equation, the two main objectives for a protection intervention funded by the European Commission may be:

1. To prevent, reduce, mitigate and respond to protection threats against persons, groups and communities affected by on-going, imminent or future humanitarian crises;

For example, perpetrators may reduce or put a halt to their actions against the civilian population, or shift to a less harmful approach when conducting their hostilities/activities (avoiding food blockades, forced displacement, restrictions of movement, etc.). Or they may improve their compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law standards, e.g. when a commander issues strict orders against rape and mistreatment of civilians.

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40 - E.g. the past years actual displacement in Colombia has reduced, but the number of confined communities has increased – this is partly due to the fact that after 30 years of conflict the coping capacities and resources of communities to displace themselves have been eroded.
2. To reduce the protection vulnerabilities and increase the protection capacities of persons, groups and communities affected by on-going, imminent or future humanitarian crises. This can be achieved by promoting direct changes in the lives of protected people. These direct changes will improve the way that people cope with the risks they face. Examples:

- In response to a threat of mistreatment if caught with no ID by authorities, individually-issued identity cards and registration documents are granted to refugees to reduce their vulnerability. Vulnerability to the threat of gender-based violence is also reduced by issuing these documents to individuals, including women of a displaced family, and avoiding dependency on documentation issued only to male heads of household;
- In response to a threat of child recruitment into armed groups, steps are taken to reduce vulnerability by establishing parent watch groups and develop a trigger mechanism that alert teachers and law enforcement when armed groups are in the area. Capacity to respond to this threat is built by identifying youth leaders and role models, and building safety lessons into the school curriculum.
- In response to the threat of violence from an armed group within a particular geographical area, IDPs in a camp receive humanitarian aid such as food aid, safe shelter, etc., so that they need not expose themselves to danger in order to obtain them.

As the risk equation is an analytical tool facilitating a protection risk analysis for a specific group of people affected by a humanitarian crisis, the risk analysis as such does not apply to assessments for the third main objective (see part 3.2) as this relates to the capacities of the humanitarian system.

Important issues to consider:

- It is not necessarily expected that a humanitarian partner covers both objectives 1 and 2 in a single project. But at the very least objective 1 (related to threats) must always be part of the analysis when designing a project intervention, as the result of the analysis will influence the design of objective 2.
- By the same token, objective 2 (reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing capacities) may include activities from other sectors of humanitarian action, because they also address needs of the targeted population (for example, with the integrated approach between food assistance and protection[41]). Nevertheless, "pure" assistance, such as WASH or food assistance activities without considering the threats, will not be considered protection activities in and by themselves, if the main protection needs (objective 1 related to threats) are not somehow addressed by that same intervention or by other, related projects. For all actions involving children, child safeguarding/child protection standards must be adhered to (policy, procedures, people and accountability).
- The achievement of protection outcomes often requires a multi-disciplinary and integrated approach that incorporates different perspectives and promotes the involvement of a wide range of actors.Attributing improved protection outcomes to a single humanitarian actor or their activities is difficult; complementarity and collaboration are key aspects of protection work.
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REMINDER – ISSUES OFTEN FORGOTTEN IN PROTECTION ANALYSIS

Social Exclusion/Structural Discrimination
Social exclusion is defined as a process/state that prevents individuals or groups from full participation in social, economic and political life and from asserting their rights. It derives from exclusionary power relationships resulting from social identity (e.g. race, gender, ethnicity, caste/origin/trade or religion) and/or social location (areas that are remote, stigmatised or suffering from war/conflict) or a combination of those. While who is ignored will depend on the specific context it is good to keep in mind that certain groups tend to be overlooked to a larger degree. These include amongst others:

- Persons with disabilities;
- Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex (LGBTI) persons;
- Very marginalised social groups, such as the untouchables (Dalits) in South Asia; the Roma in Europe; the Pygmies, San or Bella in Africa; and indigenous populations.

Freedom of Movement (within the borders of each state)
Freedom of movement is a key human right because it is essential for life and dignity: it ensures access to services, income and livelihoods, social and cultural interactions and as such ability to claim and access a whole range of rights, etc. In crises, freedom of movement can be intentionally restricted as a deliberate strategy, used as an instrument, or can simply be a consequence of insecurity and violence. The threats can be real or perceived. Freedom of movement restrictions can be made legally, but the consequences for the affected population must be reasonable.

Harmful and dangerous coping mechanisms
Some issues are difficult to identify, as affected populations will hesitate to raise them due to shame, and humanitarian actors may shy away from recognising them due to culture or religion – or because they do not know how to address them. Nevertheless, these must be identified in the analysis in order for it to be comprehensive and for the right response to be found. Depending on the context this might include issues such as survival sex, sexual exploitation (including of children), early marriages, child labour, etc.

5.2 Developing appropriate responses
Developing appropriate responses based on the protection risk analysis entails deciding on programmatic approach, response type and modality, targeting methodology, as well as assessing context- and action-related risks of the proposed intervention. This process should be based on clearly defined outcomes that are measured by a reduction in risk using a causal logic (informed by the context-specific protection analysis as outlined in part 5.1) a basis for the design of interventions and to identify actors from other disciplines or sectors that will contribute to the achievement of the outcome.

5.2.1 Approaches
Humanitarian protection is both a cross-cutting issue and a sector in its own right. Thus, two main approaches: targeted actions (sector) and mainstreaming (cross-cutting) can be used to work towards objectives 1 and 2 above. A third approach is capacity building, aiming to ensure the support to develop sufficient capacities within the humanitarian system to appropriately address protection in humanitarian crises (objective 3).42

42 - Note that slightly different terminology is used in the existing DG ECHO Thematic policies. In DRR “integrated” means that all actions have to be risk-informed (so here corresponding to “mainstreaming”), while “targeted” refers to specific DRR actions (i.e. same as “targeted” in this document). The Gender policy distinguishes between “Mainstreaming” (meaning systematic integration of a gender perspective into needs assessment, appraisal, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of interventions and in all aspects and sectors of assistance), i.e. same concept as mainstreaming here; while “Targeted” refers to targeting of a specific group in order to respond to specific gender-induced vulnerabilities, needs and risks. The terminology chosen for this document reflects the terminology widely used and agreed upon by protection actors globally.
Targeted Actions

Targeted actions consist of two distinct sub-approaches, namely integrated protection programming and stand-alone protection programming, which share a common purpose of actively contributing to reduce the risk and exposure of the affected population.\(^{43}\) Targeted protection actions relate to upholding of Protection Principles 3 and 4 from the 2011 Sphere Guidelines.\(^{44}\)

The difference between the two lies in the composition of the response, where stand-alone protection programming will consist of protection sector activities only (see first part of table 3), while integrated protection programming will employ responses from one or more traditional assistance sectors (shelter, WASH, health, food assistance, nutrition, etc.) in order to achieve a protection outcome.\(^{45}\) The latter might also involve combining protection sector responses with one or more of the other sectors. Please refer to annex 10.6 for an example of more elaborate integrated programming guidance (specifically on integrated food assistance and protection programming). For the European Commission, there is no difference between the protection activities that might be undertaken under a stand-alone or an integrated programme.\(^{46}\)

The European Commission will fund both stand-alone and integrated protection programming. Protection – by its nature – is multi-disciplinary, and protection issues will often manifest themselves in other humanitarian sectors. It is, however, important to distinguish between integrated and multi-sectorial programming. For protection programming to be integrated, there has to be an objective of achieving a protection outcome, and the sectors have to combine efforts to achieve this.

Mainstreaming

Protection mainstreaming is protection as a cross-cutting theme, which implies incorporating protection principles and promoting meaningful access, safety and dignity in humanitarian aid. This might also be described as “good programming” or “safe programming”.\(^{47}\) Protection mainstreaming refers to upholding Protection Principles 1 and 2 from the 2011 Sphere Guidelines.\(^{48}\)

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**EXAMPLE – Health care and Protection**

Provision of healthcare can constitute an important entry point for protection (related) activities. The individual and confidential encounter between patients (victims of physical/sexual/psychological violence) can provide important information to be used for programming and advocacy. Presence of international/external healthcare workers is an important asset, as local healthcare workers might find it difficult to document some of the issues. This protection outcome is thus unlikely to be achieved if access to health care is provided through cash/voucher modalities or performance-based financing modalities.

**EXAMPLE – The need to use an integrated approach to meaningfully mitigate protection risks**

Early marriage is a common coping mechanism amongst Syrian refugees in Lebanon – and often perceived solely as a GBV/child protection issue for which only GBV/child protection responses should be employed. While it is difficult – if not close to impossible – to currently address the root cause of this coping mechanism (legality of stay, improved living conditions, legal access to employment) a mixture of responses are needed including protection (obtaining marriage registration) and health (access to reproductive health care) to mitigate the consequences of this harmful coping strategy. Siloing of responses – even among various protection actors – unfortunately often results in missed opportunities.

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\(^{45}\) In undertaking integrated programming the DG ECHO policies on those specific sectors ([http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/policy-guidelines_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/policy-guidelines_en)) must be adhered to as well.

\(^{46}\) See further on type of activities under part 5.2.3 – Indicative Response Typology as well as Annex 10.7.

\(^{47}\) While either of these terms may actually be more accurate and even serve to ensure that this is rightly perceived as a collective responsibility of all humanitarian actors (not only those specialised in protection) DG ECHO has chosen to maintain the terminology of protection mainstreaming in its guidance, as this is also the terminology used by the GPC and most global actors.

Mainstreaming of basic protection principles in traditional assistance programmes is of paramount importance to the European Commission. It refers to the imperative for each and every humanitarian actor to prevent, mitigate and respond to protection threats that are caused or perpetuated by humanitarian action/inaction by ensuring the respect of fundamental protection principles in humanitarian programmes – no matter what the sector or objective. While mainstreaming protection is closely linked to the ‘do no harm’ principle, it widens it to prioritising safety and dignity and avoiding causing harm, ensuring meaningful access, ensuring accountability and participation and empowerment.

Using the outcome of the protection risk analysis, all proposals should demonstrate integration of these principles across the proposal, i.e. the logic of the intervention, activity descriptions, indicators, etc. The protection mainstreaming requirements of the European Commission naturally go hand in hand with the demands and principles outlined in the European Commission’s Gender Policy and the Gender and Age Marker.

Global guidelines exist to support protection mainstreaming, and humanitarian partners are encouraged to refer to these for further inspiration and examples, while remembering that the range of issues to be considered should always be based on a comprehensive protection risk analysis as outlined above, rather than on pre-conceived and standardised vulnerabilities.

**Capacity building**

As highlighted by the consultations leading to the World Humanitarian Summit and the “Independent Whole of System Review of Protection” there is still limited capacity of humanitarian actors to understand and address protection threats, and there is a need to stimulate capacity building for protection programming – whether targeted or mainstreaming – in humanitarian action. Likewise there is still a need to reinforce the capacity of the overall system and coordination with clear leadership, roles and responsibilities to ensure that the Centrality of Protection is promoted and strengthened. The European Commission is therefore

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**EXAMPLE – Mainstreaming and Integrated Approach – What is the difference?**

In Bangladesh, Mobile Money Transfers (MMT) are often used as a modality to respond to the aftermath of natural disasters. Beneficiaries must have a national ID card in order to acquire a SIM card. The importance of safe-keeping ID cards and other personal documents is part and parcel of protection mainstreaming in disaster responses. Occasionally, depending on the level of preparedness and/or the severity of the disaster, beneficiaries lose their civil documentation. Oxfam Bangladesh, in their response to the Tropical Storm Mahasen, integrated a protection component in their disaster response, which included assisting beneficiaries to renew/replace their lost National ID card. As well as facilitating inclusion in the cash transfer programme, this activity also ensured access to government safety net programmes and overall protection of the individual. MMT is also appreciated as being more physically secure because the phone “holds” the cash, and it reduces misuse of funds by other people.
committed to enhancing the ability of those involved in humanitarian aid to assess, plan, deliver, monitor, evaluate and advocate for protection-sensitive humanitarian aid in a coordinated manner. Support for operations aimed at building capacity in this field is provided mainly through the Enhanced Response Capacity initiative, financed from the EU budget.\(^55\)

Capacity building efforts should be sustainable beyond the funded action and coordinated amongst the relevant actors, at the local, national and/or global levels. They should also promote shared learning, through the dissemination of good practices and lessons learnt.

### 5.2.2 Response Types & Modalities

Protection activities may be categorised in relation to (a) **objectives and time-perspective** of those activities, and (b) in relation to the protection duties of duty-bearers.\(^56\) Each of these is outlined below.

**Response Types – Objectives and Time-Perspective of Protection Activities**

According to this criterion there are Responsive, Remedial and Environmental-Building activities, as per the chart below.\(^57\)

**Table 2: Protection activities, according to objectives and time-perspective**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Responsive activities(^58)</th>
<th>Remedial activities</th>
<th>Environment-Building activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose/Characteristics</strong></td>
<td>Stop, prevent, and alleviate the worst effects of human rights violations and patterns of abuse. They are immediate and urgent, targeting specific groups and/or persons.</td>
<td>Restore dignity in the aftermath of human rights violations. Support people living with the effects of those violations. They can be preventive of secondary abuse.</td>
<td>Aim to create an environment that allows full respect of rights, promoting deep change in attitudes, policies, values, or beliefs. They are about the prevention and long-term transformation of causes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Examples</strong></td>
<td>Advocacy to stop or reduce forced displacement of people by security forces or by a non-state armed group. Immediate attention to GBV survivors. Humanitarian assistance to newly arrived refugees in an improvised camp. Determination of refugee status for asylum seekers.</td>
<td>Mainstreaming protection in long-term activities in established refugee camps. Return or relocation processes for IDPs. Protection by peace-keeping forces for displaced peasants to grow and harvest in newly assigned lands.</td>
<td>Strengthening the judicial system of a country. Creation of an Ombudsman Office or a new government Ministry for the Rights of Women (examples).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{56}\) - The ICRC developed these approaches to humanitarian work.

\(^{57}\) - This model was initially devised by the ICRC.

\(^{58}\) - This also includes prevention activities.
From the point of view of DG ECHO, responsive and remedial activities are typical humanitarian protection activities, while the terms and requirements of environment-building activities are more structural in nature and usually go beyond the scope of humanitarian action (but within the scope of other EU funding instruments). This is also in line with the Sphere Protection Principles, where Principle 3 refers to responsive action, while Principle 4 refers to remedial action. However, many activities, such as IHL dissemination and advocacy, reporting and persuasion, are difficult to categorise under the three different types of actions. Likewise there may be activities that could be defined as “environment-building” (e.g. training judges and others on the protection of unaccompanied children, or building the capacities of social welfare officials to respond to the needs of GBV survivors), which might still be pertinent for a humanitarian protection. The best way to distinguish between responsive and remedial, on one hand, and environment-building, on another, is therefore to look beyond the activities as such and review whether the specific objective of the project is related either to a responsive logic (stop, prevent, and alleviate the worst effects of human rights violations and patterns of abuse, immediate and urgent, targeting specific groups and/or persons), or to a remedial logic (restore dignity in the aftermath of human rights violations, support people living with the effects of those violations; can be preventive of secondary abuse). From this point of view, the European Commission would, for example, not be in a position to fund (from the humanitarian budget line) the global strengthening of the judicial system of a country, or the global structure of a new Ombudsman Office, or a new Ministry for the Rights of Women.

“ The best way to distinguish between responsive and remedial, on one hand, and environment-building, on another, is therefore to look beyond the activities as such and review whether the specific objective of the project is related either to a responsive logic. ”
Response Modalities – Activities in relation to the protection obligations/responsibilities of duty-bearer stakeholders

When looking at responsible authorities, there are five main modes of humanitarian action that may be combined to meet the protection needs of affected people:

**Substitution** and **support** are ways of somehow taking the place of responsible authorities (or duty-bearer stakeholders in general) to provide direct protection assistance or expertise to persons, groups or communities faced with violations, threats and their social and economic consequences. **Support** is appropriate when responsible authorities are willing to take action around protection issues, but simply do not have the capacity or the means. **Substitution** should be a last resort, but may be necessary when the responsible authorities are unwilling or manifestly incapable, despite support, of taking appropriate action. It is, however, not easy for humanitarian organisations to directly respond to the protection needs of people as such responses usually require clear and committed action by responsible authorities or non-state armed groups. Two examples of substitution in protection include the refugee status determination when conducted by UNHCR alone, and the activities of peace-keeping forces to protect civilians (the latter would not be funded from the humanitarian budget line though).

**Persuasion**, **mobilisation** and **denunciation** describe different means, including advocacy, of applying pressure to ensure the compliance and cooperation of the relevant authorities in line with standards of protection of civilians laid down in international law. **Persuasion** requires a discreet engagement with duty-bearers to let them know about their duties in protection and to promote their fulfilling their protection obligations. **Mobilisation** involves engaging (often in a non-public way) with other key stakeholders so that they themselves put some pressure on duty-bearers. Both persuasion and mobilisation require a certain degree of confidentiality, but if they do not work, sometimes it is possible and necessary to resort to the third means, **denunciation**, in which information is put in the public realm, so that the duty-bearers feel compelled to take action (provided they are moved by shame).

The choice of mode of action in a given situation should be determined by the following considerations:

- Analysing and addressing the capacity and willingness of the authorities to respond;
- Assessing the risks involved in the different modes for the security of the affected population and for the security of humanitarian actors and agencies.

59 - These tools may also be used in other contexts.
Some important issues to consider:

- The ability and willingness of the responsible authorities to protect affected people will always be a critical factor in the choice of mode of action and the programme design. Less willing authorities are likely to require more coercive strategies of denunciation and mobilisation, while more willing authorities may respond to the more collaborative and cooperative modes of persuasion, substitution and support to services.

- Complementarity and collaboration are key aspects to achieve protection outcomes: protection involves a concerted effort, making the most of the different mandates, expertise, resources and networks of partners, and fostering diversity and cooperation.

Any requests for funding denunciation activities will be thoroughly analysed by the European Commission, as they would imply public disclosure of international law violations and likely create an adversarial relationship, which may be detrimental to responding to people’s protection and assistance needs and contrary to the European Commission’s principled approach.

5.2.3 Indicative response typology

Below is a list of typical responses to achieve protection outcomes that the European Commission would consider for funding, depending on the context – this list should not be regarded as exhaustive, or as a straightjacket. Nor is it organised in an order of priority. Situations may arise where responses not included in this list would be the most appropriate and not all responses will be appropriate in all contexts, nor are all responses appropriate for all actors. The choice of appropriate responses must be based on the outcome of the comprehensive risk analysis (as outlined in 5.1), clearly identifying the protection threats, vulnerabilities and capacities faced by the different gender, age, social, religious and ethnic groups in that specific situation at that point in time. A few of the responses are linked to a particular displacement status (refugee/IDP/Third Country National (TCN)), but in general the European Commission will not accept displacement status as an automatic entry point (see further below under targeting).
Table 3: Indicative response typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Category</th>
<th>Sub-categories/examples of activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROTECTION ACTIONS</strong> – might be implemented as stand-alone OR as part of an integrated approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documentation, Status &amp; Protection of Individuals</td>
<td>Birth and marriage registration; Restoration of lost personal documentation; Legal aid to obtain social benefits; Refugee Status Determination; Monitoring detention conditions; Family links; Family tracing and reunification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of and response to violence (including GBV)</td>
<td>Prevention: Sensitisation/Awareness raising; Hardware/Infrastructure. Response: Medical; Mental Health and Psycho-social Support (MHPSS); Legal; Security; Cash-based interventions for reintegration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Protection</td>
<td>Prevention of and response to violence, including through strengthening existing child protection systems (see above); Registration and identification of children; Case-management including BIA and BID processes; Family tracing and reunification; Prevention, demobilization, release and reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAAFAGs); Child Friendly Spaces/Adolescent Friendly Spaces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing, Land and Property Rights61</td>
<td>Legal aid for: Security of tenure in displacement situations – including preventing forced evictions; HLP Restitution for durable solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Action</td>
<td>Humanitarian demining; Assistance to Victims; Mine Risk Education; Armed Violence Reduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based Protection</td>
<td>Community-based protection processes and structures (incl. child-specific ones); Community centres; Community policing; Social cohesion/Conflict mitigation; Community-based planning processes; Assistance to host community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information dissemination</td>
<td>Rights and access to services awareness (including child-specific measures); Sensitisation campaigns/Risk awareness; IHL/IIHRL dissemination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information management</td>
<td>Monitoring/tracking of population movements (DTM); Protection monitoring; Profiling; Screening, registration and verification exercises; Protection databases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durable Solutions62 (return, local integration and resettlement)</td>
<td>Information on and preparation for DS possibilities; Legal aid; Registration; Transport; Monitoring of DS conditions; Evacuation of TCNs/Migrants in Crises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Specific studies/surveys; Cluster/coordination support; Training; Case Management referrals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy63</td>
<td>Mobilisation; Persuasion; Denunciation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER SECTOR ACTIONS</strong> – as part of an integrated protection approach64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to specific vulnerable groups65</td>
<td>Typically some sort of material assistance (but could also be specialised medical, PSS or legal assistance).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actively using other sectors to achieve protection outcomes</td>
<td>All “traditional” assistance sectors – food assistance, WASH, health, shelter &amp; settlements, nutrition, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Inter-linkages between these sector needs and protection needs to be identified through the risk analysis. Identification of coping mechanisms and freedom of movement restrictions are often key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durable Solutions (return, local integration and resettlement)</td>
<td>Return packages such as food, permanent shelter, agriculture packages, etc., finding joint approaches with development actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reception of evacuated/ expelled TCNs/migrants/ asylum seekers</td>
<td>Transit/reception facilities; registration; medical screening and services; food, NFIs and WASH in transit; legal aid and information; onward transportation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61 – Please refer also to the upcoming DG ECHO Shelter and Settlement Guidelines that also describe how safe and secure shelter is an important component of protection especially for displaced people, or in a context of damaged infrastructure such as an earthquake zone.

62 – Facilitate enforced, well-informed, safe and dignified return/repatriation, local integration and resettlement. Note that DG ECHO will normally only fund emergency submission of cases for resettlement as well as the preparatory aspects linked to “normal” resettlement, but not the physical resettlement.

63 – Advocacy is a modality that may in principle relate to all the other types of responses listed above.

64 – Cash-Based Intervention (CBI) is a modality that may in principle relate to all these types of responses. Cash Based Intervention (CBI) can be considered as an assistance tool when: 1) the protection analysis clearly identify which threats are addressed by the action and how CBI is the most appropriate modality alongside the other components of the programme; 2) the logical causality and the process leading to the protection outcome through the chosen CBI modality is clearly and explicitly identified; 3) the CBI is framed in a range of protection activities and processes.

65 – Not already covered in other categories.
Non-exhaustive examples of protection activities that should normally not be funded by the EU humanitarian aid instrument are listed below. Exceptions should be approved on a case-by-case basis by management and discussed with the EU Delegation concerned as needed.

- Demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups, except for children (whose integration in an armed group violates the law);
- Peace-keeping forces/operations;
- Support to security sector reform (SSR);
- General strengthening of the judiciary system of a country;
- Establishment of a new government ministry (e.g. for the Rights of Women or Children);
- Truth and reconciliation commissions.

5.2.4 Targeting

Humanitarian programmes aim to target the most vulnerable out of a commitment to needs-based programming. Often who is the "most vulnerable" is determined by a list of standard vulnerabilities with little or no analysis of what might constitute protection vulnerabilities due to specific threats in a given context at a specific point in time. This has a risk of inclusion and exclusion errors; hence the European Commission argues that protection-sensitive vulnerability targeting is needed in order to minimise these errors as much as possible.

Defining vulnerability

In humanitarian crises, life circumstances (e.g. poverty, education) and/or discrimination based on physical, social or other characteristics (sex, age, disability, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, legal status, etc.) may reduce a person’s ability to enjoy equal access to rights, services and livelihoods, thus making the person more vulnerable and/or marginalised, but no person is born vulnerable per se.

People are, or become, more vulnerable due to a combination of physical, social, environmental, cultural and political factors, and vulnerability is not a fixed category. Not everyone with the same characteristics will experience the same level of vulnerability; however, there are factors that may make certain individuals or groups inherently more vulnerable to specific identified threats, for example age and/or gender. Vulnerability is also time-bound; someone may be vulnerable due to specific circumstances at a particular moment in time, but that does not mean that a person will remain vulnerable.

Responding to ‘specific needs’ of children, different age groups, elderly, chronically ill, persons with disabilities, lactating or pregnant women means enabling their access to basic needs (shelter, food, water, health, nutrition and education) and this sometimes requires the humanitarian actors to have a stronger focus on certain groups or individuals.

It in humanitarian crises, life circumstances and/or discrimination based on physical, social or other characteristics may reduce a person’s ability to enjoy equal access to rights, services and livelihoods, thus making the person more vulnerable and/or marginalised, but no person is born vulnerable per se.

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66 - Inspired by the work on the Jordan VAF and the Protection Vulnerability Analysis Framework from the Ukraine Protection Cluster and Cash Working Group.

67 - Ibid.

68 - Inspired from “Protection & Prioritising the most Vulnerable Persons in the Ukrainian Humanitarian Response”, draft July 2015, Ukraine Protection Cluster
Protection-sensitive vulnerability targeting attempts to capture the above and simultaneously avoids resorting to the use of standardised vulnerability groups. Using the outcome from the risk analysis (part 5.1), it therefore entails targeting humanitarian assistance activities in a way that takes into account the protection concerns of individuals and groups based on:

- the risk of exposure to harm, exploitation, harassment, deprivation and abuse, in relation to identified threats;
- the inability to meet basic needs;
- limited access to basic services and livelihood/income opportunities;
- the ability of the person/population to cope with the consequences of this harm; and
- due consideration for individuals with specific needs.

These questions do not need to be asked to all individuals; rather, the context analysis done using the risk equation is crucial in obtaining this information for different age, sex, social, ethnic, and religious groups, in different locations, at specific points in time, during a given crisis.

The point of departure for the targeting analysis should be the entire crisis-affected population. In general, the European Commission will not accept e.g. displacement status as an automatic qualifier for assistance, but based on a risk analysis, displacement status can be considered a relevant vulnerability for a specific group of people, in a specific location, at a given point of time, in a given crisis.

The use of negative or dangerous coping mechanisms should be kept in mind when conducting the analysis. These are important vulnerabilities, as they will often expose people to harm and may eventually even turn into threats, yet are often hidden (due to stigma and shame – or because of not being recognised as dangerous by the community) and may not surface unless specifically searched for. In this regard, the Coping Strategies Index (CSI), originally developed for food assistance interventions, may be a useful tool – particularly for integrated programming – as it measures behaviour and analyses the structure of coping strategies. It can be used to evaluate vulnerability for targeting, as an early warning indicator, and for monitoring the outcome of actions.

Likewise issues of social exclusion and discrimination should be considered in the analysis. Groups, households or people facing such issues will often be hidden in the communities and be systematically excluded from participation in community-based consultation and participative processes. Thus, while community-based targeting methods might be useful, as often communities will intuitively define households whose members undertake risky and degrading behaviours as being vulnerable, there might be an important
exclusion risk in relying solely on this approach. Keep in mind that social exclusion and discrimination can be linked with a great variety of combined factors depending on the context (sex, age, disability, ethnicity, language spoken, colour of skin, religious/sexual orientation, gender identity, etc.) and do not overlook factors related to lived experience (having fled fighting in some conflicting settings, being a survivor of sexual violence, for instance, could link to different forms of discrimination).

In some contexts “standardised” social vulnerabilities are often catered for by social (state) and/or community welfare systems. Recent examples hereof include Ukraine, with an extensive state-run social welfare system providing support to e.g. elderly, single-female headed families and large families, and Lebanon, where studies have shown that those most vulnerable to evictions by private house owners are adolescent boys and young single men. In such situations humanitarian assistance and protection must focus on those “falling through the cracks” of the formal or non-formal systems.

The risk analysis can also identify whom NOT to target with a particular activity and propose alternatives. Humanitarian responses design programmes to meet needs, but where meeting a need puts a household or an individual at risk alternatives should be found (this can often be done through integrated programming).

The table below illustrates how different people in the same location face different threats – but none of them are automatically more vulnerable than others.

### EXAMPLE – Different people, different threats, same location

**And how to take this into account in targeting and programming**

When violence erupted in South Sudan in late 2013, tens of thousands of people from the Nuer tribe sought refuge and protection within the UNMISS bases in Juba. They were joined by small numbers from other ethnic groups and stranded foreign migrant workers (such as Ethiopians, Kenyans, and Somalis). These sites within the UN bases became known as Protection of Civilian (PoC) camps.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Main protection threats</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Food Assistance</th>
<th>WASH &amp; Shelter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young Nuer (12-25 years) boy/man in PoC camp in Juba – came to camp alone</td>
<td>Pressure to join opposition forces. Alcohol and drug abuse prompting violent behaviour. No freedom of movement out of camp.</td>
<td>Ensure that he is not left out of targeting for food assistance, as this may further encourage high risk behaviour.</td>
<td>What would be the living conditions most likely to mitigate the risks – living within a family or a group living for several of these boys?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adolescent Nuer girl in PoC camps in Juba</td>
<td>Sexual exploitation for survival. SGBV in and outside (fetching water, firewood, etc.) of camp.</td>
<td>Proper clinical and psycho-social response mechanism in place.</td>
<td>Ensure targeting &amp; that she has access to the food within the family. Discourage family from sending girls out on errands if risk involved.</td>
<td>Lighting in camps; Improved shelters; Locks on shelters and latrines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority (incl. foreign migrants) in PoC camps in Juba</td>
<td>Retaliatory violence by majority community who feel the minorities may support the GoSS. Discrimination in access to services and involvement in camp issues.</td>
<td>Ensure non-discrimination in access to services especially as agencies are now looking to mainly recruit Nuer staff due to trust and language.</td>
<td>Ensure that these groups are not left out in e.g. community-based targeting processes.</td>
<td>Ensure that these groups have access to water points and latrines and are not excluded based on e.g. religion or superstition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.5 Self-protection strategies and capacities

Local communities’ own knowledge and protection strategies are crucial for their safety and survival: Field practice demonstrates that self-protection must be at the heart of protection strategies, and people in need of protection should be seen not just as victims but also as actors of their own protection. States have obligations to protect them, but the most critical protection strategies of civilians may often be their own. People generally know much more than agencies about their own situation, in particular:

- the nature and timing of the threats confronting them and the history of previous threats; the mind-set and personalities of, and the relationships between, the people posing these threats;
- the resources within their community, the coping mechanisms and the practical possibilities and opportunities for resisting these threats; and
- the optimal linkage between their own response and that of a humanitarian agency.

While communities may know about their protection needs and possible responses, this is not tantamount to being capable of taking action on them. Therefore, supporting and empowering communities to better analyse the risks they face, and to develop their own strategies to reduce exposure to and mitigate the effects of these risks, need to be maintained as a core strategy in protection work. Protection that is achieved by people, rather than delivered to them, is likely to be more durable.

Recent extensive studies\(^{73}\) show that livelihoods, cash transfers and protection are intimately linked, and customary law, local values and traditions may often matter a lot, in addition to formal human rights. One of the recommendations is putting the community’s perspective and participation at the centre and allow for a holistic response addressing physical safety, livelihoods, and psychosocial needs.

However, it is important to note that some coping strategies can be harmful to (segments of) a population, in particular if they are based on selective power relationships within a community (so that a particular gender or social group are excluded), or if they are based on a coercive relationship with the belligerents (in armed conflicts). When this is recognised, strategies should be developed to mitigate these situations.

As a final note, crucial as it is, humanitarian agencies cannot and should not be seen as a substitute for the protection role and responsibility bestowed on national authorities or – when that fails – international actors. Addressing the threats faced by a specific community may require action from a range of different actors, across multiple disciplines and sectors. Even where they are unable to take direct action to address a threat, humanitarian

\(^{73}\) See for example the Local to Global Protection [www.local2global.info](http://www.local2global.info) and the ERC Cash and Protection project and initiative [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/erc-guide-for-protection-in-cash-based-interventions.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/erc-guide-for-protection-in-cash-based-interventions.pdf)
actors are likely to play a critical role in analysing the risks, identifying the relevant actors and mobilising their contributions to reduce risk. At times, local actors may have greater access and are less likely to be targeted than international actors, while at other times international actors may have more influence or authority with national governments and/or belligerents. An assessment of which actors can achieve the most effective protection results is essential when pursuing a multi-disciplinary and integrated approach to the delivery of protection outcomes.

5.2.6 Managing context- and action-related risks that may affect programme implementation

Risks can be defined as foreseeable potential situations that might affect the implementation of the action, without necessarily excluding its further implementation, but requiring specific measures aimed at reducing them.

The implementation of humanitarian protection activities may be particularly challenging, especially in armed conflicts where one or more parties pose threats to affected people. As many protection activities may involve some level of engagement with powerful duty-bearers, this may increase the risks linked to protection work as compared to other sectors. For example, advocacy activities might entail risks to the security of affected populations, the intervening agency and others, and the EU as a donor, because the purpose of these activities has to do with stopping action by perpetrators and improving compliance by duty-bearers, and those activities deal with sensitive information. Insensitive or unprofessional advocacy by humanitarian staff can lead to punitive reprisals or accelerated military action by authorities or armed groups.

While humanitarian agencies may not be in a position to eliminate all context-related risks, any adverse impacts that the context in which humanitarian crises occur may have on affected populations should be mitigated as far as possible. At the same time, humanitarian interventions must take into account action-related risks so that they do not create, exacerbate or contribute to perpetuating inequalities or discrimination and must not put beneficiaries at risk, in accordance with the ‘do no harm’ principle and a conflict-sensitive approach.

Thus, in some scenarios it may be useful to shift from the so-called protection dilemmas (as for example having to choose between two mutually exclusive objectives, e.g. the choice between humanitarian access and advocacy, where the latter one might undermine access), into an action-oriented approach: how to advocate for protection needs while maintaining access to the affected population.

The more sensitive the context, the more context- and action-related risks need to be evaluated ahead of starting interventions. Using the integrated approach (i.e. achieving protection outcomes through other sector objectives and activities) might be one way in which to mitigate these risks.
6. Monitoring, Evaluation & Indicators

DG ECHO requires all funded operations to be based on a well-developed intervention logic, which defines the objectives to be achieved, the activities to be undertaken to achieve these objectives and the logical relation and intermediary steps between them. Changes in behaviour, attitudes, policy, knowledge, and practice are intermediate outcomes, which are expected to contribute to overall protection impact in terms of reduction of risks. The outcomes are effects of the activities and the resulting outputs, i.e. products and services provided to beneficiaries and stakeholders. A clear intervention logic with objectives, outcomes, outputs and activities enables to prioritise efforts and resources, to observe progress and changes, as well as to learn lessons from success and failure of protection interventions. This is all the more important as protection activities to a large extend seek to address behaviour change of duty-bearers and crisis-affected persons, groups and communities, which is difficult to anticipate and control given the range of factors influencing it.

Indicators are used to measure outputs and outcomes in an objective manner. DG ECHO partners can make use of existing indicators and well-defined custom indicators to capture the different aspects of the results. Triangulation, i.e. the combination of different indicators and sources is important to obtain a complete picture. For example, an indicator on perception of risk/safety could be used in conjunction with an indicator on actual security incidents.

Output indicators for protection measure the specific steps and measures taken by the project to influence the behaviour of key, primary and duty-bearer. Outcome indicators for protection capture the change in the threats and vulnerabilities as well as the

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Indicators Registry held by UNOCHA (regularly updated by the Global Protection Cluster and its AORs), the ones provided by the standards on mainstreaming protection (such as the Child Protection Minimum Standards), and the indicators used in Strategic Response Plans/Humanitarian Response Plans.
capacities of the affected population. Outcome indicators, however, also capture the intermediary effects of an intervention, such as improved knowledge of duty-bearers or affected populations or specific steps taken by project stakeholders, etc. In some cases, coverage, i.e. the proportion of beneficiaries of a coherent set of protection services compared to the overall needs, can be used as proxy indicator for outcomes.

Baselines for all indicators are crucial to monitor progress during the intervention and achievements at the end. As with all indicators, it is also important to triangulate this indicator with others (such as number of protection incidents around the same activities).

75 - In some cases, if the stakeholder that is meant to take action is highly collaborative, these actions could also be included under outputs even if the stakeholder is not part of the implementation team.

**INDICATORS – Examples and Suggestions**

**EXAMPLES – Output Indicators**
- # of beneficiaries who obtain civil documentation by the end of the project;
- Law enforcement officials trained on protection-related matters;
- # of reported cases of persons (disaggregated by age and sex) experiencing violence who receive an age- and gender-appropriate response;
- Register system of cases of persons in need of protection is in place;
- # of public advocacy briefs/reports produced and disseminated.

**EXAMPLES – Outcome Indicators**
- Responsible authorities implement a protocol to address the protection needs of affected people;
- Existing cases of aggressions against affected population are diminished;
- % of girls and boys separated from armed forces or groups who are effectively reintegrated in their families and the community or alternatively integrated;
- % of people of concern registered on an individual basis, according to standards and at agreed level of registration.

**Indicators for Training and Capacity Development**
In proposals containing considerable training or capacity development components (not sensitisation/awareness), the different layers of training results should be kept in mind: 1) Reaction (How did participants react to the training?), 2) Learning/knowledge (How much did participants learn?), 3) Behaviour (How did the work of participants change due to the training?), 4) Effects (How did the action/performance of the organisation change due to the training?). The project logframe should contain at least an indicator on #2 (Learning, measured for example through an in/out test) and on #4 (organisational effects). It is not enough to report on the number of participants and their reaction or appreciation of the course (#1).

**The “feeling safe” indicator**
The perception of affected people of the risk they are facing (i.e. if they feel safe) may be an outcome indicator for a protection intervention. Three points are to be considered when defining such indicator: 1) Be specific in order to avoid diverging interpretations: rather than broad questions around whether a person or a group “feels safe” or not, it may be more useful to ask questions about contextually relevant activities that are affected by safety concerns, such as going to fetch water, to the market, to visit relatives, etc. 2) As risks and perception of risk vary within a population, it is very important to survey different groups of people, such as women, children or minorities. 3) Survey questions should focus on the current situation (“feeling safe now”) instead of comparisons (“feeling safer than one month ago”). If the same questions are asked at regular intervals to a sample of the population using the same response grid, changes in the perceptions of safety can be observed.
7. Coordination & Advocacy

**Coordination, Coherence & Complementarity**
Achieving the objectives of this document requires maximising impact, avoiding gaps and duplication, and ensuring continuity and sustainability. The European Commission will pay particular attention to enhanced coordination on protection and will strive for a higher degree of coherence and complementarity.

To this end the European Commission will fully cooperate with and support the aims of the Transformative Agenda to optimise operational and strategic coordination on country (or regional) basis. Where there is no contradiction with basic humanitarian principles, such as the neutral and non-partisan nature of humanitarian assistance, this will include support to the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team, and in particular to its protection coordination platform, such as clusters or equivalent. This will include support to the joint humanitarian planning process for the protection sector – and protection mainstreaming in all sectors, including joint needs assessment, joint humanitarian strategy firmly rooted in the Centrality of Protection and joint action plan.

Overall, maximising the impact of European Commission humanitarian protection interventions requires an enabling environment.

Coordination and cooperation between European Commission services, EU institutions, EU Member States and other major humanitarian and development donors is being maximised to ensure that European Commission protection programming decisions are made on the basis of need, factoring in all funding and assistance strategies expected from other donors and actors.

The Global Protection Cluster has a key role to play in this. It is the forum through which protection humanitarian agencies, major donors and other actors can agree, task and resource global humanitarian protection priorities in direct support of field operations.

The European Commission’s network of humanitarian protection experts works to strengthen the functioning of the Protection Cluster, and ensures the articulation between local level project performance and coordination with regional and global strategies, priorities and standards. It also encourages an equitable participation between the Cluster Lead agency and other protection actors, in order to promote inclusiveness, co-responsibility and mutual accountability. The European Commission recognises the importance of fully exploiting synergies available through closer coordination with other Global Clusters, often also supported through European Commission humanitarian funding. For example, to ensure mainstreaming of protection in all other humanitarian assistance sectors.
The European Commission’s advocacy role

Due to its extensive field network and vocation as a global humanitarian donor, the European Commission’s humanitarian staff are often the only EU actor – and sometimes among the very few international actors – present in the “deep field” in conflict and disaster zones, and therefore have important information and detailed technical expertise that others do not, including those – including political and military actors – in a position to improve the situation.

As a well-known principled and global humanitarian donor, the European Commission also has a respected voice that it can and should use for the benefit of the affected people. Not using the European Commission’s advocacy potential to the fullest also sends a message and risks giving the impression that nothing needs to be changed. At the same time, humanitarian advocacy takes place in a fast-paced environment where stakes are particularly high and risks increase when advocacy is badly planned or wrongly deployed. It is necessary to minimise and mitigate those risks.

For a detailed analysis of advocacy issues specifically related to IHL and protection, please see the forthcoming DG ECHO Advocacy Toolbox.
8. Key practical recommendations

Partners and experienced staff
Humanitarian partners must ensure that the programme implementation is properly resourced with experienced staff. Protection programming is likely to require specialised human resources often not readily available. While the cost of material inputs might be low, the cost in staff can be significant, and thus protection staff should be considered as ‘input costs’ rather than ‘support costs’. The more the context is complex, the more the protection activities are demanding in specific skills (e.g. participatory and analytical skills at the assessment stage, strategic planning skills during programme design, community-mobilisation, capacity-building, legal, negotiation and advocacy skills during programme delivery) and are time consuming. Stability in the team to sustain a protection intervention over a period of time is also fundamental. Good knowledge of, access to the local population, experience of engaging with affected communities, and skills to manage sensitive protection data and information, are all important to ensure that the targeted population are indeed reached.

Exit strategy & transition
Exit strategy for protection programmes must be envisaged at the earliest possible stage. A very early collaboration with the local or national authorities and other actors able to pursue longer term programmes (other European Commission services, United Nations agencies, World Bank, etc.) is needed. Regular review of the protection risk analysis should orientate the Commission about the current pertinence of the actions funded in a particular context.

A particular difficulty for exit/transition in the area of protection is linked to ensuring that humanitarian protection actors do not leave a vacuum when moving into a development context, and that state and/or development actors take over.76

Nevertheless, all the elements are present in the development approach - in particular in fragile states with a large focus is on state building - but not under the label of “protection”. Most activities related to protection are to be found, in a development framework, under human rights, rule of law and good governance programmes. Humanitarian actors have nevertheless to be careful that state-building goals (which are essentially politically driven) in a given context do not contravene the humanitarian protection goals in the same context, and have to ensure that particularly vulnerable groups, which might be overlooked in the development phase, are still protected. This applies in particular to refugees and IDPs after their return, but could also relate to particular ethnic, social or religious groups.77

76 - Child protection, for example, may be one of the exceptions, as they draw extensively on existing protection systems
77 - Limited research exists on this issue, but see e.g. “Health in the service of state-building in fragile and conflict affected contexts: an additional challenge in the medical-humanitarian environment” by Mit Philips and Katharine Derderian on http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/pdf/s13031-015-0039-4.pdf which focuses on health, but from where conclusions related to protection in such contexts can also be drawn.
When protection is implemented in an integrated approach with other sector programming, exit strategies of protection must be aligned with the criteria set by the other type of programming in order to ensure consistency.

**Management of sensitive protection information**

Information management (data collection, analysis, storage, dissemination and use) is a sensitive process that must be undertaken with due care, especially in situations of conflict or armed violence. Common activities, such as conducting individual interviews, can put people at risk. The risks they incur can range from physical violence to social marginalization, and are often unknown to the individual soliciting the information, and sometimes to the person providing it. Stored information may be lost, hacked or stolen. The protection actor seeking and managing the information bears the responsibility for managing the risks associated with the process (all protection actors should have policy or guidelines on this topic or make use of existing ones).

The ‘Professional Standards for Protection Work’ highlight the following basic principles that must be respected by actors across every discipline and sector:

- Protection actors must only collect information on abuses and violations when necessary for the design or implementation of protection activities. It must not be used for other purposes without additional consent.
- Systematic information collection, particularly when involving direct contact with individuals affected by abuses and violations, must only be carried by organisations with the capacity, skills, information management systems and necessary protocols in place.
- Protection actors must collect and handle information containing personal details in accordance with the rules and principles of international law and other relevant regional or national laws on individual data protection.
- Protection actors seeking information bear the responsibility to assess threats to the persons providing information, and to take necessary measures to avoid negative consequences for those from whom they are seeking information.


Protection actors setting up systematic information collection through the Internet or other media must analyse the different potential risks linked to the collection, sharing or public display of the information and adapt the way they collect, manage and publically release the information accordingly.

Additional key issues include:

- Transfer of data to authorities, if strictly required, or publication of data: it should be done with particular caution and appropriate security safeguards ensuring confidentiality, and following best practice and requirements about this. Do consider dissociating personal details from the rest of information. If in doubt, before handing over data on any beneficiary it is important to seek advice from the Global Protection Cluster or other mandated actors (such as UNHCR in the case of refugees or stateless persons).

- For GBV cases, in particular, strict attention should be paid to WHO’s safety and ethical recommendations for the collection of information on sexual violence in emergencies, including confidentiality and informed consent as well as anonymised and aggregated data. Furthermore, procedures for mandatory reporting of sexual violence must be clearly explained to survivors before they disclose any information.

**Sexual Exploitation and Abuse**

The term sexual exploitation and abuse refers to any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes.
including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.\textsuperscript{81} Unequal power dynamics in humanitarian situations create the risk of persons in need of support (especially the most vulnerable) being exploited sexually to obtain basic provisions.

To address this, specific measures and coordination between humanitarian actors are necessary to protect beneficiaries. These include the adoption and implementation of codes of conduct, the development of collective reporting mechanisms, strengthened investigation standards as well as corrective measures, the aim being to ensure zero tolerance for any abuse.\textsuperscript{82}

**Protection Activities linked to Deliberate Targeting of Humanitarian Personnel**

Where meeting the basic needs of an affected population is put in peril due to deliberate targeting of humanitarian personnel, certain protection activities might be relevant to try and mitigate this. This issue has been particularly highlighted in connection with healthcare providers (health facilities, ambulances, supplies) being frequently targeted by armed actors (e.g. killings of vaccinators in Pakistan; bombing of facilities in Afghanistan or Yemen; looting of drugs stock in DRC), but may equally affect provision of services and assistance in other sectors. In some cases, this deliberate targeting might constitute IHL violations due to the nature of the situation in which they take place; in other instances this is not necessarily the case. Recent years have e.g. witnessed cases of inability to respond to epidemics outbreaks in Central America due to extremely high levels of gang-related violence (other situations of violence) or even just reduced access to health care and education in the same areas, as health care providers and teachers are too afraid to work there.

While this issue is closely linked to access in general and as such extends beyond the protection sector, certain tools from protection might be useful in this regard. These include e.g. dissemination of IHL/IHRL to all armed actors, as well as appropriate advocacy tools. Determining the right tools to use in a given context will require conducting a thorough risk analysis of the different modalities and actions (see more under 5.2.6).\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{81} \textemdash \text{UN Secretary-General's Bulletin on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) (ST/SGB/2003/13)) from } \url{http://pseataskforce.org/en/overview#section_2}

\textsuperscript{82} \textemdash \text{Please see further in part 6 of the DG ECHO Gender policy.}

\textsuperscript{83} \textemdash ICRC's Health Care in Danger project is a good example of this. See more on } \url{http://healthcareindanger.org/hcid-project}
9. Conclusion

This document updates the 2009 Funding Guidelines for Humanitarian Protection, based on global developments and accumulated experiences over the past years. It defines humanitarian protection from the European Commission’s perspective as **addressing violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation and abuse for persons, groups and communities in the context of humanitarian crises**, and promotes the risk approach to humanitarian protection as a tool for identifying the aspects and considerations that should be reflected in proposals submitted to the European Commission. It highlights that the Commission will fund both stand-alone and integrated protection programming, and that protection should be mainstreamed in all humanitarian actions funded by the European Commission. Finally, the document offers guidance on response types and modalities that can be funded, on the importance of protection-sensitivity in vulnerability targeting, on engagement of local actors and on measuring output and outcome of protection interventions.

It is the hope of the European Commission that this document will serve as a useful tool for our partners in assessing, designing, implementing and monitoring humanitarian protection interventions funded by the European Commission and that it will be a valuable complementary tool to existing globally recognised guidelines and manuals.
10. Annexes

10.1 Terminology

**Forced displacement**
The term is widely understood to cover a broader scope of groups than those covered by the refugee and IDP definitions with the common denominator being that some level of force and compulsion is part of the “decision” to leave. No simple definition or official designation exists.

**Humanitarian crisis**
An event or series of events which represent a critical threat to the health safety, security or wellbeing of a community or other large group of people. A humanitarian crisis can have natural or manmade causes, can have a rapid or slow onset and can be of short or protracted duration.

**Humanitarian Protection**
Addressing violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation and abuse for persons, groups and communities in the context of humanitarian crises.

**Humanity**
Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population. The dignity of all victims must be respected and protected.

**IDP**
Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border.

**Impartiality**
Humanitarian aid must be provided solely on the basis of need without discrimination between or within affected populations.

**Independence**
The autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, economic, military or other objectives. Serves to ensure that the sole purpose of humanitarian aid remains to relieve and prevent the suffering of victims of humanitarian crises.

**Neutrality**
Humanitarian aid must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute.

**Refugee**
A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees).

**Social exclusion**
Social exclusion is defined as a process and a state that prevents individuals or groups from full participation in social, economic and political life and from asserting their rights. It derives from exclusionary relationships based on power resulting from social identity (e.g. race, gender, ethnicity, caste/clan/tribe or religion) and/or social location (areas that are remote, stigmatised or suffering from war/conflict).
### 10.2 Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Accountability to Affected People</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>AORs</td>
<td>Areas of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIA</td>
<td>Best Interests Assessments</td>
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<tr>
<td>BID</td>
<td>Best Interests Determination</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAFAGs</td>
<td>Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>Cash-Based Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Coping Strategies Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Durable Solutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTM</td>
<td>Displacement Tracking Matrix</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Enhanced Response Capacity</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
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<td>GPC</td>
<td>Global Protection Cluster</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPPi</td>
<td>Global Public Policy Institute</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLP</td>
<td>Housing, Land and Property</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRuF</td>
<td>Human Rights up Front initiative</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHRL</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBTI</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHPSS</td>
<td>Mental Health and Psycho-Social Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMT</td>
<td>Mobile Money Transfers</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFIs</td>
<td>Non-Food Items</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>PIM</td>
<td>Protection Information Management initiative</td>
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<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilian</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSEA</td>
<td>Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSS</td>
<td>Psycho-Social Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>Third Country National</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAF</td>
<td>Vulnerability Analysis Framework</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHS</td>
<td>World Humanitarian Summit</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRC</td>
<td>Women's Refugee Commission</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
10.3 Key reference documents

General


"Scoping Study: What Works in Protection and How do We Know" (by the GPPI, commissioned by the UK Department for International Development - http://www.gppi.net/publications/humanitarian-action/article/scoping-study-what-works-in-protection-and-how-do-we-know/)


Local 2 Global Protection - www.local2global.info

Humanitarian Response Indicators Registry  - https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/applications/ir/indicators/global-clusters/10


Relevant EU/DG ECHO policies and Guidance


European Agenda on Migration - http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf


Links to all policies and guidelines relevant to DG ECHO’s work can be found on http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/policy-guidelines_en

These include:

**Food assistance**

- Food Assistance: From Food Aid to Food Assistance

**Nutrition**

- Addressing undernutrition in emergencies: a roadmap for response
- Nutrition: Addressing Undernutrition in Emergencies
- Guidance Document: Infant and young children feeding in emergencies

**Water Sanitation and Hygiene**

- Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH): Meeting the challenge of rapidly increasing humanitarian needs in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
- European Commission Staff Working Document on Humanitarian Wash Policy: Meeting the challenge of rapidly increasing humanitarian needs in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)
**Health**
- Policy document: Addressing Undernutrition in Emergencies
- General Documents and Guidelines on Health in Crisis Affected Populations
- Endemic and Epidemic Diseases in Crisis Affected Populations
- HIV/AIDS in Crisis Affected Populations
- Mental Health in Emergencies
- Reproductive Health in Emergencies including Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
- Other documents

**Cash and Vouchers**
- Cash and Vouchers: increasing efficiency and effectiveness across all sectors

**Gender-sensitive aid**
- Gender in Humanitarian Aid: Different Needs, Adapted Assistance
- Gender-Age Marker toolkit

**Disaster risk reduction (DRR)**
- Disaster Risk Reduction: increasing resilience by reducing disaster risk in humanitarian action

**Helping Children in Need**
- A Special Place for Children in EU External Action
- The EU Action Plan on Children's Rights in External Action
- Children in Emergency & Crisis Situations

**Refugees**
- Operational Standards for Registration and Documentation, December 2007, [http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ae9ac8f0.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ae9ac8f0.html)

**Internally displaced persons**

**Stateless**
Gender Based Violence


Child Protection


UN Guidelines for the alternative care of children: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c3acd162.html


Mine Action

International Mine Action Standards (endorsed by the IASC in 2001): http://www.mineactionstandards.org/about/about-imas/


**Housing, Land and Property (HLP) Rights**


**Psychosocial support**


**Data Management**


Protection Information Management Initiative (PIM), by DRC and UNHCR: [http://data.unhcr.org/imtoolkit/events/index/lang:eng](http://data.unhcr.org/imtoolkit/events/index/lang:eng)


**Cash**


10.4 Normative Frameworks Sources

International Humanitarian Law (IHL)  
(also referred to as the Law of war)

The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (especially the IV Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War) and their two Additional Protocols of 1977

Refugee and Displacement Law

Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961
OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa, 1969
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, 1984 (not legally binding, but widely respected and applied by states in Latin America)
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998 (not legally binding)
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), 2009
Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (Great Lakes Protocols, 2006)

International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and core international human rights instruments

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
American Convention of Human Rights
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 1990
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts, 2000

84 - This is a non-exhaustive list
Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 2006

Others


Statement of Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN and Non-UN Personnel

To know which international human rights instrument a specific State has committed itself to respect, refer to:
### 10.5 Identifying Threats, Vulnerabilities and Capacities

Below are some key issues/questions to consider when identifying threats, vulnerabilities and capacities of people/groups/communities in a given context at a given point in time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>Capacities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Main characteristics of the threat: Including type/manifestation, frequency/prevalence, and geographic area.</td>
<td>1. Who are the individuals/groups vulnerable vis-à-vis this threat? Why are they vulnerable? Including location, time, activity, access resources, gender, age, disability, social/religious/economic/political group or identity, service provision, restricted mobility, ethnicity/culture/traditions/land, and non-visual vulnerabilities (i.e. psychosocial vulnerabilities).</td>
<td>1. What resources, capacity, and strengths exist to cope with and/or mitigate this threat? Ability to analyse risks? Possibility to move? Preparation or availability of services for any harmful events? Ability or power to convince those threatening them to change or others to protect them? Existing livelihood skills? Education? Awareness of their rights as affected population or power to access/enjoy them if aware? Is capacity assessed in relation to the specific risk, taking into account vulnerability vis-à-vis a threat? This includes consideration of access restrictions that may impact on participation and engagement and reduce capacity accordingly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the main characteristics of the actors responsible for the threat? Including individual/group, relationship to affected individual/population, structure/location of decision-making power, clear/ambiguous chain of command, and duty-bearer or not.</td>
<td>2. Recognise that vulnerabilities change over time.</td>
<td>2. What resources, capacity, and strengths exist to cope with and/or overcome the consequences of this threat?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the main factors driving their behaviour? Including motivations to mistreat individual/population, formal/informal policies/practices, governing norms, power dynamics, and attitudes, ideas &amp; beliefs.</td>
<td>3. Recognise that taking away one vulnerability can increase another vulnerability; what vulnerabilities are we creating?</td>
<td>3. What protective mechanisms exist within the community/family/individual? Is there a level of community organization?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. What is their will and capacity to comply with IHL, IHRL &amp; Refugee Law and other protective norms?</td>
<td>4. Recognise that a lack of coping mechanisms (negative or positive) can be a vulnerability.</td>
<td>4. Which duty-bearers, key stakeholders, civil society and INGOs are responding? How are they linked to current community-based initiatives/protective measures? Are they supporting, promoting, strengthening, or undermining?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. What are the main sources of resources, influence, pressure and leverage? Including economic, political, legal, and social.</td>
<td>5. Look at patterns of vulnerability over periods of time.</td>
<td>5. What did the protective environment look like prior to the crisis/emergency? Including health services, psychosocial services, child &amp; family welfare, and legal/judicial system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. What are the possible incentives to change their policy, practice, attitudes and beliefs?</td>
<td>6. What is the impact/consequence of this threat? Including life-threatening, permanent injury/disability, non-life-threatening injury, loss of property/assets/livelihood, loss of access to life-sustaining resources, loss of access to essential services, loss of ability to sustain life/health, marginalisation/exclusion, separation from family, recruitment into armed forces, and detention.</td>
<td>6. At each level (individual, family, community, structural, institutional, national) what are the relevant points of influence &amp; leverage? What are the linkages within the protective system (environment) where a change in one factor can influence a positive change in another?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. What are the disincentives to comply with norms/make the desired behaviour change?</td>
<td>7. How are development actors, initiatives &amp; programs linked to those of emergency response actors? How is this being utilised or undermined?</td>
<td>7. How are development actors, initiatives &amp; programs linked to those of emergency response actors? How is this being utilised or undermined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5 Identifying Threats, Vulnerabilities and Capacities</td>
<td>8. What commitments exist within civil society actors &amp; NGOs?</td>
<td>8. What commitments exist within civil society actors &amp; NGOs?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9. What are the leverage points of influence/intervention?</td>
<td>9. What are the leverage points of influence/intervention?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10. Do we understand the interconnectedness of the system?</td>
<td>10. Do we understand the interconnectedness of the system?</td>
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10.6 Guidance for Integrated Protection & Food Assistance Programming

Why This Document?

In many contexts in which humanitarians work, insecurity, conflict and protection challenges are what prevent households from carrying out their livelihoods, accessing basic services and realising their basic rights. Likewise, existing or new complex social dynamics may result in different vulnerabilities to crises — whether natural or man-made — and necessitate different programme approaches for different groups, even under the same objective/result, in order to counteract deeply ingrained mechanisms of social exclusion. In South East Asia for example, Dalit communities are prevented from receiving emergency aid or accessing shelters or communal kitchens due to perceived ‘untouchability’ and internalised social norms or fears of violence.

In these contexts to what extent do we, as humanitarians, understand the balancing act performed daily by households, such as choosing between “I’m afraid but I’m hungry”; the dilemma faced by individuals and families who must weigh the urgency of accessing their basic needs against the risk of violence and/or degradation faced in doing so? We know that in some insecure areas households decide to send women to cultivate because the risk of rape that they face is less consequential to household well-being than the risk of death faced by men, and we know that in many contexts refugees continue to exchange in transactional sex for access to education, freedom of movement and food.

But are we doing enough to understand and to programme to address this dilemma? Recent protection mainstreaming efforts have increased awareness about do no harm which aims to ensure that programmes do not make things worse. What this document aims to do is to take the next step, to use the tools at our disposal to Make Things Better through integrated programming.

This document focuses specifically on the nexus between protection and food assistance. This is because there is increasing interest and acknowledgement amongst food security and protection actors that more work needs to be done in this area to develop and promote more appropriate responses. The tools and approaches are relevant for integrated programming with other sectors as well (e.g. WASH, Health, Shelter), but there are currently less examples on which to develop specific approaches and tools.

Mainstreaming and Integration of Protection – What is the difference?

Protection mainstreaming is protection as a cross-cutting theme which implies incorporating protection principles and promoting meaningful access, safety and dignity in humanitarian aid.

Protection integration refers to sector work that aims to prevent and respond to violence or threat of violence; coercion and exploitation; deliberate deprivation, neglect or discrimination, and supporting people to enjoy their rights in safety and with dignity, through sector specific work.

An example of protection mainstreaming could be that safety is ensured on the road to and from and at food distribution sites. If this is not possible then integrated programming should be applied. This implies thinking how other measures from the combined toolbox of protection and food assistance could be put in place such as advocacy with relevant duty-bearers to enhance the safety in distributions while simultaneously ensure provision of food assistance in situ.

85 - Social exclusion is defined as a process and a state that prevents individuals or groups from full participation in social, economic and political life and from asserting their rights. It derives from exclusionary relationships based on power resulting from social identity (e.g. race, gender, ethnicity, caste/dam/tribe or religion) or social location (areas that are remote, stigmatised or suffering from war/conflict). Note that social exclusion is NOT the entry point for DG ECHO interventions, but it is a TRIGGER for analysis.


In many humanitarian contexts an integrated approach to programming food assistance and protection is essential. Poorly conceived protection programmes can have a negative impact on food security, and poorly conceived food assistance can have a negative impact on protection outcomes, whereas well-conceived and implemented protection programming can have positive food assistance outcomes and vice versa. A simple example of this is protection advocacy to promote freedom of movement gives households secure access to markets to buy and sell goods and services.

**Objectives and Principles**

This document has been prepared as a first step to stimulate relevant analysis and create space to innovate, collect, and document successful strategies and tools that bring these strongly linked sectors together. By encouraging integrated thinking and programming amongst DG ECHO staff and partners it is hoped that actual implementation on the ground will contribute to increased experience and collection of evidence-based case studies, which will lead to further refinement of this document and its development into funding guidelines.

Specifically, the document aims to maximise the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of integrated food assistance and protection programming by:

1. Providing a framework for improved context analysis that considers threats as well as the needs, vulnerabilities and capacities of populations;
2. Offering guidance for programme design, indicator formulation, and monitoring for integrated food assistance and protection programming;
3. Demonstrating the importance of breaking down silos, in particular between food assistance and protection, so as to improve programme design and implementation;
4. Strengthening the synergies and complementarities between assistance and advocacy.

**Reference Documents and Existing Standards**

The frameworks and principles within which DG ECHO operates, as well as the policies and guidelines that inform its programming, support integrated protection programming with food assistance and other sectors (for example WASH\(^\text{88}\)). As a needs-based donor, ensuring sufficient access to food and livelihoods as well as protection from violence, coercion, deprivation, and discrimination are fundamental concepts in any response, and part of the fundamental human rights\(^\text{89}\) of any individual or group.

Existing guidelines on food assistance and protection also highlight the importance of mainstreaming as well as integrated programming: The Sphere Project, Household Economy Analysis, ALNAP Protection Guidelines, WFP and UNHCR guidelines, etc. Nonetheless, there is relatively little work and guidance explicitly focused on integrated programming.

This document’s conceptual model incorporates and builds on fundamental principles and approaches endorsed by DG ECHO including:

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88 - “In non-acute crisis, WASH interventions are mainly conceived in support of other sector interventions (such as health, nutrition, food assistance or protection or as part of an integrated package of several sector interventions...)(European Commission Staff Working Document on Humanitarian WASH Policy, 18/9/2012)

89 - While DG ECHO prioritises its interventions based on needs (ref. Humanitarian Consensus par. 8), the Humanitarian Consensus equally makes strong references to applicable international bodies of law, i.e. IHL, IHRL and Refugee Law (par. 16).
• To adhere to the basic principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, by promoting a more comprehensive context analysis;

• Identification of different risks faced by different age and gender groups in order to ensure that the programming is adapted hereto as per DG ECHO’s Gender Policy;90

• Building resilience to external food security and protection shocks by including conflict and protection deficiencies due to state fragility when working to reduce food insecurity linked to disaster risks, as per the European Commission’s Post 2015 Hyogo Framework for Action;91

• Linking relief, rehabilitation, and development (LRRD) by identifying specific opportunities to address the fundamental causes of vulnerability, such as land and property rights, which is critical to the development of resilience of vulnerable populations.

DG ECHO defines food assistance as: “Any intervention designed to tackle food insecurity, its immediate causes, and its various negative consequences. Food assistance may involve the direct provision of food, but may utilise a wider range of tools”92. Protection mainstreaming and integrated programming are critical elements to the policy: “support to responsive and remedial humanitarian protection actions, where protection concerns may trigger, or arise from, acute food insecurity.”93

DG ECHO defines protection94 as “addressing violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation and abuse for persons, groups and communities in the context of humanitarian crises, in compliance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and within the legal frameworks of IHRL, IHL and Refugee Law”.95 Protection is a core objective of all humanitarian programming, and underscores the importance that all humanitarian aid programmes ‘think protection’ and focus on how a programme can reduce vulnerability to the various threats households face.

Table 1 illustrates how the objectives and activities of one sector can have an impact on another sector. Explicitly designing integrated protection and food assistance actions can therefore maximise the positive outcomes on beneficiaries. Similarly, it can minimise negative outcomes by ensuring that programmes do not inadvertently encourage affected populations to continue using dangerous coping mechanisms in order to put food on the table. This document aims to show how it is necessary to ensure that in conflicts and disaster situations with complex social dynamics the respective food assistance and protection objectives are aimed for in a complementary manner – even if not necessarily implemented by the same actor.

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91 - Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The post 2015 Hyogo Framework for Action: Managing risks to achieve resilience, April 2014.
94 - Humanitarian Protection: Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises, p. 4-5.
95 - As defined in section 2.1 of the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.
### Protection Objectives

**Prevent, reduce and mitigate protection threats against persons affected by ongoing, imminent or future humanitarian crises (by changing the behaviour of perpetrators or the actions of responsible authorities).**

- **Protection Activities:**
  - Advocacy with national army to remove illegal road blocks or stop extortion at road blocks.
  - Support to obtain lost ID cards – to increase safety in movement and reduce risk (for example arbitrary arrest and detention) as well as ensure access to humanitarian assistance.

- **Humanitarian Food Assistance Outcomes:**
  - Increased freedom of movement improves access to fields, livelihoods, and markets where goods and services can be bought and sold, thus minimising damage to food production and marketing systems.
  - Improved access to food through better access to government safety net/humanitarian response programmes, financial institutions or mobile money transfer systems to receive cash grants and facilitated access to relief programmes.

**Reduce the protection vulnerabilities and increase the protection capacities of persons affected by ongoing, imminent or future humanitarian crises.**

- **Protection Activities:**
  - Community-based protection committees that enable communities to better analyse, deconstruct, and manage the risks they face and thus contributes to reducing their fear.

- **Humanitarian Food Assistance Outcomes:**
  - Increased capacity to safely carry out livelihood activities such as travel to fields, transhumance, collection of cash crops, access to markets for daily labour or collective negotiation of prices for sale of goods, thus minimising damage to food production and marketing systems.

### Humanitarian Food Assistance Objectives

**Safeguard the availability of, access to, and consumption of adequate, safe and nutritious food for populations affected by on-going, firmly forecasted, or recent humanitarian crises so as to avoid excessive mortality, acute malnutrition, or other life-threatening effects and consequences.**

- **Humanitarian Food Assistance Activities:**
  - Food assistance (cash, voucher or in-kind) is provided to households who are experiencing significant gaps in their food needs due to lost livelihoods and/or cannot meet household food needs without engaging in risky behaviours.

- **Protection Outcomes:**
  - Vulnerable households and individuals within them needn't expose themselves to threats, abuses or carry out risky activities to access food.

**Protect livelihoods threatened by recent, on-going, or imminent crises, minimise damage to food production and marketing systems, and establish conditions to promote the rehabilitation and restoration of self-reliance.**

- **Humanitarian Food Assistance Activities:**
  - Training in intensive agricultural techniques to populations who have lost access to large areas of land due to insecurity.

- **Protection Outcomes:**
  - Households and individuals can avoid threats and abuse when carrying out livelihood activities.

**Strengthen the capacities of the international humanitarian aid system, to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of food assistance.**

- **Humanitarian Food Assistance Activities:**
  - Support to working groups to conduct analyses, develop tools, monitor and report on integrated programming.

- **Protection Outcomes:**
  - Food assistance actors are better equipped for context analysis in general, and can contribute to attenuating protection challenges in areas where protection actors have no access.
Humanitarian Protection: Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises

Analytical Framework and Programme Design

Framework & tools for improved context analysis
Risk equation for context analysis

Context analysis should systematically be conducted by organisations conducting assessments and evaluations in humanitarian contexts. The risk equation tool outlined below should be triggered:

a. in all conflict situations;
b. in disasters (natural or man-made) where there is evidence of systematic, deliberate and/or exacerbated social exclusion (which can prevent specific population groups from accessing livelihoods, services and humanitarian programmes); and
c. in contexts where there are likely to be high risks of coercion, deprivation and abuse, for example in displacement situations.

Risk Equation Tool

Populations in humanitarian crises face risks, and as such context analyses should include a risk analysis, particularly in the situations mentioned above. The risk equation model presented below has the advantage that it includes identification of threats as well as vulnerabilities and capacities, and also illustrates the relationship between them. It thus draws out the external threats to the target population, their internal vulnerabilities, and their capacities to counteract and cope with the vulnerabilities and threats.

\[
\text{RISK} = \frac{\text{THREATS} \times \text{VULNERABILITIES}}{\text{CAPACITIES}}
\]

The model stipulates that Risk consists of Threats multiplied by Vulnerabilities divided by Capacities. The degree of risk depends on 1) the level and nature of the threat; 2) the vulnerabilities of affected persons; and 3) their capacities to cope with the threat. Risks are reduced by reducing threats and vulnerabilities and increasing capacities, or a combination of these elements. Threats can be reduced by either achieving changes in the behaviour of the perpetrators or improving the compliance of duty-bearers, while vulnerabilities are reduced and capacities increased through direct changes in the lives of the primary stakeholders (beneficiaries). To analyse consider the elements outlined in the table below:

Humanitarian actors in Mauritania were alarmed to learn that acute malnutrition rates in one of the Malian refugee camps were alarmingly high despite complete and regular food distributions. Further analysis showed that only the discriminated “slave” tribe was acutely malnourished as the more dominant tribes had taken control of the food distributions and were not delivering food to this population, whom they felt were ineligible based on pre-existing social exclusion dynamics. In this case a protection analysis would have highlighted the risk that systematic social exclusion posed, and systems could have been put in place to minimise it.

The analysis may conclude that there is no direct link between food security and protection, in which case “only” protection mainstreaming is necessary. It is important to remember that protection mainstreaming DOES NOT substitute for integrated programming where the latter is deemed necessary.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Definition</strong></th>
<th><strong>Questions and Issues to consider</strong></th>
<th><strong>Analytical Competencies</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk</strong></td>
<td>Humanitarian outcomes/needs faced by households and communities due to crises or social exclusion. These consist of threats multiplied by vulnerabilities divided by capacities – for a specific population, in a given scenario at a given time.</td>
<td>All of the below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat</strong></td>
<td>Violence, coercion, deprivation, abuse or neglect against the affected population/individual. It is committed by an actor (note that perpetrators and duty-bearers are sometimes the same actor).</td>
<td>What is the violation or abuse? Who is causing the violation or abuse? What is driving the abuse (intention, attitudes, and circumstances)?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerability</strong></td>
<td>Life circumstances (e.g. poverty, education) and/or discrimination based on physical or social characteristics (sex, disability, age, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, etc.) reducing the ability of primary stakeholders (for example, individuals/households/community) to withstand adverse impact from external stressors. Vulnerability is not a fixed criterion attached to specific categories of people, and no one is born vulnerable per se.</td>
<td>What are the individual characteristics making people vulnerable to the threat? Livelihood activities, age, gender, length of exposure, location, ethnicity, disability, family status, health, customs, local regulations, etc.?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacities</strong></td>
<td>Experiences, knowledge and networks of primary stakeholders (e.g. individuals, households, communities) that strengthen their ability to withstand adverse impact from external stressors. Capacities represent the opposite of vulnerabilities.</td>
<td>Community Organization? Possibility to move? Preparation? Convincing those threatening them to change or others to protect them? Craftsmen? Livelihood skills such as animal husbandry or small business?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
It should be noted that certain issues, for example displacement, could be considered a threat, vulnerability or a capacity depending on the scenario, the concerned population and the moment in time. While being displaced is most often considered a vulnerability, the ability to displace away from a threat could also be considered a capacity\(^7\), and likewise displacement can entail threats before it happens or during the actual displacement.

**Example of using a Risk Equation from North Kivu, DRC**

Mostly agrarian Community Y was displaced five kilometres from their village of origin due to conflict, and settled along a major commercial route near a large city, which offered dynamic markets and services. The IDPs were hospitably received and given land on which to settle and farm. Within months, the new farmland became inaccessible due to insecurity linked to a rogue army general. IDPs were therefore forced to return to their former fields to cultivate. In doing so they had to cross check points and enter rebel-held territory. In a time period of 18 months 79 people were killed, kidnapped, or disappeared. Any harvest obtained was extorted by armed actors. Women confessed to prostituting themselves in order to get cash to buy food. Despite the risks and degradation faced, the community felt they had no choice but to farm their fields – they were hungry.

The risk analysis equation for food insecurity is below:

\[
\text{RISK} = \text{Lack of access to food} \\
\text{X} \quad \begin{align*}
\text{THREATS} & \quad \begin{align*}
& \quad \text{Kidnapping} \\
& \quad \text{Death} \\
& \quad \text{Extortion}
\end{align*} \\
\text{VULNERABILITIES} & \quad \begin{align*}
& \quad \text{Agrarian population unable to produce food} \\
& \quad \text{Lack of income generating opportunities and credit} \\
& \quad \text{Displaced} \\
& \quad \text{Unpredictable access to land (weak land tenure rules and distance)} \\
& \quad \text{High risk behaviours to access food}
\end{align*}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{CAPACITIES} \\
\begin{align*}
& \quad \text{Basic agricultural knowledge/farming experience} \\
& \quad \text{Small business experience} \\
& \quad \text{Community sense (except exclusion of one group)} \\
& \quad \text{Analyse own security environment}
\end{align*}
\]

This example will be referred to throughout the document to provide an example of how the context analysis informs programming.

\(^7\) The last couple of years actual displacement in Colombia has reduced, but the number of confined communities has increased – this is partly due to the fact that after 30 years of conflict the coping capacities and resources of communities to displace themselves have been eroded.
Additional Tools to Complement the Context Analysis:

a. Mapping the capacity and willingness of duty-bearer stakeholders. Possible and pertinent responses will vary considerably depending on whether local, national and international stakeholders are willing and/or capable of ensuring, or advocating for, the protection of the population in question.

b. Household Economy Analysis to better understand livelihoods: an analytical framework that seeks to describe how people obtain food and cash to cover their needs, HEA describes their assets, opportunities, constraints and strategies in times of crises. The analysis is not only at the household level but also describes connections between groups and geographical areas, which allows one to understand how assets are distributed within a community, and who gets what from whom.

c. Coping Strategy Index to identify coping strategies and mechanisms including self-protection strategies used by communities, households and individuals to maintain their lives and livelihoods. The coping strategies to which a community has access will vary by location (even village to village) and even within a community (due to ethnicity, social status, livelihood group, etc.). It is thus important to profile which options are available where, and to weigh them according to community perceptions of appropriateness and risk. Sale of a chicken, for example, is less significant than the sale of a child.

d. Market mapping: Markets are vulnerable to protection threats including direct insecurity, social disruption and policy changes. They are a social construct within which goods and services are bought and sold and any disruption of a market can have a major impact on community and household food security. Protection threats can impact: access to markets; capacity to store goods (less availability in the markets will increase prices); transport of goods by increasing costs but also by blocking movement from zones of surplus to zones of deficiency. Changes in social dynamics can also destroy the market structure, such as in Central African Republic where Muslims, who were the majority of wholesalers, and large retailers, were displaced from Bangui and the west of the country.

Important Issues to Consider When doing the Context Analysis:

a. The analysis should be done at the community and household levels separately. Protection programmes tend to focus on community-level strategies that support individual households, whereas food assistance tends to target households. Some food security challenges are faced by a group as a whole however, such as negotiating access to land when communities are displaced, and some protection issues are faced by individual households, such as poor access to food driving a woman to prostitution.
Land for Kitchen Gardening in Pakistan

PEFSA IV was targeting most vulnerable communities in district Umerkot, largely dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods and chronically poor. The families targeted for the food security package largely represent the groups that do not own land (and if any, that is highly insignificant). These landless households earn most of their income from non-agricultural sources. Hence, land availability for implementing kitchen gardening activities was a challenge. The challenge itself triggered beneficiaries to indirectly initiate the dialogue with respective landowners to acquire a piece of land for kitchen gardening. Following successful negotiation, beneficiaries were allotted a piece of land for kitchen gardening by landowners, and backyard kitchen gardening were carried out by beneficiaries.

Good intentions but poor results

Traditional communities often operate under plural legal settings, which at times compete with each other and may at the end do more harm than good. There are examples in Ethiopia, where women under traditional rule do not inherit land from their deceased husbands, but fought through statutory means and managed to officially inherit land. Though they managed to get what they opted for through the pursuit of their constitutional right, they eventually had to abandon their land and villages and migrate to urban areas as their action was taken to be defamatory and disregarded community values. They were excluded and stigmatised by men and women alike, and their exclusion was so severe as to compromise their social life and livelihoods, thus they had lost their capacity to survive.

b. Examine community and household level challenges simultaneously but separately to facilitate the identification of better solutions and to ensure coherency and build synergies in a humanitarian response. Joint advocacy for access to safe land can have positive protection and food assistance outcomes for households receiving agricultural assistance for example.

c. Ensuring that the context analysis also identifies capacities of the local communities. In particular, traditional and religious features that might be either opportunities or threats in the prevention/mitigation of protection-related concerns should be identified, and lead to a careful analysis of the implication of the various protection avenues, the pros and cons of the various options vis-à-vis the traditional social fabrics and practices and the need for building consensus on protection in the community.

d. All threats, vulnerabilities, and capacities should be analysed by relevant gender, age, and diversity (e.g. religion, ethnicity, displacement status, social status, family status, sexual orientation, etc.) and livelihood groups in specific geographical locations. Using ‘standardised’ vulnerability groups should be avoided as it amounts to an unsubstantiated and dogmatic pre-supposition of vulnerability. For example, in southern Madagascar women were targeted by NGOs for income-generating projects despite increasingly problematic criminality by unemployed young men, who may have reduced their criminal activities, had they had access to alternative income sources.

Tools and hints for programme design, indicator formulation and monitoring

Once the context and risk analysis are done the threats, vulnerabilities and capacities of populations are clearly articulated. Feasible objectives and results can be defined and proposed using response analysis tools from food security and protection, and integrated activities proposed where relevant. Their implementation and impact on household and community level food security and protection can be monitored using the framework of the risk analysis. This section aims to provide guidance on how to design an integrated programme.

Core questions for programme design/response framework

Response activities should be tailored based on the risk analysis of each location; gender, age, diversity, and livelihood group; and protection vulnerability. There is no single solution or response that suits everyone, everywhere. Even in the same geographical area different groups may require different responses because of different livelihoods.
and/or different protection vulnerabilities. This Document is not designed to propose response options, but below are some considerations and opportunities presented through integrated programming.

The risk analysis can identify whom not to target with a particular activity and propose alternatives. Humanitarian responses design programmes to meet needs, but where meeting a need puts a household/individual at risk (i.e. do no harm) alternatives should be found (i.e. integrated programming). Identified threats will vary from being possible/straightforward to reduce, or impossible/dangerous. In the latter case programme activities should aim to impact vulnerabilities and capacities.

Integrated Protection and Food Assistance Programming can support an analysis that focuses on creating win-win situations in contexts of inter-communal violence or tensions where social and community cohesion should be prioritised. This occurs at two levels:

1. Where tensions and conflict arise due to issues of common interest (land, access to service, political power, etc.) these issues should be identified and understood, including identifying entry points and people (change agents) to create dialogue and to strategically use programmes to mitigate risks.

2. Where humanitarian programming can trigger tensions, it is not only important to prevent escalation of tensions/conflict but to mitigate the triggers of conflict. For example, in contexts of displacement it is important to programme for the host community – whether through provision of services or including them in distribution programmes – as well as displaced populations. Furthermore, it is sometimes important to programme beyond a needs analysis to attain a protection objective. In Darfur for example, pastoralists were much less vulnerable than agrarian populations, but many programmes targeted their needs so as to avoid exacerbating existing inter-communal tensions.

The modality selection of a distribution programme can have an impact on protection issues. Providing transfers through bank accounts or Microfinance Institutions may necessitate organisations to support beneficiaries to access identification – and all the protection and opportunities that this identification may offer (access to land, health, election cards, etc.) and to which they otherwise would not have access. Mobile phone transfers are both an anonymous means to distribute cash/assistance and also ensures that beneficiaries get, or will receive, a means of communication.

In the North Kivu example, the partners’ response was to form protection committees and distribute seeds and tools. The Protection Committees were largely used for project activities. Seeds & tools were distributed despite a known lack of safe access to land (based on the oft-made assumption that “households will manage”) - in fact the partner distributions encouraged households to expose themselves to known threats. A risk and response analysis could have identified whether protection interventions could have made access to land safer, or find food assistance activities informed by vulnerabilities and capacities. A more relevant response would therefore have been to:

• Ensure the protection committee advocated against extortion at government checkpoints and use of transactional sex through existing channels (protection cluster, ICRC); advocate with UN peacekeepers to work with populations accessing fields (as it was unlikely to change the behaviour of the perpetrators killing and kidnapping). By reducing these threats, communities would have safer access to fields and more products to consume or sell at the market.

• Households with safe access to land could have been provided with training on intensive agriculture (produce more on less area) as well as seeds and tools, and households without safe access to land could have benefited from food assistance (cash/food) and income generating activities.

In Bangladesh some partners use Mobile Money Transfers (MMT). Beneficiaries must have a national ID card in order to acquire a SIM card. Occasionally, depending on the level of preparedness and/or the severity of the disaster, beneficiaries misplace their civil documentation. Oxfam Bangladesh in their response to the Tropical Storm Mahasen built a protection component in their Cash Transfer Programming which included facilitating beneficiaries to renew their National ID card. As well as inclusion in the CTP, this activity also ensures access to government safety net programmes and overall protection of the individual. MMT is also appreciated as being more physically secure because the phone “holds” the cash, and it reduces misuse of funds by other people.
Targeting

Humanitarian programmes aim to target the most vulnerable out of commitment to needs-based programming. Where integrated programming is deemed to be necessary, both protection and food security considerations should be taken into account based on information in the risk analysis. Protection programming, often targeting the community level, and food assistance programming, usually implemented at the household level, should refer to the risk analysis to articulate targeting criteria.

In the above example from North Kivu food insecurity arose because the displaced and asset poor households could not safely access their fields to produce food (they went anyway out of desperation), and/or had to resort to risky behaviour to access cash. The household level targeting for assistance therefore should have been based on food security criteria (such as Food Consumption Score) as well as the protection threats that people expose themselves to carry out livelihoods and access food.

Community-based targeting methods should take into account protection risks: communities will intuitively define households whose members undertake risky and degrading behaviours as being vulnerable. There is an important exclusion risk in relying on this approach however, as households that are socially marginalised – whether due to discrimination, their behaviour or social status – risk being excluded.

Coping Strategy Index (CSI)\textsuperscript{100}

The CSI was developed as a proxy indicator for food security and is often used as it is simpler than more complicated food security measures. It is useful for integrated programmes as it measures behaviour and analyses the structure of coping strategies. It can be used to evaluate vulnerability, for targeting, as an early warning indicator and for monitoring the impact of actions.

The Index must be developed for each context to capture locally relevant strategies and to weigh them. For example, the collection of wild foods is unlikely to be relevant to urban communities, and in other communities the collection of wild foods may not be considered a sign of stress. Communities and individual households may use none, some, or all of the strategies available to them and thus the coping strategies adopted can be used as a proxy indicator for vulnerability. It is important to remember that it is not an absolute indicator; there are no thresholds within which a household can be considered more or less vulnerable – the tool only identifies differences within a group, and/or for that group over time.

Box 3, copied from the WFP EFSA Handbook, version 2, describes the process for establishing theCSI. Further guidance is also provided in the manual on how to establish the coping strategy indicators.

\textsuperscript{100} - The Coping Strategies Index- Field Methods Manual, second edition, CARE, Feinstein International Center, Tongo, USAID, WFP, January 2008

\textsuperscript{101} - Emergency Food Security Assessment Handbook. WFP. Second Edition. p. 76-78
Currently most agencies use the Reduced Coping Strategy Index, which only looks at a common set of coping strategies that are linked to food access or consumption. As these strategies are universally used, this index is a quick, comparable short cut for food security measurement. For the purposes of integrated programming it is important to query non-food based coping strategies as well, and to use the complete tool, which allows for identification of coping strategies that are also of concern to protection actors: transactional sex, exposure to kidnapping, slavery, begging, forced marriages, removal from school, forced migration, etc. It is an objective of this paper to encourage the use of the full CSI rather than the reduced one which is incomplete in many contexts as it does not capture the variety of strategies undertaken to access food or cash.

**Indicators and Impact Monitoring**

In an integrated programme it is important to ensure that both protection and food assistance indicators are included at a minimum at the level of the specific objective, and where relevant at the level of results. A variety of documents describe sector specific indicators. Below are two indicators that capture the impact of an integrated programme.

**Coping Strategy Index:**

As mentioned above, the CSI can be used for monitoring and measuring impact. When the value of the household or community CSI decreases this indicates that households/communities are adopting less, and/or less severe, coping strategies to cover their needs.

**Qualitative Indicator of Perception of Safety: “Do you feel safer as a result of the project activities?”**

Qualitative indicators complement quantitative indicators. They are powerful because they provide in a simple question and answer a summation of attitudes, feelings and perceptions. In protection programming, particular skills are necessary to explore issues such as transactional sex, violence, sale of children etc., but if a household or individual reports that they feel safer as a result of an intervention – a question that does not require protection expertise to pose – then not only does that capture one of the paramount objectives in humanitarian programming, but inherent in the answer is that the protection threats to which they have been exposed have been attenuated. Similar questions can be posed on e.g. dignity, knowledge of rights, access to information of services.

**Human Resources**

Integrated programming requires both food assistance and protection expertise in order ensure that tools, analysis and programme design relevantly take into account both sectors. As a donor DG ECHO is prepared to pay either for complementary staffing of qualified food assistance and protection officers/consultant or to ensure that partners with specific expertise have the means to assist other actors. For example in Central African Republic DG ECHO supported a protection partner to provide protection technical support to food assistance partners.

**Breaking down silos**

**Some Common Issues at the Nexus of Food Assistance and Protection**

**Freedom of movement.** Freedom of movement is a key human right because it is essential to life and dignity: it ensures access to services, access to income, access to livelihoods, social and cultural interactions, etc. In crises, freedom of movement can be intentionally restricted as a deliberate strategy, used as an instrument, or can simply be a consequence of insecurity and violence. The threats can be real or perceived.\(^{102}\)

\(^{102}\) – There are circumstances where governments may legitimately restrict freedom of movement, e.g. during a legally declared state of emergency.
Obvious barriers to freedom of movement include roadblocks and confinement, but they also include less obvious ones such as lack of identification documents and cultural or gender restrictions. The potential consequences to food security are obvious: complete loss of livelihoods, less time spent cultivating, less visits to markets to buy and sell services, etc.

**Table 4: Restrictions in Freedom of Movement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restriction in Freedom of Movement</th>
<th>Potential Food Security Consequence</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>As a Strategy:</strong> Externally and deliberately unlawfully imposed movement restrictions, segregation and/or confinement with nefarious intent and no compensation.</td>
<td>Loss/destruction of livelihoods through loss of physical or social access. Dependence on external support to meet food needs.</td>
<td>Political action and advocacy against violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)/International Human Rights Law (IHRL), for reprieve to access livelihood. Targets are political actors. Food assistance should only be considered following a do no harm analysis, and focus on assistance that minimises exposure to risks. Where aid may be construed as indirectly supporting the strategy of the perpetrators (dilemma between humanitarian imperative and humanitarian principles), the risk equation should serve to identify the best response based on capacities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>As an Instrument:</strong> Externally imposed movement restrictions or segregation with “protection” intent. Sometimes compensation is provided.</td>
<td>Loss/destruction of livelihoods through loss of physical or social access. Dependence on external support to meet food needs.</td>
<td>Advocacy and dialogue against violation of IHL/IHRL, for reprieve to access livelihood. Food assistance might be considered following a do no harm analysis, and only in combination with the above dialogue and advocacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>As a Consequence:</strong> Generalised insecurity and violence causes individuations and communities to self-impose restrictions due to fear.</td>
<td>Change in livelihoods including de-capitalisation, smaller land area cultivated, change in feeding practices, displacement due to exposure to threats.</td>
<td>Development of and support to community-based protection strategies such as advocacy against illegal roadblocks, and extortion, and increasing community capacity to better find out which risks can be mitigated by themselves. Change in livelihood practices: collective cultivation, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control of natural resources:** Conflict between groups over control of access to natural resources is often an underlying cause of man-made crises (exacerbated by climate change). The primacy of access to resources as a cause of conflict necessitates that solutions and/or community dialogue be sought to mitigate the impact of conflicts at the local level. A classic example is pastoral/agricultural conflict (Darfur, Central African Republic) where customary and national laws that regulate the movement of livestock – in particular in time and space through agricultural areas – break down. Regulation of pastoral movements are a structural issue but the interdependence and need for co-existence between the two groups necessitates that this issue be addressed to both affect protection issues (conflict mitigation) and livelihoods (access to land and markets).

**Land tenure:** Land tenure issues are a major source of conflict, but also of food insecurity. Examples of conflict to control access to land and its resources abound, but often less examined is the contribution of unresolved issues linked to land tenure, or poorly managed land tenure regulations, to food insecurity.
In Pakistan “2% of households control more than 45% of all land, severely constraining agricultural competitiveness and livelihood opportunities”\textsuperscript{103}. In countries where women cannot inherit land, widows are highly vulnerable. Land tenure issues are clearly structural, complex and can only be resolved over the medium and long term; land tenure laws can have profound political, social and economic consequences and are thus difficult to adapt/develop and take years to implement. As with management of natural resources however, their primacy necessitates that they be at a minimum acknowledged in programming.

\textit{Coordination – Linkages between Clusters or Sector Coordination Mechanisms}

Food assistance actors tend to be better at identifying vulnerabilities, while protection actors tend to be better at identifying threats. Unfortunately collaboration across the two sectors still remains rare, and there is a tendency of siloing. Some concrete actions that could be taken to improve integrated programming include:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Establishment of country/regional Food Assistance and Protection Working Groups;
  \item Development, whether within the remit of these groups or other groups, of harmonised tools that are relevant to particular regions or crises and that are based on a shared analysis;
  \item Joint evaluations by protection and food assistance actors to ensure a shared analysis of a particular crisis;
  \item Improved technical support "services" within the Cluster Coordination system: better coordination between clusters on shared analysis and response strategies;
  \item Stronger operationalization of the Centrality of Protection in Strategic Response Plans and similar plans.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Strengthening synergies and complementarities between assistance and advocacy}

Protection programmes benefit enormously from advocacy interventions designed to either stop violations by perpetrators and/or convince duty-bearers to fulfil their responsibilities. The extent to which acting on either of these is relevant and feasible, and at what level, varies. Nonetheless it is important to ensure that \textit{“micro” level assistance responses be combined with “macro” level advocacy responses}. This needn’t be done by a single actor and better integration of protection into food assistance programming not only shares the load (food assistance is more likely to happen at the micro level) but also

\textit{La Guajira Department, Colombia}

Drought, high criminality, extreme poverty and the closure of the Colombian-Venezuelan border have contributed to a humanitarian crisis and an average of two children dying each day, principally of malnutrition and treatable diseases. Advocacy for opening the border to essential commodities could relieve problems linked to food availability (increased supply) and access (cheaper prices) and slow the negative spiral into crisis.

\textit{“The water is theirs, the grass is ours”}

“In response to the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa, VSF Germany implemented DG ECHO’s Drought Risk Reduction Action Plan decision whose objective was “to enhance the capacities of selected cross border communities and stakeholders to effectively prepare for and respond to drought shocks” targeting communities along the Kenya/ Ethiopia border. VSF-G originally only targeted Dasanech and Hammer communities in Ethiopia and Kenya. But a conflict risk analysis led VSF-G to include all communities in the cross border grazing areas to build a more sustainable natural resource use environment for enhanced community resilience. Reciprocal grazing agreements were developed and signed by the cross border communities and cross border peace committees to monitor and implement the agreements established. This improved security of livestock and people, joint resource sharing and mutual access to pasture and water particularly during dry seasons.

103 - http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/USAID_Land_Tenure_Pakistan_Issue_Brief_1.pdf
provides an opportunity for the simple fact that food assistance actors often have better access to populations than protection actors. This does not mean that food assistance actors should do protection, but that food assistance could programme to support protection objectives.

Advocacy Options

There are different modes of action to make the relevant actors aware of and fulfill their responsibilities: persuasion, mobilisation and denunciation. The selection of one or more technique depends on the attitude of the authorities, but also on the organisation’s own strengths and weaknesses, as well as on the external opportunities and constraints, including threats. Food security issues and examples may be a less sensitive illustration of major protection violations.

• **Denunciation** activities imply public disclosure of international law violations and generally create an adversarial relationship. This may be detrimental to responding to people’s protection and assistance needs. Such activities are thus unlikely to be funded by DG ECHO.

• **Persuasion** actions, by which one tries to convince the authorities to change their policies and practices of their own accord, will be efficient if the responsible authorities demonstrate political goodwill. For example, advocating that households have access to markets to sell their goods is a useful negotiation tactic to allow them to realise their right of freedom of movement.

• **Mobilisation** actions, through which information is shared in a discreet way with selected people, bodies or states that have the capacity to influence the authorities to satisfy their obligations and to protect individuals and groups exposed to violations, will be needed when authorities are more resistant. E.g. reducing tensions between agriculturalists and pastoralists requires resolution through key leaders in both communities.
10.7 Indicative Response Typology

Below is a list of TYPICAL responses to protection needs - this should not be regarded as exhaustive, or as a straightjacket. Situations may arise where other responses not included in this list would be the most appropriate, and not all responses listed below will be appropriate in all contexts. The choice of appropriate responses will depend on the outcome of a comprehensive context analysis clearly identifying the protection threats, vulnerabilities and capacities faced by the different gender, age, social, religious and ethnic groups in that specific situation at that point in time – and should not be determined by the responses "supplied" by partners. A few of the responses are linked to a particular displacement status (refugee/IDP/TCN), but in general DG ECHO will not accept displacement status as an automatic entry point.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main category</th>
<th>Sub-categories</th>
<th>Activity examples/explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROTECTION ACTIONS – might be implemented as stand-alone OR as part of an integrated approach&lt;sup&gt;104&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil documentation</td>
<td>Legal support, payment of fees and/or transportation to offices for registration of new-borns (or persons never registered) and legal registration of marriages, divorces and deaths in crisis and displacement situations. Legal aid to obtain social benefits.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration of lost civil documentation</td>
<td>Legal support, payment of fees, including support to obtain specific documents required to stay in the country of displacement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Status Determination (RSD)</td>
<td>Individual RSD is conducted either by the host government (where it has the capacity) or by UNHCR or by the two in collaboration. Note that in many crisis/conflict situations prima facie recognition will apply.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring detention conditions</td>
<td>Only to be conducted by specialised organizations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family links</td>
<td>Messages, phone calls, visits.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family tracing and reunification</td>
<td>Search of missing persons – Only to be conducted by specialised organizations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>104</sup> Please refer to the DG ECHO Humanitarian Protection Policy for the difference between these two approaches.
## Humanitarian Protection: Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main category</th>
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<th>Activity examples/explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of and response to violence (including GBV)</td>
<td>Prevention: Sensitisation and awareness-raising strategies (particularly related to GBV)</td>
<td>Information dissemination on the health, psychological and social consequences of GBV and availability/access to confidential services (including location, opening hours, etc.). Activities aimed at fighting stigma against victims of rape and at challenging the gender norms leading to GBV might also be funded, but should include a baseline and an end-line survey to assess their impact. Male targeting and involvement in these activities are crucial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prevention: Hardware/Infrastructure</td>
<td>Physical infrastructure to improve protection/reduce opportunities for violence and exposure to risks – typical in camp/settlement/collective centre settings. Examples include: Firewood distribution, lighting, fencing, fuel-efficient cooking technology, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response: Medical</td>
<td>This is the core of victim assistance and must always be part of the response. Consists of basic medical trauma treatment, and for victims of rape the provision of a post rape treatment kit. Must be provided by skilled staff and in accordance with internationally recognised protocols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response: Mental Health and Psycho-social Support (MHPSS)</td>
<td>Psychological first aid and more specialised psychosocial services i.e. trauma counselling, including psychological and mental health. Quality of services provided – especially related to personnel – has to be carefully observed for each level of PS service provision. If at all possible it must be ensured that the entire referral pathway (from basic non-specialized to mental health services) is in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response: Legal</td>
<td>Support to take legal recourse if victim so wishes (and if contextually feasible) as well as legal aid for family law cases. As absolute minimum information about possible access – or even the difficulty in accessing – must be provided. In as far as possible victims should be informed of all the potential consequences of taking the legal recourse – including possibly negative ones. There should commitment of ensuring that the victim is accompanied to the end of the legal process if they decide to start it – not necessarily by the humanitarian actors themselves, but that some kind of follow-up is assured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response: Security</td>
<td>Victims of violence’s physical safety and security concerns must be carefully analysed and appropriately addressed. Safe houses/Protection houses could represent one of the possible responses, but issues related to stigmatization and lack of confidentiality must be carefully addressed. Whenever possible, different alternatives should be envisaged (e.g. relocation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response: Cash-based Interventions for reintegration</td>
<td>Cash-based interventions may be considered as an assistance modality, and as such they may be used as one of a range of complementary activities to achieve protection specific results. The logical causality and the process leading to the protection outcome through the use of CBI need to be clearly and explicitly identified in the proposal by the partner. Economic assistance as direct compensation for protection violations experienced will not be funded.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that ideally a comprehensive response considers all of the response categories listed by using a case management approach. Where one organisation cannot ensure all of these aspects, this must be addressed through referral mechanisms.

**ALL SERVICES MUST BE AVAILABLE TO MEN, BOYS, WOMEN AND GIRLS**


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Main category</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child Protection (CP)</td>
<td>Prevention of and response to violence</td>
<td>Same principles as above tailored specifically to the needs of children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Case management including BIA and BID Processes</td>
<td>Case management process should be done according to Inter-agency Guidelines of Case Management &amp; Child Protection.(^\text{107}) Best Interest Assessment and Best Interest Determination must be conducted to ensure that the best solutions are found for SC/UA children and children in situations (or at risk of) of violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family tracing and reunification</td>
<td>Only to be conducted by specialised organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                               | Prevention, demobilisation, release and reintegration of Children Associated  | • Prevention - Community level awareness and sensitisation activities for the prevention of family separation and child recruitment, support to civil society to prevent re-recruitment.  
• Demobilisation and release - Support to transit centres, safe houses/facilities, etc.  
• Reintegration - Accelerated Learning Programs (ALP) and education. Preference in as far as possible should be given to reintegration in the formal education system rather than skills training. |
|                               | with Armed Forces and Armed Groups                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|                               | Child Friendly Spaces (including adolescents)                                  | Provide places of protection from sexual violence, recruitment, and abduction; provide trauma mitigation and rehabilitation, reinstating a sense of normalcy. Quality of services provided – particularly psychosocial – has to be carefully observed. The needs of different age and gender groups of children must be carefully considered. Combining this work with working with parents is strongly encouraged. |
| Housing, Land and Property Rights (HLP) | Security of tenure in displacement situations – including preventing forced evictions | Legal protection against forced evictions, harassment and other threats to residents and users of property, whether or not they own it. Types of activities may include monitoring and EWS, information on relevant rights, legal aid to obtain appropriate documents and challenge evictions, emergency cash-based intervention to find alternative housing after evictions. The above activities may also be funded in response to confiscations/demolitions in cases where these appear as a clear strategy against e.g. one specific population group to force them into displacement. |
|                               | HLP Restitution for durable solutions\(^\text{108}\)                          | Legal aid to property restitution or obtaining documents in connection with return/local integration.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Mine Action                   | Humanitarian demining                                                          | Removal and destruction of mines and other explosive remnants of war in order to reduce accidents, prevent their future use as tools of violence and promote durable solutions. Only to be conducted by specialised agencies.                                                                                                                                                                      |
|                               | Assistance to victims                                                          | Medical and MHPSS responses should follow the guidance outlined above, and should also include rehabilitation and support to socio-economic reintegration as per internationally recognized practices.\(^\text{109}\)                                                                                                                                                                          |
|                               | Mine Risk Education (MRE)                                                      | Promote safe conduct in: 1) potentially hazardous areas, 2) in areas of temporary displacement, 3) in at risk areas of IDP and refugees return.                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|                               | Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)                                                 | Combat the risks associated with widespread proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and foster a wider ethos of responsibility. Increase awareness of the dangers of small arms, encourage safe behaviour when handling firearms, promote safe storage of weapons, restrict accessibility for children and prevent accidents.                                                                                     |

\(^\text{108}\) - Please refer to [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/pinheiro_principles.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/pinheiro_principles.pdf) for further guidance  
\(^\text{109}\) - See Annex 10.3 for reference documents on mining and humanitarian assistance
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Main category</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community-based Protection</td>
<td>Community-based protection processes and structures</td>
<td>Establish or work with existing committees (preference should always be given to working with existing groups or committees rather than establishing new ones), train committees, link committees to authorities and traditional duty bearers. Support community-based processes to identify/establish self-protection mechanisms from own perception and needs via committees or communities as whole (remember to include focus groups of specific groups such as women and youth). Activities resulting from this could include: Community initiatives such as joint firewood and water collection or farming patrols, or establishment of early warning systems for imminent attacks, but also about slowly mounting intra- or inter-communal conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community centres</td>
<td>Community centres</td>
<td>Community-hub for crisis-affected populations to access vital information, protection awareness, legal information and counselling, psycho-social activities and advice on livelihood opportunities, as well as proving a safe space for affected populations to de-stress, interact and re-engage. In situations of displacement it can furthermore encourage intercommunal dialogue and social cohesion amongst displaced populations and their hosts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community policing</td>
<td>Community policing</td>
<td>Most often in camps or very isolated environments. Support volunteer community members with training and small equipment (whistles, flashlights, etc.) and ensure linkage with formal security providers. Care must be taken to ensure that these remain protection mechanisms and do not become informal security structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion/Conflict mitigation</td>
<td>Social cohesion/Conflict mitigation</td>
<td>Support dialogue, processes or projects that contribute to prevent and mitigate local and intercommunal conflicts before they erupt into violence by supporting local conflict resolution efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based planning processes (CBP)</td>
<td>Community-based planning processes (CBP)</td>
<td>CBP can be used in sensitive environments to identify and address protection issues in a non-offensive manner and may thus be more acceptable to authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to host community</td>
<td>Assistance to host community</td>
<td>Provide assistance to host communities (or other groups in the area) in order to avoid discrimination and conflict/violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information dissemination</td>
<td>Rights awareness and access to services</td>
<td>Information to the affected population on the relevant legal frameworks, possibilities for legal assistance, and access to basic services (location, opening hours, costs, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sensitisation campaigns/ Risk awareness</td>
<td>On specific threats identified in that specific context, e.g. forced recruitment, GBV, trafficking, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IHL/IHRL dissemination</td>
<td>To armed groups and forces, authorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Main category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-categories</th>
<th>Activity examples/explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring/tracking of population movements (DTM)</td>
<td>IDP movements, mixed migration flows, etc. Serves to determine caseload size and movement directions – might include database establishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection monitoring&lt;sup&gt;110&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Monitoring of violations to feed a trend analysis that informs response programming and advocacy; Identifies victims of violence subsequently addressed by appropriate case management as outlined above. It is crucial that cases identified during protection monitoring are referred for assistance in a timely manner. Appropriate data-protection mechanisms must be in place to safeguard confidentiality and protect those registered from potential protection risks, including violence, discrimination or stigma; Risks for both the concerned population and the monitors, as well for monitoring resulting in reduced humanitarian space and access, are considered and mitigated to the widest possible extent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profiling</td>
<td>Profiling of IDPs to design appropriate assistance, targeting of assistance and protection interventions and determine durable solutions intentions. IDP Profiling should be done with support from JIPS in order to ensure sufficiently high quality.&lt;sup&gt;111&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screening, registration and verification exercises</td>
<td>Concerning refugees, IDPs, separated children or other affected groups. For refugees registration (unless in sudden onset massive influx) should always aim to be a level 2 (biometric registration). There is no global reason to register all IDPs&lt;sup&gt;112&lt;/sup&gt; as long as sufficiently accurate caseload numbers can be obtained through DTM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection databases</td>
<td>Support to establishment (at country level) of globally recognised and agreed upon databases such as GBVIMS and CPIMS (these two should be implemented as integral parts of assistance to victims of GBV and child protection violations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on and preparation for DS possibilities</td>
<td>Information campaigns on possibilities and conditions in return locations, Go-and-See-Visits, Go-and-Inform-Visits; preparatory interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Aid</td>
<td>Reclaim housing, land and property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>Registration of durable solution interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Logistics facilitation or providing cash.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring of DS conditions</td>
<td>Monitoring of conditions following return or other durable solution – up to 12 months afterwards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation of TCNs/ Migrants in Crises</td>
<td>Pre-departure assistance such as medical assistance and basic supplies for those awaiting departure and logistical support at points of embarkation. In countries of transit: assistance such as health care and fitness to travel check, basic supplies and onward transportation from points of entry to home country destinations. Basic reception facilities and support to final destination.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>110</sup> Note that human rights violations’ monitoring with a sole purpose of holding duty-bearers/armed actors accountable through international justice is considered outside of the remit of humanitarian protection as such by DG ECHO.


<sup>112</sup> The Handbook on the Protection of IDPs states that "registration is not necessarily required, and sometimes not even desirable, in IDP contexts; rather the benefits of registration depend on factors such as the actual need for detailed data, the role of the government, and the period during which the information will remain valid." It recommends that where registration is needed, all efforts must be made to explain the purpose of registration to IDPs and to safeguard their confidentiality.

<sup>113</sup> Note that DG ECHO will normally only fund emergency submission of cases for resettlement as well as the preparatory aspects linked to “normal” resettlement, but not the physical resettlement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main category</th>
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<th>Activity examples/explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination</strong></td>
<td>Specific studies/surveys</td>
<td>Funding studies or surveys of benefit to the wider humanitarian community, including of linkages between protection and other sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cluster/coordination support</td>
<td>Support cluster functioning to enable the cluster/coordination structure to “do more”, i.e. not merely fulfilling secretariat functions and sharing of information, but taking a lead on strategic planning. Preference is on financing INGO co-leadership of the protection cluster, but could also include strengthening of IMO functions. In special cases this might be extended to also include support to AOR groups/sub-clusters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Training of partner staff on legal frameworks and protection, protection mainstreaming, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Case Management</td>
<td>Support to specific inter-agency efforts – such as “Case Conference” and “Referral Pathway Tracking” – to enhance case management in a given context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advocacy</strong> (NB: Advocacy is a modality that may in principle relate to all the other types of responses listed above)</td>
<td>Mobilisation</td>
<td>Mobilisation involves engaging with other key stakeholders so that they themselves put some pressure on duty-bearer stakeholders about their duties to fulfil. Usually done by DG ECHO or partner staff as part of normal functions and coordination activities, but rarely requires funding. If actual funding is provided this should be done only to agencies with demonstrated experience and capacity herein.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persuasion</td>
<td>Persuasion requires a confidential engagement with duty-bearer stakeholders to let them know about their duties in protection and to promote their involvement. Usually done by DG ECHO or partner staff as part of normal functions and coordination activities, but rarely requires funding. If actual funding is provided this should be done only to agencies with demonstrated experience and capacity herein.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denunciation</td>
<td>Information is put in the public realm, so that the duty-bearer stakeholders feel compelled to take action. Would normally not be funded by DG ECHO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER SECTOR ACTIONS – as part of an integrated approach</strong></td>
<td>Assistance to specific vulnerable groups (not already covered in other categories)</td>
<td>Risk analysis to identify specific protection threats against and vulnerabilities of specific groups in a specific context – avoid standardised vulnerability categories Will typically be some sort of material assistance (but could also be specialised medical or legal assistance).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actively using other sectors to achieve protection outcomes</td>
<td>All “traditional” assistance sectors – food assistance, WASH, health, shelter &amp; settlements, nutrition, NFIs, DRR. Inter-linkages between these sector needs and protection needs to be identified through the risk analysis. Identification of coping mechanisms and freedom of movement restrictions are often key. Addressing protection violations and or negative/dangerous coping mechanisms through other sectors (when protection violations are the direct cause of other humanitarian needs such as hindering physical access to health services or agricultural fields – and where the subsequent activities are thus a direct substitution). This is NOT to be confused with applying the rights-based approach.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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114 - The fora to discuss and take formal decision, develop, review case plans, for those complex cases where inter-agency, multi-disciplinary or multi-sectorial intervention is needed.

115 - Inter-agency efforts facilitated by the case management lead agency to ensure effective system for case coordination between service providers using up-to-date and accurate SOP between all service providers with the aim of following the case after suggesting referral service and verifying that it has been provided.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Activity examples/explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durable Solutions</td>
<td>DS assistance</td>
<td>Return packages such as food, permanent shelter, agriculture packages, etc. (The level and type will be completely contextual, and there should be encouragement that the humanitarian actors agree on one package)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash-Based Intervention (CBI) is a modality that may in principle relate to all the other types of responses listed above</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cash Based Intervention (CBI) can be considered as an assistance tool when: 1) the protection analysis clearly identify which threats are addressed by the action and how CBI is the most appropriate modality alongside the other components of the program; 2) the logical causality and the process leading to the protection outcome through the chosen CBI modality is clearly and explicitly identified, 3) the CBI is framed in a range of protection activities and processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reception of evacuated/expelled TCNs/migrants/asylum seekers</td>
<td>Emergency assistance</td>
<td>Transit/reception facilities; registration; medical screening and services; food, NFIs and WASH in transit; legal aid and information; onward transportation. Note that any victim of violence or e.g. SC/UAM would fall under the responses listed above.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OTHER TYPES OF PROTECTION RESPONSES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protection mainstreaming</th>
<th>Not so much specific activities as an approach that should be integrated in all programmes.</th>
<th>Safe and equal access and consideration for specific vulnerabilities.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Protection through presence</td>
<td>A widely debated concept and not clearly defined. Ranging from the assumption that the mere presence of humanitarian actors on the ground will reduce violations committed by perpetrators as potential witnessing by these will act as a deterrent, to the assumption that activities in other sectors may deter violations and can contribute to programming and advocacy by documenting and witnessing violations. Evidence of the assumed impact of mere presence as a deterrent is still somewhat scanty, and DG ECHO will not fund this as a stand-alone activity. In active combination with other sector work, protection through presence may have both positive and negative effects in terms of protection, and any such activities should be subject to a thorough risk analysis (see part 4.2.6 of the Protection Policy).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protective presence</td>
<td>This is the activist version of the above, where the actual activity is to be present in order to deter perpetrators – e.g. peace brigades in Palestine or at checkpoints. This is NOT funded by DG ECHO.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First – Choose approach (part 5.2.1)
Can identified threats, vulnerabilities and capacities be appropriately addressed by incorporating protection principles and promoting meaningful access, safety and dignity in humanitarian aid?

- NO
  - Targeted approach
  - Protection mainstreaming in other sector responses

- YES
  - Protection Risk Analysis
  - Capacity building approach

Second – Choose response type(s) and modalities (part 5.2.2)
The following questions may help determine the appropriate combination of response types:

- Is the intention to stop, prevent and alleviate the worst effects of human rights violations and patterns of abuse?
- Is the intention to restore dignity in the aftermath of human rights violations and support people living with the effects of these violations?
- Is the aim to create an environment that allows full respect of rights, promoting deep change in attitudes, policies, values, or beliefs?

- Responsive
- Remedial
- Environment-building

Cross-cutting issues
- Self-protective strategies & Capacities
- Managing risks
- International and national legal Frameworks
- Access and security
- Exit strategies & LRRD
- Gender and age mainstreaming
- Government policy
- DRR mainstreaming
- Coordination
- Staff capacity

Third – Detailed programme design
- Concrete activities (part 5.2.3)
- Targeting (part 5.2.4)
- Selection of indicators to measure outcome and output of intervention (part 6)