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Final Report

Evaluation of DG ECHO's Response to the Humanitarian Crises in Sudan and South Sudan (2011-2015)

02-12/2016

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AGIR	Global Alliance for Resilience
C&V	Cash and Vouchers
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DFID	Department for International Development UK
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
ECHO	Directorate General European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection Office
EDF	European Development Fund
EMOP	Emergency Operations
EQ	Evaluation Question
ERC	Enhanced Response Capacity
EC	European Council
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FFA	Food for Assets
FFT	Food for Training
FFW	Food for Work
FPA	Framework Partnership Agreement
FSNMS	Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System
FSTP	Food Security Thematic Programme
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GBV	Gender-based Violence

HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HIP	Humanitarian Implementation Plan
HPC	Humanitarian Procurement Centre
HQ	Headquarter
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDDRSI	IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
INGO	International NGO
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
ITA	IASC Transformative Agenda
JC	Judgement Criteria
JHDF	Joint Humanitarian Development Framework
KAP	Knowledge, Attitude, Practices
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MNP	Micronutrient powders
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NNGO	National NGO
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PA	Programme Assistant
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
POC	Protection of Civilians site
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
RRT	Rapid Response Team
RUTF	Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SBCC	Social and Behaviour Change Communication
SHARE	Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSRRC	South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
TA	Technical Assistant
TEQ	Thematic Evaluation Question

TJC	Thematic Judgement Criteria
TSFP	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHAS	United Nation's Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Abstract

This independent evaluation covers the 2011-2015 support provided by the European Commission (ECHO) in relation to the humanitarian crises in Sudan and South Sudan.

The evaluation found that the support was very relevant and flexible. The support targeted the most vulnerable groups, and was mostly in alignment with European Commission policies. The support in terms of coordination, logistics and humanitarian advocacy contributed to the delivery of results, which also benefitted the wider humanitarian community. ECHO's strong stance on humanitarian principles is applauded, but also poses challenges with regard to access to crisis-affected people.

The support was implemented effectively through high-quality projects, planned outputs were largely achieved, and – when feasible – ensured sustainability of facilities. There were few activities supporting 'Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development' (LRRD) and resilience due to limited opportunities, compounded by short funding-cycles. Contracts were managed efficiently although there were delays in contract approval, and systems for documenting and utilising lessons learnt were lacking.

It is recommended that ECHO i) further strengthens its strategy for a principled approach and advocacy; ii) continues to support and strengthen coordination; iii) considers how to scale up LRRD and resilience efforts when feasible; and iv) strengthens systems for documenting and disseminating lessons learnt.

Executive Summary[1]

The purpose of this evaluation was to have an independent retrospective evaluation of the Directorate General European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection Office's (hereafter referred to as ECHO) support in relation to the humanitarian crises in Sudan and South Sudan, from 2011-15. Based on the evaluation, four strategic recommendations for future ECHO support in the two countries were inferred.

1.1. Methodology

The evaluation was based on six evaluation criteria: Relevance, Coherence, EU Added Value, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability. The evaluation used primary and secondary data obtained through a number of tools, including document review, portfolio analysis, an online questionnaire, semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries, partners, ECHO staff, etc., along with visits to project sites in Sudan and South Sudan. A team of international and national experts conducted the evaluation.

As always when conducting large-scale evaluations in dynamic and volatile settings, the evaluation experienced challenges. Due to the sheer number of projects supported, the evaluation team was not able to visit all projects nor review all project documents, and instead made a purposive selection of project documents (FichOps) for review, and of project sites to visit. In some instances, the institutional memory of relevant organisations was constrained by a high staff turnover, limiting the availability of non-written historical data. Project site visits were challenged by the inability of the international experts to travel to areas outside of Khartoum. The national consultant in South Sudan was not able to accompany the international expert to all project sites, and the evaluation team experienced a number of changes to local travel arrangements. However, thanks to the triangulation of multiple sources of information such as documents, interviews, and the online questionnaire (and in Sudan the national consultant's ability to travel to Darfur), the results of the evaluation are found to be valid.

1.2. Context and ECHO support

For decades, Sudan and South Sudan have been marred by conflict, drought, flooding and other disasters, and as a consequence millions of people have been in need of humanitarian assistance. Every year from 2011 to 2015, between 5 and 12 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance and this figure has been increasing over the years

Figure 1: People in need in Sudan and South Sudan 2011-15

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
[1] Translations into French and Arabic are provided in annexes M and N of the main document.

(for more details, please refer to figure 1 to the right). The people in need include internally displaced people, returnees, refugees, and host communities.

To support the humanitarian efforts in the two countries, from 2011 to 2015, ECHO committed a total of EUR 850 million. ECHO was the third largest humanitarian donor in the two countries, contributing around 10% of the total humanitarian response. The 2011-15 support was provided through 13 Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs), of which the six main ones were selected for evaluation, totalling EUR 696 million. The support focused on the provision of emergency aid for people in need, including food assistance, nutrition, health, water & sanitation, shelter, non-food items, logistics, and coordination, with an overarching aspect of protection. The support was provided through 56 partners (NGOs, UN and International Organisations) by means of 247 grants with a median value of EUR 1.3 million; the largest grant was 58 million (food aid). The partners receiving most funding were WFP (41% of the EUR 696 million), ICRC, UNHCR and UNICEF; the latter three each receiving more than EUR 40 million.

1.3. Main findings and conclusions

1.3.1. Relevance

The evaluation found that the support provided by ECHO in relation to the humanitarian crises in Sudan and South Sudan 2011-15 was very relevant to the context. The quality of the assessments of the humanitarian needs, as described in the HIPs, was high – a fact confirmed by all persons interviewed. Furthermore, the ECHO support provided through partners was found to be very much in line with the identified humanitarian needs.

Through updating the HIPs, including the needs-based allocation of additional funds, ECHO was able to respond quickly and effectively to situational changes. Although only a few specific protection risk analyses had been carried out, the projects implemented nevertheless were found to generally target the most vulnerable groups such as IDPs, refugees, children, women, etc.

1.3.2. Coherence

ECHO's support is found to have been well aligned with the EC/ECHO humanitarian policies. All policies were fully incorporated in the HIPs and the implemented projects.

1.3.3. EU Added Value

The added value of ECHO's support is found to have been high. The financial contributions enabled partners to implement projects in very challenging environments and deliver results, meeting agreed targets. Furthermore, ECHO assisted the field operations of non-partners indirectly, by providing support for coordination, logistics and humanitarian advocacy. The support for logistics services was appreciated by all stakeholders, be it partners or non-partners, and facilitated the implementation of humanitarian activities in the two countries. The consistent support for coordination, especially to the cluster system, is found to be adding value to humanitarian efforts in general.

The knowledge and professionalism of ECHO staff, allowing for pragmatic solutions to the challenges the partners are facing, was praised by many interviewees. ECHO also supported activities and sectors not funded by other donors, thus filling gaps in the humanitarian response.

Although the HIPs promoted Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), the opportunities have been limited due to both the volatile context and difficulties in collaborating with the national governments concerned. Furthermore, ECHO's annual funding cycle is not

conducive to the implementation of medium or longer-term activities as is typically required for effective engagements with communities and (local) authorities.

1.3.4. Effectiveness

The ECHO support is found to have been effectively implemented in all sectors, generally with a high quality of projects funded, and planned outputs largely achieved. Despite difficulties in obtaining supplies, the nutrition support resulted in a variety of services being provided. The health services provided were of high quality, but suffered occasionally from a lack of supplies. Although the WASH services were effective, recurrent maintenance remains a concern, in part due to unclear government policies.

The evaluation found that ECHO was very strong on humanitarian advocacy and, being a principled donor, has also been able to influence other donors, especially in Sudan.

The support provided in terms of logistics and coordination is found to have had an impact not only on the effective delivery of ECHO's support, but also on other humanitarian actors' capacity to deliver effectively.

Although quantitative measurements of outcomes and impact is not possible, the evaluators found that due to the substantial support provided by ECHO lives of beneficiaries have improved and lives have almost certainly been saved.

1.3.5. Efficiency

Overall the evaluation found that ECHO managed the support in an efficient manner. Despite occasional delays in approvals of contracts caused by the internal processes of both ECHO and its partners, the contracts were managed in a highly satisfactory manner.

Given that securing supplies is challenging in both Sudan and South Sudan – transport is bound to the dry season and administrative hurdles are time-consuming – the relatively short timeframe of ECHO contracts can cause (further) delays in implementation and put a strain on the smaller partners' finances. The evaluation therefore found that the adequacy of the funding cycle was limited, and it is recommended that ECHO reviews its deadlines for proposals. To cater for the need for prepositioning supplies and to take into consideration the protracted nature of the crises, it would be useful to find ways of extending project durations, while bearing in mind that this might be restricted by the current relevant EC regulation.

Lessons learnt are not formally documented or utilised beyond their dissemination in expert groups. Due to the high staff turnover among both partners and ECHO staff, a systematic and effective documentation of lessons learnt is essential. The system in place in HOPE has improved over time but it still not possible to easy retrieve lessons learned at a macro level. Such a system would benefit ECHO internally but would also contribute to learning for the wider humanitarian community at local or global level.

Despite the difficult context with limited access in some locations, the evaluation did not find any instances of remote management *per se*, but there were incidences of temporary remote management, which would warrant the development of simple procedures based on the existing more comprehensive guidelines for remote management.

1.3.6. Sustainability

The services provided in situations of protracted displacement, mainly in camps, were found to correspond to the needs and the duration of the displacements. Sustainability could however be increased by including cost recovery mechanisms, more conditional assistance, stronger community participation, and better targeting based on vulnerability criteria.

Although the HIPs promoted LRRD as well as resilience, the active implementation of such aspects was sporadic, and only a limited number of projects had clearly identifiable LRRD or resilience elements.

1.4. Strategic Recommendations

Conclusions/Rationale	Strategic recommendations
Principled approach	
ECHO has consistently adhered to and supported its partners in strictly applying the widely-acknowledged principles of Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence in both countries. ECHO is perceived as being a principled and well informed donor, who is very vocal and effective at bringing up issues related to humanitarian space. ECHO often leads joint donor advocacy actions. However, the context is very detrimental to humanitarian space due to the lack of receptiveness to humanitarian advocacy by governments who either have other priorities (civil war in South Sudan) or are strongly pursuing a different political agenda of their own (Sudan). The principled approach has raised concerns in Sudan - where ECHO is only supporting projects in areas in which access by 'diverse' teams is ensured - while the authorities at the same time may disrupt humanitarian access in retaliation to criticisms. A potential consequence of the principled approach based on Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence may therefore be that the population most in need could be deprived of humanitarian assistance, jeopardising the other humanitarian principle of Humanity and its imperative to address human suffering wherever it is found.	ECHO should apply a two-pronged strategy to pursue the principled approach and face the political constraints to the best of its ability: (i) internally, better define with its partners the "rules of engagement" when contradictions occur between Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence on the one hand, and Humanity on the other; (ii) externally, to systematically seek synergies with other concerned EU and international actors at all levels (field and HQ), in order to promote a united response to the local authorities.
Supporting coordination	
ECHO provides consistent financial support for humanitarian leadership in both countries including in support of OCHA's role. There have, however, been concerns regarding the humanitarian leadership and the effectiveness of the UN-led coordination mechanism while some pointed to the need for ECHO to further strengthen its engagement with the wider coordination structures.	ECHO should further strengthen its support to and collaboration with the coordination mechanisms at country level, and where there are capacity constraints at country level, also by advocacy at global/HQ level. ECHO should strive for increased collaboration with the sectoral coordination mechanisms, including pushing partners to do the same, while at the same time acknowledging the gaps in the coordination mechanisms and how the funds could best be used to fill them.

Conclusions/Rationale	Strategic recommendations
Supporting resilience	
The humanitarian imperative of saving lives first, which ECHO is a strong advocate of, and rightly so, is an important factor in deciding which activities to support; and in both countries, there are indeed unmet humanitarian needs. However, there are opportunities for the implementation of LRRD/resilience activities as also described in the 2014 and 2015 HIPs regarding the application of resilience – through support to livelihood, use of the cash and vouchers modalities, and the protection of agricultural assets. Enabling communities to better resist future shocks would be a potentially cost-effective approach, as urgent assistance would be required less, and this might even pave the way for partners to access development funding that can be used for LRRD purposes. However, ECHO's short (annual) project duration and the scarcity of funding, are not well suited if medium or longer-term activities, like those required to meaningfully embarking on resilience activities, are to be effective.	ECHO should consider engaging in a discussion about if and how it will open up its present approach of focusing purely on lifesaving activities to include also when feasible a wider resilience and/or early recovery approach. In this regard strengthening support to livelihoods, capacity building and community based activities in the camps, close to the camps, and in areas of return could be considered. Considering the context of protracted forgotten crises, economic sanctions and donors' fatigue in both Sudans, resilience can, depending on the specific context, be envisaged due to resilience's focus on strengthening affected communities and requires the support of only some local authorities – which are often more accessible and committed than national ones. In collaboration with other actors and development donors, ECHO could discuss the way forward, i.e. define what should be included in the ECHO support to resilience (and/or LRRD) and what should not. As resilience projects tend to take longer to implement due to the need to ensure ownership of the beneficiary communities, ways of defining multi-year strategies while at the same considering how to extend the project duration; or some kind of guarantee should be issued to partners that their funding will continue. Issuing multi-year contracts is not possible at present due to legal restrictions. Pending a possible change in the legal basis, lessons could possibly be learnt from the Drought Risk Reduction Action Plan (DRRAP) programme implemented in the Horn of Africa.

Conclusions/Rationale	Strategic recommendations
Using lessons learnt	
ECHO's procedures for identifying, documenting and utilising lessons learnt (mainly taking place through expert groups) are unclear and not consistently applied . Partners too, do not always pay sufficient attention to filling in the required record on lessons learnt in the final report form. Documentation and utilisation of lessons learnt is not systematised, and mainly relies on the memory of ECHO staff. However, staff members are not always retained for more than a year or two due to the dynamic and difficult contexts in the Sudans.	ECHO should strengthen its capacity to keep and disseminate lessons learnt, to avoid "reinventing the wheel" and to possibly support the implementation of more cost effective activities. Capturing lessons learnt can eventually provide the basis for innovations. Ultimately, this might lead to more effective actions, contributing to save more lives for the same amount of funding. In this conjunction, ECHO should ensure that partners provide sufficient information on lessons learnt._ Lessons learnt and best practices should be captured in an easy to access and searchable manner. This could perhaps best be achieved by allowing for sector-specific searches in the existing lessons learnt records in the DG ECHO's project database (HOPE). Lessons learnt and best practices should also be shared with partners, e.g. through workshops, through the clusters, or by sharing written briefings at national or global level.

Introduction

This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations from the evaluation of DG ECHO's response to the humanitarian crises in Sudan and South Sudan. Both countries have experienced humanitarian crises caused mainly by conflict or natural disasters droughts, compounded by political instability with millions of people displaced internally and externally. There are likely to continue to be humanitarian needs in the foreseeable future.

As per the ToR (Annex A), the purpose of the evaluation is to have an independent overall evaluation of the ECHO support from 2011 to 2015 in the two countries, aiming to provide a comprehensive retrospective assessment of ECHO's strategy. The evaluation is expected to provide a maximum of five prospective strategic recommendations (included in chapter 0) for the future ECHO support to the crises, taking into account the volatile context, and with a view to maximising the benefits of ECHO's support.

The final report is intended to be of use not only to ECHO at local, regional and central levels, but also to ECHO partners, national and regional stakeholders and other humanitarian donors and agencies.

Methodology

This chapter outlines the evaluation methodology with additional details included in annex B. The point of departure for the evaluation was the six generic and seven thematic evaluation questions proposed in the ToR, covering six evaluation criteria: Relevance, Coherence, EU Added Value, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability. For each of the evaluation criteria there were a number of sub-questions (a total of 19).

Based on the evaluation questions, an evaluation matrix was developed with one or more judgment criteria and indicators for each evaluation question. Data was collected using a number of evaluation tools, both quantitative (mainly through document analysis and an online questionnaire) and qualitative (mainly through document analysis, interviews and observations) tools. The evaluation tools were,

- document review,
- a portfolio analysis,
- a FichOps review,
- semi-structured interviews, observations and
- an online questionnaire.

Data collection evaluation was also conducted in the field with field missions to Sudan and South Sudan in May and June - more details on the field missions can be found in Annex B.

The different tools applied were used to triangulate and validate data in order to provide as accurate a picture of the ECHO support as possible.

The evaluation was conducted by a team of three international experts and two national experts; one of the national consultants was female.

1.5. Challenges, Limitations and Validity

Conducting evaluations in volatile settings like Sudan and South Sudan poses a number of challenges that can limit the validity of the evaluation, especially with regards to the availability of data and access. The evaluation team, nevertheless, found ways to overcome or reduce the impact of these obstacles, and the results of the evaluation remains valid.

The general lack of data compounded by a dynamic context with frequent population movements makes measuring impact or outcomes difficult. There are no reliable statistics and the short-term nature of the humanitarian projects coupled with access constraints makes it difficult to establish procedures for the routine collection of data to measure the outcomes or the impact. The evaluation has therefore relied mainly on the assumption that if the right outputs are produced in the right quantity at the right time and place, the expected outcomes and impact are likely to have been achieved.

The evaluation team, in close collaboration with ECHO and partner staff, carefully analysed the logistical and security constraints and developed a feasible plan for site visits. The sites to visit were thus not selected as a random sample, but given the diverse range of projects visited and the match between the site visits and data from the FichOps, the evaluation team believes it was shown as representative a sample of project sites as could reasonably be expected.

The limited access also meant that the national consultant in South Sudan could not travel to all locations, and the international consultants were not able to travel outside the capital of Sudan within the timeframe of the field visit. However, as the international experts visiting South Sudan were well-versed with the local contexts and made good use of partner staff during site visits for translation and the provision of background information, the lack of an accompanying national

consultant did not lessen the reliability of the data obtained. In Sudan the national consultant travelled to the field, and as she is very experienced and had the opportunity to spend two weeks in Khartoum with the international consultants prior to travelling to Nyala - thus getting a good understanding of the purpose of the evaluation and the evaluation questions - the national consultant was able to obtain accurate data. Indeed, the data she obtained was possibly even more accurate than it would have been if the international experts had been present since interviews with beneficiaries were conducted more smoothly than they would have been if translation had been required for the international experts. It is therefore believed that although direct access to beneficiaries by the international experts was not possible, the approach did not significantly change the extent and quality of the data obtained.

The evaluation team believes that all translations done for this evaluation remained faithful to the meaning of the original questions and answers, taking into consideration the need to adopt the wording of the questions to the cultural and educational level of the respondents. Assessing female beneficiaries was expected to be a potential challenge, especially in Sudan, but the use of a female national consultant offset this, thus not affecting the evaluation's validity.

Considering the interviewees' high level of commitment to implementing the ECHO funded projects, the evaluation team might in some instances have collected data that was sometimes biased. However, as triangulation of data from partner staff with data from the document review and interviews with other stakeholders, such as beneficiaries and donors, showed a good match, it is believed that this did not affect the validity of the evaluation. The good rapport established with interviewees during interviews also ensured an honest and open atmosphere. The debriefings held at country level and in Brussels also contributed to ensuring that balanced data was obtained. Furthermore, the data from evaluations conducted by partners and the ECHO monitoring visits also contributed to a comprehensive assessment of the projects.

The working environment is not conducive to retaining staff in either country and the turnover of international staff was high amongst most implementing partners and UN organisations. Without being able to count exactly how long international interviewees had been in-country, it is likely that more than half of them had been there less than a year. This limits the possibilities for obtaining historical information which mainly has an impact on the validity of the assessment of past projects. The use of the online questionnaire partly offset this, as did the interviewees that had been in the Sudans for several years.

A few respondents were not available for interviews in the field, e.g. they were on annual leave, or out of the country for rest and recuperation periods, etc., but no respondents of significant importance were unavailable to the evaluation team. The use of the online questionnaire also helped offset any potential impact of the unavailability of interviewees on the validity of the evaluation.

Although the high response rate to the online questionnaire was encouraging, the respondents were not necessarily a representative sample, as the reason the respondents had for choosing to respond might differ (i.e. it could be that mainly those that were critical of the ECHO support responded, or perhaps mainly those that were in favour of the ECHO support responded). It is likely that most of the respondents to the online questionnaire were based in partner HQs and might have a different perspective of challenges related to the ECHO support compared to partner staff on the ground. As answers are relative (i.e. if something is 'good' it is typically relative in relation to something else, without always knowing in relation to what: is it in comparison to how good it could/should be, or is it in comparison to what other donors do?) caution was exercised when interpreting the answers. Overall, based on the varied responses and the extent to which the responses to the online questionnaire correspond with the data obtained during the semi-structured interviews, it is believed that the responses were valid.

ECHO in Sudan and South Sudan

1.6. Humanitarian context

Sudan and South Sudan are in need of humanitarian assistance, and have been for decades. After decades of conflict and, in recent years, also financial crisis, Sudan has required substantial humanitarian assistance – the UN and partners' 2015 Humanitarian Response Plan required USD 1 billion. According to the 2016 Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview, 5.8 million people out of a total population of close to 40 million were in need of humanitarian assistance. Four million people were food insecure and 2.2 million of the internally displaced people needed assistance, 2 million of whom were in Darfur. This dire situation was further compounded by 700,000 refugees, mainly from South Sudan. The fighting in Jebal Marra in Darfur displaced around 100,000 people many of whom were inaccessible. Humanitarian assistance in Sudan is controlled by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) that approves work plans and, in recent years, has pushed hard for 'sudanisation' of the organisations providing humanitarian assistance; this includes restricting the number of international NGO staff. The HAC also enforces the involvement of national NGOs in implementation. The humanitarian space, and room for civil society, is very limited in Sudan, and movements are severely restricted with the HAC controlling the movement of NGO staff.

South Sudan has been marred by conflict for decades, and the 2011 independence did not bring about the hoped-for peace dividend. Next, a civil war fought mainly between the ruling government of SPLM and SPLM In-Opposition had displaced 2.3 million people by the end of 2015, including 1.7 million internally, and 630,000 in neighbouring countries. A total of 3.9 million people were severely food insecure and the UN asked for support to 5.1 million people out of a total population of around 12 million. The 2015 Humanitarian Response Plan asked for USD 1.5 billion, of which only USD 1 billion was funded. South Sudan also hosted 265,000 refugees from neighbouring countries. A peace agreement has been signed, but progress on the ground has been slow with fighting continuing mainly in the north-eastern part of the country

Figure 2: Development in the Number of People in Need over Time

and moving closer to Juba. Additionally, the economy is on the verge of collapsing and security in the capital Juba has deteriorated rapidly.[2]

An indication of the changes in terms of those in need over the years is shown in Figure 2 above. In South Sudan especially, there has been a substantial increase in the number of people in need. More detailed timelines, also showing the main events, are included in Annex I.

1.7. ECHO's support

ECHO's financial contribution to the humanitarian crises in Sudan and South Sudan 2011-15 has been provided through 13 HIPs with a total value of EUR 850 million. The ECHO support constituted around 10% of the total humanitarian funding requirements as per the UN response plans over the five years, and meant that ECHO was among the top-five humanitarian donors[3].

Seven of the HIPs not only targeted Sudan or South Sudan, but were part of larger regional or global HIPs, such as the HIPs for enhancing Humanitarian Response Capacity, the Epidemics HIPs, and children-related HIPs. An overview of these additional seven HIPs and the accompanying projects is provided in Annex G. To focus the evaluation, it was decided that this evaluation should deal only with the six country-specific HIPs with a total value of EUR 696 million. The six HIPs are included in Table 1 below.

Table 1: List of 2011-2015 HIPs for Evaluation

HIP no.	HIP decision title	Amount
ECHO/SDN/BUD/2011/91000	Sudan and South Sudan	140,000,000
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2012/91000	Sudan and South Sudan	157,000,000
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2013/91000	Sudan and South Sudan	97,000,000
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2014/91000	Sudan and South Sudan	112,715,000
ECHO/SSD/EDF/2014/01000	Bridging Facility for South	30,000,000
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2015/91000	Sudan and South Sudan	199,000,000
Total	-	735,715,000

Based on the HIPs, country-specific intervention logics for the ECHO-funded actions have been developed as per Annex H. The intervention logics consist of two figures illustrating the linkages between,

- the humanitarian priorities identified,
- the ECHO response,
- limiting/enabling factors,
- the expected outcomes/specific impact, and
- the expected ultimate impact.

The relevance of the two intervention logics, which were prepared during the inception phase, has by and large been confirmed by the field and survey findings. Such findings have, however, further lent credence to the prediction of the limiting factors such as limited access due to

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[2] Sources: Humanitarian Snapshot, OCHA, December 31, 2015
[3] Data from Financial Tracking Service at fts.unocha.org.

insecurity and administrative impediments that challenged all four expected outcomes (restored basic livelihood, health services, protection and respect for humanitarian principles and improved resilience capacities) despite the much appreciated efforts by ECHO.

The timelines showing the development in people in need (see Figure 2 on page 4 for an overview and details in Annex I) allow a comparison over time between the intervention logic (Annex H) and the HIPs themselves, both reflecting the ECHO support to Sudan and South Sudan. The analysis in sections 1.9.1, 1.9.2 and 1.9.3 of the fit between needs assessments, the HIPs and the implemented actions, show that the needs were taking into consideration the context at any given point of time.

The situation in Sudan in 2015 for example, shows a reduction in overall "people in need" but an increase in the Darfur region due to a worsening of the Darfur crisis. This led to a twofold approach in the 2015 HIP (see also the intervention logic) of a more early recovery oriented approach in areas of protracted crisis, and emergency interventions in areas with actual fighting. An event depicted in the South Sudan timeline is the December 2013 crisis resulting in an increase in people in need from 2.5 million in 2013 to 6.4 million in 2015. This enormous increase in people in need is reflected during updates of the 2014 HIP and the bridging HIP for South Sudan, resulting in a major funding increase and a shift from LRRD to emergency interventions (see also the intervention logic). Through a comparison of the overall support to Sudan and South Sudan with the events in the timeline, it is found that support follows the events very closely and is adapted to changes, where necessary.

ECHO's response to Sudan was structured as follows:

- Focusing on emergency responses and preparedness for displaced people, refugees, returnees, host communities and nomads, in the sectors of food assistance and livelihoods, nutrition, health, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter and non-food items, and protection. It also encompassed coordination - including support to ensure the safety of humanitarian activities - and logistical support. Efforts to reduce acute malnutrition through a multi-sectorial approach were supported as well.
- In settings where the emergency was less acute, the identification of transition strategies was considered an important element.
- A focus on protection was considered particularly pertinent for all types of displaced populations (IDPs, returnees and refugees) across the country, despite implementation challenges resulting from overall access constraints and the lack of actors. Protection mainstreaming was to be increasingly promoted and improved. Targeting and diversification of aid modalities to build resilience of vulnerable communities to future shocks was expected to be of paramount importance.

ECHO's activities in South Sudan focused on lifesaving activities, including support to refugees and IDPs; they also took into account food insecurity and malnutrition which continued to be amongst the major humanitarian needs in the country. After the eruption of the armed conflict in December 2013, ECHO's response focused on four main axes:

- Support for the scaling-up of humanitarian assistance where the greatest needs are identified, including through adequate food aid and emergency medical and nutritional interventions, emergency WASH to reduce deaths, and logistical support;
- Advocacy for a better protection of civilians inside and outside UNMISS Protection of Civilians areas;
- Continued humanitarian assistance to address the basic needs of refugees; and
- Support to communities exposed to high risks of morbidity and mortality, including severe food insecurity, high malnutrition rates and outbreaks of epidemics because of shocks

linked to flooding and seasonal hunger during the lean season. Effective coordination has also been supported.[4]

In order to better understand the projects supported under the HIPs, the main features of the projects are described below.

1.8. ECHO supported Projects

This section contains a summary of the ECHO supported projects in Sudan and South Sudan with more details to be found in Annex J, the portfolio analysis.

ECHO has been the third largest humanitarian donor in both countries, contributing approximately 10% of the total humanitarian response. The US has been the largest by far contributing around 40%.

Each of the five major HIPs had between 40 and 60 projects each, with 9 projects for the 2014 bridging facility. Slightly more projects were implemented under the 2011 and 2012 HIPs. The variation in the number of projects per HIP is mainly due to the differences in the amounts available to each HIP.

Geographical distribution

Slightly more than half (140) of the 247 projects were implemented in South Sudan, 40% in Sudan and 5% in both countries; the latter were implemented under the first three HIPs only, while, naturally, the 2014 Bridging Facility projects were only implemented in South Sudan. A graphical illustration of the number of projects by geographical location and HIP is included in Figure 3 to the right.

Figure 3: Projects per Country

Half of the projects implemented in Sudan were registered as implemented in Darfur. Given the concentration of humanitarian needs in Darfur coupled with (even more) limited access - thus a lack of partners - in the southern and eastern parts of the country, this distribution of project locations is understandable and reasonable. 15% of the projects in Sudan were registered as covering all of Sudan.

Just over a third of the projects implemented in South Sudan are registered as implemented in the conflict areas of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile (also known as Greater Upper Nile) where there were clearly high humanitarian needs throughout the period covered by the evaluation.

Contracted amounts

A quarter (EUR 177 million) of the total amount contracted over the five years has been committed to Sudan, two thirds (EUR 437 million) to South Sudan and the rest (EUR 80 million) to both countries during 2011/12 when South Sudan was gaining independence.

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[4] DG ECHO: Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Sudan and South Sudan 2015

The contracted amounts range from EUR 130,000 to EUR 58 million with the average contracted amount being EUR 2.8 million and the median EUR 1.3 million (see also Figure 4 to the right).

The average contracted amounts for the 2011 HIP were the lowest (EUR 2.3 million) with the average contracted amounts for the 2015 HIP being the highest at EUR 3.5 million with fluctuations over the year without a clear trend.

The average cost of projects in South Sudan was generally higher (EUR 3.1 million) than in Sudan (EUR 1.9 million) - as is shown in Figure 5 below - in line with the fact that more funds were provided to South Sudan.

Figure 4: Contracted Amounts

Figure 5: Average Contracted Amount per Project per HIP per Country

Partners

A total of 56 different partners were involved in the implementation of the six HIPs, 29 of which were supported in Sudan and 43 in South Sudan (one partner can be operational in both countries). WFP is by far the largest recipient with EUR 286 million (41%) of the contracted amounts received for 23 projects, receiving in total as much as the next 13 largest recipients received altogether. Second, in terms of contracted amounts, is ICRC (EUR 48 million), closely followed by UNHCR and UNICEF with more than EUR 40 million each. Of the 247 projects, 163 (66%) are registered as having been implemented by NGOs, 66 (27%) by the UN, and 18 (7%) by IOs with similar trends for every HIP, as seen in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Type of Implementing Partner by HIP and Country

Aid type

The projects in the HOPE database are registered with eleven different "Primary Aid Types", and this was expanded by the evaluation team to include three additional types: Health and Nutrition, Multi-sectoral, and Logistics. The Food projects were the largest aid type, receiving 37% of the funds followed by Health and Nutrition and Water / Sanitation with 18 and 10% respectively. Logistics was supported with 7.8%. For a graphical presentation, please refer to Figure 7 below. It should be noted that ECHO forwarded a spreadsheet in October 2016, covering only 2015, that provides slightly different figures based on different aid types and without the complete budget: Based on the new spreadsheet, support to Nutrition and Health constitutes 32% and Water / Sanitation 13%.

Figure 7: Contracted Amounts per Primary Aid Type per HIP

Multi-phase projects

Almost half of the projects were multi-phase with five of the projects having four phases, and one project - a Food project implemented by WFP in South Sudan - having 5 phases[5]. The relatively large proportion of multi-phase projects shows commitment not only by ECHO but also by the partners, and can form the foundation for a better understanding of the context, needs, and beneficiaries' priorities; but it can also facilitate the learning of lessons, and the application of these lessons learnt.

Multi-phase projects also have the advantage of contributing to ensuring a more reliable and steady source of income for the partners, enabling them to achieve reasonable staff retention rates and invest in more durable assets for implementation. There were between 40 and 60 multi-phase projects every year constituting between a quarter and two thirds of the total number of projects. As illustrated in Figure 8, there was an increase in the percentage of multi-phase projects over the years in question.

Figure 8: Share of Multi-Phase Projects (%)

Overall, the support is found to be in line with the objectives stated in the HIPs, and to cover relevant geographic locations. There is a mix of smaller and larger projects reflecting the difference in sizes of the partners, with larger partners being granted larger projects. A relatively large number of partners were used, including NGOs (most), UN agencies and International Organisations. All major sectors were covered (education through Children of Peace HIPs). The support thus helped alleviate humanitarian needs in terms of emergency lifesaving interventions in successive or protracted humanitarian crises. In contexts where exit strategies could not be envisaged, relevant multi-phase projects with consistent partners, locations and activities were implemented.

As pointed out in section 1.12 on the effectiveness of the ECHO support, implementation of the supported projects are overall found to be of a high standard taking into consideration the hiccups that can be expected in challenging contexts like Sudan and South Sudan. The main limiting factors were a lack of infrastructure especially during the rainy season (mainly in South Sudan), obstructions due to cumbersome administrative procedures (mainly in Sudan), insecurity that in some places hampered implementation and monitoring to some extent. As always, there was, however, a need to push for continued improvements, which ECHO is indeed supporting through its monitoring visits (see also section 1.13.1 for more on monitoring). Partners that did not perform well did not receive funding in subsequent years.

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[5] Possibly more as the classification of multi-year projects is based on projects implemented by the same partner with similar project titles; some projects might have changed name significantly and are thus not captured.

Findings

This chapter contains the findings from the application of the various data collection tools, including document reviews, interviews, and project site visits. Conclusions based on the recommendations are included in chapter 0.

1.9. Relevance

Evaluation Question 1:

- *What was the **Relevance** of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period?*

1.5 under this question also cover thematic question 2b) of the ToR:

- *'To what extent has ECHO's support targeted the people most at risk affected by crises in the two countries? To what extent has ECHO's support taken into account an assessment of vulnerability, including protection risks analysis?'*

Judgment Criteria:

JC 1.1: Quality of needs assessments

JC 1.2: Alignment between needs assessments, HIPs and projects funded

JC 1.3: Capacity to adapt response to changing needs

JC 1.4: Reflection of needs of beneficiaries and adequate targeting of people most at risk

1.9.1. JC 1.1: Quality of Needs Assessments

The needs assessments included in the HIPs are developed based on internal and external background documents, the knowledge available within ECHO, and consultations with partners. The HIPs analyse and condense the data with information concerning other sectors and the humanitarian environment added, all of which provide a final strategic orientation. The HIPs are found to accurately represent the general humanitarian needs on the ground although there were occasions in which the static nature of a written document approved through a lengthy process at several levels, was not always able to adequately capture the dynamic context – perhaps best exemplified in relation to the outbreak of the civil war in December 2013. The updates made to the HIPs due to additional funding becoming available were also found to be relevant and accurate.

The demand for better identification of needs in complex emergencies has led to the development of a number of needs assessment tools used by ECHO partners. Among them is the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) that is widely used by partners in the food security sector. As the IPC collected data are not always sufficiently analysed and because a risk of political bias exists, some partners specified that triangulation with other methodologies is required. The field visits and the online questionnaire showed that the Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) is a widely used tool on cluster level that gives a general overview of an emergency situation. It is mainly used in conjunction with cluster specific tools and the organisations' own tools and data, to enhance the level of detail.

Other tools used by partners include:

- Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS),
- Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) based on the two most vital and basic public health indicators (nutritional status of children under-5 and mortality rate of the population), and
- The multi-sector needs assessment tool IMPACT/REACH.

Other partners were using the Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System (FSNMS) developed by WFP in cooperation with UNICEF as well as other food security assessments.

Partners stated that they are facing time, capacity and financial constraints concerning the use of major assessment tools in most emergency situations, and security and administrative access constraints are further hindrances. Many partners stated that they were using their own regular M&E data and experiences (especially from multi-phase projects) in their areas of operations.

1.9.2. JC 1.2: Alignment between needs assessments, HIPs and projects funded

As referred to above, by and large, the HIPs are found to be providing an accurate general picture of the humanitarian situation in the two countries. Data from the document analysis, interviewees and respondents to the online questionnaire indicate that the needs outlined in the HIPs are perceived as well aligned with the reality on the ground (only 3% of the respondents to the question in the online questionnaire regarding the fit between the HIPs and the actual needs found it to be poor or very poor). The evaluation found that over the years the projects supported were largely aligned with HIPs with regard to geographical and sectoral priorities, more so in the latter years; barring the ability to capture in detail specificities in local areas and contextual changes such as local conflicts and instability.

Concerning the geographical coverage and prioritised sectors of the HIPs, the evaluation found that in Sudan, the geographical areas and sectors of the supported projects matched the needs in the HIPs for **2011** and **2012**, but in South Sudan only three quarters of the contracted amount (and half of the projects) matched the needs in 2011, and three quarters of the contracted amount in 2012. The intention to ensure the inclusion of LRRD components and to transit actions towards the development and stability instruments is clearly mentioned in the 2011 and 2012 HIPs.

After the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the idea was to consolidate and to enable a gradual transfer of operations in non-emergency areas by supporting the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP 2012) and the government. In practice however, projects with LRRD components and an eventual handover (for example of health facilities) to the government were rare with only a handful of projects identified. In Sudan, the increasingly difficult political situation and the departure of a large number of humanitarian actors, did not enable planning of a similar consolidation process.

In **2013**, the geographical priority areas mentioned in the HIPs were covered by the supported projects in both Sudan and South Sudan. Furthermore, the sectoral fit between the HIP and the projects realised was good.

In **2014**, almost all of the projects supported were aligned with the needs described in the HIPs. In South Sudan, the situation had become extremely complex due to the December 2013 crisis and the expected support from development donors towards recovery did not materialise. The resulting projects are based on the HIP with regards to geographical locations and sectors covered.

Most of the contracted amount in Sudan in **2015** was in line with the sectors prioritised in the HIP. Concerning LRRD components and development instruments, the 2015 HIP was optimistic

about the opportunities for transition to longer-term development due to upcoming DEVCO financing.

For South Sudan, there was a good fit between the HIP and the projects realized. The 2015 HIP did not anticipate a move towards LRRD due to the on-going conflict and limited availability of development funding, but refers to ECHO's active support of the "Joint Humanitarian Development framework (JHDF)"[6] and the EU's "Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP)"[7].

Partners in both countries generally acknowledged the fit between the assessments in the HIPs and the financed projects. Half of the online questionnaire respondents evaluated the fit as good and one in ten as excellent. While acknowledging that the funding available does not allow full coverage to be achieved, the geographical prioritisation on needs basis is generally seen as realistic and pragmatic.

Concerning cases in which changes had to be made to a project, the majority of partners appreciate the flexibility of ECHO. A large majority of partners mentioned changes in the humanitarian context as the major trigger for the adaptation of an action. Recommendations by the ECHO technical assistants, the clusters as well as budgetary constraints are also mentioned as reasons for changes to projects, but to a far lesser degree.

Partners confirmed that they referred to the HIP when developing proposals. At the same time, some partners found that the priorities put forward in the HIPs were somehow generic, which, however, in turn allowed some flexibility in the funding decisions. Changes in the humanitarian situation during the period covered by the HIP, are not continuously reflected in the HIPs, causing a degree of incertitude for some partners, but ECHO is dealing with this issue through support to rapid response teams.

1.9.3. JC 1.3: Capacity to adapt response to changing needs

The 2011-2015 HIPs for Sudan and South Sudan were each modified two to four times when additional funding was made available or when there was a shift in the budget lines as in 2011, for example when EUR 8 million was shifted to Food Aid. A total of EUR 198 million was allocated additionally over the years. Each update and the corresponding justifications are included in updated HIPs, all of which the evaluation team found to be reasonable and in line with changes in the needs.

The FichOps review revealed that modification requests were received for more than two thirds of the projects, and that 90% of these were granted. This is in line with the findings from the field where a large majority of partners confirmed that ECHO is very open, flexible and reactive with regards to changes in needs. In case of changes in needs during an on-going project, the ECHO technical assistants could be approached at any time for discussions, and if sufficient evidence for the changed needs was made available, ECHO would try to find a solution. In South Sudan, however, it was at the same time felt that a focus on priority areas could prevent support in some more local areas with pockets of needs. Partners stated that the main triggers for requesting modifications due to changes in needs was influxes of newly displaced people.

The responses to the online questionnaire also show that ECHO was perceived as flexible, with less than 10% of those respondents who answered the questions related to flexibility, stating

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[6] JHDF is a strategic analysis aimed at enhancing a strategic dialogue on food security and nutrition between humanitarian and development institutions of the EU. The result was an approach to build the resilience of vulnerable populations through linking hunger relief with longer-term development in areas of protracted crises.

[7] FSTP supports activities aimed at improving food security for the most vulnerable populations through addressing structural issues in the medium or long term.

that this was poor. The main reasons for changes to the projects were contextual changes, recommendations from ECHO monitoring visits or evaluations, and budgetary changes.

1.9.4. JC 1.4: Reflection of beneficiaries' needs and adequate targeting of people most at risk

A condition in all HIPs was that the projects should target the needs of the most vulnerable and most-at-risk groups. This was more pronounced after the 2013 South Sudan crisis. Although the HIPs do not make reference to any specific vulnerability analyses or assessments beyond the IPC rating, the operational strategy in all HIPs defines refugees and IDPs as the most-at-risk with special emphasis on the population of IDP settlements in hard to reach areas of which in South Sudan for example, only half were reached according to the 2014 Bridging Facility HIP. Also pregnant and lactating women, and children under-5 specifically are considered as some of the most-at-risk groups. The provision of basic lifesaving services (food aid, nutrition, WASH, shelter, NFI) is the most important activity in all HIPs.

It is generally acknowledged in the HIPs that limitations in the provision of basic services have negative effects on protection. The host population and the additional strains it experiences due to the high IDP caseloads are also referred to. The desk study found that two thirds of the projects included a description of the needs of the most-at-risk groups to a large or very large extent (groups identified included children under-5, pregnant and lactating women (PLW), and the elderly). By status, the IDPs, refugees and returnees are considered the most vulnerable in one sixth of the projects and less than a handful of the projects reviewed were assessed as 'limited' with regards to targeting the most-at-risk groups.

The evaluation found that the partners generally provided assistance which was relevant to the needs, as confirmed by interviews with beneficiaries in the field, cluster coordinators, and other donors. This was confirmed during the field missions, during which beneficiaries stated that they were frequently involved in needs assessments conducted by the partners, e.g. in Bentiu where the population currently returning to their areas of origin were asked to prioritise services, based on which these partners provided water, education support (semi-permanent schools) and mobile clinics. The evaluation team also found that the local governmental authorities and line ministries were involved in the planning process. Nowhere did the interviewed beneficiaries state that they would have preferred different types of assistance; they considered vouchers as the best form of support as it offered a higher degree of flexibility. In some locations, beneficiaries, especially those that had been displaced for longer periods, would like to receive livelihood support too (in the form of income generating activities, agriculture, etc.) in addition to food aid.

The HIPs request partners to include vulnerability assessments in their context analysis and to consider beneficiary groups with special needs in their proposals (Gender/Age Marker, Inclusiveness etc.). The FichOps review showed that a little more than half of the projects reviewed were based on systematic vulnerability assessments. Most activities in the projects supported by ECHO target some of the most vulnerable groups with a large number of partners focusing on pregnant and lactating women and children under-5. Additionally, some partners used vulnerability criteria developed by the protection cluster for the identification of the most vulnerable. Specific protection risk analysis was done in a small part (one in ten) of the projects reviewed during the desk phase, with most focusing on child protection. Only in South Sudan did a few partners confirm that they had conducted separate protection risk analysis as part of their needs assessments - that it was not done in Sudan could be considered proof of the difficult working environment in Sudan where protection and rights issues are less freely discussed. Most partners stated that protection-related topics were mainstreamed into their needs assessments.

1.10. Coherence

Evaluation Question 2:

*What was the **Coherence** of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period?*

Judgment Criteria:

JC 2.1: HIPs are aligned with EC/ECHO humanitarian policies (as listed in ECHO's website) – if not, why not?

1.10.1. JC 2.1: Alignment of HIPs with EC/ECHO humanitarian policies

At strategy level, the HIPs for Sudan incorporate ECHO's humanitarian policies and guidelines[8], in as far as resources allow (budget, presence of skilled partners, access, cooperation of authorities) and according to the identified priority needs. The most frequently identified policy alignments concern food assistance, nutrition, WASH, health, protection, and children (rather as a cross-cutting issue). The 'Gender-sensitive aid' policy is considered in project documents as evidenced by gender targeting and provision of gender disaggregated data. Protection activities also include specific concerns about GBV and children. It should furthermore be noted that (i) the C&V modality is attempted where possible in Sudan and (ii) DRR is difficult to apply in the current chaotic contexts of Sudan and even more in South Sudan.

The evaluation found that the projects were aligned with ECHO's policies and guidelines despite the fact that generally the partner field staff were not familiar with them. This is likely because the policies are in line with standard humanitarian policies and practices and as such already are part of the partner's own guidelines, and because partner HQ staff, who contribute to developing the projects, ensure such alignment.

1.11. EU Added Value

Evaluation Question 3:

- *What was **the EU Added Value** of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period?*

JCs 3.3 to 3.6 cover also thematic question 2d) and 2f) of the ToR:

- *'To what extent has ECHO's support to the coordination of humanitarian assistance and for logistical operations supporting humanitarian assistance contributed to improving the quality of humanitarian operations?';*
- *'To what extent has ECHO's participation in humanitarian leadership inside and outside the UN system been successful?'*

Judgment Criteria:

JC 3.1: Help ensure presence of skilled implementing partners in the field

JC 3.2: Provide major funding contributions to specific sectors and activities, not adequately covered by other donors

JC 3.3: Help ensure international humanitarian logistics capacities

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[8] These policies include: food assistance; nutrition; WASH; health; C&V; protection; gender-sensitive aid; DRR; and helping children in need (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/policy-guidelines_en).

JC 3.4: Support to and dialogue with humanitarian leadership and coordination mechanisms

JC 3.5: Support and/or play active role in other IASC Transformative Agenda (ITA) coordination tools, (see also needs assessment tools in JC 1.1)

JC 3.6: Use all opportunities for cooperation with development donors – if not, why not?

In addition to adding value through the above judgment criteria, the evaluation found that ECHO has also added value to the efforts of alleviating the humanitarian needs in the two countries through its advocacy efforts, especially on humanitarian access, as described in section 1.12.2 on page 25.

1.11.1. J.C 3.1: Help ensure presence of skilled implementing partners in the field

As stated earlier, the ECHO support is provided in very challenging environments which includes problems of access due to conflict and logistics – this limits monitoring too - but also administrative difficulties. In South Sudan for instance, the not-yet-implemented new NGO Act is likely to impact on the INGO partners' capacities to implement humanitarian projects due to, amongst other things, limiting the percentage of expatriates employed to 20%, and leaving the decision as to where NGOs should operate to the government. ECHO has been vocal in its criticism of the NGO Act, and the EU Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management has issued a brief statement expressing his concern. In Sudan, the issuance, or lack hereof, of travel permits and visas significantly hampers the recruitment of skilled staff, and completely prevents access to many areas.

The interviews conducted during the field visits and the responses to the online questionnaire provide a generally quite positive view of ECHO's support to the field presence of their implementing partners. More than two thirds of the respondents to the online questionnaire rate the ECHO support as "excellent" or "good" and a further fifth as "average". Comments outline e.g. the added value of ECHO staff to the humanitarian response, as well as their knowledge, professionalism, and readiness to "find good solutions within regulations".

The evaluation found that ECHO's humanitarian advocacy[9] along with support to logistics services and coordination as described below, contributed to ensuring the presence of partners and facilitating the implementation of activities in line with humanitarian principles.

1.11.2. J.C 3.2: Provide major funding contributions to specific sectors and activities, not adequately covered by other donors

Gaps in the humanitarian response often also relate to specific geographical areas or to new displacements not covered by existing interventions, or interventions of other donors that might not require large amounts of funding. An analysis of support to activities not funded by others therefore needs to consider not only the support in terms of how substantial the financial support was, but also where and when it was provided. In this regard, the evaluation found that ECHO filled geographical gaps rather than sectoral gaps in accordance with information provided to ECHO through ECHO staff's regular participation in coordination forums (sector meetings, inter-sector meetings, donor coordination meetings, etc.), close contact with partners, and frequent visits to the field. In addition to financing gaps in the geographical coverage, ECHO also financed gaps related to sudden-onset emergencies such as new displacements or flooding through highly appreciated emergency response teams, and contributed to preparing

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[9] For more on humanitarian advocacy, please refer to sections 1.12.2.

partners to respond to upcoming humanitarian crises[10]. The support was possible, in part due to ECHO's flexibility in allowing modifications to on-going projects and in part through support provided to the partner's emergency response teams tasked with addressing such gaps. An interviewee in the field provided a recent example of how ECHO has funded important activities that would perhaps not usually be funded by humanitarian donors[11]. However, based on the financial data available it is not possible to identify the extent to which ECHO covered specific financing gaps.

1.11.3. J.C 3.3: Help ensure international humanitarian logistics capacities

The support to ensure logistical capacity focused on air transport (UNHAS), the Logistics Cluster[12] and infrastructure rehabilitation which accounted for 8% of the total expenditure, or EUR 54 million, over the years in question. More than a third of this was for UNHAS in Sudan and South Sudan, around half was for the Logistics Cluster in South Sudan, and most of the remainder was for infrastructure support in South Sudan through UNOPS.

The vast majority of opinions collected from interviewees considered UNHAS an indispensable service for fast and safe access to field locations; its safety and reliability is widely appreciated. Partners were also very satisfied with the UNHAS' small-cargo transportation solution. During the rainy season, UNHAS is faced with inadequately constructed airstrips at many destinations; the introduction of recovery flights has reduced the negative impact but renders the operations of UNHAS more difficult. From the evaluation team's own experience during the fieldwork as well as through statements by partners, the UNHAS system for recovery flights is generally working well with regular and timely flights to most destinations.

UNHAS Sudan has successfully implemented the majority of recommendations resulting from the 2015 visit of the ECHO regional aviation expert with a 10% reduction in budget. Further budget reductions are still needed, but partners voiced the opinion that further reductions will most likely negatively affect access and humanitarian operations. The UNHAS operations in both countries struggle with the increased need of more expensive transport options due to security risks and climatic conditions that make many destinations only accessible by rotary-wing aircraft. Partners also reported an increase in administrative hurdles by local authorities (obtaining flight clearance, cargo handling etc.).

The Logistics Cluster is active in South Sudan and provides air, land (common transport services, shunting) and barge transportation as well as common storage and coordination services. In general, partners are positive towards the Logistics Cluster. The Logistics Cluster staff in the hubs is perceived as active, cooperative and trying hard to make things work. A number of partners mentioned capacity restraints making cargo transport somewhat unpredictable. Long-term planning is necessary in order to ensure supplies are available at a certain point at a certain time. The Logistics Cluster has access to two helicopters and one fixed wing aircraft operated by UNHAS.

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[10] Partners praised the ECHO support to counter the impact of the El Nino phenomenon (although from 2016 and thus outside the scope of this evaluation) where, according to partners, no other donor had invested in similar in-depth analysis and an adapted regional response. ECHO was considered – as one interviewee mentioned – a "reference donor" in this case.

[11] The example given was the investment in heavy earthmoving equipment in Malakal, facilitating the establishment of the Protection of Civilian site (POC) and which later on allegedly facilitated securing funding from other donors.

[12] The Logistics Cluster is a coordination mechanism responsible for coordination, information management, and, where necessary, logistics service provision to ensure that an effective and efficient logistics response takes place in emergencies. The World Food Programme is the lead agency for the Logistics Cluster.

A specific concern to some partners in South Sudan was the difficulty in accessing air assets for the mobile emergency teams supported by ECHO. These teams sometimes operate in areas that are not considered a priority by UNHAS and the logistics cluster, and it can therefore be difficult to position staff and supplies. In particular their coordination can prove difficult with an example provided of staff being on the ground but waiting for two weeks for supplies to arrive. Attempts are underway to allocate air assets specifically for these teams.

ECHO supported infrastructure rehabilitation through contributions to UNOPS. The works were identified through the Logistics Cluster. Due to funding constraints and a concentration on lifesaving activities, this support was reduced over the years covered by this evaluation. For many partners this is regrettable, as the work done was perceived as well targeted, of good quality and appreciated by all stakeholders.

The online questionnaire reinforces the findings that the support to logistics capacity is highly appreciated: the ECHO support to humanitarian logistics capacities is rated good or excellent by more than half of the respondents, and only a small minority found it to be below average. The necessity of providing support humanitarian logistics capacity is unanimously acknowledged.

1.11.4. J.C 3.4: Support to and dialogue with humanitarian leadership and coordination mechanisms

The level of ECHO support to UN/OCHA leadership mechanisms of Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Humanitarian Country team (HCT) has been consistent since 2014 despite criticisms from ECHO about HC/HCT shortcomings. A total of EUR 9.3 million was allocated to projects that are registered with Coordination as the primary aid type, constituting 1.3% of the total support provided over the five years.

In the current context, ECHO provides substantial and consistent financial support to humanitarian leadership in both countries. Among the projects selected for review, some included direct and unambiguous funding to and support of OCHA's role, even though the present HC in South Sudan was found to give low priority to humanitarian efforts. The 2014 evaluation of the ECHO ERC (Enhanced Response Capacity) funding mechanism found major HC dysfunctions such as late decision-making. ECHO has been vocal in addressing this at capital level, e.g. through the HCT, but also at global level, together with other actors. Concerns were also expressed about the efficiency of OCHA in Sudan in 2014 and 2015.

In addition to support for OCHA, ECHO also supports other, non-UN coordination mechanisms, such as the 'South Sudan NGO Forum Secretariat'. The risk of creating parallel coordination structures is avoided by ensuring the NGO forum coordinates closely with (i) OCHA on issues affecting humanitarian access and (ii) with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) on security, and (iii) works with the NGO Steering Committee to set an agenda for the NGO community. The INGO Forum will be closing down in 2016 as the government has deemed it illegal. The Secretariat of the NGO forum in Sudan is financed by ECHO through a partner and has its office within OCHA.

There is also a regional drought coordination mechanism which ECHO participates in. At regional level, ECHO participates proactively in the regional IDDRSI (IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative) steering committee.

Despite dissatisfaction with the HC's role in prioritising humanitarian efforts, ECHO's implementing partners generally appreciated the coordination efforts of OCHA, and appreciated ECHO's support to OCHA. More than half of the respondents to the online questionnaire rated ECHO's support as either excellent, good, or average. Just over a third of the respondents did not have any opinion on this issue.

The evaluation team, along with most partners, found that the cluster system is functioning in all field locations visited despite reservations by ECHO field staff in Sudan. Cluster leads are active and are fulfilling their tasks even though most of them also have programme responsibilities in their respective organisations. As can be expected, some clusters operated better than others, but partners evaluated them as mostly effective. ECHO is funding some of the cluster coordinators and also participates in cluster meetings.

Some interviewees stated that there was a need for ECHO and its partners to strengthen its focus within the wider coordination structures, and to avoid creating separate coordination mechanisms, such as the one led briefly by NRC in South Sudan. One of the criticisms was that some partners did not appropriately inform the sector coordination structures of their activities - which may lead to overlaps or gaps– and that updated lists of ECHO funded partners are not shared regularly with the coordination mechanisms.

1.11.5. J.C 3.5: Support and/or play active role in other IASC Transformative Agenda (ITA) coordination tools

The UN Humanitarian Reform process initiated in 2005 by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response through greater predictability, accountability, responsibility and partnership, includes the IASC Transformative Agenda (ITA) launched in 2010. It focused on improving the timeliness and effectiveness of the collective humanitarian response through e.g. better leadership, improved assessment tools (MIRA) and coordination structures (HC, HCT, clusters). ECHO has been strongly supporting this approach at global level, in particular through the Emergency Response Capacity funding scheme.

ITA tools for monitoring the performance of coordination were tested in South Sudan with the support of ECHO after the civil war erupted in December 2013. In that context, ECHO provided financial support to useful surge capacity RRTs (Rapid Response Teams), which allowed highly knowledgeable regional resident staff to be deployed whilst RRTs filled in positions at the regional office.

Eight global clusters operating in Sudan and South Sudan were supported by ECHO: CCCM, Food Security, Health, Logistics, Nutrition, Protection (including sub-clusters of child protection and GBV), Shelter and WASH. As stated earlier the performance of the clusters varies and in general they provide the basic functions that are expected from them, especially at the capital level, but their performance in the field is frequently less satisfactory with some poor data collection, attempted control by authorities, or lack of collective ownership of the aid efforts.

Among ITA tools, ECHO also funded global Civil-Military Coordination, whose teams were able to effectively liaise with the military contingents from various nationalities to UNMISS in South Sudan in early 2014, and to improve their awareness of humanitarian principles.

It should be noted that the above documentary findings could not be triangulated during the field visits as interviewees were not able to identify exactly which role ECHO had played in the ITA beyond supporting the cluster coordination mechanisms.

1.11.6. J.C 3.6: Use all opportunities for cooperation with development donors

Throughout the period evaluated, the HIPs promoted LRRD[13] and set out relevant initiatives supported by EDF and other donors, despite steadily deteriorating situations in both countries. All HIPs published over the period duly outlined that LRRD opportunities were quite limited due

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[13] For more on LRRD, please refer to section 1.14.2.

to volatile conflict areas and the lack of cooperation from governments – a prerequisite for development programmes. The online questionnaire shows that more than half of the respondents do not have an opinion on ECHO's relationships with development-oriented donors. Some respondents are nevertheless interested in pursuing development too or at least recovery activities: 40% of respondents found ECHO's efforts towards LRRD excellent, good, or average.

In South Sudan, until the end of 2013, a transition to development was anticipated despite significant challenges in terms of a lack of basic infrastructure and chronic food insecurity. Taking into consideration the outbreak of the civil war at the end of 2013, the HIP 2015 mentions that a revised and enhanced LRRD strategy had been adopted and that an EC Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF) had been developed in 2014, focusing on food and nutrition security as well as health (and to some extent education). The goal was to expand the JHFD to other sectors of activities and to other main humanitarian and development donors – subject to the conclusion of a peace process between the government and the opposition. ECHO was also involved in developing the EU's Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) call for proposals.

In South Sudan, the implementation of four projects under the EU Pro-Resilience Action in Greater Upper Nile (a region where DFID is also active) has been on-going since 2014 based on a joint EU/ECHO programming approach. In the HIP 2015 for Sudan, a tentative LRRD approach was again mentioned that would address long-term IDP caseloads in Darfur camps with DEVCO funding, based on a joint analysis framework with ECHO.

Several partners regret the lack of focus on resilience; capacity building, community mobilisation and livelihood – partly due to inadequately short project cycles - see also section 1.13.1 for more details on this.

1.12. Effectiveness

Evaluation Question 4:

*What was the **Effectiveness** of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period?*

JC 4.1 cover also thematic question 2c) of ToR:

'To what extent has ECHO's support to humanitarian assistance in the fields of food assistance, emergency medical and nutrition aid, WASH, shelter and NFIs been successful?'

JC 4.2 and 4.3 covers thematic questions 2a and 2.e:

Effectiveness in terms of Humanitarian Advocacy and respect and adherence to humanitarian principles;

Judgment Criteria:

JC 4.1: Planned outputs and outcomes effectively achieved in the targeted sectors – if not, why not?

JC 4.2: Consistent advocacy for the respect of International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, Refugee Law and access, despite impediments and violations

JC 4.3 Adherence to humanitarian principles – if not, why not?

JC 4.4: Contribution to effective impact on the overall humanitarian response

1.12.1. JC 4.1: Planned outputs / outcomes effectively achieved in the targeted sectors

This section describes the achievements within each of the five ECHO priority sectors: Food Aid, Health, Nutrition, WASH, Shelter and Non-Food Items (NFIs)[14]. The sectors not described here (i.e. demining, disaster preparedness, and protection) are minor, having been allocated only EUR 80 million (12%). The desk review revealed that these projects were largely also achieving their targets. For more information on coordination, please refer to section 1.11.4 and for logistics to section 1.11.3.

Food Aid

Over the five-year period 2011 to 2015, ECHO spent more than a third of its total budget on Food Aid, i.e. EUR 257 million of which EUR 120 million was for South Sudan, EUR 68 million for Sudan, and EUR 68 million for both countries (in 2011 before the independence of South Sudan and in Abyei). The support was mainly provided through WFP (94%).

Through the FichOps review, the evaluation team found that the food aid projects achieved the expected outputs to a high degree in both countries. In Sudan the food aid was previously implemented as an emergency operation EMOP, but in 2015 was changed to a two-year Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) aimed at a gradual shift from relief to recovery and resilience activities. The emergency component in the PRRO remains nonetheless strong with food aid delivered through in-kind or cash/voucher based transfers depending on the functionality of markets in the areas. Generally, beneficiaries in the field praised the flexibility of the voucher system in the few locations where it is now used. According to WFP, the proportion of unconditional food aid has been decreasing, while conditional food aid (Food for Assets (FFA), Food for Training (FFT), and Food for Work (FFW)) has increased. With the move towards a vulnerability-based approach, food aid is supposedly increasingly targeting the most vulnerable.

In South Sudan, food is still largely distributed as unconditional in-kind. The food rations were reduced in 2015, but although the beneficiaries raised the issue to the evaluation team during the field mission, there were no indications that beneficiaries' malnutrition rates had increased as a result of this, implying the use of other coping mechanisms. The food distribution observed in South Sudan was conducted swiftly and in an organised manner, ensuring an effective distribution. The food aid core pipeline was generally reported to be stable although delayed funding (not ECHO funding) in 2015 led to an increase in the use of expensive air drops, illustrating the critical role played by the poor infrastructure in South Sudan, requiring careful and timely planning.

Nutrition

5% (EUR 33.5 million) of the total ECHO spending was allocated to nutrition projects over the five years, two thirds of which were for South Sudan[15]. Some of the projects were implemented by the same partners that were also implementing health projects; a total of 14 partners were supported, including NGOs and the UN. The projects were implemented in locations with high rates of malnutrition.

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[14] The figures quoted in this section is based on the 'Primary Aid Type' registration in the HOPE database which does not consider 'Secondary Aid Type' registrations, and does not include multi-sectoral projects: The figures quoted are thus only approximate.

[15] According to a spreadsheet provided by ECHO on October 6, 2016 covering only 2015 and with an incomplete budget, support to nutrition has constituted 17% in 2015.

The desk review indicated high-quality nutrition projects, which was confirmed during the field mission by both stakeholders and through visits to nutrition centres. There had, however, recently been difficulties in securing supplies.

The nutrition partners visited in South Sudan were running nutrition interventions based on Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) , including stabilization centres (SAM with medical complications), OTP sites and services (SAM treatment), TSFP (MAM treatment) and BSFP (under 2s or under 5s as well as PLWs). These were combined with IYCF and Community Nutrition Volunteers (CNV) schemes. The visits to project sites indicated that the activities were generally running well and following the appropriate guidelines.

Members of the nutrition sector in Sudan and the sector lead confirmed good progress of projects with the core pipeline normally fully operational. A pipeline break of RUTF (plumpy nut) and nutrition related drugs was, however, noticed in one region of South Sudan during the field visits. To mitigate the negative effects of such potential breaks most of the nutrition partners have included buffer stocks for nutrition supplies in their proposals. The purchase of the nutrition supplies, however, takes time as it is done at Humanitarian Procurement Centres (HPCs) in Kenya or in Europe and then shipped to the project location. Most buffer stocks therefore arrive late in the project cycle. Beneficiaries confirmed that they had been sent home from nutrition centres a number of times due to supplies being unavailable. This was confirmed by a visit to a nutrition centre that appeared to be well organised and maintained with 300 children being treated, but which was also experiencing a shortage of supplies. Partners' funding gaps due to an increase in needs did not affect the operations in the field as gaps were covered by additional donor contributions, including from ECHO. WHO supplies nutrition-related drugs to their partners. The partners however reported difficulties concerning the management of cases of Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) due to pipeline breaks of CSB in 2015 caused by the refusal of two shipments by the authorities due to different interpretations of the GMO-free standards. This was mitigated by WFP by identifying and certifying local producers of CSB and plumpy nut although their capacities are insufficient to cater for the full requirement. A return to stable pipeline operations is expected during the second half of 2016. Partners and WFP have taken further mitigating measures by increasing non-food activities (Social and Behaviour Change Communication (SBCC)) and increasing the supply of micronutrient powders (MNP). The nutrition centres were, however, kept open despite the shortage of supplies, making the resumption of activities easier once the pipeline stabilises; nonetheless the partners signalled that some beneficiaries were defaulting, i.e. were dropping out of the programme, and thus there was a risk of an increase in SAM cases due to incomplete MAM management. Early recovery food security activities as alternatives or follow-up to MAM treatment in suitable regions, were suggested by a number of partners, including activities such as the distribution of improved seeds, tools, and basic training in modern agricultural techniques, kitchen gardens etc. all of which aims to increase the households' agricultural production and to have a positive impact on the nutritional situation of children under five years. The evaluation team found that this would be a reasonable approach.

Health

Support to health activities amounted to approximately EUR 129 million, almost a fifth of the total budget over the five year period[16], with more than 80% of the funding for health activities allocated to South Sudan. This large imbalance is likely due to higher needs in South Sudan, but also due to higher costs as the health facilities in Sudan are to a large extent using local

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[16] According to a spreadsheet provided by ECHO on October 6, 2016 covering only 2015 and with an incomplete budget, support to health has constituted 15% in 2015.

seconded staff whereas in South Sudan it is necessary to use a larger number of expatriate staff. Together ICRC and the MSF family have had contracts for more than half of the total health support. Interviews with stakeholders during the field mission, and information obtained during visits to health facilities supported by ECHO partners in the two countries indicated that the projects were achieving the expected outputs and that the quality of work was high. This was confirmed by the desk review.

The health facilities visited in South Sudan were well structured and maintained, and found to offer curative as well as preventive services (including health education and hygiene promotion, Vitamin A supplementation, deworming, screening for malnutrition of U5 children and measles immunisation campaigns where necessary). The medical and psycho-social care of victims of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) was integrated. Attracting qualified staff was a challenge for many partners, partly due to the conflict.

In Sudan, the health support was provided through clinics manned with staff seconded from the state Ministry of Health; the capacity of staff was oftentimes below expectations. Investments in the capacity development of local staff were a major concern for all health partners and according to them ECHO did not favour financially supporting training measures to the extent this would be necessary. The integration of SGBV leaves room for improvement as beneficiaries and partners seemed reluctant to report on this due to the sensitivity of the matter. Partners also encouraged ECHO to invest in the expanded program on immunization (EPI), i.e. by supporting cold chain in the health facilities, instead of accelerated campaigns. Importing essential drugs can be lengthy and sometimes lead to shortages at the clinics, forcing beneficiaries to obtain medicine from the private sector at a cost. Some partners believed they could only purchase quality medical drugs and equipment at Humanitarian Procurement Centres (HPCs) and requested that they be allowed to buy at least consumables and equipment locally if the quality is satisfactory.

WASH

Almost 10% (64 million) was spent on WASH projects[17], two thirds of which was in South Sudan. The water supply facilities visited in South Sudan (in a POC) were found to be well functioning with a steady supply of sufficient water; latrines and showers were available according to the SPHERE guidelines, and hygiene was promoted. The evaluation team found that the latrines and showers were well designed and kept clean by a rotating team of camp inhabitants; the design of the latrines was gradually being improved in order to facilitate proper use. Lack of space in the POCs was, however, found to be a constraint on the number of latrines that could be constructed. Garbage was collected and disposed of on a regular basis in the POCs. As per the desk review, the projects generally achieved their targets.

New technologies were tested in one of the WASH projects visited in South Sudan; a water purification system (flocculation and chlorination) with a filtering system was being tested - the advantage of the filtering system would be that less external supplies for purification of the water would be required, reducing the risk of clean water shortages. The water system was reported by both partners and beneficiaries to be running well and producing safe water.

As most partners are running multi-sectoral programmes combining nutrition with health, food security or WASH activities, a number of them expressed their disappointment that ECHO is funding their nutrition activities, but did not approve the WASH elements included in the same

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[17] According to a spreadsheet provided by ECHO on October 6, 2016 covering only 2015 and with an incomplete budget, support to WASH constituted 13% in 2015.

proposal. According to a number of interviewees, the WASH supply pipeline seems to be working well in South Sudan.

In Sudan the situation was similar. Health and nutrition interventions were typically combined with WASH activities, especially the provision of safe drinking water to health facilities and hygiene promotion activities, reinforcing the overall impact of both types of projects. The change from public latrines to household latrines with reusable slabs was much appreciated by the beneficiaries. In agreement with ECHO a number of partners are partly introducing cost recovery mechanisms in their WASH programming, with indications that with intensive community mobilization efforts this might work in some places.

Identifying sources of water was a challenge in some locations in both countries; often camps are not established based on the availability of water, but on where people choose to flee due to security considerations, and some water sources were dry during the dry seasons.

The partners in Sudan complained to the evaluation team about complicated procedures to access the WASH pipeline and as a consequence only half of the pipeline was utilised in 2015. The cluster lead confirmed the under-usage of the pipeline and as a consequence issued a new Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) at the beginning of 2016 with the objective of making access to core WASH pipeline items easier. If this strategy is successful - which could not be confirmed through the partners as nobody had used the new SOP yet - the sector lead was convinced that the year 2016 will prove the functionality and the necessity of the pipeline.

Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items

Just over 10% (EUR 80 million) of the total budget was spent on Emergency Shelter/NFI projects, two thirds of which were in South Sudan[18]. The support was provided through more than 20 partners, including NGOs and UN agencies. In Sudan the Emergency Shelter/NFI sector is led by IOM with supplies to partners delivered through the ES/NFI pipeline managed by UNHCR based on IOM registration data. The NFI basket was jointly defined by the ES/NFI cluster. The basket includes one jerry can, one plastic sheet, one kitchen set and two blankets and mats. The emergency shelter kit consists of bamboo sticks and rope along with the above-mentioned plastic sheet. The items were issued to the beneficiaries and in use. No pipeline breaks were reported.

In South Sudan the system is similar. IOM is the ES/NFI cluster lead and manages the common ES/NFI pipeline. In general, the supplies are available in the different key hubs and field locations. To access them, partner organizations have to sign a contract with IOM. NFI kits as well as shelter kits had been distributed and were in use. In South Sudan, UNHCR is managing its own NFI supply for their refugee operation through a logistics company rather than through the Logistics Cluster as it is found to be more cost-efficient.

Overall assessment of sectoral effectiveness

The project site visits conducted by the evaluation team confirmed that the quality of outputs in terms of the breadth of services delivered and their quality (materials and approaches used) was generally high. This was further confirmed by interviews with stakeholders in the field, including with non-ECHO staff and with beneficiaries. This was also found during the evaluation team's review of selected Fichops that showed that the quality of more than half of the projects was high or very high with less than a third of the projects considered to be of average or poor quality. The expected outputs were generally achieved. Less than 10% of the projects did not

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[18] According to a spreadsheet provided by ECHO on October 6, 2016 covering only 2015 and with an incomplete budget, support to WASH constituted 3% in 2015.

reach the expected quality or the expected output which is mainly due to access constraints. In cases where partners did not deliver sufficient quality despite support through monitoring visits and dialogue no new contracts were issued. Overall the evaluation found that the quality of the ECHO supported projects was high, especially when taking into consideration the difficult operational contexts with insecurity, logistical constraints, etc. Major success factors and limiting factors to the projects are included in Annex K.

The TOR request an assessment of the achievement of not only outputs, but also of outcomes. Measuring the achievement of outcomes is notoriously difficult in complex settings such as the Sudans where, in the best of situations, there is a lack of reliable statistics and a dynamic situation with frequent population movement. Measuring achievements of outcomes would also presuppose that specific expected outcomes were described in a measurable form in the ECHO documents; this is, however, not the case. Some partners do conduct their own assessments, but there is generally insufficient follow-up or comparison of assessments (e.g. KAP studies and the like) from year to year, and in some instances the data seems unrealistic or anecdotal, such as improvements in delivery attendance at health clinics to almost 100%. Nevertheless, given the high quality and level of achievement of outputs, the basis has been laid for also achieving the expected outcomes. An example of a positive outcome is the substantial and well-timed support provided by ECHO, to contain the outbreak of cholera in South Sudan in 2014.

1.12.2. JC 4.2: Consistent advocacy for the respect of International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, Refugee Law and access, despite impediments and violations

In South Sudan, all partners at Juba level agreed that ECHO is their most principled donor – which is linked to ECHO's thorough knowledge through field visits. ECHO is unanimously perceived as being very vocal and effective at bringing up issues related to humanitarian space and rights with not only the government but also with other donors, the UN and other relevant stakeholders. ECHO was found to collaborate closely with other donors on issues of common concern such as access and insecurity, and often leads in joint donor advocacy actions. Within the HCT forum in particular, the fieldwork revealed that ECHO was praised for being instrumental in pushing the current Humanitarian Coordinator to take a deeper interest in humanitarian activities and principles. The desk study of FichOps testifies to ECHO's advocacy efforts with partners such as OCHA, UNHCR, ICRC, UNICEF and major NGOs. Outside Juba, however, there was limited knowledge of ECHO's advocacy in relation to humanitarian principles.

The picture is slightly less clear-cut in Sudan, where ECHO's advocacy is nevertheless much appreciated considering e.g. the crucial importance of access. ECHO in Sudan insists on only supporting projects for which access is judged effective. This is a contributing factor to why some areas, most notably in the south, do not receive funding from ECHO. Many partners, however, feel that still more could be done in synergies with other international actors. Facing a very strong government, a clear overall strategy is needed to contribute to enforcing the strict compliance with the humanitarian principles of Impartiality, Neutrality and Independence, that provide key guidance to all humanitarian actions when the equally important humanitarian imperative to save lives wherever this is necessary (principle of Humanity) is threatened to be impeded – e.g. in the White Nile state. Only in the HIP 2015 for Sudan could an approach to advocacy be found, although this does not seem to amount to a fully developed strategy as yet.

These findings were confirmed by a triangulation of the data from interviews with the replies to the online questionnaire where half of the respondents rated ECHO's effectiveness in advocating for humanitarian space as excellent/exemplary or good. Just under a third of the respondents found that ECHO's advocacy efforts were "average", while the others did not have an opinion on the subject.

In addition, ECHO regularly published 'stories' from field blogs on its website. In 2015 alone, nine audio-visual materials reachable on YouTube were presented about Sudan and South Sudan. The audience is, however, unknown and the publications are more illustrations of the results of ECHO's funded activities rather than targeted advocacy efforts to promote principled approaches and humanitarian space.

The advocacy efforts by ECHO also help to add value to ECHO's activities. For more on other aspects of ECHO's added value, please refer to section 1.11 on page 15.

1.12.3. JC 4.3: Adherence to humanitarian principles

The documentary study outlined the adherence of ECHO to the four humanitarian principles of Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality and Independence, which are well defined and explained in §11-14 of the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, as follows.

- Humanity: saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found.

- Impartiality: acting solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations.

- Neutrality: acting without favouring any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out.

- Independence: the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

The first – and general – principle of **Humanity** is very broad by definition in its coverage and ambition. Its application depends however on a number of pre-conditions, which are increasingly difficult to fulfil in the deteriorating situations of Sudan and South Sudan coupled with budget constraints. As stated above, the fulfilment of Humanity can also sometimes be limited by the application of some of the three other principles, which may in some cases create conflicting situations with authorities and restrict access. As repeatedly stressed in the HIPs, in the case of South Sudan the geographical distribution of affected areas and the lack of humanitarian space (presence of skilled partners, access without 'bureaucratic impediments', support from parties to the conflict) – not to mention the huge numbers of potential beneficiaries (over two million uprooted people) – do not currently allow the full implementation of this principle.

Challenges to – and violations of – humanitarian principles in South Sudan are well detailed in the internal ECHO documents. Despite the commitments made at the high-level humanitarian conference in Oslo in May 2014, there has been little or no progress in terms of contribution by the authorities and warring parties to a safe, unhindered humanitarian access nor in terms of government investment in sectors that would alleviate the suffering of the population.

The situation in Sudan did not improve either during the period concerned. Needs are still numerous in Darfur, in transitional areas and in some eastern provinces. Humanitarian assistance to some of those areas, where very partial information shows a persistently high malnutrition rate, is almost non-existent as the international community has not been granted access by either side of the conflict. The forced closure of projects of some INGOs in 2009 and 2013 stopped independent assessments in some regions. Bureaucratic impediments can be added to conflicts, natural disasters, the lack of basic infrastructure and displacements, and many humanitarian needs cannot be assessed due to access restrictions. For instance, in early 2013, the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) issued new "Directives for Humanitarian Work 2013" which outlined the procedural requirements for humanitarian work in Sudan. Since its publication, there has been no sign of improvement in the working conditions for humanitarian organizations. International staff continue to face difficulties in getting timely

travel permits and visas, as also testified by the evaluation team members who were denied timely access to Darfur.

ECHO and all its partners seem to have duly followed the principle of *Neutrality*, even though the environment was not conducive. In Sudan, the HIPs consistently noticed 'further deterioration of the operating environment' since 2013. Two main aid agencies (ICRC, UNHCR) were (temporarily) suspended in 2014, either officially or de facto, and others were forced to leave. ICRC is the leading international agency in matters of principled humanitarian actions in general, and neutrality in particular. After long periods of suspension, ICRC and UNHCR have been able to restore some operational capacity in certain areas of concern.

ECHO and all partners have consistently applied the principle of *Impartiality* in the highly challenging context of the civil war in South Sudan, which since the end of 2013 has led to the deliberate targeting of civilian populations (based on ethnicity, tribal affiliation, and gender among other things) by both parties in the conflict.

Independence is strictly applied by ECHO in Sudan but is specifically threatened in that country where various documents indicate a deterioration of the situation. This situation has not improved in more recent years; on the contrary access is hindered by a strict aid control policy by the government, an active "Sudanisation" agenda (nationalisation of international aid) and the risk to the principle of independence created by the intervention of some 'non-traditional donors' who may not apply a principled approach. In South Sudan the delivery of services has been increasingly difficult in some areas of the country since the start of the civil war in 2013.

1.12.4. JC 4.4: Contribution to effective impact on the overall humanitarian response

Although it is not possible to quantify the impact that the ECHO support has had on the overall humanitarian response, the evaluation found that the impact was high. The expected outputs were largely achieved, and all interviewees highly appreciated the impact of the ECHO interventions on the overall humanitarian response although without being able to provide precise data. The majority of interviewees also agreed that ECHO's principled and needs-based approach and support (see also previous two sections) did help save lives and that the support to common services such as coordination and logistics was indispensable[19]. ECHO, as a donor, is generally found to be setting standards on many levels other donors should be aspiring to.

Beneficiaries interviewed praised the support that they were given by ECHO. Beneficiaries reported that without this support their already difficult situation would worsen, especially for the most vulnerable such as women and children who have even less alternative ways of sustaining themselves.

The online questionnaire reinforced these conclusions: almost a fifth of the respondents considered the impact on the overall humanitarian response to be excellent, almost two thirds considered it good and more than 10% average. These very good results compound the data collected in the interviews. Only 2% of the respondents evaluated the impact as poor and 6% did not have an opinion.

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[19] For more on these issues, please refer to sections 1.11.3 and 1.11.4.

1.13. Efficiency

Evaluation Question 5:

*What was the **Efficiency** of ECHO actions in the two countries during the evaluation period?*

Judgment Criteria:

JC 5.1: ECHO and partners have managed the contracts efficiently – if not, why not?

JC 5.2: Lessons learned and best practices are identified, documented and utilised - if not, why?

JC 5.3: ECHO's funding cycle has been adequate for implementing partners – if not, why not?

JC 5.4: In cases where Remote Management is being used, to what extent does this follow existing guidance documents and good practice, and how successful is it?

1.13.1. JC 5.1: ECHO and partners have managed the contracts efficiently

Overall, the ECHO partners interviewed in the field were satisfied with the efficiency of the management of their contracts, although some took exception to the duration of contract approval. The time required for the approval of the contracts included the regular appraisal processes, which meant passing all proposals via the regional experts which caused some delay. This was perhaps due to a large workload at the beginning of the year, but there were also delays caused by the time partners took to respond to queries from ECHO and delays in submitting revised versions of the proposals. More than half of the projects reviewed were extended, many probably due to changes in needs and/or allocation of additional funding, others because the implementation faced difficulties. The evaluation team finds this quite reasonable: as an interviewee stated, it was better to let the partners finish the projects in due course rather than insist on sticking to deadlines, and thus jeopardise the quality.

Although the partners noticed that a large number of questions and comments were provided by ECHO during the appraisal, which could cause additional delay, they also stated that ECHO's feedback was contributing to the improvement of the quality of their proposals.

During implementation, ECHO attempts to visit all projects at least once, and more if there are concerns with regards to the pace or quality of implementation. All stakeholders interviewed confirmed that the monitoring visits were very useful and helped ensure high-quality projects.

Replies to the online questionnaire show that three quarters of the 49 respondents rated "the expertise, responsiveness/flexibility in internal coordination between field and HQ and the adequacy of ECHO's contract management tools' as either excellent, good or average. ECHO field staff are overwhelmingly considered as very knowledgeable and flexible when needed, whilst there is a perceived disconnect between "what the Field Officer understands of the context and what the Desk Officer in Brussels understands". In parallel, a significant majority of respondents gave similar ratings on the adequacy of human resources within their own organisations, in terms of quality and quantity, turnover, and cost-effectiveness of staff.

1.13.2. JC 5.2: Lessons learned and best practices are identified, documented and utilised

The document review showed that in over two thirds of the FichOps reviewed, no reference was made to lessons learnt during the implementation of activities. For almost half of the projects reviewed there were no conclusions nor mention of lessons learnt. For a fifth of the projects, lessons learnt could not be evaluated as the final report had not yet been submitted. Thematically, the lessons learnt, as described in the FichOps, focused on WASH and Post Distribution Management. However, there are no tools in place for searching for e.g. WASH

lessons learnt and one would have to be able to identify the appropriate project(s) in order to identify the lessons learnt.

The sections in the project documentation from the partners on lessons learnt and good practices were generally not well developed with a number of partners admitting in interviews conducted during the field missions, that the "lessons learnt" part of the e-single form were not usually a priority and were oftentimes forgotten. The data from the online questionnaire is not conclusive as to the partner's perception of ECHO's system for documenting and using lessons, as the comments indicate that at least some of the respondents look at their own organisation's system of handling lessons learnt rather than at ECHO's. Partners interviewed realised that more information on lessons learnt could be useful, but found that in order to fill in the lessons learnt part, more data was to be obtained, further analyses were necessary, and more documents would need to be prepared, all of which is time-consuming and has to be done in addition or parallel to other tasks. A more critical partner saw it in a very different way: because of doing the same thing over and over again there really is not much to be mentioned. This might not completely capture the evolutions that actually do take place within the projects: the evaluation team did in fact observe gradual improvements in implementation, especially with regards to the design of facilities such as latrines. Almost half of the projects supported in the two countries were multi-phase, which means lessons from previous phases can be utilised.

Although no formalised systems for easy storage and the retrieval of lessons learnt and best practices exist at the level of the ECHO country offices, at global level the humanitarian policies/guidelines listed on ECHO's website do contain some examples from the field, but the examples are limited in number and many of them are a few years old. There would also appear to be some overlaps between some of the documents, e.g. the two WASH documents; and the perhaps crucial annexes to the health guidelines are missing altogether. ECHO is furthermore disseminating lessons learnt through various sectoral expert groups. Most of the local institutional memory, however, is kept in the FichOps (and as described above only to a limited extent) or in ECHO staff's memory. This can pose a problem when staff leave although detailed hand-overs will contribute to alleviate this. As TAs normally only stay a relatively short time (a few years), part of the institutional memory relies on the national Programme Assistants (PA) who tend to stay longer. Due to difficulties in attracting qualified staff, for the past couple of years ECHO South Sudan has had only one PA, something which increases the risk of lessons learnt disappearing should he or she decide to resign.

1.13.3. JC 5.3: ECHO's funding cycle has been adequate for implementing partners

ECHO is currently presenting the HIP for the following year in October or early November leaving implementing partners with around six weeks to complete their proposals. According to partners, this timeframe is too short considering that needs assessments have to be completed.

The evaluation team agrees with the partners that the usual ECHO project cycle of twelve months is too short considering the challenging contexts, also taking into consideration the fact that it takes time for ECHO to appraise the proposals. ECHO has shortened its appraisal period – done by ECHO technical assistants, HQ personnel and regional experts – to one month in order to speed up the process. After the appraisal phase the contracts are signed (often in March or April) with some exceptions for which it can take longer.

In Sudan, it takes time to sign off on the technical agreements between the partners and the government and obtaining travel permits can be a lengthy procedure, which delays the deployment of international staff for implementation and monitoring. If the project is a continuation of an already running project, the technical agreements are usually signed faster and activities can normally continue running. In South Sudan, late signing of contracts meant that small partners with limited alternative funding sources were struggling to ensure the prepositioning of supplies before the rainy season while other - larger - partners could

themselves pre-finance the prepositioning through the use of other funds. ECHO has tried to alleviate this concern by insisting on partners co-financing projects, thereby ensuring that the partner indeed had funds available for pre-financing the project. Although the capacity to provide such co-financing is a prerequisite for obtaining an FPA with ECHO, some partners, especially the smaller ones, reported that it could be difficult due to other donors having other funding timeframes.

Respondents to the online questionnaire had similar concerns such as too much time taken to approve proposals, thereby jeopardising pre-positioning, and too short project durations failing to take into consideration that both countries are faced with protracted crises.

Although this seemed less of a concern to partners, ECHO staff were dissatisfied with the distribution of additional funding throughout the year. Such additional funding led to an additional administrative workload for ECHO and partner staff in terms of developing new project proposals or amending existing e-single forms and FichOps.

1.13.4. JC 5.4: ECHO-funded projects successfully made use of remote management according to guidelines and good practices

No project proposals reviewed by the evaluation team included remote management as their *modus operandi* in their proposals as per the criteria included in the "Instruction note for ECHO staff on Remote Management". A few projects in Sudan, however, had experienced temporary access restrictions, mainly for international/senior staff, that led to temporary remote management in the sense that international staff were briefly unable to monitor the project activities directly. The projects had all been allowed to continue as they fulfilled the seven assessment criteria as described in the instruction note, especially taking into consideration that the limited access was not expected to last long. In South Sudan, a few projects had been temporarily suspended due to fighting or bad weather, but activities were resumed at a later stage.

None of the partners interviewed on the topic were familiar with ECHO's guidelines for remote management, nor did the partners themselves have any specific procedures for how to implement activities remotely.

1.14. Sustainability

Evaluation Question 6:

*What was the **Sustainability** of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period?*

Judgment Criteria:

JC 6.1: Provision of services in camp settings is maintained as long as required – if not, why not?

JC 6.2: LRRD and resilience components had positive and lasting effects – if not, why not? (see also JC 3.6)

1.14.1. JC 6.1: Provision of services in camp settings is maintained as long as required

The EU Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries (2013-2020) includes activities aimed at designing and implementing resilience programmes for refugees, IDPs, and returnees,

through, amongst other things, addressing their "longer term developmental needs".[20] The Action Plan advocates longer term approaches and strategies to address protracted displacements.

Only the HIP of 2015 refers directly to the topic of long term provision of services in IDP and refugee camp settings in which, under the heading LRRD, it is recommended that more protracted caseloads, e.g. the population in the IDP camps in Darfur, could be addressed with an LRRD strategy "supported by possible upcoming DEVCO funding". Otherwise, the HIPs only address the problem of protracted displacement indirectly through:

- recommending that programmes include livelihood analysis for operational decision-making with regard to food assistance (HIP 2013),
- the protection of agricultural, livestock and fisheries production for the population and the displaced population (bridging facility 2014), and
- increased and strict targeting by vulnerability and not by status (HIP 2015) to be applied especially with regard to food aid.

The increasingly protracted displacement is recognised and described in the HIPs, but systematic reflections and strategic recommendations to deal with it are not yet included in them. The HIPs acknowledge that the topic is very complex with different groups displaced in different locations, e.g.

- Sudanese refugees in South Sudan,
- South Sudanese refugees in Sudan (officially registered or considered as "brothers and sisters"),
- returnees (especially returning South Sudanese),
- IDPs on both sides,
- the special situation in Protection of Civilians sites (PoCs)), and
- the focus on humanitarian needs as these were and are the most pressing.

The FichOps review found that slightly more than half of the projects reviewed were fully implemented in camp settings and a further 7% were partially implemented in camp settings. These figures show the partners' willingness and ability to deal with protracted displacement in line with the HIP. Although project descriptions indicate that longer-term needs are taken into account, the data does not allow for a detailed analysis of the extent to which ECHO funding was indeed used for longer-term as only a few of the FichOps considered the issue, but usual in relation to the continuation of a specific project and not in general.

Only slightly more than half of the projects reviewed made reference to the duration that the facilities are intended to be used for, with a third of these confirming that facilities will be for long-term use (i.e. more than one year after implementation).

In the camps/POCs visited in South Sudan, all services were fully operated and maintained by the humanitarian actors. Based on information provided by beneficiaries and partner staff, there has been a gradual shift towards semi-permanent structures as refugees/IDPs in camps are expected to stay longer, e.g. through continued improvements in the designs and replacement of tarpaulins with more durable corrugated iron sheets. The POCs are also slowly moving in that direction with the expectation/hope, however, that most inhabitants can return within a relatively short timeframe. The choice of facilities/services was generally found to correspond with the needs, taking into consideration the expected duration of the displacement insofar as the materials used were appropriate for longer term use, the level of services provided, the involvement of local actors etc.

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[20] "Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries", Commission Staff Working Document, European Commission, May 2013

In Sudan most camps have existed for several years, some for more than a decade. Partners nonetheless stated that the need for the provision of basic services in the camps will continue to exist in the foreseeable future, but that changes have to be made as to how it is delivered: communities have to be involved and - where possible - contribute to the cost of delivering the services. This is being piloted in the WASH sector with the testing of cost recovery mechanisms. Better targeting and more conditional assistance such as Food for Work etc. are believed to ensure the provision of services to the most vulnerable. This will require an extensive use of household and socio-economic profiling, something which might be difficult to conduct in the present context.

Most of the health and nutrition facilities observed during the field visits were of a permanent nature, i.e. a brick structure with sheet metal roof although some were also constructed with less durable materials requiring regular costly maintenance.

In conclusion, the evaluation found that ECHO provided services for people experiencing protracted displacements for as long as it is required. It is visible through the high number of multi-phase projects covering longer term needs as well as in the way facilities are constructed and services delivered.

1.14.2. JC 6.2: LRRD and resilience components had positive and lasting effects

LRRD

LRRD and transitional approaches (i.e. more community involvement, less substitution through NGOs, exit strategies etc.) from a purely emergency setting, are integrated in some of the HIPs, subject to the current security and political context, and are plausible.

For Sudan, the HIPs 2011 to 2014 judge a transition towards development donors to be unrealistic. The context of new conflicts and insecurity, increasing administrative impediments and the subsequent exit of aid and donor organisations and difficult access to many parts of the country did not favour the realisation of LRRD approaches. The 2015 HIP on the other hand, advises that the protracted caseloads (e.g. the population in camps in Darfur) could be addressed by an LRRD strategy and a gradual shift to development-oriented activities if DEVCO support was available.

For South Sudan, two phases can be distinguished. Before the crisis in 2013, the HIP actively encouraged consolidation with other donors[21] (as well as a maximal use of LRRD components within the actions (2011)). In 2012, the active EU support to the South Sudan Development Plan led to the EU recommending to gradually transition actions in non-emergency areas of the Health, Food Aid and Food Security and Livelihood sectors to development and stability instruments. Furthermore, the EU Member States joint programming initiative published an EU Single Country Strategy paper, aligned with South Sudan's 2011–2013 Development Plan, in January 2012. In 2013, the HIP still encouraged the transition of ECHO funded activities to development funding instruments.

With the crisis in South Sudan in 2013, the process stopped due to the re-entry into the emergency phase almost all over the country. The HIP 2014 declares the situation as non-favourable for LRRD and transitional approaches. The decision concerning the 2014 bridging facility still calls for a transition of Health, Food Aid and Food Security & Livelihood actions to the development and stabilisation instruments, but with the intention to relieve the strained emergency instruments caused by the enormous humanitarian needs in South Sudan. The 2015 HIP assesses the situation (deterioration of the security situation in formerly stable regions

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[21] Please also refer to section 1.11.6 on collaboration with development donors.

of South Sudan, on-going violence and political standoffs etc.) as not favourable for LRRD approaches. ECHO remains nonetheless engaged in the transitional process and will continue, once circumstances allow.

A third of the projects reviewed during the FichOps review contained some references to LRRD, but mostly in the form of more general statements rather than specific activities. This shows, that the partners are mainly in emergency mode and that the majority of partners so far have not engaged in LRRD oriented activities with ECHO funding. The reasons for this can be many, but it is clear, that the general deterioration of the humanitarian situation, especially in South Sudan, did not leave much room to do anything other than pure emergency interventions in all sectors.

The comments on the online questionnaire showed that some respondents found that there was little funding available for the implementation of LRRD and that it was anyhow difficult to do because of the relatively short duration of the grants. An exception to this is the close connection between nutrition and food security that has led partners implementing nutrition programs financed by ECHO, to enter into food security activities with other funding sources. The EU Food Security Thematic Program (FSTP) for South Sudan is one of the EU Food Security programs currently running. A partner visited in the field is implementing an FSTP project parallel to the ECHO funded nutrition activities. The results are promising as the partner is reporting a reduction by half in admissions to the Outpatient Treatment Program (OTP) sites in the FSTP project area. The distribution of improved seeds and planting material, tools and the training in modern agricultural techniques, as well as food for work activities during the lean season implemented by the FSTP project seemed to have a positive impact. One problem, however, is that, the FSTP rarely covers the same geographical area as the emergency nutrition intervention. Other examples are ECHO partners implementing nutrition programmes that also carry out simple livelihood programmes for the patients (vegetable gardening); one partner is piloting it with ECHO funding.

Resilience

Resilience is a relatively new concept in humanitarian aid. The resilience discussion within the emergency and development services of the EU, gained momentum at the end of 2012 with two regional initiatives focused on droughts in Africa: "Support to the Horn of Africa's Resilience" (SHARE) and "Global Alliance for Resilience" (AGIR)[22] in the Sahel. The first orientation towards resilience is noticeable in the 2013 HIP, which recommends the use of livelihoods analysis as the basis for operational decision-making. The 2014 HIPs for Sudan and South Sudan are the first HIPs that explicitly mention resilience and give clear instructions to partners to include resilience elements in their actions. In parallel, the resilience marker was introduced and incorporated into the e-single form as a tool to systematically include and monitor resilience in ECHO funded actions. Together with the resilience marker and the instruction for the inclusion of resilience components, the HIP 2014 includes livelihood support and the increased use of voucher systems and cash programming in Food Assistance. The decision for the Bridging Facility (2014) HIP follows the resilience argument by prioritising emergency livelihood assistance as one out of three priority interventions. This includes the protection of agricultural, livestock and fisheries production for IDPs and the population in IPC emergency phase areas. Finally, the HIP 2015 emphasizes the obligation of the partners to include resilience elements in all actions.

Only one third of the projects assessed as part of the FichOps review, included resilience components. The main resilience topics found in the reviewed FichOps focus on the provision of

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[22] Building Resilience, the EU's approach, Fact Sheet, 2016.

sustainable income in camp settings, food security interventions, community based approaches (i.e. in nutrition) and food for work. The field visits only revealed a few examples of LRRD and resilience strategies being put into practice. In the more peaceful areas of South Sudan a few partners have started to integrate nutrition activities, implemented by the partners without collaboration with the authorities, into the governmental health facilities. This integration of nutritional activities into the health system is required following the national guidelines for the integrated management of severe acute malnutrition and the South Sudan primary health care and nutrition policy. One partner, working with an active County Health Department was generally quite positive about this way of working although problems such an increase in the theft of nutrition supplies now stored in the health facilities, and changing the "mind set" of the health facility staff, who consider nutritional activities as INGO/UNICEF activities, need to be addressed.

However, resilience offers a gradual shift away from the continued delivery of emergency assistance towards enabling communities to better resist future shocks by themselves. Furthermore, in the context of budget restrictions, resilience should not only be seen as a "competitor" for scarce funding with emergency lifesaving activities, but also as a potentially cost-effective approach. In the event of a new crisis, affected resilient communities are indeed likely to require new assistance less urgently and in fewer quantities than non-resilient ones. Their resilience would also enable communities to more readily access funding aimed at development or LRRD from other donors or other budget lines, provided such funding is indeed made available, which has so far not been the case to any large extent.

A regularly increasing compendium of lessons learnt and good practices23 outline that, to be effective, resilience needs to be seen as a comprehensive – the more holistic the better - framework of activities, which must be adapted to a specific situation. This framework is bound to include such a wide scope of issues that a single donor or actor can hardly cover them all with its mandate and resources. Synergies are therefore mandatory. Setting up an effective resilience framework is also likely to require several consecutive years of efforts – depending on the development level of the community and the time needed to advocate ownership of the resilience measures - thus making multi-phase projects a prerequisite.

Resilience activities can include:

- social cohesion,
- reconciliation of communities after conflict,
- improved community governance,
- land ownership,
- establishing good relations with local authorities for protection and support,
- vocational training and basic calculation,
- provision of tools,
- livelihoods,
- WFP's FFA and FFT,
- IGA (in particular through VSLA – village-level savings and loans associations),
- food security (sustainable agriculture, small cattle),
- good nutritional practices,
- good hygiene practices,
- access to water,

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[23] See for example the reports compiled by ALNAP:
http://www.alnap.org/search/simple.aspx?cx=002503473335972040492%3Atqtul-zyvxq&cof=FORID%3A11&ie=UTF-8&q=resilience&sa=Search

- gender equity,
- sensitisation to SGBV and relevant human rights,
- health,
- education (including for illiterate adults in key positions in the community), and
- environmental protection.

It should be noted that ECHO has been able to successfully implement such approaches with the AGIR and SHARE programmes, but also with its far-sighted and creative recent exit strategy from Ivory Coast24.

Given the context of increasingly severe and protracted emergencies, the HIPs do not foresee exiting from the two countries. Likewise, the FichOps review showed that that almost half of the projects did not contain exit strategies either. Although the quality of the exit strategies that were included in the FichOps have not been assessed in detail, it is noticeable, that most of them remain very vague envisaging a "handover" to other partners, local NGOs, the government etc. Important questions such as exit criteria and information about how a handover to communities or authorities will be prepared and take place are rarely answered in the project descriptions.

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24 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/Bookshop_Final%20report.KR%2004-15-526-EN-N.pdf

Conclusions and Operational Recommendations

This chapter includes the conclusions and the operational recommendations stemming from them, most of the latter of which are operational / organisational in scope. The first paragraph under each evaluation criteria summarises the overall assessment of the evaluation criteria. The strategic recommendations are included in chapter 0.

1.15. Relevance

Evaluation Question 1:

*What was the **Relevance** of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period?*

The evaluation found that ECHO's support to Sudan and South Sudan was very relevant with high quality needs assessments carried out in the two countries and a good fit between the needs and the projects supported, in terms of geographical coverage and the contracted amount. ECHO, furthermore, was generally strong on ensuring support to the most vulnerable parts of the populations. ECHO was also flexible in allowing for changes during implementation when warranted by contextual changes.

Quality of Needs Assessments

The evaluation found, in line with partners and others interviewed, that the quality of the assessments of the humanitarian needs in the two countries as expressed in the HIPs was high.

The partners use assessment tools based on which they and ECHO can apply an evidence-based decision-making process. If partners do not use the major standardised assessment tools, they conduct their own assessments as a basis for project proposals.

Alignment between needs assessments, HIPs and projects funded

Based on an analysis of the relevant documents and information obtained from interviews with stakeholders, the evaluation found that there was a good fit between the needs assessments in the HIPs, and the projects implemented, acknowledging that a few projects were outside or not covered by the HIPs but had other strong justifications based on vulnerability criteria. The large degree of flexibility in the HIPs allows for quick changes to the projects, in cases of changes to the humanitarian situation.

Capacity to adapt response to changing needs

ECHO was able to allocate substantial additional funds to both countries over the years with the subsequent updates of the HIPs being in line with the changed needs. Justified changes during implementation were readily approved. The evaluation therefore found that ECHO was very strong overall, in terms of adapting to changes in needs, thanks to its flexibility.

Reflection of beneficiaries' needs and adequate targeting of people most at risk

The evaluation found that the needs of beneficiaries were taken into consideration in the support provided by ECHO, both in the priorities put forward in the HIPs and in the projects implemented. Most of the projects were explicit about how they targeted some of the most vulnerable - IDPs, refugees, children, women, the elderly, etc. - and vulnerability assessments are conducted by most partners. Specific protection risk analyses were only done in a few

projects - and only in South Sudan; possibly because the oppressive regime in Sudan does not allow protection concerns to be addressed directly.

Overall, the evaluation found that ECHO was strong on ensuring support that considers the beneficiaries' needs, and targets the most vulnerable - with some gaps in Sudan.

1.16. Coherence

Evaluation Question 2:

*What was the **Coherence** of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period?*

The HIPs and the projects implemented by partners based upon them are well aligned with the EC/ECHO humanitarian policies.

Alignment of HIPs with EC/ECHO humanitarian policies

The ECHO website[25] details a list of ten key humanitarian policies. At strategy level, the HIPs incorporated the policies - as much as resources allowed and according to the identified priority needs – with a caveat concerning gender equity. More importantly, the projects implemented by partners are found to be aligned with the humanitarian policies.

Overall, the level of alignment between the HIPs and the humanitarian policies was assessed to be high by the evaluation, with consistent alignment of HIPs with the policies. It should be noted that field-based partners did not always appear properly informed about them.

1.17. EU Added Value

Evaluation Question 3:

*What was **the EU Added Value** of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period?*

The evaluation found that the added value of ECHO's support was high and that ECHO assisted in ensuring not only its own partners but also other humanitarian actors' presence in the field. This was achieved through support to coordination, logistics and humanitarian advocacy, which the evaluation found was very strong. Furthermore, ECHO successfully funded gaps in the overall assistance. Attempts to add additional value by linking activities supported by ECHO with those of development donors, were less successful, partly due to the lack of such opportunities and partly due to the limited timeframe of ECHO support.

Help ensure presence of skilled implementing partners in the field

ECHO's support to coordination, logistics and humanitarian advocacy assisted in ensuring the presence of partners. In very challenging circumstances, the knowledge, professionalism, and readiness of ECHO staff to "find good solutions within regulations" added value to the support by ensuring a continued presence of implementing partners.

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[25] http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid_en

Provide major funding contributions to specific sectors and activities, not adequately covered by other donors

ECHO is found to have been instrumental in providing support to activities and sectors that were not covered by other donors, through the support to ensure capacities to respond to sudden-onset emergencies.

As the ECHO share of the total humanitarian support is limited to around 10%, it is not possible to ascertain whether ECHO provided major contributions to specific sectors or activities, with gaps left by other donors. ECHO was, however, pro-active and supported activities that other donors probably would not have supported.

Help ensure international humanitarian logistics capacities

The evaluation found that the degree to which the support with humanitarian logistics capacities facilitated and improved the implementation of activities was very high. The necessity of logistics services (esp. air transport and the Logistics Cluster) was unanimously acknowledged by stakeholders and the quality of services was generally appreciated. Problems may exist, but they do not cast any doubt on the effectiveness on the support as such.

Support to and dialogue with humanitarian leadership and coordination mechanisms

In the current context, the evaluation found that ECHO provided substantial and consistent financial support to humanitarian leadership in both countries. Among the projects selected for review, a number concerned direct and unambiguous funding in support of OCHA's role, even though the present HC in South Sudan was found to give a low priority to the humanitarian efforts and serious concerns about humanitarian leadership were also raised in Sudan in 2014 and 2015. At the same time, interviewees stated the need for ECHO to further strengthen its focus within the wider coordination structures.

Support and/or play active role in other IASC Transformative Agenda (ITA) coordination tools

After the civil war erupted in December 2013 and an L-3 emergency was declared in early 2014, some ITA tools supported by ECHO proved quite useful, e.g. the surge capacity RRTs, the clusters, or the civil-military cooperation teams. Field visits did not provide triangulated evidence as interviewees were not informed about ECHO support to ITA with the exception of some of the cluster leads. Due to the consistent and timely support of the development of ITA tools and most clusters, ECHO's support was rated as strong by the evaluation.

Use all opportunities for cooperation with development donors

The HIPs consistently promoted LRRD and detailed relevant initiatives supported by EDF and other donors despite steadily deteriorating situations in both countries. At the same time, all HIPs published over the period duly outlined that LRRD opportunities were quite limited due to the volatile context and the lack of cooperation from governments – a prerequisite for development programmes.

The cooperation with development donors so far had been unsuccessful despite attempts made – essentially due to very limited opportunities for development cooperation in Sudan, and in South Sudan due to the civil war/ humanitarian situation. ECHO's short project cycles were found to be inappropriate for effective longer-term activities.

1.18. Effectiveness

Evaluation Question 4:

*What was the **Effectiveness** of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period?*

The evaluation found that ECHO's actions were effective in all sectors. The quality of the projects supported within all sectors was high and the planned outputs were generally achieved. Food aid projects were able to improve the food security of the beneficiaries with the increased use of cash and vouchers being especially appreciated by the beneficiaries. It was found that the nutrition projects delivered a variety of services despite difficulties in sourcing supplies and staff. The quality of the health services provided were high although the occasional shortages of supplies were a constraining factor. The WASH projects were also effective although recurrent maintenance continues to be of concern. The ES/NFI support was effective too.

Furthermore, based on interviews with stakeholders, the evaluation found that ECHO was very strong on humanitarian advocacy and was generally perceived as the leading and most principled donor in this regard. ECHO was also able to influence other donors, especially in Sudan. The evaluation, however, also found that ECHO's adherence to Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence might have an impact on ensuring that humanitarian needs are addressed in some locations.

It was not possible to measure the achievement of outcomes due to a lack of data and because no targets were set at the HIP/country level.

ECHO's support was found to have improved the lives of beneficiaries, and most likely also saved lives. ECHO's support to coordination and logistics, furthermore, had an impact not only on ECHO partners and the beneficiaries of their ECHO-funded projects, but also on other humanitarian actors and their activities and beneficiaries.

Planned outputs / outcomes effectively achieved in the targeted sectors

Overall, the evaluation assessed the quality of the ECHO-supported projects implemented in Sudan and South Sudan as satisfactory with outputs generally achieved, taking into consideration the difficult contexts. Only a few projects did not reach the expected quality outputs, and due to this some partners were not granted new contracts.

An assessment of the level of achievement of outcomes was not possible due to the lack of clear specific expected measurable outcomes, but given the outputs achieved by the projects, the foundation for the delivery of the outcomes too, was laid.

The evaluation found that the food aid projects were effectively implemented and were able to improve the availability of food for the targeted beneficiaries. Better targeting and increased use of conditional food aid (food for work, assets, training etc.) as well as cash/vouchers using market systems where possible are expected to reduce the amount of food required and the dependency on the core pipeline (i.e. mitigating the risks of pipeline breaks), and in Sudan will pave the way for early recovery activities. The increased use of food vouchers/cash is appreciated by beneficiaries, and in line with the global trend of increasingly using cash or vouchers, empowering beneficiaries and supporting the local community/market.

The nutrition projects were able to deliver a variety of nutrition services to beneficiaries despite occasional difficulties in securing supplies and in accessing experienced staff. There had been difficulties in maintaining a stable pipeline of supplies with an increased risk of beneficiaries defaulting. The move towards local suppliers of nutrition supplies and their certification is a good example of how to deal with difficulties in ensuring timely access to supplies.

Overall the quality of the health services provided was high except for the shortage of some supplies, indicating a need for better advance planning/storage management on behalf of the partners. Partners have to put considerable effort into capacity building measures for their local (seconded) staff. The expected outputs were found to have been achieved overall.

The evaluation found that the WASH projects were generally effective, achieving their targets of providing sufficient safe water to the beneficiaries. Maintenance of the facilities is a recurrent concern due mainly to unclear government policies and limited financial capacity of beneficiaries, but attempts are underway to work out at least part user-payment in some of the locations with protracted displacements.

The ES/NFI supplies are generally available in the major hubs and the core pipeline is stable. Their distribution (usually one-off) to the beneficiaries (IDPs, refugees) is done through partners and no serious complaints were registered. The composition of the basket, variations of quantities due to family size and the quality of the items seemed to be accepted. The evaluation assessed that the ES/NFI support to be satisfactory.

<u>Recommendations</u>

In order to measure the achievement of outcomes, ECHO should consider developing a system for clarifying exactly what the support provided by ECHO is expected to achieve. This could be in the form of targets e.g. how much is the ECHO support expected to reduce malnutrition or increase access to health services. As a minimum, ECHO could consider defining how many people it wants to reach with different services, e.g. how many people it expects to make sure are fed, how many people it expects to serve with safe water, etc. This would also facilitate the assessment of the cost-effectiveness of ECHO's support as outlined in the recent ECHO cost-effectiveness study.[26] Much of the information is expected to be readily available in the FichOps or with the partners, but it needs to be compiled in a manner whereby it can be compared and aggregated across projects, paying particular attention to issues such as the duration of support (e.g. how to compare a one month delivery of water through trucking with the provision of safe water through water points throughout the year) and some way of ensuring that there are wider outcomes in the form of improvements in health or better practices (e.g. hygiene promotion campaigns should not count those that listened in, but only those for which the information actually made a (positive) difference).

In order to increasingly move towards early recovery/resilience whenever possible, it is important to continue pushing for more targeted food aid when and wherever possible. Alternative modalities to in kind food aid, i.e. cash/vouchers, are to be continuously promoted. As cash and vouchers are essentially different in their nature, continued support should be given to partners (e.g. WFP) who are developing tools as to which modality to use. The transition towards the EU thematic programme on food security has to be actively pursued in suitable situations.

To complement the nutrition pipeline and as a mitigation measure for pipeline breaks, the establishment of local capacity to produce vital nutrition supplies should be encouraged. The results of quality assessments of possible local suppliers by partners could be included in the proposals or discussed during the review process - however, support to increase local production capacity is possibly a task for development partners and not for ECHO. A closer connection between nutrition and food security/livelihoods activities in an early recovery context should be considered.

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[26] "Study on Approaches to Assess Cost-Effectiveness of DH ECHO's Humanitarian Aid Actions - Final Report"; Volume 1, August 2016, ADE, Belgium.

Additional guidance and case-based clarifications to help health partners to understand the alternative possibilities for procuring medical supplies and medical devices would be useful for some partners.

Consistent advocacy for the respect of International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, Refugee Law and access, despite impediments and violations

In South Sudan, ECHO is seen as the most principled – and best informed – donor. It is very vocal and effective at bringing up issues related to humanitarian space. ECHO duly collaborates with other donors and advocates on issues of common concern such as access and insecurity and often leads joint donor advocacy actions. The picture is slightly more mitigated in Sudan, where ECHO's advocacy faces numerous constraints by a strong government. In such a case, adherence to the principles of Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence, that are the key guide for all humanitarian actions, needs to be outlined to partners as required, and strictly enforced in situations when it may have implications for the equally important humanitarian imperative to 'address human suffering wherever it is found', according to the principle of Humanity.

Although there does not yet seem to be a consistent advocacy strategy, due to the thorough advocacy efforts and support provided to partners with advocacy capability, ECHO is found by the evaluation team to have been strong on advocacy.

Adherence to humanitarian principles

According to the evaluation's assessment, ECHO, to a high degree, consistently adhered to and supported its partners in strongly applying the principles of Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence in both countries. However, this approach has raised concerns by some partners who stated – particularly in Sudan - that it may lead the authorities to disrupt access for life-saving interventions in some vulnerable areas. Challenges to - and violations of - humanitarian principles are well detailed in the HIPs and other programming documents. Regarding the very broad principle of Humanity – which may be, as stated above, sometimes at odds with the three other principles - it is increasingly difficult for ECHO and its partners to fulfil its requirements while facing deteriorating situations and huge needs in Sudan and South Sudan.

Recommendation

Clarifications towards partners are needed when they raise concerns about the possible implications of being limited in delivering lifesaving humanitarian assistance following the strict – and entirely necessary - compliance with the humanitarian principles of Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence, notwithstanding the policies of a government which is not receptive to advocacy.

Contribution to effective impact on the overall humanitarian response

ECHO is found to have high humanitarian standards and a principled and needs-based approach that serves as a good example to other donors - but also to partners. The ECHO support is appreciated and has contributed to improving the lives of some of the most vulnerable and is almost certain to have saved lives too. Additionally, it was found that ECHO's support to coordination and logistics ensured that the support benefits not only ECHO partners and their beneficiaries, but also the wider humanitarian community and their beneficiaries.

1.19. Efficiency

Evaluation Question 5:

*What was the **Efficiency** of ECHO actions in the two countries during the evaluation period?*

The evaluation found that ECHO's actions overall were efficient in terms of management of the contract. The evaluation did not reveal any instances of planned remote management. The evaluation, however, also found that ECHO could do more to document lessons learnt and best practices, and that the funding cycle can make it difficult for partners to ensure prepositioning of supplies.

ECHO and partners have managed the contracts efficiently

The efficiency of ECHO's management of partners' contracts was overall judged to be highly satisfactory. That being said, delays in approval of proposals did occur - caused both by partners and ECHO.

Lessons learned and best practices are identified, documented and utilised

Besides sharing lessons learnt and best practices in expert groups, the evaluation team found insufficient formal documentation and utilisation of lessons learnt. Identification and documentation of lessons learnt at country-level were not systematised and mainly relied on the memory of ECHO staff, in particular national staff who typically stay longer than international staff. Due to the lack of a systematic approach the evaluation found that ECHO was weak in identifying, documenting and utilising lessons learnt.

Recommendation

Given the difficult and dynamic context with numerous challenges and high staff turnover, it is recommended that lessons learnt and best practices be captured in an easy to access and searchable manner - this would possibly be best done by allowing sector specific searches in the already existing lessons learnt records in the HOPE database[27]. This can prevent repetition of previous mistakes and might eventually provide the basis for innovations. Such lessons learnt and best practices should also be shared with partners, e.g. through workshops or by sharing briefings either at national or global levels. The cluster system could also play a role in the dissemination.

ECHO's funding cycle has been adequate for implementing partners

The time taken to appraise and approve proposals is lengthy and the project duration is short, and considering that it takes months to source supplies, and to sign technical agreements with authorities in Sudan, this causes further delays and strains especially on the smaller partners' budgets. In South Sudan, the poor transport infrastructure necessitates prepositioning of supplies before the rainy season starts in May. The additional funding trickling in during the duration of the HIP is placing an additional administrative burden on ECHO and partners. Overall, the evaluation found that the suitability of ECHO's funding cycle to its partners was inadequate.

Recommendation

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[27] The record could possibly be expanded to include also a box to tick if the lesson learnt is specific to the partner, to the country or globally.

ECHO should review its deadlines for proposals, possibly moving them forward to November or earlier. Given that the crises are mostly protracted, ways of extending the project duration should be considered; this might, however, be difficult considering legal restrictions and would probably require changes to ECHO's legal basis.

ECHO-funded projects successfully made use of remote management according to guidelines and good practices

Projects did not plan for the use of remote management, but temporary remote management was applied during the implementation of a few projects. The ECHO guidelines for remote management were largely unknown.

<u>Recommendation</u>

Given the context, the fact that project proposals did not include remote management as an explicit *modus operandi* should not mean that the need for future - at least temporary - remote management once the projects get going should be ruled out. It is recommended that more efforts are devoted to ensuring that cases of temporary remote management also apply certain minimum procedures, especially with regards to monitoring for which the ECHO instruction note has some reasonable and concrete proposals, which ECHO could request partners to report upon. Such minimum procedures could be based on the existing more comprehensive procedures.

1.20. Sustainability

Evaluation Question 6:

*What was the **Sustainability** of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period?*

In the situations and areas with protracted displacement, the evaluation found that the sustainability of activities was commensurate with the needs and the duration of the displacement. Longer-term sustainability and impact in the form of LRRD and resilience, however, were not implemented to the desirable extent.

Provision of services in camp settings is maintained as long as required

The evaluation considered that the choice of facilities/services provided in camps generally corresponded with the needs and the duration of the displacement.

LRRD and resilience components had positive and lasting effects

Even though the HIPs clearly describe and recommend the inclusion of LRRD and resilience aspects (exit strategy, resilience marker etc.), the practical implementation leaves room for improvement if there are to be significant effects.

<u>Recommendation</u>

ECHO should consider engaging in a discussion on if and how it will need to expand its current lifesaving approach so that in relevant contexts, it can increasingly include room for exit strategies such as more resilience approaches (targeting communities) and/or early recovery approaches (in tandem with longer-term donors). Both approaches can include livelihoods, capacity building and community based activities within or close to the camps and in areas of return depending on the specific context, e.g. rural, urban, etc. In a context of protracted forgotten crisis, economic sanctions and donors' fatigue, resilience can be more readily

envisaged as it focuses at first on communities rather than traditional development, and mainly involves some local authorities – who are often more approachable than national ones. The partners would generally welcome more flexibility and if steps are taken to move towards resilience or LRRD with ECHO funding, the application of development instruments either by the EU or other donors might be facilitated provided they ensure funds for such activities are made available. In synergy with other concerned donors and actors, ECHO should contribute to defining which activities could be included in a comprehensive resilience package adapted to the Sudan situation. Where feasible and relevant, ECHO should then systematically consider the usefulness of resilience as an exit strategy.

Strategic Recommendations

Based on the conclusions and specific recommendations presented in chapter 0, four strategic recommendations have been developed as per the below.

Conclusions/Rationale	Strategic recommendations
Principled approach	
ECHO has consistently adhered to and supported its partners in strictly applying the widely-acknowledged principles of Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence in both countries. ECHO is perceived as being a principled and well informed donor, who is very vocal and effective at bringing up issues related to humanitarian space. ECHO often leads joint donor advocacy actions. However, the context is very detrimental to humanitarian space due to the lack of receptiveness to humanitarian advocacy by governments who either have other priorities (civil war in South Sudan) or are strongly pursuing a different political agenda of their own (Sudan). The principled approach has raised concerns in Sudan where the ECHO 'rule' of only supporting projects in areas in which access by 'diverse' teams is guaranteed while the authorities at the same time may disrupt humanitarian access in retaliation to criticisms. A potential consequence of the principled approach based on Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence may therefore be that the population most in need could be deprived of humanitarian assistance, jeopardising the other humanitarian principle of Humanity and its imperative to address human suffering wherever it is found.	ECHO should apply a two-pronged strategy to pursue the principled approach and face the political constraints to the best of its ability: (i) internally, better define with its partners the "rules of engagement" when contradictions occur between Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence on the one hand, and Humanity on the other; (ii) externally, to systematically seek synergies with other concerned EU and international actors at all levels (field and HQ), in order to promote a united response to the local authorities.
Supporting coordination	
ECHO provides consistent financial support for humanitarian leadership in both countries including in support of OCHA's role. There have, however, been concerns regarding the humanitarian leadership and the effectiveness of the UN-led coordination mechanism while some pointed to the need for ECHO to further strengthen its engagement with the wider coordination structures.	ECHO should further strengthen its support to and collaboration with the coordination mechanisms at country level, and where there are capacity constraints at country level, also by advocacy at global/HQ level. ECHO should strive for increased collaboration with the sectoral coordination mechanisms, including pushing partners to do the same, while at the same time acknowledging the gaps in the coordination mechanisms and how the funds could best be used to fill them.

Conclusions/Rationale	Strategic recommendations
Supporting resilience	
The humanitarian imperative of saving lives first, which ECHO is a strong advocate of, and rightly so, is an important factor in deciding which activities to support; and in both countries, there are indeed unmet humanitarian needs. However, there are opportunities for the implementation of LRRD/resilience activities as also described in the 2014 and 2015 HIPs regarding the application of resilience – through support to livelihood, use of the cash and vouchers modalities, and the protection of agricultural assets. Enabling communities to better resist future shocks would be a potentially cost-effective approach, as urgent assistance would be required less, and this might even pave the way for partners to access development funding that can be used for LRRD purposes. However, ECHO's short (annual) project duration and the scarcity of funding, are not well suited if medium or longer-term activities, like those required to meaningfully embarking on resilience activities, are to be effective.	ECHO should consider engaging in a discussion about if and how it will open up its present approach of focusing purely on lifesaving activities to include also when feasible a wider resilience and/or early recovery approach. In this regard strengthening support to livelihoods, capacity building and community based activities in the camps, close to the camps, and in areas of return could be considered. Considering the context of protracted forgotten crises, economic sanctions and donors' fatigue in both Sudans, resilience can, depending on the specific context, be envisaged due to resilience's focus on strengthening affected communities and requires the support of only some local authorities – which are often more accessible and committed than national ones. In collaboration with other actors and development donors, ECHO could discuss the way forward, i.e. define what should be included in the ECHO support to resilience (and/or LRRD) and what should not. As resilience projects tend to take longer to implement due to the need to ensure ownership of the beneficiary communities, ways of defining multi-year strategies while at the same considering how to extend the project duration; or some kind of guarantee should be issued to partners that their funding will continue. Issuing multi-year contracts is not possible at present due to legal restrictions. Pending a possible change in the legal basis, lessons could possibly be learnt from the Drought Risk Reduction Action Plan (DRRAP) programme implemented in the Horn of Africa.

Conclusions/Rationale	Strategic recommendations
Using lessons learnt	
ECHO's procedures for identifying, documenting and utilising lessons learnt (mainly taking place through expert groups) are unclear and not consistently applied. Partners too, do not always pay sufficient attention to filling in the required record on lessons learnt in the final report form. Documentation and utilisation of lessons learnt is not systematised, and mainly relies on the memory of ECHO staff. However, staff members are not always retained for more than a year or two due to the dynamic and difficult contexts in the Sudans.	ECHO should strengthen its capacity to keep and disseminate lessons learnt, to avoid "reinventing the wheel" and to possibly support the implementation of more cost effective activities. Capturing lessons learnt can eventually provide the basis for innovations. Ultimately, this might lead to more effective actions, contributing to save more lives for the same amount of funding. In this conjunction, ECHO should ensure that partners provide sufficient information on lessons learnt. Lessons learnt and best practices should be captured in an easy to access and searchable manner. This could perhaps best be achieved by allowing for sector-specific searches in the existing lessons learnt records in the DG ECHO's project database (HOPE). Lessons learnt and best practices should also be shared with partners, e.g. through workshops, through the clusters, or by sharing written briefings at national or global level.

Annex A - Terms of References

EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL HUMANITARIAN AID AND CIVIL PROTECTION - ECHO

ECHO A - Strategy, Policy and International Co-operation
A/3 - Policy and Implementation Frameworks

ANNEX I

**Terms of Reference
For the evaluation of the ECHO response to the
Humanitarian crises in Sudan and South Sudan
2011 - 2015**

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1. DEFINITIONS AND REFERENCES

The **legal base** for Humanitarian Aid is provided by Article 214[1] of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR; No. 1257/96)[2]. The objectives of EU humanitarian assistance are outlined in these documents, and could – for evaluation purposes – be paraphrased as follows: *From a donor perspective and in coordination with other main humanitarian actors, to provide the right amount and type of aid, at the right time, and in an appropriate way, to the most vulnerable people affected by natural and/or manmade disasters, in order to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity.*

The humanitarian aid budget is mainly implemented through annual funding decisions[3] adopted by the Commission, which are directly based on the HAR. A funding decision is taken for humanitarian operations in each country/region at the time of establishing the budget, or for each unforeseen intervention as needed. The funding decision specifies the amount, the objectives, maximum amounts to be financed by objective, potential partners, and possible areas of intervention. Since 2011 the funding decisions are referred to as '**Humanitarian Implementation Plans**' (HIP).

2. CONTEXT

Insecurity and multiple conflicts prevail in both countries. The mandate for the three peacekeeping operations has been extended throughout 2015: the United Nations (UN) Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS)[4]; the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNIFSA)[5] and the UN-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)[6].

2.1. SOUTH SUDAN

ECHO's Integrated Analysis Framework for 2015-2016 identified extreme humanitarian needs in South Sudan. The country scores 3 out of 3 in the crisis index and is ranked number 3 in the vulnerability index. In the UN system, the country remains at emergency level 3. The UN estimates the conflict has triggered more than 2 million forced displacements, out of an estimated population of 11.6 million

On 26 August 2015 a new peace and power sharing agreement has been signed but it is unlikely to result in an improvement of the humanitarian situation in the short term. Instability remains high and conditions for return are not yet in place. In the conflict-affected areas, the provision of basic services remains almost entirely under humanitarian aid and the livelihoods and coping mechanisms have drastically deteriorated.

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[1] http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-5-external-action-by-the-union/title-3-cooperation-with-third-countries-and-humanitarian-aid/chapter-3-humanitarian-aid/502-article-214.html

[2] Council Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid

[3] http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/funding-evaluations/funding-decisions-hips

[4] UNSC Resolution 1996 as last amended by 2132 (change of mandate) and lately 2155

[5] UNSC Resolution 1990 as last amended by 2205

[6] UNSC Resolution 1769 as last amended by 2228

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2.2. SUDAN

ECHO's Integrated Analysis Framework for 2015-2016 identified high humanitarian needs in Sudan and is ranked no. 5 in the vulnerability index. At the same time, the Humanitarian Development Index calculated by UNDP is 0.5 (ranking 166) while the GINI index is 35.3.

The political and security environment continued to be of particular concern in 2015 with the ongoing conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The initiatives for conflict settlement such as the National Dialogue have stalled while the consequences of the conflicts have heightened insecurity in the region, already severally compounded by widespread crime and banditry. In Eastern Sudan, the political situation remains fragile and the humanitarian picture is characterized by chronic under-development and wide-spread poverty with malnutrition rates which are among the highest in the country.

Sudan's complex and protracted crisis suffers from the limited exposure of foreign media to the humanitarian suffering. Sudan is therefore considered by ECHO a forgotten crisis in 2015 for the second year in succession.

In the Abyei Administrative Area, the political and security situation remains tense and unpredictable as long as the final status of the disputed region is not settled, yet the resolution of outstanding issues between Sudan and South Sudan is not progressing.

3. ECHO RESPONSE

ECHO's response in *South Sudan* evolved during the period under review. Following the start of the crisis in December 2013, ECHO's response focused on four main axes: support for the scaling-up of humanitarian assistance where the greatest needs are identified, including through adequate food aid and emergency medical and nutritional interventions, emergency WASH to reduce deaths, logistic support; advocacy for a better protection of civilians inside and outside UNMISS Protection of Civilians areas; continued humanitarian assistance to address the basic needs of refugees; and support to communities exposed to high risks of morbidity and mortality, including severe food insecurity, high malnutrition rates and outbreaks of epidemics as a result of shocks linked to flooding and seasonal hunger during the lean season. Effective coordination has also been supported.

Sudan has been identified as a forgotten crisis. ECHO's response focussed - if access allowed - on emergency response and preparedness for displaced people, refugees, returnees, host communities and nomads, in the sectors of food assistance and livelihoods, nutrition, health, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter and non-food items and protection. It also encompassed coordination - including support to security programmes - and logistic support. Efforts to reduce acute malnutrition through a multi-sectorial approach have also been supported. In settings where the emergency is less acute, the identification of transition strategies was considered an important element. An overall focus on protection is considered particularly pertinent for all types of displaced populations (IDPs, returnees and refugees) across the country, despite implementation challenges due to overall access constraints and lack of actors. Protection mainstreaming will increasingly be promoted. Improved targeting and diversifying aid modalities to build resilience of vulnerable communities to future shocks will be of paramount importance.

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ECHO funding

During the evaluation period 2011-2015 the following financial allocations have been made to address humanitarian crises in Sudan and South Sudan:

- Financial decision: 2011 ECHO/SDN/BUD/2011/91000 140,000,000
- Financial decision, 2012 ECHO/-AF/BUD/2012/91000 157,000,000
- Financial decision   2013 ECHO/-AF/BUD/2013/91000   97,000,000
- Financial decision, 2014 ECHO/-AF/BUD/2014/91000 112,715,000
- Financial decision   2015 ECHO/-AF/BUD/2015/91000 139,000,000

In addition to these financial decisions, funding has also been allocated to address the humanitarian crises in Sudan and South Sudan including from the Epidemic HIP, the children of Peace HIP and with funds of the European Development Fund.

4. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

4.1. PURPOSE AND GENERAL SCOPE

Based on Regulation (EC) 1257/96 and the EU Financial Regulation, the purpose of this Request for Services is to have an independent **overall evaluation** of the ECHO actions in South Sudan and Sudan **2011 – 2015**.

Specifically, the evaluation should provide:

- A comprehensive, retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's Strategy (as formalised by the Humanitarian Implementation Plans) in Sudan and South Sudan, covering the evaluation issues of **relevance, coherence, EU Added Value, effectiveness, efficiency** and **sustainability**;

- A maximum of **5 prospective, strategic recommendations** – based on the retrospective evaluation and the related research – for a future ECHO crisis response strategy in the countries, taking account of the volatile environment, and with a view of maximizing the benefits of ECHO's initiatives on the ground. These strategic recommendations could possibly be supported by further, related, operational recommendations.

The main users of the evaluation report include *inter alia* ECHO staff at HQ, regional and country level, national and regional stakeholders, the participating implementing partners, and other humanitarian and development donors and agencies.

4.2. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The conclusions of the evaluation will be presented in the report in the form of evidence-based, reasoned answers to the evaluation questions presented in the following. The questions to be addressed by the Evaluator consist of two sets: 1) General questions; and 2) Thematic questions, that partly overlap with the general questions. On the basis of the responses to the questions under both sets, the Evaluator should provide general statements on the evaluation issues as listed under sub-section 4.1 above. Furthermore in responding to the questions below, the Evaluator must appropriately reflect the different contexts of the two countries.

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1. **General, generic questions**: These are based on the mandatory evaluation issues as specified under sub-section 4.1. The questions should be further tailored to the specific country context(s) by the Evaluator, and finally agreed with the Steering Group in the inception phase:

    a. What was the Relevance of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period? Issues to consider are e.g. quality of needs assessments, capacity to adapt ECHO's response to shifting needs, fit between HIPs and needs assessments, fit between projects funded and HIPs; fit between needs assessments and projects funded;

    b. What was the Coherence of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period? Issues to consider are e.g. alignment with relevant Commission policies in the humanitarian field;

    c. What was the EU Added Value of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period? Issues to consider are e.g. how ECHO has drawn on its specific role and mandate to create a specific EU added value;

    d. What was the Effectiveness of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period? Issues to consider are e.g. how successfully ECHO has implemented its strategy in the two countries, in terms of achieving required outputs and outcomes and in terms of its impact on the humanitarian response in general.

    e. What was the Efficiency of ECHO actions in the two countries during the evaluation period? Issues to consider are e.g. use of resources, management, monitoring processes, drawing on lessons learned and good practices in funding allocations, and the impact of ECHO's funding cycle on partners' response capacity and administrative tasks.

    f. What was the Sustainability of ECHO's actions in the two countries during the evaluation period? Issues to consider are: sustainability of ECHO's support to the provision of services in camp settings, ECHO support to LRRD and Resilience, and in general to positive, lasting effects.

2. **Thematic questions addressing specific information needs**: These questions could, as appropriate, be fitted into the structure of the general questions above.

    a. To what extent has ECHO taken into account the respect and adherence to humanitarian principles to guide its operational decisions regarding funding in the two countries?

    b. To what extent has ECHO's support targeted the people most at risk affected by crises in the two countries? To what extent has ECHO's support taken into account an assessment of vulnerability, including protection risks analysis?

    c. To what extent has ECHO's support to humanitarian assistance in the fields of food assistance, emergency medical and nutrition aid, WASH, shelter and NFIs been successful?

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d. To what extent has ECHO's support to the coordination of humanitarian assistance and for logistical operations supporting humanitarian assistance contributed to improving the quality of humanitarian operations?

e. How effective has ECHO been in terms of Humanitarian Advocacy (on issues like coordination, access, defending principled humanitarian space, IHL violations)?

f. To what extent has ECHO's participation in humanitarian leadership inside and outside the UN system been successful?

g. In cases when Remote Management is being used, to what extent does this follow existing guidance documents and good practice, and how successful is it?

4.3. OTHER TASKS UNDER THE ASSIGNMENT

The Contractor should, mainly on the basis of the research carried out for responding to the evaluation questions:

- Identify the **main lessons learnt** in the different sectors covered by the ECHO intervention (Protection, Shelter/NFIs, Water and Sanitation, Health, Food Assistance, Multi-sectoral assistance and coordination). What has worked or not and what were the major critical success factors? How can the identification and documentation of good practices be further improved?

- At a general level, identify the main factors **limiting the success of the projects** funded in the countries over the period covered by the evaluation.

- Reconstruct the **intervention logic** for the ECHO-funded actions in South Sudan and in Sudan;

- Provide a statement about the **validity of the evaluation results**, i.e. to what extent it has been possible to provide reliable statements on all essential aspects of the intervention examined. Issues to be referred to may include scoping of the evaluation exercise, availability of data, unexpected problems encountered in the evaluation process, proportionality between budget and objectives of the assignment, etc.;

- Make a proposal for the **dissemination** of the evaluation results;

- Provide an **abstract** of the evaluation of no more than 200 words.

5. METHODOLOGY AND PROJECT PHASES

In their offer, the bidders must describe in methodological approach they propose in order to address the evaluation questions listed above, as well as the other tasks.

To the extent possible the methodology should promote the participation in the evaluation exercise of all actors concerned, including beneficiaries and local communities when relevant and feasible.

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The methodological approach will be refined with, and validated by, the Commission during the desk phase.

Deliverables

Within the framework of the present evaluation, the contractors will produce the following deliverables, in accordance with the schedule defined in this chapter:

1. Inception Report
2. Desk Report
3. Field Report
4. Final Report + one annexe per country

Meetings

It is expected that the contractor participate in four meetings in Brussels with the evaluation Steering Group, as specified below. For these meetings **minutes should be drafted by the contractor**, to be agreed among the participants.

5.1. INCEPTION PHASE

The inception phase starts from the moment the contract is signed. During the inception phase the evaluation team will analyse the intervention logic on the basis of official documents and propose the evaluation questions and judgment criteria. The team then will specify the indicators, and develop the final definition of the methodology and the schedule for the field visits.

Kick-off meeting

A kick-off meeting will be convened as soon as possible after the signature of the contract. The consultants will present their understanding of the Terms of Reference. The evaluation questions, either from the ToR or proposed by the evaluation team will be discussed as well as an indicative methodological design. Access to informants and to documents, as well as foreseeable difficulties will be considered.

Inception report

The Inception Report will be produced after the kick-off meeting and will contain, at a minimum, the following elements:

- a finalised evaluation framework covering all evaluation questions;

- an intervention logic;

- a description of the methodology for data collection and analysis, including the chain of reasoning for responding to the evaluation questions, and indicating limitations;

- draft questionnaires and interview guides; and

- a final detailed work plan and timetable.

Inception meeting

One week after the submission of the Inception report the evaluation team will present its overall approach in the Inception Meeting, which will take place in Brussels at DG ECHO headquarters with the relevant Commission staff. The Inception report will be discussed and the evaluation team will have the possibility to ask for additional information and/or clarification on the requirements of the ToR, as well as to obtain relevant security instructions and possibly technical support relative to the execution of the tasks. The Inception Report will be revised if needed according to the mutually agreed amendments and approved by the Commission.

5.2. DESK PHASE

The **Desk Phase** comprises:

- a first analysis of available data in relation to the evaluation questions; partial answers to the evaluation questions will be provided

- limitations of the evaluation methods used will be pointed out, biases and risks, as well as problems to be solved

- meetings with Commission staff, other donors, organisations and partners, as appropriate;

- a final approach and schedule for the field missions.

The Desk Report will include:

- A short description of the data collection work implemented, including the meetings, reviews and interviews conducted;

- The first elements of answers to the evaluation questions when available;

- The initial assumptions concerning the evaluation questions, to be tested during the Field Phase, on the basis of the preliminary analysis carried out during the desk phase;

- Progress of data gathering; a conclusion on the quality of data collected so far, and whether remedial actions will be required in the next phase to close information gaps; identification of data to be collected in the field; an outline for the field visit including a preliminary schedule and list of partners, stakeholders and projects to be visited, explaining criteria used for choosing the sample of projects;

- Methodological tools to be used in the field phase, describing how data should be cross-checked, including any possible limitations;

- A discussion of possible issues identified during the Desk Phase that had not been previously discussed with the Commission. The Commission will consider these issues and decide on whether they merit further consideration in the light of the evaluation.

Desk meeting

One week after a desk report is received a meeting will be organized in Brussels to present the desk report and discuss it with the Steering Committee. A video conference with the field office could be envisaged. The evaluator will duly consider all comments from the Steering Committee, as a condition for approval. In case of disagreement, the evaluator will provide an argumented reply explaining why a certain comment cannot be accepted.

5.3. FIELD PHASE

Following the formal approval of the Desk Report, the evaluation team shall undertake **field visits to South Sudan and Sudan**.

The details of the field missions will be discussed and agreed with the Commission during the inception meeting, and will be refined in the inception and desk reports.

The travel and accommodation arrangements, the organisation of meetings, and the securing of visas will remain the sole responsibility of the contractor.

If, during the Field Phase, any significant change from the agreed methodology or scheduled work plan is considered necessary, this will be explained to and agreed with DG ECHO Evaluation Sector, in consultation with the steering group.

At the end of the mission the consultants should meet with the Delegation, DG ECHO's experts and DG ECHO's partners for discussion of observations arising from the evaluation. The evaluation team is required to share their findings with the NGOs/IOs concerned to allow them to comment upon. The purpose is to promote dialogue, mutual learning and ownership and to build capacity of the Commission's partners.

At the end of each field trip the team leader should ensure that a **Field Report** is drawn up and transmitted to DG ECHO Evaluation Sector. The Field Report will describe briefly the data collection activities implemented, with special mentioning of those of a participatory nature (including in annex the list of sites and persons visited, minutes from the focus groups if organized, the minutes of the workshop and any other relevant technical documents); a brief description of the situation found; as well as any relevant items identified during the field visit, which could have an influence in the methodology or the conclusions of the evaluation. *N.B.: the Field Report is not an evaluation as such, and should not include overall conclusions and recommendations, neither a collection of project evaluations. It is a working document to report on the fieldwork and identify any particular issues to be tackled during the synthesis phase (e.g. remedial actions related to the methodological approach, etc.).*

A meeting will be organized in Brussels to present the Field Report and discuss it with the Steering Committee. A video conference with the field office may be organised. The evaluator will duly consider all comments from the Steering Committee, as a condition for approval. In case of disagreement, the evaluator will provide an argumented reply explaining why a certain comment cannot be accepted. In case of substantial disagreements, the evaluator may be called for another meeting in Brussels to further discuss the subject of disagreement. The expenses for such a meeting will be covered by the existing budget of the Specific Contract.

5.4. SYNTHESIS PHASE

The Draft Final Report should deliver the results of all tasks covered by these Terms of Reference, and must be clear enough for any potential reader to understand.

As a reminder, even if the evaluation will assess individual projects, conclusions and recommendations must be drafted with a view to the overall evaluation of the Commission's intervention in the area concerned, and will be based on the overall information collected during the evaluation process.

The structure of the report should follow a broad classification into three parts:

- **Executive Summary**: It sets out, in no more than 5 pages, a summary of the evaluation's main conclusions and the main evidence supporting.
- **Main body**: The main report must be limited to 50 pages and present, in full, the results of the analyses and conclusions arising from the evaluation. It must also contain a description of the subject evaluated, the context of the evaluation, and the methodology used; and
- **Annexes**: These must collate the technical details of the evaluation, and must include the Terms of Reference, questionnaire templates, interview guides, any additional tables or graphics, and references and a full quotation of all sources.

Draft Report Meeting

A **meeting** will be organised in Brussels after the submission of the first draft final report. The evaluator will make a PowerPoint presentation to the Steering Committee on the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. The date for the meeting will be agreed between the Steering Committee and the evaluator. The Steering Committee will provide comments to the draft final report. The comments should be taken into account in the final report.

While finalising the report and its annexes, the evaluators will always highlight changes (using track changes) and modifications introduced as resulting from the meeting and the comments received from DG ECHO Evaluation Sector.

In case of disagreement, the evaluator will provide an argumented reply explaining why a certain comment cannot be accepted. In case of substantial disagreements, the evaluator may be called for another meeting in Brussels to further discuss the subject of disagreement. The expenses for such a meeting will be covered by the existing budget of the Specific Contract.

Final Report

On the basis of the comments made by the Steering Committee, the evaluator shall make appropriate amendments, insofar as these do not interfere with the independence of the evaluator in respect of the conclusions they have reached and the recommendations made. The Executive Summary should be translated into **French and Arabic** by a professional translator, once it has been approved by the Steering Committee.

The Final Report should be accompanied by a PowerPoint presentation in electronic form, covering the main conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. The evaluator may be

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requested to present the evaluation results once in Brussels to DG ECHO's staff and / or stakeholders.

For a further detailed description of the format required for the Final Report (incl. EU Bookshop requirements), see Annex.

5.5. DISSEMINATION AND FOLLOW-UP PHASE

The evaluation report is an important working tool for DG ECHO, and once finalised it will be published in the public domain on the Internet. Its use is intended for DG ECHO's operational and policy staff, EU Member States and citizens, and other international and national actors. This evaluation report is also a legal obligation and as such will be transmitted to the European Parliament and the Council.

Following the approval of the Final Report, DG ECHO will proceed with the dissemination and follow-up of the results of the evaluation.

6. MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION

The Evaluation Sector of DG ECHO is responsible for the management and the monitoring of the evaluation, in consultation with the Unit(s) responsible for the evaluation subject. The DG ECHO Evaluation Sector, and in particular the internal manager assigned to the evaluation, should therefore always be kept informed and consulted by the evaluator and copied on all correspondence with other DG ECHO staff.

The DG ECHO Evaluation manager is the contact person for the evaluator and shall assist the team during their mission in tasks such as providing documents and facilitating contacts.

A Steering Committee, made up of Commission staff involved in the activity evaluated, will provide general assistance to and feedback on the evaluation exercise, and discuss the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.

7. EVALUATION TEAM

This evaluation will be carried out by a team with experience both in the humanitarian field, (particularly food assistance, emergency health and nutrition) and in the evaluation of humanitarian aid. If necessary, the experts must agree to work in high-risk areas. It is therefore recommended that the team include national experts whenever possible.

8. AMOUNT OF THE CONTRACT

The maximum budget allocated to this study is **230 000 €**.

9. TIMETABLE

The duration of the assignment is **8 months**.

The evaluation starts after the contract has been signed by both parties, and no expenses may be incurred before that. The main part of the existing relevant documents will be provided after the signature of the contract.

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In their offer, the bidders shall provide an indicative schedule based on the following table:

Indicative timing	Report	Meeting
T+1 week		Kick-off
T+4 weeks	Draft Inception Report	
T+5 weeks		Inception meeting
T+11 weeks	Draft Desk Report	
T+12 weeks		Desk Report meeting
T+19 weeks	Draft Field Report	
T+21 weeks		Field Report meeting
T+26 weeks	Draft Final Report	
T+29 weeks		Draft Final Report meeting
T+ 32 weeks	Final Report	

10. CONTENT OF THE OFFER

The administrative part of the bidder's offer must include:

1. The tender submission form (annex D to the model specific contract);

2. A signed Experts' declaration of availability, absence of conflict of interest and not being in a situation of exclusion (annex F to the model specific contract)

The technical part of the bidder's offer should be presented in a maximum of **30 pages**, and must include:

1. A description of the overall understanding of the Terms of Reference, the evaluation questions and the tasks covered by the contract;

2. The methodology the bidder intends to apply for this evaluation for each of the phases involved;

3. A description of the distribution of tasks in the team, including an indicative quantification of the work for each expert in terms of person/days;

4. A detailed proposed timetable for its implementation with the total number of days needed for each of the phases (Desk, Field and Synthesis).

5. The CVs of each of the experts proposed.

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The <u>financial part</u> of the offer must include the proposed total budget in Euros, taking due account of the maximum amount for this evaluation as defined in chapter 7 of this Terms of Reference. The price must be expressed as a lump sum for the whole of the services provided.

11. AWARD

The contract will be awarded to the tender offering the best value for money on the basis of the following criteria:

Quality criteria

N°	Qualitative Award criteria	Weighting (max. points)
1.	Understanding of the terms of reference and the aim of the services to be provided	10
2.	Methodology for structuring, data collection and analysis	40
3.	Organization of tasks and team, timetable	10
4.	Appropriateness of the team on the basis of the expertise proposed	40
	Total	100

Only those tenders with a mark higher than 50% of the maximum number of points for each quality criteria, and higher than 70% for the overall maximum number of points, will be considered for the award of the contract.

Price

For the purpose of the financial evaluation of the offers, the Commission will use the lump sum price as submitted in the financial offer of the tenderer.

Award of the contract

The contract will be awarded to the tender achieving the highest score obtained by applying the following formula:

Score for tender X	=	$\dfrac{\text{Cheapest price}}{\text{Price of tender X}}$	*	total quality score (out of 100) for all criteria of tender X

ANNEX: THE FINAL REPORT

By commissioning an independent evaluation and/or review DG ECHO expects to obtain an objective, critical, easy to read and transparent analysis of its interventions. This analysis should contain the information needed by the Commission for management, policy-making and accountability. It should also include operational, realistic recommendations at operational and/or strategic level. Above all, the report should be a document that can function as a learning tool. Therefore, while writing it, the evaluators should always bear in mind why the report is done, for whom, and how the results will be used.

To each evaluation question quoted in the report the consultant will provide an evidence-based, reasoned answer. Conclusions[7] will be provided pointing out strengths and weaknesses of the evaluated intervention, with special attention paid to the intended and unintended results. Furthermore, the report is a working tool of value to DG ECHO only as long as it is feasible and pragmatic, keeping in mind DG ECHO's mandate constraints and it clearly reflects the evaluator's independent view. DG ECHO's concern is to respect this independence.

The evaluation methods should be clearly outlined in the report and their appropriateness, focus and users should be explained pointing out strengths and weaknesses of the methods. The report should briefly outline the nature (e.g. external or mixed) and composition of the team (e.g. sectoral expertise, local knowledge, gender balance) and its appropriateness for the evaluation. It should also briefly outline the evaluators' biases and/or constraints that might have affected the evaluation and how these have been counteracted (past experiences, background, etc.).

The report shall be written in a straightforward manner in English with an Executive Summary at the beginning of the document. Final editing shall be provided by the contractor. The report should be in the font Times Roman 12, have single line spacing and be justified.

The final report should contain an Executive Summary of maximum **5 pages** and technical and/or other annexes as necessary.

This format should be strictly adhered to:

- *Cover page* (a template is provided at the end of this annex)
  – title of the evaluation report;
  – date of the evaluation;
  – name of the contracted company;
  – disclaimer in the sense that "The opinions expressed in this document represent the views of the authors, which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission."

- *Table of contents*

- *List of Abbreviations and Acronyms*

- *Executive Summary*
  A clearly drafted, up to-the-point and free-standing **Executive Summary** is an essential element. It should focus on the key purpose of the evaluation, outline the main points of the analysis, and contain a **matrix** made of two columns clearly indicating the main conclusions and specific recommendations. Cross-references should be made to the corresponding page or paragraph numbers in the main text. The Executive Summary will be published also on DG ECHO website. The evaluation team should take this into account when drafting this part of the report.

- *Main body of the report*
  The report should include at least a description of
  • the purpose and scope of the evaluation;

---

[7] A conclusion draws on data collection and analyses undertaken, through a transparent chain of arguments. (OECD Glossary of Key terms in Evaluation and results based management)

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- the conduct of the evaluation, including of the methodology used;
- the limitations and challenges occurred during the process;
- the evidence found;
- the analysis carried out;
- the conclusions drawn in the form of reasoned answers to each of the evaluation questions provided in the ToR. The questions must be quoted fully in the report, followed by an evidence-based answer. Conclusions should be fully substantiated, and derive in a logical manner from the data collection and analysis carried out during the evaluation process;
- the recommendations for the future. Recommendations should be clearly linked to the findings and based on conclusions. They should be as realistic, operational and pragmatic as possible; they should take careful account of the circumstances currently prevailing in the context of the implementation of the humanitarian activities, DG ECHO's mandate and of the resources available to implement it both locally and at the Commission level. Recommendations should be prioritised, directed at specific users and where appropriate include an indicative timeframe.

All possible **confidential information** shall be presented in a **separate annex.**

While finalising the report and its annexes, the evaluators will always highlight changes (using track changes) and modifications introduced as resulting from the meeting and the comments received from DG ECHO Evaluation Sector.

The final report should be sent also by email in three separate documents in PDF format each containing: the Executive Summary, the Report without its annexes (also removed from the table of contents) and the Report with its annexes.

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NAME AND LOGO OF THE CONSULTING COMPANY

(OPTIONAL INSERTION OF PICTURE/DRAWING/MAP)

TITLE OF THE EVALUATION REPORT;
DATE OF THE EVALUATION;

This report was commissioned by the European Commission.
The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' point of view which is not necessarily shared
by the European Commission or by the authorities of the concerned countries.

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Publications Office

DOI:XXXXXXXXXX

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Annex B - Methodology Details

The point of departure for the development of the methodology for this evaluation was the six generic and seven thematic evaluation questions proposed in ToR covering six evaluation criteria: Relevance, Coherence, EU Added Value, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability.

An evaluation matrix was developed based on the evaluation questions. The matrix provided overall guidance for the evaluation and ensured a systematic approach. For each evaluation question one or more judgement criteria (a total of 21) were developed; the sub-questions in turn had a number of indicators (up to five). For each indicator sources of information were identified along with the different tools used to extract the information. The tools included both quantitative (mainly through document analysis and online questionnaire) and qualitative (mainly through document analysis, interviews and observations) tools (see the section below for details). The different tools applied were used to triangulate and validate data in order to provide as accurate a picture of ECHO support as possible.

The evaluation consisted of four main phases:

i) Inception phase with analysis of the intervention logic and development of the evaluation matrix with judgment criteria and indicators, and the methodology;

ii) Desk phase with detailed analysis of documents, including FichOps, initial meetings with ECHO HQ staff, and preparation for the field missions;

iii) Field phase with collection of data from Sudan and South Sudan;

iv) Synthesis phase with synthesis of the information obtained from the previous phases of the evaluation, resulting in the development of this report.

The evaluation was conducted by a team of three international experts and two national experts, the latter were mainly involved in the field phase. All the consultants were well-versed in evaluation or implementation of humanitarian assistance from the Sudans or similar contexts. The international consultants were generalists and focused on different sectoral aspects of the ECHO support. The national experts provided background/context-specific information with the added value of speaking the local languages. One of the national consultants was female.

Evaluation Tools

The evaluation tools consisted of a document review, a portfolio analysis, a FichOps review, semi-structured interviews, observations and an online questionnaire as described in more detail below.

Document Review

In order to analyse the overall situation in the two countries, the specific context, the EC and ECHO support, and other organisations' support, a number of documents were reviewed by the evaluation team. These included the Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs), policy guidelines, humanitarian appeals, situation analysis, etc.

Portfolio Analysis

ECHO provided the evaluation team with a copy of an Excel spreadsheet that contained key data on the projects implemented between 2011 and 2015, e.g. sector, location, partner, budget size, etc. This spreadsheet was used for an overall analysis of the support provided over the years.

FichOps Review

An initial sample of supported projects was selected for a more detailed analysis. The projects were selected purposely with a view to ensure that all sectors, different geographical locations, different sizes (in terms of budget) and different types of partners (INGO or UN) were represented.

These projects were complemented with projects selected based on a skimming of all relevant projects (247) implemented over the five-year period for any special issues such as good or poor performance, innovation, remote management, or other special or rare elements. The skimming process ensured a comprehensive overview and provided a full picture of the diversity of the supported ECHO Projects.

A total of 56 projects were reviewed in detail with a full list of the selected projects included in Annex C.

Semi-structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a wide range of informants. Included were:

- Former and present ECHO staff at HQ, regional and country level;
- Implementing partners' staff (UN and NGOs);
- Other international NGO (INGO) staff;
- EC staff;
- Other donors;
- IFRC/ICRC staff;
- UN agencies, including cluster leads;
- National and local authorities officers;
- Beneficiaries.

Face-to-face interviews were preferred as they facilitate the establishment of a good rapport with the interviewees. However, when face-to-face interviews were not feasible due to the inaccessibility of the interviewees or security constraints, telephone or Skype interviews were conducted. Such interviews are not as easy to conduct as face-to-face interviews, but they serve the purpose and most interviewees were found to be very free and answered openly, especially when it was made clear it was ECHO that was being evaluated and not themselves.

In some locations the evaluation team was able to interview groups of beneficiaries on an ad-hoc basis. Although strictly speaking not focus group discussions as such, the group discussions were conducted in a similarly participatory manner with a focus on the relevance and quality of the services provided to beneficiaries, based on their specific needs and perceptions. Such discussions enabled the evaluators to get a more in-depth understanding of how activities were conceived and implemented, and their relevance for the intended beneficiaries/target population at country level.

The interviews were conducted using interview guidelines. The guidelines served as a reminder of the interview topics and ensured conformity when interviews were conducted by different evaluation team members. Not all questions were phrased exactly as in the guidelines and the questions asked were adapted to the specific interview, including the knowledge and educational background of the interviewee. The sequence of the questions also varied according to the flow of the interview. Different interview guidelines were developed for different categories of interviewees. The interview guidelines are included in Annex D.

Just over 100 interviews were conducted with a total of almost 200 people during the course of the evaluation. Interviewees were promised confidentiality and the list of interviewees is thus not included here.

Observations

Direct observations at project sites were used to obtain first-hand independent data on the quality of the facilities constructed and services provided to beneficiaries, e.g. water supply facilities. Additionally, observations were used to validate information on the use and maintenance of facilities. The checklists used for observations are included in Annex E.

Online Questionnaire

In order to capture the opinions and perceptions of partner staff that are no longer working in the two countries or were working at headquarters, an online questionnaire with 26 questions was distributed to email addresses extracted from the HOPE database. The questionnaire was purposely kept simple and used multiple-choice questions, contributing to a reasonable response rate: The questionnaire was sent to 315 email addresses, of which 95 were no longer in use, leaving 220 potential respondents. Most of the email addresses were likely to be from HQ based partner staff. Of these 220, 79 responded to at least one question and 54 to at least two questions. Using the 54 responses as the basis, a response rate of 24% can be calculated. The questionnaire is included in Annex F.

Field Missions

The evaluation included two field missions: one to Sudan from April 30 to May 19 and one to South Sudan from June 13 to June 24. During the field missions more than 180 people were interviewed with project visits to South Darfur (Nyala), Upper Nile (Maban and Malakal), Unity (Bentiu), and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil).

Ideally, the field missions should also visit projects dating back to the beginning of the period covered by the evaluation. However, in highly volatile context such as the Sudans, locating beneficiaries or implementing partner staff that would be able to recall exactly what was done and where it was done, would be a difficult task. The site visits instead focused on on-going or recently completed projects assuming that these would provide a good-enough proxy also for past projects. The rationale for the selection of project sites to visit was to ensure that as many different partners implementing different types of projects (by sector) with both large and small contract amounts were visited in different geographical areas. An initial analysis of relevant geographical areas to visit was refined by identifying areas with a larger number of partners available, which offset the fact that the time allocated for the field visits was limited and that there were logistical constraints in the form of means of traveling, travel permits and security concerns. The advice of ECHO staff was also taken into consideration during the selection process as they had a deeper knowledge of the on-going and recent projects. The locations for the project visits within the areas selected were identified in collaboration with the implementing partners, taking into consideration logistical and security constraints.

Having a plan for the areas to visit was one thing, another was to ensure its execution: In Sudan, the process of obtaining a travel permit for the international consultants was only partially successful to the extent that only the travel permit for the team leader was granted, and when it was granted, there were no flights available for the trip to South Darfur. The evaluation team therefore decided to interview as many field-based partner staff members from South Darfur as possible through Skype and telephone - field-based partner staff that in the meantime (while the evaluation team waited for travel permits) had travelled to Khartoum or were stuck in Khartoum due to missing travel permits, were interviewed face-to-face in Khartoum. The national consultant was dispatched to Darfur immediately after the international consultants' departure. In South Sudan, the evaluation team experienced first-hand how difficult movements

can be in the rainy season: The flights to Maban and Bentiu were postponed by a day, giving less time in Maban than anticipated. The return flight from Bentiu on the other hand was postponed by 2 days, providing an opportunity to conduct more interviews in Bentiu than planned. Due to security concerns, the national consultant in South Sudan was only able to travel to Northern Bahr el Ghazal.

The field missions were concluded with debriefings with partners at ECHO country offices for further validation of preliminary findings.

Annex C - List of Projects Selected for FichOps Review

Table 2: Details of Projects Selected for FichOps Review

Agreement ID	HIP	Country	Primary Aid type	Contract amount	Size	Partner	UN / NGO / IO	Phase[28]	Comment
-AF/BUD/2012/91007	-AF/BUD/2012/91000	SDN	Multi-sectoral	6,000,000	Large	CICR-CH	IO	0	
-AF/BUD/2012/91010	-AF/BUD/2012/91000	SSD	Food	28,000,000	Large	WFP-IT	UN	1	
-AF/BUD/2012/91037	-AF/BUD/2012/91000	SSD	Protection	15,000,000	Large	UNHCR-CH	UN	1	
-AF/BUD/2012/91006	-AF/BUD/2012/91000	SSD	Nutrition, therapeutic or supp. feeding	2,800,000	Medium	STC-UK	NGO	0	
-AF/BUD/2012/91002	-AF/BUD/2012/91000	SSD	Water / Sanitation	2,693,900	Medium	MEDAIR-CH	NGO	1	
-AF/BUD/2012/91044	-AF/BUD/2012/91000	SSD	Water / Sanitation	5,000,000	Medium	UNICEF-US	UN	0	
-AF/BUD/2012/91046	-AF/BUD/2012/91000	SDN	Health and Medical	775,000	Small	WHO	UN	0	
-AF/BUD/2012/91030	-AF/BUD/2012/91000	SDN	Water / Sanitation	850,000	Small	CARE-UK	NGO	1	
-AF/BUD/2013/91016	-AF/BUD/2013/91000	SDN	Food	20,000,000	Large	WFP-IT	UN	1	
-AF/BUD/2013/91013	-AF/BUD/2013/91000	SSD	Demining	1,500,000	Medium	UNMAS-US	UN	0	
-AF/BUD/2013/91026	-AF/BUD/2013/91000	SSD	Health and Medical	2,000,000	Medium	CICR-CH	IO	0	
-AF/BUD/2013/91018	-AF/BUD/2013/91000	SSD	Nutrition, therapeutic or supp. feeding	2,000,000	Medium	ACF-ES	NGO	3	

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[28] Phase 0 indicates that the project is not a multi-phase project, other numbers does not indicate the total number of phases, only what phase the selected project is.

Agreement ID	HIP	Country	Primary Aid type	Contract amount	Size	Partner	UN / NGO / IO	Phase[28]	Comment
-AF/BUD/2013/91040	-AF/BUD/2013/91000	SSD	Protection	130,000	Small	NRC-NO	NGO	0	
-AF/BUD/2013/91027	-AF/BUD/2013/91000	SDN	Shelter	200,000	Small	UNHCR-CH	UN	2	
-AF/BUD/2013/91022	-AF/BUD/2013/91000	SDN	Water / Sanitation	900,000	Small	COOPI-IT	NGO	3	
-AF/BUD/2014/91001	-AF/BUD/2014/91000	SSD	Shelter	11,230,000	Large	IOM-CH	IO	2	
-AF/BUD/2014/91026	-AF/BUD/2014/91000	SSD	Disaster preparedness	2,945,000	Medium	SI-FR	NGO	3	
-AF/BUD/2014/91006	-AF/BUD/2014/91000	SSD	Health and Medical	2,000,000	Medium	MSF-CH	NGO	0	
-AF/BUD/2014/91024	-AF/BUD/2014/91000	SDN	Support to special operations	3,000,000	Medium	WFP-IT	UN	3	
-AF/BUD/2014/91036	-AF/BUD/2014/91000	SSD	Health and Nutrition	450,000	Small	COSV-IT	NGO	0	
-AF/BUD/2014/91038	-AF/BUD/2014/91000	SDN	Multi-sectoral	400,000	Small	CARE-UK	NGO	3	
-AF/BUD/2015/91022	-AF/BUD/2015/91000	SSD	Health and Medical	18,000,000	Large	CICR-CH	IO	2	
-AF/BUD/2015/91033	-AF/BUD/2015/91000	SDN	Nutrition, therapeutic or supp. feeding	14,000,000	Large	WFP-IT	UN	3	
-AF/BUD/2015/91015	-AF/BUD/2015/91000	SDN	Multi-sectoral	1,600,000	Medium	TEARFUND-UK	NGO	4	
-AF/BUD/2015/91037	-AF/BUD/2015/91000	SDN	Coordination	800,000	Small	OCHA-CH	UN	4	
-AF/BUD/2015/91036	-AF/BUD/2015/91000	SSD	Coordination	1,000,000	Small	OCHA-CH	UN	2	
-AF/BUD/2015/91025	-AF/BUD/2015/91000	SSD	Disaster preparedness	1,000,000	Small	WHO	UN	4	
-AF/BUD/2015/91017	-AF/BUD/2015/91000	SDN	Multi-sectoral	900,000	Small	CARE-UK	NGO	4	
-AF/BUD/2015/91013	-AF/BUD/2015/91000	SDN	Water / Sanitation	350,000	Small	IR-UK	NGO	0	

Agreement ID	HIP	Country	Primary Aid type	Contract amount	Size	Partner	UN / NGO / IO	Phase[28]	Comment
SDN/BUD/2011/91016	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SDN/SSD	Food	58,000,000	Large	WFP-IT	UN	1	
SDN/BUD/2011/91051	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SDN	Support to special operations	6,300,000	Large	WFP-IT	UN	1	
SDN/BUD/2011/91053	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SSD	Food	1,200,000	Medium	MCE-UK	NGO	0	
SDN/BUD/2011/91009	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SSD	Health and Medical	1,200,000	Medium	GOAL-IR	NGO	0	
SDN/BUD/2011/91058	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SSD	Health and Medical	1,500,000	Medium	MSF-BE	NGO	1	
SDN/BUD/2011/91027	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SDN	Health and Medical	2,110,000	Medium	MERLIN-UK	NGO	1	
SDN/BUD/2011/91025	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SDN	Water / Sanitation	1,300,000	Medium	COOPI-IT	NGO	1	
SDN/BUD/2011/91010	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SSD	Water / Sanitation	2,250,000	Medium	OXFAM-UK	NGO	1	
SDN/BUD/2011/91047	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SDN	Water / Sanitation	3,500,000	Medium	UNICEF-US	UN	0	
SDN/BUD/2011/91049	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SSD	Water / Sanitation	3,600,000	Medium	UNICEF-US	UN	0	
SDN/BUD/2011/91026	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SDN	Health and Medical	300,000	Small	RI-UK	NGO	0	
SDN/BUD/2011/91031	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SSD	Water / Sanitation	300,000	Small	CAFOD-UK	NGO	0	
SSD/EDF/2014/01001	SSD/EDF/2014/01000	SSD	Coordination	3,000,000	Medium	UNOPS-US	UN	0	
SSD/EDF/2014/01004	SSD/EDF/2014/01000	SSD	Health and Medical	3,000,000	Medium	MSF-NL	NGO	1	
SSD/EDF/2014/01009	SSD/EDF/2014/01000	SSD	Multi-sectoral	3,650,000	Medium	ACTED-FR	NGO	1	
Additional project selected based on skimming									
-AF/BUD/2012/91049	-AF/BUD/2012/91000	SDN/SSD	Food	1,200,000	Medium	MCE-UK	NGO	0	Cash based
-AF/BUD/2013/91027	AF/BUD/2013/91000	SDN	Shelter	200,000	Small	UNHCR	UN	2	In order to add an additional shelter project

Agreement ID	HIP	Country	Primary Aid type	Contract amount	Size	Partner	UN / NGO / IO	Phase[28]	Comment
-AF/BUD/2014/91010	-AF/BUD/2014/91000	SSD	Multi-sectoral	14,100,000	Large	UNICEF-US	UN	1	RRM (rapid response mechanism) and very expensive
-AF/BUD/2014/91011	-AF/BUD/2014/91000	SSD	Multi-sectoral	1,550,000	Medium	DRC-DK	NGO	3	Close partner for protection. Present in Unity and Upper Nile
-AF/BUD/2014/91013	-AF/BUD/2014/91000	SDN	Health and Nutrition	1,520,000	Medium	IMC-UK	NGO	3	Some element of remote management
-AF/BUD/2014/91014	-AF/BUD/2014/91000	SDN	Health and Medical	500,000	Small	GOAL-IR	NGO	0	Include as Red Cross example and in North Darfur where field work
-AF/BUD/2014/91031	-AF/BUD/2014/91000	SDN	Health and Nutrition	500,000	Small	CROIX-ROUGE-DE	IO	3	Transition
-AF/BUD/2015/91010	-AF/BUD/2015/91000	SSD	Protection	3,500,000	Medium	UNHCR-CH	UN	2	Appeared to be a weaker partner.
-AF/BUD/2015/91016	-AF/BUD/2015/91016	SDN	Disaster preparedness	970,000	Small	TRIANGLE-FR	NGO	0	DRR
-AF/BUD/2015/91024	-AF/BUD/2015/91000	SSD	Coordination	6,500,000	Medium	WFP-IT	UN	2	Latest logistics project
SDN/BUD/2011/91053	SDN/BUD/2011/91000	SSD	Food	1,200,000	Medium	MCE-UK	NGO	0	Market approach

Annex D - Interview Guidelines

ECHO staff

Introduction: *confidentiality.*

What do you think of the quality of the IAFs?

What do you think of the frequency of the changes to the HIPs?

Is there sufficient flexibility to adjust projects to changing needs, how, why, why not

Did ECHO support sectors or geographical areas that were not sufficiently covered by other actors? Why not?

Were vulnerability assessments or protection risk analysis a requirement for funding, why, why not?

Where ECHO humanitarian polices and guidelines used, why not, what were the results?

What has ECHO done to ensure availability of skilled partners?

How do you rate the adequacy of the human resources of the partners, why?

How do you see ECHO's support to coordination, what else/more could have been done?

How do you rate ECHO's support to the cluster system, what else/more could have been done? What was the result?

How do you rate ECHO's support to humanitarian leadership, why?

How do you rate ECHO's support to the IASC transformative agenda, what else/more could have been done?

How do you see ECHO's support to logistics, what else/more could have been done?

Were there opportunities for alignment with EC or other programmes that should have been considered? How? Which? Why? Why not?

Did ECHO contribute to uphold humanitarian principles? How? What was the result.

Did ECHO succeed in achieving civil protection due to its advocacy efforts? How? Why not?

Did ECHO contribute to uphold the humanitarian space? How? Why not? What was the results, any examples of statements etc.?

Were expected outputs and outcomes of projects achieved? Why not?

What was the overall impact of ECHO support/presence?

How was the quality of ECHO supported projects' outputs?

How was the quality of ECHO management of funding? Was it timely, efficient? Why not?

Did IPs' have the capacity to implement on time? Why not?

Did monitoring by ECHO increase project efficiency? How? Why not?

Is a system for storing lessons learnt and good practices in place? How? Why not?

Are lessons learned and good practices used in project implementation? How? Why? Why not?

Did the ECHO funding cycles influence the IPs' response capacity? How did it influence their administrative tasks?

Were the services provided in camps (with ECHO support) available in the longer-term as well? Which? How? Why? Why not?

How was sustainability ensured, why not?

Where exit strategies developed? Why not? How was the quality?

Have the ECHO-funded projects contributed to positive lasting effects? Which? How? Why? Why not?

Did the funded projects contain LRRD or Resilience components? How (timeliness, appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness)? Why not? Any successful examples

How are the resilience markers in HOPE used?

Were any ECHO-supported actions implemented that used remote management for monitoring? Which? How? Why? Why not?

Was remote management used for implementation of the ECHO projects? What guidelines were used,? How? Why not?

Any other comments

Partner staff

Introduction: What it is about (not an evaluation of your organization but of the ECHO response); Confidentiality.

Do ECHO's needs' assessments correspond with the actual needs as you see them, with other actors' (e.g. the UN) needs' assessments? Why? Why not?

What do you think of the frequency of the changes to the HIPs?

Is there sufficient flexibility to adjust projects to changing needs, why not?

What were the triggers for your organisation to change approach/beneficiaries during implementation?

Did ECHO support sectors or geographical areas that were not sufficiently covered by other actors? Why not?

What is your opinion on the ECHO needs assessments as presented in the HIPs, are the right beneficiaries targeted, the right geographical locations, why, why not?

Do you conduct vulnerability assessments or protection risk analysis, why, why not?

What types of needs assessment do you conduct?

Do you involve beneficiaries in needs assessments? How? Why? Why not?

Where ECHO humanitarian polices and guidelines used, why not, what were the results?

What has ECHO done to ensure availability of skilled partners?

Are your human resources adequate for implementation, why not?

How do you see ECHO's support to coordination, what else/more could have been done?

How do you rate ECHO's support to the cluster system, what else/more could have been done? What was the result?

How do you rate ECHO's support to humanitarian leadership, why?

How do you rate ECHO's support to the IASC transformative agenda, what else/more could have been done?

How do you see ECHO's support to logistics, what else/more could have been done?

Were there opportunities for alignment with EC or other programmes that should have been considered? How? Which? Why? Why not?

What did your organisation contribute to uphold humanitarian principles? How? What was the result?

Did ECHO succeed in achieving civil protection due to its advocacy efforts? How? Why not?

Did ECHO contribute to uphold the humanitarian space? How? Why not? What was the result?

Were expected outputs and outcomes of projects achieved? Why not?

What was the overall impact of ECHO support/presence?

How was the quality of ECHO supported projects' outputs?

How was the quality of ECHO management of funding? Was it timely, efficient? Why not?

Did you have the capacity to implement on time? Why not?

Did monitoring by ECHO increase project efficiency? How? Why not?

Is a system for storing lessons learnt and good practices in place? How? Why not?

Are lessons learned and good practices used in project implementation? How? Why? Why not?

Did the ECHO funding cycles influence your organisations response capacity? How did it influence your administrative tasks?

Were the services provided in camps (with ECHO support) available in the longer-term as well? Which? How? Why? Why not?

How was sustainability ensured, why not?

Where exit strategies developed, why not, how was the quality?

Have the ECHO-funded projects contributed to positive lasting effects? Which? How? Why? Why not?

Did the funded projects contain LRRD or Resilience components (timeliness, appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness)? How? Why not? Any successful examples

Was remote management used for implementation of the ECHO projects? What guidelines were used? How? Why not?

Any other comments

Community Leaders and Beneficiaries

Introduction: What it is about (not an evaluation of your organization but of the ECHO response); Confidentiality.

How many people lives here?

What type of assistance have you received?

Were there any changes to the needs? Which? Did the support change?

Are there any people here that have special needs, who, what needs, what support was provided to them?

Where you involved in assessing the needs, how?

Did everybody receive assistance equally, why not

What was achieved in your community, what were the obstacles, what else should have been done, why was it not done?

What was the overall impact of the support?

How was the quality of the outputs of the ECHO supported projects?

Was the project completed timely?

Can the support received be used also in the future? Why? Why not?

What will happen when the support ends, why?

Have the ECHO-funded projects contributed to positive lasting effects? Which? How? Why? Why not?

Did international NGO staff visit your community to check on implementation, when?

Any other comments

Donors

Introduction: What it is about (not an evaluation of your organization but of the ECHO response); Confidentiality.

Did ECHO support sectors or geographical areas that were not sufficiently covered by other actors? Why not?

What is your opinion on the ECHO needs assessments as presented in the HIPs?

How do you see ECHO's support to coordination, what else/more could have been done, what else/more could have been done?

How do you rate ECHO's support to the cluster system, what else/more could have been done? What was the result?

How do you rate ECHO's support to humanitarian leadership, why?

How do you rate ECHO's support to the IASC transformative agenda, what else/more could have been done?

How do you see ECHO's support to logistics, what else/more could have been done?

Were there opportunities for alignment with EC or other programmes that should have been considered? How? Which? Why? Why not?

Did ECHO contribute to uphold humanitarian principles? How? What was the result?

Did ECHO succeed in achieving civil protection due to its advocacy efforts? How? Why not?

Did ECHO contribute to uphold the humanitarian space? How? Why not? What was the result?

What was the overall impact of ECHO support/presence?

Any other comments

UN and others

Introduction: What it is about (not an evaluation of your organization but of the ECHO response); Confidentiality.

Did ECHO support sectors or geographical areas that were not sufficiently covered by other actors? Why not?

What is your opinion on the ECHO needs assessments as presented in the HIPs?

What has ECHO done to ensure availability of skilled partners?

How do you rate the adequacy of the human resources of the ECHO partners, why?

How do you see ECHO's support to coordination, what else/more could have been done?

How do you rate ECHO's support to the cluster system, what else/more could have been done? What was the result?

How do you rate ECHO's support to humanitarian leadership, why?

How do you rate ECHO's support to the IASC transformative agenda, what else/more could have been done?

How do you see ECHO's support to logistics, what else/more could have been done?

Were there opportunities for alignment with EC or other programmes that should have been considered? How? Which? Why? Why not?

Did ECHO contribute to uphold humanitarian principles? How? What was the result?

Did ECHO succeed in achieving civil protection due to its advocacy efforts? How? Why not?

Did ECHO contribute to uphold the humanitarian space? How? Why not? What was the result?

What was the overall impact of ECHO support/presence?

How was the quality of the outputs of the ECHO supported projects?

Were the services provided in camps (with ECHO support) available in the longer-term as well? Which? How? Why? Why not?

Any other comments

Authorities

Introduction: *Purpose of evaluation: document progress towards achievement of goals and provide lessons learnt.*

Relevance

How did activities fit with needs/priorities?

How was it ensured that the most vulnerable households were included?

Has accessibility and delivery of services to the vulnerable improved, how?

Has ECHO been able to adapt to the changing context, how?

Connectedness

What other sources of assistance were available?

Did it take into consideration longer-term development needs?

Effectiveness

Have the outputs and sectoral outcomes been achieved/are likely to be achieved?

What were the unintended outcomes/impacts?

Were you involved in developing the proposals/plans?

Was anything changed during implementation?

What were the main hiccups during planning and implementation?

What worked and what did not, why?

What influenced the achievement/non-achievement of the outputs/outcomes?

What would have happened without the ECHO projects, why?

Efficiency

How efficient have the programme been implemented?

Could the same results have been achieved with fewer resources?

Could the funds have been spent better on something else, why?

Sustainability

Will intended benefits continue when projects end?

What is the level of ownership of the activities among the beneficiaries/local authorities?

Are there exit strategies, are they appropriate?

Was authorities involved in implementation, how, why?

Was beneficiaries involved in implementation, how, why

Coordination

Did partners coordinate with authorities

Did authorities participate in monitoring

Any other comments

Annex E - Observation Checklist

Observation Checklist - Health

Date: _____, State: _____, County: _____

Payam: _____, Community: _____,

Project (project reference if possible): _____

Name of facility/services: _____

Use of facilities

No. of	Male	Female	Male	Female
Population total				
Adults				
Children				

Is the facility functioning/service operating: Yes/No, If no, why not:

_____

_____

_____

Mark the appropriate: Construction or Rehabilitation

Does the facility appear as if it is being maintained: Yes/No

Do the users pay for using the facility/services: Yes/No

Other comments:_____

Buildings:

Part	Perfect	Major issues	Minor issues	Completely missing
Roof				
Walls				
Doors/windows				

WASH/garbage disposal facilities:

Part	Perfect	Major issues	Minor issues	Completely missing
Incinerator				
Fenced in garbage pits				
Placenta Pit				

Latrines/showers:

Part	Perfect	Major issues	Minor issues	Completely missing
Roof				
Walls				
Door				
Slab				

How many latrines/showers are there? _____

Are they separate for men and women?   Yes/No

Are the latrines clean: Yes / No, Are the doors lockable: Yes /No

Is there a lid: Yes / No

Is there a foot rest: Yes / No, is it an appropriate height: Yes /No

How far is the latrine/shower from the nearest water source: _____

HEALTH / NUTRITION Questions (for beneficiaries, best to talk to a group of mothers with children)

What brought you here today?

For **Health** related visits:

1. How long did you wait to see the doctor or treating personnel?
2. Did the Doctor explain what your child (or you) are sick of and what medication you need to take?
3. Did you receive medical drugs? Where you ever told that there were no drugs?
4. Have you paid anything today during your visit?

For **maternity** related visits or mothers with babies:

1. Have you delivered your child in the health facility?
2. Did you visit the health facility before and after the delivery? (for antenatal and postnatal care)
3. During those visits did you receive any drugs or other items? (delivery kit, mosquito net, vaccination etc.)
4. Was your child vaccinated?
5. Have you paid anything for the delivery and when you came to the health center?

For **Nutrition** related visits:

1. What problem does your child have?
2. What are the people here giving your child? Food? What kind of food?
3. Where you ever told that there is no food?
4. How long are you already coming here?
5. Is your child already doing better?
6. Have you ever paid anything?

Observation Checklist - WASH

Date: _____

Location (camp, community, location, etc): _____

Project: _____

Type of facility:_____

Name of facility: _____

Use of facilities:

No. of	*Male*	*Female*
Population total		
Adults		
Children		

Is the facility functioning/operating: Yes/No.

If no, why not:

_____

_____

_____

Mark the appropriate: Was it <u>Construction</u> or <u>Rehabilitation</u>

Is there always water?

Does the facility appear as if it is being maintained: Yes/No

Do the users pay for using the facility/services: Yes/No

How much do they pay?

Can all afford to pay if not, what do they do?

Other comments:_____

WASH facilities:

Part	Perfect	Major issues	Minor issues	Completely missing
Apron				
Generator house				
Water distribution point				
Fence				
Drainage				

Is the water collection point clean: Yes / No

Is there stagnant water around the collection point: Yes / No

Is there a caretaker: Yes/No

Do they pay for the water: Yes / No,. If yes, who pays: _____

Latrines:

Part	Perfect	Major issues	Minor issues	Completely missing
Roof				
Walls				
Door				
Slab				

Are the latrines clean: Yes / No

Are the doors lockable: Yes / No

Is there a lid: Yes / No

Is there a foot rest: Yes / No.

Is it an appropriate height: Yes / No

How far is the latrine from the nearest water source: _____

Annex F - Online Questionnaire

EVALUATION OF DG ECHO'S RESPONSE TO THE HUMANITARIAN CRISES IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN (2011-2015)

Dear Respondent,

The European Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (**DG ECHO**) has contracted **Particip GmbH** to conduct a review of its activities in Sudan and South Sudan for the years 2011-2015.

The evaluation focuses ECHO's strategy in the two countries as a whole rather than on individual projects.

The scope of the evaluation will cover the implementation of DG ECHO funded actions in the two countries between 2011 and 2015. It will review the ECHO programming including the needs assessments and the policy framework/HIPs. The objective is to evaluate the effectiveness, relevance, coherence ad sustainability of these activities in order to improve future interventions and programs.

The evaluation will be undertaken using a review of documents, interviews and field visits by the evaluation team. As it is not possible to interview everybody that has been engaged in ECHO funded activities an online questionnaire has been developed.

Feel free to forward the link to the questionnaire to colleagues whom you believe could also contribute to enrich the evaluation.

This survey is not anonymous, but kindly note that all analysis and reporting will be confidential and non-attributable.

If you have any queries please contact:

Emilie Schroder, Project Manager, Emilie.schroder@particip.de

Erik Toft, Senior Evaluator, erik@toft.CD

With our most sincere thanks in advance for your cooperation,

The Particip Evaluation Team

QUESTIONNAIRE TO SELECTED RECIPIENTS

1. **For what kind of organization do you work? Where?**

   Organization: (1) INGO (2) Local NGO (3) UN (4) Donor

   Location: (1) Sudan (2) South Sudan

2. **In your work in relation to ECHO, do you use the following needs assessment tools (please check the box). If yes please explain at what point, process or stage? If you do not use the tool(s), please explain why.**

❑ Multi-Cluster/ Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA)	
❑ ACAPS Country Briefing Notes and Assessment Tools	
❑ SMART Surveys	
❑ IMPACT/REACH	

3. **How do you rate the quality of the needs analysis presented in the yearly ECHO HIPs?**

   (1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

4. **How do you rate the degree of coverage (geographical and needs related) achieved by ECHO in the two countries?**

   (1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

5. **Does ECHO allow enough flexibility to react and adapt to changing needs and identified gaps?**

   (1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

6. **What are the "triggers" for your organization to change approach, beneficiaries or other important elements of your project during implementation? Please chose from the alternatives below:**
   - ❑ Perceived situational changes on the ground (through experiences during project implementation)
   - ❑ New findings of own or other partners' needs assessments
   - ❑ Recommendations out of external evaluations or ECHO TA monitoring visits
   - ❑ Recommendations based on discussions in the respective cluster
   - ❑ Budgetary considerations
   - ❑ Other "triggers":

   _____

7. **How do you rate the fit between financed projects with the needs analysis and the ECHO HIP they are based on?**

   (1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

8. **How would you rate ECHO's efforts to facilitate and improve project implementation by supporting skilled implementing partners through advocacy and other measures?**

   (1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

   If you believe the situation could be improved, please state how.

   _____

9. **How do you rate ECHO's contributions to logistical operations supporting humanitarian assistance (air services, logistics cluster, rehabilitation of infrastructure etc.).**

   (1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

   If you believe the situation could be improved, please state how.

   _____

10. **Please mark the sector(s) your organization is working in and (if existing) rate the functionality of your sector's "core pipeline"?**

11. How do you evaluate the impact of ECHO support to the OCHA Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)?

(1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

12. How do you rate ECHO's relationship with development oriented Donors (i.e. DEVCO) in Sudan and South Sudan?

(1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

13. How do you rate the contribution of ECHO and its partners to the overall humanitarian efforts and results in South Sudan?

(1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

14. Please evaluate ECHO's and its partners response in the sectors listed below:

Health	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent
Nutrition	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent
Protection	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent
WASH	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent
Shelter	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent
Livelihoods/early recovery	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent
Food Security	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent

15. How do you rate the geographical coverage of ECHO support in Sudan and South Sudan?

(1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

16. Please evaluate, if the budget allocated by ECHO to the different sectors has been appropriate?

Health	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent
Nutrition	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent
Protection	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent
WASH	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent

Shelter	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent
Livelihoods/early recovery	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent
Food Security	(1) Very Poor	(2) Poor	(3) Average	(4) Good	(5) Excellent

17. **How do you rate ECHO's system of identification, documentation and utilization of lessons learned and best practices?**

    (1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

    If you believe the situation could be improved, please state how.

    _____

18. **Please rate the expertise, responsiveness/flexibility in internal coordination between field and HQ and the adequacy of ECHO's contract management tools?**

    (1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

19. **Please evaluate the timing and influence of ECHO's funding cycles (at field and HQ levels) on the implementing partners' response capacity?**

    (1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

    If you believe the situation could be improved, please state how.

    _____

20. **Please rate the adequacy of human resources of the implementing partners (quality and quantity, turnover, cost-effectiveness) in Sudan and South Sudan?**

    (1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

21. **How do you rate ECHO's and its partners' response to the special challenges of protracted crises situations and camp environments/ settings?**

    (1) Very Poor   (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

    If you believe the situation could be improved, please state how.

    _____

22. **How do you rate the quality and adequacy of resilience components included in ECHO financed projects?**

    1) Very Poor (2) Poor   (3) Average   (4) Good   (5) Excellent

23. How do you rate the degree of coherence between ECHO and its Partners concerning the inclusion of LRRD components and the design of exit strategies in partner actions?

1) Very Poor (2) Poor (3) Average (4) Good (5) Excellent

Please explain your ratings above.

_____

24. How do you rate the effectiveness of ECHO's advocacy measures and upholding the humanitarian space?

1) Very Poor (2) Poor (3) Average (4) Good (5) Excellent

Please explain your rating above.

_____

25. Please rate the fit of ECHO's position to remote management and the guidelines for remote management with the realities in the field?

1) Very Poor (2) Poor (3) Average (4) Good (5) Excellent

26. Do you have any other comments you would like to make on ECHO's work in Sudan and South Sudan? Feel free to send documents and/or links you consider important to the e-mail address mentioned above.

_____

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME!

If you have further questions, please contact:

Emilie Schroder, Project Manager, Emilie.schroder@particip.de

Erik Toft, Senior Evaluator, erik@toft.CD

Annex G - Overview of Additional HIPs

In addition to the six HIPs (five Sudan and South Sudan HIPs for the respective years 2011-2015 and one EDF bridging facility) 15 additional actions have been financed under seven additional HIPs during the evaluation period. A short overview of the HIPs as well as the financed actions is presented in the paragraphs below.

Year	Decision no.	HIP decision title	Amount [EUR]
2011	ERC/BUD/2011/01000	Enhanced Humanitarian Response Capacity	24,117,000
2013	ERC/BUD/2013/91000	Enhance Humanitarian Response Capacity	19,767,867
2013	CHD/BUD/2013/01000	Children affected by Conflict	4,000,000
2014	CHD/BUD/2014/91000	EU Children of Peace	6,712,500
2014	DRF/BUD/2014/93000	Epidemics	11,500,000
2015	CHD/BUD/2015/91000	EU Children of Peace	11,000,000
2015	-HF/EDF/2015/01000	Humanitarian Actions in the Greater Horn of Africa	78,000,000
Total	-	-	155,097,367

The objective of the HIP ERC/BUD/2011/01000 is to enhance humanitarian response capacity and its focus lies on civil-military cooperation, logistics and the global humanitarian reform process (esp. the coordination role of the U.N.). Emphasis is furthermore put on more varied and appropriate mechanisms of food assistance and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in connection with climate change.

Under this HIP one project implemented by HelpAge was financed in Sudan with the objective to increase the capacity of the humanitarian system, key agencies, donors and field based staff to address the needs of older and disabled people whose lives have been disrupted by crisis or disaster. Activities include sensitisation and shaping of key policy tools, such as the IASC gender marker, to mainstream the specific needs of older men and women.

The HIP ERC/BUD/2013/91000 is also addressing the humanitarian response capacity but with the backdrop of the expected negative effects of climate change. The major needs of the humanitarian system are defined (resources, esp. human resources; more effective coordination and cluster approach; rapid needs assessment and related tools; emergency preparedness, DRR and early warning; local capacity building and logistics (prepositioning, stockpiling). ECHO focuses specifically on the development of a broader set of food assistance tools and better humanitarian coordination.

The one project financed under this HIP was implemented by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD-CH). Its objective was the increase of knowledge and application of humanitarian norms by Armed Non-State Actors (ANSA) in order to protect the conflict affected population in Sudan.

The HIP CHD/BUD/2013/01000 is concentrating on children affected by conflict. Supported are educational activities in emergency, crisis as well as early recovery situations. Actions in

refugee and IDP camps are prioritized as well as such enhancing protection from abuse and exploitation.

The only project financed by this HIP is located in three camps in Upper Nile in South Sudan supporting students in the Accelerated Learning Programme cycle (ALP) and is implemented by LWF-CH.

The HIP CHD/BUD/2014/9100 is equally targeting children affected by conflict and supports educational projects in acute emergencies and crisis. Strategic emphasis lies a) on situations of protracted crisis with long term displacement (refugee, IDP camps) as well as b) on action supporting a transition towards the formal education system and development interventions.

The project Schools of Safe Haven is implemented by ZOA and the only action financed under this HIP in Sudan. Its objective is the reduction of vulnerability of school-aged children affected by conflict in Gereida locality through improved access to and quality of education (the ALP cycle). Measures to increase the safety and security at school include child protection and support services.

The HIP DRF/BUD/2014/93000 is addressing communicable diseases causing major emergencies. Especially in developing countries epidemics pose a significant risk to health, lives and livelihoods of the population, as preparedness levels are low and national contingency plans are underfunded. This HIP is therefore funding preparedness and rapid response components in order to reduce morbidity and mortality as consequences of public health disasters focusing on diseases with specific epidemic potential (i.e. cholera, meningitis, dengue fever, yellow fever, measles, leptospirosis, and malaria). The HIP was modified five times due to changing needs during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the Cholera outbreak in South Sudan.

In South Sudan four projects were funded based on this HIP during the Cholera outbreak in 2014/15. ACF-ES (limited to Central Equatoria), UNICEF-US and MSF-ES (both countrywide) were providing medical care, water and sanitations measures as well as community mobilization and sensitization activities together with the Ministry of Health and numerous partner NGOs.

The HIP CHD/BUD/2015/91000 centres on children affected by conflicts. Next to educational activities in emergency and crisis situations the objective is to avoid a "lost generation" phenomenon by supporting longer-term education interventions in protracted crisis situations. Eligible are also interventions in transition periods until the formal education system has regained its functionality. LRRD components and a close cooperation with development actors are encouraged. The HIP mentions peace education and psychosocial in order to break the potential circle of violence by youth who have been traumatized during situations of conflict and war.

Three actions were financed under this HIP. Two trans-border interventions by Save the children-UK providing protective education for children in Ethiopia and South Sudan and those displaced from South Sudan to Ethiopia. The projects include the provision of EiE teaching and learning materials, training and incentives for teachers and a gradual handover to the local education authorities. LWF-CH is providing education and protection support for IDP, refugee and host community children in Ajuong Thok and Maban camps in Unity State in South Sudan.

The HIP -HF/EDF/2015/01000 is supporting humanitarian interventions in the Greater Horn of Africa Region (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda) mitigating the impact of El Niño weather conditions whose peak was expected from October 2015 until January 2016. To prevent excess mortality and morbidity among the population directly or indirectly affected by weather events linked to the phenomenon a coherent, lifesaving, multi-sectoral response is needed while at the same time strengthening resilience.

The four projects financed under the above-mentioned HIP support populations affected by El Niño based on different approaches and in different geographical areas in Sudan. GAC-DE and ZOA-NL focus on the prevention of the degradation of nutritional status, improved food access and availability and the protection of livelihoods in North Darfur and Kassala States. WFP-IT provides emergency food assistance in Darfur and North Kordofan. A multi-sectoral intervention (food security and livelihoods, health, WASH and nutrition) is implemented by Save the Children-UK in North Darfur and North Kordofan.

Annex H - Intervention Logic

Figure 9: Intervention Logic for Sudan (2011-15)

## Figure 10: Intervention Logic for South Sudan (2011-15)

Annex I - Timelines of Major Events

Figure 11: Timeline of Major Events in Sudan

Figure 12: Timeline of Major Events in South Sudan

Figure 12: Timeline of Major Events in South Sudan

Annex J - Portfolio Analysis

This analysis provides an overview of the ECHO portfolio supported using the six HIPs selected for this evaluation. The six HIPs selected for inclusion in this evaluation are listed in the table below. There were additionally 7 HIPs that are not included in the evaluation - these HIPs are described in Annex G. The six HIPs have a total value of EUR 676 million and were used to support a total of 247 projects. The -AF/BUD/2012 HIP was the largest with EUR 157 million, while the SSD/EDF/2014, a South Sudan Bridging Facility HIP allocated to deal with the aftermath of the outbreak of the civil war in late 2013 was the smallest.

Table 3: List of 2011-2015 HIPs Selected for Inclusion in the Evaluation

HIP no.	HIP decision title	Amount [EUR]	Total no. of projects	Average contracted amount per contract
ECHO/SDN/BUD/2011/91000	Sudan and South Sudan	140,000,000	59	2,326,483
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2012/91000	Sudan and South Sudan	157,000,000	53	2,962,264
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2013/91000	Sudan and South Sudan	97,000,000	40	2,422,392
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2014/91000	Sudan and South Sudan	112,715,000	40	2,817,875
ECHO/SSD/EDF/2014/01000	Bridging Facility for South	30,000,000	9	3,333,333
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2015/91000	Sudan and South Sudan	159,000,000	46	3,455,435
Total	-	695,715,000[1]	247	2,804,952

Number of projects

The number of projects per HIP ranged from nine for the EDF/SSD/2014 HIP to 59 for the SDN/BUD/2011 HIP. The main variation in the number of projects is due to the variations in the total amount available for each HIP. For the five major HIPs there is a more or less equal distribution of projects - around a fifth (between 40 and 60) for each, and nine projects for the bridging facility with slightly more projects implemented under the 2011 and 2012 HIPs (see table above). The following table shows that more than half (140) of the 247 projects were implemented in South Sudan, 40% (97 projects) in Sudan and 55 (ten projects) in both countries. The ten projects implemented in both countries were implemented under the first three HIPs only, while, naturally, the SSD/EDF/2014 projects were only implemented in South Sudan.

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[1] The contracted amounts for the five years adds up to a little less, i.e. EUR 693 million. with the discrepancy mainly in the 2011 HIP.

Table 4: Locations of Projects by Country

HIP no.	SDN	SSD	SDN/SSD	Total
ECHO/SDN/BUD/2011/91000	28	28	3	59
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2012/91000	20	29	4	53
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2013/91000	16	23	1	40
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2014/91000	15	25		40
ECHO/SSD/EDF/2014/01000		9		9
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2015/91000	18	26	2	46
Grand Total	**97**	**140**	**10**	**247**

A graphical illustration of the number of projects by geographical location and HIP is included in the figure below.

Figure 13: Projects per Geographical Location

The specific locations within a country in which the projects were implemented were not recorded in a uniform manner in the spreadsheet and the evaluation team has sorted this out to facilitate listing the locations, e.g. 'South Darfur State' was shortened to 'South Darfur' etc. Information retrieved from the spreadsheet is included in Table 5 and shows that a third (83) of the projects were registered as being implemented in more than one location. It is assumed that these other locations were secondary and they are therefore not included in the table.

Table 5: Number of Projects by Location per Year

| Country	Registered location	HIP						Total	%
		SDN/BUD/ 2011	AF/BUD/ 2012	AF/BUD/ 2013	AF/BUD/ 2014	SSD/EDF/ 2014	AF/BUD/ 2015		
Sudan	All Sudan	5	2	3	3	-	2	15	15
	Blue Nile	3	0	0	0	-	0	3	3
	Central Darfur	0	2	3	2	-	3	10	10
	Darfur	3	8	5	4	-	3	23	24
	East Sudan	1	0	0	0	-	0	1	1
	Gedaref	1	1	0	0	-	0	2	2
	Jebel Marra	0	1	0	0	-	0	1	1
	Khartoum	0	0	0	1	-	0	1	1
	Kordofan	0	0	0	0	-	1	1	1
	North Darfur	2	2	2	3	-	5	14	14
	South Darfur	3	1	2	1	-	4	11	11
	South Kordofan	1	0	0	0	-	0	1	1
	Three areas	1	0	0	0	-	0	1	1
	West Darfur	7	2	1	1	-	0	11	11
	White Nile	1	1	0	0	-	0	2	2
	Grand Total	**28**	**20**	**16**	**15**	**-**	**18**	**97**	**100**
South Sudan	All South Sudan	12	14	10	11	3	11	61	44
	Central Equatoria	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
	Eastern Equatoria	1	1	0	0	1	0	3	2
	Greater Upper Nile	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
	Jonglei	6	4	3	3	2	4	22	16
	Lakes	0	0	0	3	1	1	5	4
	NBG	2	3	5	1	0	2	13	9
	Unity	1	0	0	1	0	4	6	4
	Upper Nile	2	5	5	6	2	2	22	16
	Warrap	2	2	0	0	0	0	4	3
	Western Equatoria	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
	Grand Total	**28**	**29**	**23**	**25**	**9**	**26**	**140**	**100**
Sudan and South Sudan	Abyei Administrative Area	1	2	0	-	-	0	3	30
	All South Sudan	1	1	0	-	-	0	2	20
	Darfur	1	1	0	-	-	0	2	20
	Unity	0	0	1	-	-	1	2	20
	Warrap	0	0	0	-	-	1	1	10
	Grand Total	**3**	**4**	**1**	**-**	**-**	**2**	**10**	**100**

A small proportion (15%) of the projects implemented in Sudan are registered as implemented throughout Sudan. Half of all projects (50) are registered as implemented in different parts of Darfur. Given the concentration of humanitarian needs in Darfur coupled with even more limited access (and thus a lack of partners) in the southern and eastern parts of the country, this distribution of project locations is understandable.

The table above shows that almost half (44%) of all projects implemented in South Sudan have been registered as being implemented in all of South Sudan, with a third (36%) of the projects registered as implemented in the conflict areas of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile (also known as Greater Upper Nile) and 9% in NBG. While the reason for the relatively high number of projects in NBG is not clear, the need in Greater Upper Nile has persisted throughout the period.

Contracted amounts

The contracted amounts[2] range from EUR 130,000 to EUR 58 million with the average contracted amount being EUR 2.8 million and the median EUR 1.3 million. The average contracted amounts for the 2011 HIP were the lowest (2.3 million) with the contracted amounts for the 2015 HIP being the highest at EUR 3.5 million. There are, however, no clear trends in the development of the average size of the contract. For use during the FichOps review, the projects have been categorised as small (=<1 million), medium (>1 and =<10 million), or large (>10 million). There are a total of 109 (44%) small projects, 113 (46%) medium projects, and 25 (10%) large projects. The figure below illustrates the distribution of projects; the horizontal red lines indicate the limits between small, medium and large.

Figure 14: Distribution of Projects by Contracted Amount

A breakdown of the average contracted amounts per project per country is provided in Table 6 below. The table shows that the cost of projects in South Sudan was generally higher (EUR 3.1 million) than in Sudan (EUR 1.9 million). Note: Projects implemented in both countries are not

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[2] The contracted amounts are used in instead of the amounts paid as some of the 2015 projects have not yet been paid in full.

included as they were so few in numbers (9) and included one large project with a contracted amount of EUR 58 million, meaning that calculating average contract amounts did not make sense.

Table 6: Average Cost per Project per Country

Decision / HIP Id	SDN	SSD
ECHO/SDN/BUD/2011/91000	1,313,053	1,244,536
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2012/91000	2,221,250	3,495,690
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2013/91000	2,141,918	2,679,348
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2014/91000	1,945,667	3,341,200
ECHO/SSD/EDF/2014/01000	0	3,333,333
ECHO/-AF/BUD/2015/91000	1,778,889	4,808,846
Total	1,862,790	3,127,029

Graphically illustrating the above data in Figure 15 below, it is easier to see that the contracts in South Sudan generally had a higher value compared to the projects in Sudan.

Figure 15: Average Cost per Project per HIP

Partners

A total of 56 different partners were used for the implementation of the six HIPs, 29 of which were funded in Sudan and 43 in South Sudan (one partner can be operational in both countries).

A list of the partners, the number of contracts and the total contracted amounts per partner is included in the table below. WFP is by far the largest recipient with EUR 286 million (41%) of the contracted amounts received. WFP received as much as the next 13 recipients on the list above. Second on the list in terms of contracted amounts is ICRC, closely followed by UNHCR and UNICEF. ICRC received less than a fifth of what WFP received.

WFP also had the largest number of contracts (23), followed by Tearfund which had 13 contracts, and UNHCR and IOM with 10 contracts each.

Table 7: Partners, Number of Contracts and Total Contracted Amounts

	Partner	No. of contracts	Contracted amount	%
1	WFP-IT	23	286,100,000	41.3
2	CICR-CH	7	47,900,000	6.9
3	UNHCR-CH	10	43,050,000	6.2
4	UNICEF-US	9	40,985,000	5.9
5	IOM-CH	10	28,280,000	4.1
6	MEDAIR-CH	5	19,003,900	2.7
7	IMC-UK	9	17,220,000	2.5
8	OXFAM-UK	7	15,786,344	2.3
9	SI-FR	6	15,035,000	2.2
10	MSF-NL	6	14,600,000	2.1
11	MSF-BE	6	13,150,000	1.9
12	TEARFUND -UK	13	12,132,066	1.8
13	ACTED-FR	4	9,280,000	1.3
14	ACF-ES	5	9,000,000	1.3
15	GOAL-IR	7	8,700,000	1.3

Of the 247 projects, 163 (66%) are registered as implemented by NGOs, 66 (27%) by the UN, and 18 (7%) by IOs. The distribution of partners by type per HIP is illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 16: Type of Implementing Partner by HIP and Country

Aid type

The projects are registered with "Primary Aid Type". The existing categories were,

- coordination
- demining
- disaster preparedness
- first aid items
- food

- health and medical
- nutrition, therapeutic or supp. feeding
- protection
- shelter
- coordination
- support to special operations
- multi-sectoral
- water / sanitation

The initial review of projects revealed that a large number of projects included both health and nutrition, and that other aid types were left blank. This was corrected by entering the primary aid types based on the FichOps, and by introducing three new categories of "Primary Aid Type": Health and Nutrition, Multi-sectoral, and logistics.

Most of the projects are within Health and Medical, and Water / Sanitation aid types, followed by Food and Nutrition. Analysing the contract amounts, the Food projects were the largest aid type in terms of contract amounts followed by Health and Nutrition and Water / Sanitation. For a graphical presentation, please refer to the two figures on the next pages.

Figure 17: Number of Projects per Primary Aid Type per HIP

Figure 18: Contracted Amounts per Primary Aid Type per HIP

All projects cover at least one sector, two thirds (141) cover two sectors, a quarter of the projects (59) cover three sectors, and only 10 projects cover four or five sectors.

Multi-phase projects

137 (55%) of the projects are single phase[3] with five of the projects having four phases, and one project - a Food project implemented by WFP in South Sudan - having 5 phases. The relatively large proportion of multi-phase projects shows commitment by not only ECHO, but also the partners, and can form the foundation for not only a better understanding of the context, needs, and beneficiaries' priorities, but also for facilitating the learning of lessons, and the application of these lessons learnt. Multi-phase projects also have the advantage of contributing to ensuring a more steady and reliable source of income for the partners, enabling them to ensure reasonable staff retention rates and perhaps invest in longer-term assets used for implementation such as housing and transport equipment.

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[3] As it is not registered in the FichOps if a project is a follow-up to a previous phase, the evaluation team has assessed projects as multi-phase based on the assumption that if projects were implemented by the same partners with the same titles, they are multi-phase projects. However, as project titles might change over time as the activities or context evolves, there could be more multi-phase projects than the 137.

Annex K - Major Success Factors and Limiting Factors of Projects

The factors that have contributed to ensuring successful implementation of the ECHO support projects are multiple. They include the availability of experienced partners coupled with close, highly-qualified and hands-on monitoring and follow-up by ECHO staff, including an insistence on quality and a principled approach. The flexibility shown by ECHO during implementation to adjust activities when changes in the contexts warranted so also helped ensure relevant and effective projects as opposed to a more rigid approach whereby already agreed upon deliverables were adhered to, regardless of their feasibility, as practiced by some donors. The consequent needs-based selection of projects with good and relevant geographical coverage was also a critical factor in ensuring the success of ECHO's support.

Additionally, the long-standing close relations with partners, resulting in numerous multi-phase actions further contribute to the positive achievements, which in turn, combined with no-guarantee of financial support and yearly independent funding decisions further contribute to ensuring continuation and synergies between different phases while at the same time ensuring competition and constant improvements.

The main limiting factors include the difficult context with natural (weather), infrastructural and political and security constraints, making operations difficult to carry out as planned, or not at all. The relative isolation of the two countries with poor infrastructure can hamper the planned acquisition of supplies, and can cause delay in prepositioning, which especially in South Sudan inevitably causes substantial delays in implementation. Given the situation in the two countries, donor funding in general is less generous than the needs warrant, and funding for development activities is minimal, thus contributing to a vicious circle whereby the humanitarian needs are barely addressed while at the same time there is too little development funding (and thus activities) available to help break the vicious circle.

Annex L - Dissemination Proposal

As required by the ToR, a proposal for the dissemination of the evaluation has been developed.

The products resulting from this evaluation are:

- A full evaluation report with annexes
- An executive summary (in English and French) outlining the main conclusions and recommendations
- A PowerPoint presentation

B1: Dissemination of full evaluation report

It is proposed that ECHO disseminates the full evaluation report including the three versions (English, French and Arabic) of the executive summaries to the following:

- ECHO staff

ECHO management staff based at ECHO HQ in Brussels
ECHO desk officers responsible for Sudan and South Sudan
ECHO field staff in Sudan and South Sudan and in neighbouring countries, e.g. Uganda, Kenya, Chad, Eritrea and Ethiopia and possibly also Somalia due to Somalia being a similarly highly complex conflict-driven humanitarian crisis

- EU institutions:

DEVCO desk officers responsible for Sudan and South Sudan
EU Delegations in Sudan and South Sudan
European Parliament
European Council

- Partners:

Country directors of partners at country level
Partner contact points at head quarters

- Public:

Publication of the full final report on ECHO's website/EU Bookshop
Publication of the final report on other humanitarian websites, such as ALNAP or Relief Web

B2: Dissemination of executive summaries

It is proposed that the executive summaries (English, French and Arabic) are disseminated to the following:

- Main (humanitarian) donors in Sudan and South Sudan,

DFID
USAID
NORAD
SIDA
Danida
JICA
Germany

- Other humanitarian and development agencies and institutions

Humanitarian Country Teams
Common Humanitarian Funds
UNDP in Sudan and South Sudan (other UN agencies will receive it automatically as they are ECHO partners)
UNMISS
UNAMID

- Relevant government stakeholders (this might not be a priority, but if they want it they will get it anyhow, and sharing it with them might be a sign of good will)

Humanitarian Aid Commission in Sudan
Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management in South Sudan
South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC)

- Public

Publication of the executive summaries on ECHO's website/EU Bookshop
Publication of the executive summaries on other humanitarian websites, such as ALNAP or Relief Web

B3: Use of PowerPoint Presentation

It is proposed that the PowerPoint presentation is presented by the ECHO evaluation section to senior ECHO management in order to ensure buy-in from all levels to the management response. The presentation can also be used for presentation at regional or national meetings and seminars.

Annex M – Résumé analytique

Le présent document a pour but de présenter une évaluation rétrospective indépendante du soutien fourni par la direction générale de la Commission européenne en charge de l'aide humanitaire et de la protection civile (ci-après nommée «ECHO») en rapport avec les crises humanitaires au Soudan et au Soudan du Sud, de 2011 à 2015. Sur la base de cette évaluation, quatre recommandations stratégiques ont été formulées concernant l'appui futur à apporter par ECHO dans ces deux pays.

Méthodologie

L'évaluation s'est basée sur six critères d'évaluation : pertinence, cohérence, valeur ajoutée pour l'UE, efficacité, efficience et durabilité. Elle a exploité des données primaires et secondaires obtenues au moyen de plusieurs outils, notamment une analyse documentaire, une analyse de portefeuille, un questionnaire en ligne, des entretiens semi-structurés avec des bénéficiaires, des partenaires, des membres du personnel d'ECHO, etc., ainsi que des visites rendues sur les sites de projet au Soudan et au Soudan du Sud. Une équipe composée d'experts internationaux et nationaux a réalisé l'évaluation.

Comme cela arrive toujours lorsque l'on mène une évaluation à grande échelle dans un environnement dynamique et volatil, des difficultés ont été rencontrées. D'emblée, le grand nombre de projets bénéficiant d'une aide n'a pas permis à l'équipe d'évaluation de les visiter tous ni d'examiner la totalité des documents les concernant. Il a donc fallu procéder à une sélection raisonnée de documents de projet (FichOps) à examiner, et de sites de projet à visiter. Dans certains cas, la mémoire institutionnelle d'organisations pertinentes a souffert d'une importante rotation du personnel, limitant la disponibilité de données historiques non écrites. Les visites de sites de projet ont été entravées par l'incapacité des experts internationaux à se déplacer dans les régions situées hors de Khartoum. Le consultant national au Soudan du Sud n'a pas pu accompagner l'expert international sur tous les sites de projet, et l'équipe d'évaluation a dû composer avec plusieurs changements dans l'organisation des déplacements locaux. Néanmoins, grâce à la triangulation de multiples sources d'information comme les documents, les entretiens et le questionnaire en ligne (et, au Soudan, le fait que le consultant national pouvait se rendre au Darfour), les résultats de l'évaluation ont été jugés valables.

Contexte et soutien d'ECHO

Pendant des décennies, le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud ont été affectés par le conflit, des sécheresses, des inondations et d'autres catastrophes, avec comme conséquence des millions de personnes dépendantes de l'aide humanitaire. Chaque année de 2011 à 2015, entre 5

et 12 millions de personnes ont eu besoin d'aide humanitaire, et ce chiffre a augmenté au fil des ans (pour en savoir plus, voir la Figure 1 à droite). Les personnes vulnérables comprennent les personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays, les personnes de retour, les réfugiés et les communautés d'accueil.

Personnes vulnérables au Soudan et au Soudan du Sud entre 2011 et 2015

Total des personnes vulnérables au Soudan et au Soudan du Sud
Personnes vulnérables au Soudan (total)
Personnes vulnérables au Darfour
Personnes vulnérables au Soudan du Sud (total)

Afin de soutenir les efforts humanitaires dans ces deux pays, ECHO a engagé un total de 850 millions d'euros entre 2011 et 2015. ECHO y a été le troisième plus grand pourvoyeur d'aide humanitaire, contribuant à hauteur de quelques 10 % au total de la réponse humanitaire. Sur la période 2011-2015, le soutien a été déployé dans le cadre de 13 plans de mise en œuvre humanitaire (HIP), dont six ont été sélectionnés aux fins de la présente évaluation, pour un total de 696 millions d'euros. L'appui fourni a été centré sur l'offre d'aide d'urgence en faveur des personnes vulnérables, notamment dans le domaine de l'aide alimentaire, de la nutrition, de la santé, de l'eau et de l'assainissement, de la fourniture d'abris et de produits non alimentaires, de la logistique et de la coordination – le dénominateur commun étant la protection des personnes. Cette aide a été apportée par le biais de 56 partenaires (ONG, Nations Unies et organisations internationales) et au moyen de 247 subventions d'une valeur médiane de 1,3 million d'euros, la subvention la plus substantielle ayant atteint 58 millions d'euros (pour l'aide alimentaire). Les partenaires ayant reçu le plus de financement sont le PAM (41 % des 696 millions d'euros), le CICR, le HCR et l'UNICEF, les trois derniers ayant chacun bénéficié de plus de 40 millions d'euros.

Principales constatations et conclusions

Pertinence

Selon l'évaluation réalisée, l'aide fournie par ECHO en rapport avec les crises humanitaires au Soudan et au Soudan du Sud entre 2011 et 2015 se caractérise par une grande pertinence par rapport au contexte. La qualité des évaluations des besoins humanitaires, tels que décrits dans les HIP, était élevée, un fait confirmé par toutes les personnes interviewées. De plus, l'aide d'ECHO fournie par le biais des partenaires a été jugée conforme aux besoins humanitaires identifiés.

En mettant à jour les HIP, y compris l'affectation de fonds supplémentaires sur la base des besoins, ECHO a réussi à réagir avec rapidité et efficacité aux changements de situation. Bien que peu d'analyses des risques de protection spécifiques aient été réalisées, il a été constaté que les

projets mis en œuvre avaient généralement pour bénéficiaires les groupes les plus vulnérables, tels que les PDI, les réfugiés, les enfants, les femmes, etc.

Cohérence

L'aide d'ECHO s'est avérée bien alignée sur ses propres politiques humanitaires et celles de la Commission européenne. Toutes les politiques ont été entièrement intégrées dans les HIP et les projets mis en œuvre.

Valeur ajoutée de l'UE

La valeur ajoutée de l'aide fournie par ECHO a été jugée élevée. Les contributions financières ont permis aux partenaires de mettre en œuvre des projets dans des environnements très difficiles et de produire des résultats en atteignant les objectifs convenus. De plus, ECHO a fourni une aide indirecte aux opérations sur le terrain des non-partenaires en leur apportant un soutien en matière de coordination, de logistique et de plaidoyer humanitaire. L'appui aux services logistiques a été apprécié par toutes les parties prenantes, partenaires ou non-partenaires, et a facilité la mise en œuvre des activités humanitaires dans les deux pays. L'appui régulièrement apporté à la coordination, en particulier au système de clusters, s'est avéré une source de valeur ajoutée pour les efforts humanitaires en général.

Les compétences et le professionnalisme du personnel d'ECHO, qui permettent d'offrir des solutions pragmatiques aux défis rencontrés par les partenaires, ont été loués par de nombreuses personnes interrogées. ECHO a également soutenu des activités et des secteurs non financés par d'autres donateurs, comblant ainsi des lacunes de la réponse humanitaire.

Bien que les HIP aient encouragé le lien entre l'aide d'urgence, la réhabilitation et le développement (LARD), les possibilités d'établir ce lien ont été limitées tant par la volatilité du contexte que par les difficultés de collaboration avec les gouvernements nationaux concernés. De plus, le cycle de financement annuel d'ECHO n'est pas propice à la mise en œuvre d'activités à moyen ou long terme, qui sont habituellement nécessaires pour concrétiser un engagement efficace avec les communautés et les autorités (locales).

Efficacité

Selon l'évaluation, l'aide d'ECHO a été mise en œuvre efficacement dans tous les secteurs, pour des projets généralement de haute qualité, et les résultats escomptés ont été largement atteints. Malgré des difficultés pour obtenir les fournitures, l'appui dans le domaine de la nutrition s'est traduit par l'offre de divers services. Les services de santé dispensés ont été de haute qualité mais ont à certaines occasions pâti du manque d'approvisionnements. Bien que des services efficaces aient été assurés dans le domaine de l'eau, de l'assainissement et de l'hygiène («WASH»), l'entretien régulier des installations reste problématique, notamment en raison du manque de clarté des politiques gouvernementales.

L'évaluation a montré qu'ECHO avait excellé sur le plan du plaidoyer humanitaire et, en tant que donateur empreint de principes, a également réussi à influencer d'autres donateurs, en particulier au Soudan.

L'appui fourni en termes de logistique et de coordination s'est avéré avoir eu un impact non seulement sur la fourniture efficace de l'aide d'ECHO mais aussi sur la capacité d'autres acteurs humanitaires à intervenir avec efficacité.

Même s'ils n'ont pas pu évaluer quantitativement les résultats et l'impact, les évaluateurs ont constaté que l'aide substantielle apportée par ECHO a permis d'améliorer l'existence des bénéficiaires et même de sauver des vies.

Efficience

Dans l'ensemble, l'évaluation a jugé qu'ECHO avait géré l'aide avec efficience. En dépit de retards occasionnels dans l'approbation des contrats dus aux procédures internes d'ECHO et de ses partenaires, les contrats ont été gérés de façon extrêmement satisfaisante.

Étant donné qu'il est difficile d'assurer les approvisionnements tant au Soudan qu'au Soudan du Sud – les transports dépendent de la saison sèche et les obstacles administratifs font perdre beaucoup de temps –, les durées relativement courtes des contrats ECHO peuvent être à l'origine de retards (supplémentaires) de mise en œuvre et mettre sous pression les finances des plus petits partenaires. L'évaluation a ainsi constaté une adéquation limitée du cycle de financement. À cet égard, il est donc recommandé à ECHO de revoir les échéances applicables aux propositions. Pour répondre à la nécessité de mettre en place des fournitures à l'avance et tenir compte du caractère endémique des crises, il serait utile de parvenir à prolonger la durée des projets, tout en gardant à l'esprit que ce changement pourrait se heurter à la réglementation actuelle de la Commission européenne en la matière.

Les enseignements issus de l'expérience ne sont pas documentés de façon formelle ni exploités au-delà de leur diffusion parmi des groupes d'experts. À cause de la forte rotation du personnel à la fois des partenaires et d'ECHO, il serait primordial de documenter de façon systématique et efficace les enseignements tirés. Le système mis en place dans HOPE s'est amélioré au fil du temps mais ne permet pas encore de retrouver facilement des enseignements tirés au niveau macro. Si le système permettait des recherches de ce type, il offrirait des avantages internes à ECHO mais contribuerait aussi à l'apprentissage au bénéfice de la communauté humanitaire élargie, aux niveaux local ou mondial.

Malgré le contexte difficile marqué par un accès limité à certains sites, l'évaluation n'a pas identifié de cas systématiques de gestion à distance, mais plutôt des situations temporaires de gestion à distance, qui justifieraient l'élaboration de procédures simples fondées sur les lignes directrices détaillées qui existent déjà dans ce domaine.

Durabilité

Les services fournis dans les situations de déplacement prolongé, surtout dans des camps, ont été jugés conformes aux besoins et à la durée des déplacements. La durabilité pourrait toutefois être améliorée si la fourniture des services comprenait des mécanismes de recouvrement des coûts, une aide plus conditionnelle, une participation plus forte de la communauté et un meilleur ciblage basé sur des critères de vulnérabilité.

Bien que les HIP aient encouragé le LARD ainsi que la résilience, la mise en œuvre active de tels aspects s'est avérée sporadique, et seul un nombre limité de projets incluaient des éléments de LARD ou de résilience clairement identifiables.

Recommandations stratégiques

Conclusions/Motifs	Recommandations stratégiques
Approche fondée sur des principes	
ECHO a systématiquement adhéré aux principes largement reconnus de neutralité, d'impartialité et d'indépendance, et encouragé ses partenaires à les appliquer strictement dans les deux pays. ECHO est perçu comme un donateur bien informé qui suit des principes et qui se fait entendre très efficacement quand il s'agit de soulever les problèmes liés à l'«espace humanitaire». ECHO mène fréquemment des actions de plaidoyer en collaboration avec d'autres donateurs. Toutefois, le contexte est très défavorable à l'espace humanitaire à cause du manque de réceptivité des gouvernements à l'égard du plaidoyer humanitaire, soit parce qu'ils ont d'autres priorités (guerre civile au Soudan du Sud), soit parce qu'ils poursuivent leur propre agenda politique (Soudan). L'approche fondée sur des principes a suscité des inquiétudes au Soudan - où ECHO appuie uniquement des projets situés dans des régions auxquelles des équipes «diverses» peuvent accéder - alors que les autorités sont en même temps susceptibles d'entraver l'accès humanitaire en guise de représailles contre les critiques. L'une des possibles conséquences de l'approche fondée sur les principes de neutralité, d'impartialité et d'indépendance serait donc une privation d'aide humanitaire pour la population qui en a le plus besoin. Une telle situation constituerait une atteinte à un autre principe humanitaire – l'humanité – et à son impératif de soulager la souffrance humaine où qu'elle se trouve.	ECHO devrait suivre une double stratégie pour poursuivre son approche fondée sur des principes et faire face aux contraintes politiques en utilisant au mieux ses capacités : (a) en interne, mieux définir avec ses partenaires les «règles d'engagement» lorsque des contradictions apparaissent entre les principes de neutralité, d'impartialité et d'indépendance, d'une part, et d'humanité, d'autre part ; (b) en externe, rechercher systématiquement des synergies avec d'autres acteurs de l'UE et d'autres acteurs internationaux concernés à tous les niveaux (terrain et siège) afin de promouvoir une réponse unifiée aux autorités locales.
Appui à la coordination	
ECHO apporte un soutien financier régulier au leadership humanitaire dans les deux pays, y compris pour soutenir le rôle d'OCHA. Des préoccupations ont cependant été soulevées au sujet du leadership humanitaire et de l'efficacité du mécanisme de coordination dirigé par l'ONU, alors que d'aucuns ont souligné la nécessité pour ECHO de renforcer encore son engagement auprès des structures de coordination plus générales.	ECHO devrait encore renforcer son appui et sa collaboration avec les mécanismes de coordination au niveau national, et lorsque les capacités sont limitées à ce niveau, agir aussi en ce sens par des actions de plaidoyer aux niveaux mondial/du siège. ECHO devrait s'efforcer de renforcer sa collaboration avec les mécanismes de coordination sectorielle, y compris en incitant ses partenaires à faire de même, tout en admettant qu'il y a des lacunes dans les mécanismes de coordination et en cherchant les meilleurs moyens d'utiliser les fonds pour combler ces lacunes.

Conclusions/Motifs	Recommandations stratégiques
Appui à la résilience	
L'impératif humanitaire consistant à d'abord sauver des vies, dont ECHO est à juste titre un fervent défenseur, est un facteur important au moment de décider quelles activités seront appuyées. Il faut savoir que, dans les deux pays, des besoins humanitaires restent encore sans réponse. Il y a toutefois des possibilités de mise en œuvre pour des activités de LARD/résilience, comme également décrit dans les HIP 2014 et 2015 au sujet de l'application de la résilience : par le soutien aux moyens de subsistance, l'utilisation des modalités liées aux espèces et aux bons d'échange, et la protection des biens agricoles. Donner aux communautés les moyens de mieux résister aux chocs futurs pourrait s'avérer une approche d'un bon rapport coût/efficacité car l'aide d'urgence deviendrait alors moins nécessaire. Cela pourrait même être une façon de préparer la voie pour que les partenaires accèdent à des fonds de développement pouvant être utilisés à des fins de LARD. Néanmoins, la brève durée (annuelle) des projets d'ECHO et la rareté des fonds ne conviennent pas à la situation si l'on recherche l'efficacité pour des activités à moyen ou long terme, comme celles qui doivent être menées pour entreprendre avec réalisme des projets de résilience.	ECHO devrait envisager de se lancer dans un débat visant à déterminer si et comment il devrait élargir son approche actuelle, centrée sur les activités visant à sauver des vies, pour y inclure, quand cela est faisable, un volet plus général axé sur la résilience et/ou le relèvement précoce. À cet effet, les solutions à étudier sont le renforcement de l'aide aux moyens de subsistance, le renforcement des capacités et les activités communautaires à mener dans les camps, près des camps et dans les zones de retour. Compte tenu du contexte marqué par des crises prolongées et oubliées, des sanctions économiques et une lassitude des donateurs dans les deux Soudans, la résilience peut, en fonction des situations spécifiques, être envisagée. En effet, elle est axée sur le renforcement des communautés affectées et ne nécessite le soutien que de certaines autorités locales, qui sont souvent plus accessibles et engagées que leurs homologues nationaux. En collaboration avec d'autres acteurs et donateurs d'aide au développement, ECHO pourrait examiner la voie à suivre pour progresser, c.-à-d. définir ce qui devrait être inclus ou non dans l'appui d'ECHO à la résilience (et/ou au LARD). Étant donné que la mise en œuvre des projets de résilience nécessite généralement plus de temps, cela en raison de la nécessité d'assurer leur appropriation par les communautés bénéficiaires, il faudrait trouver des moyens de définir des stratégies pluriannuelles mais aussi d'étendre la durée des projets ; une sorte de garantie de continuation de leur financement pourrait aussi être donnée aux partenaires. À l'heure actuelle, les restrictions juridiques empêchent la conclusion de contrats pluriannuels. En attendant une modification éventuelle de la base juridique, des enseignements pourraient être tirés du Plan d'action pour la réduction du risque de sécheresse (DRRAP) qui est mis en œuvre dans la corne de l'Afrique.

Conclusions/Motifs	Recommandations stratégiques
Utilisation des enseignements tirés	
Les procédures suivies par ECHO pour identifier, documenter et utiliser les enseignements tirés (surtout par le biais de groupes d'experts) manquent de clarté et ne sont pas appliquées de manière systématique. Les partenaires, eux non plus, n'attachent pas assez d'importance à renseigner, dans le formulaire de rapport final, les données demandées au sujet des enseignements tirés. La documentation et l'utilisation des enseignements tirés ne sont pas systématisées et reposent surtout sur la mémoire du personnel d'ECHO. Or, les membres du personnel ne restent pas toujours en poste plus d'un an ou deux, cela à cause des contextes mouvants et difficiles dans les deux Soudans.	ECHO devrait renforcer sa capacité à conserver et diffuser les enseignements tirés afin d'éviter de «réinventer la roue» et éventuellement pour soutenir la mise en œuvre d'activités ayant un meilleur rapport coût/efficacité. L'intégration des enseignements tirés peut offrir un tremplin vers des innovations et, au bout du compte, déboucher sur des actions plus efficaces, contribuant à sauver davantage de vies pour un financement d'un même montant. Dans ce cadre, ECHO devrait veiller à ce que ses partenaires apportent des informations suffisantes sur les enseignements qu'ils ont tirés. Les enseignements tirés et les meilleures pratiques devraient être captés par des instruments faciles d'accès et se prêtant aux recherches. La meilleure solution pourrait consister à permettre des recherches par secteur parmi les enseignements tirés déjà enregistrés dans la base de données de la DG ECHO (HOPE). Les enseignements tirés et les meilleures pratiques devraient aussi être partagés avec les partenaires, par exemple lors d'ateliers ou par le biais des clusters, ou en diffusant des notes d'information au niveau national ou mondial.

ملخص تنفيذي – Annex N

الهدف من هذا التقييم هو التوصل إلى تقييم مستقل يستعيد الأحداث، للدعم الذي يقدمه مكتب المديرية العامة للمفوضية الأوروبية للمساعدات الإنسانية والحماية المدنية (الذي يشار إليه لاحقا ب "ECHO") فيما يتعلق بالأزمات الإنسانية في السودان وجنوب السودان، في الفترة الممتدة من عام 2011 إلى عام 2015. وبناء على هذا التقييم، تم الخروج بأربع توصيات استراتيجية بالنسبة للدعم الذي سيقدمه مكتب (ECHO) لهذين البلدين في المستقبل.

المنهجية

اعتمد التقييم على ستة معايير تتمثّل في: الصلة، والترابط، والقيمة المضافة للاتحاد الأوروبي، والفعالية، والكفاءة، والاستدامة. واستخدم التقييم بيانات أولية وثانوية تم الحصول عليها بفضل عدد من الآليات، ومنها مراجعة الوثائق، وتحليل الملف، واستبيان عبر الإنترنت، وإجراء مقابلات شبه منظمة مع المستفيدين، والشركاء، وموظفي مكتب (ECHO) وغيرها، علاوة على القيام بزيارات لمواقع المشاريع في السودان وجنوب السودان. وأشرف على إجراء هذا التقييم فريق من الخبراء الدوليين والوطنيين.

وكما هو الحال دائما عند إجراء عمليات تقييم واسعة النطاق في وضع مضطرب ومتقلب، فقد واجهت عملية التقييم هذه عدة صعوبات. وهكذا لم يتمكن فريق التقييم من زيارة جميع المشاريع أو دراسة جميع الوثائق المتعلقة بالمشاريع، نظرا للعدد الهائل من المشاريع المدعومة، وقام بدلا من ذلك، باختيار مجموعة معينة من الوثائق المتعلقة بالمشاريع (FichOps) لدراستها، وزيارة مجموعة من مواقع المشروع. وفي بعض الحالات، كانت الذاكرة المؤسسية للمنظمات المعنية محدودة بسبب عملية تبديل الموظفين، مما جعل توفر البيانات التاريخية غير المكتوبة محدوداً. وتميزت الزيارات الخاصة لمواقع المشروع بعدة صعوبات بسبب عدم تمكن الخبراء الدوليين من السفر إلى المناطق الموجودة خارج الخرطوم. ولم يتمكن المستشار الوطني في جنوب السودان من مرافقة خبير دولي لزيارة جميع مواقع المشروع، كما تعرض فريق التقييم لعدد من التعديلات فيما يخص ترتيبات السفر على المستوى المحلي. ومع ذلك، وبفضل المصادر الثلاثية للمعلومات المتمثلة في الوثائق، والمقابلات، والاستبيان عبر الانترنت (وإمكانية المستشار المحلي في السودان من السفر إلى دارفور)، تم اعتبار نتائج عملية التقييم مُرضية.

السياق، والدعم المقدم من قبل مكتب المفوضية الأوروبية للمساعدات الإنسانية والحماية المدنية (ECHO)

الشكل 1: الأشخاص الذين كانوا في حاجة إلى مساعدات في السودان وجنوب السودان في الفترة مابين 2011 - 2015

12		11.8
10		10.5

Total people in need in Sudan and South Sudan

People in need in Sudan (total)

People in need (Darfur)

People in need South Sudan (total)

مجموع الأشخاص الذين هم في حاجة لمساعدات في السودان وجنوب السودان

الأشخاص الذين هم في حاجة لمساعدات في السودان (المجموع)

الأشخاص الذين هم في حاجة لمساعدات (دارفور)

الأشخاص الذين هم في حاجة لمساعدات في جنوب السودان (المجموع)

عانى كل من السودان وجنوب السودان ومنذ عقود من النزاعات، والجفاف، والفيضانات وغيرها من الكوارث، وأدى ذلك إلى ظهور الحاجة لمساعدات إنسانية لملايين من الأشخاص. وفي الفترة الممتدة من 2011 إلى 2015، بلغ عدد الأشخاص الذين هم في حاجة إلى مساعدات إنسانية كل عام مابين 5 و12 مليون شخص، ويشهد هذا العدد ارتفاعاً متواصلاً على مر السنين (لمزيد من التفاصيل، يرجى الرجوع إلى الشكل1 أعلاه). ومن بين الأشخاص الذين هم في حاجة ماسة للمساعدات الانسانية نازحين داخلياً، وعائدين ولاجئين ومجتمعات مستضيفة.

ولدعم الجهود الإنسانية في هذين البلدين، ساهم مكتب (ECHO) في الفترة الممتدة من 2011 إلى 2015، بمبلغ إجمالي يقدّر ب850 مليون يورو. ويعتبر مكتب (ECHO) ثالث أكبر جهة مانحة للعمل الانساني في هذين البلدين، ويساهم بحوالي 10٪ من إجمالي الاستجابة الإنسانية. وتم توفير الدعم خلال الفترة الممتدة من 2011 إلى 2015 عن طريق 13 خطة تنفيذية للمساعدات الإنسانية، وتم اختيار منها ستة مخططات رئيسية لعملية التقييم، بتمويل إجمالي يبلغ 696 مليون يورو. وتركز الدعم على تقديم المساعدات الطارئة للمحتاجين، ومنها المساعدات الغذائية، والتغذية، والصحة، والمياه والصرف الصحي، والمأوى والمواد غير الغذائية، والخدمات اللوجستية، والتنسيق، إلى جانب المحور المتعلق بالحماية. وتم توفير الدعم عن طريق 56 طرفاً شريكاً (المنظمات غير الحكومية والأمم المتحدة والمنظمات الدولية) بتقديم 247 منحة بقيمة متوسطة قدرها 1.3 مليون يورو. وبلغت قيمة أكبر منحة 58 مليون يورو (مساعدات غذائية). ومن بين الشركاء الذين تلقوا معظم التمويل: برنامج الأغذية العالمي (WFP) (41٪ من 696 مليون يورو)، الصليب الأحمر الدولي (ICRC)، والمفوضية السامية للأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين (UNHCR) واليونيسيف (UNICEF)؛ وتلقى كل من هؤلاء المؤسسات الثلاثة أكثر من 40 مليون يورو.

النتائج والاستنتاجات الرئيسية

الصلة

بيّن التقييم أن الدعم الذي قدمه مكتب (ECHO) في الفترة الممتدة من عام 2011 إلى عام 2015 فيما يتعلق بالأزمات الإنسانية في السودان وجنوب السودان كان وثيق الصلة بالسياق. كما اعتبر تقييم الاحتياجات الإنسانية، كما هو موضح في الخطط التنفيذية للمساعدات الانسانية، عالي المستوى– وهي تعدّ حقيقة أكدها جميع الأشخاص الذين تم إجراء مقابلات معهم. وعلاوة على ذلك، فإن مساعدات مكتب (ECHO) المقدمة عن طريق الشركاء تستوفي إلى حد كبير الاحتياجات الإنسانية المحددة.

وبفضل تحديث الخطط التنفيذية للمساعدات الانسانية، ومنها تخصيص أموال إضافية وفقاً للاحتياجات المطلوبة، تمكن مكتب (ECHO) من الاستجابة بسرعة وبفعالية لتغيرات الوضع في البلدين. وعلى الرغم من تنفيذ عدد محدود من التحليلات الخاصة بأخطار الحماية، إلا أن المشاريع المنفذة قد استهدفت عموماً أشد الفئات ضعفاً على غرار النازحين، واللاجئين، والأطفال والنساء، إلخ.

الترابط

تبين أن الدعم الذي قدمه مكتب (ECHO) يتماشى إلى حد كبير مع السياسات الإنسانية للمفوضية الأوروبية/ مكتب (ECHO) . وتم إدراج جميع السياسات بالكامل في الخطط التنفيذية للمساعدات الإنسانية والمشاريع المنفذة.

القيمة المضافة للاتحاد الأوروبي

اعتبرت القيمة المضافة للدعم المقدم من قبل مكتب (ECHO) عالية. وبفضل المساهمات المالية تمكن الشركاء من تنفيذ المشاريع في ظروف صعبة للغاية وتحقيق نتائج تستجيب للأهداف المنتظرة. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، قدم مكتب (ECHO) مساعدات غير مباشرة للأطراف غير الشريكة لإنجاز عمليات في الميدان، وذلك من خلال تقديم الدعم لعمليات التنسيق والجانب اللوجستي ومساندة الأعمال الإنسانية. وأعربت جميع الأطراف المعنية سواء من الشركاء أو غير الشركاء عن تقديرها للدعم المقدم للخدمات اللوجستية، والتسهيلات المتعلقة بتنفيذ الأنشطة الخاصة بالأعمال الإنسانية في هذين البلدين. وشكل الدعم المستمر لعمليات التنسيق وخاصة النظام الذي يعتمد على الجماعات، قيمة مضافة للجهود الإنسانية بشكل عام.

وقد أثنى العديد من الأشخاص الذين تم مقابلتهم بالخبرة والكفاءة المهنية التي تحلى بها موظفو مكتب (ECHO) ، مما سمح بإيجاد حلول عملية للصعوبات التي واجهها الشركاء. كما قام مكتب (ECHO) بدعم

الأنشطة والقطاعات غير الممولة من الجهات المانحة الأخرى، وبذلك ساهم في سد عدة ثغرات في مجال الاستجابة للأعمال الإنسانية.

وعلى الرغم من أن الخطط التنفيذية للمساعدات الانسانية قد عززت الربط بين الإغاثة وإعادة التأهيل والتنمية (LRRD)، فإن الفرص كانت محدودة بسبب الوضع المضطرب من جهة، وصعوبة التعاون مع الحكومات الوطنية المعنية من جهة أخرى. وفضلاً عن ذلك، فإن دورة التمويل السنوية لمكتب (ECHO) غير مناسبة لتنفيذ الأنشطة المتوسطة أو الطويلة المدى، مثلما هو منتظر عادة في مجال الالتزام الفعال مع السلطات والمجتمعات (المحلية).

الفعالية

اتضح أن الدعم المقدم من قبل مكتب (ECHO) قد تم تنفيذه بشكل فعال في جميع القطاعات، وأن المشاريع الممولة تميزت بصفة عامة بجودة عالية، وحققت إلى حد كبير النتائج المنتظرة منها. وعلى الرغم من الصعوبات التي اعترضت الحصول على الإمدادات، فإن دعم قطاع التغذية قد فتح المجال لتقديم مجموعة متنوعة من الخدمات. وتميزت الخدمات الصحية المقدمة بجودة عالية، بالرغم من وجود نقص في الإمدادات في بعض الأحيان. وعلى الرغم من أن خدمات المياه والصرف الصحي والنظافة (WASH) كانت فعالة، إلا أن الصيانة الدائمة لها ما تزال تثير بعض القلق، ويعود ذلك جزئياً للسياسات غير الواضحة للحكومة.

وكشف التقييم أن تدخل مكتب (ECHO) كان قويا جدا في مجال تأييد العمل الانساني، وتمكن أيضاً باعتباره المانح الرئيسي من التأثير على الجهات المانحة الأخرى، وخاصة في السودان.

وكان للدعم المقدم في مجال الخدمات اللوجستية والتنسيق تأثيرا ليس فقط على التنفيذ الفعال لخدمات مكتب (ECHO)، ولكن أيضاً على قدرة الجهات الأخرى النشطة في المجال الإنساني في توفير خدمات فعالة.

على الرغم من أن القياس الكمي للنتائج والآثار المترتبة ليس ممكناً، إلا أن وجد المقيمون نتيجة الدعم الهائل الذي قدمه مكتب (ECHO) بأن حياة المستفيدين قد تحسنت ويكاد يُجزَم أنه تم إنقاذ العديد من الأرواح.

الكفاءة

كشف التقييم عموماً أن مكتب (ECHO) قد سيّر الدعم بطريقة كفؤة. وعلى الرغم من بعض التأخيرات الظرفية في مجال الموافقة على العقود بسبب الإجراءات الداخلية لمكتب (ECHO) وشركائه، فإن إدارة العقود تمت بطريقة مرضية للغاية.

وبالنظر إلى أن تأمين الإمدادات يعتبر صعباً في كل من السودان وجنوب السودان ـ حيث يرتبط النقل بموسم الجفاف والعقبات الإدارية تتطلب وقتا طويلاً ـ فإن الفترة الزمنية القصيرة نسبيا لعقود مكتب (ECHO) يمكن أن

تتسبب في (المزيد من) التأخير في التنفيذ وتشكل عبئاً بالنسبة للشركاء الماليين الأصغر. لذا اعتبر التقييم أن دقة دورة التمويل كانت محدودة، وفي هذا الصدد يدعو التقييم مكتب (ECHO) إلى مراجعة المواعيد النهائية لتقديم المقترحات. ومن أجل تلبية الاحتياجات المتعلقة بالتنصيب المسبق للإمدادات والأخذ بعين الاعتبار الطبيعة الطويلة الأمد للأزمات، ينبغي إيجاد طرق لتمديد مدة المشاريع، ومراعاة أنه قد يكون القانون التنظيمي الحالي للمفوضية الأوروبية المعني بالموضوع مقيداً لها.

لم يتم توثيق الدروس المستفادة بشكل رسمي ولم تستخدم إلّا في إطار فرق الخبراء. ويعود ذلك إلى ارتفاع معدل عملية تبديل الموظفين سواء من قبل الشركاء أو الموظفين في مكتب ا (ECHO)، ويعتبر التوثيق المنتظم والفعّال للدروس المستفادة أمراً ضرورياً. وقد شهد النظام المعمول به في مؤسسة "أمل" (HOPE) تحسناً مع مرور الوقت، لكنه لا يزال من غير الممكن استرجاع الدروس المستفادة بسهولة على نطاق واسع. ومن شأن هذا النظام أن يعود بالفائدة على مكتب (ECHO) داخلياً، وأن يسمح للمجتمع الإنساني، على المستويين المحلي أو العالمي بالاستفادة منه.

على الرغم من صعوبة الوضع الذي يجعل الوصول إلى بعض المناطق محدوداً، إلا أن التقييم لم يجد أي حالات خاصة بالإدارة عن بعد "بكل ما تحمله الكلمة من معنى"، ولكن وجد حالات ظرفية للإدارة عن بعد، مما يتطلب وضع إجراءات بسيطة للإدارة عن بعد، تعتمد على المبادئ التوجيهية الحالية وأن تكون أكثر شمولية.

الاستدامة

أظهر التقييم أن الخدمات المقدمة في الحالات المتعلقة بالنزوح الطويل الأمد، ولا سيما في المخيمات يتطابق مع احتياجات النزوح ومدته. بيد أنه يمكن رفع مستوى الاستدامة بتضمين آليات استرجاع التكاليف، وتقديم مزيد من المساعدات المشروطة، ومشاركة أقوى للمجتمع، واستهداف أفضل للفئات اعتماداً على معايير الأشخاص الأكثر ضعفاً.

على الرغم من أن الخطط التنفيذية للمساعدات الإنسانية عززت الربط بين الإغاثة وإعادة التأهيل والتنمية (LRRD) إلى جانب القدرة، فإن التنفيذ الفعال لهذه الجوانب كان غير منتظم، مع وجود عدد محدود من المشاريع التي تملك عناصر الربط بين الإغاثة وإعادة التأهيل والتنمية (LRRD) أو القدرة التي يمكن تحديدها بوضوح.

توصيات استراتيجية

استنتاجات /الأسباب المنطقية	توصيات استراتيجية

توصيات استراتيجية	استنتاجات /الأسباب المنطقية
النهج المبني على المبادئ	
يجب على مكتب (ECHO) تنفيذ استراتيجية ذات شقين من أجل مواصلة النهج المبني على احترام المبادئ ومواجهة العراقيل السياسية بقدر المستطاع :	التزم مكتب (ECHO) بشكل دائم بدعم شركائه في كلا البلدين في مجال التطبيق الصارم لمبادئ الحيادية والنزاهة والاستقلالية المعترف بها على نطاق واسع. ويعتبر مكتب (ECHO) طرفاً مانحاً رئيسياً، ومطلعاً، وصوته مسموع وفعال في طرح القضايا المتعلقة بمجال العمل الإنساني. ويقوم مكتب (ECHO) غالباً بعمليات مشتركة لتأييد العمل الانساني مع أطراف مانحة أخرى.
(أ) ينبغي أن يقوم على المستوى الداخلي، بتحديد أفضل "لقواعد الالتزام" مع شركائه في حالة وقوع تناقضات بين مبادئ الحيادية والنزاهة والاستقلالية من جهة، والعمل الإنساني من جهة أخرى؛	ومع ذلك، فإن السياق العام للعمل الانساني يعتبر عسيراً نظراً للنقص الملحوظ في قابلية الدفاع عنه من قبل الحكومات التي لديها أولويات أخرى (الحرب الأهلية في جنوب السودان) أو الحكومات التي تتبع أجندة سياسية مختلفة (السودان).
(أأ) ينبغي أن يبحث على المستوى الخارجي، وبصورة منتظمة عن مختلف أوجه التآزر مع الجهات الفاعلة الأخرى المعنية سواء على مستوى الاتحاد الأوروبي أو المستوى الدولي وعلى جميع الأصعدة (في الميدان أو المقرات الرئيسية)، وذلك بغية الخروج برد موحد قوي موجه للسلطات المحلية.	وقد أثار النهج المبني على احترام المبادئ مخاوف في السودان فيما يخص ما يقدمه مكتب (ECHO) من دعم للمشاريع التي توجد في أماكن يمكن للفرق "المختلفة" الوصول إليها، بينما تحاول السلطات أحياناً عرقلة وصول المساعدات الإنسانية رداً على الانتقادات.
	هكذا ومن المحتمل ان يصدر عن هذا النهج المبني على احترام مبادئ الحيادية والنزاهة والاستقلالية حرمان الأشخاص الأكثر فقرا من المساعدات الإنسانية، مما يهدد مبدأ آخر للعمل الانساني وهو ضرورة معالجة المعاناة الإنسانية أينما وجدت.

توصيات استراتيجية	استنتاجات /الأسباب المنطقية
دعم التنسيق	
يجب على مكتب (ECHO) تعزيز دعمه وتعاونه مع آليات التنسيق على مستوى الدولة، وفي كل مكان توجد فيه قيود تحد من قدراته على مستوى الدولة، وأيضا عن طريق تأييد العمل الإنساني على المستوى العالمي/وعلى مستوى المقرات الرئيسية. يجب على مكتب (ECHO) السعي لتكثيف تعاونه مع آليات التنسيق القطاعية، ومنها دفع الشركاء للقيام بنفس الشيء، والإقرار في نفس الوقت بالثغرات الموجودة في آليات التنسيق وكيف يمكن استخدام الأموال بشكل أفضل لسد هذه الثغرات.	يوفر مكتب (ECHO) دعماً مالياً مستمراً لأكبر المنظمات الإنسانية في كلا البلدين، ومنها دعم دور مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية (OCHA). ومع ذلك، فقد تم إبداء مخاوف بشأن المنظمات الإنسانية الكبرى وفعالية آلية التنسيق التي تقودها الأمم المتحدة، في حين تطرق البعض إلى ضرورة تعزيز مكتب (ECHO) لتعهداته تجاه هياكل التنسيق.

توصيات استراتيجية	استنتاجات/ أسباب منطقية
دعم تعزيز القدرة	

يجب على مكتب (ECHO) أن يلتزم بفتح نقاش حول ما إذا كان سيشرع في نهجه الحالي المتعلق بالتركيز فقط على الأنشطة المنقذة للحياة وإدراج النهج الخاص بتعزيز قدرة أوسع و/أو النهج الخاص بالإنعاش المبكر، عندما يكون ذلك ممكناً وكيفية القيام بذلك. وفي هذا الصدد، ينبغي إعارة الاهتمام لتعزيز الدعم الموجه لسبل كسب العيش وبناء القدرات والأنشطة المجتمعية في المخيمات، وفي محيط المخيمات، وأماكن العودة.	يعتبر الواجب الإنساني المتمثل في إنقاذ الأرواح أولا وقبل كل شيء، والذي يؤيد هذا الواجب مكتب (ECHO) بشدة، ويعتبره عاملاً مهماً في تقرير الأنشطة التي ينبغي دعمها. وهناك فعلاً احتياجات إنسانية غير مستوفاة في كلا البلدين. ومع ذلك، هناك فرص لتنفيذ أنشطة الربط بين الإغاثة وإعادة التأهيل والتنمية (LRRD) / القدرة كما هو منصوص عليه في الخطط التنفيذية للمساعدات الانسانية في العامين 2014 و2015 فيما يتعلق بتطبيق القدرة – من خلال دعم سبل كسب العيش، واستخدام الطرق النقدية والقسائم، وحماية الممتلكات الزراعية.
ونظرا لسياق الأزمات المهملة طويلة الأمد، والعقوبات الاقتصادية وإرهاق المانحين في كلا البلدين، يمكن تصور تعزيز القدرة، تبعاً لسياق معين، نظرا لتركيزها على تقوية المجتمعات المحلية المتضررة والتي تستوجب مساندة بعض السلطات المحلية – التي غالباً ما يمكن الوصول إليها وتعتبر أكثر التزاما من السلطات الوطنية.	إن تمكين المجتمعات المحلية لمقاومة أفضل للصدمات في المستقبل يمكن أن يشكل نهجاً فعالاً من حيث التكلفة، باعتبار أن الطلب على المساعدات العاجلة يكون أقل، ويمكن أن يمهد الطريق أمام الشركاء للحصول على تمويل أنشطة إنمائية يمكن استخدامها لأغراض الربط بين الإغاثة وإعادة التأهيل والتنمية (LRRD).
يمكن لمكتب (ECHO) بالتعاون مع الجهات الفاعلة الأخرى والجهات المانحة في مجال التنمية مناقشة سبل المضي قدماً، ويعني ذلك تحديد ما ينبغي إدراجه في مجال دعم مكتب (ECHO) للقدرة (و/أو الربط بين الإغاثة وإعادة التأهيل والتنمية (LRRD) وما لا ينبغي إدراجه.	إلا أن قصر مدة المشاريع (السنوية) لمكتب (ECHO) وندرة التمويل، يعتبر غير مجدٍ إذا لم تتوفر أنشطة على المديين المتوسط أو الطويل، مثل تلك المطلوبة للشروع في أنشطة تتطلب القدرة.
وبما أن مشاريع تعزيز القدرة تميل إلى أخذ وقت أطول من أجل تنفيذها، نظراً للحاجة إلى ضمان	

توصيات استراتيجية	استنتاجات/ أسباب منطقية
ملكيتها من طرف المجتمعات المستفيدة، ينبغي إطلاع الشركاء بطرق تحديد الإستراتيجيات متعددة السنوات، وكيفية تمديد فترة المشروع؛ أو نوع الضمان لمواصلة تمويل مشاريعهم. وفي الوقت الحالي ليس من الممكن إصدار عقود متعددة السنوات بسبب القيود القانونية. وفي انتظار تغيير محتمل في قاعدة البيانات القانونية، يمكن أن نستخلص الدروس من خطة العمل الخاصة بالحد من مخاطر الجفاف (DRRAP) المنفذة في منطقة القرن الافريقي.	

توصيات استراتيجية	استنتاجات/ أسباب منطقية
استخدام الدروس المستخلصة	
يجب على مكتب (ECHO) تعزيز إمكانية الاحتفاظ بالدروس المستفادة ونشرها، من أجل تجنب "إعادة الكرّة"، وتقديم دعم محتمل لتنفيذ أنشطة أكثر فعالية من حيث التكلفة. يمكن أن تستخدم الدروس المستفادة في النهاية كقاعدة للابتكارات. وقد يؤدي ذلك إلى اتخاذ إجراءات أكثر فعالية تساهم في إنقاذ المزيد من الأرواح باستخدام نفس مبلغ التمويل. وفي هذه الأحوال يجب على مكتب (ECHO) ضمان تقديم الشركاء لمعلومات كافية عن الدروس المستفادة. ينبغي أن يتم اكتساب الدروس المستفادة والممارسات الفضلى والوصول إليها والبحث عنها بطريقة أسهل. وربما أفضل طريقة لتحقيق ذلك هو القيام بعمليات البحث الخاصة بكل قطاع في السجلات الموجودة في قاعدة بيانات مشروع مؤسسة "أمل" (HOPE) لمكتب المديرية العامة للمفوضية الأوروبية للمساعدات الإنسانية والحماية المدنية (DG-ECHO). كما ينبغي تبادل الدروس المستفادة والممارسات الفضلى مع الشركاء، مثلاً من خلال ورش العمل، ومن خلال المجموعات، أو تبادل ملخصات مكتوبة على المستوى الوطني أو العالمي.	تعتبر إجراءات مكتب (ECHO) الخاصة بتحديد وتوثيق واستخدام الدروس المستفادة (خاصة من خلال مجموعة الخبراء) غير واضحة، ولا يتم تطبيقها بصفة منتظمة. كما أن الشركاء لا يمنحون دائماً اهتماماً كافياً لملء الملف المطلوب حول الدروس المستفادة في استمارة التقرير النهائي. وتعاني الوثائق واستغلال الدروس المستفادة من عدم التنظيم ، وتعتمد أساسا على ذاكرة موظفي مكتب (ECHO). ومهما كان، فإنه لا يتم الاحتفاظ دائماً بالموظفين لأكثر من سنة أو سنتين بسبب الظروف المضطربة والصعبة في السودان وجنوب السودان.

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