

# Evaluation of the implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid

## Final Report June 2014 Volume 2 – Annexes

This evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Sector of the  
Directorate General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection – ECHO  
(European Commission)

*The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' point of view which are not  
necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the authorities of the concerned countries.*

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# **Annex 1 – Terms of Reference**

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## **1. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS**

### **1.1. BACKGROUND**

The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid is the core policy document guiding European Union (EU) actions in the area of humanitarian aid. It establishes common principles and objectives as well as policy scope and implementation framework for the delivery of EU humanitarian aid. Signed by the Presidents of the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission on 18 December 2007, the Consensus expresses the highest political commitment of the EU, including the Member States, to the provisions enshrined therein.

The European Consensus confirms the EU's commitment to the fundamental humanitarian principles, to the promotion of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and to enhancing the effectiveness and quality of needs-driven humanitarian assistance. The Consensus seeks to ensure coherence and complementarity with other actors and policies when addressing humanitarian crises, and outlines the EU's role and added-value in the international humanitarian system. It also stresses the importance of partnerships and of respecting the Principles and Good Practices of Good Humanitarian Donorship with the overall focus on ensuring an adequate and high-quality assistance to the affected people.

Although it is not a legally binding document, it contains a number of directly-applicable commitments such as those related to the humanitarian principles, IHL or the use of civil protection resources and military assets in response to complex emergencies. The Consensus is widely recognized as the key reference document at the European Union level.

Based on the Consensus, the European Commission was tasked with presenting an Action Plan for practical measures to implement the Consensus, which was released on 29 May 2008<sup>1</sup>. The Action Plan was adopted for implementation by the European Commission and Member States. It contains actions divided into the following six areas:

- Area one: advocacy, promotion of humanitarian principles and international law;
- Area two: implementing quality aid approaches;
- Area three: reinforcing capacities to respond;
- Area four: strengthening partnership;
- Area five: enhancing coherence and coordination;
- Area six: the aid continuum.

On 8 December 2010, a Mid-term Review of the Action Plan was presented with the overall aim to assess progress and to propose a number of recommendations to reinforce EU-wide implementation efforts. It was conducted by the European Commission and the Member States, in consultation with the European Parliament and humanitarian partners. The Mid-Term review highlighted considerable advances in cooperation on humanitarian aid at an EU-level following the adoption of the European Consensus; indicated some key challenges; and

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<sup>1</sup> Consensus Action Plan: [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/working\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/working_paper_en.pdf)

set out recommendations with a view to further reinforcing the European Union's contribution to humanitarian aid.<sup>2</sup>

Following the Mid-term Review, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions on 17 May 2011, in which it endorsed the findings of the Review, welcomed its recommendations and priorities, and agreed to pursue further joint EU efforts on a number of issues<sup>3</sup>.

### JUSTIFICATION AND TIMING OF THE EVALUATION

The 2010 Mid-Term Review of the Action Plan proposed in its recommendations to carry out an evaluation of the impact of the European Consensus towards the end of the five-year period of the current Action Plan<sup>4</sup>.

Given that the Consensus is a joint statement of the Council of the European Union, the EU Members States, the European Commission and the European Parliament, establishing their shared commitments, the evaluation of the implementation of the Consensus in terms of policy and practice should cover both the Commission and the Member States and be undertaken jointly, in consultation with the European Parliament and relevant stakeholders.

Regarding the timing, the current Action Plan will expire in mid-2013. By that time, the European Commission and the Member States will have started discussion on possible options for its follow-up. The follow-up approach should be agreed by the end of 2013 at the latest. The evaluation will feed into these processes as they run.

### 1.2. DESCRIPTION OF TASKS

#### Purpose, Objective and Scope

The current evaluation should contribute to advance EU reflection on the future implementation of its humanitarian policy, including practical considerations to be reflected in a follow-up to the current Consensus Action Plan. It should also identify key lessons learnt to improve decision making in the future.

The main objective of the evaluation is to deliver an independent assessment of the implementation of the Consensus and of the Action Plan at the European Union level, in view of reflections on follow-up to the current Action Plan after its expiry in mid-2013, and improving European Union performance in humanitarian field in the future. In particular, the evaluation will investigate to what extent to which the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid has contributed to better coordination and coherence in the implementation of EU Humanitarian Assistance by the Commission and the Member States.

In this regard, and in the first place, the evaluation will provide an assessment of the implementation of the Consensus by the European Union comparing results against objectives laid down in the Consensus and its Action Plan.

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<sup>2</sup>Mid-term Review of the Action Plan:

[http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/mid-term\\_review/1\\_EN\\_ACT\\_part1\\_v21.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/mid-term_review/1_EN_ACT_part1_v21.pdf)

<sup>3</sup>Council Conclusions on Mid-term Review:

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/118460.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/118460.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> The Mid-term review of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan, p. 10, point 6

[http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/mid-term\\_review/1\\_EN\\_ACT\\_part1\\_v21.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/mid-term_review/1_EN_ACT_part1_v21.pdf)



The evaluation will also conclude how far the processes in place, following the adoption of the Consensus, supported the achievement of its overall objectives in terms of better humanitarian response.

Finally, the evaluation will assess the progress made and implementation gaps. It will also make recommendations as to how to ensure strong continued commitment to the application of the European Consensus by the European Commission and the EU Member States, better awareness of the commitments contained therein by actors beyond the 'traditional' humanitarian stakeholders (e.g. external affairs actors).

### **Scope**

The evaluation will focus on two main subjects: it will assess how the Consensus is implemented and on how the Action Plan is used.

The evaluation will assess the influence that the Consensus has had on the formulation and implementation of EU humanitarian aid policy and operations, in particular in the action areas foreseen in the Consensus Action Plan. The analysis should include all levels from high-level political commitments, humanitarian aid approaches, strategic and policy approaches at the European and national levels through their implementation in practice, including in the field. It should also take into consideration EU Civil Protection activities in third countries; to the extent they play a role in relief operations.

The time-period covered by the evaluation is **2008 to 2012**.

The key users of the evaluation will include the European Commission and the EU Member States as well as all stakeholders involved in the planning, development and implementation of humanitarian activities.

### **Evaluation Questions**

The evaluation will address the following questions:

#### **Overarching questions:**

1. To what extent has the Consensus been actively implemented by the European Commission and the EU Member States and has influenced and supported the EU Member States in developing their individual humanitarian aid policies, structures and procedures?
2. To what extent has the Consensus Action Plan assisted in translating the Consensus into operational practice?

#### **Specific questions:**

- To what extent has better EU complementarity and coordination permitted more efficient and effective humanitarian response to crises, including the avoidance of overlaps and adequate contribution to the meeting of humanitarian needs, following the adoption of the Consensus?
- To what extent has the Consensus led to a more coherent and visible EU response to humanitarian crises?
- To what extent has strengthened EU information-share, policy exchange and operational coordination and promotion of best practice led to strengthening of the overall EU contribution to the international humanitarian system?

- To what extent has the implementation of the Consensus contributed to strengthening the respect of the fundamental humanitarian principles, promotion of IHL and recognition of the aims and objectives of EU humanitarian action?
- To what extent has the Consensus contributed to a better, needs-based response for people in need facing humanitarian crisis? What areas of practical application would benefit from more emphasis in further implementation of the Consensus commitments?
- To what extent has the Consensus contributed to improved coherence and complementarity between humanitarian policy and other external policies, in particular strengthened interaction with development actors as well as with political and military actors?
- To what extent has the Consensus contributed to improve the complementarity and coherence between in EU civil protection resources in third countries facing disaster with humanitarian aid?

When addressing the evaluation questions, and whenever feasible/applicable, the evaluators will take due account of

- the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria: relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact <sup>5</sup>;
- the 3Cs<sup>6</sup> - complementarity, coordination and coherence;
- and the 23 Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship<sup>7</sup>.

### 1.3. EVALUATION PROCESS AND DELIVERABLES

The work of the evaluators will be structured according to the following stages:

- Inception phase
- Data collection phase
- Synthesis phase

#### **Inception Phase**

**The inception phase and the data collection phase start from the moment the contract is signed.** The contactor will ensure that appropriate literature review and data collection is carried out during the whole contract. The Inception phase will be based on both documents provided by the Steering Committee, Member States and collected by the contractors from the start of their work. The documents may be produced by the European Commission, Member States, other European Institutions or any other relevant actor (international agencies, other donors, partners, communities of practice...). The contractor will ensure that an appropriate literature review is carried out throughout the contract.

At the beginning of the **Inception Phase, an Inception Meeting** with the Steering Committee will take place in Brussels at DG ECHO headquarters. The purpose of the meeting is to consolidate the understanding by the evaluation team of:

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<sup>5</sup> For further explanation of these evaluative criteria evaluators are advised to refer to the ALNAP guide "Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC Criteria. An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies", ODI, 2006. Evaluators should also refer to the "Evaluation of humanitarian aid by and for NGOs. A guide with ideas to consider when designing your own evaluation activities", Prolog Consult, 2007 ([http://ec.europa.eu/echo/evaluation/thematic\\_en.htm#eval\\_guide](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/evaluation/thematic_en.htm#eval_guide)).

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.three-Cs.net>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/gns/principles-good-practice-ghd/overview.aspx>

- the context in which the evaluation is being launched, of its purpose and scope
- the evaluation questions
- the main methodological options
- the evaluation process
- the time schedule

During this meeting, the evaluators will present their understanding of the Terms of Reference, they will propose judgement criteria (JC) for each evaluation question as well as a detailed presentation of the methodology proposed (using a Power Point Presentation). All necessary clarifications will be provided by the Steering Committee during the meeting.

Two weeks after the Inception Meeting, a one-day workshop with the Reference Group (see section 1.4 below) will be held in Brussels. The European Commission will provide the meeting room. The contractor will organize the event<sup>8</sup>. The contractor will facilitate the workshop and draft its conclusions.

One week after the workshop the contractor will produce a short **Inception Report**. The Inception Report will provide information concerning the data collection and analysis activities carried out up to that moment, limits, and challenges. It will

- summarise the contents of the Inception Meeting;
- summarise the conclusions of the workshop;
- refine the evaluation questions and the judgement criteria on the basis of the information received during the meeting and in the course of the interviews held around it;
- refine the intervention logic, accordingly to comments;
- refine any draft methodological tools required in the Specifications or proposed by the contractors in their offer;
- identify limitations and challenges;
- provide an outline of the next steps in the evaluation work;
- identify potential additional issues for consideration based on inception phase documents study, interviews;
- and suggest a final timing for the evaluation in terms of next steps in the evaluation process, including the schedule for the field work and case studies.

The Inception Report will be commented on by the Steering Committee, redrafted by the contractor on the basis of the comments received and if satisfactory, approved by the Commission. If the Contractor does not accept to take all comments into account, the reasons why will be clearly justified in writing, in a separate document.

### **Data Collection Phase**

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<sup>8</sup> It means that contractor will prepare and send invitations, prepare presentation (ppt) and all other relevant documents necessary for distribution, will facilitate the discussion, and will provide catering for maximum 60 persons.

During the Data Collection Phase the contractor will contact all Member States in order to gather all data and information necessary to conclude on the progress in implementation of the Consensus. The contractor will foresee at least one visit to Geneva. Visits to the HQ of other International Organisations and NGOs may be foreseen if necessary.

The evaluators shall accomplish the following tasks in order to collect the data necessary for the evaluation:

- an analysis of all relevant documents (legal, policy and strategy documents, relevant country information and evaluations, public statements on humanitarian situations...) provided by the EU Institutions and Member States;
- an analysis of existing evidence and facts (databases, reports, statistics...) provided by other actors involved in humanitarian aid: notably, other donors, partners, international agencies;
- interviews with EU humanitarian actors, including Member States' representatives, implementing organizations;
- interviews, surveys and other types of data collection tools, to be defined by the contractor and validated by the Steering Committee, in order to get relevant information from other stakeholders (affected populations, national authorities, other donors, partners, international agencies ...), including, visits to Member States and to the seats of relevant International Organisations and United Nations Agencies. *N.B. In any case, all Member States will have to be contacted during and for the purposes of this evaluation;*
- field visits to a sample of **2 countries** where the highest number of EU Member States are funding humanitarian aid;

The objective of the field visits is to identify and illustrate the actual translation of Consensus principles and actions in terms of actual cooperation in the field and, possibly, how cooperation has, or has not, led to more efficient, timely and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. They are not aimed at identifying the impact of individual projects, programmes or interventions, but should contribute to assessing to what extent the existence of the consensus may contribute to such an impact. Each country visit should last a minimum of ten days. In their offer, the tenderers will propose the case studies that they intend to carry out. The final decision on the case studies will be taken by the Commission during the inception phase. A final workshop in the field, with the participation of the EU Delegation, DG ECHO representatives, Member States' representatives and partners, shall be organised before leaving each country where field visits have taken place. The modalities and content of the workshop will be discussed and agreed with DG ECHO staff in the field and the Evaluation Sector will be informed about them beforehand. The summary of the workshops in the field as well as a short description of the field visits will be sent to the Evaluation Sector.

The travel and accommodation arrangements, the organisation of meetings and the securing of visas for the field visits will remain the sole responsibility of the contractor. If, during the Data Collection Phase, any significant change from the agreed methodology or scheduled work plan is considered necessary, this will be explained to and agreed with the Steering Committee.

At the end of the data collection phase, a meeting will be organized during which **an Interim Report** will be presented to the Steering Committee.

The Interim Report will include:

- short description of the data collection work implemented, including the meetings, reviews and interviews conducted;
- presentation of the data allowing for clarification of the global issues, over and above individual evaluation questions, with a view to making an overall assessment;
- presentation of both problems encountered and solutions found, to examine the reliability of the collected data and to present its main findings;
- refined version of the overall methodology for the evaluation on the basis of the work carried out so far;
- revision of the initial assumptions concerning the evaluation questions on the basis of the preliminary analysis carried out during the data collection phase;
- discussion of possible issues identified during the Data Collection Phase that had not been previously raised. The Steering Committee will consider these issues and decide on whether they merit further consideration in the light of the evaluation;
- series of draft individual factsheets describing the implementation measures taken in each Member State.

The contractors will take into consideration all comments received from the Steering Committee concerning the interim report. The cases where these comments were not fully taken into account have to be justified providing arguments in written. The report will be approved by the Commission.

### **Synthesis Phase**

The contractors will analyse the whole of the information collected in order to obtain evidence-based findings to each of the Evaluation Questions. This will be done by properly combining primary data (i.e. information collected directly by the evaluators during their work) with secondary information (programming and policy documents, monitoring reports and data, statistical data, relevant studies and evaluations, etc.).

At the end of the synthesis phase, the contractors will facilitate a second **one-day workshop** with the Reference Group in Brussels, in the same conditions as the first one. The objective of the workshop will be to carry out a discussion on the key findings identified during the data collection phase evaluation. The conclusions of the workshop will be integrated in the synthesis work and will appear as a separate annex in the final evaluation report.

On the basis of the analysis done, and the results of the workshop, the Contractors will provide the Commission with a draft **final evaluation report** provided within 20 days. The Steering Committee will comment on the draft evaluation report. The contractors will take into consideration all comments received from the Commission. If the Contractor doesn't accept to take all comments into account, the reasons why will be clearly justified in writing, in a separate document.

The report is a working tool of value only as long as it is feasible and pragmatic, keeping in mind practical constraints and it clearly reflects the evaluator's independent view. The final report should be based on the whole evaluation process and previous reports.

The evaluator will provide conclusions in the form of evidence-based, reasoned answers to each of the evaluation questions. Additionally, it can present overall conclusions in a separate chapter.

Recommendations should be linked to each of the conclusions, without being a direct copy of them. The recommendations have to be prioritised.

The **final report** must:

- be consistent, concise and clear;
- be well balanced between argumentation, tables and paragraphs;
- be free of linguistic errors;
- include a table of contents, indicating the page number of all chapters listed therein, a complete list in alphabetical order of any abbreviations used in the text;
- contain the executive summary, max 5 pages, translated into French and German<sup>9</sup>;
- include a list of annexes;
- the report should be written in the font Time Roman 12, with single line spacing;
- the main report should not exceed 70 pages, including a cover page, the table of content, the list of annexes and abbreviations.

The final report shall be written in a straightforward manner with an Executive Summary at the beginning of the document. Final editing shall be provided by the contractor.

### **Summary of deliverables**

In short, throughout the evaluations and according to the time scheme above, the evaluators will be expected to deliver the following products:

1. Inception report (Inception phase)
2. First workshop (Inception phase)
3. Interim report (Data collection phase)
4. Second workshop (Synthesis phase)
5. Draft and Final report (Synthesis phase)

All deliverables will be provided in English.

### **Quality assessment**

The quality of the final report will be assessed by the European Commission (the evaluation sector, of the DG ECHO) on the basis of the quality assessment grid, as indicated here below:

#### **QUALITY GRID** **[Title of the Evaluation]** **[Draft / Final Report] [Date]**

<b>Concerning these criteria, the evaluation report is:</b>	<b>Unacceptable</b>	<b>Poor</b>	<b>Good</b>	<b>Very Good</b>	<b>Excellent</b>
<b>1. Meeting needs:</b> Does the evaluation adequately address the information needs of the commissioning body and fit the terms of reference?					

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<sup>9</sup> The costs of translation of the executive summary will be included in the price of the evaluation.

## 1. Technical Specifications

<b>2. Relevant scope:</b> Is the rationale of the policy and its set of outputs, results and outcomes/impacts examined fully, including both intended and unexpected policy interactions and consequences?					
<b>3. Defensible design:</b> Is the evaluation design appropriate and adequate to ensure that the full set of findings, along with methodological limitations, is made accessible for answering the main evaluation questions?					
<b>4. Reliable data:</b> Are the primary and secondary data selected adequate? Are they sufficiently reliable for their intended use?					
<b>5. Sound analysis:</b> Is quantitative and qualitative information appropriately and systematically analysed according to the state of the art so that evaluation questions are answered in a valid way?					
<b>6. Credible findings:</b> Do findings follow logically from, and are they justified by, the data analysis and interpretations based on carefully described assumptions and rationale?					
<b>7. Validity of the conclusions:</b> Does the report provide clear conclusions? Are conclusions based on credible findings?					
<b>8. Usefulness of the recommendations:</b> Are recommendations fair, unbiased by personal or stakeholders' views, and sufficiently detailed to be operationally applicable?					
<b>9. Clearly reported:</b> Does the report clearly describe the policy being evaluated, including its context and purpose, together with the procedures and findings of the evaluation, so that information provided can easily be understood?					
<b>Taking into account the contextual constraints on the evaluation, the overall quality rating of the report is considered</b>					

### Dissemination

To facilitate dissemination, together with the final report, the evaluators will provide a Power Point presentation in electronic form, with the main conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. Before the expiration of the contract, the contractors may be required to present briefly DG ECHO's staff or stakeholders with the results of the evaluation.

The contractors might be also requested to present main conclusions and recommendations of the final report to Members States representatives during the COHAFa meeting in Brussels.

## 1.4. MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION

### The evaluation manager

The evaluation will be managed by the Evaluation Sector of DG ECHO, assisted by a Steering Committee chaired by the European Commission and composed of representatives of Member States and the Commission.

The DG ECHO Evaluation manager is the contact person for the contractor and shall assist the team during their mission in tasks such as providing documents and facilitating contacts.

As DG ECHO Evaluation Sector will lead the evaluation, the internal manager assigned to the evaluation, should therefore always be kept informed and consulted by the contractor and copied in all correspondence.

### **The Steering Committee**

The Steering Committee discusses and comments on the terms of reference drawn up by the evaluation manager, which are the basis for this evaluation.

It aggregates and summarises the views of the Commission and the Member States and acts as an interface between the evaluation team and the stakeholders for this evaluation, thereby supplementing bilateral contacts.

It provides suggestions and advice to the Commission about the conduct of the evaluation.

It discusses and comments on notes and reports produced by the evaluation team.

It assists in the feedback of the findings, conclusions and recommendations from the evaluation.

As chair of the committee, the Commission collects, integrates and communicates the comments from the different members of the team in a coherent manner. As responsible for the contract, it takes the final decision on issues linked to the implementation of the evaluation, taking due account of the comments and suggestions received from the Steering Committee.

The Commission will convene meetings of the Steering Committee during the evaluation process. Meetings will take place in Brussels.

In parallel, all Member States will be able to follow the evaluation, provide input to the evaluation via an existing IT platform for the Network for the Evaluation of the EU Humanitarian Activities by providing comments to all evaluation deliverables. Member States can also disseminate the final evaluation report in their countries and follow up final recommendations.

### **The Reference Group**

The Reference Group will be composed of experts in humanitarian area in the European Institutions and representatives of the NGOs and Civil Society interested in the evaluation. The role of the Reference Group will be consultative. The Reference Group will be involved through two workshops organized during the evaluation process.

### **The evaluation team**

Each team member is jointly responsible for the final accomplishment of the tasks; however, the separate elements of work necessary for the accomplishment of the tasks should be allocated between the experts and clearly specified in the offers for the tender. The members of the team must work in close co-ordination.

The team leader appointed in the contractor's offer shall have the added responsibility of the overall co-ordination of the tasks to be completed, of the elaboration of Executive Summary



and of the final coherence of the report and related work, both in terms of content and presentation.

### 1.5. TIMETABLE

The work must be completed within **9 months from the date of the Inception Meeting**. The contractor is expected to start the work immediately after the contract has been signed.

At the latest, **the draft final report will be delivered by the end of the 8 month after the Inception Meeting**. Unless explicitly authorised by the Commission in written form, **this deadline has to be strictly respected**.

The evaluation starts at the actual signature of the contract and by no means any contact and/or expense may occur before it. The largest part of relevant documents will be provided after the signature of the contract and during the Inception phase.

In their offer, the bidders shall provide an indicative schedule based on the table below. As a reminder stages in the evaluation process have to follow this logical process, but may overlap slightly:

Dates	Evaluation Phases and Stages	Meetings	Deliverables
1 <sup>st</sup> month	Inception Phase (max. 2 months)	Inception Meeting	
1 <sup>st</sup> month			Workshop
2 <sup>nd</sup> month			Inception Report
3 <sup>rd</sup> to 6 <sup>th</sup> month	Data collection phase (max. 4 months)		
6 <sup>th</sup> month		Meeting on the Interim Report	Interim Report
6 <sup>th</sup> month	Synthesis phase (max. 2 months)		Workshop
8 <sup>th</sup> months			Draft Final Report
		Meeting on Draft Final Report	
9 <sup>th</sup> month			Final Report

#### Complementary information:

- European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid:  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:025:0001:0012:EN:PDF>
- Consensus Action Plan:  
[http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/working\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/working_paper_en.pdf)

## 1. Technical Specifications

- Mid-term Review of the Action Plan:  
[http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/mid-term\\_review/1\\_EN\\_ACT\\_part1\\_v21.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/mid-term_review/1_EN_ACT_part1_v21.pdf)
- Staff Working Document attached to the Mid-term Review:  
[http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/mid-term\\_review/1\\_EN\\_autre\\_document\\_travail\\_service\\_part1\\_v21.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/mid-term_review/1_EN_autre_document_travail_service_part1_v21.pdf)
- Council Conclusions on Mid-term Review:  
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122057.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122057.pdf)
- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development  
<http://www.oecd.org/dac/>
- Humanitarian principles:  
[http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OOM\\_HumPrinciple\\_English.pdf](http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OOM_HumPrinciple_English.pdf)<http://www.godhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/home.aspx>

**Variants are not allowed.**

## Annex 2 – Methodological approach

This annex presents the overall methodological approach taken for this evaluation. This includes the following elements, addressed in separate subsections below:


- Evaluation phases
- Evaluation questions
- Data collection tools

### 1. Evaluation phases

As foreseen by the ToR, the evaluation was conducted in **three main phases** (inception, data collection and synthesis). Each phase had its own activities and deliverables. In addition, the evaluation includes a dissemination phase for the evaluation.

The following Figure summarizes the activities carried out in each phase, the deliverables produced and the interaction with the Steering Committee and Reference Group.

**Figure 1 – Evaluation Phases**



## 2. Evaluation questions

The EQs for this evaluation were approved by the evaluation Steering Committee.<sup>1</sup>

The set of questions is constituted as follows:

- The first two questions are overarching questions: one on the overall implementation and influence of the European Consensus and the other one on the usefulness of the Action Plan in this respect;
- Four questions relate to issues of “coordination”, “complementarities” or “coherence” in the context of the European Consensus:
  - EQ 3 tackles the issue of coordination and complementarities at the level of humanitarian aid *strategies and operations* of the different EU institutions and MS;
  - EQ 4 concerns the issue of coherence in the sense of the consistency between EU institutions’ and MS’s *humanitarian aid policies*. In addition it examines issues of EU visibility and value added;
  - EQ 8 also concerns coherence, but in the sense of the consistency between EU institutions’ and MS’s *humanitarian aid policies* on the one hand *and their other external policies* on the other hand;
  - EQ 9 focuses on the improved complementarities between *EU humanitarian and civil protection resources*.
- The three remaining questions focus on other priorities of the European Consensus :
  - EQ 5 concerns the EU contributions to international good practices initiatives;
  - EQ 6 focuses on the contributions of the Consensus to upholding and promoting humanitarian principles and IHL;
  - EQ 7 aims at verifying to what extent the Consensus enhanced need based responses.

Table 1 below lists the nine questions.

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<sup>1</sup> The full set of evaluation questions including judgment criteria and indicators are included in Annex VI.

**Table 1 – Proposed evaluation questions**

#	Evaluation Question
<b>EQ 1</b>	<b>On making the Consensus concrete</b> <i>To what extent has the Consensus been implemented by EU Institutions and MS and has it influenced and supported them in developing their humanitarian aid policies, structures and procedures?</i>
<b>EQ 2</b>	<b>On the usefulness of the Action Plan</b> <i>To what extent has the Consensus Action Plan assisted EU Institutions and MS in translating the Consensus into operational practice?</i>
<b>EQ 3</b>	<b>On coordination and complementarities for responses to crises</b> <i>To what extent has the EU Consensus improved the coordination between EU Institutions and MS and enhanced the complementarities between their humanitarian aid strategies and operations?</i>
<b>EQ 4</b>	<b>On coherence and visibility</b> <i>To what extent has the Consensus led to a more coherent and visible EU response to humanitarian crises, with a clear EU added value?</i>
<b>EQ 5</b>	<b>On EU contributions to the international humanitarian system</b> <i>To what extent did the implementation of the Consensus strengthen the international humanitarian system by fostering a common EU position and approach to international good practice initiatives?</i>
<b>EQ 6</b>	<b>On upholding and promoting humanitarian principles and IHL</b> <i>To what extent has the implementation of the Consensus contributed to promoting and upholding the fundamental humanitarian principles, promoting IHL and respecting the distinct nature of humanitarian aid?</i>
<b>EQ 7</b>	<b>On needs-based responses</b> <i>To what extent has the implementation of the Consensus contributed to ensuring that EU responses to humanitarian crises were based on humanitarian needs and not on other concerns?</i>
<b>EQ 8</b>	<b>On coherence with other external policies</b> <i>To what extent has the implementation of the Consensus contributed to targeting improved coherence between EU Institutions and MS' humanitarian policies and other external policies, and better coordination and division of roles between the corresponding actors? with a view to guarantee independance of humanitarian idea</i>
<b>EQ 9</b>	<b>On civil protection</b> <i>To what extent has the Consensus contributed to improve complementarities between EU humanitarian and civil protection resources in third countries ?</i>

### 3. Data collection tools and approaches

This section outlines the data collection tools and approaches used during the data collection phase. It contains three subsections:


- **The overall methodological approach** : a description of the overall methodological design
- **Data collection work done** : a brief description of the work completed to date and the tasks that remain to be completed
- **Problems encountered and solutions found** : a short overview of problems encountered during the data collection phase and the solutions found by the evaluation team.

#### 3.1 Overall methodological approach

The evaluation was designed around multiple evaluation tools in order to allow cross-checking between sources.

The following diagram presents the full set of data collection tools used:

**Figure 2 – data collection tools**



These tools were intended to facilitate a multi-stakeholder approach:

### 3.2 Data collection work done

The following figure presents the data collection activities undertaken by the evaluation team:

**Figure 3 – Data collection work done**

<b>Policy/strategy document</b>	5	224 policy/strategy documents reviewed and integrated in findings per evaluation question. Documents included national policies and strategies, system-wide reviews, ECHO questionnaire, mapping and fit for purpose responses.
<b>EU aid inventory</b>	5	Inventory of EU humanitarian aid 2008-2012 completed and integrated in findings per evaluation question and the Member State factsheets (Annex II).
<b>Country reports / evaluations</b>	5	96 country reports and/or evaluations collected from EU Member States and integrated in findings per evaluation question.
<b>Literature review</b>	5	Literature review conducted covering a forward-looking assessment of challenges expected to affect to the humanitarian landscape in the coming decade.
<b>Interviews</b>	5	184 stakeholders met across 80 interviews, conducted in Brussels (DG ECHO, EEAS, DG DEVCO, UN Agencies, NGOs), Geneva, in 8 EU MS (cf. below), in Kenya and in Pakistan. Interview results collated and integrated into findings per evaluation question.
<b>Member State survey</b>	5	Survey sent to 28 Member States; 26 responses received and results integrated into findings per evaluation questions.
<b>NGO survey</b>	5	Survey sent to the members of the VOICE Consensus TaskForce, 16 responses received, representing 29 NGO members of the VOICE network, plus two non-members.
<b>Member State and Geneva</b>	5	Field missions conducted to eight Member States (Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Spain, Poland, UK) and Geneva. Interviews conducted with Member State agency staff, NGO and implementing partners.
<b>Field visits (Kenya and Pakistan)</b>	5	Field visits conducted to two recipient countries: Kenya and Pakistan. Interviews conducted included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Nairobi : 6 EU Member States, 2 other donors, 3 Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement bodies, 6 UN agencies, 7 NGOs</li> <li>▪ Islamabad : 8 EU Member States, 7 other donors, 3 Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement bodies, 5 UN Agencies, 12 NGOs</li> </ul> Interview results integrated into findings per evaluation question.
<b>Telephone interviews</b>	5	Telephone interviews conducted with EU Delegations and ECHO offices in four countries not visited during the field mission (Democratic Republic of Congo, the Occupied Territories of Palestine, Jordan and Ethiopia).

The EU Member State and field visits were selected in order to present a range of different contexts across several criteria. The full set of criteria are presented below:

*EU Member State visits:*<sup>2</sup>

- **EU15 / New Member State** : a mix of EU15 and New Member States were selected, on the basis of the date of their accession to the EU (before or after 1 May 2004, respectively).
- **Total humanitarian aid contributed** : a range of Member States with varying total humanitarian aid contributions to humanitarian aid over the evaluation period.
- **Humanitarian aid per capita** : a range of Member States by total humanitarian aid contributions over the evaluation period, divided by the average population figure for 2008-2012.
- **Humanitarian aid as a percentage of GDP** : a range of Member States by total humanitarian aid contributions over the evaluation period, divided by the average GDP figure for 2008-2012.
- **Percentage of humanitarian aid given to forgotten crises** : a range of Member States by share of humanitarian aid contributions to recipient countries listed in ECHO's forgotten crisis assessments 2008-2012.
- **HRI scores** : The Humanitarian Response Index 2011 (HRI 2011) provides an industry overview of 23 OECD-DAC humanitarian donors. Whilst the HRI has received criticism in some quarters, it is used here as a means to add to the quantitative analysis provided by the preceding criteria. Member State scores on the HRI 2011 are available for the EU15 but not the New Member States. The Member State visit selection included a range of Member States the following HRI parameters:
  - The donor grouping<sup>3</sup>
  - The Pillar 1 score<sup>4</sup>
- **Interlocutor presence** : The evaluators collected information regarding the presence of humanitarian aid organisations and civil society groups in several Member State capitals. Member State visits were selection with a view to maximise the number of interlocutors met in each visit.

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<sup>2</sup> Data used in the selection process was based on the evaluators' analysis of the data in UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service, as used in section 2, above.

<sup>3</sup> The donor groupings are determined by the authors of the HRI 2011 index on the basis of the findings for that year. Three groupings are identified : principled partners, learning leaders and aspiring actors. The groupings reflect the qualitative differences between humanitarian donors across a range of criteria. For a full explanation of these categories, please see Dara International (2011), « The Humanitarian Response Index 2011 ».

<sup>4</sup> The Pillar 1 score quantifies the extent to which the donor succeeds in providing humanitarian aid in a needs-responsive manner, on the basis of the findings of the HRI Index 2011.



### *Field visits :<sup>5</sup>*

- **Number of Member State donors** : Field visits were selected to include countries with a high number of EU Member States that have contributed humanitarian aid to the country over 2008-2012.
- **Total contributions received** : Field visits were selected to include countries with a high level of financial contributions received in humanitarian aid from all EU Member States over the evaluation period.
- **Instances of “forgotten crises”**: Field visits were selected to include at least one country featured in ECHO’s Forgotten Crisis Assessment over the period 2008-2012. *Source: ECHO Forgotten Crisis Assessment 2008-2012.*
- **Protracted crises** : Field visits were selected to include at least one protracted crisis. The evaluators used the FAO definition of protracted crises as given in FAO (2010) “The State of Food Insecurity in the World”. *Source: FAO 2010 The State of Food Insecurity in the World.*
- **ECHO Global Vulnerability and Crisis Assessment (GVCA) Index** : Field visits were chosen to include at least country with a crisis listed on each of the ECHO 2013 GNA Index categories. The GNA Index provides a categorisation of humanitarian crises worldwide, according to the severity of three crisis factors: (i) natural disasters index (ii) conflict index and (iii) uprooted people index. Each factor is ranked on a scale of 0-3, with 3 implying the greatest severity.<sup>6</sup> (*Source: ECHO GVCA Index 2013*)
- **Geographical region** : The recipient country visits were chosen to include at least one African country and at least one non-African country.
- **Most recent crisis appeal** : The field visits sought to visit countries with recent crisis appeals, as registered on the UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service over the period 2008-2012.
- **Interlocutor accessibility**: field visits were selected in order to maximise the number of interlocutors met. Thus, an assessment of interlocutor accessibility and availability was made by the evaluators for countries that satisfied the criteria listed above. This information was recorded in terms of either “high” or “low” accessibility. In addition, countries with ongoing conflicts (e.g. Syria and Somalia) or those where previous ADE evaluations have shown access to be difficult (e.g. Sudan) were graded low on this factor on the grounds of low interlocutor availability.

### **3.3 Limitations of the analysis**

As in each evaluation, it is important to bear in mind that there are a number of limits inherent to the tools used for data collection when taken individually. This can largely be overcome by triangulating information obtained through different sources and tools, as done in this evaluation and by using each information source with the limits it has. More specifically, the following elements can be underlined:

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<sup>5</sup> Unless otherwise stated, the data used in the selection process was based on the evaluators’ analysis of the data in UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service, as used in section 2, above.

<sup>6</sup> Further information on the definition of these indicators is available in EC (2011) *Technical Note: Methodology for the Identification of Priority Countries for Humanitarian Aid “GNA and FCA”*, EC.

- **Reliance on stakeholder opinion:** the evaluation methodology utilised interviews conducted in HQ and field offices of EU and other donor organisations, NGOs and implementing partners. As such, the evaluation findings are to a certain extent derived from the opinions and views of the main stakeholders of the European Consensus. Moreover, the team could only rely on individuals in place at the time of the evaluation. Due to some staff turnover, the people met sometimes lacked institutional memory. In order to overcome the potential for bias by any stakeholder group or organisation, the evaluation team has triangulated and cross-checked findings between ranges of information sources (types of interviewees, documents, etc.).
- **Number of field missions:** the evaluation includes visits to two recipient countries and eight Member States. In order to overcome the risk of generalisation from specific cases, the evaluators have taken three steps: i) clear and transparent selection criteria were used for the selection of Member States and recipient countries to visit; ii) survey and complementary telephone interviews with EUDs and ECHO field offices were used to cross-check findings from individual visits against responses from other countries not visited; iii) the results of recipient country visits are used only as illustrations of evaluation findings rather than basing generalised findings upon two field visits.
- **Survey bias:** EU Member State surveys often presented a more positive picture than interviews with the same Member State agencies during the visits to Member State capitals. Respondents are often representatives of the humanitarian agencies or departments, which may introduce a bias. To overcome this effect, survey results have been cross-checked with interview findings in the analysis presented below.

## Annex 3 – EU Member State Typology

This annex provides a typology of European humanitarian aid donors. The typology provides an overview of the differences that exist between the European Union Member States in terms of their humanitarian aid provision. A full understanding of these differences is necessary in order to understand the evaluation findings regarding the implementation of the European Consensus across each Member State.

The typology covers the 28 EU Member States, minus Croatia.<sup>1</sup> The data used in the typology is derived from the evaluation inventory of EU humanitarian aid commitments. The inventory was taken from the UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service in June 2013.

The typology groups each donor on the basis of the size and shape of their humanitarian aid. Two indicators are used to distinguish the donor categories: the donors' humanitarian aid commitments over 2008-2012 and the humanitarian structures the donors had in place at the end of the evaluation period. This analysis yields three donor groupings across the EU Member States and ECHO:

**Table A2.1: donor groupings and associated criteria**

Donor grouping	Criteria
<b>Large donors</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Humanitarian aid commitments over the period 2008-2012 amounting to US\$1 billion or more; <i>and</i></li> <li>Humanitarian structures containing all of the following elements: distinct humanitarian aid policies; distinct humanitarian aid departments; signatory to the Stockholm statement establishing the GHD<sup>2</sup> initiative in June 2003.</li> </ul>
<b>Established donors</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Humanitarian aid commitments over the period 2008-2012 amounting to less than US\$1 billion but more than US\$100 million ; <i>and</i></li> <li>Humanitarian structures containing at least two of the following elements: distinct humanitarian aid policies; distinct humanitarian aid departments; signatory to the GHD Stockholm statement.</li> </ul>
<b>Fledgling donors</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Humanitarian aid commitments over the period 2008-2012 amounting to less than US\$100 million; <i>and</i></li> <li>Humanitarian structures containing none of the following elements: distinct humanitarian aid policies; distinct humanitarian aid departments; signatory to the GHD Stockholm statement.</li> </ul>

To qualify for each donor grouping, Member States need to demonstrate satisfaction of both criteria for that grouping. On this basis, the typology of European humanitarian donors is presented in the table below:

<sup>1</sup> Croatia joined the EU in 2013, after the end of the evaluation period.

<sup>2</sup> The Good Humanitarian Donorship grouping established in 2003.

Table A2.2: donor typology

Donor grouping	Donor	Humanitarian aid 2008-2012 (US\$m)	Distinct humanitarian policy	Distinct humanitarian unit or department	GHD early-adopter
Large donors	Sweden	3,619	✓	✓	✓
	UK	3,432	✓	✓	✓
	Germany	2,120	✓	✓	✓
	Netherlands	1,496	✓	✓	✓
	Denmark	1,267	✓	✓	✓
Established donors	Spain	1,024	✓	✓	✗
	Belgium	725	✓	✓	✓
	France	674	✓	✓	✓
	Finland	602	✓	✗	✓
	Ireland	601	✓	✓	✓
	Luxembourg	246	✓	✓	✓
Fledgling donors	Italy	575	✗	✗	✗
	Austria	93.52	✓	✓	✗
	Greece	34	✗	✗	✗
	Czech Republic	22	✓	✗	✗
	Poland	21	✗	✓	✗
	Estonia	7	✗	✗	✗
	Slovakia	5	✗	✗	✗
	Hungary	5	✗	✗	✗
	Portugal	5	✗	✓	✗
	Slovenia	4	✗	✗	✗

Donor grouping	Donor	Humanitarian aid 2008-2012 (US\$m)	Distinct humanitarian policy	Distinct humanitarian unit or department	GHD early-adopter
	Romania	4	✗	✗	✗
	Malta	2	✗	✗	✗
	Bulgaria	2	✗	✗	✗
	Cyprus	2	✗	✗	✗
	Lithuania	1.2	✗	✗	✗
	Latvia	0.7	✗	✗	✗



## **Annex 4 – The Evaluation Surveys**

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This annex presents the surveys of EU Member State and NGOs conducted during the evaluation data collection phase. The surveys provide aggregate data on stakeholder views concerning the implementation of the EU Consensus. As such, they supplement the stakeholder views gathered during the visits to EU Member States. Results from the surveys were integrated into the findings per evaluation question (see the Main Report, section 3).

Two surveys were launched, both via an online survey service. Both surveys were confidential, with results kept anonymous and only the participants able to view the survey itself.

The first survey targeted staff in the humanitarian agencies of EU Member States. One staff member was identified for each Member State. The participants were identified through the COHAFA representatives of the Member States. In many cases the COHAFA representatives completed the survey themselves. In total, 26 out of the 28 Member States completed the survey.

The second survey targeted staff in European NGOs. To ensure that the participants were in a position to comment on the EU Consensus, the survey was sent to the EU Consensus Taskforce managed by VOICE. This includes 17 NGOs, of whom 16 completed the survey.

The annex includes four sections:

- AIV.1: The aggregated results for the EU Member State survey
- AIV.2 : The aggregated results for the NGO survey
- AIV.3: The EU Member State survey
- AIV.4: The NGO survey

## AIV.1: The aggregated results for the EU Member State survey

**Table 0.1: Survey respondents**


Participating countries			
Austria	Finland	Latvia	Slovakia
Belgium	France	Luxembourg	Slovenia
Croatia	Germany	Malta	Spain
Cyprus	Greece	Netherlands	Sweden
Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	United Kingdom
Denmark	Ireland	Portugal	
Estonia	Italy	Romania	

**Question 1.1 : Before the end of the year 2012, how would you best describe your knowledge of :**

**Table 1.1 : Survey responses**

Answer	The EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid		The EU Consensus Action Plan	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
I had a good idea of its content	20	76.92%	9	34.62%
I had some idea of its content	6	23.08%	15	57.69%
I was aware of its existence but had no clear idea of its content	0	0.00%	2	7.69%
I was not aware of its existence	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
No answer	0	0.00%	0	0.00%

**Figures 1.1 Pie chart of responses**



*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*




**Question 1.2 : To what extent has the EU Consensus served as a reference document for your organisation's (Ministry, Government Agency or similar) humanitarian aid policy and strategy over the period 2008-2012?**

**Table 1. 2 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage
It was a key reference to shape our humanitarian approach	11	42,31%
It was one reference among many other sources	9	34,62%
It was not used (which can be for many reasons)	0	0,00%
Our humanitarian policy was developed prior to the EU Consensus	2	7,69%
It was de facto our humanitarian policy/strategy	1	3,85%
We do not have a specific humanitarian policy	3	11,54%
I do not know	0	0,00%
No answer	0	0,00%

**Figure 1.2 Pie chart of responses**





*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*

**Question 1.3 : Key objectives of the EU Consensus and/or in the Action Plan are listed here below. For each of them please answer the two questions raised using the modalities described in the following table:**

**Table 1. 3 Survey responses**

Key objectives	Q1:How has the importance given by your country to these objectives evolved over the period 2008-2012?				Q2:What role has the EU consensus played in this evolution?				
	1 Increased	2 Unchanged	3 Decreased	4 Do not know	A The EU Consensus was the main factor triggering those changes	B The EU Consensus has played a role in triggering those changes, but other factors have been at least as important	C The EU Consensus has played little or no role in triggering those changes	D I have no opinion on the role of the EU Consensus in this respect	E Not applicable as no change
<i>Fundamental humanitarian principles</i>	18	7	0	1	3	17	4	0	2
<i>International Humanitarian Law</i>	12	13	1	0	2	13	8	0	3
<i>Needs based approach</i>	19	6	0	1	4	15	3	1	3
<i>Neglected crises</i>	16	7	0	3	2	14	5	2	3
<i>Particular vulnerabilities (women, children, elderly, sick and disabled people)</i>	17	8	0	1	3	14	6	0	3
<i>Accountability (monitoring &amp; evaluation)</i>	16	8	1	1	4	10	4	2	6
<i>Speed of response to humanitarian crises</i>	18	7	0	1	3	11	6	1	5
<i>Reinforcing local capacities as first line of response</i>	10	11	1	4	1	10	7	1	7
<i>Strengthening Disaster Risk Reduction activities</i>	20	4	1	1	4	14	6	0	2
<i>Interaction between humanitarian aid and development aid</i>	16	9	0	1	4	12	6	0	4
<i>Division of roles between humanitarian aid and military assets</i>	10	11	1	4	2	12	5	4	3
<i>Division of roles between humanitarian aid and civil protection interventions</i>	12	11	1	2	3	12	6	1	4
<i>Division of roles between humanitarian and political actors</i>	12	12	0	2	2	10	8	1	5
<i>Transforming aid pledges into disbursements in a timely way</i>	16	8	1	1	1	11	8	0	6

**Figure 1. 3 Bar graph of responses**




**Question 1.4 : Please indicate where your country has undertaken specific actions in support of promoting the relevant following objectives over the period 2008-2012. (if minimal actions have been undertaken for some specific objectives, do not tick the box). Actions may be very diverse in nature, depending also on the nature of the objective (e.g. advocacy, development of specific methodologies, change of procedures, change of institutional set-up, etc.)**

**Table 1. 4 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage	Objective number in figure
Needs based approach	20	76,92%	O1
Particular vulnerabilities (women, children, elderly, sick and disabled people)	16	61,54%	O2
Fundamental humanitarian principles	16	61,54%	O3
Speed of response to humanitarian crises	16	61,54%	O4
Strengthening Disaster Risk Reduction activities	16	61,54%	O5
Interaction between humanitarian aid and development aid	16	61,54%	O6
Accountability (monitoring & evaluation)	15	57,69%	O7
Transforming aid pledges into disbursements in a timely way	13	50,00%	O8
Neglected crises	12	46,15%	O9
International Humanitarian Law	11	42,31%	O10
Reinforcing local capacities as first line of response	9	34,62%	O11
Division of roles between humanitarian aid and civil protection interventions	9	34,62%	O12
Division of roles between humanitarian and political actors	7	26,92%	O13
Division of roles between humanitarian aid and military assets	7	26,92%	O14

**Figure 1. 4 Bar graph of responses**




Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS

**Question 1.5 Over the period 2008-2012, were there substantial changes introduced regarding humanitarian aid in your country's policies, structures and procedures?**

**Table 1. 5 Survey responses**

Answer	Policies		Structures		Procedures	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
Yes	17	65,38%	12	46,15%	15	57,69%
No, marginal changes at best	9	34,62%	14	53,85%	11	42,31%
I do not know	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%
No answer	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%

**Figure 1. 5 Pie chart of responses**




*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*

**Question 1.5.a / b / c : Indicate to what extent the EU Consensus has played a role in substantial changes introduced regarding humanitarian aid in your country's :**

**Table 1.5.a/b/c : Survey responses**

Answer	Policies		Structures		Procedures	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
The EU Consensus was the main factor triggering those changes	1	5.88%	1	7.69%	1	6.25%
The EU Consensus has played a role in triggering those changes, but other factors have been at least as important	13	76.47%	4	30.77%	10	62.50%
The EU Consensus has played little or no role in triggering those changes	2	11.76%	5	38.46%	3	18.75%
I have no opinion on the role of the EU Consensus in this respect	1	5.88%	1	7.69%	0	0.00%
No answer	0	0.00%	2	15.38%	2	12.50%

**Figure 1.5.a/b/c: Pie chart of responses**




Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS

**Question 2.1 To your knowledge, did your country make specific use of the Action Plan as a tool to implement the EU Consensus?**

**Table 2. 1 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage
Yes, ex ante to decide which actions to undertake	2	7.69%
Yes but rather as an ex post check of the conformity of the actions undertaken with those listed in the Action Plan	5	19.23%
Yes, both ex ante and ex post	5	19.23%
No	8	30.77%
I do not know	6	23.08%
No answer	0	0.00%

**Figure 2.1 Pie chart of responses**



*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*


**Question 2.2 How would you rate the usefulness of having an Action Plan to accompany the implementation of the EU Consensus for the past period (2008-2012) ?**

**Table 2. 2 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage
Very useful	5	19.23%
Rather useful	9	34.62%
Rather not useful	4	15.38%
Not useful	1	3.85%
No opinion	7	26.92%
No answer	0	0.00%

**Figure 2.2 Pie chart of responses**

Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS



Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS

**Question 2.2.2 Could you please briefly explain why you find the action plan rather useful:**

**Table 2.2.2 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	8	72,73%
No answer	3	27,27%

Country	Answer
<i>Country 1</i>	In general, an Action Plan could be very useful, however, the Consensus Action Plan is more useful for the Commission than for the Member States (many actions listed in it target the Commission competencies).
<i>Country 2</i>	It serves as an easily understandable guidance and reference during the implementation of humanitarian policy, outlining key actions and outputs.
<i>Country 3</i>	Provides a good overview with regard to the steps to be taken for the implementation of the European Consensus
<i>Country 4</i>	In the implementation of quality aid approaches to ensure an adequate overall humanitarian response.
<i>Country 5</i>	The Action Plan can be considered as an operational tool, which helps to translate in concrete actions the EU Consensus Humanitarian Aid contents. Furthermore, the Action Plan can be used to evaluate ex-post adherence of the DGCS action to the European Humanitarian Aid policies and strategies. On the contrary, such exercises deserve additional financial and human resources, which are not always available.
<i>Country 6</i>	Comprehensive document shaping EU policy and principles of humanitarian aid.
<i>Country 7<sup>1</sup></i>	For the conformity - operationalizing the Consensus is helpful

**Question 2.2.3 Could you please briefly explain why you find the action plan rather not useful :**

**Table 2.2.3 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	4	66,67%
No answer	2	33,33%

Country	Answer
<i>Country 1</i>	The common vision and principles stated in the EU Communication defining the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid are clear enough so that recommendations may be implemented by EU MMSS without any Plan of Action. A Plan of Action with no concrete targets and timing and no monitoring does not add much value to the document, even though it may help for implementation in some cases.
<i>Country 2</i>	To general indicators, no clear division of responsibilities between MS and EC, lacking system of verification of indicators.
<i>Country 3<sup>2</sup></i>	Not very useful since it has not been followed up (e.g. at COHAFA meetings).

<sup>1</sup> There is no explicit text answer for the Country 8

<sup>2</sup> There is no explicit text answer for the Country 4




**Question 2.3 How would you rate the usefulness of having an Action Plan to accompany the implementation of the EU Consensus for the future period (2014 and ongoing) ?**

**Table 2.3 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage
Very useful	8	30.77%
Rather useful	10	38.46%
Rather not useful	2	7.69%
Not useful	0	0.00%
No opinion	6	23.08%
No answer	0	0.00%

**Figure 2.3 Pie chart of responses**

Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS



Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS

**Question 2.4 Suggestions to improve such an Action Plan or regarding to other means to be developed that would help making the EU Consensus more concrete:**

**Table 2. 4 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	15	57,69%
No answer	11	42,31%


Country	Answer
Country 1	It might be more effective to have a brief Action Plan focusing on a few expected outcomes with concrete and measurable targets related to some critical issues in the future such as policy coherence, quality standards, DRR and CCA, EU donor coordination...
Country 2	Introduction of detailed/verifiable indicators Indication of responsible parties for each indicator Broad information/educational "campaign" about consensus itself and the Action Plan not only within COHAFA group would be useful
Country 3	See previous comment
Country 4	The Action Plan should be drafted by the EU in the COHAFA working group, so that the actions relevant for Member states are included. The Action Plan should reflect the work done in GHDI and other relevant global humanitarian initiatives
Country 5	Regular monitoring (not just Mid-Term) and discussion within the EU, with frequent follow-up. Many points were not very concrete, proved to be too vague, their interpretation left for the stakeholders. There should be some very concrete examples what does it mean in the field, how is it being implemented.
Country 6	Better linkage between Humanitarian and Development Cooperation, particularly in Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction. Implementation of the Transformative Agenda.
Country 7	Each future Action Plan should focus on maximum 4 priorities, to be chosen among the major obstacles encountered in a certain period. E.G. food aid assistance, forgotten crises, humanitarian coordination at global and local level, education in emergencies.
Country 8	There are no particular suggestions regarding improvements of an Action Plan or other means to help making the EU consensus more concrete.
Country 9	While it is challenging to include specific actions across the Action Plan, given the large number of actors who have committed to implementing it, it might be useful to have one or two specific key actions per action area, including a time frame for implementation. It might also be useful to learn from other recent EU Action Plans, notably the Action Plan on the EU Approach to Resilience, and propose short, medium and long-term actions per action area. This would provide further focus to the Action Plan and would allow for more frequent and specific measurement of the EU and its Member States' performance in implementing the plan.
Country 10	Il conviendrait de le rendre opérationnel pour l'ensemble des Etats membres, malgré les différences de pratiques nationales.
Country 11	- Mentoring/consulting programmes on humanitarian aid for geographically smaller countries or new Member States; - Promotion of more frequent Joint Missions for monitoring and evaluation of EU supported programmes and actions; - More frequent Joint meetings of Working Groups: CODEV/COHAFA and geographical; - NOHA (Network on Humanitarian Assistance) national seminars and trainings. - EU Aid Corps as an effective tool
Country 12	Often there are too many objectives and indicators in the Action Plans which makes reporting cumbersome. Focus more on strategic objectives, instead of very detailed matrixes.
Country 13	There is a need to develop a more results based approach.
Country 14	More coherence in the area of military support/involvement.

**Question 3.1 Over the period 2008-2012, how would you judge the evolution of the following topics and what role has the EU Consensus played in that evolution?**

**Table 3. 1 Survey responses**

Topic	Evolution						Consensus influence					
	1 Increased	2 Unchanged	3 Decreased	4 Not relevant since our country entered EU too recently	5 Do not know	No answer	A The EU Consensus was the main factor triggering those changes	B The EU Consensus has played a role in triggering those changes, but other factors have been at least as important	C The EU Consensus has played little or no role in triggering those changes	D I have no opinion on the role of the EU Consensus in this respect	E Not applicable as no change	No answer
Information exchange among EU institutions and EU MS regarding a particular humanitarian crisis	25	1	0	0	0	0	11	9	1	4	1	0
Collaboration between EU institutions and EU MS regarding a particular humanitarian crisis	20	5	0	0	1	0	7	11	1	4	2	1
Complementarities and synergies among EU institutions and EU MS regarding a particular humanitarian crisis	18	7	0	0	1	0	8	9	2	4	2	1
Coordination between different EU interventions in a particular humanitarian crisis	15	8	0	0	3	0	4	10	0	7	4	1

**Figure 3. 1 Bar graph of responses**



**Question 3.1.1 Please describe briefly the significant changes occurred and the Consensus influence on them:**

**Table 3.1.1 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	16	61,54%
No answer	10	38,46%

Country	Answer
<i>Country 1</i>	Information exchange and coordination between EU members in the humanitarian response to a mega disaster (such as Haiti earthquake) has improved considerably through COHAFA meetings and there is more EU concertation on common messages within the international humanitarian community, but donor strategies of EU MS are still linked to each country's foreign policy.
<i>Country 2</i>	Better coordination between Commission and EU member states within COHAFA framework.
<i>Country 3</i>	Establishment of COHAFA has increased collaboration, information exchange etc. N.b. that I have only been working with humanitarian issues since beginning of September 2012 and thus find it difficult to assess changes.
<i>Country 4</i>	- joint pledges for big donor conferences - joint actions towards particular political-security-humanitarian crises (through COHAFA) - coordinated delivering in particular disasters (Haiti, Japan) - attempts for more holistic approach (resilience agenda, comprehensive approach)
<i>Country 5</i>	Exchange of information has improved, in particular with the establishment of COHAFA. Elaboration of common messages have strengthened a better common understanding of the necessary policies and strategies in addressing a specific humanitarian crisis. Consensus puts a strong focus on coordination, coherence and complementarity.
<i>Country 6</i>	In its implementation, the Consensus brought about a more effective EU contribution to humanitarian aid, where the Commission together with Member States worked together to try and eliminate duplication of resources, better flow of exchange of information, and increase cooperation.
<i>Country 7</i>	Exchange of information is extremely useful, but overall coordination has to be done by UN. So at the moment very good procedures, I do not know the influence of the EU Consensus but presume that it played a role for better exchange of information
<i>Country 8</i>	In some cases - like in the Philippines - EU coordination was successful. In other crises it was less efficient, despite the Consensus.
<i>Country 9</i>	A single most significant and to Slovenia as an EU MS visible change that occurred is the information exchange among EU institutions and EU MS regarding a particular humanitarian crisis. The work of the DG ECHO field offices and the information they share with the EU MS in COHAFA is of particular value.


Country	Answer
Country 10	<p>As an overarching comment, the establishment of the Working Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA) in 2009, following agreement on the Consensus, has greatly contributed to increased interaction in each of the below topics, providing a dedicated policy forum for enhanced engagement between the EU and its Member States in the humanitarian sphere</p> <p><b>Information Exchange:</b> Since the establishment of COHAFA and, noticeably over the last two to three years, the quality and frequency of information exchange has improved considerably, both in terms of discussion at formal COHAFA meetings and through circulation of relevant information by the COHAFA Secretariat. The Commission has played a key role in this, through the circulation of the ECHO Daily Flash, and through its compilation and inclusion of data on Member States' support to specific crises in its country-specific crisis reports.</p> <p><b>Collaboration</b> While the joint development and implementation of plans still presents a number of challenges, there has been some progress over the last number of years. In particular, the joint work undertaken in 2013 in agreeing the Council Conclusions on the EU Approach to Resilience and related Action Plan represents a significant step forward. The joint instruction letter issued to heads of EU Delegations, ECHO field offices and EU missions and signed by the Directors General of DEVCO, ECHO, and all Member States' Development Directors General in relation to the implementation of the Action Plan represents a concerted effort to ensure that the EU as a whole works together in a collaborative and effective manner in order to increase the overall impact and coherence of individual actions.</p> <p><b>Complementarities and synergies</b> This is an area which merits further attention, although some limited progress has been made – notably, in the current response to the crisis in Syria and the related engagement with the UN system to define the exact interventions required in specific areas and the relevant partners working within each sector. However, this is an area in which further progress may prove challenging, given differing national priorities and other pressures which may be brought to bear on the provision of humanitarian aid to particular situations.</p> <p><b>Coordination</b> Coordination has improved significantly since the Consensus was agreed and, with the establishment of ECHO's Emergency Response Coordination Centre in 2013, is expected to further improve in the future. The ERCC's role in the response to Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 provides a good example of the way in which coordination may be enhanced, with details of each Member State and institutions' contributions to the relief effort being regularly updated and circulated and frequent coordination meetings taking place from a very early stage after the Typhoon made landfall. The 'Lessons learned' exercise on the response to Typhoon Haiyan being undertaken by ECHO will be extremely useful in improving coordination in future humanitarian relief efforts.</p>
Country 11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Information sharing among EU institutions and EU Member States on humanitarian crises- COHAFA Working Group;</li> <li>- MS and EU Institutions can call attention to specific crisis or geographical areas that are in need of a more focused aid from the donors - COHAFA Working Group;</li> <li>- Several joint actions and measures to international/multilateral organizations on issues of quality in HA or progress of commitments (e.g. OCHA common methodological framework for needs assessment);</li> <li>- A more coordinated and stronger approach in humanitarian fora and international/multilateral organizations (e.g. WFP);</li> <li>- A more coordinated approach in donor conferences and the global platform on HA;</li> <li>- Better coordination with Civil Protection at an European level.</li> </ul>
Country 12	No comments
Country 13	The establishment of the COHAFA Working Group allowed for more coordination between Member States and it is a platform for introducing future activities.
Country 14	Increased level of coordination among EU Member States.
Country 15	Better coordination and networking at the implementing level (national Rescue Team), enhanced information sharing and coordination among MS and EU institutions when a humanitarian crisis happens

**Question 4.1 Would you agree on the following statements ?**

**Table 4.1 Survey responses**

Statement	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	No answer
Today, EU institutions and MS share a common view on humanitarian aid	9	15	2	0	0	0
Today, the implementation of humanitarian aid by EU institutions and MS is closely in line with the EU Consensus	7	16	1	0	2	0
It is important that EU institutions and MS are jointly visible as "EU" when providing humanitarian aid	7	14	3	1	1	0
EU institutions and EU MS's support to humanitarian aid is increasingly visible as "EU" support (i.e. not as the support of an individual actor or MS)	2	11	11	0	2	0
In general, EU MS have an approach to visibility that privileges the visibility of an individual EU MS over common "EU visibility"	5	12	4	1	4	0

**Figure 4.1 Bar graph of responses**



*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*

**Question 4.1.1 Please feel free to add comments related to the issue of the visibility of humanitarian aid:**

**Table 4.1.1 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	10	38,46%
No answer	16	61,54%


Country	Answer
Country 1	Visibility is high up on the ECHO agenda but not a priority from our view - efficiency and added value is of greater importance. Processes within the EU humanitarian system should be as efficient as possible and coordination should be done when this has largest surplus value.
Country 2	It is difficult to answer this question comprehensively since the level of coherence and the common view depends on the issue, the context and whether you are talking about individual Member States or Member States in general.
Country 3	In bilateral hum aid, visibility is not the hot task (in many situations, visibility of the donor can compromise the security of the recipients) - rather the transparency and coordination. However, if there are occasion for visibility of donors, both the public and the media prefer to highlight the bilateral aid before a common EUs, incl. MSs.
Country 4	Many MS have their own humanitarian aid policy (e.g. France in Syria), some seem to have not very developed policy, some definitely like to have their own "flag". But information sharing and common messaging have much improved over the years.
Country 5	In humanitarian situations where visibility is contextually appropriate, it is likely to continue to prove challenging to present a unified 'EU' response, due for the most part to pressures within national systems to demonstrate what an individual country is doing in response to a crisis and to visibly demonstrate the impact of national humanitarian assistance programmes to the taxpayers of that country.
Country 7	I think that MS still feel that HA is a matter where is essential to give visibility to the efforts that are made nationally, specially by countries with a longer tradition on this issue.
Country 8	Visibility should not be the main issue but principled humanitarian action. There are still questions whether all EU institutions fully understand that humanitarian assistance is not a crises managment tool
Country 9	Members States should have the priority in showing visability of humanitarian action financed by themselves directly, whilst EU funded programmes should enjoy the visability of the EU.
Country 10	Visibility as individual MS is domestically important political tool for the public support to the humanitarian response.

**Question 4.2 Among the following items please select those that can be considered as a specific added value of the Commission (compared to individual EU MS) for the past period (2008-2012) (multiple selections are possible) :**

**Table 4.2 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage	Item
Global presence (capacity to draw on a network of EU Delegations and DG ECHO Field Offices)	23	88,46%	Item 1
Field-level specialist humanitarian expertise	23	88,46%	Item 2
Promoting good humanitarian practices amongst EU institutions and MS	17	65,38%	Item 3
Promoting good humanitarian practices amongst implementing partners	17	65,38%	Item 4
Providing a common voice on behalf of EU MS and Commission	15	57,69%	Item 5
Role as coordinator of Commission and EU MS activities	14	53,85%	Item 6
Capacity to intervene flexibly in politically sensitive situations	13	50,00%	Item 7
Promoting coherence of EU member states policies	11	42,31%	Item 8
No added value	0	0,00%	Item 9
I do not know	0	0,00%	Item 10
Other	0	0,00%	Item 11

**Figure 4.2 Bar graph of responses**



Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS




**Question 4.3 Where should the Commission concentrate on adding value in the future ? (multiple selections are possible)**

**Table 4.3 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage	Item
Promoting good humanitarian practices amongst EU institutions and MS	21	80,77%	Item 1
Promoting good humanitarian practices amongst implementing partners	19	73,08%	Item 2
Capacity to intervene flexibly in politically sensitive situations	16	61,54%	Item 3
Global presence (capacity to draw on a network of EU Delegations and DG ECHO Field Offices)	15	57,69%	Item 4
Promoting coherence of EU member states policies	15	57,69%	Item 5
Role as coordinator of Commission and EU MS activities	15	57,69%	Item 6
Field-level specialist humanitarian expertise	14	53,85%	Item 7
Providing a common voice on behalf of EU MS and Commission	12	46,15%	Item 8
Other (Country 1 : Promoting coherence and coordination with other non-EU donors)	1	3,85%	Item 9
No added value	0	0,00%	Item 10
I do not know	0	0,00%	Item 11

**Figure 4.3 Bar graph of responses**




Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS

**Question 5.1 Would you agree on the following statements :**

**Table 5.1 Survey responses**

Statement	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	No answer
It is important that EU Institutions and MS take common policy/strategic positions in global platforms for humanitarian aid	17	8	0	0	1	0
Since 2008, EU Institutions and MS have increasingly taken common policy/strategic position in global platform for humanitarian aid	7	18	1	0	0	0
Since 2008, EU Institutions and MS have increasingly contributed jointly to international good practice initiatives (e.g. OCHA common methodological framework for needs assessment, GHD initiative, etc.)	10	16	0	0	0	0
Since 2008, EU Institutions and MS have increasingly developed a shared understanding of when it is appropriate to use civil protection and military assets in emergencies	6	13	2	0	5	0
Since 2008, EU Institutions and MS have not developed redundant mechanisms regarding humanitarian assistance	3	6	3	2	12	0

**Figure 5.1 Bar graph of responses**



Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS

**Question 5.2 Could you give a brief explanation of your agreement or disagreement ?**

**Table 5.2 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	8	30,77%
No answer	18	69,23%

Country	Answer
<i>Country 1</i>	The EU is coordinating when negotiating documents (UN humanitarian resolutions etc.) - not that much when humanitarian aspects are discussed in political-security Framework (like in the UN Security Council - or even in EU - COPS).
<i>Country 2</i>	Having a united front the EU and Member States can have a better impact on the delivery aid and the implementation of its strategic aims.
<i>Country 3</i>	An improved coordination of MSs reflecting in common positions in global platforms, would strenghten the effectiveness of the political and humanitarian action of the EU as a whole. It would show an internal strenght, coherent to its position of first humanitarian donor in the world.
<i>Country 4</i>	<p>i) It is important that EU Institutions and MS take common policy/strategic positions in global platforms for humanitarian aid. As contributions from the EU and its Member States constitute the largest proportion of humanitarian assistance globally, the adoption of common policy and strategic positions in global platforms for humanitarian aid has the potential to carry significant weight in such platforms. A unified approach in such fora, based on shared principals and commitments, is therefore likely to have greater influence on discussions.</p> <p>ii) Since 2008, EU Institutions and MS have increasingly taken common policy/strategic position in global platform for humanitarian aid. There has been significant progress in agreeing common policies and strategic positions in global platforms for humanitarian aid, with common messaging being agreed prior to a variety of fora. However, the proliferation of different fora and the fact that not all Member States are members of, or represented at, each forum means that it is not always possible to agree common approaches.</p> <p>iii) Since 2008, EU Institutions and MS have increasingly contributed jointly to international good practice initiatives (e.g. OCHA common methodological framework for needs assessment, GHD initiative, etc.) The EU and its MS have increasingly contributed to international good practice initiatives, including those referenced above, and have strongly engaged on, for example, the roll-out of the 'Transformative Agenda' and encouraging a more collaborative approach between various good practice and research partners with a view to further professionalising humanitarian assistance and agreeing common standards.</p> <p>iv) Since 2008, EU Institutions and MS have increasingly developed a shared understanding of when it is appropriate to use civil protection and military assets in emergencies. ECHO's expansion to include civil protection under its mandate has allowed for greater engagement between humanitarian and civil protection actors. The agreement in 2013 of legislation guiding civil protection provides further clarification on specific roles and responsibilities. The recent, positive cooperation between civil protection, military and humanitarian actors in the response to Typhoon Haiyan is indicative of a growing understanding of roles and responsibilities. Similarly, the recent Communication on the Comprehensive Approach and the negotiations/discussions leading up to the issuing of this Communication have highlighted the specificity and independent nature of humanitarian aid amongst the other instruments at the EU's disposal.</p> <p>v) Since 2008, EU Institutions and MS</p>


Country	Answer
	have not developed redundant mechanisms regarding humanitarian assistance On the basis of the information available on EU institutions and MS' mechanisms for humanitarian assistance, we would agree. However, without a detailed knowledge of all mechanisms implemented by each MS and institution, it is not possible to fully judge this statement.
<i>Country 5</i>	As the world's biggest donor I find it essential that the EU should have a common and coordinated voice in the global humanitarian platforms and fora, in order to achieve a more effective and efficient humanitarian response. With the welcomed entrance of new donors and actors in the humanitarian area, it is also essential that the good practices and "lessons learned" of the EU are communicated, in order to avoid duplication of efforts, missteps and that the budget available is maximized, thus helping the largest number of people possible.
<i>Country 6</i>	Humanitarian assistance is a shared area of competence in accordance with the Lisbon treaty. We want to see a strong Commission, and the Commission to guide EU's humanitarian action also in the future. However, this should not mean that individual MSs would lose their right to speak for instance in the Governing bodies of the UN, Funds, Programmes and Specialized agencies (unless otherwise agreed through local arrangements).
<i>Country 7</i>	Would welcome increased level of shared understanding of when it is appropriate to use civil protection and military assets in emergencies. We consider EU mechanisms regarding humanitarian assistance relevant.
<i>Country 8</i>	Regular EU coordination helps to consolidate a common and stronger EU message and visibility in the UN system that has been and will be helpful to develop the international humanitarian system.

**Question 5.3 Please provide your views on the progress made by the EU as a whole (i.e. the European Institutions and the EU MS) with respect to the objectives of the EU Consensus in the period 2008-2012 as compared to before:**

**Table 5.3 Survey responses**

Objective	Increased	Unchanged	Decreased	Do not know	No answer
Needs based approach	24	0	0	2	0
Speed of response to humanitarian crises	23	0	0	3	0
Particular vulnerabilities (women, children, elderly, sick and disabled people)	22	1	0	3	0
Fundamental humanitarian principles	21	1	1	3	0
Neglected crises	21	1	1	3	0
Accountability (monitoring & evaluation)	20	4	0	2	0
Interaction between humanitarian aid and development aid	18	3	0	5	0
International Humanitarian Law	17	4	1	4	0
Strengthening Disaster Risk Reduction activities	17	4	0	5	0
Division of roles between humanitarian aid and civil protection interventions	16	4	0	6	0
Transforming aid pledges into disbursements in a timely way	13	4	1	8	0
Reinforcing local capacities as first line of response	11	5	0	10	0
Division of roles between humanitarian aid and military assets	10	5	0	11	0
Division of roles between humanitarian and political actors	9	7	0	10	0

**Figure 5.2 Bar graph of responses**




**Question 5.4 Please indicate also which of these objectives, the EU as a whole should consider as key priorities in the near future (i.e. the next five years).**

**Table 5.4 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage
Needs based approach	17	65,38%
Fundamental humanitarian principles	15	57,69%
Interaction between humanitarian aid and development aid	15	57,69%
Reinforcing local capacities as first line of response	12	46,15%
Accountability (monitoring & evaluation)	11	42,31%
Particular vulnerabilities (women, children, elderly, sick and disabled people)	10	38,46%
Neglected crises	9	34,62%
International Humanitarian Law	9	34,62%
Speed of response to humanitarian crises	8	30,77%
Strengthening Disaster Risk Reduction activities	7	26,92%
Division of roles between humanitarian and political actors	5	19,23%
Transforming aid pledges into disbursements in a timely way	3	11,54%
Division of roles between humanitarian aid and civil protection interventions	2	7,69%
Division of roles between humanitarian aid and military assets	1	3,85%
Other	1	3,85%

**Figure 5.2 Bar graph of responses**



*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*

**Question 5.5 Please list below any additional comment you would like to make on the past and future of the implementation of the EU Consensus and/or any other relevant comments for this evaluation:**

**Table 5.5 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	6	23,08%
No answer	20	76,92%

Country	Answer
Country 1	Implementation of the EU consensus in the future should go further in promoting quality aid approaches among all EU MS, and especially among new members.
Country 2	As already mentioned, my experience of the humanitarian system and the EU are limited.
Country 3	No further comments.
Country 4	When the EU is trying to implement an Action Plan it has to take into consideration the limited resources of small Member States in terms of effective implementation and the delivery of these objectives. To this effect, information sharing and joint cooperation through the EU is of vital importance for better delivery and results.
Country 5	Question 5.3 is difficult to answer because of a permanent change staff at the humanitarian aid division. This also applies for some other questions
Country 6	The effective delivery of humanitarian assistance can be achieved by the EU Consensus, our actions have to comply with the basic tenets of that. The Action Plan provides the necessary method whereby the collective actions of m-s and institutions alike become more coherent.

## AIV.2 : The aggregated results for the NGO survey

**0.1 Please indicate in which country your NGO is based (in the case that your organisation is a national office of an international NGO, please select the country where you are based):**

### NGO 0.1 Survey respondents

Country	NGO
Belgium (BE)	Caritas Europa
	Save the Children UK
France (FR)	HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION
Germany (DE)	Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe
	Malteser International
Ireland (IE)	Concern Worldwide
	Trocaire
Netherlands (NL)	CARE Nederland
	ICCO
	ICCO-Cooperation
	Stichting War Child
United Kingdom (UK)	CAFOD
	Christian Aid
	HelpAge International
EU Office	VOICE
Geneva Office	CARE International




**Question 1.1 Before the end of the year 2012, how would you best describe your knowledge of :**

**NGO Table 1.1 Survey responses**


Answer	The EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid		The EU Consensus Action Plan	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
I had a good idea of its content	10	62,50%	6	37,50%
I had some idea of its content	4	25,00%	5	31,25%
I was aware of its existence but had no clear idea of its content	2	12,50%	4	25,00%
I was not aware of its existence	0	0,00%	1	6,25%
No answer	0	0,00%	0	0,00%

**NGO Figure 1.1 Pie chart of responses**

**The EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid**



**The EU Consensus Action Plan**



**NGO Figure 1.1.2**


Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS

**Question 1.2 Does your organisation make specific use of the EU Consensus?**

**NGO Table 1.2 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage
Yes	11	68.75%
No	3	18.75%
I do not know	2	12.50%
No answer	0	0.00%

**NGO Figure 1.1 Pie chart of responses**




*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*

**Question 1.3 Key objectives of the EU Consensus and/or in the Action Plan are listed here below. For each of them please answer the two questions raised using the modalities described in the following table**

**NGO Table 1.3 Survey responses**

Objective	Q1:How has the importance given by your country to these objectives evolved over the period 2008-2012?				Q2: Linked to the EU Consensus ?		
	1 Increased	2 Unchanged	3 Decreased	4 Do not know	Linked to the EU Consensus	Not linked to the EU Consensus	Do not know
<i>Fundamental humanitarian principles</i>	10	5	0	1	15	0	1
<i>International Humanitarian Law</i>	7	6	1	2	11	4	1
<i>Needs based approach</i>	10	6	0	0	8	5	3
<i>Neglected crises</i>	9	7	0	0	8	4	4
<i>Particular vulnerabilities (women, children, elderly, sick and disabled people)</i>	9	6	0	1	9	4	3
<i>Accountability (monitoring &amp; evaluation)</i>	8	7	0	1	6	5	5
<i>Speed of response to humanitarian crises</i>	5	10	0	1	5	6	5
<i>Reinforcing local capacities as first line of response</i>	5	9	0	2	6	4	6
<i>Strengthening Disaster Risk Reduction activities</i>	14	1	0	1	10	4	2
<i>Interaction between humanitarian aid and development aid</i>	10	5	1	0	8	5	3
<i>Division of roles between humanitarian aid and military assets</i>	5	6	4	1	8	3	5
<i>Division of roles between humanitarian aid and civil protection interventions</i>	6	5	3	2	6	6	4
<i>Division of roles between humanitarian and political actors</i>	3	7	3	3	6	4	6
<i>Transforming aid pledges into disbursements in a timely way</i>	2	5	7	2	5	5	6

**NGO Figure 1.2 Bar graph of responses**




Source : ADE, based on on-line survey to NGO

**Question 2.1 How would you rate the usefulness of having an Action Plan to accompany the implementation of the EU Consensus for the past period (2008-2012) ?**

**NGO Table 2.1 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage
Very useful	1	6.25%
Rather useful	8	50.00%
Rather not useful	3	18.75%
Not useful	0	0.00%
No opinion	4	25.00%
No answer	0	0.00%

**NGO Figure 2.1 Pie chart of responses**



*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*

**Question 2.1.1 Could you please briefly explain why you find the action plan very useful:**

**NGO Table 2.1.1 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	1	100.00%
No answer	0	0.00%

NGO	Answer
NGO 1	Any policy that is not accompanied by a clear and practical action plan can be easily ignored/forgotten. The action plan forces accountability, puts theory into practice and provides clarity. Anew AP should be SMART-er though....

**Question 2.1.2 Could you please briefly explain why you find the action plan rather useful:**

**NGO Table 2.1.2 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	8	100.00%
No answer	0	0.00%

NGO	Answer
NGO 1	An action plan is very important to hold the EU, including Member States, to account for the commitments they made, to prioritise actions and to review progress in implementation. A follow-up mechanism to the Action Plan is thus crucial, but should perhaps contain less actions, combined with more ownership by Member States. To this purpose, it is crucial that the evaluation identifies the barriers which MS feel have hampered them to implement the Consensus Action Plan.
NGO 2	it is important to operationalize a more abstract set of concepts and ideas which the Consensus is. It gave NGOs also means to lobby, monitor etc the progress of the consensus. This was very important.
NGO 3	Because it is a commonly agreed plan which holds the different actors (MS Commission, etc) to account for adhering to commitments they have signed up in the Consensus
NGO 4	The action plan provides a clear articulation of the Consensus, which support the ability of member states to implement the necessary steps towards the consensus and for NGOs/civil society to monitor progress. It also provides a clearer framework for the development of what is a quite high level theoretical document (the consensus) into something more practical. Where it lacks for us (and hence the "rather" useful description) is the translation of commitments to impartial assistance and assistance for vulnerable groups (including older people) into practical steps.
NGO 5	The Action Plan was formulated in a clearly actionable way so in itself it was quite 'easy' to lobby for its implementation with EU institutions and EU member states.
NGO 6	It is the document that allows us to hold accountable Member States to their commitments.
NGO 7	Provides a framework against which EU institutions and its member states need to report against. This provides the NGO community as well, the necessary data to assess to what degree the EU is acting in line with its policies.
NGO 8	As it translates the Consensus into practical action and it therefore easy to follow up step by step on its operational side.

**Question 2.1.3 Could you please briefly explain why you find the action plan rather not useful:**

**NGO Table 2.1.3 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	3	100.00%
No answer	0	0.00%

NGO	Answer
NGO 1	[We] are not very aware of it, it does not feature very largely in our work and activities, therefore it is rather not useful to us
NGO 2	The humanitarian response described in the action plan is less the response of the EU than the one of the aid agencies supported, notably, by EU funding. While the principle of humanitarian donorship is essential to ensure high level of funding to principled humanitarian organizations and to promote the principles exposed notably in the Consensus, the action remains the one of the actors that, for many of them, had been operating according to these principles well before the Consensus was drafted.
NGO 3	Because it seems to have been somewhat ignored by the Member States. I feel that there needs to be more clarity as to whose plan it is. My impression is that Brussels see it as a plan for the MS, while the MS see it as a plan only for Brussels. Any new plan needs to be practical, pragmatic and realisable. Again, my understanding is that some Member States see the current plan as too detailed/granular and requiring a level of input that is beyond their capacity (and perhaps inclination?).

**Question 2.1.4 Could you please briefly explain why you find the action plan rather not useful:**

**NGO Table 2.1.4 Survey responses**


Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	0	0.00%
No answer	0	0.00%

**Question 2.2 How would you rate the usefulness of having an Action Plan to accompany the implementation of the EU Consensus for the future period (2014 and ongoing) ?**

**NGO Table 2.2 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage
Very useful	10	30.77%
Rather useful	5	38.46%
Rather not useful	1	7.69%
Not useful	0	0.00%
No opinion	0	23.08%
No answer	0	0.00%

**NGO Figure 2.2 Pie chart of responses**



*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*

**Question 2.3 Please explain your answer to the previous question and make suggestions to improve such an Action Plan - or other ideas to be developed - that would help make the EU Consensus more concrete:**

**NGO Table 2. 3 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	15	93.75%
No answer	1	6.25%

NGO	Answer
NGO 1	The Action Plan should be open, public and shared widely with member states linking it to national plans and policies. for example, Ireland has been very active in promoting the consensus but the benchmarks and individual country targets and commitments are not widely shared.
NGO 2	A new Action Plan needs to be developed to ensure better coherence and coordination on humanitarian aid within the EU (main humanitarian donor worldwide), by sequencing the EU priorities in implementation of the Consensus and setting a timeline. - A new Action Plan should be easier to put into practice by being supportive of Member States (MS), increasing relevance for and ownership by Member States. There is a key role to play for COHAFA here in order to develop a new action plan which is workable for MS. - The new Action Plan should be 'upped' in terms of level, looking more at key principles and allowing Member States more flexibility for realising those key principles/targets; it is important that the targets chosen are SMART, allowing to verify progress made. In addition, there should be clear milestones during the duration of the Action Plan to discuss progress. - Reporting on progress: all MS should annually report on progress in implementation and should include views of civil society in that process. - COHAFA could be used to identify and disseminate good practice examples, so the MS can check, modify and use them. In this way not every Member State would have to 'reinvent the wheel'. - Consider enabling a peer review mechanism for Consensus implementation, for example by including adherence to Consensus commitments in the OECD-DAC peer review mechanism for EC and EU Member States. Perhaps peer reviews are less threatening, and it has the potential of creating an interesting, public outcome.
NGO 3	Same reasoning: you can only monitor progress of a Consensus if its ideas are operationalised. Then we can lobby for the execution of the action plan, in national platforms and with VOICE.
NGO 4	The next Action Plan needs to have clearly SMART targets. It should be shorter, with less indicators/activities and focus on more strategic issues which will make a real difference to the quality and integrity of humanitarian action. There should be a common reporting framework, which whilst not seeking to be over-onerous should ensure that MS all report as fully as possible. Annual reporting should not be optional
NGO 5	In principle a new document would help reinforce attention to the consensus and force the people writing and reading it into thinking about how best to ensure the Consensus is honoured. Its content should be practical, achievable, simple and it should be clear who will do what when and how this will be measured
NGO 6	Following on from my last written answer, any new plan will be useful only if it is accepted and implemented by the Member States. I believe that there should be a plan and that if there is one that is realistic, it could have a very positive impact on the consistent delivery of the Consensus among the MSs.




NGO	Answer
NGO 7	In general terms: Reduce the number of actions and give priorities. Develop indicators for the achievement of actions Develop clear reporting by MS towards ECHO and COHAFA. In concrete terms: A set of public consultations EU and national level, allowing the involvement of national Parliaments, civil society and humanitarian NGOs A more regular monitoring of progress in implementation of the Action plan An improved methodology for an effective Division of Labour like a protocol/guideline to proceed in different multi-donor scenarios. A capacity assessment may also contribute to the identification of volunteer facilitators and teams of EU Member State representatives who will commit to pursuing joint action under the Consensus Action Plan, A peer review mechanism to enhance the performance of the Division of Labour More communication materials to be produced to enhance public awareness of the EU Consensus and its Action Plan
NGO 8	For us it would be very useful if the points made above were addressed, however more broadly for humanitarian actors it offers value in terms of translation of the high level into more practical steps.
NGO 9	Without a clearly formulated action plan, the EU Consensus will end up into mere window dressing. The problem is though the lack of independent monitoring of its implementation / compliance.
NGO 10	It is important to hold MS accountable to their commitments. • It needs to be developed to ensure better coherence and coordination on humanitarian aid within the EU (main humanitarian donor worldwide) by setting a timeline. • It should be SMART • It should be used to identify lessons learnt and involve partners in these evaluations and make the findings public. • There should be annual reporting on progress including views of civil society in that process. o The next Consensus action plan should require the EEAS, including EU delegations, to recognize, actively promote and ensure adherence to/defend the European Consensus on humanitarian aid.
NGO 11	Again, be SMART! Set timelines, sequence priorities, be practical, be accountable (reviews, reports, publicity)....
NGO 12	Civil-military cooperation: - provide the establishment of a formal mechanism which ensures that NGOs are consulted about potential humanitarian implications when military missions and EU crisis management exercises are planned -increase humanitarian briefings to the Political and Security Council (PSC) Administrative burden - try to diminish the administrative burden, the format for revisions and modifications DDR - make a better link with the climate change agenda - provide clear definitions of DRR, LRRD and resilience and the way ECHO works with the concepts Further give attention to child rights, gender, vulnerable groups.
NGO 13	Action plan should promote not only principles, but concrete instruments such as quick funding programmes without red tape, a better (funding) link between humanitarian aid and developmental institutions, improving collective efforts of the community and strengthening local NGO.
NGO 14	Same reason as for the current one. Additional sections useful, including non-compliance.
NGO 15	From my perspective, with ECHO / DIPECHO budget threatened by cuts, I would give priority to finance actions plans such as HIP and DIPECHO which do have direct impact to persons affected by disasters either by preparedness, response, and recovery. I think that the Action plan, as far as I understand it, should continue to keep up the good work ECHO DIPECHO is doing in disaster prone countries with support of its staff in Brussels and the field offices.

**Question 3.1 Over the period 2008-2012, how would you judge the evolution of the following topics and what role has the EU Consensus played in that evolution?**

**NGO Table 3.1 Survey responses**

Topic	Evolution						Consensus influence					
	1 Increased	2 Unchanged	3 Decreased	4 Not relevant since our country entered EU too recently	5 Do not know	No answer	A The EU Consensus was the main factor triggering those changes	B The EU Consensus has played a role in triggering those changes, but other factors have been at least as important	C The EU Consensus has played little or no role in triggering those changes	D I have no opinion on the role of the EU Consensus in this respect	E Not applicable as no change	No answer
Information exchange among EU institutions and EU MS regarding a particular humanitarian crisis	9	3	0	0	4	0	1	7	2	2	4	0
Collaboration between EU institutions and EU MS regarding a particular humanitarian crisis	7	4	0	0	5	0	1	4	2	4	5	0
Complementarities and synergies among EU institutions and EU MS regarding a particular humanitarian crisis	5	4	2	0	5	0	0	5	2	4	5	0
Coordination between different EU interventions in a particular humanitarian crisis	7	4	2	0	3	0	2	5	2	4	3	0

**NGO Figure 3.1 Bar graph of responses**



**Question 3.1.1 Please describe briefly the significant changes occurred and the Consensus influence on them:**

**NGO Table 3.1.1 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	14	87.50%
No answer	2	12.50%

NGO	Answer
NGO 1	Each crisis has conflicting interests. In many militarised contexts, especially post-war on terror, good practice and commitments to instruments like the Consensus has been ignored in favour of military and security interests. Humanitarian aid is often seen as a crisis management tool (Somalia, Afghanistan, Libya) and humanitarian principles are sometimes seen as an excuse by agencies not to cooperate with the objectives of these other interests.
NGO 2	The Consensus has played a pivotal role in creating a common vision of best practice for humanitarian action in the European Union. Moreover, it is a framework which all institutions signed off, so this is a very powerful political commitment, even if the Consensus is not legally binding. And indeed, many Member States have created or updated their humanitarian policies, often linking it to the Consensus. The Consensus has helped to strengthen the humanitarian aid architecture at EU level: the COHAFA, the Humanitarian Rapporteur in the EP and a separate EU Commissioner for EU humanitarian aid. This together led to increased visibility of EU humanitarian aid, for example by bringing in a humanitarian perspective in Council Conclusions. The existence of the COHAFA has increased coordination among ECHO and Member States. There is information exchange; Member States and EU now prepare together for the humanitarian segment of ECOSOC, as well as for board meetings of UN Agencies (WFP); share best practices, etc. Moreover, they slowly work towards a more coordinated, complementary position in terms of operations, but more work is needed on that level. Individual Member States, such as UK and Belgium, do often coordinate operations on a bilateral basis.
NGO 3	I think the COHAFA played a significant role in all the processes described. As far as I know COHAFA was founded not because of the consensus. So the consensus does not have a big role there.
NGO 4	The establishment of COHAFA has arguably been more instrumental in promoting information exchange and collaboration between MS that the Consensus has been.
NGO 5	It is not clear to me in my role how the Consensus have affected MS vs EC coordination in crises since 2008.
NGO 6	Need to bear in mind that the Consensus was a reflection of the way that things were going - and they way that Member States wanted them to continue going. As such, it is a reflection of intent and practice. It is perhaps a little misleading to suggest - as some of the questions here may be seen to do - that the Consensus as been the be all and end all in some of the changes that we have seen in recent years. I would suggest that it is more likely that it has contributed to the way in which MSs make decisions, the degree to which there is co-ordination, etc., rather than being the sole causal factor in making this happen.


NGO	Answer
NGO 7	It is generally hard to say whether or not changes have occurred since there is little evidence to suggest the one over the other. A more realistic Action Plan with indicators and a clear reporting could help to achieve more transparency. In MS there seems to be an understanding that the Consensus is something only for the EU institutions or only for ECHO but not for the MS. There is little buy in from MS and little effort to abide by the spirit of the Consensus when it comes to humanitarian decision-making although the Consensus has been referenced in a number of policy docs at national level. A transparent system of reporting should look at ways on how progress towards implementing the actions of a future Action Plan can be measured but this should be accompanied by some independent political analysis of what role the Consensus has played as a policy framework to guide the EU (institutions and MS) in responding to a humanitarian crisis. Key parameters from the Consensus could be looked at in more detail in such an analysis: HA not a crisis management tool, respect of humanitarian principles and challenges of compliance, diversity of actors respected, civil-military relations, timely funding, LRRD approach taken into account, etc. MS have to get more on board and there needs to be a mandatory reporting mechanism on what has been achieved in terms of implementation of the actions listed in the Action Plan.
NGO 8	The work we do is more focused on operational policy and the usefulness of the consensus and action plan to support it. As such it is less concerned with interactions of member states around the consensus hence I cannot add much to this question by way of a response.
NGO 9	Dutch Government has done little to disseminate the EU Consensus among humanitarian actors in The Netherlands. It is unclear to me whether the Dutch Government is in favour of the objectives of the Consensus or not.
NGO 10	The Consensus provides a framework/reference/benchmark/sounding board that helps member states and NGOs alike to ensure principled humanitarian action. More attention is needed though for DRR, LRRD and resilience (the interrelationship of which is currently poorly understood and at times confusing...).
NGO 11	I consider that the structural changes that were introduced with the Lisbon Treaty played an important role in defining the EU crisis management tools, the links and coordination with humanitarian assistance, the creation of the Emergency Response Center - coordination with the EEAS and Sitcen, and were less influenced by the Consensus.
NGO 12	I have only seen few if any references to the Consensus in any situation or change that took place. Those changes that have been achieved (eg civ-mil cooperation) possibly would have been achieved without the consensus just as well.
NGO 13	Recognition of the importance of humanitarian aid has increased and its means of implementation, therefore better information channels for exchange in place. - On the spot coordination has been strengthened. - Synergy effects doubtful, still too many players, bureaucracy and competences at stake
NGO 14	The consensus ensures that ECHO is able to provide neutral and impartial humanitarian action according to needs. ECHO is well respected and recognized in the entire humanitarian community for this, and its staff is cooperating well with actors along a humanitarian crisis.

**Question 4.1 Would you agree on the following statements ?**

**NGO Table 4.1 Surevey responses**

Statement	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	No answer
Today, EU institutions and MS share a common view on humanitarian aid	1	7	8	0	0	0
Today, the implementation of humanitarian aid by EU institutions and MS is closely in line with the EU Consensus	0	8	7	1	0	0
It is important that EU institutions and MS are jointly visible as "EU" when providing humanitarian aid	3	7	5	0	1	0
It is important that EU NGOs are visible as "EU actors" when providing humanitarian aid	1	5	7	3	0	0
EU Institutions and EU Member States' support to humanitarian aid is increasingly visible as "EU" support (i.e. not as the support of an individual actor or EU Member State)	0	3	7	3	3	0
In general, EU MS have an approach to visibility that privileges the visibility of an individual EU MS over common "EU visibility"	2	10	3	0	1	0

**NGO Figure 4.1 Bar graph of responses**



Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS

**Question 4.1.1 Please feel free to add comments related to the issue of the visibility of humanitarian aid:**

**NGO Table 4.1.1 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	8	50.00%
No answer	8	50.00%

NGO	Answer
NGO 1	Member States are not always equally committed to humanitarian aid delivered in a principled manner. Collective visibility will be problematic where for example member states support peacekeeping/peace enforcement in a country where humanitarian assistance is badly needed and humanitarian space is manipulated for other purposes.
NGO 2	With regards implementation of the Consensus, the Commission is very much following the consensus, whereas the practice among Member States varies a lot more. - With regards visibility, there were several questions on that topic in the Fit for purpose questionnaire of the EC, so please also take those results into account. Problem: -The overall communication strategy of ECHO is lacking or unclear. -As a result, communication actions appear too scattered, do not reach across the whole EU and are therefore not effective in raising the awareness of the general public. The main reliance has been on ECHO partners carrying out communications activities, who are not necessarily the best equipped for this role. - ECHO partners also have to seek own funding, including for co-financing ECHO actions and to support ongoing activities beyond ECHO actions including LRRD. They also have obligations to other donors. It is important therefore to get the balance right between donor demands and the NGOs' own financial needs. Some ideas for improvement put forward were: - Strengthen ECHO's communication department, manned or supported by professional communication experts. - A communications strategy should be developed by ECHO, and shared with relevant stakeholders, including partners. Priority focus should be on communications raising awareness in Europe, informed by information from the field. Secondary focus should be on visibility of the EU as a donor in the field. The different rationales should be made clear. - Use the ECHO network of field offices and staff as primary source of information to support EU communication activities. - Prioritise media as a mass communication channel, and do additional outreach across Europe, via schools, universities, public spaces etc. - Include a focus on forgotten crises as well as high-profile emergencies. - In the field, visibility measures should seek to enhance accountability towards beneficiaries.
NGO 3	Important that ECHO with its good policy documents coordinates EU humanitarian aid to a higher extent than is now the case. In the evaluation now going on in the Netherlands of Dutch govt hum aid the question is put to respondents whether Holland should not execute aid through ECHO.... Then the Member states humanitarian depts can all take care of maintaining the independent position ECHO has...
NGO 4	For me, I don't see that it matters whether aid provided by my Govt (UK) or my NGO is perceived as European or not. What matters is what difference it makes to the lives of vulnerable people. Its Europeanification is not a priority.
NGO 5	Recent discussions around ECHO's budget and the costs of humanitarian programming do suggest a difference of opinion amongst EU institutions regarding the allocation of EU humanitarian aid.

NGO	Answer
NGO 6	If 'visibility' would mean 'boasting', 'pride' and 'show of ownership', then better to get rid of it. If EU visibility would mean joint promotion of common principles and approaches to hum. aid, then it is a laudable initiative. But as long as there is no real consensus on principles and approaches to hum. aid and member states continue to prioritise own interests, joint promotion is theory.
NGO 7	Visibility should be a secondary concern. And it is highly competitive: In a situation where 50 NGO and 20 donors are on spot, there is only a small slot for media attention. To get into this slot is resource intensive and time consuming, and at the end of the day either nobody can distinguish who is helping where or it leaves people with the perception that "it's all Red Cross". If visibility, then it should create a common understanding of and identity with humanitarian aid rather than marketing of narrow individual projects, donors and organisations.
NGO 8	Visibility is part of being accountable, indicating where aid is coming from and enable beneficiaries, its governments, and the persons / institutions providing funds to recognize the aid and also to make questions.




**Question 4.2 Among the following items please select those that can be considered as a specific added value of the Commission (compared to individual EU MS) for the past period (2008-2012) (multiple selections are possible)**

**NGO Table 4.2 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage	Item
Promoting good humanitarian practices amongst EU institutions and MS	15	93.75%	Item 1
Global presence (capacity to draw on a network of EU Delegations and DG ECHO Field Offices)	13	81.25%	Item 2
Field-level specialist humanitarian expertise	12	75.00%	Item 3
Promoting good humanitarian practices amongst implementing partners	12	75.00%	Item 4
Capacity to intervene flexibly in politically sensitive situations	10	62.50%	Item 5
Providing a common voice on behalf of EU MS and Commission	9	56.25%	Item 6
Role as coordinator of Commission and EU MS activities	7	43.75%	Item 7
Promoting coherence of EU member states policies	7	43.75%	Item 8
Other ( <i>attention for forgotten crises ; example of really implementing a policy of diversity of actors</i> )	2	12.50%	Item 9
No added value	0	0.00%	Item 10
I do not know	0	0.00%	Item 11

**NGO Figure 4.2 Bar graph of responses**



Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS




**Question 4.3 Where should the Commission concentrate on adding value in the future ? (multiple selections are possible)**

**NGO Table 4.3 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage	Item
Promoting good humanitarian practices amongst EU institutions and MS	13	81.25%	Item 1
Field-level specialist humanitarian expertise	13	81.25%	Item 2
Capacity to intervene flexibly in politically sensitive situations	12	75.00%	Item 3
Promoting good humanitarian practices amongst implementing partners	10	62.50%	Item 4
Global presence (capacity to draw on a network of EU Delegations and DG ECHO Field Offices)	7	43.75%	Item 5
Promoting coherence of EU member states policies	7	43.75%	Item 6
Role as coordinator of Commission and EU MS activities	7	43.75%	Item 7
Providing a common voice on behalf of EU MS and Commission	7	43.75%	Item 8
Other ( <i>Keep attention for forgotten crises; Promoting its policy on diversity of actors to MS</i> )	2	12.50%	Item 9
No added value	0	0.00%	Item 10
I do not know	0	0.00%	Item 11

**NGO Figure 4.3 Bar graph of responses**




Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS

**Question 4.4 To what extent does the EU as a global entity in humanitarian aid have added value over the EU Institutions and EU Member States acting individually?**

**NGO Table 4.4 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage
Significant added value	8	50.00%
Some added value	6	37.50%
Not much added value	0	0.00%
No added value at all	0	0.00%
No opinion	2	12.50%
No answer	0	0.00%

**NGO Figure 4.4 Pie chart of responses**




*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*

**Question 4.5 To what extent does the EU as a global entity have added value compared to other official humanitarian donors (e.g. USA, Japan etc.) ?**

**NGO Table 4.5 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage
Significant added value	11	68.75%
Some added value	4	25.00%
Not much added value	1	6.25%
No added value at all	0	0.00%
No opinion	0	0.00%
No answer	0	0.00%

**NGO Figure 4.5 Pie chart of responses**




*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*

**Question 5.1 Would you agree on the following statements? :**

**NGO Table 5.1 Survey responses**

Statement	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion	No answer
It is important that EU Institutions and MS take common policy/strategic positions in global platforms for humanitarian aid	6	8	2	0	0	0
Since 2008, EU Institutions and MS have increasingly taken common policy/strategic position in global platform for humanitarian aid	1	9	2	0	4	0
Since 2008, EU Institutions and MS have increasingly contributed jointly to international good practice initiatives (e.g. OCHA common methodological framework for needs assessment, GHD initiative, etc.)	0	9	2	0	5	0
Since 2008, EU Institutions and MS have increasingly developed a shared understanding of when it is appropriate to use civil protection and military assets in emergencies	0	6	5	1	4	0
Since 2008, EU Institutions and MS have not developed redundant mechanisms regarding humanitarian assistance	0	4	2	0	10	0

**NGO Figure 5.1 Bar graph of responses**



*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*

**Question 5.2 Could you give a brief explanation of your agreement or disagreement ?**

**NGO Table 5.2 Survey responses**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	9	56.25%
No answer	7	43.75%


NGO	Answer
NGO 1	Last question was unclear
NGO 2	ECHO is a powerful player, with lots of funds. On top of that it has quality, a good policy, promotes diversity of actors, and promotes humanitarian principles!
NGO 3	I think there is some value in the EU working together as its voice and influence are therefore more powerful, but I don't think this is super-important, as ECHO and DFID have a powerful voice and influence in their own right, and in the interests of democracy and diversity and self-determination and freedom of speech I think the MS should be entitled to voice a different view if they are not comfortable with the Commission view or the majority view
NGO 4	While it would clearly be valuable for member states and EU institutions to take common positions on humanitarian aid, the feasibility of this should be taken into consideration - i.e. where member state security and foreign policy don't align with the requirement for response to humanitarian need e.g. UK's limited response in CAR or West Africa. In these situation the value offered by the EU institutions is the promotion and call for principled impartial response based on analysis of need.
NGO 5	Although DG ECHO has done a lot to develop / participate in developing international standards, many member states and more so the Dutch Government have done little to promote and adhere to them in practice.
NGO 6	The EU is the main humanitarian donor, and should position itself in a coordinated way with its Member States to provide a strong position in promoting international good practices.
NGO 7	On redundant mechanisms: There is still a lot of "in between" dividing humanitarian aid and recovery/transitional aid. Not only few NGO "follow the money", i.e. their programming is highly influenced by the provisions of different donors. There is humanitarian funding reaching into development, and there is development funding taking its piece of the humanitarian bid. There is a rather big area of overlapping.
NGO 8	The weight of common EU positions is stronger, therefore more promising when it comes to enforcement/implementation. The EU is increasingly more active when it comes to positioning/global initiatives, more to be done as a key player. Positions on civil protection/military still vary.
NGO 9	ECHO is recognized as impartial needs based humanitarian actor through its funding and presence in the field. This practical experience is a powerful tool to raise the voice in the humanitarian system, and complements the experience and expertise of the implementing partner agencies across the humanitarian system from UN over IFRC to NGOs.

**Question 5.3 Please indicate also which of these objectives, the EU as a whole should consider as key priorities in the near future (i.e. the next five years).**

**NGO Table 5.3 Survey responses**

Answer	Count	Percentage
Reinforcing local capacities as first line of response	11	68.75%
Fundamental humanitarian principles	10	62.50%
Needs based approach	8	50.00%
Strengthening Disaster Risk Reduction activities	8	50.00%
Neglected crises	7	43.75%
Transforming aid pledges into disbursements in a timely way	7	43.75%
Interaction between humanitarian aid and development aid	5	31.25%
Accountability (monitoring & evaluation)	5	31.25%
Particular vulnerabilities (women, children, elderly, sick and disabled people)	4	25.00%
International Humanitarian Law	4	25.00%
Division of roles between humanitarian and political actors	4	25.00%
Speed of response to humanitarian crises	3	18.75%
Division of roles between humanitarian aid and military assets	2	12.50%
Division of roles between humanitarian aid and civil protection interventions	1	6.25%
Other	1	6.25%

**NGO Figure 5.3 Bar graph of responses**



*Source: ADE, based on on-line survey to MS*

**Question 5.4 Please list below any additional comment you would like to make on the past and future of the implementation of the EU Consensus and/or any other relevant comments for this evaluation:**

**NGO Table 5.4**

Answer / No answer	Count	Percentage
Answer	5	31.25%
No answer	11	68.75%

NGO	Answer
NGO 1	The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid is a very good framework, so the Consensus itself should not be re-opened. - With regards the key themes in the Consensus, NGOs based in Member States were asked which issues were important on top of the issues in your table. Additional themes which are important to us are: * Comprehensive approach (art. 15, 30): "EU humanitarian aid is not a crisis management tool". Therefore it should not be used to 'win hearts and minds' of affected populations. *Added value of NGOs (art. 49-50): Recognition that NGOs are the main deliverers of humanitarian aid and intrinsic support for a plurality of implementing partners (UN, Red Cross/Crescent movement, NGOs). This commitment should translate in an adequate % of funding going to NGOs. * Reducing administrative burden (art. 52): Commitment to maximise flexibility of admin systems, seeking to streamline procedures among EU donors and reducing the administrative burden on implementing organisations. *Local actors (art. 53,74): Recognises that local capacity is key, especially for sudden onset disasters. Seeks to support capacity building to strengthen local disaster response.
NGO 2	There is probably nothing on the list on the previous page that is not important. It is quite difficult to only select five issues. There is some potential crossover between some of the options, depending on how liberal interpretation you put on the points.
NGO 3	Focus should be on activities that support the quality and effectiveness of aid in line with the humanitarian principles. A commitment to this approach will result in more effective accountability, interaction between military actors etc. However, these issues should not detract from the value added of EU aid, and the leadership it provides to the wider sector.
NGO 4	I am highly interested in the outcome.
NGO 5	Many thanks to ECHO and please keep up - or even enhance and strengthen - the good work of elements such as ECHO and DIPECHO.

### AIV.3: The EU Member State survey



#### AIV.4: The NGO survey




## **Annex 5 – Intervention logic**

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This annex presents the intervention logic (IL) of EU Consensus over the evaluation period 2008-2012. It represents the hierarchy of strategic objectives pursued by the EU, as outlined in the Action Plan.

The intervention logic is the backbone for the evaluation, delineating the set of objectives against which the EU's actions will be assessed. The hierarchical links for attaining expected impacts are made explicit in the diagrams.

The following approach was used for developing the intervention logic:



The intervention logic differentiates between four levels of expected effects which correspond to five levels of objectives, and the intended activities for attaining the effects:

- Global impact (corresponding to global objectives, in the long term);
- Intermediate impact (corresponding to intermediate objectives, in the long-medium term);
- Outcomes (corresponding to operational objectives);
- Outputs (corresponding to intervention deliverables);
- Inputs (corresponding to intervention activities).

Figure 7 overleaf presents the intervention logic under the five levels outlined above. It also locates each of the evaluation questions (EQs) on the Consensus intervention logic, in order to demonstrate how the questions cover the key areas of the Consensus and the Action Plan. It should be noted that EQs 5 (on the strengthening of the international humanitarian aid system) and 9 (on civil protection) are not related to any specific area of the Action Plan, and have thus been placed in isolation from the intervention logic.

Figure 1 – Proposed intervention logic with evaluation questions




Figure 7 denotes specific output groupings for each area of the Action Plan. The following table presents each of the expected outputs for the intervention logic, as defined in the Action Plan:

**Table 1 – Action Plan expected outputs**

Output area	Expected outputs
<b>Action Plan Area 1</b> <i>Advocacy, promotion of humanitarian principles and IHL</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ High level international conference on IHL</li> <li>▪ Specific situations of failure to uphold IHL raised with responsible parties</li> <li>▪ EU statements and international action in accordance with humanitarian principles</li> <li>▪ Agreement of EU MS on practical steps for ensuring application of the guidelines</li> <li>▪ Material developed and disseminated</li> </ul>
<b>Action Plan Area 2</b> <i>Implementing quality aid approaches</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Common framework for needs assessment finalised</li> <li>▪ Operational guidelines on sectoral issues</li> <li>▪ Recommendations on how humanitarian aid may adapt to the impacts of climate change</li> <li>▪ Funding decisions based on assessed needs</li> <li>▪ EU humanitarian budget sufficient to make substantial contribution to meeting humanitarian needs</li> <li>▪ Increased synergies between EU donor strategies</li> <li>▪ Policy and financing adjusted to contexts and needs</li> <li>▪ Dissemination of relevant standards</li> <li>▪ Increased efficiency of EC humanitarian aid and governance</li> <li>▪ Evaluation methodology updated and shared with other donors</li> <li>▪ Efficiency of EC decision-making process increased</li> <li>▪ Common set of performance indicators</li> </ul>
<b>Action Plan Area 3</b> <i>Reinforcing capacities to respond</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ EU support for strengthened logistical capacities of the international humanitarian system</li> <li>▪ Promotion of a multi-donor approach to capacity building</li> <li>▪ Reinforcement of EU training provision for humanitarian professionals and other actors</li> <li>▪ Improved EU understanding of IDRL</li> <li>▪ Reinforcement of best practices exchange between EU donors</li> </ul>
<b>Action Plan Area 4</b> <i>Strengthening partnerships</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Active EU participation and value-added in humanitarian meetings</li> <li>▪ GHD principles adhered to in practice by all EU donors</li> <li>▪ Recommendations for strengthened participation of disaster-affected populations</li> <li>▪ Encouragement of UN, Red Cross Movement and humanitarian NGOs in application of the Principles of Partnerships of the GHD</li> <li>▪ Provision of quality inputs for policy implementation</li> <li>▪ GHD Implementation Platform</li> <li>▪ Humanitarian days in the EU</li> </ul>

Output area	Expected outputs
<b>Action Plan Area 5</b> <i>Enhancing coherence and coordination</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Civil-military liaison offices in place</li> <li>▪ Working Group plays an effective role in EU policy dialogue on humanitarian aid</li> <li>▪ Improved information on donor response to humanitarian needs</li> <li>▪ Assessment of implementation results</li> <li>▪ Recommendations for future work</li> <li>▪ Reinforced information sharing between donors</li> <li>▪ Overview and contacts established and maintained</li> <li>▪ Evaluation plans and results shared</li> <li>▪ Guidance note and training provided</li> <li>▪ Enhanced understanding of UN MCDA/Oslo guidelines</li> <li>▪ Improved EU understanding of operational challenges and better coordination of EU response</li> <li>▪ Links established between EU military staff and humanitarian NGOs</li> <li>▪ Embassy/Delegation staff briefed on humanitarian action</li> </ul>
<b>Action Plan Area 6</b> <i>The aid continuum</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ EU DRR strategy</li> <li>▪ Priorities list established</li> <li>▪ Best practice awareness increased</li> <li>▪ Recommendations considered</li> <li>▪ Coordination between development aid and humanitarian aid actors and national/local authorities to facilitate LRRD</li> <li>▪ Country strategies integrated support to early recovery</li> </ul>

It should be noted that figure 7 defines the outputs as those listed in the Action Plan. This does not mean that the evaluation will automatically consider that possible actions to implement the EU Consensus are limited to the 47 actions of the Action Plan. Under EQ2, the evaluation will indeed examine whether these 47 actions were appropriate to translate the EU Consensus or whether stakeholders consider that other actions needed to be foreseen.

The majority of the EQs are placed between the output and the intermediate impact levels. This reflects the fact that the evaluation scope is the Consensus implementation, and not an assessment of the quality of EU humanitarian aid as defined by the intermediate impacts outlined in the intervention logic.





## **Annex 6 – Evaluation questions**

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This annex presents the structured evaluation questions (EQs) as defined in the evaluation inception report. Each EQ is structured by a number of judgement criteria (JCs) that provide a breakdown of the question's component parts. Each judgement criteria are supplemented by indicators against which the judgement criteria are assessed.

The annex presents each EQ, its background and rationale, and the logic of the judgement criteria. The judgement criteria are then provided, along with the indicators and the link to the intervention logic provided in Annex 4.

<b>EQ 1</b>	<b>To what extent has the Consensus been implemented by EU Institutions and MS and has it influenced and supported them in developing their humanitarian aid policies, structures and procedures?</b>
<b>Rationale and coverage of the question</b>	<p><u>Background</u></p> <p>The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid is a joint statement adopted on 18 December 2007 by the Council and the representatives of the Member States (MS) meeting with the European Parliament and the European Commission. It expresses the highest political commitment of the EU to the principles underpinning the provisions enshrined therein.</p> <p>The signature of the Consensus was set against the backdrop of several international efforts to improve the quality and principled nature of humanitarian aid, including, among others, the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative. These initiatives, in combination with lessons learned by donors from events such as the Asian Tsunami in 2003, constituted the environment in which the Consensus was borne.</p> <p>In a first part, the Consensus presents the common vision that guides the action of the EU, both at its Member States and Community levels, in humanitarian aid in third countries. In a second part, the Consensus sets out the European Community humanitarian aid approach to guide implementation of this vision and it further specifies priorities for concrete action at community level.</p> <p><u>Understanding and coverage of the question</u></p> <p>This overarching question covers two dimensions that are closely related to each other and that concern directly one of the two main subjects of this evaluation as defined in section 1.2 of the ToR (i.e. how the Consensus is implemented). It first aims at assessing to what extent the Consensus has actively been implemented by the Commission and the EU Member States (MS), in the sense that they have taken tangible action to reflect the Consensus. Second, it aims at understanding to what extent the Consensus has helped the EU MS to shape their humanitarian aid policies, as well as the shaping of the structures and procedures to implement these policies. This should be understood both in a qualitative manner (the nature of the policies, of the structures) and quantitatively (the definition of priorities in terms of financial weight). It is also useful that the question examines the reasons why such implementation did or did not take place and in what manner the Consensus has influenced and supported EU MS.</p> <p><u>Rationale behind the JCs</u></p> <p>Taking into account the above mentioned interpretation, it is proposed to answer this question using several JCs as building blocks. More specifically, the JCs aim at examining whether:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The European Commission and the EU MS took initiatives to make sure that the Consensus would be taken on board, and if so which ones. Among other things, this will entail examining whether actions were undertaken with respect to the six dimensions of the Action Plan.<sup>1</sup></li> <li>▪ Whether the Consensus has also really played a role in helping EU MS to develop their aid policies and related structured and procedures.</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> The Action Plan in itself provides indeed an interpretation of what it means to “implement the Consensus”. We suggest following that structure (the six dimensions) in EQ 1. This does not mean however that we assume that the Action Plan is the correct translation of the EU Consensus, as will appear under EQ2.

<b>Link with IL and evaluation criteria</b>	The Evaluation Question aims to evaluate the Consensus against the criterion of <b>effectiveness</b> . It relates to the link between the Consensus as a whole (input) and the development of humanitarian aid by the EC and the EU MS (outcomes).
<b>Judgment criteria and indicators</b>	
<b>JC 1.1</b>	<b>EU Institutions and MS took concrete initiatives to make sure the 6 key areas of the EU Consensus were taken on board in their humanitarian aid</b>
I-1.1.1	The European Commission and the EU MS knew the EU Consensus (new its existence, its contents, and considered it a reference document)
I-1.1.2	Responsibility given by EU Institutions and MSs to a specific actor(s) to ensure that EU Consensus was taken on board and to follow this up
I-1.1.3	Specific mechanisms or practices developed by the EU Institutions and MS to make sure that the EU Consensus was taken on board (guidelines, monitoring, ..)
I-1.1.4	Actions undertaken by the EU Institutions and MS with respect to advocacy, promotion of humanitarian principles and IHL
I-1.1.5	Quality aid approaches developed by the EU Institutions and MS further to the Consensus
I-1.1.6	Actions undertaken by the EU Institutions and MS to reinforce capacities to respond
I-1.1.7	Actions undertaken by the EU Institutions and MS to strengthen partnerships
I-1.1.8	Actions undertaken by the EU Institutions and MS to enhance coherence and coordination
I-1.1.9	Actions undertaken by the EU Institutions and MS to strengthen the continuum between humanitarian and development aid
<b>JC 1.2</b>	<b>The EU Consensus implementation has influenced and supported the EU Institutions and MS's humanitarian aid policies, structures and procedures</b>
I-1.2.1	EU Institutions and MS's documents related to their humanitarian aid policies, structures and procedures explicitly refer to the EU Consensus
I-1.2.2	Examples of specific changes or even clear patterns in EU Institutions and MS's humanitarian aid policies, structures and procedures further to the EU Consensus
I-1.2.3	Stakeholders views <sup>2</sup> on the (direct or indirect) influence of the EU consensus on EU Institutions and MS's humanitarian aid policies, structures and procedures
I-1.2.4	Attention paid to EU Consensus in evaluations, reviews and other studies by the EU Institutions and MSs

<sup>2</sup> Stakeholder views are sought on a number of indicators across all evaluation questions. Stakeholders are herein defined in a broad sense to include ECHO staff members, EU Member State humanitarian agencies, implementing partners, NGOs, other international humanitarian donors, non-donor humanitarian organisations (e.g. UN OCHA), researchers and experts in humanitarian aid.

<b>EQ 2</b>	<b>To what extent has the Consensus Action Plan assisted EU Institutions and MS in translating the Consensus into operational practice?</b>
<b>Rationale and coverage of the question</b>	<p><u>Background</u></p> <p>The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid tasked the European Commission with presenting an Action Plan for practical measures to implement the Consensus. This Action Plan was actually released on 29 August 2008 and covers six action areas: advocacy, promotion of humanitarian principles and international law; implementing quality aid approaches; reinforcing capacities to respond; strengthening partnership; enhancing coherence and coordination; the aid continuum.</p> <p>The majority of actions identified in the Action Plan were to be pursued by the Commission and the EU Member States acting together. In a limited number of cases implementation lay primarily or solely on the European Commission.</p> <p><u>Understanding and coverage of the question</u></p> <p>This second overarching question aims at assessing to what extent the Action Plan proved an appropriate and effective instrument to implement the Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. It relates to one of the two main subjects of this evaluation as defined in section 1.2 of the ToR (i.e. how the Action Plan is used). It does not cover the extent to which the Consensus itself proved an appropriate and effective instrument to promote humanitarian principles among EU donors (this is covered instead under EQs1 and 6).</p> <p><u>Rationale behind the JCs</u></p> <p>JCs (i) examine the coherence between the Action Plan and the Consensus; (ii) aim at verifying whether the actions as defined in the Action Plan are appropriate to reach their objectives (iii) check to what extent the Action Plan has been used and been considered useful; (iv) check whether “an” Action Plan was the right and sufficient tool to make sure the objectives of the EU consensus were reached.</p>
<b>Link with IL and evaluation criteria</b>	The EQ addresses the <b>appropriateness</b> of the Action Plan as an instrument for implementing the Consensus and its <b>effectiveness</b> in translating the Consensus into operational practice.
<b>Judgment criteria and indicators</b>	
<b>JC 2.1</b>	<b>The Action Plan adequately reflects the principles and objectives stated in the EU Consensus</b>
I-2.1.1	The principles and objectives in the EU Consensus are reflected in the Action Plan (comprehensive)
I-2.1.2	Stakeholders consider that the Action Plan provides a correct interpretation of the EU Consensus principles and objectives (accuracy)
<b>JC 2.2</b>	<b>The actions defined in the Action Plan are appropriate to reach the principles and objectives of the Consensus</b>
I-2.2.1	Documentary evidence (e.g. on State of the art practices) on the level of appropriateness of the planned actions to reach the objectives of the corresponding Consensus articles

I-2.2.2	Stakeholder views on the level of appropriateness of the planned actions to reach the objectives of the corresponding Consensus articles
<b>JC 2.3</b>	<b>The EU Institutions and MS have used the action plan to translate the Consensus into operational practice and considered it a useful tool in this respect</b>
I-2.3.1	The EU Institutions and MS humanitarian aid policy and/or strategy documents explicitly refer to their commitments with respect to the EU consensus and to the Action Plan
I-2.3.2	Stakeholders' views on the usefulness of the Action Plan as a tool
I-2.3.3	Stakeholders provide examples where EU Consensus objectives were reached with other means than through the Action Plan
<b>JC 2.4</b>	<b>An Action Plan was an appropriate and sufficient tool to make sure that the objectives of the EU consensus were reached</b>
I-2.4.1	Stakeholders consider that an Action Plan was needed
I-2.4.2	Stakeholders consider that no other initiatives were needed in addition to the Action Plan
I-2.4.3	Stakeholders provide examples where EU Consensus objectives were reached with other means (cf. I-2.3.3)

<b>EQ 3</b>	<b>To what extent has the EU Consensus improved the coordination between EU Institutions and MS and enhanced the complementarities between their humanitarian aid strategies and operations?</b>
<b>Rationale and coverage of the question</b>	<p><u>Background</u></p> <p>The Consensus underlines that “<i>the EU strongly supports the central and overall coordination role of the United Nations, particularly the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in promoting a coherent international response to humanitarian crises</i>”. It further states that “<i>EU humanitarian donors will work together through strengthened EU coordination and promotion of best practice with a view to promoting the EU common vision in a flexible and complementary way that reinforces international efforts</i>”.</p> <p><u>Understanding and coverage of the question</u></p> <p>The Evaluation Question aims at assessing to what extent the adoption of the Consensus led to stronger coordination at EU level. It further examines to what extent this coordination enhanced complementarities.</p> <p><u>Rationale behind the JCs</u></p> <p>The first JC aims at assessing to what extent adoption and implementation of the Consensus has contributed to strengthen coordination of the EU humanitarian activities. The second one verifies to what extent this led to improved complementarities between the humanitarian aid provided by EU institutions and MS’, both at strategy and operational level.</p>
<b>Link with IL and evaluation criteria</b>	The Evaluation Question addresses the issues of <b>coordination</b> and <b>complementarity</b> .
<b>Judgment criteria and indicators</b>	
<b>JC 3.1</b>	<b>The adoption of the Consensus has led to better EU coordination (cf. Alnap Guide)</b>
I-3.1.1	Increase of the information-exchange practices and/or coordination plans jointly developed and implemented at EU level by EU institutions and MS, including clear distribution of roles (e.g. geographically, thematically)
I-3.1.2	Emergence or joint appointment by EU institutions and MS of a lead coordination agency (or agencies) responsible for coordination of EU donors in crisis response, or delegation of this role to a non-EU agency
I-3.1.3	Targeting of complementarities and synergies between EU institutions and MS by the coordination mechanisms and practices developed further to the EU Consensus (e.g. jointly designing strategies and responding to particular crises)
I-3.1.4	Set up and/or use of joint funding mechanisms at EU level (channelling, basket funds, etc.) by EU institutions and MS or common approaches to non-EU joint funding mechanisms
I-3.1.5	Factors enhancing / hampering coordination at EU level

JC 3.2	<b>Complementarities between EU Institutions and MS' humanitarian aid improved at strategy and operational level</b>
I-3.2.1	Reduction in duplication of efforts between EU interventions (e.g. same beneficiaries, same geographical zones, same activities)
I-3.2.2	Increased adequacy in meeting humanitarian needs (gaps avoided, more comprehensive coverage, wider donor base)
I-3.2.3	Existence of synergies due to better coordination (e.g. better use of comparative advantages)
I-3.2.4	Linkages observed between improved complementarities and improved timeliness and cost-effectiveness
I-3.2.5	Linkages observed between improved complementarities and improved reaching of objectives by interventions

<b>EQ 4</b>	<b>To what extent has the Consensus led to a more coherent and visible EU response to humanitarian crises, with a clear EU added value?</b>
<b>Rationale and coverage of the question</b>	<p><u>Background</u></p> <p>The term coherence is understood here as (<i>cf. ALNAP guide</i>, p. 33) “<i>the extent to which policies of different actors were complementary or contradictory</i>”. The evaluation focuses on the Consensus between different EU institutions and MS. Hence the aforementioned “policies of different actors” can refer to two components of the coherence question: (i) the humanitarian policies of different EU actors; (ii) the different policies (humanitarian, development, military) of different actors, whether EU or not. The present question refers to the first components, while question 8 tackles the second component. To avoid confusion with the second dimension, we suggest using the term “consistency”. Furthermore, this question focuses on the policy level, while question 3 targets the strategy and operational levels.</p> <p><u>Understanding and coverage of the question</u></p> <p>The Evaluation Question aims at examining to what extent EU institutions have taken initiatives, as a consequence of the EU Consensus, to increase the consistency between their humanitarian aid policies. It also aims at assessing to what extent the Consensus helped increasing the visibility of EU institutions and MS's responses to crises as “EU” responses. Finally, it verifies whether the EU had a specific value added in humanitarian crises.</p> <p><u>Rationale behind the JCs</u></p> <p>The JCs break the question down into three key elements: coherence and consistency of EU responses, visibility and EU value-added. Each of these elements combine to provide an answer to the EQ. Thus, the JCs aim at assessing the contribution of the Consensus to (i) the enhanced commitment of EU institutions and MS to a more consistent EU response to humanitarian crises; (ii) an improved consistency between the humanitarian policies of EU institutions and EU MS; (iii) improving the visibility of EU institutions and MS' as EU humanitarian actors among the donor community; (iv) the EU value added in humanitarian crises.</p>
<b>Link with IL and evaluation criteria</b>	The Evaluation Question tackles the <b>coherence</b> criterion, understood as the consistency between the policies of the various EU institutions and MS. It also tackles the issues of visibility and EU value added.
<b>Judgment criteria and indicators</b>	
<b>JC 4.1</b>	<b>As a consequence of the Consensus implementation, EU institutions and EU MS bought into the objective of increasing convergence in the EU response to humanitarian crises</b>
I-4.1.1	Commitment to a more consistent EU response in policy and strategy documents
I-4.1.2	Mechanisms emerged or developed by EU institutions and EU MS to ensure a more consistent EU response
I-4.1.3	Stakeholder views on the extent to which EU institutions and MS were firmly committed to enhancing the consistency of the EU response to humanitarian crises



I-4.1.4	Factors enhancing or hampering the commitment to consistency
<b>JC 4.2</b>	<b>The Consensus implementation improved the consistency between the humanitarian policies of EU institutions and EU MS</b>
I-4.2.1	Humanitarian policy, strategy and operational documents explicitly refer to choices made with a view to increasing convergence between EU humanitarian policies
I-4.2.2	Views of stakeholders on the improvement of the convergence of EU humanitarian policies
<b>JC 4.3</b>	<b>As a consequence of the Consensus, the response of EU institutions and EU MS to humanitarian crises became more visible as an “EU” response</b>
I-4.3.1	EU Institutions and MS policy and strategy documents show a commitment to visibility of the EU an entity
I-4.3.2	Stakeholders’ views on the extent to which EU institutions and MS are committed to the visibility of the EU as an entity and take initiatives to promote it
I-4.3.3	EU institutions and MS visibility strategies and practices that are geared towards a common EU visibility and that are followed
I-4.3.4	Recipient governments, tax payers and non EU humanitarian actors are more aware of EU humanitarian response
<b>JC 4.4</b>	<b>The EU as an entity was recognised as having a clear value added in humanitarian crises</b>
I-4.4.1	Evidence that the EU’s global presence had an added value (e.g. through extensive field-level specialist humanitarian presence, capacity to draw on network of EUDs)
I-4.4.2	Evidence of a specific role played by the EU in ensuring coherence in Community policies
I-4.4.3	Evidence of the specific role played by the EU in promoting good humanitarian practice amongst EU Institutions and MS
I-4.4.4	Evidence of the EU’s better capacity to intervene in politically sensitive situations more flexibly
I-4.4.5	Evidence of the Commission having facilitated coordination it own activities, those of the MS and other actors

<b>EQ 5</b>	<b>To what extent did the implementation of the Consensus strengthen the international humanitarian system by fostering a common EU position and approach to international good practice initiatives?</b>
<b>Rationale and coverage of the question</b>	<p><u>Background</u></p> <p>As outlined in articles 25 and 26, the Consensus commits the EU institutions and Member States to work towards greater overall coordination in part with a view to strengthening the EU's contributions to the international humanitarian system:</p> <p><i>“Stronger EU co-ordination would enhance the overall international humanitarian response, including concerted efforts to improve the humanitarian system, and would also reinforce the EU ambition of working closely with other humanitarian actors. Therefore, without prejudice to their respective competences and traditions, EU humanitarian donors will work together through strengthened EU coordination and promotion of best practice with a view to promoting the EU common vision in a flexible and complementary way that reinforces international efforts. This means that the EU will seek to act in a concerted way to protect the ‘humanitarian space’ and to strengthen the overall humanitarian response, including identifying gaps and supporting well-organised delivery of aid where it is most needed.”</i> (EU Consensus, articles 25-26)</p> <p><u>Understanding and coverage of the question</u></p> <p>In this light, the Evaluation Question aims to assess whether as a consequence of the EU Consensus, EU Institutions and MS have contributed to strengthening international good practice initiatives.</p> <p><u>Rationale behind the JCs</u></p> <p>The JCs assess the contribution of EU to the international humanitarian aid system in two ways. Firstly, the degree to which EU institutions and Member States took common policy and strategy positions within global humanitarian aid platforms (e.g. vis-à-vis policy positions taken with regards to the UNOCHA reform agenda or strategic relations with UN agencies). Secondly, the degree to which EU actors were able through joint approaches to enhance the capacities of the international aid system by, for example, ensuring that they jointly contributed to the GHD initiative, Principles of the Partnership of the Global Humanitarian Platform, etc.</p>
<b>Link with IL and evaluation criteria</b>	The Evaluation Question addresses the issue <b>effectiveness</b> . It aims at assessing to what extent initiatives aimed at implementing quality aid approaches contributed to strengthen the EU contribution to the international humanitarian system.
<b>Judgment criteria and indicators</b>	
<b>JC 5.1</b>	<b>EU Institutions and MS strengthened the international humanitarian system by taking common policy/strategic position in global platforms for humanitarian aid</b>
I-5.1.1	EU Coordination activities ( <i>cf. EQ3</i> ) aimed at determining common policy / strategic positions
I-5.1.2	Documentary evidence of common EU policy / strategic positions in global platforms of humanitarian aid as a consequence of the EU Consensus
I-5.1.3	EU and international stakeholders can provide examples of common EU policy / strategic positions in global platforms of humanitarian aid as a consequence of the EU Consensus

I-5.1.4	Documentary evidence and stakeholders' views on the effects of common EU positions or the lack thereof on the international humanitarian system
<b>JC 5.2</b>	<b>EU Institutions and MS have usefully contributed to international good practice initiatives through joint approaches</b>
I-5.2.1	Approaches defined and mechanisms set up by EU Institutions and MS to ensure a joint contribution to international good practice initiatives (e.g. OCHA common methodological framework for needs assessment, GHD initiative, Principles of the Partnership of the Global Humanitarian Platform, etc.)
I-5.2.2	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which such approaches and mechanisms facilitate the design and implementation of these international good practice initiatives

<b>EQ 6</b>	<b>To what extent has the implementation of the Consensus contributed to promoting and upholding the fundamental humanitarian principles, promoting IHL and respecting the distinct nature of humanitarian aid?</b>
<b>Rationale and coverage of the question</b>	<p><u>Background</u></p> <p>The Consensus states that <i>“the EU is firmly committed to upholding and promoting the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.”</i> It further states that <i>“the EU will advocate strongly and consistently for the respect of International Law, including Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and Refugee Law.”</i> Finally, it specifies that <i>“the principles that apply to humanitarian aid are specific and distinct from other forms of aid”</i>.</p> <p><u>Understanding and coverage of the question</u></p> <p>The Evaluation Question aims at assessing to what extent implementation of the Consensus contributed to strengthened EU commitment to ensuring neutral and independent humanitarian action and to protecting humanitarian space, and to better recognition of the aims and objectives of EU humanitarian action. In both cases, it aims mainly at verifying to what extent the EU was able to project respectively fundamental humanitarian principles and promotion of IHL on other stakeholders. It also looks as a first step to what extent EU institutions and MS made sure themselves they upheld them. A third dimension of the question concerns the contribution of the Consensus to a better recognition of the specificities of humanitarian action within EU institutions and MS.</p> <p><u>Rationale behind the JCs</u></p> <p>The JCs defined below aim at constructing progressively an answer to the question, by distinguishing between the three aforementioned dimensions of the evaluation question.</p>
<b>Link with IL and evaluation criteria</b>	The Evaluation Question aims to evaluate the Consensus implementation against the criterion of <b>effectiveness</b> .
<b>Judgment criteria and indicators</b>	
<b>JC 6.1</b>	<b>The implementation of the Consensus contributed to the upholding and promoting of the fundamental humanitarian principles</b>
I-6.1.1	As a consequence of the Consensus, EU Institutions and MS policy / strategy documents contain explicit commitments to the fundamental humanitarian principles
I-6.1.2	Initiatives taken by EU Institutions and MS to uphold themselves and promote among partners the respect of the fundamental humanitarian principles, including mitigating measures
I-6.1.3	Stakeholders provide examples of increased commitment of the EU and its partners to the respect of the fundamental humanitarian principles further to EU Institutions and MS' initiatives

JC 6.2	<b>The implementation of the Consensus contributed to the promotion of IHL</b>
I-6.2.1	Initiatives taken by EU Institutions and MS to promote among partners <sup>3</sup> the respect of IHL
I-6.2.2	Stakeholders or documents provide examples of increased commitment of EU partners <sup>4</sup> to the respect of IHL further to EU Institutions and MS' initiatives
JC 6.3	<b>The Consensus contributed to the respect (recognised and acted upon) by EU institutions and MS of the distinct nature of humanitarian aid</b>
I-6.3.1	As a consequence of the Consensus, EU Institutions and MS policy / strategy documents contain explicit recognitions of the distinct nature of humanitarian aid
I-6.3.2	Initiatives taken by EU Institutions and MS to make sure that the distinct nature of humanitarian aid is respected (recognised and acted upon) (e.g. in terms of divisions of responsibility, independence of the chains of command)
I-6.3.3	Stakeholders views on whether the respect for the distinct nature of humanitarian aid by EU Institutions and MS has increased as a consequence of the implementation of the Consensus

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<sup>3</sup> Partners is here defined broadly to include both ECHO and Member State implementing partners as well as other donor and humanitarian organisations that both ECHO and Member States cooperate with.

<sup>4</sup> Idem.

<b>EQ 7</b>	<b>To what extent has the implementation of the Consensus contributed to ensuring that EU responses to humanitarian crises were based on humanitarian needs and not on other concerns?</b>
<b>Rationale and coverage of the question</b>	<p><u>Background</u></p> <p>The Consensus states that “humanitarian needs should be transparently allocated on the basis of identified needs and the degree of vulnerability. This means that aid recipients should be identified based on objectively verifiable criteria and that aid should be delivered in such a way that defined priority needs are matched by adequate funds”.</p> <p>It also states that “the EU affirms its commitment to ensuring a balance of response between different crises based on needs, including aid for protracted crises. Forgotten crises or crises where intervention is particularly difficult and where the overall international humanitarian response is inadequate warrant special attention from the EU. Neglected needs in response to specific crises also deserve particular consideration.”</p> <p>The Consensus further notes that “on the assessment of needs, the Commission has developed a specific methodology for analysing general vulnerability and state of crisis at a comparative country level on an annual basis – the Global Needs Assessment” and “that it applies a specific approach to identifying ‘Forgotten Crises’ and to ensuring an appropriate funding response.”</p> <p><u>Understanding and coverage of the question</u></p> <p>The Evaluation Question aims at assessing the contribution made by the Consensus to ensure that responses to humanitarian crisis are based on needs. It is based to a large extent to articles 31 to 39 of the EU Consensus.</p> <p>Particular attention will be devoted to the areas of practical application that would benefit from more emphasis in the further implementation of the Consensus commitments.</p> <p><u>Rationale behind the JCs</u></p> <p>The JCs aim at constructing an answer to the question in two steps. In a first step, the aim is to verify to what extent the needs assessments as done by EU Institutions and MS have improved. In a second step, it aims at checking whether a number of provisions in the EU Consensus in terms of improved coverage in response to needs were followed.</p>
<b>Link with IL and evaluation criteria</b>	The Evaluation Question aims to evaluate the Consensus implementation against the criteria of <b>appropriateness, effectiveness and coverage</b> . It relates the outputs of the actions implemented under area 2 (implementing quality aid approaches) of the Action Plan to their outcomes that are (i) humanitarian needs are precisely identified, (ii) an increased focus is put on neglected crises and (iii) humanitarian needs are effectively met.
<b>Judgment criteria and indicators</b>	
<b>JC 7.1</b>	<b>EU Institutions and MS have more precisely and comprehensively assessed the needs of the people facing humanitarian crisis</b>
I-7.1.1	Objectively verifiable criteria increasingly used by EU Institutions and MS to identify aid recipients and allocate funds
I-7.1.2	Initiatives taken by the EU to promote a common understanding of needs-assessments at the EU level

I-7.1.3	Agreement reached within the EU and with the international partners on a suitable methodology and programming principles for global and local needs assessment
I-7.1.4	Increased use by EU institutions and MS of appropriate field presence and expertise and of the UNDAC teams for assessment of local needs
I-7.1.5	Stakeholders' views and documentary evidence on the extent to which EU institutions and MS have more precisely and comprehensively assessed needs
<b>JC 7.2</b>	<b>EU Institutions and MS took specific initiatives to enhance appropriate coverage</b>
I-7.2.1	Initiatives taken by EU Institutions and MS to ensure that the mobilisation of funding for humanitarian aid is based on assessed need and evolving circumstances (including notably for the provision of emergency food aid) <sup>2</sup>
I-7.2.2	Existence of an EU assessment of the adequacy of the resources available to the European Community humanitarian aid, in light of its comparative advantage
I-7.2.3	Increased bilateral humanitarian aid contributions in absolute terms and expanded donor base as a consequence of the Consensus
I-7.2.4	Evidence of increased attention given by EU Institutions and MS to forgotten crises or crises where intervention is particularly difficult
I-7.2.5	Initiatives taken by EU institutions and MS to take into account particular vulnerabilities when responding to humanitarian need (notably specific attention to women, children, the elderly, sick and disabled people)
I-7.2.6	Stakeholders views and/or documentary evidence on gaps in terms of appropriate coverage
<b>JC 7.3</b>	<b>EU Institutions and MS's responses to humanitarian crises were not geared by considerations other than humanitarian needs</b>
I-7.3.1	EU Institutions and MS' policy and strategy documents explicitly endorse the needs based approach, further to the Consensus
I-7.3.2	Stakeholders confirm that these endorsements are translated into practice
I-7.3.3	Examples in documents or provided by stakeholders of humanitarian responses based on other considerations than needs (e.g. commercial, political, strategic, etc. interests)
I-7.3.4	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which responses were increasingly based on humanitarian needs or not, and on possible linkages with the Consensus



<b>EQ 8</b>	<b>To what extent has the implementation of the Consensus contributed to targeting improved coherence between EU Institutions and MS' humanitarian policies and other external policies, and better coordination and division of roles between the corresponding actors?</b>
<b>Rationale and coverage of the question</b>	<p><u>Background</u></p> <p>The Consensus states that <i>“the EU commits to ensuring policy coherence, complementarity and effectiveness by using its influence and the full range of tools at its disposal to address the root causes of humanitarian. In particular, humanitarian aid and development cooperation, as well as the various instruments available to implement stability measures, will be used in a coherent and complementary fashion, especially in transitional contexts and situations of fragility, in order to use the full potential of short- and long-term aid and cooperation.”</i></p> <p>The Consensus further mentions that coherence is a dimension of humanitarian aid in which the Community has a comparative advantage and is providing value-added. It notes in this respect that the Commission, with the support of EU Member States, is <i>“ensuring coherence in Community policies, in particular at the meeting points between Community policies in the area of humanitarian aid, development, food security, public health and human rights, including through Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), disaster risk reduction and preparedness strategies”</i>.</p> <p><u>Understanding and coverage of the question</u></p> <p>The ALNAP guide “Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD/DAC criteria” defines coherence as <i>“the need to assess security, developmental, trade and military as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human-rights considerations”</i>. In this perspective, this questions aims at examining to what extent EU institutions and MS took initiatives to enhance such coherence.</p> <p>This concerns in particular the link between humanitarian aid and development aid through disaster risk reduction and LRRD. This question is different from question 4 that focuses on the coherence between the humanitarian aid policies of EU Institutions and MS.</p> <p><u>Rationale behind the JCs</u></p> <p>The JCs aim at assessing to what extent humanitarian aid agencies took initiatives to ensure consistency with respectively development policies and military policies. It also aims at verifying to what extent EU political assets were used to ensure the humanitarian space.</p>
<b>Link with IL and evaluation criteria</b>	The Evaluation Question aims to evaluate the Consensus against the criteria of <b>complementarity, coherence</b> and <b>connectedness</b> . It relates the outputs of the actions implemented under area 6 (the aid continuum) of the Action Plan to their outcomes: humanitarian aid better linked with longer term development and Disaster Risk Reduction strengthened and supported by long-term aid approaches.
<b>Judgment criteria and indicators</b>	



<b>JC 8.1</b>	<b>The adoption of the Consensus has led EU institutions' and MS' humanitarian agencies to strengthen their interaction with development, political and military actors</b>
I-8.1.1	Initiatives taken by EU institutions and MS humanitarian agencies to improve information-exchange with agencies of development, political and military actors both at HQ level and on the ground
I-8.1.2	Responsibility for strengthening the interaction with development, political and military actors assigned to specific bodies within EU institutions and MS
I-8.1.3	Factors enhancing / hampering interaction with development, political and military actors
<b>JC 8.2</b>	<b>Strengthened interaction of EU institutions' and MS' humanitarian agencies with development actors has aimed at increased coherence between humanitarian and development policies, notably in terms of resilience</b>
I-8.2.1	Initiatives taken by EU institutions and MS to increase coherence between humanitarian and development policies, notably in terms of resilience
I-8.2.2	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which was targeting adequately increased coherence between humanitarian and development policies, notably in terms of resilience
<b>JC 8.3</b>	<b>Strengthened interaction of EU institutions' and MS' humanitarian agencies with military actors has aimed at increased coherence between humanitarian and security policies and at improve coordination and division of roles</b>
I-8.3.1	Evidence on initiatives taken with a view to improve coherence, coordination and division of roles, further to the Consensus
I-8.3.2	Stakeholders provide examples of improved coherence, coordination and division of roles, or the lack thereof, and link them to the Consensus
<b>JC 8.4</b>	<b>The EU has deployed its means to ensure the "humanitarian space" to secure access</b>
I-8.4.1	Evidence on initiatives taken with a view to deploy available means to preserve humanitarian space and secure access
I-8.4.2	Stakeholders provide examples where the EU has deployed means, including political leverage, that were critical to secure access
I-8.4.3	Stakeholders views on the extent to which humanitarian aid remained independent in such cases (taking into account the Oslo and UN MCDA guidelines)

<b>EQ 9</b>	<b>To what extent has the Consensus contributed to improve complementarities between EU humanitarian and civil protection resources in third countries ?</b>
<b>Rationale and coverage of the question</b>	<p><u>Background</u></p> <p>In a paragraph devoted to Civil Protection, the Consensus points out that <i>“in natural disasters and technological and environmental emergencies, civil protection resources can provide an important contribution to humanitarian actions based on humanitarian needs assessments and their possible advantage in terms of speed, specialisation, efficiency and effectiveness, especially in the early phase of relief response.”</i></p> <p>It further states that <i>“where deployed in any humanitarian crisis, the use of civil protection resources should be needs-driven and complementary to and coherent with humanitarian aid. Therefore proper coordination between different European actors and instruments is essential, as is respect for the overall coordinating role of the UN.”</i></p> <p>Finally, it underlines that <i>“the use of civil protection and military assets in response to humanitarian situations must be in line with the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in complex emergencies and the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in International Disaster Relief”</i>. It proposes that the EU promotes a common understanding of these guidelines and encourages common training on international law and the fundamental humanitarian principles.</p> <p><u>Understanding and coverage of the question</u></p> <p>The Evaluation Question aims at assessing to what extent the use by the EU of civil protection resources in the framework of humanitarian interventions has been coherent and complementary with humanitarian actions. This implies that the use of civil protection and military resources is in line with MCDA/Oslo guidelines.</p> <p><u>Rationale behind the JCs</u></p> <p>The JCs first aim at verifying whether the Consensus enhanced among EU institutions and MS a shared understanding on when it is appropriate to use civil defence assets. It then checks whether these assets were deployed when offering a comparative advantage and whether the Consensus encouraged closed and effective filed coordination between EU civil defence and humanitarian actions.</p>
<b>Link with IL and evaluation criteria</b>	The Evaluation Question assesses the issues of <b>complementarity</b> and <b>coherence</b> . It relates the actions undertaken under area 5 of the Action Plan to improve understanding of the UN MCDA/Oslo guidelines and to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between humanitarian and civil protection actors to their intermediate impacts in terms of effective and efficient response to humanitarian crisis.
<b>Judgment criteria and indicators</b>	

<b>JC 9.1</b>	<b>The Consensus implementation contributed to a shared understanding among EU institutions and MS of when it is appropriate to use civil protection assets in emergencies in third countries</b>
I-9.1.1	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which civil protection resources were deployed on a needs driven basis, and on the impact of the Consensus in this respect
I-9.1.2	Stakeholders do not provide specific examples that would show that there was a lack of shared understanding
<b>JC 9.2</b>	<b>The Consensus implementation helped to ensure that civil protection assets were deployed in situations where they offered a comparative advantage over alternative humanitarian instruments</b>
I-9.2.1	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which civil protection resources were complementary to humanitarian aid, and on the impact of the Consensus in this respect
I-9.2.2	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which civil protection resources, when deployed, had a specific added value in terms for instance of speed, specialisation, and in the early phase of relief response
<b>JC 9.3</b>	<b>The Consensus implementation encouraged close field coordination between EU civil protection and humanitarian actions</b>
I-9.3.1	Specific initiatives taken by EU Institutions and MS to ensure effective field coordination between EU civil protection and humanitarian actions, further to the Consensus
I-9.3.2	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which field coordination improved between EU civil protection and humanitarian actions



## Annex 7 – Future challenges to the humanitarian landscape – a literature review

This annex presents a review of available literature concerning the challenges likely to affect the humanitarian landscape in the coming decade. The annex includes three sections:

- A summary of the findings of the literature review;
- A review of the origins and evolution of modern humanitarianism;
- A review of future challenges to the humanitarian landscape.

The review covered a total of 41 academic and policy papers, listed in the bibliography below.

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## Acronym List

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
EU	European Union
ECHO	Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection
GHA	Global Humanitarian Assistance
HFP	Humanitarian Futures Programme
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UN	United Nations
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Programme

## 1. Summary

As described in the sections below, there is clearly significant interest in examining the evolution of modern humanitarian action, its ideals, structures, and shortcomings, and what potential futures these might illuminate. However this discourse, despite its noted focus on a broader, more diverse and inclusive future humanitarian landscape, remains one predominantly led by – and which subsequently echoes the interests, activities and motivations of – those organisations and individuals with their roots in the origins of the traditional humanitarian system.

While elements influencing the humanitarian challenges in the coming decade may be novel, some have highlighted that ‘the evidence suggests that many of today’s challenges to humanitarian action not only have a historical precedent, but are also the result of an expanding humanitarian system that has extended its reach and ambitions into types of conflict and crisis that were previously off-limits.’<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, with now-protracted conflict in the Arab world, resurgent conflict in central Africa, and climate-driven disasters around the globe, as well as diverse and often polarised political and economic forces exerting pressure on all aspects of the prevailing international order, ‘unpredictability is more than ever the rule in the humanitarian field’.<sup>2</sup>

It would seem self-evident that the traditional elements of the humanitarian sector must find meaningful ways to move away from its cloistered structures of the past, not only to deal with such increasing unpredictability, but also to remain relevant in a multipolar world. Given the stakes at hand and the accumulated influence of the humanitarian sector, debates about its future must therefore go beyond mere introspection.<sup>3</sup>

Such an approach will require a pluralist discourse, one which ‘recognises that different communities have different visions of the good life and different imaginations of how to get there (including different models of assistance to the crisis-affected), not necessarily based on the same values as Western humanitarianism.’<sup>4</sup>

Many of the inherent tensions within humanitarianism, such as balancing the need to provide immediate life-saving assistance with the inescapable desire to address the underlying causes are unlikely to ever be resolved. That said, with the post-2015 agenda<sup>5</sup> taking shape and the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit on the horizon, humanitarians have abundant opportunities to discuss these and other issues amongst themselves as well as with those concerned with humanitarian action in all its forms.

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<sup>1</sup> Collinson and Elhawary 2012, pp. 25

<sup>2</sup> Bernard 2011, pp. 896

<sup>3</sup> Bernard 2011, pp. 896

<sup>4</sup> Fiori 2013 pp.11

<sup>5</sup> Ref Hyogo II SDGs

## 2. The origins and evolution of modern humanitarianism

The origins and intellectual foundations of 'humanitarianism' can be traced back across centuries and cultures.<sup>6</sup> The predominant understanding of modern humanitarianism in the Western world however, owes much of its current form and philosophy to the developments of the mid-twentieth century, largely in the aftermath of the Second World War and European decolonisation of the mid-twentieth century. Three distinct yet interdependent pillars of what has come to be commonly termed the international humanitarian system emerged: the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement<sup>7</sup>, the United Nations (UN) humanitarian agencies and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs).

Spurred by the brutality of 19<sup>th</sup> century warfare, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) took shape in the 1860's, and saw its role in the protection of persons affected by conflict—civilians, as well as the wounded and captured—codified under the Geneva Conventions,<sup>8</sup> and through its declaration of principles in 1965. Concurrently, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies increasingly assumed important duties in aiding crisis-affected populations at home and abroad, both independently and under the umbrella of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). With its vast capacity and inherent connection to the affected through National Red Cross Societies, the Red Cross Movement largely retains its unique role within the international humanitarian system as the so-called guardians of International Humanitarian Law<sup>9</sup> and the benchmark for humanitarian neutrality.

The formation of the United Nations (UN) and its operational humanitarian agencies, most prominently, UNICEF (1946), UNHCR (1951), WFP (1961), similarly began to play a major role in crises around the globe after the Second World War. The influence of the UN on humanitarianism is not isolated to these agencies however; its peacekeeping operations, fortification of the political and economic dominance of Western powers, and the actions—and inaction—of the UN Security Council have each critically shaped the nature of the humanitarian sector in recent decades.

Though sharing many key characteristics, the third pillar of the humanitarian system, INGOs are a disparate and often fragmented grouping. Most major western INGOs have their roots in the conflicts of the twentieth century,<sup>10</sup> and like the other pillars of the traditional humanitarian system, remain heavily engaged in conflict-affected contexts. Since the 1980's, most of these organisations have also been active in natural disasters, previously the near-exclusive domain of national governments,<sup>11</sup> and have provided a great deal of financial and technical support to indigenous relief organisations. The expansion of humanitarian actors and their 'protectionist' discourse into previously unfamiliar domains

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<sup>6</sup> See generally: Davey, Borton and Foley (2013)

<sup>7</sup> This includes the International Committee of the Red Cross (founded 1863), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (founded 1919), and the 189 National Societies, collectively the world's largest humanitarian network (IFRC: <http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/the-movement/>)

<sup>8</sup> Geneva Conventions 1949, 1977

<sup>9</sup> Sandoz (1998)

<sup>10</sup> Labbe 2012 pp.4; It has been noted that until the late 1980's many organisations work in conflict-affected contexts was largely in refugee camp settings in other states (Terry 2002 in Collinson and Elhawary 2013, pp. 5)

<sup>11</sup> Labbe 2012, pp.5



has in large part been a result of donor governments turning to INGOs as a funding channel to disaster-affected populations hosted by increasingly developed nations that increasingly resist assistance from Western-orientated aid agencies.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, scrutiny over the role of such agencies has driven a greater reliance on INGOs and multilateral fora,<sup>13</sup> which command growing resources and comprise increasingly representative membership.

## 2.1 Principles<sup>14</sup>

Diverse as their origins, roles and structures may be, humanitarian organisations have all nominally subscribed to a core set of humanitarian principles orientated around concepts of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.<sup>15</sup> Fundamentally, adherents consider these principles universal values essential for appropriately accessing affected populations,<sup>16</sup> attending to their needs and navigating the crisis context (political actors, authorities and armed actors<sup>17</sup>) in a way that alleviates human suffering. That said, the ways in which these principles guide the actions of humanitarian organisations have always been subject to varied interpretation<sup>18</sup> and orders of priority,<sup>19</sup> and are highly likely to remain contentious issues within the sector for the foreseeable future (see 'Changes with the humanitarian sector: Evolving interpretations of humanitarianism').

## 2.2 Expansion of 'humanitarian', from relief through rights to resilience

Contemporary international law and convention within civil society acknowledge the primary responsibility of the state to protect its population and to respond to humanitarian disaster.<sup>20</sup> In times of crisis however, governments are subject to substantial scrutiny in discharging this duty and, where they are seen to be failing to adequately meet the needs of their citizens, are likely to invite offers of international assistance that challenge their sovereign competence over internal affairs, perhaps even to an existential degree.<sup>21</sup> This reality has become particularly pronounced in recent years, as a series of post-Cold War

<sup>12</sup> Labbe 2012, pp. 5. The motivations for this are varied and range from heightened domestic capacity to fears of foreign interference.

<sup>13</sup> 'International aid sector' here is taken to refer broadly to all assistance provided by donor governments (bilaterally and through multilateral institutions) to developing nations, in order to reflect the reality that such diverse activities were (and in some cases are) often regarded collectively as the core relations between rich and poor nations;

<sup>14</sup> See Macdonald and Valenza 2012 for a thorough examination of the role of principles in humanitarian action

<sup>15</sup> Numerous, and largely consistent, definitions have been offered, including:

ICRC: [http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc\\_002\\_0513.pdf](http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0513.pdf)

OCHA: [https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OOM\\_HumPrinciple\\_English.pdf](https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OOM_HumPrinciple_English.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> Caritas 2011, pp.10;

<sup>17</sup> Madonald and Valenza 2012, pp. 9

<sup>18</sup> Labbe 2012, pp.3; Fiori 2013, pp.5;

<sup>19</sup> Fiori 2013, pp. 5: "In South East Asia, neutrality and impartiality have been seen as secondary to the principle of non-interference. In China, where the notion of the state as guarantor of the welfare of its people is grounded in Confucian tradition, the independence of humanitarian agencies from governments is not considered to be necessary, desirable, or possible. And in Latin America, support for those affected by conflict, extreme poverty and disaster has often been guided by a solitary that precludes neutrality and impartiality."

<sup>20</sup> UN Resolution 46/182. HFA 2005-2015.

<sup>21</sup> Khan & Cunningham, 2013, p. S146.

developments further widened the 'protectionist' humanitarian discourse that accompanied the rise of the INGOs and civil society, international criminal courts, and the augmentation of multilateral peacekeeping missions of the 1990s.

In part, the role of INGOs in this expansion can be attributed to the optimism that followed the end of the Cold War as well as the growing discomfort of many at 'addressing not only the consequences but also the root causes of both man-made and natural disasters.'<sup>22</sup> These contextual factors have been critical drivers in, for instance, the foray of the humanitarian sector into the domestic affairs of nations.<sup>23</sup> As all aspects of the broadly defined international aid industry have grown in parallel with overt political and military interventionism, many of the INGOs regarded as 'multi-mandate' organisations now stretched themselves well beyond the provision of emergency relief, and sought alignment with matters of development, human rights, politics and security. However, such approaches are often regarded as in conflict with the 'Dunantist' <sup>24</sup> strain of humanitarianism, given collaboration with certain actors is seen as out of sync with the principles of independence and neutrality<sup>25</sup>, particularly where governments are party to a conflict.

## 2.3 Structure, codification

This period of chaotic growth, combined with a series of devastating crises, spurred efforts to move from the diverse –though still predominately Western-led— humanitarian body into a coherent structure with codified policies and professional practice. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and INGOs created their own code of conduct,<sup>26</sup> and the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 46/182, which reinforced the centrality of humanitarian principles and aimed to solidify the role of the UN at the centre of the international humanitarian system through the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). The Sphere Guidelines, the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative (GHD, 2003), the Hyogo Framework for Action, (HFA, 2005) as well as the growing prominence of pooled funding mechanisms all contributed to the development of the sector.

Each of these elements have contributed to what has been characterized as 'a centralised, top-down, largely UN-coordinated and sponsored system, focused on international response, and with power concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of Western donor states and NGOs based in distant capitals.'<sup>27</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Labbe 2012, pp.4

<sup>23</sup> Fiori 2013, pp. 7; Fiori has also noted that traditional humanitarian action can be considered political, both in its motivations to empower the affected through the provision of assistance and in its consequences as it inescapably alters the distribution of power. (pp. 7)

<sup>24</sup> 'Dunantist' refers to a more traditional and narrowly defined form of humanitarianism, in line with the principles of the ICRC, founded by Henri Dunant

<sup>25</sup> Labbe 2012, pp.7

<sup>26</sup> IFRC 1994

<sup>27</sup> Fiori 2013, pp. 9

## 2.4 The early stages of 21<sup>st</sup> century humanitarianism

It has been stated that since the turn of the century the humanitarian 'system has dramatically improved in responding to crises quickly, effectively, and professionally.'<sup>28</sup> But in spite of the growing reach of the international humanitarian system and the progress towards coherence and accountability, the sector endures streams of criticism from many sources, the most pointed of which often come from within. Among the major criticisms are that the sector has been characterised as 'highly competitive, often anarchic, ungovernable and inefficient'<sup>29</sup>; that it is 'frequently exclusive, dominant, internally competitive and fragmented'<sup>30</sup>; that, in spite of the rhetoric of agency and inclusiveness, it generally remains predicated on 'what the West does to the rest';<sup>31</sup> and that despite the obvious growth in diversity, it remains dominated by the core traditional actors.<sup>32</sup>

Such critiques notwithstanding, today's international humanitarian system has far greater capacity than at any time in history. The value of humanitarian assistance has more than doubled since the mid-1990's, though it remains relatively miniscule when compared to other financial flows into crisis-prone countries<sup>33</sup> and still does not meet the system's financial needs.<sup>34</sup>

It is critical to further note that the capacity of the international humanitarian system has been vitally supplemented in more recent years with the rise in assumption of humanitarian responsibilities of the 'non-traditional' actors, such as the private sector, military and emerging donor organisations, i.e. those who do not readily fit within the structures of the dominant 'traditional' troika of actors discussed above. Today, therefore, one can observe the 'formal, or institutional...mostly Western actors whose *raison d'être* is humanitarian and who are linked together by established codes, shared principles and jargon, and common mechanisms and practices'<sup>35</sup> as well as an 'informal humanitarian system, constituted by affected communities and so-called non-traditional actors coming to their succour, and driven by different modes of action and objectives, be they charitable, economic, or political.'<sup>36</sup>

Though some among the non-traditional grouping are gradually being integrated into the activities of traditional actors<sup>37</sup> as the exclusivity of the sector declines, predominant elements of the international humanitarian landscape retain many of their original features and the capacities of non-traditional actors generally remain under-utilised.

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<sup>28</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 916

<sup>29</sup> Healy & Tiller 2013, pp.1

<sup>30</sup> Collinson and Elhawary 2012, pp. 25

<sup>31</sup> Fiori 2013, pp. 3

<sup>32</sup> Healy & Tiller 2013, pp. 1

<sup>33</sup> GHA Report 2013 notes that while USD \$5.6 billion in international humanitarian assistance went to 15 of the 20 top recipients in 2011, this pales in comparison to USD \$15.1 billion in development assistance, USD \$25.6 billion in foreign direct investment, USD \$40.8 billion in remittances, and USD \$390.5 billion in government expenditure

<sup>34</sup> GHA 2013 reports that 37.3% of the UN CAP Appeal needs were unmet in 2012, and between approximately one-quarter and over one-third of needs unmet in each year of the preceding decade; GHA 2013 pp. 14

<sup>35</sup> Labbe 2012, pp. 5

<sup>36</sup> Labbe 2012, pp. 6

<sup>37</sup> Labbe 2012, pp. 6

Part of the reason for this is because the growth of actors in crises (both in number and diversity) can threaten the construct of principled humanitarian action to a given crisis by a given actor.<sup>38</sup> The humanitarian sector remains a system with deeply rooted ideals which at one level traverses nations and cultures, but which at another are largely viewed as Western exports, which are highly subjective in their interpretation and operational application, and which can be at odds with the inclination of those engaged in the attempt to prevent, relieve or recover from a humanitarian crisis.

Concurrently, crises have become more complex<sup>39</sup> and more resilient themselves, with not only the number of actors engaged generating mixed and often conflicting approaches over what needs to be done and why, but also as a result of the nature of humanitarian crises becoming more dynamic in a context of rapid global change. Among the most-cited issues facing the humanitarian sector are demographic shifts and migration<sup>40</sup>, climate change<sup>41</sup>, economic turmoil and inequality<sup>42</sup>, geopolitical reorientations<sup>43</sup>, technology<sup>44</sup>, the evolving nature of conflict<sup>45</sup>, pandemics<sup>46</sup>, and diminishing 'humanitarian space'.<sup>47</sup> These alone are not the only issues that pose challenging new questions to the traditional 20<sup>th</sup> century humanitarian system. Issues similarly persist as to the efficacy of short-term and narrow humanitarian responses in light of persistent underlying causes such as poverty and underdevelopment. Humanitarian action now typical encapsulates—or is at least intricately entwined with—activities spanning from relief through recovery and resilience, as well as human rights advocacy and peace building. In the eyes of some this has 'spread the system out, dispersed its effects and created exceedingly high expectations.'<sup>48</sup> That said, it remains the case that humanitarian actors tend to be better at emergency response than at prevention or preparedness activities.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Caritas 2011, pp. 10

<sup>39</sup> Caritas 2011, pp. 10

<sup>40</sup> Haub 2009, Labbe 2012; Ferris 2011;

<sup>41</sup> Labbe 2012; Healy & Tiller 2013; Ferris 2011; EU 2008;

<sup>42</sup> Labbe 2012; Healy & Tiller 2013; Ferris 2011; EU 2008;

<sup>43</sup> Labbe 2012; Healy & Tiller 2013; Ferris 2011; EU 2008;

<sup>44</sup> Labbe 2012; Healy & Tiller 2013; Ferris 2011;

<sup>45</sup> Labbe 2012; Healy & Tiller 2013; Ferris 2011; EU 2008;

<sup>46</sup> Healy & Tiller 2013;

<sup>47</sup> The term 'humanitarian space' is common used throughout the sector, but lacks a commonly understood and accepted definition. Collinson and Elhawary (2012) have compared various definitions, and offer a definition of 'humanitarian space as a complex political, military and legal arena: [a definition which] highlights the highly political nature of the task humanitarian agencies seek to achieve and that humanitarian needs (and their relief) are a product of the dynamic and complex interplay of political, military and legal actors, interests, institutions and process.', 2012, pp. 1

<sup>48</sup> Healy & Tiller 2013, pp. 3

<sup>49</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 915

### 3. Looking forward

Already under-resourced to address existing, mega and protracted crises, and grappling with the effects of contextual evolution, the humanitarian system is likely to experience even greater stress in the coming decades.<sup>50</sup> As noted above, there are many common themes within the literature on the challenges for humanitarian action in the future, often catalogued as related to the nature and dynamics of crises, the external challenges influencing the humanitarian landscape, and those which are internal to the sector. While these might appear logical categorisations for purposes of comprehension, they are each intertwined and the major challenge for 21<sup>st</sup> century humanitarianism will be to reconcile their interconnected effects in its forward action.

The crises of the future are likely to be conditioned by multiple intertwined crisis drivers, including the novel and unforeseen as well as long-standing crisis drivers, any and all of which may interact with each other in countless ways, often highly specific to individual contexts and crises. The potential impacts of such drivers traverse the perceived boundaries of the humanitarian landscape, while also potentially driving both positive and negative humanitarian impacts. For instance, demographic shifts are altering the profile of the affected while also driving political and economic change in many contexts, and technological advancement is generating new risks, such as cybernetic failures and advanced weaponry, while also enabling more effective and decentralised humanitarian actions. The potential impact of such major issues on the future of humanitarianism are explored under the thematic headings below:

#### 3.1 Climate change

Although the number and impact of climate-related disasters has grown markedly since 1990,<sup>51</sup> and the severity and intensity of such disasters are expected to increase in the coming decades<sup>52</sup>, evidence now suggests that the growth in number of natural disasters has stabilised over the past decade.<sup>53</sup> The number of affected in 2012 (9,655 killed and over 124 million affected) is also below that of other recent years which have seen mega-disasters, such as 2008's Cyclone Nargis and 2010's earthquake in Haiti.<sup>54</sup> But while the number of affected may be declining, the value of damages stemming from such disasters in 2012 (US\$157.3 billion) was nearly 10% more than the average of the preceding decade, in large part due to the massive losses from Hurricane Sandy.<sup>55</sup>

Quantifying the impact of climate-related disasters demonstrates their variability, as well as how the impact of climate-related disasters is heavily influenced by economic and social factors which play a crucial role in determining vulnerability. As such, the developing world is likely to continue to face the bulk of suffering from climate-driven disasters. Such nations are increasingly paying the ecological bill for the development and industrialization

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<sup>50</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 916

<sup>51</sup> CRED 2013a, pp. 3

<sup>52</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 930

<sup>53</sup> CRED 2013a, pp. 21

<sup>54</sup> CRED 2013a, pp. 21

<sup>55</sup> CRED 2013a, pp. 21

of the developed world,<sup>56</sup> a crucial and perhaps underestimated factor which may have profound effects on domestic and global geopolitics and economics. As Bernard has noted, 'the map of climatic risks is thus often overlapped by patterns of political instability, chronic insecurity, and underdevelopment.'<sup>57</sup> There are also likely to be more instances of disaster responses conditioned by conflict.<sup>58</sup>

Such climate-driven disasters are likely to continue to challenge the capacity of governments and humanitarian agencies around the world, regardless of their relative wealth or state of development, particularly as inequality continues to polarise societies around the world. Japan's 2010 multi-faceted disaster further demonstrates that the technology of all nations, no matter their culture of preparedness or level of development, is intricately related to vulnerability to climate-related crisis events.<sup>59</sup> Demographic trends also further compound the impact of climate-related disaster and climate change; massive population growth not only poses increased risks to growing coastal communities and dense urban areas, but it also exacerbates the challenges of global emissions, natural resources and food production, to name but a few of its possible effects.<sup>60</sup>

### 3.2 Demographic shifts

Four major demographic trends are expected to be of particular relevance for humanitarian action: unprecedented population growth; the developing world is expected to experience the largest growth in population; the greatest regional demographic crisis will be in Sub-Saharan Africa; and unplanned, peri-urban areas will increasingly house large concentrations of vulnerable populations.<sup>61</sup>

With the globe's population expected to exceed 8 billion by 2025<sup>62</sup> demands on the planet's resources will only increase, likely increasing tensions and potentially conflicts over access to increasingly scarce resources. The majority of this growth is expected to be concentrated in nations which are already young and poor, predominately in Africa and states with large Islamic populations,<sup>63</sup> rendering it 'highly probable that a high percentage of persons will be born into 'chronic risk.'<sup>64</sup>

Declining birth rates in many wealthier nations will potentially leave them with increasing numbers of vulnerable elderly, while also narrowing their tax base. This may not only leave such societies with significantly underfunded domestic social safety net resources, but may also lead these nations to become potentially less willing to fund social safety nets abroad.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Bernard 2011, pp. 891

<sup>57</sup> Bernard 2011, pp. 892

<sup>58</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 931

<sup>59</sup> Bernard 2011, pp. 892; also Ferris 2011, pp. 922

<sup>60</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 919

<sup>61</sup> Feinstein and HFP 2009, pp. 4

<sup>62</sup> Gelsdorf 2010 pp. 6 in Ferris 2011, pp. 917:

<sup>63</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 918

<sup>64</sup> Feinstein and HFP 2009, pp. 4

<sup>65</sup> Feinstein and HFP 2009, pp. 6

Though the 'youth bulge' in much of the developing world is well documented, and expected to produce a so-called 'demographic dividend', the growing numbers of elderly across the globe will require assistance which takes into account their medical needs and how they may be uniquely affected by crises and displacement.<sup>66</sup>

Improvements in medical care and technology have and are likely to continue to significantly contribute to enabling population growth and longer life expectancy as new—and often increasingly expensive and unevenly accessible—technologies allow people to remain healthy longer.<sup>67</sup> However, lifestyle changes across the world are likely to continue to increase the prevalence of the non-communicable disease commonly associated with the Western world, such as diabetes, obesity and hypertension, in less developed countries.<sup>68</sup>

Concurrently, migration, whether driven by conflict, climate change, or economics, will continue to alter the profile of community, countries, and the globe, affecting the relations between and within states.

As current trends in much of the world already demonstrate, many economies are likely to continue to struggle to create jobs for growing populations,<sup>69</sup> with significant political consequences, which may be most acutely felt in urban centres. Haub has noted that 'the increasing concentration of populations in cities, while with some potential benefit also carries with it the risk of mass casualties.'<sup>70</sup>

Urban centres, already home to the majority of the world's population, act 'as an amplifier to the vagaries of nature and war'<sup>71</sup> and have already become increasingly important fora for humanitarian action. Their growing economic and political clout has and will likely continue to force a rebalancing of power between national and municipal levels of government.<sup>72</sup>

### 3.3 Conflict

Though most of the world's conflicts have deep historical roots and often seem intractable,<sup>73</sup> they are being conditioned by emergent factors. For instance, increasingly large and urbanised populations, coupled with their contribution to the effects of climate change are likely to drive resource-related conflict.<sup>74</sup>

Such factors, entwined with a range of political, economic and social factors new and old, continue to present a staggering picture of the effects of conflict around the world. In

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<sup>66</sup> Ferris 2011, pp 918

<sup>67</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 920

<sup>68</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 920 fn 21

<sup>69</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 918

<sup>70</sup> Haub 2009, pp. 47

<sup>71</sup> Bernard 2011, pp. 892

<sup>72</sup> Ferris 2011, pp 929

<sup>73</sup> Bernard 2011, pp. 892

<sup>74</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 920

2012, over 172 million people were affected by conflict, with the vast majority residing in conflict zones, rather than having fled insecurity and violence.<sup>75</sup>

The effects of conflict, and the assistance delivered, often differs significantly depending on an individual's status within a given conflict.<sup>76</sup> CRED has asserted that 'a person's status as a refugee, IDP, or CAR effectively determines whether he lives or dies'.<sup>77</sup> While those resident in a conflict area 'suffer measurably worse health than refugees', 'the health impact of conflict falls most heavily on IDPs'.<sup>78</sup> This illuminates how the traditional categorisations of international law and the international humanitarian system do not account for the impact of contemporary conflict and the needs of all those affected by crisis.

The lawlessness and insecurity which are prevalent in many crises also increasingly involve and attract varied criminal enterprises and other, often heavily fragmented, armed groups.<sup>79</sup> Such actors now present some of the most significant threats to the operational security of Western humanitarian agencies in many crises.

Combined with the operational choices of many organisations, such risks have led humanitarians towards a more bureaucratic, risk averse, and 'bunkerised' approach to security in conflict settings, which has a significant impact on their relations with local populations and their response capacity.<sup>80</sup> In order to remain operational and relevant in such violent and politicised contexts, humanitarian agencies are likely to need to embrace innovative collaborations with local partners that may challenge their adherence to their preconception of fundamental humanitarian principles.<sup>81</sup>

These changes have also led many to question the relevance of International Humanitarian Law. As it is now commonly 'ignored or blatantly violated'<sup>82</sup>, it is 'often described as obsolete or irrelevant'.<sup>83</sup> Technological developments are playing no small part in these challenges, as the use of robotics, cyber-attacks, and other emerging technologies challenge the boundaries of conflict and the attribution of responsibility.

The Global War on Terror, whose rhetoric leaves little if any room for neutral humanitarian action, has only exacerbated such challenges. Anti-terror legislation has created significant barriers to neutral engagement with actors that control access to populations in many crisis stricken regions.<sup>84</sup>

Further, in some of the contexts central to the US-led war on terror, humanitarian action has been instrumentalised as one facet of a 'comprehensive approach', comprising parallel

<sup>75</sup> CRED 2013b, pp. 9; from the countries surveyed, CRED found that 5 of conflict-affect people were refugees, 11% were internally-displaced persons, and 87% were Conflict-affected residents (CAR)

<sup>76</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 935

<sup>77</sup> CRED 2013b, pp. 15

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Bernard 2011, pp. 893

<sup>80</sup> Healy & Tiller 2013, pp. 4

<sup>81</sup> See, for instance: Jackson & Aynte 2013

<sup>82</sup> EU 2008, art. 3

<sup>83</sup> Bernard 2011, pp. 893

<sup>84</sup> See Mackintosh & Duplat



combat operations and development assistance, which threaten the legitimacy of humanitarian action often by fostering negative, politicised perceptions, which in turn compromise the effectiveness of humanitarian action.

### 3.4 Politicisation

In the context of growing pressure on Western state spending on overseas assistance, one possible ‘worst-case scenario’ foresees donor states increasingly delivering a humanitarian response only when a crisis poses an immediate risk to that country’s domestic or foreign policy interest and therefore at the expense of a focus on the needs of a crisis affected population.<sup>85</sup> While the utility of foreign aid to serve hard power interests is waning in many parts of the world given growing domestic capacity in countries most commonly affected by disaster (not to mention the greater scrutiny applied to humanitarian action more generally by these countries), such an approach would further compound the vision of humanitarian aid as a tool of Western hegemony,<sup>86</sup> leading many among the crisis-affected community to view humanitarian agencies as ‘trojan horses’ for the agendas of foreign interests.<sup>87</sup> Nonetheless, the growth in scale and prominence of crises and international humanitarian actors has magnified the capacity of external actors—be they political, military, or civil—to facilitate, manipulate, and obstruct humanitarian action.

Humanitarian actors remain preoccupied with the notion of ‘humanitarian space’, particularly in the context of the potential for the politicisation or instrumentalisation of humanitarian aid. That said, some observers suggest that the debate around the potential for reduced principled, independent humanitarian space as a result of such politicisation is misguided. Indeed, humanitarian actors would do better to conceive of themselves as part of the political picture in which they ‘promote a more humanised politics and more effective humanitarian action’ which more concisely understands the ‘precise nature of this essentially political space as it affects particular actors—including civilian groups and specialised humanitarian agencies—or as it affects broader humanitarian problems in particular places and at particular points in time’.<sup>88</sup>

This kind of necessary approach to the humanitarian space is further reflected in the fact that the scale and diversity of humanitarian needs can be used to justify broader engagement and a less exclusive approach for humanitarian actors. As is increasingly understood within the sector, ‘no single humanitarian actor—or group of actors—will be able to address the numerous challenges ahead alone. The diverse skills and approaches available within, but also outside, the humanitarian system will all need to be associated with the effort, while managing the tensions that such a collective effort inevitably creates.’<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Ferris 2011, p. 927

<sup>86</sup> Fiori 2013, pp. 10

<sup>87</sup> Healy & Tiller 2013, pp. 4

<sup>88</sup> Collinson and Elhawary 2012, pp. 4

<sup>89</sup> Labbe 2012, pp. 2

### 3.5 Growing inequality

At the global level, the engines of world economic growth, from the BRICS to other regional powers, are reducing the dominance of the Western world and realigning the prevailing polarity of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. However while by traditional measures the world has collectively become more wealthy in recent decades and access to public services, education and life expectancies has increased, recent global prosperity has been spread with considerable inequality between and within nations.<sup>90</sup> Indeed many states, particularly those which are crisis-prone and/or considered fragile or failed states such as Haiti, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, remain trapped in cycles of poverty, violence and chronic political dysfunction.

It has been suggested that such states may become even more marginalized in the global order as their past advocates from the upper-reaches of the developing world join, and compete with, the ranks of the world's most powerful nations.<sup>91</sup> However it remains to be seen how such emergent powers will engage with the humanitarian crises of the future; whether they will increasingly support the vulnerable beyond their own borders, and if they will do so through the existing international system, through other channels, bilaterally, or otherwise.

### 3.6 The retreat of de facto Western dominance

There is much discussion around the need to move the humanitarian discourse away from its centralised and Western-dominated roots in order to accommodate the rising influence of non-Western powers and the overwhelming demand for innovative humanitarian action.<sup>92</sup> Most conceptions of this necessary shift still, however, retain traditional Western ideals and approaches while seeking to become less exclusive.<sup>93</sup>

Though this has become a pervasive topic within the traditional humanitarian community—with a typical dialogue espousing a less centralised, more inclusive, and diverse humanitarian sector—some have noted that the debate remains tethered to and actually reinforces the central tenets of the existing system noting that it:

*“invariably attempts to set the parameters and rules for dialogue with those to whom it seeks to devolve power. It asserts commitment to the values and norms of Western humanitarianism (presented as universal) as a condition for partnership, even if it accedes to a degree of variation in their interpretation and application. And it reaffirms the centrality of existing structures of humanitarian governance, even if it proposes that these become more inclusive.”<sup>94</sup>*

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<sup>90</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 923

<sup>91</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 925

<sup>92</sup> Fiori 2013, pp. 9

<sup>93</sup> Fiori 2013, pp. 9

<sup>94</sup> Fiori 2013, pp. 9

## *Stronger states*

The growing strength and assertiveness of many national governments, including in crisis-prone states, as well as their reluctance to accept international assistance, is well-documented.<sup>95</sup> MSF has suggested that '[s]tronger states, more capable local organisations and a decline in influence and economic power of the West will mean there is a more diverse and wide range of responses to emergencies.'<sup>96</sup>

The summary impact of the expansion of the humanitarian agenda has been for humanitarians to be positioned more closely to those they perceive they have a moral responsibility to assist, and for humanitarianism to increasingly advocate for citizens on issues that traditional state conceptions of sovereignty would regard as the unique preserve of governments. Occurring in parallel with the rising resources now available to and commanded by humanitarian actors, this development has clearly not been amenable to the interests of many governments. This is particularly because many states tend to maintain a rigid conception of sovereignty founded on non-interference in internal affairs and territorial integrity as defined in the UN Charter.

With the nature of the relationship between states and humanitarian actors, even in the least complex crises, widely understood to have soured as a result,<sup>97</sup> states have taken strides to turn the tables on the often inefficient and imperfect practices of the humanitarian machine. Indeed while the rhetoric of partnerships and local capacity building may have become central conceptual orientations for many contemporary humanitarian actors, the model of Western-led (and Western-staffed) humanitarian intervention still dominates, and remains one which traditional actors are struggling to change.<sup>98</sup> Even when bypassing the state to directly engage the needs of affected populations, this model remains one which fails to adequately incorporate the views of affected populations.<sup>99</sup>

The result has been for many crisis-affected states to become less willing to allow international humanitarian agencies the freedom to which they had become accustomed as a result of their operational and conceptual expansion,<sup>100</sup> and for states to increasingly reiterate their sovereign right to assert their primacy where they wish not to be seen as ineffective or, where they may question the motives and implications of international assistance for domestic policy.<sup>101</sup> The political importance of crises to governments in this respect is acutely evident in the difficulties that humanitarian agencies have experienced in obtaining access to authoritarian regimes in particular,<sup>102</sup> as well as situations of conflict and

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<sup>95</sup> See: Ferris 2011, Kent 2011

<sup>96</sup> Healy & Tiller 2013

<sup>97</sup> Khan and Cunningham, 2013; del Valle and Healy, 2013.

<sup>98</sup> Bernard 2013

<sup>99</sup> ALNAP 2012

<sup>100</sup> Kent 2011

<sup>101</sup> ALNAP 2010, pp. 22

<sup>102</sup> See, for instance: del Valle & Healy 2013. See also: 'Burma Junta Hands out Aid Boxes with Generals' Names', AP [online], 5<sup>th</sup> October 2008. Available: [http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-05-10-burma-aid\\_N.htm](http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-05-10-burma-aid_N.htm). Retrieved: 28/10/2013. Of the limited foreign in-kind aid that was accepted post-Cyclone Nargis, some was even reportedly modified to make it look as if it was provided by Myanmar's military regime.

insecurity,<sup>103</sup> however as a well-documented trend, one can also observe the role of such sensitivities among states of all types, and in a variety of contexts.<sup>104</sup>

### *Donor pressures*

The global financial crisis, along with the conservative and isolationist bent of many Western governments, has undeniably affected the approach of such governments to funding humanitarian aid. Although strong policy commitments have been made by many states humanitarian organisations still face considerable obstacles to accessing principled funding to adequately address needs.<sup>105</sup>

Many of the aforementioned states with growing economic and political global actorhood are becoming increasingly involved in responding to crises, often with their own variegated definitions of humanitarianism and the priorities which inform their action. Greater engagement with emerging donors almost certainly requires rather more than soliciting support for the existing system and instead using their alternative capacities, insights and approaches to help shape the future of the international humanitarian landscape.<sup>106</sup> However, such approaches carry risks, particularly when engaging with states who do not adhere to the norms of the Western world, such as human rights and equality (though that is not to suggest that such risks are unique to engaging with non-traditional donors.)

### *Emerging actors, new models of coordination and collaboration*

While the rhetoric of partnerships and inclusion echo throughout the humanitarian sector, organisations continue to struggle to move towards the implementation of alternatives to Western-dominated responses and hierarchical relationships.

The NGO MSF has noted that many of these emerging actors do not participate in established systems, leaving them invisible to traditional actors and, while local actors often have a significant impact, particularly in the early stages of a crisis, they are still commonly marginalised from the mainstream system.<sup>107</sup> It has also been noted that despite the progress made at the policy level, '[p]artnerships can be in name only and southern organisations can be treated simply as a pipeline for delivery, with little say in their work and little sense of sustainability or of shared learning and mutual accountability.'<sup>108</sup> Indeed while there may be a 'growing evidence-base of the importance of local capacity and the need to work in genuine partnerships',<sup>109</sup> it has been observed that 'local capacities are frequently undermined or excluded, often systematically so.'<sup>110</sup>

<sup>103</sup> Following the recent October 2013 earthquake in Balochistan, Pakistan, no state authorisation for humanitarian actors to conduct operations has been issued, reportedly for fear that external involvement would highlight issues related to law and order in the troubled province. For more, see: 'International Aid Agencies Barred from Pakistan Earthquake Areas', K. Ghumman, Asia News Network [online], 8<sup>th</sup> October 2013. Available: <http://www.asianewsnet.net/International-aid-agencies-barred-from-Pakistan-ea-52535.html>. Retrieved: 30/10/2013.

<sup>104</sup> See, for instance, HFP 2013, pp. 8-10.

<sup>105</sup> Macdonald and Valenza 2012, pp. 29

<sup>106</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 927

<sup>107</sup> Healy & Tiller 2013, pp. 5

<sup>108</sup> Nightingale 2012, pp. 2

<sup>109</sup> Nightingale 2012, pp. 7-8

<sup>110</sup> Nightingale 2012, pp. 8

Numerous barriers to genuine collaboration and partnerships, particularly with non-traditional actors, remain, including the financing of genuine partnerships in a sector which has traditionally favoured hierarchical relationships.<sup>111</sup>

Further contributing to or enabling this exclusion is a perhaps more deep-rooted obstacle: the proclaimed universalism and protectionism of the traditional humanitarian sector. It has been observed that for non-traditional actors 'to build legitimacy, obtain resources, and function even in a semi-autonomous manner, they are required to adopt the universalised modes of mainstream humanitarianism.'<sup>112</sup>

### 3.7 The role of the affected

The affected, along with or as part of local organisations, are generally the first line of assistance in a crisis. And, in light of '[t]he increasing numbers and complex nature of emergencies, it is even more important that the humanitarian sector incorporates local emergency capacity into the heart of its operations and builds that capacity as part of more comprehensive resilience development.'<sup>113</sup>

This need can in part be attributed to the imbalance of power inherent in the humanitarian act, which can inhibit honest communication between provider and recipient.<sup>114</sup> New approaches, such as cash transfer programming and the greater involvement of affected populations enabled by technology are however challenging this imbalance.<sup>115</sup> Such developments will likely continue to challenge the position of traditional humanitarian actors as well as the already weak humanitarian coordination infrastructure.<sup>116</sup>

### 3.8 The private sector as donor and actor

The private sector—local, national, regional, and global—has taken a greater interest in humanitarian action and crisis contexts.<sup>117</sup> Their involvement in crises, both in conjunction with humanitarian agencies and independent of the humanitarian system, is likely to expand significantly, which humanitarian organisations are likely to struggle to adapt to.

However, increasing coordination with and learning from the private sector is not without its risks. Some feel that any increase in private financial support for humanitarian action is likely to focus on less political but more high-profile natural disasters rather than the protracted and complex crises<sup>118</sup> which consistently struggle to attract international attention and financing.

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<sup>111</sup> Nightingale 2012, pp. 2;

<sup>112</sup> Fiori 2013, pp. 10

<sup>113</sup> Nightingale 2012, pp 6

<sup>114</sup> HAP 2013, pp. 59

<sup>115</sup> HAP 2013, pp. 59

<sup>116</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 929

<sup>117</sup> See Kent & Burke 2013

<sup>118</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 926

### 3.9 Impact of science and technology

Scientific and technological developments have had profound effects on all aspects of society in recent decades. In the coming decades, the pace of scientific and technological innovation is expected to increase. Though the benefits of such innovations are not felt uniformly across populations, innovation itself may become increasingly democratic as it spreads<sup>119</sup> and extends its reach deeper into previously isolated crises.

Computers, particularly when combined with mobile communications technology, are expected to move further away from being storehouses of data and knowledge, becoming 'increasingly smarter, more autonomous, and more anthropomorphic'<sup>120</sup>

They have also unmistakably altered the media landscape, with the immediacy and ubiquity of modern media increasing the scrutiny on the humanitarian sector and reinforcing the importance of its effective response to crises.<sup>121</sup>

Many of these technologies have potentially transformative applications for identifying and monitoring affected populations, delivering assistance, as well for communicating and coordinating inside and outside the sector and raising funds.

Though online crowd-funding shares many characteristics with the traditional public fundraising campaigns which are integral to the response models of most humanitarian agencies, new technologies, particularly communications and financial technologies, are likely to make such approaches more efficient and more accessible to actors—and affected populations—without the professional and broad communications and fundraising devices of major organisations. It has been argued, for instance, that substantial reforms to traditional UN-led funding mechanisms will be required for local organisations, either in partnership or independently, to access necessary resources.<sup>122</sup>

However, technological development also brings new and potentially devastating risks, such as new biological, cybernetic, and conventional weapons, while also potentially increasing vulnerability as a result of increasing dependence on energy and technology.

Further compounding the vulnerability of the certain segments of communities, particularly the young and marginalised, will be the effect of technological automation on economies and employment opportunities. While often enabling development and innovation, increasing automation also often reduces the amount of available employment, particularly for the service sector and other options for the unskilled.<sup>123</sup> Such evolutions in the global job market will fundamentally change conceptions of livelihoods and the ways that humanitarians endeavour to support and protect them in crisis situations.

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<sup>119</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 920, 922

<sup>120</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 921

<sup>121</sup> Bernard 2011, pp. 896

<sup>122</sup> Nightingale 2012, pp. 31

<sup>123</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 921

### 3.10 Changes with the humanitarian sector

#### *Evolving interpretations of 'humanitarianism'*

Humanitarianism is increasingly viewed as a critical part of an aid continuum that ranges from relief through to longer-term development. In all likelihood, the humanitarian sector will continue to struggle with the boundaries of 'humanitarian' action within this continuum as it seeks to address evolving discourses around relief, resilience and recovery. The demands of emergencies, the desire for clarity of purpose and the traditional humanitarian principles will, for instance, continue to confront the domineering desire to address the root causes of vulnerability. As Labbe notes, the difficulties of defining the humanitarian system include the fact that it 'virtually encompasses anybody extending a helping hand to people affected by crisis' and 'the long-standing antagonism and increasing overlaps between humanitarianism and development'.<sup>124</sup>

Experience suggests that efforts to address the persistent tension between humanitarian relief and the broader spectrum of activities in which the community engages will continue to be influenced from many quarters (aid agencies, donors, the affected, the giving public, amongst others). However, this may also be hindered by the fact that it remains easier for organisations to raise funds for high-profile acute and dramatic crises than longer-term or less striking crises.<sup>125</sup>

Emerging humanitarian policies, standards, and frameworks, such as HFA II, the Sustainable Development Goals, and certification schemes are likely to play an important role in shaping the structure and ambitions of the humanitarian sector in the coming years. However some are of the opinion that the cumulative weight of such standards is stifling innovation, and ultimately restricting action in crises which, by definition, require swift and adaptive responses.

Standards for joint needs assessment ranks high among the priorities for many humanitarians. Despite awareness of the problem and efforts to address it, the lack of consistent methodologies and adequate capacity for joint needs assessment<sup>126</sup> remains a significant impediment to truly impartial humanitarian action by allowing room for interventions to be prioritised based on criteria other than need, including, but not limited to political concerns and sector biases.<sup>127</sup>

Accountability is another priority, one much discussed and well-backed by the humanitarian community, but still a 'movement [which] is in its infancy'.<sup>128</sup> Nonetheless, and while the impact of accountability mechanisms on humanitarian activities will be necessary,<sup>129</sup> the field is thought to demonstrate positive potential for the more responsible delivery of assistance to affected populations.<sup>130</sup> Any such evolution of

<sup>124</sup> Labbe 2012, pp. 6-7

<sup>125</sup> Ferris 2011, pp. 926

<sup>126</sup> Madonald and Valenza 2012, pp. 17

<sup>127</sup> Madonald and Valenza 2012, pp. 17

<sup>128</sup> HAP 2013, pp. 58

<sup>129</sup> HAP 2013, pp. 59

<sup>130</sup> HAP 2013, pp. 58

accountability mechanisms will however need to mirror changes in the international humanitarian system so that rather than reinforce the traditional and largely hierarchical structures of humanitarian governance; they reflect a forward-looking process that considers the intricacies of the future humanitarian landscape.<sup>131</sup> Communications technology may play an important role in this respect, enabling those affected by disaster to 'articulate their needs this creating, de facto, a greater accountability.'<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Fiori 2013, pp. 9

<sup>132</sup> Bernard 2011, pp. 896



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## **Annex 8 – Field mission debriefings**

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This annex presents the debriefing presentations presented to the ECHO field offices in Nairobi and Islamabad. The debriefing presentations provide an overview of the work carried out in the field missions, and the findings per evaluation question derived from the interviews and activities conducted therein.

Accordingly, the annex is structured as follows:

- Nairobi debriefing presentation
- Islamabad debriefing presentation



# Evaluation of the implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid

*Data collection phase*  
Debriefing Field visit Pakistan

15 January 2014



*This document is designed as support to the oral presentation  
and is not intended to be used separately*

## Inception meeting

### Objectives of today's meeting

- Provide an overview of the activities of the field visit
- Present the data collected and findings
- Discussion with participants on findings and issues identified





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
## Agenda

- Purpose, scope and methodology of the evaluation (reminder)
- Purpose of the visit (reminder) and activities undertaken
- Presentation of data collected, findings and issues
- Key issues for discussion
- Next steps

## Agenda

- Purpose, scope and methodology of the evaluation (reminder)
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- Key issues for discussion
- Next steps





## Overview of the Evaluation Questions

*Reminder*

#	Evaluation Question
EQ 1	On making the Consensus concrete
EQ 2	On the usefulness of the Action Plan
EQ 3	On coordination and complementarities for responses to crises
EQ 4	On coherence and visibility
EQ 5	On EU contributions to the international humanitarian system
EQ 6	On upholding and promoting humanitarian principles and IHL
EQ 7	On needs-based responses
EQ 8	On coherence with other external policies
EQ 9	On civil protection

ADE HUMANITARIAN FUTURES 8



## Agenda

- Purpose, scope and methodology of the evaluation (reminder)
- Purpose of the visit (reminder) and activities undertaken
- Presentation of data collected, findings and issues
- Key issues for discussion
- Next steps

### Reminder

## Purpose of the country visits and approach

### Key objective

- Identify & illustrate the actual translation of Consensus principles and actions in the field
- Possibly how cooperation has or not let to more efficient and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance
- But not an evaluation of the impact of individual projects, programmes or interventions


### Overall approach

- Briefing and debriefing with DG ECHO, EUD, possibly extended to other key stakeholders
- Interviews and focus groups with key actors on the ground, notably DG ECHO, EUD, EUMS, other donors, partners and NGOs
- Deliverable: debriefing PPT


*Reminder*

## Why Pakistan?

- High volume of financial support (2008-2012): 744,3 US\$m
- Support from a large number of EU MS (20)
- ECHO 2013 GNA index:
  - Ref./IDPs: 3
  - Nat.disaster: 2
  - Conflict : 3
- Asian country



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## Humanitarian Crises

### Longstanding humanitarian needs

Since 1979 massive Afghan refugee population

On-going insecurity in FATA, KPK, Baluchistan, Jammu & Kashmir

2005 Kashmir & NWFP (KPK) Earthquake

### Severe development challenges

2012 UN Human Development Index ranking:

*146 of 187 countries*

Sources: Relief Web, UNDP HDI



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## Major Humanitarian Crises 2008 - 2012

**On-going insecurity in FATA, KPK:** Over 1 million internally displaced

**2009 Swat conflict :** 2.5 million more internally displaced

**2010 floods:** Unprecedented scale, over 20 million affected

**2011 floods:** Over 5 million affected

**2012 floods:** 4.8 million affected

### As of December 2012

1.7 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan

Over 750,000 displaced in KPK & FATA

15.1% Global Acute Malnutrition

86.5/1,000 under 5 mortality

Sources: Relief Web, OCHA



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## Stakeholders Consulted

**38 organisations/delegations, 62 individuals**

**ECHO, EU Delegation**

**8 EU Member States**

Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, UK

**7 non-EU Donor States**

Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, USA

**3 Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement Organisations**

ICRC, IFRC, Danish Red Cross

**5 UN Agencies & Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator**

WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, OCHA

**12 INGOs & Pakistan Humanitarian Forum**

MSF, Save the Children, Oxfam, Norwegian Church Aid, CWS-P/A, Johanniter, Islamic Help, Handicap International, Plan International, Trocaire, Care, Norwegian Refugee Council

Other actors (including GoP, donors, and multilateral institutions) were approached for meetings, but could not be met during the mission



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## Agenda

- Purpose, scope and methodology of the evaluation (reminder)
- Purpose of the visit (reminder) and activities undertaken
- Presentation of data collected, findings and issues
- Key issues for discussion
- Next steps



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## Approach and caveat


- Presentation of main findings with reference to the related EQ
- Identification of key issues that might fit into the general evaluation
- No conclusions or recommendations specific to Pakistan

## Total humanitarian aid to Pakistan for 2008-2012 (USD millions)


Donor	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total Humanitarian aid 2008-2012
United States of America	2,7	96,5	505,0	71,0	141,0	816,3
EU + MS	9,6	75,1	362,8	177,4	119,5	744,3
Japan	-	5,1	118,5	0,5	1,2	125,3
Australia	-	5,1	54,6	3,6	-	63,4
Canada	0,4	3,8	25,6	7,7	11,0	48,6
Others	13,1	44,3	123,3	9,7	5,3	195,8
<b>Total</b>	<b>25,8</b>	<b>229,9</b>	<b>1.189,9</b>	<b>269,9</b>	<b>278,1</b>	<b>1.993,6</b>

Source: ADE from UN OCHA financial tracking service <http://fts.unocha.org>

## Main donors from the European Union



## Evolution per year of the EU main donors



## Knowledge, use(fulness) of EU Consensus and Action Plan (ref. EQ 1 & 2)

- Apart from ECHO, limited knowledge

	EU Consensus	Action Plan
<b>ECHO</b>	<i>Well known</i>	<i>Little or no knowledge</i>
<b>Other actors</b>	<i>Little or no knowledge</i>	<i>Little or no knowledge</i>

- EU Consensus was seen by wide range of actors:
  - As an ECHO document, not geared to EU MS
  - As a Headquarters issue, not for EU MS on the ground
- Not many examples of the EU Consensus or the Action Plan being used (e.g. for advocacy / accountability)
- But several interviewees underline that « *you can see the EU Consensus in everything DG ECHO does* »

## On coordination and complementarities on humanitarian aid (ref. EQ 3)

- Like-minded donor group: main platform for donor specific coordination (includes non EU MS and not all EU MS)
- ECHO takes the lead on coordination:
  - It consists mainly in exchange of information:
  - not on a specific division of roles, complementarities and synergies
  - no set-up or use of joint funding mechanisms at EU level
- Several interlocutors raise questions on relevance of coordination at EU level:
  - Not all actors consider it relevant (more geared to like minded donors)
  - Some consider it a duplication with respect to work of OCHA
  - Different situations of EU MS make coordination more difficult:
    - Most EU MS have no specific units dedicated to humanitarian aid in the country: they cover different issues (humanitarian, development, politics, trade...)
    - EU MS are also driven by other considerations (overall relations with the country)
    - Respective role of capital versus embassy
    - Different planning and funding cycles

## On coordination and complementarities on humanitarian aid (ref. EQ 3) *(continued)*

- EU:
  - not perceived by actors as 1 entity but as DG ECHO, EUD and EU MS separately
  - Respective roles of ECHO/EUD not well understood by a number of non EU actors
- Overall rather weak donor coordination; examples of successes and opportunities to grasp
  - Strong coordination (beyond EU):
    - E.g. *joint demarche* to Pakistan authorities regarding NGO registration
    - Several state that in acute emergencies there was more coordination
  - Opportunities not seized: taking common position on humanitarian access (e.g. VISA issues), use of leverage of EUD and EU MS jointly; other donors would welcome more common advocacy positions
- Coordination ECHO - EUD :
  - Fairly good but quite informal
  - ECHO is very independent: allows it to uphold specificities of humanitarian aid
  - But weaknesses in transition humanitarian – development (cf. EQ 8)
  - How to use EUD leverage effect (cf. above)?

## Coherence of humanitarian policies – visibility – EU added value (ref. EQ 4)

### COHERENCE

- Broad consensus in humanitarian community that EU donors (institutions & EU MS) subscribe to the same objectives and principles
- In the application of principles to specific situations, differences sometimes appear (cf. EQ8, issue of support to return of IDPs)
- Several interviewees state that there are differences between EU MS, explained by:
  - Different groupings, sometimes closer to non EU-Donors
  - Different dynamics, which may be for several reasons:
    - Each have their own humanitarian and development system
    - Big variations in the weight of their (humanitarian) funding
    - Varying capacities in country to engage with humanitarian issues
    - Need to follow their “line from back home”



## Coherence of humanitarian policies – visibility – EU added value (ref. EQ 4)

### EU VA

- Broad consensus among interlocutors on different types of DG ECHO VA :
  - Forcefulness on the principled approach:
    - ECHO presented as the most principled (quite unanimously)  
*“go-to ally” for principle issues; are viewed as independent, autonomous, and “humanitarian agenda is their [only] agenda”*
    - Interviewees explain this by:
      - Its less political profile
      - Its independence, driven only by humanitarian consideration
      - The fact that it is not driven by other considerations
  - Hands on approach and field presence (EU MS being more limited, their diplomatic status reducing their possibilities to travel)
  - Its critical mass in terms of funding
- Specifically for the EUD, the leverage power through the Ambassador and perception as less politicized
- Interlocutors were not able to mention a specific EU (the EU as a whole) value added

## Coherence of humanitarian policies – visibility – EU added value (ref. EQ 4)

### VISIBILITY

- There is no common EU visibility (EU MS keep their own visibility)
- ECHO: flexible on visibility obligations, notably where security is a concern
- Several are reluctant to objectives of visibility, especially “banners and stickers”:
  - Safety should come before visibility (in certain regions all aid from outside = threat): see NGO refusing substantial amounts of USAID because of visibility requirements
  - Some say it goes against the community identity
- Several state that in theory visibility could have leverage effects but not in Pakistan :
  - Showing the aid you are providing, may help:
    - In the dialogue with (local) authorities
    - To convince the EU tax payer of the usefulness of aid
  - Broad consensus that in Pakistan the leverage towards the government is low
- Good for EU MS, especially those that contribute less to say they are active in a country
- ECHO's voice seen as having little strength (no Ambassador) by a number of interlocutors

## On humanitarian principles and IHL (ref. EQ 6)

### HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES

- Interlocutors underline the principled approach of ECHO and the fact that ECHO is very vocal on this.  
*"I have witnessed here and across the board in Africa that ECHO is very vocal and strong on the humanitarian principles, talking about them, advocating for them, using partnerships to strengthen them, not minding to be controversial as a way of raising flags"*
- Interlocutors consider that broadly all EU MS (and other donors) subscribe to humanitarian principles, but do not necessarily have the capacity to deeply engage with the issues
- In concrete situations, different positions appear, reflecting a tension between upholding humanitarian principles and answering to needs
  - Ex. Return of IDPs in FATA/KPK:
    - Support needed to go to government
    - No possibility to monitor
  - DG ECHO: decided not to provide support
  - Some others (notably UN and some EU MS) provided support
- Some assumption that partners chosen by EU MS at HQ level have a principled approach

## On humanitarian principles and IHL (ref. EQ 6)

### HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES

- Different view on this stance within the donor community
  - Some underline the need to stand firmly on principles:
    - Also to avoid that a precedent is created.
    - See examples of Afghanistan where donors accused of being part to conflicts
  - Others question how this balanced again:
    - Importance of answering to the needs
    - Attention to forgotten crises
    - Use of pooled funding

### IHL

- Government considers there is no internal armed conflict
- IHL issues were rarely mentioned
- Not clear what initiatives are taken to promote IHL

## On needs based approaches (ref. EQ 7)

- DG ECHO: explain the aim at a needs based approach
  - General understanding of the situation and use of different tools to assess needs
  - Includes also vulnerable groups and constant attention to forgotten crises and do no harm (position EU MS less clear)
  - Yearly strategy on that basis
  - Check needs assessments of partners when they submit proposals
  - But no specific tools for need assessment provided by HQ
- Not really common and joint assessments at country level
- Several actors state they do not have a complete picture of the needs
- Coverage of needs :
  - Gaps exist: nutrition supply breakages, shelter needs in Sindh, gap in terms of wash. Simply a funding issue
  - Reasons invoked: short term and much attention to development

## Coherence with other external policies and with civil protection (ref. EQ 8 & 9)

### HUMANITARIAN - DEVELOPMENT

- Interviewees underline difficulties to overcome differences in logic :
  - Humanitarian: short term, hands on, importance of independence and neutrality
  - Development: more LT, systemic approach, e.g.:
    - Most important is to solve FATA situation as such
    - For LT solutions it is essential to go through the Government
- LRRD:
  - Commission side: bridge not well made, missed opportunities
  - EU MS: not clear
- From institutional point of view:
  - ECHO clearly separate from EUD
  - In the field several donors (including EU MS):
    - No separate unit or person in charge of humanitarian affairs
    - Programmes managed from HQ despite substantial funding
    - Many interlocutors point to a growing tendency (Aussaid and CIDA) to bring back humanitarian aid under foreign affairs:
      - Raise questions on blurring of lines + feeling choices not always needs based
      - *"If you want to de-link humanitarian aid from politics and governments, then MS should give their humanitarian funds to ECHO"*

## Coherence with other external policies and with civil protection (ref. EQ 8 & 9)

### HUMANITARIAN – MILITARY

- Pakistan military plays and increasingly prominent role in emergency relief and had significant (and growing) capacity
- But approach is not seen as neutral or impartial; often using relief to further security objectives
- Most consider military relations in relief operations to be potentially very hazardous for humanitarian actors; little willingness from both sides to collaborate

### HUMANITARIAN – CIVIL PROTECTION

- Not much info
- Deployment should be through ECHO office

## The way forward: challenges / priorities highlighted by interlocutors

- Consistent adherence to humanitarian principles by everybody (*"single most important thing"*)
- Access and security :
  - Access: humanitarian space shrinking by the day:
    - Might get worse as of 2014 due to potential further insecurity in Afghanistan
    - Many obstacles are political and bureaucratic
  - Security: more and more complex environment, with several types of militant groups
- Attitude of the Government :
  - Do not want to launch appeals for humanitarian aid, do not want international organisations to have access
  - Do not recognize the scale and impact of ongoing conflicts
- Impact of new donors : not so clear, but seem to operate outside of EU and other donors
- Longer term perspective and DRR (how to avoid protracted crises and lessen impact)
- Actors to be better harmonised; More capitalization in the EU and closer collaboration EUD and ECHO

## Some issues for discussion / questions for the evaluation

- Predictability of funding (multi-year funding and use of pooled funds)
- Work in terms of awareness raising in the field on the (implementation of) EU Consensus?
- Need to enhance coordination, but benefits of a specific EU coordination?
- Leverage for ECHO
  - Role of EUD, while maintaining independence?
  - A case for joint EU positions?
  - Humanitarian aid cannot be a leverage for external relations, but the reverse (e.g. granting of GSP+ status to Pakistan)?
- Objectives of visibility? What visibility and to whom?
- Principled approach:
  - Broad agreement on the principles, but what criteria to take positions in front of specific situations?
  - Principled approach versus other objectives: humanitarian imperative, forgotten crises, pooled funding

## Some issues for discussion / questions for the evaluation (continued)

- Humanitarian – development: two different logics to be reconciled, but tension between sustainable approaches (and hence alignment with Governments) and neutrality?
- Development of common EU humanitarian strategies?
- Overall tendency to remerge humanitarian with foreign affairs: also within EU?
- IHL: sufficiently upheld and promoted?
- Future implementation of the Consensus: focusing on some of the key challenges identified (principles; security / access; governemtn refusal to appeal; DRR, etc.)

## Next steps

- 7/02: Interim report
- 13/03: Draft final report
- 4/04: Final evaluation report

**We thank you for your contribution to this study**

**For additional information please contact**

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# Evaluation of the implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid

Debriefing of Field visit to Nairobi

17 January 2014



*This document is designed as support to the oral presentation  
and is not intended to be used separately*

## Objectives of today's meeting

- Provide an overview of the activities of the field visit
- Present and validate the main findings
- Present and discuss ideas on the way forward



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## Agenda


- Purpose, scope and methodology of the evaluation (quick reminder)
- Purpose of the field visit and activities undertaken
- Presentation of main findings
- Presentation and discussion of future priorities
- Next steps

Reminder

## Evaluation subject, purpose and scope

<b>Purpose</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide an <b>independent assessment</b> of the Consensus <b>implementation</b>.</li> <li>• Investigate to what extent the Consensus has contributed to better EU <b>coordination , coherence and quality of humanitarian response</b></li> <li>• Contribute to <b>advancing the EU reflection</b> on the future implementation of its humanitarian policy</li> </ul>
<b>Subject</b>	The way that the Consensus has been taken on board, <b>not the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid</b> downstream
<b>Scope</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Geographical:</b> third countries and Member States</li> <li>• <b>Temporal:</b> 2008-2012</li> <li>• <b>Thematic:</b> Influence that the Consensus has had from policy to operational levels</li> </ul>





### Overview of the Evaluation Questions Reminder

	Evaluation Questions
EQ 1	On making the Consensus concrete
EQ 2	On the usefulness of the Action Plan
EQ 3	On coordination and complementarities for crisis response
EQ 4	On EU policy coherence and visibility
EQ 5	On EU contributions to the international humanitarian system
EQ 6	On upholding and promoting humanitarian principles and IHL
EQ 7	On needs-based responses & quality of aid
EQ 8	On coherence with other external policies and instruments
EQ 9	On civil protection

ADE HUMANITARIAN FUTURES 6

## Agenda

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Reminder

## Purpose of the country visit and approach

### Key objective

- Identify & illustrate the actual translation of Consensus principles and actions in the field (Somali Refugees, Somalia and Kenya)
- How cooperation has impacted on the efficiency, effectiveness and quality of the delivery of humanitarian assistance
- But not an evaluation of the impact of individual projects, programmes or interventions

### Overall approach

- Briefing and debriefing with DG ECHO, EUD, possibly extended to other key stakeholders
- Interviews and focus groups with key actors on the ground, notably DG ECHO, EUD, EUMS, UN agencies, Non-EU donors, partners and NGOs
- Deliverable: debriefing PPT

## Stakeholders Consulted

### 31 organizations, 51 individuals

**ECHO (RSO, Kenya, Somalia, 'SST')**  
**EU Delegation (Somalia, Kenya)**

**6 EU Member States**  
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, UK

**2 non-EU Donor States**  
Australia, Japan

**3 Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement Organisations**  
ICRC, IFRC, Kenya Red Cross

**6 UN Agencies**  
WFP, UNHCR, WHO, FAO, UNICEF, OCHA

**7 INGOs**  
CONCERN, MSF, Save the Children, Oxfam, Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council, ADESO.

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### ■ Knowledge

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- Almost no knowledge of the *Action Plan*

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### ■ Usefulness

- One EU document consolidating all international humanitarian commitments and key good practices for humanitarian approach
- High level political commitment (though not legally binding)

## EQ 3: Coordination and complementarities

### ■ Value added of EU level humanitarian coordination

- Coordination at all active donors level – no EU level *humanitarian* donor coordination
- EU limited value added (no all MS active, limited representation and budget, decision making at different levels)

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- Wide appreciation of 'leadership' role of ECHO

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- Improvement in operational coordination required - overlaps and gaps persist
- Limited complementarities in EU actions
- Some duplication of coordination efforts between OCHA and ECHO

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- **Operational humanitarian coordination**
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  - Limited complementarities in EU actions
  - Some duplication of coordination efforts between OCHA and ECHO
- **Humanitarian – development coordination**
  - Continues to be a major challenge within EC Institutions and within MS
  - Structural barriers to concrete coordination (mandates, procedures, partners, timeframes, staffing capacities)
  - Uneven progress – context and personality driven

### EQ 4: Coherence of EU humanitarian policies and visibility

- **EU Coherence**
  - Humanitarian approaches of EC institutions and EU MS broadly similar and in line with the provisions of the consensus
  - More significant policy differences with (some) non EU donors
  - ECHO recognized as most *principled* humanitarian donor attributed to structural independence (among other things)
  - EU MS adopt more flexible positions on use of humanitarian aid, due to multiple mandates
  - ECHO library of sectoral humanitarian guidelines not widely utilized by EU MS

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### ■ EU Visibility

- ECHO and national visibility for *humanitarian contributions* is important for public accountability
- In some contexts visibility policies may run counter to humanitarian principles

## EQ 6: Humanitarian principles

### ■ Knowledge

- Good knowledge of humanitarian principles amongst *most established* donors, many NGOs and parts of the UN
- Less known/ understood by *new donors* (state and private sector), dual mandate agencies



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### ■ Use

- Most relevant in conflict situations (Somalia) but paradoxically most difficult to respect (eg. contradiction between being needs based and neutral)
- Principles remain relevant in other contexts (eg. Kenya election preparedness, repatriation of Somali refugees, clashes in Tana River)
- Interpretation in principles differs by context and stakeholders (eg. different interpretations on independence)

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### ■ Usefulness

- In general principles remain useful in guiding humanitarian assistance
- Questioning of *utility in protracted conflict* (Somalia) – does not ensure access and obstacle to development cooperation
- Reflections on how should principles should evolve in changing context (new stakeholders, rise of dual mandate agencies, protracted crises)

## EQ 7: Needs based & quality aid approaches

### ■ Overall

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- ECHO expertise appreciated
- Response not always needs based (forgotten crises, donor darlings and orphans)

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- ECHO reporting system challenges agencies positively
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### ■ Protracted Crises

- Current concern with improving the quality of response to protracted/ recurrent crises

## EQ 8 & 9: Coherence with other external policies / instruments

### ■ CivMil

- Well known international guidelines
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### ■ Political

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- EU Political Counselors meetings used to share humanitarian concerns

### ■ Aid Continuum

- High on the agenda of all EU MS and EC institutions
- Struggling to work across the institutional divide (cfr. Coordination)
- Other policies than the Consensus taken as more relevant reference documents (LRRD, Resilience)

## Agenda

- Purpose, scope and methodology of the evaluation (quick reminder)
- Purpose of the field visit and activities undertaken
- Presentation of main findings
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## The way forward: Suggested Approaches

### ■ Coherence

- Promotion of humanitarian principles to *non traditional* donors (new donors, private sector) using creative means
- Humanitarian sectoral guidelines jointly developed, agreed and used at EU level (use of ECHO capacities)
- Address the structural barriers within EC institutions to have better collaboration leading to joint programming
- *Should humanitarian aid be an independent structure?*

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### ■ Coordination

- Consistent EU support to improve the quality of the UN coordination system
  - Alignment behind CAP process / ECHO support to pooled funds
- Develop common country level EU humanitarian strategies
- Co-location of EU MS humanitarian advisors to ECHO (*larger donors*)
- ECHO delegated management of EU MS contributions to nominated crises (*smaller donors*)

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### ■ Quality of Aid

- Multi-year humanitarian funding for protracted crises (predictability, improved exit strategies)

## Next steps

- 7/02: Interim report
- 13/03: Draft final report
- 4/04: Final evaluation report

**We thank you for your contribution to this study**





## **Annex 9 – Bibliography**

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This annex presents each document reviewed during the data collection phase.

The documents are listed alphabetically by author, then by year, title and organisation/publication.

Author	Year	Title	Organisation/publication
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ALNAP	2012	The State of Humanitarian System	ALNAP
Austria	2009	International humanitarian aid Policy document	Austrian Development Cooperation
Austria	2010	Evaluierung der Humanitären Hilfe der Österreichischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Zeitraum 2004–2008	Austrian Development Cooperation
Austria	2011	ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID - 2011	Austrian Development Cooperation
Austria	2011	Annual questionnaire 2011	Austrian Development Cooperation
Austria	2012	Annual questionnaire 2012	Austrian Development Cooperation
Austria	2013	Annual questionnaire 2013	Austrian Development Cooperation
Austria	2012	Ethiopia Country Strategy 2008-2012	Austrian Development Cooperation
Belgium	2006	Plan Directeur de l'aide Humanitaire Belge	Service public fédéral Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au Développement
Belgium	2012	Procédures relatives au financement de projets spécifiques introduits par des ONG dans le cadre de l'Aide Humanitaire Belge.	Service public fédéral Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au Développement
Belgium	2011	CORNE DE L'AFRIQUE Deuxième cadre de financement (05 août 2011) Suivi de la réunion du 04 août 2011	Service public fédéral Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au Développement
Belgium	2011	Adoption d'un cadre de financement ad hoc: crise Libye 2011 - Aide d'urgence et Réhabilitation (AB 14 54 52 35.00.83 – budget général des dépenses pour l'année budgétaire 2011)	Service public fédéral Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au Développement
Belgium	2011	Procedures for funding specific projects presented by NGOs in the field of Belgian Humanitarian Aid	Service public fédéral Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au Développement
Belgium	2012	Annual questionnaire 2012	Service public fédéral Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au Développement

Author	Year	Title	Organisation/publication
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Belgium	2013	Cadre crises sous-financées 2013	Service public fédéral Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au Développement
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Belgium	2013	Annual questionnaire 2013	Service public fédéral Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au Développement
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Author	Year	Title	Organisation/publication
Estonia	N/A	Comments by the Estonian delegation to the background document „Mid-Term Review of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan – Next Steps“	N/A
Estonia	2011	MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID ACTION PLAN – FOLLOW-UP Mapping exercise tables	N/A
European Commission	2008	The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid - Action Plan	Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2008)1991
European Commission	2010	Commission Communication on Humanitarian Food Assistance	European Commission Communication, COM(2010)600
European Commission	2010	The mid-term review of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan - implementing effective, principled EU humanitarian action	European Commission Communication, SEC(2010) 1505
European Commission	2010	Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance	European Commission Communication, COM(2010)600
European Commission	2010	Commission Staff Working Document: On the mid-term review of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan: assessing progress and priorities in the EU's implementation of humanitarian aid	European Commission, staff working document, COM(2010) 722
European Commission	2011	Annual Report on the Implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid 2011	European Commission
European Commission	2012	Civil Protection Mechanism: Activities 2007-2012	European Commission
European Commission	2013	COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid in 2013	European Commission
European Commission	2011	COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection- ECHO Operational Strategy 2011	European Commission
European Commission	2012	COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Humanitarian aid strategy for 2012	European Commission
European Commission	2012	Special Eurobarometer 383 CIVIL PROTECTION REPORT	European Commission
European Commission	2012	Special Eurobarometer 384 HUMANITARIAN AID REPORT	European Commission
European Commission	2012	Eurobaromètre Civil Protection EU27	European Commission
European Commission	2012	Eurobaromètre Humanitarian Aid EU27	European Commission
European Commission	2013	MEETING REPORT Subject: Stakeholder conference on the future of EU humanitarian aid	European Commission



Author	Year	Title	Organisation/publication
European Union	2006	Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: 'The European Consensus	European Union
European Union	2007	Treaty of Lisbon	European Union
European Union	2008	Joint Statement on THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID	European Union
European Union	2006	Good Humanitarian Donorship – at country level A guiding note for colleagues at country level	European Union
Finland	2012	Finland's Humanitarian Policy	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Finland	2007	Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines - Finland's national plan for implementing the good humanitarian donorship principles	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Finland	2005	THE EVALUATION OF FINNISH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 1996 2004 Final Report	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Finland	2007	Evaluation Finnish Aid to Afghanistan	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Finland	2008	EVALUATION KOSOVO COUNTRY PROGRAMME	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
France	2012	RAPPORT D'ACTIVITÉ SUR L'ACTION HUMANTAIRE D'URGENCE 2012	Ministère des Affaires étrangères
France	2012	Le Centre de crise La diplomatie de l'urgence	Ministère des Affaires étrangères
France	2013	ECHO Fit for Purpose	Ministère des Affaires étrangères
France	2011	Annual questionnaire 2011	Ministère des Affaires étrangères
France	2011	Rapport d'activité sur l'action humanitaire d'urgence 2011	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes
France	2012	Humanitarian Strategy	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes
France	2011	MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID ACTION PLAN – FOLLOW-UP	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Germany	2013	Die zwölf Grundregeln der humanitären Hilfe	German Humanitarian Assistance
Germany	2013	Konzept des Auswärtigen Amtes zur Förderung von Vorhaben der Humanitären Hilfe der Bundesregierung im Ausland (Kapitel 0502 Titel 687 72)	Federal Foreign Office



Author	Year	Title	Organisation/publication
Germany	2012	Guide outlining the tasks of the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in the spheres of humanitarian assistance as well as recovery and rehabilitation	Federal Foreign Office
Germany	N/A	What principles govern the Federal Foreign Office's humanitarian assistance?	German Humanitarian Assistance
Germany	2012	Strategy of the Federal Foreign Office for Humanitarian Assistance Abroad	Federal Foreign Office
Germany	2011	Joint Evaluation German Humanitarian Aid Abroad Summary	Federal Foreign Office
Germany	2009	Bericht der Bundesregierung über die deutsche humanitäre Hilfe im Ausland 2006 bis 2009	Federal Foreign Office
Germany	2013	Stakeholder Consultation on the Union's Humanitarian Aid: Fit for Purpose?	Federal Foreign Office
Germany	2013	Conference on preparedness in Berlin, 11 June 2013 Principles and Recommendations on Preparedness	/
Germany	/	Joint Declaration on CivMil Cooperation	/
Germany	/	Compilation of Principles and Recommendations on Preparedness from a series of Workshopees and Meetings	/
GHD	2013	10 YEARS ON HOW ARE DONORS IMPLEMENTING THE GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP PRINCIPLES?	GHD
GHD		A rough guide to Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)	GHD
GHD	2007	Principles of Partnership A Statement of Commitment Endorsed by the Global Humanitarian Platform, 12 July 2007	GHD
Greece	2005	Hellenic aid annual report	Hellenic aid
Greece	2006	Hellenic aid annual report	Hellenic aid
Greece	2007	Hellenic aid annual report	Hellenic aid
Greece	2008	Hellenic aid annual report - part one	Hellenic aid
Greece	2008	Hellenic aid annual report - part two	Hellenic aid
Greece	2009	Hellenic aid annual report	Hellenic aid
Greece	2008	Hellenic aid annual report - part three	Hellenic aid
Greece	2010	Hellenic aid annual report	Hellenic aid
Greece	2011	Hellenic aid annual report	Hellenic aid
Greece	2012	GREEK HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN 2012	Hellenic aid
Greece	2012	HELLENIC AID ANNUAL REPORTS 2004-2012 Summary	Hellenic aid
Greece	2012	Annual questionnaire 2012	Hellenic aid
Greece	2013	Annual questionnaire 2013	Hellenic aid
Greece	2006	2006 OECD review	Hellenic aid
Greece	2011	3rd PEER REVIEW OF GREECE MEMORANDUM	Hellenic aid

Author	Year	Title	Organisation/publication
Greece	2010	GREEK INPUT TO THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID-ACTION PLAN	Hellenic aid
Hungary	2005	ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ _annual report	Külügyminisztérium
Hungary	2006	ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ _annual report	Külügyminisztérium
Hungary	2007	ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ annual report	Külügyminisztérium
Hungary	2008	ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ annual report	Külügyminisztérium
Hungary	2011	Questionnaire 2011	Külügyminisztérium
Hungary	2012	Questionnaire 2012	Külügyminisztérium
Hungary	2009	Questionnaire 2009	Külügyminisztérium
Hungary	2010	ANNEX EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID - ACTION PLAN	N/A
Hungary	2007	EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid	Department for International Development Cooperation Humanitarian Unit Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hungary	2007	MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID ACTION PLAN – FOLLOW-UP Mapping exercise tables	N/A
Hungary	2009	ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ annual report	Külügyminisztérium
Hungary	2010	Beszámoló Magyarország 2010	Külügyminisztérium
Hungary	2011	HUMANITARIAN PARTNERSHIP REPORT FINAL VERSION MISSION TO HAITI AND PANAMA 15-18 NOVEMBER 2011	N/A
Hungary	2011	Monitoring Sri Lanka	Külügyminisztérium
Hungary	2011	JELENTÉS Magyarország 2011. évi nemzetközi fejlesztési és humanitárius segítségnyújtási tevékenységéről	Külügyminisztérium
Hungary	2007	BESZÁMOLÓ a Nemzetközi Fejlesztési Együttműködési Tárcaközi Bizottság (NEFE TB) részére a 2006. évi nemzetközi fejlesztési együttműködési (NEFE) tevékenységről és a 2007. évre tervezett feladatokról	Külügyminisztérium
IDPS	2011	A NEW DEAL for engagement in fragile states	IDPS
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction	2005	Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters	United Nations
Ireland	2009	Humanitarian relief policy	Irish Aid
Ireland	2008	Hunger task Force report to the government of Ireland	Irish Aid
Ireland	2013	One World,One Future Ireland's Policy for International Development	Government of Ireland
Ireland	2006	White paper on Irish Aid	Government of Ireland
Ireland	2009	Questionnaire 2009	Irish Aid
Ireland	2010	Questionnaire 2010	Irish Aid
Ireland	2011	Questionnaire 2011	Irish Aid

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Ireland	2012	Questionnaire 2012	Irish Aid
Ireland	2013	Questionnaire 2013	Irish Aid
Ireland	2010	ANNEX EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID - ACTION PLAN	N/A
Ireland	2011	Irish Aid Annual Report 2011 Accountable to People, Accounting for Aid	Irish Aid
Ireland	2005	Irish Aid Annual Report 2005	Irish Aid
Ireland	2006	Irish Aid Annual Report 2006	Irish Aid
Ireland	2007	Irish Aid Annual Report 2007	Irish Aid
Ireland	2008	Irish Aid Annual Report 2008	Irish Aid
Ireland	2009	Irish Aid Annual Report 2009	Irish Aid
Ireland	2010	Irish Aid Annual Report 2010	Irish Aid
Ireland	2004	Annual Report 2004	Development and Cooperation Department
Italy	2011	ITALIAN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION 2011 – 2013 Programming guidelines and directions	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Italy	2012	Linee Guida per l'aiuto umanitario Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Italy	2009	Annual questionnaire 2009	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Italy	2010	Annual questionnaire 2010	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Italy	2011	Annual questionnaire 2011	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Italy	2013	Annual questionnaire 2013	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Italy	2013	OECD DAC PEER REVIEW OF ITALY- 2013 Memorandum	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Italy	2009	Development Assistance Committee (DAC) PEER REVIEW	OECD
Latvia	2013	Questionnaire 2013	N/A
Luxembourg	2013	Annual questionnaire 2013	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Immigration
Luxembourg	2013	Annual Report on the Implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid 2012	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Immigration
Luxembourg	2012	Questionnaire funding and strategies	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Immigration
Luxembourg	2012	ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID - 2011	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Immigration

Author	Year	Title	Organisation/publication
Luxembourg	2006	Rapport annuel 2006	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Immigration
Luxembourg	2007	Rapport annuel 2007	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Immigration
Luxembourg	2008	Rapport annuel 2008	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Immigration
Luxembourg	2009	Rapport annuel 2009	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Immigration
Luxembourg	2010	Rapport annuel 2010	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Immigration
Luxembourg	2011	Rapport annuel 2011	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Immigration
Luxembourg	2012	Rapport annuel 2012	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Immigration
Luxembourg	2013	Action humanitaire 2013 Stratégie et orientation	Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de l'Immigration
Malta	2013	ELABORATE AND ACTION A POLICY AND WORK PROGRAMME	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malta
Malta	2006	Overseas Development Policy and a Framework for Humanitarian Assistance for Malta	Government of Malta
Netherlands	2012	Questionnaire 2012	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Netherlands	2013	Questionnaire 2013	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Netherlands	2013	The Union's humanitarian aid: Fit for purpose?	Humanitarian Department
Netherlands	2011	MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID ACTION PLAN – FOLLOW-UP Mapping exercise tables	N/A
Netherlands	2012	Aid for people in need Policy Framework for Humanitarian Aid	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Netherlands	2011	IOB Evaluation Assisting Earthquake Victims: Evaluation of Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in 2010	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
ODI	2010	INTERNATIONAL FINANCING FOR DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT THE 20-YEAR STORY (1991-2010)	ODI
OECD	1999	Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance In Complex Emergencies	OECD
Poland	2010	SPECIAL REVIEW OF POLAND	OCDE

Author	Year	Title	Organisation/publication
Poland	2012	Development Cooperation Plan for 2012	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Poland	2013	Annual questionnaire 2013	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Poland	2012	2013 Development Cooperation Plan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Poland	2004	Poland's Development Co-operation 2004 annual Report	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Poland	2011	Development Cooperation Act	N/A
Poland	2011	MULTIANNUAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROGRAMME 2012 - 2015	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Poland	2005	Annual report 2005	Polish aid
Poland	2006	Annual report 2006	Polish aid
Poland	2007	Annual report 2007	Polish aid
Poland	2008	Annual report 2008	Polish aid
Poland	2009	Annual report 2009	Polish aid
Poland	2010	Annual report 2010	Polish aid
Poland	2011	Annual report 2011	Polish aid
Poland	2008	multiannual development cooperation programme 2012-2015	Polish aid
Poland	2008	POLISH AID 2008 Activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland	Polish aid
Poland	2011	Tekst ustawy ustalony ostatecznie po rozpatrzeniu poprawek Senatu	Polish parliament
Poland	2012	Poland's humanitarian assistance 2011-2012	Polish aid
Portugal	2005	A STRATEGIC VISION FOR PORTUGUESE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION	camoes
Portugal	2012	Annual questionnaire 2012	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Portugal	2013	Annual questionnaire 2013	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Portugal	2010	ANNEX EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID - ACTION PLAN	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Red Cross, Red Crescent and the ICRC	1994	Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief	Red Cross, Red Crescent and the ICRC
Romania	2013	Annual questionnaire 2013	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Romania	2012	Appendix In-House Implementation Rules for Granting Funding Intended to Development Assistance	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Romania	2006	Government of Romania DECISION No. 703 of 31 May 2006	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Romania	2011	Memorandum : Approval of the partner countries identified as development assistance recipients and the related funding for the 2012-2015 period	Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Author	Year	Title	Organisation/publication
Romania	2011	DECISION No. 1,052 of 19 October 2011 concerning the regulation of the specific actions related to funding assistance in the framework of the national policy of international cooperation for development	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Romania	2012	Annual questionnaire 2012	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Romania	2011	Memorandum : Approval of the Multiannual Strategy for the extension of multilateral development assistance (2011-2015)	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Romania	2010	Annual questionnaire 2010	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Slovakia	2009	Medium-Term Strategy for Official Development Assistance of the Slovak Republic for the years 2009-2013	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic
Slovakia	2003	Medium-Term Strategy for Official Development Assistance: 2003 – 2008	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic
Slovakia	2011	DAC SPECIAL REVIEW OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC	OECD
Slovenia	2013	Evaluation of the implementation of the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Slovenia	2006	INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACT (ZMRS)	National Assembly
Slovenia	2008	Resolution on International Development Cooperation of the Republic of Slovenia until 2015	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Slovenia	2012	IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA UNTIL 2015: AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Slovenia	2012	Annual questionnaire 2012	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Slovenia	2010	ANNEX EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID - ACTION PLAN	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Slovenia	2010	Mid-Term Review of the Implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and its Action Plan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Spain	2009	La acción humanitaria en 2008-2009: la ayuda resiste a la crisis Informe del Observatorio de la Acción Humanitaria	Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria
Spain	2010	La acción humanitaria en 2009-2010: en esas estábamos cuando tembló Haití Informe del Observatorio de la Acción Humanitaria	Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria
Spain	2011	La acción humanitaria en 2010-2011: crisis sobre crisis Informe del Observatorio de la Acción Humanitaria	Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria
Spain	2012	La acción humanitaria en 2011-2012: tocando fondo Informe del Observatorio de la Acción Humanitaria	Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria
Spain	2012	Memoria AECID 2012	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación

Author	Year	Title	Organisation/publication
Spain	2005	Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2005-2008	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Spain	2009	Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2009-2012	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Spain	2007	Estrategia de Acción Humanitaria de la Cooperación Española para el Desarrollo	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Spain	2008	Humanitarian Action Strategy Paper Spanish Development Cooperation Executive Summary	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Spain	2008	Plan Anual de Cooperación Internacional 2008	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Spain	2009	Plan Anual de Cooperación Internacional 2009	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Spain	2010	Plan Anual de Cooperación Internacional 2010	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Spain	2011	Plan Anual de Cooperación Internacional 2011	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Spain	2012	Plan Anual de Cooperación Internacional 2012	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Spain	2012	Towards Better Humanitarian Donorship 12 Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews	OECD
Spain	2011	BALANCE DE ACTIVIDADES 2011	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Spain	2009	Informe Provisional Evaluación en tiempo real del Operativo de respuesta humanitaria en Filipinas – Tormenta tropical Ondoy (Ketsana)	AECID – IECAH
Spain	2010	EVALUACIÓN de la RESPUESTA de la OFICINA DE ACCIÓN HUMANITARIA de la AGENCIA ESPAÑOLA de COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL PARA EL DESARROLLO en HAITÍ durante el año 2010	AECI
Spain	2010	Informe de proyecto : “Propuestas de mejora de la capacidad de respuesta de la acción humanitaria española”	AECID – IECAH
Spain	2011	PLAN ESTRATEGICO OPERATIVO OAH - AECID 2011	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Spain	2012	Líneas para el documento de programación de la OAH 2012	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación



Author	Year	Title	Organisation/publication
Spain	2010	PROGRAMACIÓN OPERATIVA 2010 ÁMBITO: ACCIÓN HUMANITARIA	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Spain	2010	Desembarco en Haití Un análisis de la respuesta española al terremoto	Intermón Oxfam
Spain	2011	DARA - Humanitarian Response Index	Dara international
Spain	2011	Review of Good Humanitarian Donorship Indicators	Development Initiatives
Spain	2012	10 YEARS ON HOW ARE DONORS IMPLEMENTING THE GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP PRINCIPLES?	Good Humanitarian Donorship
Spain	2012	INFORME DE EVALUACIÓN Proyecto: Acceso efectivo a los derechos de las víctimas civiles del conflicto armado en especial de las víctimas de Minas Antipersonal y Restos Explosivos de Guerra en Colombia -Octubre 2010-Julio 2012-	AECID
Spain	2012	Review of Proposals Submitted by Implementing Partners in 2011: Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations FINAL REPORT	AECID
Spain	2012	INFORME CONSOLIDADO de las evaluaciones realizadas sobre los Programas de la Oficina de Acción Humanitaria ejecutados en: CAMPAMENTOS DE REFUGIADOS SAHARAUIS, ETIOPIA, SUDAN (Norte) y TERRITORIOS PALESTINOS OCUPADOS	AECID
Spain	2012	Nota Interna Grupo de Acción Humanitaria de la CONGDE Propuestas del Grupo sobre la Acción Humanitaria de la AECID	AECID
Stockholm Group	2003	PRINCIPLES AND GOOD PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP	Stockholm Group
Sweden	2004	The Government's Humanitarian Aid Policy	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Sweden	2010	Saving lives and alleviating suffering Policy for Sweden's Humanitarian Assistance 2010–2016	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Sweden	2006	Sida Evaluations and Audits 2005	SIDA
Sweden	2010	Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance Case Study Report Kenya	SIDA
Sweden	2010	Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance Case Study Report Indonesia	SIDA
Sweden	2010	Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance Case Study Report Somalia	SIDA
Sweden	2005	DAC Peer Review SWEDEN	OECD
Sweden	2009	DAC Peer Review SWEDEN	OECD
Sweden	2007	Sida's Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance 2008-2010	SIDA



Author	Year	Title	Organisation/publication
The Sphere Project	2011	Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response	The Sphere Project
United Kingdom	2006	Humanitarian response to natural disasters, Seventh Report of Session 2005–06, Volume I	House of Commons International Development Committee
United Kingdom	2012	DFID's Humanitarian Emergency Response in the Horn of Africa	Department for International Development
United Kingdom	2006	REPORT ON DFID'S RESPONSE TO THE INDIAN OCEAN DISASTER	Department for International Development
United Kingdom	2008	DFID-CHASE REPSONSE STRATEGY TO THE NARGIS CYCLONE, MAY 2008	Department for International Development
United Kingdom	2008	The UK's Response to the South Asia Earthquake	National Audit Office
United Kingdom	2006	Tsunami: Provision of Financial Support for Humanitarian Assistance	National Audit Office
United Kingdom	2006	Saving lives, relieving suffering, protecting dignity DFID's Humanitarian Policy	Department for International Development
United Kingdom	2011	Cause for hope? DFID's response to the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review	Humanitarian Policy Group
United Kingdom	2011	Humanitarian Emergency Response Review: UK Government Response	DFID
United Kingdom	2012	Evaluation of DFID's Bilateral Aid to Pakistan	DFID
United Nations	2003	Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies	United Nations
UNOCHA	2007	Guidelines on The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief Revision 1.1	UNOCHA
UNOCHA	2013	Global Humanitarian Contributions in 2012: Totals by Donor	UNOCHA
UNOCHA	2008	HOLIS 14 Points	UNOCHA
VOICE	2013	Terms of Reference for a Consultancy Study on the European Consensus on humanitarian aid/ An NGO perspective	VOICE
VOICE	2013	VOICE consolidated reply ECHO questionnaire The Union's Humanitarian Aid: fit for purpose?	VOICE
VOICE	2011	EU Humanitarian Aid Consensus - Action Plan and implementation - Timeline	VOICE