



COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels  
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**COMMISSION DECISION**

**of**

**on the financing of humanitarian Actions from the general budget of the European  
Communities in Zimbabwe**

(ECHO/ZWE/BUD/2009/02000)

## **COMMISSION DECISION**

**of**

### **on the financing of humanitarian Actions from the general budget of the European Communities in Zimbabwe**

(ECHO/ZWE/BUD/2009/02000)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No.1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid <sup>1</sup>, and in particular Article 2 and Article 15(2) thereof:

Whereas:

- (1) Zimbabwe continues to face a protracted emergency situation due to adverse governance and socio-economic breakdown ;
- (2) The country has suffered from chronic food insecurity since 2002, due to dry weather, shortages of tractor/draught power for tillage, fuel, and fertilizers, under-investment in infrastructure and lack of incentive because of price controls ;
- (3) The initial assessments of the 2008/2009 cropping season, however, have been generally positive, a result of the timely delivery of inputs to many farmers and the effective rains ;
- (4) Food supply and availability has hugely improved for the 2009/2010 season thanks to the good harvest, the dollarization of the economy and the abolition of restrictions on commercial imports of cereals. This in turn means that the factors affecting accessibility to food have changed drastically this year ;
- (5) The main challenge remains to link hitherto largely disassociated food aid and food security programmes in a perspective of linking seasonal relief to development ;
- (6) To reach populations in need, aid should be channelled through Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), International Organisations including United Nations (UN) agencies. Therefore the European Commission should implement the budget by direct centralized management or by joint management;
- (7) An assessment of the humanitarian situation leads to the conclusion that humanitarian aid Actions should be financed by the Community for a period of 18 months.;
- (8) It is estimated that an amount of EUR 9,000,000 from budget article 23 02 02 of the general budget of the European Communities is necessary to provide humanitarian assistance to over one million people amongst the most vulnerable food-insecure groups, taking into account the available budget, other donors' contributions and other

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<sup>1</sup> 1- OJ L 163, 2.7.1996, p. 1.

factors. Therefore the activities covered by this Decision may be financed in full in accordance with Article 253 of the Implementing Rules of the Financial Regulation;

- (9) The present Decision constitutes a financing Decision within the meaning of Article 75 of the Financial Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002<sup>2</sup>, Article 90 of the detailed rules for the implementation of the Financial Regulation determined by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002<sup>3</sup>, and Article 15 of the internal rules on the implementation of the general budget of the European Communities<sup>4</sup>;
- (10) In accordance with Article 17 (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No.1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid, the Humanitarian Aid Committee gave a favourable opinion on 1 July 2009.

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

#### *Article 1*

1. In accordance with the objectives and general principles of humanitarian aid, the Commission hereby approves a total amount of EUR 9,000,000 for humanitarian food assistance support for vulnerable populations in Zimbabwe affected by the breakdown of essential social services by using article 23 02 02 of the 2009 general budget of the European Communities.
2. In accordance with Article 2 of Council Regulation No.1257/96, the humanitarian Actions under this Decision shall be implemented in the pursuance of the following specific objective:
  - To provide short-term food security and livelihood support in order to contribute to the early recovery of food security for the most vulnerable population groups

The full amount of this Decision is allocated to this specific objective.

#### *Article 2*

1. The duration for the implementation of this Decision shall be for a maximum period of 18 months, starting on 1 July 2009.
2. Expenditure under this Decision shall be eligible from 1 July 2009.
3. If the Actions envisaged in this Decision are suspended owing to *force majeure* or comparable circumstances, the period of suspension shall not be taken into account for the calculation of the duration of the implementation of this Decision.

#### *Article 3*

1. The Commission shall implement the budget by direct centralised management or by joint management with international organisations.
2. Actions supported by this Decision will be implemented either by non-profit-making organisations which fulfil the eligibility and suitability criteria established in Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/96, International organisations or directly by the Commission.

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<sup>2</sup> 2- OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p.1.

<sup>3</sup> 3- OJ L 357, 31.12.2002, , p.1.

<sup>4</sup> 4- Commission Decision of 5.3.2008, C/2008/773

3. Taking account of the specificities of humanitarian aid, the nature of the activities to be undertaken, the specific location constraints and the level of urgency, the activities covered by this Decision may be financed in full in accordance with Article 253 of the Implementing Rules of the Financial Regulation.

*Article 4*

This Decision will take effect on the date of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, [...]

*For the Commission*  
*Member of the Commission*



**Humanitarian Aid Decision**  
**23 02 02**

Title: Humanitarian food assistance support for vulnerable populations in Zimbabwe affected by the breakdown of essential social services

Location of Action: Zimbabwe

Amount of Decision: EUR 9,000,000

Decision reference number: ECHO/ZWE/BUD/2009/02000

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**Supporting Document**

**1 - Rationale, needs and target population.**

1.1. - Rationale :

In the late Eighties, Zimbabwe became a *de facto* one-party state (ZANU-PF<sup>1</sup>), with President Robert Mugabe extending his powers to both presidential and executive authority. Following a series of flawed elections since 2000, he has held on to power and presided over the progressive economic and structural collapse of his country. The most recent election, in March 2008, was won by the opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a situation which led to months of political violence, regional and pan-African negotiations.

A Global Political Agreement (GPA) was signed on September 15, 2008, between ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M. Five months later, a Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed with the swearing in of Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister on February 11, 2009, and of a new Cabinet on February 13, 2009. The Zimbabwe dollar (ZIM\$) was withdrawn in October 2008, being replaced by the US dollar and the South African rand (ZAR). This has put an end to the rampant and historic hyperinflation experienced for the last four or five years. The new Government, however, faces many more difficult challenges.

Since its installation, the GNU has been defining its strategy for the stabilization of the country in the Short Term Economic Recovery Programme, which has become the blue print document to address in the short term key issues on democratization, stabilization and

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<sup>1</sup> Zimbabwe African National Union – Popular Front

national healing. The Government further prioritized its activities in a 100 Day Plan. It is a management tool to be used in the implementation and execution of the STERP and it covers five clusters: Economy, Infrastructure, Social, Rights and Interests, and Security.<sup>2</sup>

The adverse implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) implemented forced seizures of mostly white-owned land by ZANU war veterans, and wider inappropriate economic policies, crippled the country and led to an unrelieved shortage of basic commodities and services from 2000 onwards. The crisis was aggravated by a severe drought in 2002, since when Zimbabwe has suffered from chronic food insecurity. The country, once the breadbasket of southern Africa, has become a food importer, has one of the world's fastest crumbling economies and faces the overall rapid decline of social services, previously amongst the best in the continent. The spread of HIV/AIDS (estimated 15,6% prevalence rate<sup>3</sup>) is another factor which continues to have a deleterious effect on the humanitarian situation. This rapid decline is demonstrated by an effective loss of about 30 places in the Human Development Index (HDI)<sup>4</sup> compiled by the United Nations Development Programme: Zimbabwe's index fell – one of a tiny handful of such cases – from 0.654 in 1990 to 0.513 in 2005. Countries with an index of 0.654 (Sao Tome and Botswana) are 123<sup>rd</sup> and 124<sup>th</sup> respectively in the HDI. Zimbabwe, with an astonishing adult literacy rate of 90%, now comes in at 151<sup>st</sup>, just above Togo and Yemen, with adult literacy rates of 53% and 54% respectively.

The drought in Zimbabwe took a heavy toll on the 2007 harvest, which resulted in low yields from some of the best land in the country, and poor recompense to farmers. The impact of adverse weather, combined with the severe economic constraints combined to reduce maize production. Apart from dry weather, the reduction in the harvest was due to shortages of tractor/draught power for tillage, fuel, and fertilizers, under-investment in infrastructure and lack of incentive because of price controls. The collective result of all of these events is that the difficult access to food – both physical and economic – has had serious deleterious effects on the food security status of vulnerable populations.

The food security situation in Zimbabwe did not improve at all during the 2007/2008 season as compared to the previous year. Primary factors responsible for the lack of improvement in 2007/8, in addition to adverse weather, were untimely delivery of seeds and shortages of fertilizer, deteriorating infrastructure, and most importantly unprofitable prices for most of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) controlled crops. Though unquantifiable, it appears likely that the wave of political violence after the March 29<sup>th</sup> 2008 elections also had an impact on the harvest. A decline in national agricultural production over the previous 7-8 years is also due to the structural change. The newly settled farmers cultivate only about half of the prime land allocated to them owing to shortages of tractor/draught power, fuel, and investment in infrastructure/ improvements, and absenteeism on the part of some new settler beneficiaries. The large-scale commercial sector produces less than one-tenth of the maize that it produced in the 1990s.

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<sup>2</sup> The EC is represented as one of the five international partners sitting on the STERP steering committee

<sup>3</sup> UNAIDS Report 2006: National adult HIV prevalence is estimated at 20.1 %, down from 22.1 % in 2003. Ministry of Health uses the figure of 15,6 % prevalence, based on a 2007 national estimate

<sup>4</sup> UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008

To respond to this situation, WFP distributed food aid to as many as 4.8 million beneficiaries/month while the C-SAFE network<sup>5</sup>, complemented WFP's Food Aid operation by distributing food to 1.8 million people. Overall, a total of 6,6 million people were assisted with food aid.

In parallel, UNICEF conducted a nutrition survey<sup>6</sup> in November 2008 in order to monitor the nutritional situation. As compared to the previous year, and just at the start of the seasonal food distributions, the nutritional situation had remained stable, or even improved. Indeed, only one district had global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence above 7% (as compared to 5 in 2007 survey). At national level, the GAM rate was found to be 4.8%, in line with previous years. It is once again interesting to note that, despite the socio-economic collapse, nutrition indicators remained almost unchanged in 2008 as compared to 2007 and 2006 which was considered as a normal year. The fact that an ever poorer harvest had not had a significant impact on the nutritional situation raises some serious questions. It appears that the major role of remittances, as well as other coping strategies, is still insufficiently taken into consideration when assessing and analysing livelihoods.

### 2009 Food Security prospects

The initial assessments<sup>7</sup> of the 2008/2009 cropping season have been generally positive, a result of the timely delivery of inputs to many farmers and the effective rains. The Ministry of Agriculture's harvest estimates and preliminary FAO estimates for food and non-food crops indicate a significant overall increase from last years' historical low harvest. The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) interim assessment results also indicate significant improvements in household cereal harvests this year compared to 2008. This means that the combined cereal production for 2008/9 is estimated at 1,510,000 MT, almost twice as much as last year's harvests.

This and varied good harvest is likely to have a huge impact on the diversification of food security mechanisms, and does not yet take into account the forecast huge crop of sweet potatoes from a virus-free strain developed over the past three years and widely distributed to vulnerable households.

An additional element to be taken into account in the crop assessments is that thousands of beneficiaries of food aid planted maize grain from the November and December 2008 food aid. This planting has produced varying yields, but has had a marked impact on household food security.

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<sup>5</sup> Consortium for Southern Africa Food Security Emergencies, comprised of CARE, Catholic Relief Services and World Vision. Entirely funded by USAID, this consortium manages about half of the US food pipeline and operates in complementarity to WFP operation according to a geographical division of labour.

<sup>6</sup> Combined Micronutrient and Nutrition Surveillance Survey, report prepared by the Food and Nutrition Council and UNICEF, November 2008.

<sup>7</sup> The 2008/2009 maize production is estimated at almost 1,250,000 MT<sup>7</sup> from a planted area of 1,521,780 ha, with an average yield of 0.8 T/ha. The production estimate is about **160%** more than last year's estimate at the same period, and about 13% higher than the average of the past five years. In addition, the total small grains production (sorghum and millet) is estimated at about 270,000 MT, altogether about **190%** more than last year's harvest, and 110% more than the average of the past five years. Furthermore, the production of other major crops vastly increased in comparison with the previous year : soya bean 115,817 MT or + **140 %**, groundnuts 216,619 MT or + **65%**, sugar beans 37,329 MT or + **881%**, sunflower 39,018 MT or + **614%**.

The results of a joint FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) which took place in the first half of May were, however, not available at the time of writing.

#### DG ECHO strategy/funding

An amount of 25 million euros has been earmarked for interventions in Zimbabwe in 2009, of which 10 million euros from the 2009 general humanitarian aid budget line and 15 million euros from the food aid budget line.

Several factors have contributed to a decision to mobilise this funding in several stages in 2009, rather than in a Global Plan:

- The situation in Zimbabwe is evolving continuously, which may mean that new needs will emerge over the coming months;
- There is need, however, for continuing and timely support for interventions in the health and water / sanitation sectors;
- The timing of food aid/food security cycle cannot be altered: the harvest, and therefore initial crop assessments, takes place in Zimbabwe in April, and the agricultural campaign starts in September;
- The identification of a European Commission short-term strategy of support to the country after the establishment of the Unity Government in February 2009;

In the light of the above, and in order to avoid gaps in funding to humanitarian interventions, it was proposed to the Humanitarian Aid Committee on 23 April 2009 to:

- Commit 8 million euros from the general humanitarian budget line in May 2009 (decision adopted on 15 May 2009);
- To launch an ad hoc decision from the food aid budget line in June 2009, amount to be specified as a result of the April programming mission, in order to ensure timely funding to food assistance interventions starting in September 2009 (the current decision) ;
- To commit the balance of funds earmarked for Zimbabwe in a further ad hoc decision later in the year, possibly September, in respect of any new needs, or to consolidate actions to be funded from the above decisions.

#### 1.2. - Identified needs :

Since over 80% of rural households and 60% of urban households get a significant proportion of their annual food requirements from their own crop production, improved harvests are likely to lead to improved post-harvest access to food for the majority of these households compared to the same time last year. Two other important developments have had a great impact on the economic front, and on food availability, over the past several months: the collapse of the ZIM\$ and its withdrawal from circulation in October 2008, making way for the legalisation of the USD and the ZAR as the means of exchange, with the associated elimination of hyperinflation ; and the collapse of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), which exercised a monopoly on the import of cereals and their sale at hugely subsidized prices. These two elements mean that it is now possible for private traders to import food and other items, and to sell them at proper market prices in a stable currency. As a result of this, and of the arrival on the market of Zimbabwe-produced maize from the new harvest, food is widely



available. Furthermore, the price of mealie meal (as a benchmark item for household consumption) has dropped from USD 2/kg in January to between USD 0.30-35/kg (less than USD 0.50/kg even in Harare supermarkets) in April 2009<sup>8</sup>. Prices are now on a par with those in South Africa. Lack of access to foreign currency, however, is problematic for the most vulnerable.

The dollarization of the economy and the abolition of restrictions on commercial imports of cereals have had clear benefits in terms of the availability of food. Two distinct trends appear to be emerging, however, in terms of accessibility to food linked to the dollarization, with a common denominator which is access to the dollar (or rand) itself :

- Vulnerable urban and peri-urban populations who have little or no land, so cannot produce (enough) food to ensure household food security, have typically coped by evolving in the informal economy. Now, many are quickly being squeezed out by the formal economy which is rapidly taking over, as shops and markets can now offer a wide range of produce at normal market prices. In the meantime, Zimbabwe's depressed economy continues to limit employment opportunities, and even for those that are employed, low wages limit their purchasing power for food and other basic commodities and services. In addition, most of these households have limited access to other sources of income such as casual labour, livestock sales, etc. to access food on the market. Though prices are reasonable, it is necessary to pay in foreign currency, which the most vulnerable groups do not have. For these groups, the potential for non-in kind based livelihoods interventions is enormous: swipe card technology, for example, offers very promising avenues to explore as a type of urban voucher system now that the era of hyper-inflation is over.

- Many rural households will find their food security situation vastly improved this year as compared to previous years. Indeed, many will have a harvest which will ensure relative food security for their families, and for some of them will even have crops to sell. A big issue here, however, is that the dollarization of the economy and limited stocks of hard currency has increased barter trade. Most rural households have only their crops to pay for goods and services. Deterioration of the terms of trade between grains and other priority goods and services (such as soap, school fees, etc.) imposed upon them result in early depletion of household food stocks and could end up making them food insecure after a good harvest<sup>9</sup>.

On the other hand, in spite of ample evidence that food aid has served many relevant purposes, including disaster mitigation and short-term safety net for vulnerable households, it should be made clear that food aid in Zimbabwe is a preventive action and not a life-saving operation. As such, it is particularly important to properly and accurately target the beneficiaries in order to avoid falling into a “relief-trap” and create structural food aid dependency.

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<sup>8</sup> FEWSNET Price Watch bulletin on Urban Food Markets April 2009 records the biggest monthly decrease in maize price in the world on the market in Harare in April – minus 37% compared to March

<sup>9</sup>As an example, the two priority items mentioned without exception by beneficiaries are soap (essential for hygiene with 100,000 cholera cases in the country) and school fees. The barter price for a bar of soap (70 cents on the market) is 24 kg of maize (worth USD 8). The barter price for school fees is equivalent to more than double the USD/ZAR price. The barter price to mill 20 kg of maize is between 5-10 kg of maize, etc. etc. In addition, between 10-15% of the harvest is typically lost in storage due to insects. So, bucket of maize by bucket of maize, the food security of the farmer is jeopardized, and he/she still has not succeeded in accessing any cash.

However, food aid and food security programmes have been to a large extent dissociated rather than complementing each other in a perspective of linking seasonal relief to development (LRRD).

Zimbabwe is this year likely to benefit from the best harvest in five years, which comes fortuitously at a time of currency stability, of economic liberalisation, and of transitional strategies. Furthermore, the EC Delegation has currently mobilized a series of food security instruments which will come on stream in time for the 2009/2010 agricultural campaign. Without prejudice to the perhaps less favourable evolution of the political situation, a window of opportunity appears to be present for DG ECHO<sup>10</sup> to try innovative approaches in terms of emergency food security and livelihoods strategy in order to consolidate these gains.

In such a context, it is recommended that DG ECHO consolidate its strategy in favour of enhancing and adding value to emergency food security actions, reinforcing the complementarities with the EC Delegation and other donors' food security projects in an LRRD framework. Should the improvement in the food security sector be consolidated by next year's harvest, DG ECHO would be able to significantly scale down funding in the sector.

### 1.3. - Target population and regions concerned :

This Decision will support interventions targeted at the most vulnerable population groups all over the country, and specifically at district level in urban, peri-urban and rural areas. This targeting is a reflection of the widespread vulnerability on a national level, and the widespread breakdown of all essential services. DG ECHO-funded interventions will specifically aim at supporting the early recovery of the food security and livelihoods of the most vulnerable populations.

Furthermore, in order to reinforce the synergy and impact of actions funded from the general humanitarian budget line in terms of an integrated public health approach, emergency food security actions to be funded by DG ECHO will prioritise the areas of the country which suffered the most serious cholera outbreaks. This is because cholera is not only a symptom of the breakdown of essential health and watsan services, but equally of poverty and vulnerability.

### 1.4. - Risk assessment and possible constraints :

A possible constraint to the implementation of this Decision may arise due to the ongoing uncertainty surrounding the stability of the new Unity Government, and the potential new policies and structures which will emerge over the next months which may have an impact at district level. The possibility of the collapse of the power-sharing arrangement and a return to civil unrest cannot, unfortunately, be ignored.

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<sup>10</sup> Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid - ECHO

## **2 - Objectives and components of the humanitarian intervention proposed:**

### **2.1. - Objectives\_ :**

Principal objective: To safeguard the availability of, and access to, food for vulnerable populations affected by the breakdown of essential social services

Specific objective :

- To provide short-term food security and livelihood support in order to contribute to the early recovery of food security for the most vulnerable population groups

### **2.2. - Components :**

In order to take advantage of the window of opportunity described above, it is proposed that DG ECHO make a substantial contribution to supporting food security interventions.

As such, rather than duplicating the substantial EC Delegation food security projects<sup>11</sup>, DG ECHO's support would reinforce and complement the EC Delegation intervention with the aim of launching livelihoods approaches in rural, urban and peri-urban areas such as, for example :

- Distribution of food rations on a targeted basis to individuals or households affected by severe food insecurity. Attention will be paid to the appropriateness, quality and acceptability of the food, as well as its micro-nutrient composition ;
- Use of non-food transfers (through the use of cash transfers or voucher systems, such as swipe cards linked to local supermarkets) that improve beneficiaries' access to food as an alternative or complement to food aid, where appropriate;
- Restoration of basic livelihoods and strengthening of resistance to future shocks by ensuring access to agriculture and livestock inputs and services (such as milling vouchers, pest control chemicals, appropriate storage containers, sweet potatoes seedlings and non-maize cereals), and other factors of production and livelihoods ;
- Support to short-term employment generation and labour schemes, such as food for work, vouchers for work or cash for work programmes;
- Strengthening of food assistance partners' capacities for designing optimally appropriate responses, through technical review, development of assessment tools, training, dissemination and follow-up;
- Reinforcement of coordination in the food security and livelihoods sector.

Actions will also be coherent with and complementary to the public health interventions funded/to be funded from the general humanitarian line, in order to increase the impact of DG ECHO funding. Furthermore, all actions will include a component of mainstreaming of HIV and AIDS, in line with DG ECHO Guidelines on HIV and AIDS<sup>12</sup>, and particularly its section 6.

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<sup>11</sup> Through the Food Facility, STABEX, 9<sup>th</sup> EDF B-envelope, Food Security Thematic Budget Line

<sup>12</sup> October 2008

### **3 - Duration expected for Actions in the proposed Decision:**

The duration for the implementation of this Decision shall be 18 months

Humanitarian Actions funded by this Decision must be implemented within this period.

Expenditure under this Decision shall be eligible from 1 July 2009 in order to allow partners to plan for the start of the 2009 agricultural campaign.

Start Date : 1 July 2009

If the implementation of the Actions envisaged in this Decision is suspended due to *force majeure* or any comparable circumstance, the period of suspension will not be taken into account for the calculation of the duration of the humanitarian aid Actions.

Depending on the evolution of the situation in the field, the Commission reserves the right to terminate the agreements signed with the implementing humanitarian organisations where the suspension of activities is for a period of more than one third of the total planned duration of the Action. In this respect, the procedure established in the general conditions of the specific agreement will be applied.

#### **4 - Previous interventions/Decisions of the Commission within the context of the current crisis**

### List of previous DG ECHO operations in ZIMBABWE

[illegible]

Dated : 15 May 2009

Source : HOPE

(\*) decisions with more than one country

## 5 - Overview of donors' contributions

Donors in ZIMBABWE the last 12 months					
1. EU Members States (*)		2. European Commission		3. Others	
	EUR		EUR		EUR
Austria		DG ECHO	16,934,160		
Belgium	599,500	Other services			
Bulgaria					
Cyprus					
Czech republic	300,000				
Denmark	5,172,155				
Estonia	57,508				
Finland	500,000				
France	2,450,000				
Germany	8,876,161				
Greece	1,240,350				
Hungary					
Ireland	3,623,454				
Italy	2,254,527				
Latvia					
Lithuania					
Luxemburg	500,000				
Malta					
Netherlands	13,200,000				
Poland					
Portugal	50,000				
Romania					
Slovakia					
Slovenie					
Spain	2,235,424				
Sweden	3,519,459				
United kingdom	11,349,850				
Subtotal	55,928,388	Subtotal	16,934,160	Subtotal	0
		Grand total	72,863,148		

Dated : 05 May 2009

(\*) Source : DG ECHO 14 Points reporting for Members States. <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac>

Empty cells means either no information is available or no contribution.

## 6 - Amount of Decision and distribution by specific objectives:

6.1. - Total amount of the Decision: EUR 9,000,000

### 6.2. - Budget breakdown by specific objectives

<b>Principal objective:</b> <i>To safeguard the availability of, and access to, food for vulnerable populations affected by the breakdown of essential social services</i>				
<b>Specific objectives</b>	<b>Allocated amount by specific objective (EUR)</b>	<b>Geographical area of operation</b>	<b>Activities</b>	<b>Potential partners<sup>13</sup></b>
Specific objective 1: – To provide short-term food security and livelihood support in order to contribute to the early recovery of food security for the most vulnerable population groups	9,000,000	National	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Distribution of food rations on a targeted basis to individuals or households affected by severe food insecurity ;</li> <li>- Use of non-food transfers (through the use of cash transfers or voucher systems, such as swipe cards linked to local supermarkets) that improve beneficiaries' access to food as an alternative or complement to food aid, where appropriate ;</li> <li>- Restoration of basic livelihoods and strengthening of resistance to future shocks by ensuring access to agriculture and livestock inputs and services (such as milling vouchers, pest control chemicals, appropriate storage containers, sweet potatoes seedlings and non-maize cereals), and other factors of production and livelihoods ;</li> <li>- Support to short-term employment generation and labour schemes, such as food for work, vouchers for work or cash for work programmes;</li> <li>- Strengthening of food assistance partners' capacities for designing optimally appropriate responses, through technical review, development of assessment tools, training, dissemination and follow-up;</li> <li>- Reinforcement of coordination in the food security and livelihoods sector.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ACF - FRA</li> <li>- CARE - DEU</li> <li>- CORDAID - NL</li> <li>- FAO</li> <li>- GERMAN AGRO ACTION</li> <li>- HELP</li> <li>- MERCY CORPS SCOTLAND</li> <li>- OXFAM - UK</li> <li>- SAVE THE CHILDREN - UK</li> <li>- SOLIDARITES</li> <li>- WFP-PAM</li> <li>- WORLD VISION - UK</li> <li>- WORLD VISION DEU</li> </ul>
<b>TOTAL:</b>	9,000,000			

<sup>13</sup> ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM, (FR), CARE INTERNATIONAL DEUTSCHLAND E.V. (DEU), DEUTSCHE WELTHUNGERHILFE e.V., CATHOLIC ORGANISATION FOR RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT AID (NLD), HELP- HILFE ZUR SELBSTHILFE E.V. (DEU), MERCY CORPS SCOTLAND (GBR), OXFAM (GB), SOLIDARITES, (FR), THE SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND (GBR), UNITED NATIONS - FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, WORLD FOOD PROGRAM, WORLD VISION - UK, WORLD VISION, (DEU)

## **7 - Evaluation**

Under article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No.1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid the Commission is required to "regularly assess humanitarian aid Actions financed by the Community in order to establish whether they have achieved their objectives and to produce guidelines for improving the effectiveness of subsequent Actions." These evaluations are structured and organised in overarching and cross cutting issues forming part of DG ECHO's Annual Strategy such as child-related issues, the security of relief workers, respect for human rights, gender. Each year, an indicative Evaluation Programme is established after a consultative process. This programme is flexible and can be adapted to include evaluations not foreseen in the initial programme, in response to particular events or changing circumstances. More information can be obtained at:

[http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/evaluation/introduction\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/evaluation/introduction_en.htm).

## **8. MANAGEMENT ISSUES**

Humanitarian aid Actions funded by the Commission are implemented by NGOs, Specialised Agencies of the Member States, and the Red Cross organisations on the basis of Framework Partnership Agreements (FPA) and by United Nations agencies based on the EC/UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) in conformity with Article 163 of the Implementing Rules of the Financial Regulation. These Framework agreements define the criteria for attributing grant agreements and financing agreements in accordance with Article 90 of the Implementing Rules and may be found at [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/about/actors/partners\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/about/actors/partners_en.htm).

For International Organisations identified as potential partners for implementing the Decision, actions will be managed under joint management.

Individual grants are awarded on the basis of the criteria enumerated in Article 7.2 of the Humanitarian Aid Regulation, such as the technical and financial capacity, readiness and experience, and results of previous interventions.