

EVALUATION OF DG ECHO'S ACTIONS IN BURUNDI (2006 - 2009)

CONTRACT N°: ECHO/ADM/BUD/2009/01203

(June 15 - August 31, 2009)

Final Evaluation Report

14th October 2009



Evaluation Team:

Ton de Klerk, Team Leader

Pierre Capdegelle, Team Member

Emmanuel Nshimirimana, Local Expert

Cost of the report (89,694 € 0.12% of the budget evaluated)

EUROPEAN COMMISSION



Humanitarian Aid

The report has been financed by and produced at the request of the European Commission. The comments contained herein reflect the opinions of the consultants only.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents	i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
1 INTRODUCTION.....	9
1.1 Country Context	9
1.2 Terms of Reference	9
1.3 Methodology	10
2 LRRD STRATEGY	11
2.1 Policy of the EC	11
2.2 Policy of DG ECHO and the Delegation in Burundi	12
2.3 Findings and assessment of the LRRD Strategy of the EC in Burundi.....	14
3 DG ECHO's Action (2006 – 2009).....	17
3.1 Repatriation and Reintegration.....	17
3.1.1 Background	17
3.1.2 Programme description	17
3.1.3 DG ECHO / EC Funding.....	19
3.1.4 General Assessment	19
3.1.5 Assessment of LRRD strategy	21
3.2 Food Security and Food Aid	22
3.2.1 Background	22
3.2.2 Programme description	23
3.2.3 DG ECHO / EC Funding.....	24
3.2.4 General Assessment	24
3.2.5 Assessment of LRRD Strategy.....	27
3.3 Health and Nutrition.....	27
3.3.1 Health sector.....	27
3.3.1.1 Sector and programme description.....	27
3.3.1.2 DG ECHO / EC Funding.....	28
3.3.1.3 General Assessment	28
3.3.1.4 Assessment of LRRD strategy	29
3.3.2 Nutrition Sector	30
3.3.2.1 Sector and programme description.....	30
3.3.2.2 DG ECHO / EC Funding.....	31
3.3.2.3 General Assessment	31
3.3.2.4 Assessment of LRRD Strategy.....	32
3.4 CAMPS FOR CONGOLESE REFUGEES.....	32
3.4.1 Background	32
3.4.2 DG ECHO Funding.....	32

3.4.3	Findings.....	32
4	STABILISATION OF PEACE	33
4.1	Background	33
4.1.1	Land property issues.....	33
4.1.2	Reconciliation process.....	34
4.1.3	Malfunctioning of the juridical system	34
4.2	Findings.....	34
5	MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	36
5.1	Main Conclusions.....	36
5.2	Assessment of LRRD Strategy.....	38
5.2.1	Phasing out and handing over strategy.....	38
5.2.2	LRRD strategy at project level.....	40
5.3	Recommendations	41
5.3.1	Operational Level.....	41
5.3.2	Strategical Level.....	43

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In recent years, DG ECHO has progressively reduced its humanitarian aid in Burundi to coincide with both the arrival of development-oriented donors and the handing over of actions to other EC financial instruments. In the Country Strategy Paper 2003 – 2007, it was envisaged that, in partnership with DG ECHO, the 9th EDF would support the link between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) with a transition from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development. However, it was not until early 2006, following the inauguration of the new democratically elected President in August 2005, that the donor community commenced consultations with the Burundi government, opening the way for DG ECHO to begin its phase-out strategy.
2. The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the appropriateness of DG ECHO's actions in Burundi for the period 2006 – 2009 (in accordance with its mandate), in order to establish whether the objectives have been achieved, but with a main focus on its LRRD strategy. To properly understand the LRRD strategy and process, actions funded from other EC instruments were also included in the analysis.
3. For the assessment of the DG ECHO LRRD approach, the Communication of the Commission of April 2001 “Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development” and the more recent EC policy note, “The Communication on Fragile States of 2007” were consulted. Finally, the contribution of the DG ECHO funded actions to the stabilisation of peace process has been evaluated.

General assessment of DG ECHO's actions

4. **Relevance:** The projects funded by DG ECHO in the period 2006 - 2009 were in line with the general policy of DG ECHO and responded to major humanitarian needs in the country. (par. 90, 139, 167, 187, 199)
5. **Internal Coherence:** The comprehensive approach of the reintegration programme (including elements for conflict prevention, appropriate return packages, house construction and the follow-up by the ‘villagisation’ programme for a group of refugees of 1972) was a major factor contributing to the achievement of the main objectives of the repatriation and reintegration programme. (par. 79 - 89)
6. **Effectiveness:** Since 2006, 180,000 persons have been repatriated and reintegrated in their villages of origin, without major problems occurring. The assistance package that the repatriates received can be considered as ‘generous’, creating the necessary conditions to regain a minimum level of self-sufficiency. However, while most refugees could regain access to their lands, many of the ‘old’ refugees who had fled the country in 1972 could not, which continues to hamper their successful reintegration. (par. 97 - 99)
7. Targeting vulnerable groups has improved with time. Selection procedures in food aid and food security projects for targeting of vulnerable groups had major flaws in the past, resulting in the inclusion of beneficiaries that did not meet the objectives of DG ECHO. However, from 2007, more transparent and participative methods have ensured better results. Adoption of seed fairs, for distribution of seeds, guaranteed that farmers received seeds of good quality, appropriate for the local circumstances, the farmers’ needs and preferences.
8. One of the major partners of DG ECHO has been slow in adopting the seed fairs approach, and has, instead, continued with direct seed distributions. Proper quality of the seeds could therefore not be guaranteed, nor did the distributed seeds always respond to the

needs of the farmers, thus leading to poor harvests or inappropriate use (sales, consumption) of the seeds. The project for multiplication of cassava varieties resistant to the mosaic virus has been very effective. In most regions, the disease has been largely eradicated; only in the southern provinces of Burundi does the virus still pose a threat. (par. 135 – 138)

9. In the health sector, delivery of humanitarian aid was good i.e. satisfactory levels of coverage for both curative and preventive medical care. DG ECHO's goal to contain mortality and morbidity rates within emergency thresholds was achieved and attendance rates to health facilities were within WHO standards. However, some activities such as family planning, malnutrition management and hospital referrals did not reach optimum levels. In the nutrition sector, the development of the Community based Therapeutic Centres (CTC) approach has proved to be effective and achieved results complying with the Sphere standards. However, DG ECHO partners share the opinion that case detection has to be reinforced. (par. 164, 171,174)

10. **Efficiency:** The different elements of the repatriation and reintegration programme were well organised, apart from some major weaknesses in the planning and execution in the current projects of the 'villages intégrés'. (par. 108 -109)

11. The food supply for transit camps, the camps for Congolese refugees and for the repatriates was well organised, and a regular supply has been assured. General set-up of the seed fairs programme as well as its organisation was assessed as good. The same applied for the programme for multiplication of new cassava varieties. (par. 135 - 137)

12. Projects in the health sector were implemented in an efficient manner: skilled professionals, and good organisation of service delivery, at first and secondary levels. Contracting of health services, promoted by one of DG ECHO's implementing partners, is viewed as a cost effective way to deliver good quality services. The design of complementary support operations in the nutrition sector is efficient: UNICEF has been purchasing the therapeutic foods while NGOs have been ensuring its appropriate use at peripheral levels. (par. 155 and 170 - 173)

13. **Coordination:** Coordination at a central level was good for the repatriation & reintegration sector and for the food aid & food security sector. However, in the health sector, opinions of the different agencies involved differed (except for donor coordination) whilst in the nutrition sector it was considered weak. Coordination at provincial and district levels was weak for all sectors, especially the involvement of local administrative structures. (par. 117 - 119, 142 - 144, 154, 175)

14. **Impact:** The repatriation and reintegration of 180,000 refugees has not led to major tensions, particularly as it was feared that a huge influx of refugees could lead to new outbreaks of violence. The programme therefore created adequate pre-conditions for successful reintegration of the repatriates. It is considered that it will take on average 1 - 3 years before 'normal' living conditions could be restored. In the long-term, successful reintegration will depend on overall development in the country and follow-up by appropriate development initiatives. (par. 103 - 105)

15. Food aid and food security projects have mitigated the effects of food shortages. However, as the underlying causes of food insecurity are of structural nature, it is difficult to assess the long-term impact of projects, except for some of the infrastructural works executed through food or cash for work projects. Seed distributions aimed at achieving self-sufficiency of seed supply, but seed fairs were often organised in the same communities in consecutive years, indicating that the expected outcome was not always achieved.

16. The cassava multiplication programme had a beneficial long-term impact. Without this programme, the beneficiaries, especially in the regions where cassava is the major staple food, would have suffered for a long time from major food deficits. (par. 137 - 144)

17. Some NGOs among DG ECHO's partners strongly supported improved financial access to health care. They contributed to the adoption of the governmental decree on free care for children and pregnant women. Another partner, Cordaid, which had been piloting the contractual approach, took part, along with the WHO, in the design and formulation of the Ministry of Public Health's contractual policy. (par. 165)

Assessment of LRRD strategy within the EC

18. **Coordination:** Until 2006, the Delegation, with other donors, took a 'wait and see' attitude towards commencing development programmes due to concerns about the security situation and political stability within the country. Nevertheless, in 2006, the donor community commenced consultations with the Burundi government opening the way for DG ECHO to make a start with its phase-out strategy. From 2006, there has been good coordination between DG ECHO and the Delegation. DG ECHO was entrusted to take the lead in the formulation of projects that were financed from Envelope B of the 9th and 10th EDF. For the different thematic budget lines (partly) administered by the Delegation (food security, human rights and NSA/LA), the Delegation and DG ECHO worked together on the formulation of the ToR and proposal assessments. Several joint field visits were made, and DG ECHO continued to monitor the programmes funded from the 9th EDF. (par. 60 - 64)

19. **Internal Coherence:** The Country Strategy Paper 2003 – 2007 provided an appropriate framework for the LRRD strategy within the EC, anticipating that the 9th EDF would be able to take-over from DG ECHO when peace and security were restored. Development programmes funded from the 9th EDF, Santé Plus in the health sector and PPCDR for rural development, provide support in provinces with a large percentage of repatriates and in provinces where actions were previously funded by DG ECHO, thus facilitating the hand-over process. Repatriation and reintegration activities, which facilitated the transition from relief to development, were financed from envelope B of the 9th EDF (construction of houses for repatriates and educational facilities) and the 10th EDF (villagisation programme). Other programmes of the 9th EDF, such as budget support, the good governance programme and the programme for non-state actors (NSA), are in line with the main objective of DG ECHO, i.e. contribute to stabilisation of peace. (par. 61, 64 - 70)

20. To ensure coherence with the humanitarian policy and to prevent future conflict, development projects should ensure inclusion of vulnerable groups. These should include activities appropriate for vulnerable groups and target such groups. In the Programme Post Conflict de Développement Rural (PPCDR), such special focus seems lacking. (par. 146)

21. **Effectiveness:** The final results achieved in the transfer of activities from DG ECHO to other EC instruments are assessed as successful. Funding of Santé Plus made it possible for a main partner of DG ECHO to continue its development-oriented health programme. DG ECHO's gradual withdrawal has been facilitated by funding from the 4th component (Envelope B) of the PPCDR, for the reintegration and the villagisation programmes, as well as through funding from the thematic budget lines and the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP), especially for the food security sector. (par. 71 - 73)

22. However, delayed approval and start of the Santé Plus programme compelled one DG ECHO's partner to delay closure of their operations whilst another partner was forced to withdraw, thus failing to achieve formal handover. Almost 2 years after start-up date, the PPCDR development programme has not yet shown any tangible results in the field, thus

leaving a significant time-lag before fulfilling the anticipated result of the Country Strategy Paper 2003 – 2007; namely that the 9th EDF would be able to take over from DG ECHO, especially in the field of rural development. (par. 175 - 178)

23. Phasing out of DG ECHO has taken much longer than originally foreseen. Nevertheless, this assessment considers that its longer presence has had a favourable effect. Through its prolonged presence, DG ECHO could ensure that the needs of its groups of concern were adequately addressed in projects funded from other EC instruments. (par. 72 - 73)

24. **Efficiency:** A major impediment for a timely transition from relief to development assistance was a lack of flexibility and rapidity in the implementing phase, for the mobilisation of development and cooperation funds to facilitate the take-over from emergency interventions. Allocations from the envelope B of the EDF were more flexible, but only after the programme had been approved, which took a long time for Santé Plus. (par. 80, 160 - 162)

Assessment of LRRD strategy at project level

25. **Connectedness:** The integrated approach of the repatriation and rehabilitation programme is assessed as a good example of the LRRD strategy. Proper conditions were created for the reintegration of the repatriates (towards development), through the extended period of food aid, the provision of cash grants, the construction of houses, and the development of the villagisation project for refugees of 1972. (par. 106)

26. Training programmes for 'para-juristes' at community level and for 'focal points' for non-accompanied children were assessed as commendable. However, there are strong doubts whether the newly trained persons will continue their activities, since the executing agencies of these programmes cannot ensure prolonged presence in the after-project phase. (par. 122)

27. Many programme activities in the food security sector are development oriented:

- Seed distributions enhancing the capacity of the beneficiaries to take care of themselves,
- Food or cash for work projects; such projects prevent a 'dependency syndrome' and create projects (rural infrastructure, environmental protection) contributing to development,
- Agricultural diversification activities (distribution of in-vitro banana and other seeds),
- Establishment and strengthening of early warning systems SAP/SSA. (par. 144)

28. One of DG ECHO's partners continued for too long with free distribution of food aid, when food or cash for work was more in line with its LRRD strategy and would have led to better results (regaining self sufficiency). (par.161)

29. For the health sector, a new approach for the management of health systems was approved by DG ECHO in 2007. This proposal was put forward by one of its partners to fund the Performance Based Funding (PBF) approach, which is in line with the policy of the Ministry of Public Health. Nutrition programmes can greatly benefit in the future by the integration of the screening and management of malnutrition in the "Minimum Package of Activities" within the PBF system. (par. 164, 180 - 182)

30. **Do no harm:** Focussing the repatriation and reintegration programme on conflict prevention (monitoring, mediation, strengthening of state committee "Commission Nationale de Terres et Autres Biens" (CNTB)), a main condition for stabilisation of peace and thus for future development, is exemplary for a well-devised LRRD strategy. Inclusion of vulnerable groups from the resident population (ca. 10%) in the house construction programme also helps to reduce tensions in the community between newcomers and the residents. (par. 80 - 81, 115 - 116)

31. **Ownership:** The Ministry of Solidarity and PARESI, an agency falling under the Ministry, had a central role in the coordination of activities in the reintegration and repatriation programme, and in the execution of projects. UNHCR selected local NGOs for the monitoring of repatriates after their return and for mediation and provision of legal assistance, thus contributing to local ownership and strengthening capacities of local organisations. The pilot project with CNTB, even with some major shortcomings, also contributed to ownership. In the house construction programme as well as in the organisation of the 'villages intégrés' proper attention is paid to organising of beneficiaries' groups. (par. 111)

32. **Coherence/Alignment:** DG ECHO has continued funding nutrition projects, as it has committed itself to promote the CTC approach, which is in line with the policy of the Ministry of Public Health. Projects in the health sector are also in full alignment with its policy of decentralisation and performance-based financing in health services delivery. (par. 154, 174)

Main Recommendations:

33. **Operational Level** (par. 268 - 71)

DG ECHO should maintain a presence in Burundi until at least the end of 2011, to provide support for the repatriation and reintegration of some 55,000 refugees still remaining in Tanzania, and for the camps of the Congolese refugees. This will also allow for prompt action in response to issues that may arise in connection to the upcoming elections in 2010, which some fear might stir up new violence. In the meantime, it is recommended that:

- The integrated approach toward repatriation and reintegration should continue to be used.
- Together with other stakeholders, DG ECHO takes initiative to address the problems of the refugees of 1972 who remain without access to land. (A study covering underlying sources for conflicts could be commissioned; dialogue with CNTB and local administrators could be initiated; this group of refugees could be included among the beneficiaries of the Villagisation Project).
- Together with the Delegation, additional funding opportunities are sought from different EC instruments for rural development projects with an appropriate policy approach towards targeting of vulnerable groups, including repatriates.
- It continues funding of the nutrition sector activities until final disengagement, to secure the CTC approach can be further developed and that malnutrition management can be fully integrated into routine activities of hospitals and health centres.
- It continues funding of GVC health activities until final disengagement, particularly to reinforce the 'Equipes Cadre de District' and its emergency preparedness and response capacities.

34. To accompany the process of Stabilisation of Peace, this report recommends that DG ECHO advises the EC Delegation to take the following actions: (par. 237)

- To provide technical and financial assistance to CNTB to strengthen its capacity, ensuring its presence and proper management of its tasks at a commune level;
- To seek additional funding opportunities for NGOs that can play a role in bringing together and in reconciling different groups at community levels, either through special activities or by integrating them in broader development projects;

- To seek funding opportunities for actions aimed at capacity building of the 'Tribunaux de Résidence' and for actors that can provide legal assistance to plaintiffs;
- To lobby the Government of Burundi to find a solution for outstanding issues relating to the repatriates of 1972, to guarantee the independence, impartiality and to improve management (decentralisation) of the CNTB and to reinforce the capacities of the 'Tribunaux de Résidence';
- To examine how local organisations with a strong field presence can get involved to assure sustainability of services (judicial support); and
- To improve dialogue with local administration (proper procedures should be developed for information sharing and involvement of local administration).

35. Strategic Level (par 272 - 278)

Recommendations are:

- To examine how DG ECHO field requests for adaptation of UN-agencies country programmes can be more effectively supported;
- To adopt strategies that may differ from DG ECHO's classical input-based modus operandi, such as in the PBF Cordaid project (which is a good example of a project that could build a bridge between relief and development), in order to fully embrace the LRRD approach.

36. To lobby DG DEV/ DG AIDCO to take the following actions:

- To analyse how the procedures in the preparation, approval and implementation phase of the EDF programmes can be lightened in order to improve flexibility and rapidity in responses to situations in the transition phase from relief to development;
- To analyse if more effective use can be made of the recently developed analytic tool, 'LRRD Country Situation Analysis and Action Framework for a Consolidated Response,' to improve coordinated action also at the level of EC Brussels, seeking for greater flexibility and rapidity of decision procedures;
- To consider delegation of responsibility for coordination to one of the DGs as recently suggested in a policy note¹;
- To consider further government decentralisation for the administration of the instruments of thematic budget lines, in order that local knowledge of the situation, needs and implementing partners can be improved.

¹ See also: 'Note de dossier. LRRD: état des lieux et pistes pour l'avenir' Paper of DG ECHO, Sector Strategy, policies and thematic funding. December 2008.

Main Conclusions	Lessons learned	Recommendations
<p>Effective results of the handing over strategy were attributed especially to good personal relationships between DG ECHO and the Delegation.</p> <p>DG ECHO and the Delegation have worked in unison to implement the LRRD strategy.</p> <p>The Country Strategy Paper 2003 – 2007 provided an appropriate framework for the LRRD strategy within the EC, particularly by allocating sufficient funds for Envelope B and foreseeing the use of envelope A to hand over activities.</p> <p>Funding from Envelope B could be allocated with flexibility and rapidity (through the UN agencies), once a project was approved.</p> <p>Funding from thematic budget lines that were administered by the Delegation, are allowed to promote the LRRD strategy.</p>	<p>Implementation of the LRRD strategy within the EC seems to depend very much on individual initiatives.</p> <p>Proper instruments are available within the EC to develop an LRRD strategy.</p> <p>The thematic budget lines administered by the Delegation supported a proper transition from relief to development.</p>	<p>Maintain the collaboration between DG ECHO and EC delegation to look for funding opportunities from different EC instruments.</p> <p>Consider further decentralisation for the administration of the thematic budget lines (food security), in order that local knowledge of the situation, needs and implementing partners can be maximised.</p>
<p>The analytical tool 'LRRD Country Situation Analysis and Action Framework for a Consolidated Response' was not fully utilised, i.e. no feedback was received from EC Brussels.</p> <p>A major weakness for the effective implementation of the LRRD strategy within the EC has been the lack of flexibility and rapidity for mobilising development and cooperation funds, with long delays in the implementation phase, especially from Envelope A.</p>	<p>Available mechanisms to support an effective LRRD strategy were not fully utilised, especially at EC Brussels.</p> <p>Implementation of an effective LRRD strategy is seriously hampered by long decision and heavy administrative procedures for development programmes funded from the EDF, especially for the Envelope A.</p>	<p>A more effective use should be made of the 'LRRD Country Situation Analysis and Action Framework for a Consolidated Response', to improve coordinated action also at the level of EC Brussels.</p> <p>It should be analysed how the procedures in the preparation, approval and implementation phase of the EDF programmes can be lightened in order to improve flexibility and rapidity in responses to situations in the transition phase from relief to development.</p>
<p>The comprehensive approach of the repatriation and reintegration (R&R) programme, addressed in an integrated way the necessary conditions for successful reintegration of repatriates. This was a main factor contributing to the achievement of the programme objectives.</p>	<p>A comprehensive approach in the R&R programme was a main factor that contributed to the positive results of the programme.</p>	<p>In similar situations, use should be made of an integrated approach towards R&R.</p>
<p>The R&R programme paid attention to potential sources of conflict, i.e. practised conflict prevention, especially related to land rights.</p> <p>However, underlying sources for conflicts still exist, such as unresolved land property issues, inadequate attention for</p>	<p>Underlying sources of conflict were insufficiently analysed, and subsequently not adequately addressed.</p>	<p>In Post-Conflict situations, an in-depth analysis should be made of underlying sources of conflicts. These should be integrated in the strategic framework for the LRRD, and co-jointly addressed by the different EC instruments.</p>

Main Conclusions	Lessons learned	Recommendations
<p>reconciliation at community levels, the malfunctioning of the judicial system at local level, and the problem of impunity. These problems might lead to new outbreaks of violence.</p> <p>The set-up of training programmes for 'para-juristes' and for 'focal point' persons, to ensure future monitoring and support for non-accompanied children, at community level are good initiatives. But it is doubtful that these structures will be sustainable in the after-project phase, since its executing agencies have no presence at field level.</p> <p>In the repatriation programme, coordination with the local administration was generally weak. They were not informed in advance of the arrival of returnees, nor were the representatives of the administration present at the transit camps upon the arrival of the repatriates.</p>	<p>It would have been better to assign these activities to civic organisations that have a strong presence at field level, for example church-related organisations.</p> <p>Limited involvement of local administration may hamper the success of R&R programmes</p>	<p>In similar programmes, focus should be on involvement of local organisations with a strong field presence, to assure future sustainability.</p> <p>Standard procedures should be developed in similar programmes for information sharing and involvement of local administration.</p>
<p>In the food aid and food security programme, some of the UN Agencies (funded through multi-donor funding) were slowly responding to requests from DG ECHO for changes in their programme approaches.</p>	<p>It is difficult for DG ECHO to influence policies in multi-donor funded UN-programmes and to bring them in line with its own LRRD strategy.</p>	<p>Examination should be made of how DG ECHO-field requests for adaptation of UN-agencies country programmes can be more effectively supported.</p>
<p>In the rural development programme funded under the EDF (PPCDR) there are insufficient built-in guarantees that DG ECHO's group of concerns (vulnerable, repatriates) will benefit from the rural development programme.</p>		<p>In the transition phase from relief to development, focus is on ensuring that vulnerable groups, especially victims of the conflict, benefit from the development projects, i.e. a targeted approach and activities appropriately designed for those groups.</p>
<p>A good example of a project that could build a bridge between relief and development in the health sector was DG ECHO funding of the PBF project, which requires cash transfers to health units through a contracting agency.</p>		<p>DG ECHO should adopt strategies that may differ from its classical input-based modus operandi in order to fully embrace the LRRD approach.</p>

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Country Context

37. Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 172nd out of 179 countries in the Human Development Index². It has 8 million inhabitants and suffers from one of the highest population density in Africa (circa 300 people/km² of arable land). UNDP data indicates that 70% of the population live below the poverty line of \$1.25 /day and that only 18% have attained food security³. The Burundian economy relies on the agricultural sector, which contributes to half of the national gross product, even though it is unable to guarantee food security for the whole population.

38. Since Independence (1962), the country has suffered from political instability, thus hampering economic and social development. This latent civil conflict had major peaks in 1972, 1993 and in the beginning of the 2000s. The peace stabilisation process commenced with peace talks in 2000 leading to the Arusha Agreement, continued in 2005 with democratic elections and reached a major milestone in 2006, when the last rebel group (Palipehutu-FNL) signed the cease-fire agreement. Security in the country has significantly increased, although the main issues causing the war seem unresolved. Disarmament has not been accomplished, human rights violations still occur, reintegration of the population affected by the war is ongoing, and poverty is widespread.

39. The conflict resulted in some 300,000 casualties, more than 100,000 internally displaced⁴ and more than 600,000 refugees who sought protection in the neighbouring countries (mainly Rwanda and Tanzania). Since 2002, more than 470,000 refugees have voluntarily returned to Burundi, 95,000 of which returned in 2008. As of January 2009, 55,000 refugees were still in Tanzania. They will return to Burundi in 2009, which should end the repatriation activities.

40. The fragile peace that the country is now experiencing is dependant on the regional context (stability in the neighbouring DRC directly affects Burundi's situation) and on the next election, which will take place in the summer of 2010.

1.2 Terms of Reference

41. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the appropriateness of DG ECHO's actions, in accordance with DG ECHO's mandate, in order to establish whether they have achieved their objectives with a major emphasis on the LRRD strategy, and to produce recommendations for improving the effectiveness of future operations in Burundi and eventually phasing out. The scope of the evaluation covers the implementation of DG ECHO's funded actions between 2006 and 2009. However, the more recent activities receive special attention and the focus is predominantly on the sector components, repatriation and reintegration, food security and health and nutrition. The contribution of the DG ECHO's funded actions to the peace stabilisation process has also been examined.

42. For an overall understanding of the LRRD strategy and process, actions funded from other EC instruments have also been included in the analysis focusing on issues of coherence,

² UNDP Human development index 2006

³ IMF figure <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/car020509a.htm>

⁴ No precise figure is available for IDP. This was an estimation made by OCHA in 2006. A more accurate figure is expected to be provided by the 2008 census.

coordination and complementarity of DG ECHO and other EC funded actions. Assessment of the quality of the actions funded from other EC instruments was however beyond the scope of the evaluation.

43. For the assessment of DG ECHO's LRRD approach, the Communication of the Commission of April 2001 ('Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development'), and recent internal policy notes of the EC on LRRD have been consulted (e.g. the Communication on Fragile States of 2007).

44. Alongside an assessment of the results in sectors and overall programme levels according to the ALNAP evaluation criteria, an assessment has been made in terms of the 3 Cs, that is Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence⁵.

1.3 Methodology

45. The briefing in Brussels took place during the week of the 15th – 18th of June. This commenced with a meeting with DG ECHO Evaluation Sector and the Burundi Desk Officer, at which the ToR and the proposed methodology were discussed. The briefing was used in meetings with relevant EC offices (DG ECHO Head of Sector Strategy, DG ECHO Food Assistance, DG AIDCO Burundi) and for collection of additional documentation. Unfortunately, a meeting with DG DEV Burundi could not be arranged.

46. The field visit in Burundi took place from June 20th until July 8th. On Monday June, 22nd a meeting was held with the current implementing partners of DG ECHO, where the ToR were explained and the field visit itinerary was arranged. Initial meetings were held with DG ECHO staff and TA of the EC-Delegation. Also, discussions took place with staff of UNHCR, WFP, FAO PNUD, UNICEF, the WHO, representatives of national organisations (Ministère de Solidarité Nationale, PARESI, Min. de l'Aménagement de territoire, CNTB, Ministry of Public Health), staff of PPCDR, MSF-B, DFID, and the Belgian Embassy.

47. A checklist (see annex G) was prepared with questions for each of the evaluation criteria and for all the key questions to be addressed in the evaluation. This checklist guided the interviews with the different agencies in Bujumbura and with the agencies and persons met during field visits.

48. Field visits took place from June 25th until July 4th. The team split up in two sub-teams, one for visits to the health & nutrition projects and the other for the repatriation & reintegration and the food aid & food security sectors. Informal interviews were held with individuals or in-group settings. Refugee camps in Tanzania were not visited because of time constraints and the care and maintenance programmes of the camps seemed to be less relevant for the evaluation of the LRRD strategy.

49. The first team visited health and nutrition projects of GVC, IMC and Cordaid and hospitals and health centres in the Provinces of Bujumbura Rural, Ruyigi, Rutana, Makamba and Bururi. Meetings were held with staff of the implementing agencies and health structures, and hospital directors, provincial and district health authorities (approximately 150 persons were met).

⁵ According to the "Maastricht criteria", coherence refers to the consistency of the external activities of the Union as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. We will use the criterion in a more limited sense and refer to it as internal coherence, i.e. internal consistency between the different instruments of the EC and the consistency of the intervention logic.

Referring to the consistency between the EC programme policy and the government strategies of the country (Burundi), we will use the term coherence/ alignment. Complementarity in the Maastricht C's only refers to complementarity between the policies of the EC and those pursued by the Member States.

50. The second team visited a camp for Congolese refugees, transit centres for repatriates and expellees, Centres d'Hébergements, a 'village intégré', house construction projects, attended a food distribution, visited the project for multiplication of cassava and one of the sub-projects of the PPCDR.

51. Meetings were held with (field) representatives of UNHCR, WFP, FAO, implementing partners of UNHCR (AFJ, ACCORD, Lique Iteka, IRC), Red Cross Burundi, Caritas, CISV, NRC, CRS and staff of DPAA⁶. Group meetings with beneficiaries were held in one of the Congolese refugees camps, in a Centre d'Hébergement, in one of the 'villages intégrées' and in a workshop of the income generation project of IRC (non-accompanied children).

52. Individual or small group interviews were held in the Congolese refugee camp, with beneficiaries of the food distribution, the house construction projects, the cassava multiplication project and the PPCDR sub-project. In total, some 200 beneficiaries have been involved in the meetings or the interviews.

53. A debriefing in Burundi was organised on July, 8th. Preliminary findings were presented and discussed with the representatives of the implementing partners and staff of DG ECHO.

2 LRRD STRATEGY

2.1 Policy of the EC

54. In 2001, the LRRD policy of the EC was outlined in a communication to the European Parliament⁷. A range of measures were identified that could improve the Community's contribution to international efforts in post-crisis situations.

55. Proposals included the following elements:

- Facilitate coordination;
- Improve response to disasters and other crises in a development perspective;
- Readjust and streamline the Community's own instruments, working methods and internal institutional mechanisms;
- Use Country Strategy Papers as the central reference for guiding different interventions at different stages in the crisis cycle;
- An increase in the implementation phase, flexibility and rapidity for mobilising development, and cooperation funds to facilitate the take-over from emergency interventions.

56. It is recognised that the transition from relief/humanitarian aid to development cooperation is rarely a smooth linear chronological process (continuum vs. contiguum). The phases - emergency relief, rehabilitation and development - often overlap within a single country. Different funding instruments usually therefore need to be used simultaneously and there is no uniform pattern of chronological transition between them. The 'link' must also be seen in a broader context: political, developmental, and humanitarian.

57. A call for such an integrated approach is contained in a communication on Fragile States⁸. In relation to the LRRD approach, it is said that governance, institutional

⁶ Directorat Provinciale d'Agriculture et Elevage.

⁷ Communication from the Commission. Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. April 2001.

⁸ Communication from the Commission. Towards an EC response to situations of fragility – engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace. October 2007.

development, and security have to be better integrated in its strategic framework and as well that procedures and financial mechanisms should be adapted to situations where flexibility is crucial. The purpose remains to achieve better harmonisation of analysis and policies, integration of strategies (including coordination, coherence and complementarity) and synergy of activities over a period of time, covering both humanitarian and development approaches.

58. To provide support to Delegations in looking at the LRRD 'contiguum' and to ensure that essential coordination and dialogue is taking place, an analysis tool was developed (in 2008) called 'LRRD Country Situation Analysis and Action Framework for a Consolidated Response', to be filled in jointly by the Delegation and DG ECHO.

59. The aim is to reach a consensus regarding the following three key dimensions:

- Analysis of the situation, causes of the crisis and overview of all instruments available (EC + member states);
- Assessment of needs (short, medium and long term) and analysis of existing or remaining capacities (particularly at local level);
- Preparation of consolidated response, combining the different instruments according to their specific mandate.

2.2 Policy of DG ECHO and the Delegation in Burundi

Country Strategy Papers

60. In the Country Strategy Paper 2003 – 2007, it was envisioned that in partnership with DG ECHO, the 9th EDF would ensure the link between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) and the transition from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development.

61. It was stated that at that moment (2002), it was premature for DG ECHO to retreat in view of the security situation. However, it was foreseen that the 9th EDF would be able, especially through its support to rural development, to take-over from DG ECHO when peace and security was restored.

62. The funding available from the 9th EDF amounted to €115 million for Envelope A and €54 million for Envelope B. Two concentration sectors were retained for Envelope A, Rural Development (€56.75 million) through the 5-year programme PPCDR (Programme Post Conflit de Développement Rural) and Good Governance (€15.25 million). An amount of €31.25 million was assigned for Budget Support. Envelope B is an allocation for the unforeseen, which can be allocated among others to humanitarian assistance.

63. In the Country Strategy Paper 2008 – 2013, the allocations of the 10th EDF are defined. However, it is noted that at the end of 2007 the most important development projects to be financed from the 9th EDF have just started. Their formulation and approval has taken much more time than planned, causing frustration as well as making it difficult to prepare the programmes of the 10th EDF. In the Strategy Paper, little attention is paid to the LRRD strategy except for remarking that humanitarian assistance should gradually make way for the EDF programmes, and that DG ECHO and the Delegation have cooperated closely to formulate an LRRD project for the health sector (Santé Plus).

DG ECHO Global Plans

64. DG ECHO's Global Plan for Burundi 2006 aimed at ensuring continued support to life-sustaining humanitarian assistance during a key period after political transition in Burundi. If this transition were consolidated, it would allow for a gradual phasing-out of DG ECHO and

would enable recovery and development efforts. Within the framework of the LRRD, certain sectors would receive a substantial increase in funding either from other European Commission's services or other donors, and gradually revert to a developmental approach. However, DG ECHO would maintain its multi-sector response. The envelope proposed for DG ECHO Burundi Global Plan for 2006 was €17 million.

65. DG ECHO's Global Plan 2007 comments that 2007 should mark the start of DG ECHO's phasing-out strategy. It was noted that in 2006, mine clearance and psycho-social activities had already been assumed by other donors, in particular Belgian Cooperation. Certain WatSan activities previously financed by DG ECHO had been taken over by the Delegation's "Water Facility" programme and by Swiss cooperation. A two-year financing proposal in the health sector (Santé Plus), funded from the 9th EDF B-envelope, would be decided in 2007. Some partners currently receiving DG ECHO funding would be included under this programme in the course of 2007. The allocation proposed for DG ECHO's Global Plan was €15 million.

66. In 2008, a common overall Global Plan was prepared for the Republics of Burundi and Tanzania, to be administered by DG ECHO Burundi. At one level, the overall plan aimed to continue essential humanitarian aid with a view to saving lives and to help the most vulnerable persons in Burundi, while also supporting the repatriation process, resettlement and refugees' stabilisation currently in Tanzania. A two-year financing proposal funded from the 9th EDF B-Envelope for the amount of € 10 million (component 4 of the PPCDR / Programme Post Conflit de Développement Rural) was finalised and would be in support for the returning refugees entering into the key phases of their rehabilitation, in complementarity to the support of DG ECHO on the logistical supports of repatriation.

67. In parallel with this supplementary financing, the Delegation should now focus on the activities anticipated under the PPCDR from beginning of 2008 (budget: 55 M€). The envelope proposed for the overall plan of DG ECHO to Burundi and Tanzania was 20 M€. In addition €5.7 million became available through FSTP (Food Security Thematic Programme).

68. The Global Plan 2009 envisages that the implementation of several development programmes funded through the 9th EDF and by other donors will allow DG ECHO to continue in its progressive disengagement initiated in 2008. A proposal has been prepared (Villagisation Project) for the establishment of so-called 'Villages Intégrés' to support the reintegration of refugees 'sans références et sans terres' (essentially those from 1972) that will be implemented by the Delegation and funded from the 10th EDF B-envelope (€6 million). DG ECHO will maintain its multi-sectoral aid in Burundi with proposed funding of € 20 million for Burundi and Tanzania.

Other EC Instruments

69. In 2008, 46 projects (project duration: 2 - 3 years) funded from the Budget Lines for Food Security, Human Rights and Non-state Actors and Local Authorities were ongoing: 14 Human Rights projects (€ 5 million), 14 NSA/LA projects (€ 8,4 million) and 19 Food Security projects (€ 11.9 million). The last sector includes funding from the FSTP (Food Security Thematic Programme) that started with an initial amount of €5.7 million for 2008. The instrument for Stability is not employed in Burundi.

70. Finally, in 2007, €2 million from the STABEX fund was used to boost DG ECHO's funding to take care of expellees from Tanzania as of September 2007 for a one-year period.

National Coordination

71. Prior to its withdrawal in 2008, OCHA ensured a good overall level of coordination, and set up clusters to coordinate humanitarian assistance at country level. DG ECHO played an active role in the food, security, health and nutrition clusters, as well as the "Integrated Committee for Return & Reintegration". However, coordination between the humanitarian and development sectors has been limited, with each having its own coordination structure (OCHA vs "Groupe Cadre de Partenariat / Suivi et Evaluation du CSLP"). However, there are now attempts to bring them together.

2.3 Findings and assessment of the LRRD Strategy of the EC in Burundi

72. **Coordination:** Until 2006, the Delegation and other donors took a 'wait and see' attitude towards starting up development programmes, expressing concerns about the security situation and stability of the country. Nevertheless in 2006, the donor community commenced consultations with the Burundi government opening the way for DG ECHO to make a start with its phase-out strategy.

73. In 2006, DG ECHO was already able to phase out from some sectors (mine clearance and psycho-social activities), which could be taken over by other donors, followed in 2007 by the withdrawal from the Water and Sanitation sector, also taken over by other donors and the Water Facility Programme of the EC.

74. From the end of 2006, DG ECHO and the Delegation cooperated on the formulation of projects that could ensure the transition from relief to development. The first example refers to the health sector (Project Santé Plus), where a programme was formulated that would enable one of the partners of DG ECHO to continue its activities in the regions where it was already active, and to further develop its approach to strengthen the health management system (système de contractualisation).

75. In addition, involvement of the Delegation in repatriation and reintegration programmes was set in motion after the visit of EC Commissioner Louis Michel to the refugee camps in Tanzania at the end of 2006, after which he urged the Burundi government and the EC to create appropriate conditions to encourage the return of the refugees. The government set up an ad-hoc Committee for the return wherein DG ECHO was the spokesperson for the Delegation.

76. Close cooperation between DG ECHO and the Delegation resulted in two projects for the repatriation and reintegration of refugees, support for the expelled from Tanzania and a house construction programme for repatriates, funded from the 9th EDF envelope B, which started early 2008. At the end of August 2008, a first draft was formulated for a programme for the resettlement of refugees 'sans reference / sans terres' in so-called 'villages intégrées', to be funded from the 10th EDF envelope B, again in close cooperation between DG ECHO and the Delegation. The programme is expected to start from August 2009.

77. The thematic budget line for food security, human rights and NSA/LA are partly administered by the Delegation and partly by EC Brussels. The Delegation and DG ECHO worked together on the formulation of the ToR and the assessment of proposals, concerning the budget lines that were administered by the Delegation. This facilitated these assistance programmes to the identified needs in the transition phase from emergency to development. Also the added value of proposals of NGOs previously funded by DG ECHO, could be assessed properly taking into account their past performance and what they could contribute ensuring the transition from emergency to development.

78. **Complementarity:** Generally, DG ECHO and the Delegation have been complementary in the division of funding. For the repatriation and reintegration activities, Envelope B of the 9th EDF was used for funding of house construction and educational facilities, while DG ECHO funded the logistics operations for the repatriation. Strictly speaking, the first activities are beyond the mandate of DG ECHO. Through funding from the different thematic budget lines for development-oriented activities, especially for food security, DG ECHO could gradually withdraw from these sectors. The programme Santé Plus facilitated DG ECHO's withdrawal in the health sector. EDF funding for Good Governance and support for Non-State Actors can be seen as complementary to DG ECHO's actions aiming among others to stabilise peace.

79. **Internal coherence:** The Country Strategy Paper 2003 – 2007 provided the framework for the transition from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development as well as the instruments (Envelope B) to facilitate the phasing out of DG ECHO.

80. DG ECHO and the Delegation had a coherent approach. The project Santé Plus and the PPCDR oriented their activities on the regions that were most affected by the return of refugees from Tanzania. From the Envelope B (fourth component of PPCDR) activities were funded that were essential to facilitate the reintegration of repatriates. Allocations from thematic budget lines administered by the Delegation sought to assure a proper transition from emergency to development. Better alignment with the LRRD strategy might have been achieved in the PPCDR if its approach had given more attention to ensuring inclusion of vulnerable groups. (See: par. 3.2. Food Security)

81. Through its programmes for Good Governance and support for NSA/LA and with its other development initiatives, the EC contributes to the stabilisation of peace in the country. Although it goes beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess the programmes administered by the Delegation, it can be said that EC policy is addressing in a coherent way the main issues relevant to achieve stabilisation in the country. Good governance, institutional development and security issues are targeted sectors, as advocated in the communication on Fragile States (par. 2.1).

82. **Efficiency:** A major impediment for a timely transition from relief to development assistance was a perceived lack of flexibility and rapidity, also in its implementing phase, for mobilising development and cooperation funds to facilitate the take-over from emergency interventions. The Country Strategy Paper 2003 – 2007 provided an appropriate framework for the transition from humanitarian assistance to development especially through the deployments from Envelope B, which proved to be a flexible instrument allowing rather quick and timely disbursements once a programme had been approved. It took eight months for the Programme Santé Plus, before funding was approved in Brussels and another seven months before the technical assistant for the programme arrived in Burundi.

83. The Programme PPCDR (Programme Post Conflit de Développement Rural) was delayed until August 2007⁹, one and a half years after the donor community had resumed its consultations with the Burundi government on development assistance. In the meantime, the preparatory phase had finished (partner consultations, technical studies, issuing and assessments of tenders). However in June 2009, (two years later), only a few sub-projects

⁹ In the Country Strategy Paper 2008 -2013 it is stated: 'At the end of 2007 the most important development projects to be financed from the 9th EDF have just started. Their formulation and approval have taken much more time than planned, causing frustration as well as making it difficult to prepare the programmes of the 10th EDF'.

have started. This is partly due to the arduous procedures to be fulfilled when seeking funding from the EDF Envelope A, which is managed co-jointly with the Burundi government¹⁰.

84. **Effectiveness:** Although a phasing out of DG ECHO had been foreseen since 2006/2007, it is now expected that DG ECHO will withdraw in 2010/2011. The reasons for this extended transition period were twofold: first, the repatriation of the Burundi refugees from Tanzania went at a much slower pace than foreseen; secondly, the start of the major development programmes funded from other instruments of the EC were significantly postponed.

85. Nevertheless, it is considered that DG ECHO's longer presence has been favourable and effective. It made it possible to ensure that the needs of the groups of concern to DG ECHO were adequately addressed in the projects funded from other EC instruments. The results of the handing over strategy of DG ECHO to other donors and other instruments within the EC are summarized below in table 1. It can be assessed as having achieved its goals, although with some delay.

86. The results of the handing-over strategy were attributed by all persons concerned to the good personal relationships between DG ECHO and the Delegation in Bujumbura. The 'LRRD Country Situation Analysis and Action Framework for a Consolidated Response', was a tool developed to provide support to Delegations in looking at the LRRD 'contiguum' and to ensure that essential coordination and dialogue is taking place. However, it had not been of great added value for the Delegation or DG ECHO since they had already worked closely together on the LRRD strategy. Moreover, no feedback was received from EC Brussels after submission of the document.

Table 1: LRRD / Phasing out of DG ECHO and take-over by other EC Instruments/ donors

Year	EC funding instrument	Amount (€)	Other donors	Action
2006			Belgian Cooperation and other donors	Mine Clearance Psycho-Social Activities
2007	Water Facility Programme		Belgian and Swiss Cooperation	Water and Sanitation Activities
2007	STABEX	2,000,000 / 1-year		Education Expellees from Tanzania
2008	9 th EDF Envelope B	7,870,000 / 2- years		Health / Santé Plus
2008	9 th EDF Envelope B/ PPCDR	3,500,000 / 2- years		Expellees from Tanzania
2008	9 th EDF Envelope B / PPCDR	6,500,000 / 2- years		Habitat / Integration of repatriated refugees
2008	Thematic Budget	19,570,000 /		42 projects: Food

¹⁰ By the 'cordonnateur national' i.e. the representative of the Ministry of Finance

	Lines	2 - 3 years		Security, Human Rights, NGO's
2008	FSTP	5,730,000 / 2 - 3 years		Food Security
2009	10 th EDF Envelope B	6,000,000 / 2- year		Villagisation Project

3 DG ECHO's Action (2006 – 2009)

3.1 Repatriation and Reintegration

3.1.1 Background

87. From 2002–2005, 294,000 refugees were repatriated from Tanzania. In 2006 – 2007, the repatriation began slowly (total: 84,713 persons), increasing in 2008 with a total of 95,068 persons, after the Tanzanian government started pressure to close refugee camps. In early 2009, some 40,000 Burundi refugees still remained in the camps. It was planned that all of them would be repatriated by end of June 2009, but by May only 9,294 persons had returned and the end date of the operation has been postponed until end of 2009.

88. Most of the refugees living in the camps fled Burundi around 1993. However, there is another large group of refugees, and their descendants, that escaped the violence around 1972. They live in three designated areas, in agriculture-based settlements, in western Tanzania. In 2007, the Tanzanian government offered the possibility of naturalisation for those who opted to stay. About 163,000 refugees decided to make use of this opportunity, while 55,000 persons chose to return. From this group 30,505 persons were repatriated in 2008 and another 9,822 in 2009. The remaining 15,000 are also expected to return in 2009.

89. Finally, in May 2006 Tanzania began to expel persons staying 'illegally' in the country, i.e. persons without refugee status or other legal permits. They were arrested and transported across the border, without sufficient time or delay to assist in organising their departure. Initially, UNICEF took care of this group of victims of human rights violence but since April 2007 the Burundi Red Cross took over, supported by the German Red Cross, with funding from DG ECHO. It is difficult to estimate the total number of 'illegal' persons who risk expulsion, but it has been estimated at some 40,000 persons. Until mid 2009, some 23,500 expellees had been assisted.

3.1.2 Programme description

90. Upon arrival in Burundi the repatriates are transported to Transit Centres, where they receive medical assistance, a package of non-food items, a first one-month food ration (from WFP), a first payment of their cash grants¹¹, the necessary administrative arrangements for reception of the National Identity Cards, and non-accompanied children are identified and assisted. The National Identity Cards can be collected later at the offices of the Administration in the communes where they return. After 2 – 3 days, the refugees are transported further to

¹¹ Each repatriate receives 50.000 FB (ca. €30). 20% of this amount is disbursed at the Transit Centre. The remaining amount is transferred to a bank account of a nearby branch of the cooperative bank COOPEC.

their communes of origin. Separate Transit Centres exist for the expellees, who also remain on average 2 – 3 days in the centres¹².

91. It is the primary responsibility of the local administrators to assure that the repatriates get access to the lands that originally belonged to them. If the lands in question have in the meantime been occupied by others, the local administration should mediate - in case the new occupants and the repatriates can not resolve issues among themselves. In general, the refugees of 1993 face only minor problems since their properties are known and their rights generally are acknowledged. However, refugees of 1972 face major problems. Since their departure, their lands may have been redistributed by the government, occupied by others or sold, while descendants often do not know the properties of their parents.

92. To prevent conflicts on land issues, and on any other legal issues that are mostly related to family law, two NGOs (AFJ and ACCORD¹³) intervene on behalf of UNHCR. They try to solve disputes through 'mediation'. If no solution is found and the cases are referred to the local tribunals, they can provide free legal assistance. In 2009, UNHCR also provided support to CNTB which is charged with examination of land disputes and mediation, in a pilot project in 11 communes.

93. Upon return to their villages of origin, the repatriates receive for a 5-month period¹⁴ food aid, distributed in monthly rations by the local branches of Caritas in the vicinity of their villages of return. The remaining 80% of the cash-grants can be collected from the local COOPEC branches, in one or several payments depending on what the beneficiaries prefer.

94. The repatriates are also assisted with the construction of houses. They receive the building materials and technical support, but have to provide all manual labour (production of bricks, assistance of masons etc.). In the project funded through PPCDR, around 65 % of the recently repatriated families benefited from this assistance. In addition, some 10% of the total number of houses to be built is assigned to vulnerable groups among the resident population.

95. After their return, all repatriates are entitled to free medical care for a period of three months and the chronically ill for a period of six months (government regulation).

96. A local NGO (Ligue ITEKA) monitors the situation of the repatriates after their return for UNHCR and keeps UNHCR informed when their rights and entitlements are not respected.

97. Among the refugees of 1972, some (descendants) are not able to trace their land or villages of origin. For this group, so-called 'Centres d'Hébergement' have been constructed where they can stay temporarily. In total 13 Centres have been constructed near the communes where they originate. From there, they can take the necessary actions to trace their villages or get access to their properties. Mostly they succeed within 2 - 3 months.

98. For those who are not able to trace their villages ("sans référence"), new villages are built. In 2008/2009, four villages were built accommodating each 200 households. For 2009, it was planned to build another 10 villages with funding from the 4th component of the PPCDR. They are called 'villages intégrés'. The term integrated refers to the fact that they will benefit from an integrated development approach, including provision of land, agricultural assistance, proper planning of water and education facilities and community

¹² Because they fall beyond its mandate UNHCR couldn't take care of the expellees. But the Burundi Red Cross has accepted responsibility and manages these separate transit centres.

¹³ AFJ (Association des Femmes Juristes) is a local NGO. ACCORD is an INGO based in South Africa.

¹⁴ Until July 2008, the beneficiaries received food aid for a 3-months period, distributed at the Transit Centre.

building. The need for such an integrated approach became evident after visits to 'villages de paix' constructed in the past where the new residents lacked all these facilities.

99. All groups of returnees - refugees of 1972, of 1993, and expellees – benefit from the same support. Until the 2nd half of 2008, the returnees of 1972 did not receive the non-food items packages and did not benefit from the food aid because initially, coming from agricultural settlements in Tanzania, they were expected to be less vulnerable. From 2008 on, the expellees also benefited from the 6-month food rations and were included in the system of UNHCR (CNI) for the provision of National Identity Cards.

3.1.3 DG ECHO / EC Funding

100. For its repatriation and reintegration programme UNHCR received funding from DG ECHO (within the framework of a multi donor funding agreement), over the period 2006 – 2009. It amounted to 1.5 M€ in 2006, 2 M€ in 2007, 1.7 M€ in 2008 and 2.2 M€ in 2009. Moreover, UNHCR received 6.5 M€ from the 9th EDF envelope B for 2008 – 2009. For the new villagisation project, 6 M€ from the 10th EDF envelope B will be at the disposal of the group of UN agencies (UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF and FAO) in charge of the programme.

101. Funding for food aid was included in the contracts with WFP, amounting to 4 M€ annually in the years 2006 – 2008 and 2 M€ in 2009.

102. Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) received funding of €977,000 in 2007, for the construction of 1,700 houses. The German Red Cross received €200,000 annually in 2006 - 2007 and €180,000 in 2009, for management of the camps for expellees.

3.1.4 General Assessment¹⁵

103. **Relevance:** The programme is highly relevant. The projects funded by DG ECHO in the period 2006 - 2009 were in line with the general policy of DG ECHO and responded to major humanitarian needs in the country (activities responded to main needs of repatriated refugees and focus on vulnerable groups).

104. Inclusion of the expellees in the reintegration programme is also assessed as appropriate. Many of the arrests and evictions can be considered human rights violations, leaving them no time to collect personal belongings, sometimes resulting in separation from their families.

105. Successful reintegration of the repatriates, ensuring they are not marginalised, is also highly relevant not only for the repatriates but also as a pre-condition for future stability.

106. **Internal Coherence:** The design of the reintegration programme included elements for conflict prevention, proper monitoring, support packages to bridge a first 6-month period, cash grants, construction of houses, and a villagisation programme for a group of refugees remaining without land. Through its comprehensive approach, it could contribute to the achievement of the main objectives of the programme, i.e. reintegration and maintenance of peace (thus ensuring the consistency of the intervention logic).

107. DG ECHO and the Delegation have used available instruments to ensure sufficient funding for the reintegration programme and the villagisation project, thus addressing in a coherent way the identified needs of the repatriates in the transition process from relief to development.

108. **Effectiveness:** In the period 2006 – 2009, approx. 180,000 persons have been repatriated, while some 55,000 persons still have to be repatriated. Before the operation

¹⁵ The Food Aid parts of the programme will be discussed in sub chapter 3.4

started, there were fears in the country for the return of such a large group. Land is a scarce resource and there were great concerns especially that land disputes might create new violence.

109. The repatriation and reintegration process has proceeded in a relatively calm manner, which can be considered a great success. Mediation in land disputes by the partner organisations of UNHCR (AFJ, ACCORD) has often been successful. The sub office of UNHCR in Muyinga Province recorded 429 registered land disputes (2008/2009), of which 124 were resolved through mediation; another 99 were referred to the local Tribunals and 26 to the local administration.

110. However, there are still areas of concern. Cases of arbitrary land attribution by local authorities were reported, which might cause future conflicts. In 2009, UNHCR has started a pilot project in 11 communes, deploying agents of the CNTB in Transit Centres and Centres d'Hébergement. Nevertheless, it was assessed that in general the CNTB is not yet very effective due to a weak presence at village level or poor competence.

111. Most refugees of 1993 were able to recover their land property; sometimes arrangements have had to be made to divide the land between them and the new occupants (often family members). However, although most refugees of 1972 were able to join their villages of origin (some 'sans référence' after a short stay in the Centres d'Hébergement), many of them remain without land except for small parcels to build their houses.

112. Planning of the newly built 'villages intégrés'¹⁶ (2008) was found to have some major flaws. In the village visited, after eight months the majority of the houses were still unfinished because the soil was inappropriate to make solid bricks. Difficult conditions to prepare land for cultivation had not been taken into account. School classes have yet to start and a project for distribution of goats had failed. In another village, land titles where the village was constructed and of the land designated for cultivation were contested.

113. **Efficiency:** Visits to the Transit Centres, for refugees as well as for the expellees, and the Centres d'Hébergement, showed that the activities - medical assistance, distribution of non-food items, food rations, cash grants and administrative arrangements for reception of the National Identity Cards – were well organised and proceeded in an orderly manner.

114. Also, NRC's house construction programme was well organised. Proper organisation of the beneficiaries, in 'mutual assistance' groups of on average eight families that worked together for the production of bricks and later on for the construction of the walls, contributed to the programme's success. Most houses were finished in the planned period.

115. **Impact:** The achievement of programme results and objectives has contributed to the improvement of the situation of refugees and expellees. A huge number of persons have been repatriated making it possible for them to start a new life. The comprehensive programme approach provided necessary pre-conditions for successful reintegration of the repatriates.

116. However, it is still too soon to assess the sustainability of this impact. The comprehensive programme approach creates necessary, but not sufficient pre-conditions for successful reintegration of the repatriates. It is thought to take on average 1 - 3 years before 'normal' living conditions could be restored, of course under the condition that returnees have access to land or other income generation resources. However, successful reintegration will depend mostly on overall development in the country and proper follow-up by appropriate and effective development initiatives.

¹⁶ These villages were not built with funding from DG ECHO or the EC. However, we include the project in this evaluation because it seems relevant in view of future funding for the villagisation project from the 10th EDF.

117. **Coordination:** The repatriation and reintegration process is well coordinated by the Integrated Committee for Return and Reintegration, which was established in 2007. The Committee is presided over by the Ministry of National Solidarity, Repatriation of Refugees and Social Reintegration, and composed of representatives of four Ministries, all UN Agencies concerned and major donors. DG ECHO represents the Delegation in the committee. The role of DG ECHO was highly appreciated by other members. In the committee, sub-groups exist for the Expellees and the Villagisation Programme. Several joint field visits were organised by the committee.

118. However, although coordination at a national level was strong, at provincial levels it was often weak. The integrated committee has no equivalent structures at provincial levels, so coordination has taken on a somewhat ad-hoc character, and not all of the agencies represented at the central level have also had a presence at provincial levels.

119. At the programme level, the coordination with UNHCR's implementing partners and with the WFP is good. Coordination with the local administration could however be strengthened. The local administration was not informed in advance about the arrival of returnees, nor were the representatives of the administration present at the transit camps upon the arrival of the repatriates.

3.1.5 Assessment of LRRD strategy

120. **Connectedness:** The integrated approach of the repatriation and rehabilitation programme is a good example of linking relief, rehabilitation and development. Creating proper conditions for the reintegration of the repatriates (towards development) was emphasised, through the extended period of food aid¹⁷ and the provision of cash grants, construction of houses, the development of the villagisation project for the refugees of 1972 'sans référence', and the mediation activities.

121. Until 2007, UNHCR took charge of the rehabilitation of social infrastructure (schools, health facilities, water) in the communes and a large percentage of repatriates in order to ensure they had sufficient capacity to receive them. Since 2007, UNICEF has been in charge of school construction. No data was available at provincial levels regarding its activities, except that it was remarked that UNICEF was not very visible in the field.

122. AFJ developed a training programme for 'para-juristes' at a community level, to prepare them to take over the mediation and referral functions of AFJ after their withdrawal. IRC trained 'focal point' persons to ensure future monitoring and support for non-accompanied children. Although the initiatives are laudable, the evaluation mission has doubts concerning the sustainability of these structures in the after-project phase, since both organisations have no presence at field level. It would have been better to connect these activities to civic organisations that have a strong presence, for example church-related organisations.

123. As mentioned above, the CNTB, which is in charge of the examination of land disputes and mediation at a commune level, has not only a weak presence in the field, but also its staff's competencies need strengthening. UNHCR's current pilot project, through the placement of CNTB staff in Transit Centres and Centres d'Hébergement, does not guarantee sufficiently its field presence as well as a pro-active attitude for identification and mediation of land disputes.

¹⁷ In July 2008, the food aid distribution was extended from 3 to 6 months to respond to the beneficiaries' needs, i.e. to bridge the period until they could reach a minimum self sufficiency level from their first harvests.

124. **Do no harm:** The focus in the programme for conflict prevention (monitoring, mediation and strengthening of the CNTB), as a main condition for stabilisation and thus for future development, is exemplary for a well devised do no harm strategy. Inclusion of vulnerable groups from the resident population (ca. 10%) in the house construction programme also helps to reduce tensions in the community between newcomers and the residents. Criticism has been heard relating to the assistance that repatriates receive while many of the residents consider themselves as vulnerable.

125. **Ownership:** The Ministry of Solidarity and the 'Projet d'Appui au Rapatriement et à la Réintégration des Sinistrés' (PARESI), a governmental agency falling under the ministry, had a central role in the coordination of activities and in the case of PARESI also in the execution of projects¹⁸. UNHCR selected local NGOs (Ligue ITEKA and AFJ) for monitoring of the repatriates after their return and for mediation and provision of legal assistance, thus contributing to local ownership and strengthening of capacities of local organisations. The pilot project with CNTB, although major shortcomings are observed, also can contribute to it.

126. In NRC's house construction programme, the beneficiaries were organised in 'mutual assistance' groups, working together on the production of bricks and the construction of the houses. They assisted and provided free labour for vulnerable groups (the elderly etc.). Selection of the beneficiaries for the programme was also done in close cooperation with the communities.

127. In the 'villages intégrées' for each block of 12 houses a representative is elected. Together they form a Village Committee. In the village that was visited the committee met regularly to discuss common issues and to resolve conflicts and was the intermediary between the village and outside agencies.

3.2 Food Security and Food Aid

3.2.1 Background

128. Burundi is a country with a structural food deficit. Although approximately 90% of the population depends on agricultural activities for its income, agricultural production is not sufficient to cover the country's needs. The majority of farmers produce for their own self-subsistence. In 2005, a joint mission (Ministry of Agriculture/WFP/FAO) assessed that the food deficit amounted to 27%. Later studies have shown that the situation has not greatly improved since then. Major reasons are the high demographic pressure, small farms (average size: 0,5 ha/ family), soil degradation, poor infrastructure and water management in the irrigation sector, and lack of farmer's knowledge and financial means for the transition to modern agriculture.

129. In addition, agricultural production suffered from massive displacement during the civil war and the outbreak of the mosaic virus (from 2002), affecting large parts of the cassava crop, a major staple crop, first in two northern and eastern provinces but later spreading to the rest of the country. A WFP study in 2008 showed that 43% of the population has a food intake of less than 1400kcal/day. Only 18% of the population had access to sufficient food.

130. Poverty is judged to be a main reason for lack of access to food. In 2004, the portion of the Burundi population living beyond the poverty line (< 1USD /day) was 67% (study WFP). Recently, the rising price of food products was a major concern for a large part of the

¹⁸ PARESI is, among others, the implementing partner for the construction of houses for the sub office of UNHCR in Muyinga (funding from PPCDR / 9th EDF envelope B).

population. Many households spend 40 – 50% of their income on food purchases, in some regions even up to 70%. In these precarious situations, natural shocks, resulting in poor harvests, can immediately afflict a large part of the affected population.

131. International agencies also had to respond to the needs of the large influx of repatriates, especially in the year 2008.

3.2.2 Programme description

132. DG ECHO's response consisted of support for food aid (WFP). Actions focussed on direct distributions or food for work projects, distribution of seed and agricultural tools (FAO, CRS), multiplication and diffusion of cassava planting material resistant to the mosaic virus (FAO), a number of cash for work projects (Caritas, CISV), and support for the establishment and strengthening of the food security early warning system SAP/ SSA (FAO).

133. The WFP provided food to the camps for Congolese refugees, the Transit Centres and the 5-month food rations distributed to the repatriates (and expellees) after returning to their villages. These last distributions were completed through the local branches of Caritas, which had been selected by the WFP because of its large network all over the country. Distributions were organised monthly in parishes near the villages of return. Where the number of beneficiaries was too small (< 200 households) a mobile system was used, i.e. it was distributed directly from WFP trucks in a nearby commune, with the assistance of Caritas workers. In the parishes, distributions were organised on a daily basis so that the large group of beneficiaries could be split-up guaranteeing a calm proceeding of the distributions.

134. In 2008/2009, the WFP largely reduced direct food aid for vulnerable groups and the food for work projects. This was due to budget constraints and because a large part of the remaining assistance had to be directed to food distribution for the repatriates. In the months April – May 2008, 8% of the population of Burundi (310,000 households) benefited from food distributions (for a 3-month period), compared to an average of 15% in earlier years, and even 30% in 2007. In the months January - August 2008, 49,953 households benefited from food for work projects, mostly for a 3-month period. In the same period, 21,500 Congolese refugees/per month and 30,500 repatriates/per month received food aid (for a 6-month period). Distribution of seed protection packages (for 14 days) was stopped in 2008 as it was assessed that it had little or no effect¹⁹.

135. Distribution of seeds and agricultural tools was organised through direct distributions or seed fairs. CRS started experimenting with seed fairs in 2001 and since then has continued with it. The FAO headquarters in Rome had long resisted adopting seed fairs. It was argued that the quality of the seeds could not be guaranteed. In 2007, 15% of the FAO's seed distribution was through seed fairs, in 2008 it rose to 50%. In 2009, all seeds will be distributed through fairs. The FAO also distributed in-vitro banana seeds, sorghum and sweet potato seeds to diversify the agricultural production. Furthermore, DG ECHO supported the establishment and strengthening of the food security early warning system SAP/SSA, especially the set-up of so-called 'carrés de rendement' (30 per province) that served to have a more reliable assessment of the agricultural production in the different regions.

¹⁹ Due to time constraints the evaluation team could not visit the food for work projects and the food distributions for vulnerable groups nor meet with the implementing partners for these projects. Therefore, only the food distributions in the Transit Camps, the camps for Congolese refugees and for the repatriates were assessed.

136. Seed fairs are organised by implementing partners such as the Caritas network (CRS, FAO) and the Provincial Directorates for Agriculture and Animal Husbandry (DPAE), an implementing partner of the FAO, but supervised by CRS and the FAO.

137. The outbreak of the mosaic virus was a great threat for the food security especially in regions where cassava was the main staple food. The disease spread quickly and affected almost all of the cassava fields. The Regional Support Office of DG ECHO in Nairobi supported a regional initiative (Great Lakes Region) consisting of research and multiplication and diffusion of resistant cassava varieties. Part of the funding was assigned for Burundi. The action was also supported through DG ECHO's funding of FAO's annual action plans.

138. Lastly, DG ECHO funded several cash for work projects implemented by Caritas and CISV.

3.2.3 DG ECHO / EC Funding

139. In the years 2006 – 2008, the WFP received €4M (multi-donor funding) annually. In 2009, the funding amounted to 2M€. The FAO received €978,000 in 2006, €916,000 in 2007, and 1M€ in 2008 and 2009 (multi-donor funding). In addition, €200,000/year (project duration: 3-years) was provided through a regional cassava programme, a project supported by the Regional Office of DG ECHO.

140. The CRS received (through Caritas Germany) €895,000 in 2006, 1.75 M€ in 2007 and 2008, and 1.4 M€ in 2009 for the distribution of seeds and agricultural tools through seed fairs. For the organisation of cash for work projects, Caritas branches (through Caritas Belgium) received €307,000 in 2006, €285,000 in 2007 and €249,000 in 2008, whilst CISV received one time funding in 2007 amounting to €249,000.

141. Through the FSTP (Food Security Thematic Programme) €5,722,000 was disbursed in 2008 (15 ongoing projects). 55 M€ will be available for the PPCDR (2007 – 2012).

3.2.4 General Assessment

142. **Relevance:** In view of the food insecurity in the country, food aid and food security projects targeting vulnerable groups are highly relevant. However, DG ECHO had requested the WFP to decrease the free food distributions and substitute it by food for work or cash for work projects. It was noted that often not the availability of food but access to food was the real problem, and that the continuation of free food distribution would sustain the 'dependency syndrome' among beneficiaries, which was said to be widespread.

143. The 6-month food rations distributed to repatriates helped them to bridge the period until they could collect their first harvest and gave them the necessary support to become self sufficient. Availability of seeds was a main bottleneck for many farmers. Distribution of seeds and agricultural tools, against food aid, is highly appropriate as it helps the farmers to restore their agricultural production. All persons interviewed said that the seed fairs responded adequately to the needs of the beneficiaries. Seeds brought to the market were produced locally and therefore better adapted to local circumstances and farmer preferences.

144. The outbreak of the mosaic virus represented a great threat for the food security in the regions affected by it. The project for multiplication and diffusion of resistant cassava varieties is assessed as highly relevant. The early warning system SAP/ SSA is an indispensable tool to signal food security problems and to enable targeted assistance for regions at risk. It was appropriate to support the establishment and strengthening of the system, although it might seem to go beyond the mandate of DG ECHO.

145. **Effectiveness:** No problems have been observed in the supply of food by the WFP to the camps or Caritas distribution centres. Thus, the WFP achieved its objective to ensure regular food supply for the fore-mentioned groups²⁰.

146. Targeting of vulnerable groups has improved with time. Selection of beneficiaries in projects targeting vulnerable groups is often problematic, especially if a substantial part of the population considers itself to be vulnerable as is the case in Burundi. Several persons interviewed pointed out that in the early years of the distribution programmes the selection procedure had many shortcomings. Lists of beneficiaries were provided by local administrators after receiving details of the selection criteria. Although the lists had to be validated by the staff of the implementing agencies, it was noticed that the selection procedure lacked transparency and often resulted in the inclusion of non-vulnerable groups.

147. To address this problem, from 2007 onwards, a new system was introduced. The dissemination of information regarding benefits and the modalities of the planned intervention was enhanced through communications in churches, schools and posters in public places ensuring everybody was informed. Furthermore, the selection of beneficiaries was done in public meetings open to everyone, where beneficiary lists were proposed after discussions in small groups and subsequently validated by all present. These new procedures greatly improved the selection, although some deficiencies remained.

148. Farmers appreciated the broader assortment of seeds offered at the fairs and the free choice, ensuring they could select seeds of good quality based on their own assessments²¹. Post-fair monitoring also showed that the supply of seeds, volume and variety, had been sufficient to meet the beneficiaries' demand. On the contrary, quality of the seeds provided through direct distributions (FAO) was not always ensured, due to the unfeasibility of proper quality control of the seeds supplied in large volumes by traders selected through tender procedures.

149. Just one of the cash for work projects could be visited (CISV). The technical quality of the works undertaken, rehabilitation of rural roads and construction of two bridges, has been assessed as good in the monitoring reports of DG ECHO. Discussions indicated that a selection of beneficiaries was satisfactory since the lists provided by local administrators were checked against data of vulnerable families. The number of beneficiaries (6,424) matched the target defined in the proposal. A post-project survey showed that the majority of the beneficiaries had lost large part of their crops in the previous agricultural season (2007) due to heavy rains, i.e. the project targeted a very vulnerable group.

150. The SAP/SSA has proved its importance, being consulted by the government, international agencies and NGOs for the identification of food security problems in the country and for the decision making process relative to targeting of interventions. However, weaknesses have been reported regarding the reliability of the information collected in the field. In addition, the sample of 30 'carrés de rendement'/per province to collect production data does not seem to be large enough.

151. **Efficiency:** The fact that no problems were pointed out in the provision of food to camps, transit centres and the distribution network of Caritas, indicates that the supply of the WFP up to the regional distribution centres was well organised. The food distribution by Caritas observed in one of the parishes was well-organised.

²⁰ Nevertheless, it was reported that WFP had prioritised distributions to these beneficiary groups, at the cost of food distribution to other vulnerable groups and food for work projects, activities which had to be drastically reduced in 2008.

²¹ See also: A Comprehensive Seed Fair Evaluation in Burundi. December 2007. A study commissioned by CRS and financed by DG ECHO.

152. CRS has built up a long experience in organising seed fairs. Set-up of the overall programme, planning, communication (radio stations, local churches, public advertisement), selection of vulnerable clients and organisation of the individual fairs seems efficiently done.

153. A proper structure has been put in place for multiplication of new varieties resistant to the mosaic virus, i.e. provision of plant material by the national research institute (ISABU), multiplication by selected farmers or farmer associations, and further diffusion through farmers associations. Multiplication of plant material is properly addressed by a joint effort of the FAO, some international NGOs and Provincial Departments of the Min. of Agriculture.

154. **Coordination:** The Working Group for Food Security and Nutrition (GSAN²²), which has existed since 2004, meets once a month. The group is chaired by jointly by the WFP (food aid), the FAO (food security) and UNICEF (nutrition). Besides serving the aim of exchange of information, thematic discussions are also organised. A large group of NGOs, international organisations, donors (among which DG ECHO and the Delegation) and representatives of different ministries participate, although the last group less frequently. Coordination in the sector is described as good, with an active participation of DG ECHO.

155. Joint evaluation missions (WFP, FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, OCHA and Min. of Agriculture) are organised regularly. SAP/SSA issues monthly bulletins on the food security situation. Since 2006, the IPC²³ system has been put in place and produces a bi-annual report on the food security and nutritional status in the country. The missions, the SAP-SSA and IPC systems facilitate coordination between government, major donors and executing agencies.

156. Regional division for the organisation of seed distribution is coordinated between the major executing agencies, i.e. CRS, FAO and GTZ²⁴. In the past, the FAO took care of the regions where due to insecurity or insufficient availability of seeds, the organisation of seed fairs was not possible by means of direct distribution.

157. **Impact:** Food aid and food security projects have mitigated the effects of food shortages. However, since the underlying causes of food insecurity are of a structural nature, it is difficult to assess the long-term impact of the projects, except for some of the infrastructural works executed through food or cash for work projects.

158. It is expected that distribution of the seeds will enable clients to become self-sufficient, i.e. the next harvest will enable them to set aside seeds for future seasons. However, information received from CRS shows that seed fairs are often organised in consecutive years in the same communities, which indicates that the objective is not always achieved.

159. In the northern and eastern provinces of the country, a large part of the cassava crops consist now of the new varieties resistant to the mosaic virus. However, a 100% coverage has not yet been achieved. Especially in the southern provinces, new outbreaks of the disease are being reported.

²² Groupe Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutrition.

²³ Cadre Intégré de Classification de la Sécurité Alimentaire. It is a tool developed by FAO in 2004 and adopted by several UN agencies, NGO's and others. The system is piloted in several countries, among which Burundi.

²⁴ For season B of 2009, CRS: provided 47% of the seeds, FAO: 49% and GTZ: 4%.

3.2.5 Assessment of LRRD Strategy

160. **Connectedness:** Programme activities in the food security sector contain many activities that are development oriented, namely:

- The 6-month food rations distributed by the WFP to the repatriates aim at enabling them to bridge the 'lean' period between return to their villages and their first harvest, thus facilitating the restoration of self sufficiency.
- Seed distributions aim at enhancing the capacity of the beneficiaries to take care of themselves instead of depending on outside assistance.
- Through food for work or cash for work projects, interventions can be realised for rural infrastructure or environmental protection, which contribute to development. Besides, these projects are seen as effective in preventing a 'dependency syndrome' attitude.
- The activities of the FAO related to agricultural diversification (distribution of in-vitro banana and other seeds) can be considered as development activities.
- The early warning system SAP/SSA, although very useful in the emergency phase, will be of value also in future.

161. **Internal Coherence:** Prolongation of the free food distributions for vulnerable groups on a large scale by the WFP is considered as not being coherent with the LRRD strategy of DG ECHO. In turn, DG ECHO, with support of the Regional Office in Nairobi, has tried to bring about changes in the strategy of the WFP, but with relatively little results. The WFP has announced that from 2010 they will orient the programme towards predominance of cash for work projects.

162. In a transition phase from relief to development, development projects should focus on ensuring inclusion of vulnerable groups, to ensure coherence with a humanitarian policy and to prevent causes for future conflicts, i.e. exclusion from development. In the IFAD project, funded from the FSTP budget line, CDCs (Community Development Committees) are established for planning and executing development activities; they are also in charge of the identification of projects targeting vulnerable groups. Such a targeting policy is lacking in the PPCDR.

3.3 Health and Nutrition

3.3.1 Health sector

3.3.1.1 Sector and programme description

163. At the start of the study period, the health sector underwent a considerable re-organisation, with an obvious impact on aid programmes. Two milestones of the sector reform were:

- The introduction of free medical care for children under the age of five and pregnant women (Presidential decree of May 2006)
- The adoption of a policy of contractual relationship for health services delivery (December 2006)²⁵.

164. By the end of 2005, the Ministry of Public Health had been expected to complete its re-organisation and the LRRD process be set in motion. DG ECHO's earlier withdrawal from the health sector continued during the 2006 - 2009 period.

²⁵ Politique nationale de contractualisation dans le secteur de la santé au Burundi, 19 Décembre 2006

165. UNICEF implemented, in 2006, a project for cholera epidemic preparedness and response: establishment of cholera treatment centres, provision of cholera kits, and water supply. NGOs supported the provision of the “Paquet Minimum d’Activités” (basic curative and preventive health services) at a health centre level and the “Paquet Complémentaire d’Activités” (curative care requiring techniques not available at the first level) at a hospital level.

166. While MSF Belgium and MSF Holland, funded until 2007, provided free or quasi-free access to services and immediate impact through strong logistics and a high number of expatriate personnel, NGOs such as Cordaid and GVC were more concerned with health system strengthening and project sustainability. Partners implemented their projects through the traditional input-based humanitarian assistance, but Cordaid switched to the performance-based financing (PBF) approach in 2008, in support of the new Ministry of Public Health’s policy. PBF seeks to address weaknesses by delegating service delivery to a third party under contracts that link payment to the outputs delivered.

167. DG ECHO responded and, by mid 2006, injected one million Euros worth of medicines into health facilities that were experiencing shortages as a result of the Presidential decree. DFID took over the drug supply, in 2007, in support of the “free of charge” policy.

3.3.1.2 DG ECHO / EC Funding

168. DG ECHO funded the following partners:

- UNICEF in the provinces adjoining the lake in 2006 (€1,664,956),
- MSF Belgium in Karuzi (€800,000 in 2006 and €750,000 in 2007),
- MSF Holland in Kayanza and Ruyigi (€500,000 in 2006 and €410,000 in 2007),
- GVC / AVSI throughout the 2006 - 2009 period in Bujumbura Rural (€1,407,583 in 2006, €1,220,000 in 2007, €1,400,000 in 2008 and €750,000 in 2009),
- Cordaid in Makamba and Bururi (€550,000 in 2006, €700,000 in 2007, €700,000 in 2008) and in Bururi (€200,000 for 6 months in 2009). Cordaid is currently funded on thematic lines in Makamba and Bubanza.

3.3.1.3 General Assessment

169. **Appropriateness:** When the country was still unstable, DG ECHO’s partners ensured health services delivery at both peripheral centres and referral hospitals in six provinces. If health needs (their magnitude is to be assessed by a Demographic Health Survey in 2010) may be better addressed now by development programmes, it was still appropriate to maintain a core emergency reaction capacity within DG ECHO.

170. **Effectiveness:** Both field evaluations and document review attest to good standards in the delivery of humanitarian aid: satisfactory levels of coverage for both curative and preventive medical care in all projects. The overall DG ECHO goal to contain mortality and morbidity rates below emergency thresholds was achieved. Attendance rates to health facilities were within WHO standards. However, as evidenced by Cordaid’s system of performance indicators, some activities such as family planning, malnutrition management and hospital referrals did not reach optimum levels.

171. **Efficiency:** The projects were implemented in an efficient manner by skilled professionals. Contracting, promoted by Cordaid, enhances staff motivation, innovative approaches, organisation of services, community ownership and health information system performance. It is also viewed by many donors as a cost effective way to deliver good quality health services. However, figures on the costs involved in Burundi have not yet been consolidated. Though project handovers did cause a number of problems, the scaling down of operations during the 2006 - 2009 period was conducted in an orderly manner.

172. **Impact:** Some NGOs among DG ECHO's partners strongly advocated improved financial access to health care. As acknowledged by IO representatives and MSP officials, these NGOs contributed to the adoption of the decree on free care for children and pregnant women. Cordaid, which had been piloting the contractual approach, took part, along with the WHO, in the design and formulation of the Ministry of Public Health contractual policy.

173. **Coordination:** The « Cadre de Partenariat pour la Santé et le Développement » consists of a technical body with working groups (Health financing, human resources, monitoring and evaluation, essential medicines) and a decision-making body. It is a well-designed and organised platform for donors' coordination. In parallel, the WHO provided NGO coordination within the UN system. Most partners agree that coordination at district/provincial levels was rather poor. It is only recently that decentralisation has been effective, and for most of the study period provincial and district authorities had little capacity and means to ensure appropriate coordination and supervision.

174. Opinions differ on the appraisal of coordination at a central level. Some partners argued that coordination was carried out in a rather "ad hoc" basis and that it was essentially concerned with response to epidemics. It should be noted that partners and donors hailed OCHA performance until its withdrawal. As it was disengaging from the sector, DG ECHO adopted a lower profile in the national coordinating bodies. However, DG ECHO Nairobi health experts attended the joint missions of International Health Partnership and ensured a follow-up of the sector reform.

3.3.1.4 Assessment of LRRD strategy

175. In 2007, Cordaid submitted to DG ECHO a proposal to fund, in Makamba and Bururi, the implementation of the new PBF approach. DG ECHO demonstrated its flexibility by funding, somehow at the fringe of its mandate, the "Unités de Gestion du Projet", better known in the field as "Agences d'Achat des Performances".

176. The collaboration between DG ECHO and the EC Delegation to design and formulate the Santé Plus project was exemplary. Delays may be attributed to EDF lengthy administrative procedures. The project was identified by the end of 2006 in Burundi ("Fiche d'Identification Projet" and DTA). The "Convention de Financement" was only signed in September 2007 and the Santé Plus technical assistant arrived to Burundi in May 2008.

177. The LRRD Santé Plus Project (funded on the 9th EDF B envelope) followed the "Programme de réhabilitation sanitaire" (7th EDF) and the "Programme d'appui transitoire au secteur de la santé burundais" (9th EDF).

178. The Santé Plus Project met with mixed results. A very positive achievement was the resumption of activities in areas that were previously targeted by DG ECHO (Karuzi, Ruyigi), with very encouraging results. Cordaid, still a DG ECHO partner, was sub-contracted for the project implementation. However, the delayed implementation of the Santé Plus Project compelled MSF B to postpone the close down of its operations in Buhiga Hospital (Karuzi) and no proper hand-over was carried out in Musema Hospital (Kayanza).

179. The funding gap had detrimental effects on the performances of Karuzi and Ruyigi hospitals with a sharp drop in their attendance levels. This gap also affected the inception of the Santé Plus project. Being highly dependant on humanitarian assistance and unaware of its content, the health personnel and the community alike offered resistance to the new project. As of today, these hospitals have reached the level of activities that existed during MSF presence.

180. Cordaid and Santé Plus projects are in full coherence with the Ministry of Public Health policy of decentralisation and performance-based financing in health services delivery.

181. The EC and Member States are achieving a high level of complementarity. Interventions aimed at addressing weaknesses in two sub-sectors, drug supply and human resources, are in progress. DFID is strengthening the drug purchasing agency CAMEBU management, while the EDF Santé Plus project should contribute to the retention and motivation of health personnel. The Belgian Technical Cooperation, a major actor in the health sector, is providing institutional support to the ministry.

182. The EC is covering eight provinces and the Member States (Italian and Belgian cooperation) are covering two provinces. The other provinces are being covered by Swiss Cooperation, USAID and GAVI. Only DG ECHO is supporting Bujumbura Rural.

183. The coordination has gained further momentum with the adoption by the MSP, the EC, the Member States and other donors of a consensus on the financing of fee exemptions and on the performance based financing (March 2009). This consensus is aimed at harmonising present and future donors' approaches and models to health financing.

3.3.2 Nutrition Sector

3.3.2.1 Sector and programme description

184. Studies²⁶ point to an improvement in the population nutritional status. Global acute malnutrition prevalence rates have evolved from 7.4 % to 5.6 % in the 2005 - 2007 period, well below the alert thresholds. Since the first survey had been performed during the hunger gap, results should be cautiously interpreted.

185. When high rates of severe acute malnutrition were widespread in Burundi, DG ECHO contributed to establishing therapeutic centres. These structures were very demanding in terms of human resources, expertise and funding. A first attempt, in the early 2000s, to integrate malnutrition therapeutic centres within the hospitals was a failure and prompted NGOs to resume their activities.

186. The Community-based Therapeutic Care (CTC), a much “lighter” approach to malnutrition management, offers better perspective for integration. The CTC approach had been piloted by IMC and ACF in 2006 - 2007 in the provinces of Muyinga and Kayanza, with advisory supervision of Valid International. DG ECHO resolutely committed itself to support the CTC implementation.

187. As early as 2007, DG ECHO funded UNICEF, which had the vision to gradually extend the approach to the entire country over a period of four years. Activities to be funded were the supply of therapeutic foods and the monitoring thereof. DG ECHO also funded ACF (Ngozi, Kayanza, Ruyigi) and IMC (Muyinga and Kirundo) to implement the CTC approach at provincial levels. The GVC was also funded to continue its traditional approach in Bujumbura Rural. In 2008, the GVC switched to the CTC approach and the IMC was funded for projects in Rutana and Ruyigi, where it took over the activities of ACF, after its withdrawal. As of today, UNICEF, IMC and GVC are still being funded by DG ECHO.

²⁶ Enquête Nationale d'Évaluation des Conditions de vie de l'Enfant et de la Femme au Burundi-2005 MICS; Enquête de base en vue de la mise en place du système de surveillance nutritionnelle, 2008, MSP et UNICEF

3.3.2.2 DG ECHO / EC Funding

188. DG ECHO funded the following partners:

- ACF in Ngozi, Kayanza and Ruyigi (€1,312,000 in 2006 and €1,301,000 in 2007),
- IMC in Muyinga and Kirundo in 2007 (€194,903) then, still in 2007, in Kayanza, Ruyigi and Rutana (€150 000); in Rutana and Ruyigi (€350,000) in 2008; a proposal has been submitted for funding in 2009,
- UNICEF countrywide in 2006 (€80,688); then 4 new provinces each year for the CTC approach (€500,000 in 2007, €500,000 in 2008, €769,149 in 2009).

3.3.2.3 General Assessment

189. **Appropriateness:** Though acute malnutrition rates have slightly decreased, chronic malnutrition is high (46%) and the country remains unstable in terms of food security. Erratic rainfalls could precipitate the country in another nutritional crisis. In addition, the attendance to Stabilisation Centres and Outpatient Therapeutic Care is steady, with peaks during “hunger gaps”. Malnutrition is rife among the returnee population; DG ECHO operates in Ruyigi and Rutana where the percentages of returnees in the population are respectively over 20 and 10%. In these regards, DG ECHO's intervention seems fully appropriate.

190. **Efficiency:** Owing to its design of complementary operations, DG ECHO's nutrition programme was assessed as efficient. UNICEF steers the development of the CTC approach at country level, while two NGOs well-versed in CTC technical aspects are in charge of its implementation at the provincial level. UNICEF is purchasing therapeutic foods, thus realising economies of scale, while IMC and GVC ensure their appropriate use at a peripheral level.

191. **Effectiveness:** The system in place has proven to be effective. No major stock-outs have occurred and the performances of NGOs were in line with accepted standards: cure rates over 70%, defaulter rates below 15% and mortality rates below 5%. However, DG ECHO's partners shared the opinion that case detection should be reinforced.

192. **Coordination:** At a provincial level, coordination was not an issue (only one actor) but poor collaboration did affect programme implementation. Too often, provincial authorities did not assume their responsibilities: timely orders of appropriate food quantities and transportation to the districts. At a central level, coordination was viewed as being weak or rather inappropriate. Nutrition was incorporated into the food security cluster but technical nutrition-related issues could not be properly addressed.

193. The UN management system now proposes a Health and Nutrition cluster chaired by WHO. Be it by mandate, expertise or actual involvement, UNICEF appears as the legitimate leader in the sector. Therefore, a stand-alone cluster under the auspices of UNICEF would be more appropriate. The “Programme National Intégré d’Alimentation et de Nutrition” was created in March 2009 as an offshoot of the programme “Lutte contre les Maladies Transmissibles et Carentielles”. Nutrition is thus benefiting from a higher visibility but, due to limited financial and logistical means, the new programme was not able to propose any coordination so far.

194. **Sustainability:** The Ministry of Public Health has adopted the CTC strategy in July 2007 and has related guidelines. However, owing to poor technical and organisational capacities at the peripheral level and to low levels of priority assigned by donors to the sector, the sustainability of the CTC approach remains a challenge. Important measures towards a comprehensive sector policy are still on the agenda. They include the development of a standardised nutrition information system and a nutritional alert system. The « Cadre Intégré

de Classification de la Sécurité Alimentaire » (IPC), supported by the FAO, would highly benefit from the introduction of nutrition indicators.

3.3.2.4 Assessment of LRRD Strategy

195. The LRRD strategy underpinning DG ECHO's involvement in the sector, is the integration of the stabilisation centres into hospitals - ultimately in the paediatric departments - and the incorporation of malnutrition screening and management into the PMA. However, project handover to the Ministry of Public Health would be arguably premature, at this stage.

196. In line with its commitment and in coherence with the Ministry of Public Health policy, DG ECHO has continued funding the sector and promoting the CTC approach.

197. The contractual system, in its current application, makes allowance for increased funding despite performance indicators that are lagging behind. Moreover, with a few exceptions, performance indicators for malnutrition management are very low. This unfortunate situation provides a unique opportunity to effectively integrate the screening and management of malnutrition in the "Paquet Minimum d'Activités" and to strengthen the CTC approach. A series of consultations between the main stakeholders (IMC, Cordaid, Santé Plus) to define pertinent indicators has recently started at both provincial and central levels.

3.4 CAMPS FOR CONGOLESE REFUGEES

3.4.1 Background

198. UNHCR established three camps for Congolese refugees, Gasorwe and Musasa in the province of Muyinga and Gihinga in the province of Mwaro. In total they accommodate ca. 18.000 refugees. The large majority of the refugees come from the province of South Kivu. In 2008, UNHCR has initiated a tripartite dialogue with the governments of Burundi and the DRC to examine the possibility for voluntary repatriation. However, the discussions have not been conclusive so far with regard to the security situation in DRC. In September 2009, a new tripartite dialogue is planned.

199. In May 2002, Gasorwe camp was built to accommodate refugees staying in a camp in the province of Citiboke, too close to the border of the DRC. The camp Musasa, originally a transit camp, was reopened in June 2007. In 2007, the total number of refugees in the camps increased from ca. 10,000 to almost 19,000. The increase was due on the one hand to a new influx of refugees from DRC and on the other hand, to the influx of impoverished refugees living in Bujumbura who chose to seek refuge in the camps.

3.4.2 DG ECHO Funding

200. DG ECHO's financial support for management of the camps amounted to 1.5 M€ in 2006, 2M€ in 2007, and 1.7 M€ in 2008 and 2009 (multi donor funding). In 2008, part of UNHCR's budget was assigned for conversion of Musasa camp into a permanent camp through construction of houses, a school, a health post and offices. DG ECHO requested at the end of 2007 a new registration of the refugees using the "finger printing" method, suspicious of abuse of distributions in the camp by refugees in possession of several ration cards.

3.4.3 Findings

201. After the new registration that took place between August and September 2008, the real number of refugees in the camps of Gasorwe and Musasa appeared to be 15,627 persons, instead of 19,621 persons as previously registered. This represents a reduction of almost 20%.

202. The construction of houses in Gasorwe camp, planned for 2008, had experienced a considerable delay. Only approx. 50% of the ca. 800 houses had actually been built. This was mainly because of the reluctance of the refugees to participate in the construction efforts, namely the manual labour.

203. The evaluation team visited Musasa camp. The services provided to the refugees were assessed as good. No major complaints were heard from the refugees, or the representatives of the implementing partners of UNHCR, regarding basic health services, educational facilities or food distribution (except the lack of variety of the food items). The newly built social service facilities were of good quality. A proportion of the refugees were still poorly accommodated but that was due to their own reluctance. A major problem in the camp seems to be the lack of responsiveness and responsibility on the part of the refugees themselves.

204. Refugees' committees were in place, such as the camp management committee as well as health, distribution, construction and security committees. However, although existent, they apparently were not able to motivate and mobilise their fellow refugees.

205. There were some environmental problems. The location of the camp causes serious land erosion, affecting the farmers who have their fields downstream of the camp. Until now, this problem has not been addressed adequately. Deforestation is a problem as well due to firewood collection around the camps.

4 STABILISATION OF PEACE

4.1 Background

4.1.1 Land property issues

206. At a national level, approximately 80% of the dossiers submitted to the courts are related to land disputes. Land disputes can easily escalate and be subject to political influence, particularly in a period of election campaigns. Therefore, proper handling of the land issue is of primary importance for the stability of the country. The question of land property rights for the repatriates of 1972 has a long history; however, the Burundi government has not yet provided a definitive solution.

207. After the ethnic clashes in 1972, the majority of the Hutus of some southern districts (Rumonge, Nyanza-Lac, Mabanda etc.) escaped to Tanzania. Later, the then government proceeded to redistribute the land that remained unoccupied. In 1977, a new government issued a decree relative to the reintegration of the refugees of 1972 who wanted to return, declaring that land property on which repatriates and new occupants both could claim legal rights should be divided between them. In 1981, within the frame of the villagisation policy, land was expropriated and/or redistributed in the southern region of Imbo (Rumonge and Nyanza Lac). This land was later allocated for the construction of new villages and access roads.

208. In 1991, under the then government, a decree was passed specifying that the repatriates could only settle on non-occupied lands. In 1993, the first Hutu president was elected. Administrators at all levels were replaced with the result that some land, previously owned by refugees was taken away from the new occupants. However, the new President later intervened, declaring that repatriates should settle on state lands, unless the new occupant had several properties.

209. Under the Accord of Arusha, the principle that the returnees could reclaim their land was reaffirmed, but adding that if recuperation was the only solution the other party should be compensated. In addition, the 'Commission Nationale de Réhabilitation des Sinistrés' (CNRS) was created. It was tasked to examine on the one hand all issues related to land of old refugees and those of state lands, and on the other hand land disputes and allegations of abuses related to land (re)distributions and to judge on each case. In 2005, the CNRS was transformed into the present "Commission Nationale de Terres et Autres Bien" (CNTB).

4.1.2 Reconciliation process

210. After peace had been restored in the country, all the different groups that previously opposed each other came together again in their commune. This included residents who could stay in their villages, repatriates and displaced who decided to escape the risks of violence, demobilised rebels and army soldiers who fought against each other, and political prisoners previously accused of war crimes by their fellow villagers. Victims and perpetrators might meet each other again on the same hill. It represents a potential explosive mixture, especially since many arms circulate still in the communes. The disarmament process is far from accomplishment.

4.1.3 Malfunctioning of the juridical system

211. A study of the 'Programme of Support for Good Governance' (Gutwara Neza), financed by the EC, on how the population perceives the 'justice de proximité' (the local tribunals), shows that one third of the population believes the local judiciary system is inaccessible. About 75% of the persons who went into court have little confidence in the judgements passed, while ca. 90% cites corruption of the judges.

212. The tribunals 'de residence', the local judiciary authorities, are inaccessible, ineffective and overloaded, and not trusted by the population.

4.2 Findings

213. Although the repatriation process has already occurred for the majority of the refugees, an estimated 55.000 persons remain in Tanzania. This has not led to major tensions so far, which can be considered a success. Many people had expressed great concerns about such massive repatriation, fearing it could lead to new clashes of violence.

214. Due diligence in the reintegration programme for prevention of conflicts, particularly those related to reclamation of land, contributed to its success, as well as the significant ('generous') support given to the repatriates upon their return to ensure the necessary conditions for successful reintegration were fulfilled²⁷.

215. Unresolved land property issues, insufficient on a proper reconciliation process at community level, the malfunctioning of the juridical system at local level, and the problem of impunity, remain underlying sources for conflicts. If these problems are not adequately addressed, then new outbreaks of violence may well occur.

216. Underlying sources for conflict still exist, particularly with unresolved land property issues. The refugees of 1993 and the internally displaced apparently do not face major problems to recover their land upon return to their villages. Either they find their land

²⁷ Furthermore, the Tanzanian government offered the possibility of naturalisation to the refugees of 1972, where most of them applied for, thus greatly reducing the number of repatriates (55,000 out of 218,000)

unoccupied, especially in regions where a majority of the population had fled, or if it had been occupied in the years they were absent, in most cases it can be solved. However, for many of the refugees of 1972, a proper solution has yet to be achieved. Many of them remain without access to land.

217. The State Committee CNTB, which is responsible for mediation at village level, has an insufficient presence in the field, particularly in the 11 communes where they were contracted since April this year by UNHCR (pilot project). Staff of CNTB now present in the Transit Centres and the Centres d'Hébergement, however, do not properly follow-up the situation of the repatriates of 1972 after return to their villages. In general, CNTB lacks the means and capacity to execute its tasks.

218. In their interventions, UNHCR partners (AFJ and ACCORD) prefer to focus on a solution for division of land. As a result, most of the repatriates of 1972 receive just a parcel where they can build their houses. The disputed claims of the repatriate and the new occupant are not yet thoroughly investigated and thus remain unsettled.

219. The identification of state land assigned to the 'Villages Intégrés', the responsibility of the 'Ministère de l'Eau, de l'Environnement, de l'Aménagement du Territoire et de l'Urbanisme, has not been done meticulously enough. As a result, property rights of part of the land attributed to the villages are contested (par. 93).

220. The repatriation & reintegration programme has not paid attention to aspects related to the reconciliation process (see 4.1.2), as did very few other development programmes or NGOs.

5 MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Main Conclusions

221. **Relevance:** The projects funded by DG ECHO in the period 2006 - 2009 contributed to the achievement of the objectives of DG ECHO's humanitarian assistance, namely :

- To save and preserve life,
- To provide the necessary assistance and relief to people affected by longer-lasting crises,
- To help financing the transport of aid, to carry out short-term rehabilitation work to help those affected regain a minimum level of self-sufficiency,
- To manage the consequences of population movements (refugees, displaced people and returnees) and implement schemes to assist repatriation to the country of origin and resettlement,
- To ensure preparedness for risks of natural disasters or comparable exceptional circumstances²⁸.

222. DG ECHO's assistance complied with its general objectives and responded to major humanitarian needs in the country. However, it was assessed that one of DG ECHO's partners continued with free distribution of food aid for too long, where food or cash for work would have been more appropriate and would have led to better results (regaining self sufficiency).

223. **Internal Coherence:** The comprehensive approach of the repatriation and reintegration programme - including elements for conflict prevention, appropriate return packages, house construction and the follow-up by the villagisation programme for the refugees of 1972 'sans référence' - was considered a major factor contributing to the achievement of the main objectives of the programme, i.e. reintegration and maintenance of peace.

224. **Effectiveness:** Assistance was provided for the repatriation and reintegration of approx. 180,000 persons for return to their villages of origin and to regain their life. DG ECHO's partners ensured health services and therapeutic feeding programmes in provinces where either the security situation was still relatively unstable or where a large influx of repatriates was experienced.

225. Food aid and food security projects assisted vulnerable groups to bridge periods of food shortages, and to restore their agricultural production. Assistance was provided for the care and support of Congolese refugees in refugee camps. DG ECHO also assured assistance for a special group, namely persons expelled from Tanzania who were at risk of being excluded from humanitarian assistance.

226. The 'generous' assistance package for the repatriates created the necessary conditions for regaining a minimum level of self-sufficiency. However, access to land, indispensable as the large majority of the population depends on subsistence agriculture, remains a problem for the refugees of 1972 and greatly hampers their successful reintegration.

227. Selection procedures for food aid and food security projects targeting vulnerable groups had major flaws in the past, resulting in the inclusion of beneficiaries that were not eligible for inclusion under the targeted groups of DG ECHO. Nevertheless, from 2007 onwards, more transparent and participative methods ensured better results. Adoption of seed fairs for the distribution of seeds guaranteed that farmers received seeds of good quality, appropriate to the local circumstances and responding to farmers' needs and preferences. However, one of the

²⁸ Council Regulation EC No. 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid.

major partners of DG ECHO has been slow in adopting the seed fairs approach, instead continuing with direct seed distributions.

228. Proper quality of the seeds could not be assured, nor did the distributed seeds always respond to the needs of the farmers. This has led to poor harvests or the inappropriate use of seed for sales or consumption. The project for multiplication of cassava varieties resistant to the mosaic virus has been very effective. In most regions, the disease has largely been eradicated; only in the southern provinces of Burundi, the virus still poses a threat.

229. In the health sector, it was assessed that good standards were demonstrated in the delivery of humanitarian aid, i.e. satisfactory levels of coverage in terms of both curative and preventive medical care. The overall DG ECHO goal of containing mortality and morbidity rates within emergency thresholds was achieved, and attendance rates of health facilities were within WHO standards.

230. However, some activities such as family planning, malnutrition management and hospital referrals did not reach optimum levels. In the nutrition sector the development of the CTC approach has proved to be effective, ensuring the provision of therapeutic foods. Major stock-outs did not occur and the performances of NGOs are in line with accepted standards. However, DG ECHO's partners shared the opinion that case detection had to be reinforced.

231. **Efficiency:** The different elements of the repatriation and reintegration programme were well organised, except for some evident weaknesses in the planning and execution of the current projects of the 'villages intégrés'.

232. However, the state committee CNTB, charged with examining land disputes and with mediation at communes' level, has a weak presence in the field and its staff's competencies need strengthening. The current pilot project of UNHCR, employing the placement of staff of CNTB in Transit Centres and Centres d'Hébergement, does not yet result in improving CNTB's field presence and in active mediation.

233. Special mention is given to the organisation of the food supply for transit camps, the camps for Congolese refugees and for the repatriates, where a regular supply has been assured. The general set-up of the seed fairs programme as well as its organisation were evaluated as good. The same applies for the programme for the multiplication of new cassava varieties.

234. Projects in the health sector were implemented in an efficient manner using skilled professional staff, allied to good organisation of service delivery, at both primary and secondary levels. The contracting of health services, promoted by one of DG ECHO's implementing partners, is considered as a cost effective way to deliver good quality services. However, figures on the costs involved have yet to be consolidated at the time of the evaluation.

235. The design of complementary operations in the nutrition sector is efficient. UNICEF steers the development of the CTC approach and ensures the provision of therapeutic foods while two NGOs, well-versed in CTC technical aspects, are in charge of its implementation at provincial level.

236. **Coordination:** Coordination at central level was assessed as good for both the repatriation & reintegration sector, and the food aid & food security sector. However, in the health sector, there was some difference of opinion amongst cooperating partners noted (except on donor coordination), whilst in the nutrition sector coordination was assessed as weak. Coordination at provincial and district level was assessed as weak for all sectors, especially regarding the involvement of local administrative structures.

237. DG ECHO was aware of funding in the different sectors by other donors. However, from 2006 onwards, attention of donors had shifted to the coordination of the development programmes (Groupe Cadre Partenariat) and the monitoring of implementation by the government of the PRSP. In the field of humanitarian assistance, there was no special donor coordination.

238. **Complementarity:** In the health sector, interventions aimed at addressing weaknesses in two sub-sectors, drug supply and human resources, are in progress. DFID is strengthening the drug purchasing agency CAMEBU's management, while the EDF Santé Plus project should contribute to the retention and motivation of health personnel. The Belgian Technical Cooperation is providing institutional support to the ministry. The EC is covering eight provinces, Member States (Italian and Belgian cooperation) are covering two provinces; remaining provinces are being covered by Swiss Cooperation, USAID and GAVI. DG ECHO is supporting the province of Bujumbura Rural, where no other donors are currently active.

239. **Impact:** The repatriation and reintegration of 180,000 refugees has not led to major tensions, which is considered to be a great success. Many people had feared that such a massive influx of refugees could lead to new outbreaks of violence. Furthermore, the programme created necessary, though not sufficient pre-conditions for successful reintegration of the repatriates. It was said that it would take 1 - 3 years on average before 'normal' living conditions could be restored. In the long-term successful reintegration will depend on the overall development in the country and follow-up through appropriate development initiatives.

240. Food aid and food security projects have mitigated the effects of food shortages. However, since the underlying causes of food insecurity are of a structural nature, it is difficult to assess the long-term impact of the projects, except for some of the infrastructural works executed through food or cash for work projects. Seed distributions aimed at achieving self-sufficiency of seed supply. But seed fairs were often organised in the same communities in consecutive years, which indicates the expected outcomes were not always achieved.

241. On the other hand, the cassava multiplication programme had a long-term impact. Without it, the beneficiaries, especially in the regions where cassava is the major staple food, would have suffered from major food deficits for a long time.

242. Some NGOs among DG ECHO's partners strongly advocated improved financial access to health care. They contributed to the adoption of the governmental decree on free care for children and pregnant women. Another partner, Cordaid, that had been piloting the contractual approach, took part in the design and formulation of the Ministry of Public Health's contractual policy, together with the WHO.

5.2 Assessment of LRRD Strategy

5.2.1 Phasing out and handing over strategy

243. **Overall framework:** LRRD has ranked high in EC agenda. In the 2001 EC communication on LRRD policy a range of measures were identified to improve the Community's contribution to international efforts in post-crisis situations, such as to facilitate coordination, streamline the Community's own instruments, integrate the LRRD strategy in the Country Strategy Papers, and increase the flexibility and rapidity for mobilising development funds.

244. The EC has also recognised that the transition from relief/humanitarian aid to development cooperation is rarely a linear chronological process. Therefore, different funding

instruments usually need to be used simultaneously. The 'link' in the LRRD strategy must also be seen in a broader context: namely, political, developmental and humanitarian. This is further elaborated in a communication on Fragile States (2007).

245. **Coordination:** Until 2006, the EC Delegation and other donors took a 'wait and see' attitude towards starting up development programmes due to concerns about the security situation and stability of the country. In 2006, however, the donor community commenced consultations with the Burundi government, which opened the way for DG ECHO to advance with its phase-out strategy.

246. As a result, from 2006 onwards, there has been a good coordination between DG ECHO and the EC Delegation. DG ECHO was entrusted to take the lead in the formulation of projects that would be financed from Envelope B of the 9th EDF and later on from the 10th EDF (Santé Plus project, the Repatriation and Reintegration Programme, the Villagisation Programme).

247. For the different thematic budget lines that were partly administered by the EC Delegation (human rights, NSA/LA and food security), the Delegation and DG ECHO worked together on the formulation of the ToR and the assessment of proposals. Furthermore, DG ECHO and the EC Delegation conducted several joint field visits to the repatriation and reintegration programme for the preparation of the Villagisation Programme. DG ECHO continued monitoring the programmes funded through the 9th EDF.

248. The role of DG ECHO in the different coordinating bodies for 'humanitarian assistance', such as the Integrated Committee for Return and Reintegration and GSAN for the food security sector, was appreciated by all other agencies. DG ECHO remained active in the coordinating bodies, even after programme funding was taken over, such as in the working group for the Villagisation Programme. The EC Delegation also participated in different working groups and coordinating bodies (GSAN, Villagisation Programme). In the health sector, DG ECHO later adopted a lower profile in the national coordinating bodies.

249. The support of DG ECHO's Regional Support Office in Nairobi, through regular monitoring visits and technical support, was much appreciated by DG ECHO Burundi technical assistance.

250. **Internal coherence:** The Country Strategy Paper 2003 – 2007 provided an appropriate framework for the LRRD strategy for the EC. It was foreseen that development aid delivered through the 9th EDF would be able to take-over from DG ECHO when peace and security were restored, especially through its support to rural development.

251. Santé Plus and PPCDR intervened in provinces with large percentages of repatriates and in provinces where actions were previously funded by DG ECHO (Karuzi, MSF-B; Ruyigi, MSF-H), to facilitate the handing over. Repatriation and reintegration activities are financed through envelope B of the 9th and 10th EDF, facilitating the transition from relief to development (construction of houses and educational facilities, villagisation programme). Other funding through the 9th EDF, such as budget support, the good governance programme and the programme for non-state actors, are in coherence with a main objective of DG ECHO, i.e. contribute to the stabilisation of peace.

252. Inclusion of vulnerable groups in development projects is essential to ensure coherence with humanitarian policy and to prevent future conflicts. In the PPCDR, such a policy seems to be lacking, as few activities are appropriate for vulnerable groups and target such groups.

253. **Effectiveness:** The results achieved, in terms of handing over of activities from DG ECHO to other EC instruments, are assessed as successful. Funding through Santé Plus made it possible for a main partner of DG ECHO (Cordaid) to continue its development oriented

health programme. Funding from the 4th component (Envelope B) of the PPCDR, for the reintegration and the villagisation programmes, facilitated DG ECHO's gradual withdrawal, just as funding from the thematic budget lines and the FSTP, especially for the food security sector.

254. However, the delayed approval and start of the Santé Plus project created major problems. Delayed implementation of the programme compelled MSF-B to postpone the close down of its operations in Buhiga Hospital. While waiting for new funding from Santé plus, Cordaid could only continue its activities because it had recourse to its own funding resources. No proper hand-over was carried out in Musema Hospital after the withdrawal of MSF-H.

255. As yet, the PPCDR development programme has not shown any tangible results in the field (more than three years after its identification), whereas in the Country Strategy Paper 2003 – 2007 it was foreseen that the 9th EDF would be able to take-over from DG ECHO when peace and security would be restored, especially through its support to rural development.

256. The phasing out of DG ECHO has taken much longer than originally foreseen. Nevertheless, it is considered that DG ECHO's longer presence had a favourable effect. Through its prolonged presence, DG ECHO could assure that the needs of its target groups of concern were adequately addressed in projects funded through other EC instruments.

257. **Efficiency:** This report considers that a major impediment for a timely transition from relief to development assistance is the perceived lack of flexibility and rapidity from DG DEV and DG AIDCO. This judgement also includes the implementation phase for mobilising development and cooperation funds to facilitate the take-over from emergency interventions. Allocations from the envelope B of the EDF were more flexible. Programme approval took a long time for Santé Plus. Arduous procedures to be followed in each implementation phase of the PPCDR, from EDF Envelope A, result in excessive delays.

5.2.2 LRRD strategy at project level

258. **Connectedness:** The integrated approach of the repatriation and rehabilitation programme is considered to be a good example of the LRRD strategy. Proper conditions were created for the reintegration of the repatriates (towards development), through the extended period of food aid, the provision of cash grants, the construction of houses and the development of the villagisation project for refugees of 1972.

259. Training programmes for 'para-juristes' at community level and for 'focal points' for non-accompanied children were assessed as laudable. However, there are strong doubts whether the newly trained persons will continue their activities and maintain capacity, since the implementing agencies of these programmes cannot ensure prolonged presence after project closure.

260. Many programme activities in the food security sector - seed distributions, food or cash for work projects, agricultural diversification activities, and establishment and strengthening of the early warning system SAP/SSA - are development oriented.

261. In the health sector, DG ECHO approved (in 2007) a proposal of Cordaid to fund the Performance Based Funding (PBF) approach, in line with the new policy of the Ministry of Public Health. Nutrition programmes could be of great benefit in the future by integration of the screening and management of malnutrition in the "Minimum Package of Activities" of the PBF system. Consultations between main stakeholders have recently started for this purpose.

262. In the nutrition sector, the LRRD strategy that underpins DG ECHO involvement in the sector is the integration of the stabilisation centres into hospitals - ultimately in the paediatric departments - and the incorporation of malnutrition screening and management into the PMA. However, projects' handover to the Ministry of Public Health would be arguably premature, at this stage.

263. **Do no harm:** The focus in the repatriation and reintegration programme on conflict prevention (monitoring, mediation, strengthening of state committee CNTB), is a major condition for the stabilisation of peace, and thus for future development. It is in line with the 'do no harm' principle, exemplary for a well devised LRRD strategy. The inclusion of vulnerable groups from the resident population (ca. 10%) in the house construction programme also helped to reduce tensions in the community between newcomers and the residents.

264. **Ownership:** The Ministry of Solidarity and PARESI, a governmental agency falling under the Ministry, had a central role in the coordination of activities in the reintegration and repatriation programme, and in the execution of projects. UNHCR selected local NGOs for monitoring of repatriates after their return and for mediation and provision of legal assistance, thus contributing to local ownership and strengthening capacities of local organisations. The pilot project with CNTB, could also contribute to such trends, although major shortcomings are observed. In the housing construction programme, as well as in the organisation of the 'villages intégrés' proper attention is paid to the organisation of beneficiaries' groups, handing over responsibilities for project implementation and self-management.

265. **Coherence / Alignment:** DG ECHO has continued funding nutrition projects and has committed itself to promote the CTC approach, which is in coherence with the policy of the Ministry of Public Health. The projects in the health sector (through Cordaid and Santé Plus) are in full coherence with the Ministry of Public Health policy of decentralisation and performance-based financing (PBF) in health service delivery.

266. **Coordination:** DG ECHO and other donors participated in joint evaluation missions of the WFP and the findings were presented and discussed in joint meetings. It is noted that recommendations of DG ECHO and other donors were not always adequately taken into account in new programmes.

267. In the health sector, coordination has gained further momentum with the adoption by the Ministry of Public Health, the EC, Member States and other donors of a consensus on the financing of fee exemptions and on performance based financing (March 2009). This consensus is aimed at harmonising present and future donors' approaches and models to health financing.

5.3 Recommendations

5.3.1 Operational Level

268. The main activities justifying the presence of DG ECHO in Burundi relate to the follow-up of the repatriation and reintegration process of the approx. 40,000 refugees still remaining in the camps in Tanzania and of approx. 15,000 refugees of 1972. At the moment, it is expected that all these refugees can be repatriated before the end of the year. The follow-up of the reintegration process requires at least six months. Special attention needs to be paid to the refugees of 1972 who remain without access to land, and to support for the camps of the Congolese refugees.

It is therefore recommended that:

- DG ECHO should maintain a presence in Burundi until at least the end of 2011. This will also allow for an alert for the next elections in 2010, which some fear might lead to new violence. The integrated approach toward repatriation and reintegration should continue to be employed.
- Together with other stakeholders, DG ECHO should also address the problem of the refugees of 1972 who remain without access to land. Firstly, a study should be conducted to understand the magnitude of the problem (covering underlying sources for conflicts). Secondly, a dialogue should be initiated with CNTB and local administrators to discuss what they can contribute in terms of creating solutions (for individual cases). Thirdly, it should be considered to include this group of refugees among the beneficiaries of the Villagisation Project.

269. For the food security sector, no new activities are foreseen for 2010. Food insecurity remains a problem for large groups, but mainly due to structural problems, which should be addressed through development activities. However, in the transition phase from relief to development, it should be ensured that vulnerable groups benefit from development and that special attention is paid to the group of repatriates. This requires a targeted approach and activities appropriately designed for those groups, with little or no land or other economic resources.

- From 2009 - 2011, DG ECHO and the EC Delegation should work together, as they have done previously, to seek funding opportunities from different EC instruments for projects with an appropriate policy approach towards targeting particularly vulnerable groups, including repatriates, or an approach ensuring that such groups will benefit from it.

270. Furthermore it is recommended that:

- DG ECHO continues funding the nutrition sector activities (through GVC, IMC, UNICEF) until final disengagement, to ensure that the CTC approach is further developed and that malnutrition management can be fully integrated into routine activities of hospitals and health centres.
- DG ECHO continues funding the health activities of GVC until final disengagement, particularly to reinforce the 'Equipes Cadre de District' and its emergency preparedness and response capacity.

GVC operates in Bujumbura Rural, a province that does not benefit from coverage of any other donor except DG ECHO. Furthermore, the security situation in the province remains 'sensitive' despite considerable improvements.

271. To accompany the process of Stabilisation of Peace, it is recommend that DG ECHO lobbies the EC Delegation to take the following actions²⁹:

- To provide technical and financial assistance to CNTB to strengthen its capacity, ensuring its presence and proper execution of its tasks at commune level.

²⁹ These recommendations are in line with the Communication of the EC on Fragile States of Nov. 2007, which asked for a more comprehensive approach.

- To look for funding opportunities for NGOs that can play a role in the bringing together and reconciliation of different groups at community level, either through special activities or by integrating them in broader development projects.
- To look for funding opportunities for actions that aim at reinforcing the capacities of the 'Tribunaux de Résidence' and for actors that can provide legal assistance to plaintiffs.
- To explore how local organisations with a strong field presence can get involved to ensure sustainability of services (judicial support).
- To improve dialogue with local administration (proper procedures should be developed for information sharing and involvement of local administration).
- To lobby the Government of Burundi in order that the Government:
 - Takes its responsibility to find a solution for the repatriates of 1972;
 - Guarantees the independence, impartiality and better functioning (decentralization) of the CNTB;
 - Reinforces the capacities of the 'Tribunaux de Résidence'.

5.3.2 Strategical Level

272. A major weakness for the effective implementation of the LRRD strategy has been a perceived lack of flexibility and rapidity for mobilising development and cooperation funds. This was the case for the approval of projects funded from the 9th EDF envelope B (especially Santé Plus) and in the approval and implementation phase for projects funded from envelope A (PPCDR).

273. In view of this, it is recommended that DG ECHO lobbies DG DEV / DG AIDCO for the following actions:

- To analyse how the procedures in the preparation, approval and implementation phase of the EDF programmes can be lightened in order to improve flexibility and rapidity in responses to situations in the transition phase from relief to development.
- To analyse if better use can be made of the recently developed analytic tool 'LRRD Country Situation Analysis and Action Framework for a Consolidated Response' to improve coordinated action, aiming for greater flexibility and speed in decision processes at the level of EC Headquarters in Brussels as well.
- Finally, the transfer of responsibility for coordination to one of the DGs as recently suggested in a policy note, should also be considered³⁰.

274. The thematic budget lines administered by the Delegation offered good opportunities to ensure a proper transition from relief to development, through good cooperation between DG ECHO and the EC Delegation in the formulation of the ToR and assessment of proposals.

275. It is therefore recommended that DG ECHO lobbies DG DEV:

- To consider further decentralisation in the administration of the instruments of thematic budget lines (food security), in order to ensure that maximum advantage is made of local knowledge of the situation and, needs.

³⁰ See also: 'Note de dossier. LRRD: état des lieux et pistes pour l'avenir' Paper of DG ECHO, Sector Strategy, policies and thematic funding. December 2008.

276. Programmes of UN agencies are mostly funded through multi-donor funding. It was found that some of them were slowly responding to requests from DG ECHO for changes in their programme approaches:

- Consideration should be given to how DG ECHO's field requests for adaptation of UN agencies country programmes can be more effectively supported.

277. A good example of a project that could build a bridge between relief and development in the health sector was DG ECHO's funding of the PBF project, which implied cash transfers to health units through a contracting agency.

278. In light of this, a final recommendation is made:

- To fully embrace the LRRD approach in the health sector, DG ECHO should consider adopting strategies that may differ from its classical input-based modus operandi.