EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Humanitarian Aid

Evaluation of the DG ECHO – Save the Children UK Partnership

Final Report

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PROLOG CONSULT

Prolog Consult Belgium
Ave des Grands-Prix 80
1150 Brussels (Belgium)
www.prologconsult.com

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Executive Summary

Purpose of the evaluation

This evaluation was carried in accordance with articles 7 and 8 of the EC Humanitarian Aid Regulation to assess the partnership between DG ECHO and SC-UK. It is focused principally on the inter-related capacity of the two partners to answer the needs of children, in the field of protection/rights and humanitarian assistance.

It looks at the coherence in the policies of the two partners, reciprocity in their methods of working, and the extent to which the partnership provides a basis for effective and efficient emergency response in line with funding decisions of the Commission and required standards of project management. As a measure of the partnership's success, the evaluation looks at the quality of emergency work carried out in three countries: Pakistan, Liberia and Sudan.

It considers how this work has been buttressed with funds from other donors, and how it has been sustained beyond the emergency into the phase of recovery. The evaluation has paid special attention to lessons learned from activities of the partnership. A number of recommendations are made as to how the partnership might be further strengthened and how the outcomes of its work can be yet more enhanced.

Coherence between partner's policies

SC-UK's mission is to *fight for the rights of children* and *deliver immediate and lasting improvement in children's lives world wide.* It was founded in 1919 and has a long history in humanitarian aid. SC-UK's work is organized around four thematic areas of intervention: *livelihoods and nutrition, health, child protection and education.* Other themes are brought into its work as supporting strategies and provide foci for special attention. Examples are *HIV/AIDS* and problems of children affected by war.

Close correspondence between thematic issues of concern to SC-UK and some of DG ECHO's core sectors make for strong coherence between DG ECHO's and SC-UK's policies on emergency response. There is a high degree of similarity between the ways the two partners set priorities for intervention across the emergency cycle, and this facilitates rapid agreement on project objectives. In recent times, SC-UK has implemented projects in the sectors of health, nutrition, livelihoods, shelter, NFI, and child protection with DG ECHO funds. It is a partner with capacity for large scale response, and one of the few with special surge capacity provided from an emergency response team at headquarters. SC-UK also brings to the partnership with DG ECHO a commitment to post emergency work and a capacity for LRRD.

Organization of SC-UK and relations with DG ECHO

Recently, SC-UK has undergone a restructuring that has devolved programme management to its country offices. Good modalities have been put in place to monitor the work done by country offices, to ensure sound programme planning, and to maintain standards of financial management. Further support is however needed to strengthen

country performance on project design and monitoring in order to ensure good accountability to donors such as DG ECHO. Some difficulties are also arising in meeting DG ECHO's administrative requirements. Here too there is need for more training, but there is also need for the partnership to look for solutions to special problems arising from tendering requirements when, for example, agricultural inputs are bought locally.

To improve coordination between DG ECHO and SC-UK, SC-UK should further clarify where responsibilities now lie within its organization for the signing of contracts, for reporting and for submission of proposals. It is important, too, that DG ECHO knows who the liaison persons are at SC –UK in the emergency response team.

DG ECHO's framework for funding, and the partnership in the field

In Sudan, Pakistan and Liberia, SC-UK found the EU funding decisions appropriate to needs, and the length of project cycles well adjusted to the speed at which emergencies evolved. Work on child protection would be enhanced if DG ECHO could take a longer term perspective to allow for the time it takes to train communities and create protective structures. Such an investment is important as a measure for preventing countries like Liberia from plunging into a further cycle of violence. Further regional initiatives in child protection are also justified to track the risks of children moving across borders and to assist with cross border tracing and reintegration.

SC-UK's human resources and capacity for emergency response

In Pakistan, Liberia and Sudan, SC-UK has technically qualified and experienced staff for all sectors. Most staff have some opportunity for in-service training, though there were some junior staff who had poorer supervision and needed better training. Project planning would benefit if staff had better access to SC-UK's pool of institutional knowledge, and SC-UK should strengthen systems to facilitate this.

It should also encourage lesson learning from the outcomes of projects and encourage a more analytical approach to project reporting and evaluation. The creation of SC-UK's emergency response team in London has greatly increased its capacity to backstop within-country responses. In both Pakistan and Liberia, SC-UK is putting emergency preparedness plans into place, but it has to find the right balance between reliance on local partners and maintaining surge capacity within its own organization.

Achievements of projects in Pakistan, Liberia and Sudan

Emergency relief responses were found in general to be timely, and flexibility was shown in adjusting to changing needs across different phases of the emergency. Despite some difficulties in finding the initial surge capacity for the Pakistan earthquake, the development of forward bases proceeded quickly, and assistance was delivered in time to protect people from the worst of the winter.

In both Liberia and Sudan some difficulties were encountered in making the transition from an emergency to a non-emergency phase of work. In both countries plans of work

for the immediate post emergency phase were very ambitious in terms of geographical coverage, and did not take account of the concentration of trained personnel required on the ground to implement activities. Despite ready agreement between the partners on priorities for project activities, the start up of projects has sometimes been delayed. In some cases this is because of late signing of contracts, but in others because SC-UK did not have the modalities in place to begin the work on time. In all cases, delays have detracted from optimal use of resources.

- *Distribution of emergency aid* in all three countries was found to be relevant to need, and well targeted on the most vulnerable. Nevertheless, SC-UK felt that alternatives other than seeds would have been more appropriate for the agro-pastoralist population of South Sudan. Distributions were well planned, and organized with participation of beneficiaries. Seeds and other items were of good quality and considered appropriate by beneficiaries.

- *Support with the restoration of health care* in 11 clinics in areas of refugee and IDP return in Liberia was also relevant. Clinics have been well restored and equipped, and medicines have been provided as foreseen. Training and monitoring of Ministry of Health personnel was well organized, clinic records were well maintained, and a good balance had been struck between preventative and curative work. Attempts to establish systems for disease monitoring with County Health Teams had been less successful. The decisions to pay incentives to Ministry of Health staff may make an exit strategy difficult. At present there would appear to be no other LRRD funding from the Commission apart from that of DG ECHO to support work in the health sector.

- *Child protection activities* were well focused on need in all three countries. Activities in Liberia illustrate the importance of a balance between management of children at risk and the need for preventive measures. The focus on reintegration of separated children in Sudan seemed appropriate, as did the help provided for return to normality after the earthquake in Pakistan. There is a need for better methods of monitoring the effectiveness of interventions in child protection, and attention needs to be given to the issues of sustainability. Further funding will be required in both Sudan and Liberia for reintegration of children, and in the case of Liberia, to monitor the risks to children caused by instability in the sub-region.

- Through the creation of a *livelihoods assessment forum (LAF),* a contribution has been made to building better systems for monitoring livelihoods in South Sudan, and to ensuring better focus of emergency/development within the sector. Good progress has been made with institutionalising LAF within government structures, but sustainability is uncertain. More training and greater involvement of local government staff would strengthen the capacity and increase the coverage of LAF. To achieve real impact on livelihoods in South Sudan it is important that bridges are built between LAF and the larger institutions such as FAO that has received funds from the Commission to lead work on rural livelihoods sector during the phase of LRRD.

- *Other institution and capacity building activities* funded by DG ECHO in South Sudan have been delayed because of the late signing of the funding agreement. Care needs to be taken by both partners to ensure that institution and capacity building projects are realizable within the funding cycle. Consideration also needs to be given to the time required to create the necessary conditions on the ground for such work. Through UNDP, SC-UK has already received some further funding from the Commission to continue institution and capacity building in the livelihood sector through the phase of LRRD.

The benefits for children of an integrated cross-sectoral approach

The broad strategy of intervention adopted in the three countries illustrates the point that good coordination of work in different sectors can multiply the benefits for children in emergencies. In Sudan, addressing the needs of vulnerable children simultaneously through strengthening community care structures and through livelihood support helps to ensure more sustainable systems. In Liberia and Pakistan, the community mobilization achieved through livelihood support activities has helped to create conditions for developing child welfare committees, and these in their turn have helped with the identification of the vulnerable who have needed livelihood support. For out-of-school youth, other multiplier effects have been achieved by mobilizing funds for educational and training activities. Examples are accelerated learning programmes for those wishing to complete primary education, and skills training for those formerly associated with fighting forces.

1. Mission and Policies

Save the Children fights for children's rights.
We deliver immediate and lasting improvement to children's lives worldwide.

SC Mission Statement

1.1. Historical Background

[§1] The Save the Children Fund was founded in London in 1919 to improve the lives of children in the UK following World War 1. It started work in the developing world in 1936. Although children are the focus of its mission, it has long accepted the need to work with the social, political, and economic systems that provide a support structure for the child. Through the 1970s and 80s, it played a significant role in international emergency relief. And some of its most notable interventions were in African famines.

[§2] Through the 1990s, there was a shift of emphasis in Save the Children's (SC-UK) work. As it focused more on promoting durable solutions and longer term improvements in children's lives, advocacy, policy advice and capacity building of local institutions became cornerstones of its international programme. It nevertheless continued to sustain programmes in a number of countries with chronic and cyclical emergencies, and SC-UK contributed to the development of early warning systems as well as to humanitarian relief.

[§3] In recent times, SC-UK has decided to scale up its emergency work, and has made significant responses to the South East Asia Tsunami, the Kashmir earthquake, the Niger famine, and the Java earthquake. During the 20005/06 fiscal year it spent £15 – 20 million on emergency relief[1] operations. Its principal sources of funding for this are the DEC, and DFID. During 2005 SC-UK also received more than €10 M from DG ECHO.

[§4] Emergency response work represents more than 10% of its total budgetary commitments. SC-UK's is one of the largest members of the SC-Alliance, a family of SC organizations with members in 27 countries. Reciprocal funding arrangements mean that SC-UK may act as the implementing partner for another member of the family in a country where the other member does not have a presence, and vice versa. In some countries (e.g. Uganda) there is a consolidated presence, meaning that two or more members of the Alliance may operate projects conjointly. The SC-Alliance proposes to strengthen these kinds of collaboration over coming years, and has recently launched a global project to be implemented by its members in different countries, and to reach 8,000,000 children with primary education by 2010.

1.2. Policy framework for SC-UK's current activities

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[1] Excluding Tsunami response

(§5) Following a recent policy review, SC-UK has set global *objectives* for its work in four thematic areas*:*

Thematic Area	Objective
Health	Access to quality local health services
Freedom from Hunger[1]	Local safety nets to reduce malnutrition
Education	Access and completion of quality, inclusive basic education
Protection	Access to and quality of local and national protection systems

[1]Food aid, nutrition livelihoods

(§6) The four thematic areas should not be regarded as sectoral divisions since work in one thematic area should be supportive of efforts to achieve objectives in others. Thus for example, activities supportive of better livelihoods should also consider the risks of child labour and exclusion from school. Four supporting strategies have been defined to help achieve objectives. These are:

- *promotion of* Child Rights;
- *relief from* conflict and natural disasters;
- *eradication of* poverty and economic justice; and
- *protection from* HIV/AIDS.

(§7) For each thematic area, SC-UK has a team of policy advisors to provide guidelines on more specific objectives and methods of achieving them. These guidelines are drawn up with reference to analysis of outcomes of past SC-UK interventions, to published studies, and to commissioned research. Policies for the four sectors can be summarised as follows:

a. Health

(§ 8) Activities are to be targeted at under-fives, their caregivers, and adolescents. Key indicators for assessing impact are increased usage of health services and reduction in prevalence of the top 6 causes of mortality among children (i.e. pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria measles, neonatal conditions and HIV).

(§ 9) The focus will be on building or improving the effectiveness of total health systems rather than on the provision of a particular service. Wherever possible, SC-UK will seek to build the capacity of national health authorities but it nevertheless retains the option of providing services itself in emergency contexts. SC-UK is aiming to maintain health programmes in 20 –25 countries.

b. Freedom from Hunger

(§ 10) SC-UK is producing a strategy for hunger reduction to guide work through to 2010. The emphasis in SC-UK policy is on helping food insecure people to build sustainable livelihoods that withstand shocks and stresses, the creation of systems of social support, and building of local safety nets for the most vulnerable.

(§ 11) While increasing food production in food insecure zones remains one element of the strategy, off-farm income generating schemes, and cash support are considered important to help meet the needs of the landless poor. In planning interventions, thought shall be given to income generating activities that maximize positive benefits to children and minimize negative ones (e.g. use of child labour, interference with child care, selling of girls into early marriage). Emphasis is placed on the use of Household Economy Assessment and Market Monitoring as aids to identifying needs of vulnerable populations. These instruments should be supplemented with indicators reflecting risks for children.

(§ 12) In contexts where there are severe problems of access to food, and rising levels of malnutrition, SC-UK may complement livelihoods programmes with supplementary and therapeutic feeding. Research on remission rates has led SC-UK to avoid the use of therapeutic feeding centres, and to institute procedures for care in the community.

SC-UK takes the line that in most situations, livelihoods programmes are a more appropriate tool for addressing problems of malnutrition than nutrition education, because lack of resources rather than of knowledge is usually the underlying cause of bad diet.

c. Child protection

(§ 13) Particular attention is to be given to trafficked children, to exploited children, to children in care, and to other separated children. Activities will focus primarily on the building of more protective systems through improved legislation, monitoring of implementation and training of "duty bearers".

d. Education

(§ 14) There is an important emphasis on the poorest and on ethnic minorities. The aim is both to increase inclusion and to raise the quality of provision with special attention to the capacity for instruction in mother-tongue language. Less accessible groups such as pastoralists are priorities. Building capacity of education authorities and of teachers are cornerstones of the intervention strategy.

(§ 15) A further priority is continuing provision of education in both natural disasters and more chronic emergencies. Here SC-UK will work with INEE guidelines which focus on minimum standards and emphasize the importance of schooling as both a protective environment, and one which helps children retain a sense of normality.

(§ 16) The priority target groups for activities in each thematic area can be represented as follows:

	Age Major Focus	Poorest 10%	Dis -rupted -placed	Ethnicity	Without family care	Hazar- dous work
Health	$0\text{-}4/_{12\text{-}15}$					
Freedom from hunger	0-4					
Education	4-14					
Protection	0-15					

☐ Major focus   ☐ Minor focus

1.3. SC-UK's Model for achieving impact

(§ 17) **Advocacy work** remains at the centre of the strategy for reaching objectives in the four thematic areas. National governments and the international community are seen as the most important targets for advocacy work, but the donor and humanitarian communities are also targeted. Programmes of **advocacy** work intended to have **international impact** are prepared and implemented by the teams of policy advisors in London.

(§ 18) At **country level,** advocacy work is carried out by the country office through specific projects, and through the attendance of individual members of staff at meetings. Work is underpinned by policy research, studies of problems and needs, and the production of summary reports to guide policy makers. An example of the latter is a series of recent series of pamphlets advocating for the abolition of user fees for health and education in Africa.

(§ 19) SC-UK's policy is to support its advocacy work by the creation of **pilot programmes** at district and provincial level.

1.4. Emergency response policy

(§ 20) SC-UK has a long standing presence in a number of countries with lasting emergencies (e.g. Sudan and Liberia). In these countries it has run projects in all four thematic areas to meet the needs of children affected by war.

(§ 21) It has placed particular emphasis on the protection needs of children associated with armed forces, and along with other agencies has piloted methods for returning these children to their communities. In fulfilment of its recent policy to strengthening its capacity for emergency response, SC-UK has taken two measures.

1.4.1. Creation of an emergency response team in London

(§ 22) The task of this team is to maintain emergency preparedness by ensuring that essential supplies and experienced staff can be deployed to the field at very short notice to mount a sizable operation. London based staff are obliged under contract themselves to deploy to the field within 72 hours to make preparations for an operation. The emergency response team will deploy only when:

- the response required is beyond the capacity of the community and national government;

- permission is granted to operate in the affected area, and the response can be made with a sufficient degree of security for SC-UK staff; and

- numbers of children affected justify the cost of mounting an emergency intervention.

1.4.2. Drawing up of emergency preparedness plans by all country offices

(§ 23) All country offices should draw up emergency preparedness plans:

- based on an assessment of different emergency risks and the activities required to respond to them;

- foreseeing measures for obtaining essential supplies and scaling up staff to carry out activities;

- making provision for suitably trained regular programme staff temporarily to manage emergency response while designated staff are recruited.

(§ 24) Three different phases are recognised for an emergency response, and different types of activity are prescribed for different phases:

FIRST STAGE OF EMERGENCY			
Health	**Food security**	**Education**	**Protection**
• Non-food items • Primary health • Mother & child • Immunization	• Food distribution • Nutrition • Food Security Livelihood analysis • Cash & other market interventions	• Safe spaces • Support to temporary schools/pre-schools	• Safe spaces • Care & reunification of separated children • Deterring violence

SECOND STAGE OF EMERGENCY			
Health	**Food security**	**Education**	**Protection**
Restore • Primary health • Nutrition • Mother & child Immunization	• Nutrition • In-depth needs assessment • Cash and other market inter-ventions	• Restore or support to temporary schools/pre-schools • Supplement curriculum HIV/AIDS health • Recreational spaces	• Support to community protection mechanisms • Support to unaccompanied children • Prevention recruitment armed forces • DDR • Deterring violence

THIRD STAGE OF EMERGENCY			
Health	**Food security**	**Education**	**Protection**
• Support to health authorities	• Asset replacement • Cash grant • Information systems	• Support to educational authorities • Teacher training • Accelerated learning	• Community based protection mechanisms • Support to social care authorities • Work with CAAF

1.5. Humanitarian Advocacy

(§ 25) To complement and increase the impact of emergency response work, advocacy programmes should be organized in both crisis-affected countries and more globally. Issues to be addressed by the programmes are:

- deprivation and violence against children in emergency contexts;

- improving how well the humanitarian system works for children; and

- the future of humanitarianism.

1.6. Convergences between DG ECHO and SC-UK policy

1.6.1. Emergency response and longer term development

(§ 26) For SC-UK the importance of bringing about immediate and not just longer term improvements for children is enshrined in its mission statement. SC-UK's policy is to respond to emergencies wherever they occur, provided that assistance is genuinely needed, and that it can be provided safely. At the same time, SC-UK has a commitment to ensuring support in the longer term.

For DG ECHO its mission is to bring humanitarian aid in emergencies. Its policy is to encourage the long term involvement of others so as to ensure a smooth transition to development and avoid leaving a vacuum in which a post-emergency zone is vulnerable to subsequent crises.

1.6.2. Beneficiaries

(§ 27) For SC-UK children are at the heart of its mission. It prioritizes the poorest 10%.

For DG ECHO children are a cross cutting issue which means that their needs and interest should be considered in any project planning. Children constitute a very sizeable proportion of most beneficiary populations and are among the most vulnerable in an emergency.

The poorest 10% are often among the most vulnerable prioritized by DG ECHO.

1.6.3. Sectors of intervention

(§ 28) For SC-UK there are four thematic areas for intervention: Food Security and nutrition, Health, Education, and Child Protection. Distribution of NFI and Shelter are seen as supporting strategies in emergencies.

For DG ECHO Food Security, Nutrition, Health, NFI and Shelter are all core sectors. It also provides funding for protection of children, and limited support for Education.

1.6.4. Response strategy across different phases of emergency

(§ 29) SC-UK has clearly articulated priorities for different phases of an emergency which define an intervention strategy:

- provision of services in the first instance, but support with re-establishment of government and community services as early as possible;
- attempt to sustain livelihoods from the initial stage to prevent people becoming destitute; and
- targeting of groups in post-emergency that are especially vulnerable with special attention to those who could destabilise the process of recovery (e.g. children who have been or are at risk of recruitment into fighting forces).

DG ECHO *has a similar strategy.*

1.6.5. HIV/AIDS

(§ 30) For SC-UK protection from HIV/AIDS is a supporting strategy which is mainstreamed in all its four thematic areas. There are awareness raising activities, and victims and their families receive attention as especially vulnerable groups.

For DG ECHO, HIV/AIDS is a cross-cutting issue and it is also mainstreamed.

1.6.6. Humanitarian Advocacy

(§ 31) SC-UK uses humanitarian advocacy with the aim of reinforcing still further the impact of its work on the ground.

DG ECHO *along with the rest of the humanitarian world benefits from this advocacy work when it is successful. It complements DG ECHO's own efforts to raise public awareness about humanitarian issues in Europe and elsewhere.*

1.7. Matters for consideration within the partnership

1.7.1. Restrictions on beneficiaries

(§ 32) The fact that SC-UK's sees the child at the centre of a family and community-based care system that must be supported in the event of an emergency helps to ensure that its assistance meets a much broader population than simply children. Not all vulnerable people however are seen as in this care system and these may get excluded from definitions of beneficiary groups. In the case of the Pakistan earthquake response, the beneficiary group for NFI and shelter was defined to include only families with more than four children. Some of the vulnerable, however, would have been older people with no children, and these people would not have received assistance if SC-UK had implemented the project as proposed. In the end staff on the ground solved the problem in a pragmatic way and distributed to all vulnerable people. SC-UK needs to consider how eventualities of this kind can be addressed within its policies.

1.7.2. Use of other SC-Alliance members as implementing partners

(§ 33) Possibilities for operating projects through other Alliance members extends the potential reach of SC-UK's humanitarian work beyond the countries where it is operational itself. DG ECHO policies do appear to allow its implementing partners to subcontract work to other NGOs. Seemingly there is no requirement that the sub-contracted NGO should be national NGOs of the country where the emergency is located, nor a national NGO of EU member states. Thus, it would seem that SC-UK has already received DG ECHO money to operate an emergency intervention in Malawi through SC-US. A member of the Alliance who signs a contract with DG ECHO for a project to be operated through another member needs to have in place adequate modalities to monitor the operational partner. Care needs to be taken to ensure that such monitoring is adequate within a tightly knit Alliance.

1.7.3. Humanitarian Advocacy

(§ 34) This can be an important support to intervention on the ground, but it requires careful coordination of actors particularly where it deals with issues like violence and humanitarian access. Experience from Darfur has shown that some kinds of advocacy can have negative consequences and result in humanitarian intervention becoming more difficult rather than easier. Care is needed to ensure that, by provoking antagonism from local groups it does not put humanitarian workers lives at risk. DG ECHO might wish to consider ways of supporting its partners to work with a common voice on the more difficult issues.

2. The organizational structure

2.1. The new global Structure

[§ 35] During 2005, SC-UK underwent a restructuring that devolved responsibilities for all programme planning, financing and management to the country level. The headquarters office in London continues to exercise a global monitoring and support role. Six regional offices assist with this monitoring and support the country offices through training activities.

Table 1 - Save the Children UK's Regional structure

Regional Office	Country Offices
East & Southern Africa regional office (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia)	Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Zimbabwe
West & Central Africa regional office (Dakar, Senegal)	Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone
Latin America & the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa and South East Europe regional office (London, UK)	Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, Jamaica, Honduras, Guatemala, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Occupied Palestinian territories, Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia
South & Central Asia regional office (New Delhi, India)	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
South-East & East Asia office (Bangkok, Thailand)	China, Indonesia, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Vietnam
UK regional office (London, UK)	England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland

2.1.1. Programme Planning

[§ 36] Country offices are required to draw up (a) *country strategies* based on a child rights situation analysis and (b) *thematic programme plans* in at least three of the four thematic areas defined by global policy. Strategies and plans have to be approved by a panel in London which is advised by the policy teams on appropriateness of plans for the country and compliance with global policy. Plans should cover a period from three to five years.

2.1.2. Funding

[§ 37] Within the framework of approved *thematic plans*, country offices are required to draw up an *annual plan* and budget. London based funding teams backstop country

offices in their efforts to fund these plans. Depending on the level of financial risk carried by a funding arrangement, the country office will be required to obtain the approval of either the regional office, or eventually of the London office both before making a proposal and before signing an agreement. Main determinants of degree of risk are the size of the grant, the level of risk associated with the donor and the complexity of the compliance requirements.

2.1.3. Monitoring of country finances

(§ 38) Information on all grant agreements, and funds received are communicated to both the regional office and to London. *Expenditure cannot be accounted to a donor until the funds have been entered into a database, and a code assigned by the London office. This only happens after the signing of the agreement has been communicated to London.* Checks are carried out from London to ensure that country offices collect moneys due on expired grant agreements. Financial reports are submitted on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis, and 2 –3 random checks are made on these per month by the finance department. Internal monitoring is also carried out by the country programme director through a monthly financial control checklist and through monthly and quarterly review. A regional finance officer circulates to provide support to these procedures. As part of country emergency preparedness plans, one member of staff is assigned to develop modalities for scaling up financial capacity in emergencies.

2.1.4. Monitoring of grant compliance

(§ 39) For monitoring at country level a grant compliance check list has to be drawn up specifying compliance requirements (e.g. procurement methods), and all documentation that should be kept on file. Grant management is supported by a programme funding unit in London. This has produced a Grant Management Manual. One member of staff is dedicated to supporting management of EC grants. She keeps country offices alerted to any changes in compliance requirements and circulates among regional offices to run training workshops.

2.1.5. Monitoring of accounting procedures

(§ 40) Staff from the finance department in London circulate around country offices and regional offices to ensure that there is adherence to accounting procedures. A regional finance officer provides training and support on accounting procedures through field visits and regional workshops.

2.1.6. Internal auditing of accounts

(§ 41) This is carried out by a London based team that circulates around country offices and regional offices. Between 25-30 overseas audits are carried out each year.

2.1.7. Monitoring of programme implementation

[§ 42] Country offices submit monthly, quarterly and annual narrative reports of progress. The annual outcome report is reviewed by the Department of International Operations in London, in coordination with policy teams, and feed-back is provided to inform country planning for the subsequent year. Compliance with reporting requirements for individual donors is entirely the responsibility of the country offices. Reports are sent to institutional donors direct from the country office, and there is no monitoring from the regional office or from London of the contents of reports. The project funding unit in London is, nevertheless, available to advise on the kind of report an institutional donor would require.

2.1.8. Programme Evaluation

[§ 43] A system of global impact monitoring (GIM) has been instituted. This looks at impact with respect to five dimensions of change:

- impact on lives of children;

- impact on policy and practice;

- impact on the work of civil society;

- impact on child participation;

- impact on reduction in discrimination.

[§ 44] There is an expectation that impact evaluations will be carried out annually, and a team exists within the London office to support this. Some country offices have staff assigned to monitoring and evaluation activities, but not all do. GIM is an instrument for systematically reporting successes of programmes as a whole, but it does not encourage analyses of failures and lesson learning. Nor does it encourage evaluation of the individual project. There seems to be little support for strengthening this more analytic approach to evaluation within SC-UK at present. It is something to which SC-UK could usefully give more attention because it is important to many institutional donors.

2.1.9. Human resources

[§ 45] Apart from the country Programme Director, all staff appointments are made by the country office. Terms and conditions of employment are made in accordance with local employment law, but minimum standards are prescribed by the HR office at London Headquarters. The office also provides guidance on best practice, and runs workshops on HR management. Standards of recruitment are monitored by the regional office. Standards of HR management are monitored during internal audits. Periodically, SC-UK conducts surveys of employee satisfaction. All staff are required to sign a child protection policy statement saying that they have read SC-UK's code of conduct for working with children, and that they agree to abide by it.

2.1.10. Lines of authority in emergencies

(§ 46) The decision whether to make a response to a major emergency is taken jointly by the Regional Director for the affected zone and the Director of Emergencies. Advice is also sought from the Programme Director of the affected country. Responsibility for overall management of an emergency response normally lies with the country Programme Director, and any staff deployed from the Emergency Response Team work under his/her line management. Where the Programme Director has limited experience of emergencies, the Regional Director may decide to appoint an Emergency Programme Director who reports directly to the Regional Director.

2.1.11. Security

(§ 47) SC-UK has a security management policy, and security management guidelines. A standing list is maintained of countries with significant security risks, and all countries on this list are required to have a security management plan. Responsibility for drafting and reviewing the security management plan at 6 monthly intervals lies with the Programme Director.

(§ 48) Plans have to be drawn up for each operational location in country where there is a significant risk, and they must specify measures to be taken in the face of high risk events. Plans have to be approved by the regional director. The country programme director is ultimately responsible for security. He/She must ensure that security guidelines are prepared for staff, and that reliable information is obtained on risks. Security guidelines may simply provide advice on appropriate behaviour or specify protocols to be followed as he/she sees fit. Security plans and guidelines exist for Pakistan and Liberia, but have not been updated for Sudan where until recently the guidelines of Operation Lifeline Sudan were followed.

2.2. Observations on restructuring

2.2.1. Staff opinion

(§ 49) Many staff feel that the devolution of programme management has rationalized the management process, given a greater sense of local ownership of programmes and enabled these to become better focused on local needs.

(§ 50) Some staff also feel that the new global procedures for thematic programming gave SC-UK a greater coherence as an organization, and enhanced its public image.

2.2.2. Some teething problems for Emergency Response

(§ 51) Members of the Emergency Response team expressed the view that there are teething problems. Because they are based at headquarters, information that is important for supporting operations does not reach them as well as it reaches country offices. This was particularly true of information on DG ECHO policy procedures and compliance requirements. The reorganization was considered to be confusing to DG ECHO itself

because the different roles of the country office and the emergency response team in raising funds and managing them had not been made clear. There was also need for clear designation of a person to manage relations with DG ECHO's Brussels, office inside the unit.

2.2.3. Need for more monitoring of project/programme outcomes

(§ 52) Good procedures have been put in place both for the regional offices and the London office to monitor the standards of management and financial administration, but support for monitoring of project performance is weak. This kind of monitoring is important to many institutional donors and especially DG ECHO. Weaknesses of project monitoring was observed in both Liberia and South Sudan where staff needed help with the basic tasks of defining project outcomes, and of identifying suitable indicators.

2.2.4. Persons responsible for managing relations with DG ECHO in the Field

(§ 53) There are still confusions concerning who inside SC-UK is responsible for submitting proposals to DG ECHO, for reporting, and for signing contracts. The procedures explained to DG ECHO in writing do not appear to be the ones in use in the field. SC-UK needs to clarify this.

2.2.5. Regular country programmes and emergency responses team interventions

(§ 54) There are clear rulings on the lines of authority in emergencies and the responsibilities of the emergency response team within these. The possibility of difficult situations nevertheless requires reflection. A country programme director could be required against his/her best judgement to manage a large emergency programme which was pushed along not so much by need as by a very generous public response to an appeal that he/she had not set in place.

(§ 55) Putting a separate emergency programme director in country might still leave problems if the emergency response impacted negatively on the regular programme, or vice versa. Such a situation could occur if the emergency programme gave high profile to SC-UK while the regular programme could only address very delicate issues of advocacy if it was run with a low profile. Putting an expatriate led emergency response team in country could also cause friction with regular country staff by eroding the local sense of ownership. Some of these difficulties were observed in Pakistan. SC-UK needs to assess any possible negative impact on the regular in-country programme before embarking on an emergency response with major outside intervention. It may then have to make the difficult decision as to where priorities lie.

2.2.6. Ensure that advocacy & emergency response work are mutually supportive

(§ 56) While devolution has helped to ensure that interventions in the field respond better to local needs, both policy and programming for advocacy work are firmly set at headquarters in London. Although advocacy programming may be based on sound field research, its value is lost if it is designed to address issues rather than problems arising in

particular political contexts at particular points in time. SC-UK needs to ensure that there are guidelines for field managers on how to do advocacy and how to take account of political realities. In many complex emergencies, advocacy that does not take account of the political context can be counterproductive. In present day Liberia, a very fragile government is struggling to establish itself. It is easily confused by a melee of organizations lobbying it to do different things. In emergencies, *Technical support* to implement basic life-saving policies can be more important than a long discussion about what the policies should be.

2.2.7. Problems with DG ECHO's compliance requirements

[§ 57] Despite measures put in place by the London office to advise country staff on DG ECHO's compliance requirements, difficulties are being experienced with these and are leading to delays in the recovery of project costs. The most common difficulties are with procurement procedures and the failure to obtain derogations before purchasing. SC-UK's concern to purchase on local markets so as to help the local economy and support local livelihoods creates special difficulties. Seeking derogations slows down the implementation of a project. There is need for discussion with DG ECHO on options for avoiding these delays.

2.2.8. Recommendations

a. SC-UK should give its staff more support in drafting project proposals and in reporting. In addition to ensuring that staff are able to specify suitable outcomes and indicators for projects, it should ensure that methods of drafting allow for identification of effective strategies and calculation of cost-efficiency.

b. The function of the emergency response team and the way it coordinates with the regular country team should be made clear to the desk managing the DG ECHO funding response to an emergency. In particular it should be made clear that the emergency response team has dual functions for management of financing in house and for providing back-up in the field.

c. For each emergency that involves the emergency response team, there should be someone designated within the team to manage relations with DG ECHO.

d. SC-UK should ensure that the emergency response team receives support in keeping abreast of DG ECHO procedures and compliance requirements.

e. SC-UK should discuss with DG ECHO the difficulties it is having in complying with procurement procedures, and the two partners should see what can be done to avoid consequential delays to project implementation.

3. The working relationship between DG ECHO and SC-UK

### 3.1. The place of DG ECHO funding in SC-UK's finances

[§ 58] For the fiscal year 2005/2006, DG ECHO funds constituted some 5% of SC-UK's total funding. Over the past 3 years, most of these funds have been in a small number of countries where there are chronic emergencies. Some 40% of funds have been spent on acute emergencies.

Table 2 - Total funds granted by DG ECHO to SC-UK, 2003-2005 [13.03.2006]

Country	Total Amount	%
Sudan	5 291 472	21.46
Korea, DPR	2 692 120	10.92
Zimbabwe	2 610 000	10.58
Liberia	2 511 092	10.18
Malawi	1 579 179	6.40
Indonesia	1 546 186	6.27
Pakistan	1 541 351	6.25
Iraq	1 095 000	4.44
India	905 715	3.67
Ivory Coast	882 942	3.58
Afghanistan	850 055	3.45
Niger	600 000	2.43
Peru	342 500	1.39
Iran	340 000	1.38
Nepal	255 000	1.03
China	250 000	1.01
Viet Nam	230 000	0.93
Congo, DR	228 566	0.93
Colombia	208 710	0.85
Somalia	206 520	0.84
Angola	205 406	0.83
Jamaica	156 240	0.63
Cuba	131 064	0.53
Total	24 659 117	100.00

[§ 59] SC-UK has a large base of donors for emergency work. For the Pakistan, Liberia and South Sudan programmes alone it has no less than 20 donors. DG ECHO has contributed a significant but nevertheless minor proportion of funds.

Graph – Percentage of DG ECHO funding by country, 2005/2006 financial year

PAKISTAN

ECHO 8%

Other
donors
92%

LIBERIA

ECHO
20%

Other donors
80%

SOUTH SUDAN

ECHO 16%

Other
donors
84%

(§ 60) SC-UK is often able to achieve good complementarity of DG ECHO funding with that of other donors. One example of this is in the distribution of seeds, tools and NFI in South Sudan. SC-UK was able to balance the proportionately greater sums provided by OFDA for seeds and tools with a parallel DG ECHO funding which made available proportionately more for NFI. A further example was in the distribution of shelter and NFI in Pakistan, where SC-UK was able to rely on other donors to meet distribution costs, and asked for DG ECHO funds only to purchase the items for distribution[2]. SC-UK's wide base of donors also put it in a good position to cover areas of need that may not be covered by a DG ECHO decision. One example is the child protection initiatives taken in the early days of the Pakistan earthquake. Another is the bold initiatives taken in emergency education in both Pakistan and South Sudan.

(§ 61) In large scale emergencies where much money is raised by appeals it nevertheless remains a challenge for SC-UK to coordinate donors who wish to finance programme costs, or perhaps even provide assistance in kind, with those who wish to finance self contained projects. Having donors package their money for individual projects can greatly increase the burdens of administration and reporting. In reporting to DG ECHO on the Pakistan earthquake response, SC-UK had difficulty separating the DG ECHO project from the broader programme of intervention because DG ECHO had funded only the purchase of NFI and shelter materials plus a small amount of indirect costs. From SC-UK's perspective, DG ECHO funding had contributed to carrying out a broader programme. SC-UK's uncertainties about the way it should report to DG ECHO, and the latter's need for further clarification led to delays in the disbursement of funds.

3.2. Importance of the partnership to the work of the two partners

(§ 62) For DG ECHO, SC-UK is a partner with sound technical competence, with long standing experience and well established presence in many disaster prone countries. With its capacities to mobilize human resources and put in place the necessary logistics, it can be relied upon to make timely and large scale responses in emergencies of acute onset with distributions of relief items. This perception has been enhanced by the creation of SC-UK's emergency response team, and the greater emphasis that is being given to emergency preparedness. In both acute and chronic emergencies, DG ECHO also values

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[2] In this last case, however the funding arrangement with DG ECHO may have created some difficulties for SC-UK in meeting the compliance requirements for a DG ECHO primary emergency decision.

SC-UK as a partner with special commitments to child protection, and the maintenance of livelihoods.

(§ 63) SC-UK for its part sees DG ECHO as a dependable funding partner for both acute and chronic emergencies, and values especially its commitment to forgotten emergencies. It also values the increasing commitment DG ECHO is showing to child protection and the maintenance of livelihoods in emergencies

3.3 Problems of Grant administration

(§ 64) Administrative delays that result in the late signing of contracts and disbursement of funds have been a problem for both partners. They have sometimes ended in projects not being completed on time or in a rushed manner, and in resources being less than optimally used. The current DG ECHO/SC-UK project in Sudan has a start date in January 2006, but the contract was not signed until July 2006. SC-UK's South Sudan country office was not authorized to start the project before the signing of the contract, and with the intervention of the rains, three months now remain to carry out most of the project activities. Delays of this kind seldom seem to result from fundamental disagreement between partners over which projects should be funded. Even when there are genuine disagreements (e.g. eligibility of costs, definitions of numbers and nature of beneficiaries) their magnitude would seldom seem to justify the length of the delay. There is need for the two partners to examine together why the delays occur.

(§ 65) Among SC-UK partners, DG ECHO is one of those with the most stringent compliance requirements. SC-UK shares DG ECHO's concerns with accountability. Nevertheless, SC-UK not infrequently encounters difficulties – particularly at the reporting stage – in meeting requirements with consequent delays to the approval of reports and late disbursements of funds. Despite the training modalities in place DG ECHO's requirements are not always well understood by staff. Sometimes problems seem to arise because of fairly minor misunderstandings about reporting requirements.

3.4. Working with frameworks of EU decisions and the DG ECHO funding cycles

(§ 66) In Pakistan, Liberia and Sudan, SC-UK have found by and large that DG ECHO funding cycles were long enough to allow time for an effective response, but short enough to avoid NGOs being tied to programmes of action that a changed situation had made obsolete. Staff have also found that DG ECHO's successive Global Plans were well focused on emerging needs, that the Commission's granting decisions were timely and enabled partners to make appropriate responses. It is, nevertheless, apparent that DG ECHO funding could have greater impact if, while retaining short funding cycles and the capacity for flexible response, it nevertheless worked with a broad strategy covering several funding cycles. This might enable partners to pursue courses of work that help to address some of the root causes of chronic emergencies.

(§ 67) The need is particularly acute in the child protection sector. It takes time to raise awareness to the importance of protecting children from conscription into armed forces and from other forms of abuse emanating from emergencies. An investment is required to help communities create the conditions in which children can begin to see an alternative

to a violent future. Yet this should not be dismissed as a development task which has no place in emergency response. It is an essential step in breaking the vicious cycle of violence that sustains many chronic emergencies. In Liberia, SC-UK has bravely embarked on this important longer term task, but without a DG ECHO framework of planning that goes beyond the single funding cycles, it hard to address the task with confidence. Notwithstanding these difficulties, SC-UK staff have found that DG ECHO's Global Plans and the granting Decisions of the Commission have enabled appropriate responses, and that good timing has made it possible to maintain focus on changing needs.

3.5. Recommendations

a. SC-UK and DG ECHO should examine together the reasons for delays to the signing of recent contracts in Sudan, and endeavour to find a solution.
b. DG ECHO should examine possibilities for a more medium term perspective for programming in the child protection sector.

4. SC-UK's capacity for emergency response

4.1. Emergency preparedness

[§ 68] In some countries SC-UK has experience of emergency response while in others it does not. To increase their capacity for response, all countries are required to develop emergency preparedness plans. In Pakistan and Liberia, the plans address the requirements of SC-UK global policy: Analysis of possible emergency scenarios; pre-positioning of stocks; secondment of regular country staff to emergency duties; scaling up of human resources. In both countries the last of these depends heavily on the use of local partners who in the past have lacked the capacity to do the work required.

[§ 69] Emergency preparedness plans make provision for training of local partners, but in Liberia, and probably in other countries, it seems important for SC-UK to develop the capacity for scaling up its own staff.

4.2. SC-UK's Technical capacity

[§ 70] SC-UK's staffing strategy seems to vary from country to country. The staffing establishment is larger in Liberia than in South Sudan, despite the smaller budget for the former country and the smaller operational area. In South Sudan there are very large salary differentials for local staff while in Liberia salary scales seem more graduated suggesting more diversity in level of training. In Liberia, South Sudan and Pakistan local field staff seem to have professional training relevant to the work they are performing. In all three countries, staff above the middle management level have third level education.

[§ 71] Between South Sudan and Liberia there are also differences in the ratio of expatriates to local staff, with the latter country having a lower ratio. Expatriates in all three countries have previous experience of emergency/development work with INGOS.

[§ 72] Some of them have performed previous assignments for SC-UK. All have professional training and experience relevant to the job they perform. Tours of duty vary considerably among expatriates. The average for the three countries seems to be less than a year, but some people in South Sudan and Liberia have been in post for several years.

[§ 73] Professional staff have good opportunities for continuing technical training. In Liberia, a learning and development centre has been established to support staff training. SC-UK is seeking to achieve greater sharing of expertise between countries by increasing opportunities for well trained and experienced local staff to serve terms as expatriates in other countries. Nevertheless, it is observable that country programmes do not always have access to SC-UK's global bank of institutional knowledge.

[§ 74] The large body of knowledge that SC-UK has pulled together in publication could be better used to inform programme and project planning. Initiatives taken in London to strengthen institutional learning have yet to show real impact on the ground.

4.3. Logistics

(§ 75) SC-UK is endeavouring to strengthen its logistical capacity for emergency interventions through in-country training provided by the emergency response team in London. The capacity of the emergency response team for logistics is not large. In the case of the Pakistan earthquake, the team had difficulty in finding experienced expatriates to backstop operations and had to hire a series of expatriate logisticians on short-term contracts. This caused difficulties in continuity of work and hampered the development of local capacity. The emergency response team is trying to increase its roster of logisticians, but it is in a competitive market place.

4.4. Learning lessons: focus on results and monitoring

(§ 76) From time to time, SC-UK contracts external bodies to carry out impact studies of particular kinds of emergency or development intervention. These studies sometimes consider impact of the work of a number of organizations rather than just its own. SC-UK also uses its own global impact monitoring tool to assess the impact of its work. While useful, these studies do not systematically look at the achievements of individual projects and attempt to tease out the lessons learned. This is something that merits more attention within the DG ECHO/ SC-UK partnership since the information culled would be of service to both parties in future programming. To achieve better evaluation, SC-UK needs to help staff develop more analytic and critical approaches to project writing and reporting. In project writing, they need to conceptualize more clearly the expected results and to identify objective and measurable indicators for these[3]. Project activities also need to be described in a way that makes it possible to understand how the resources were used, the amount of work involved and the staff that carried it out. Without this it is not possible to make any assessment of efficiency. In reporting, staff need to be more questioning of whether, and how far, results have been achieved. They need to discuss the effectiveness of project logics, and detail lessons learned from the exercise.

4.5. Mainstreaming and cross cutting issues

4.5.1. Children

(§ 77) Improving the lives of children is the central objectives of SC-UK. In Pakistan, Liberia and South Sudan the objective is pursued through all sectors following the principle that children are helped not just by specific child protection initiatives but through strengthening livelihoods and basic services. Projects are implemented with some monitoring to preclude the possibility that the measures taken do not inadvertently cause harm to children through, for example, increasing dangerous child labour or creating incentives for families to keep children out of school. In South Sudan, staff implementing the current livelihoods project monitor children in the market place and try to secure their

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[3] Examples are given in section 4 of the Liberia Country Report of where objective and measurable indicators are needed to give meaning to results

reinsertion into school. Procedures for this kind of risk assessment are things that SC-UK might develop further and include as a standard part of project planning and monitoring.

4.5.2. Gender Equality

(§ 78) SC-UK pursues firm policies on gender equality, while recognizing in its programming the special attention women deserve as primary carers for children in most cultures. In many cultures it is not easy to ensure the voices of women beneficiaries are heard when discussing relief needs. This was so in both Pakistan and South Sudan. In both countries, SC-UK has tried to ensure that women are represented in discussions with communities, but the fact that women are present at meetings does not mean that they willingly express an opinion. It is not uninteresting that in a meeting the evaluators held with women beneficiaries on their own in South Sudan, they expressed the view that the NFI distributed was more useful to families than the seeds and tools.

(§ 79) This is so despite the fact that more DG ECHO money was spent on seeds and tools than on NFI. In South Sudan, SC-UK is taking bold measures to improve the capacity of women to participate through literacy courses, and through the provision of training for the many unqualified women teachers. The percentages of female staff employed by SC-UK in Pakistan, Liberia, and South Sudan are 20%, 30% and 11% respectively. In all three countries there are cultural barriers to the employment of women especially where the work means relocating for periods of time to the field. In Liberia there are also security problems. In all three countries SC-UK might give more emphasis to employing local women, even if this means a large investment in training.

4.5.3. HIV/AIDS

(§ 80) In South Sudan, the current DG ECHO project has mainstreamed HIV/AIDS in all training activities. A mainstreaming coordinator has been appointed and HIV/AIDS peer educators are being trained to undertake HIV/AIDS awareness in the community. In Liberia, too HIV/AIDS awareness raising is carried out in schools and the community through children's clubs.

4.6. Visibility

(§ 81) SC-UK fully recognizes the need for DG ECHO to have visibility and chooses modalities according to the type of work being carried out and security considerations. In the early days of the Pakistan earthquake emergency, SC-UK, along with most other NGOs decided to maintain low visibility. Later, visibility was found to be positively helpful, and EU stickers along with those of SC-UK were placed on vehicles and on the gates of compounds. The EU cache was also placed on all metal shelter sheets. Attitudes towards NGOs in Pakistan were volatile and public opinion was subject to manipulation at times by extremist political and religious groups. Policies on visibility had to remain flexible. In Sudan, also security considerations made it unwise to post stickers on compounds, but EU stickers were placed on vehicles. It was felt inappropriate to cache the preventive health items, but T-shirts bearing the EU logo were worn by SC-UK staff

and local community members helping with distribution. In Liberia, the EU logo was carried by SC-UK staff, and by billboards placed in locations where project activities were regularly carried out. There is a need for donors to review the use of billboards for giving visibility. In large numbers, their permanence risks leaving local people with the impression that external agencies can be relied on to provide services. Such visibility works counter to encouraging local initiative and local ownership. Logos on cars and T-shirts are more transient and do not carry so much risk. Because there are increasing numbers of locations where the more routinely used methods of giving donors visibility expose NGOs to security risks, it is important to consider alternatives.

4.7. Recommendations

a. SC-UK should make its broader institutional knowledge more available to staff in the field. It should encourage the use of such knowledge in programmed design, and should support the setting up of local resource centres.
b. Staff in the field should take a more analytic approach to assessing the outcomes of projects. They should report on failures as well as successes, and try to analyse the effectiveness of project logics. They should also try to get focus on cost efficiency.
c. DG ECHO needs to reappraise approaches to visibility. Not only do some conventional forms of visibility raise risks, but they work against achieving community ownership and encourage dependency.

5. The DG ECHO/SC-UK partnership in practice

5.1. Distribution of emergency aid (NFI, seeds, and tools)[4]

5.1.1. Relevance

(§ 82) The large scale distributions made in Pakistan, South Sudan and Liberia seem to have been well planned and informed by good needs assessment. In both Pakistan and South Sudan beneficiaries commented to the evaluation team that the items distributed were useful. In neither Pakistan nor in South Sudan did SC-UK staff find it easy to hear the views of women. This is to be regretted as meetings held with the women in South Sudan led members of the evaluation team to think that the priority needs of the women could have been different from those of the men. In Liberia, by contrast women did play a role in representing their communities, and there were women chairpersons of the committees set up within communities to assist with distribution.

(§ 83) In South Sudan SC-UK felt that DG ECHO's policies were a constraint to providing aid of the most useful kind. Many beneficiaries would have found cash grants more useful than seeds and tools. This is so in particular for those who make their livelihoods primarily from trading or from the rearing of livestock rather than from agriculture. Handouts of seeds or other commodities can also have adverse effects on local markets with knock-on effect for trade.

5.1.2. Coverage

(§ 84) Efforts were made to coordinate with other partners so as to ensure separate zones of intervention, and to avoid the doubling of distributions. For the most part these efforts were successful. There was careful consultation with communities to identify priority groups for distribution. In the case of South Sudan, priority was given to returnees, in Pakistan to those who were most vulnerable to the winter cold, and in Liberia a complexity of criteria were used for identifying vulnerable groups.

(§ 85) High proportions of the prioritized populations appear to have been reached in the distribution zones in both Pakistan and South Sudan, (95% and more than 80% respectively). In Sudan many fewer people received the preventive health care items (i.e. mosquito nets, blankets and cooking ware). This was to be regretted as they were more valued by the women than the seeds and tools.

5.1.3. Effectiveness

(§ 86) In Pakistan, the shelter items, NFI and clothing proved very effective in helping people to survive the winter cold. Much of the metal sheeting provided has been reused to make semi-permanent structures which will house people until the government has issued standards for permanent structures. Villages reported that there had been no increase in

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[4] More detailed information is given on activities in different sectors in section 5 of each of the country reports in annex.

respiratory tract infections which could be attributed to cold exposure. In South Sudan, beneficiaries reported an increase in acreages planted, and better feeding of children. Project reports do not include information on movements in market prices that would constitute more objective confirmation of greater availability of food. The primary health care items distributed in South Sudan appear to have been well used by beneficiaries, but objective evidence for the reduction of malaria and respiratory tract infections has not been gathered.

5.1.4. Efficiency

(§ 87) SC-UK has used distributions as a means to kick starting other important recovery and development processes in communities, and to achieve value added. In Liberia agreements were reached with community members that tools provided would be used by volunteer groups to help with the construction of houses for vulnerable people. In Sudan distributions were accompanied by training of beneficiaries in preventive health and the correct use of mosquito nets and blankets. In Pakistan, the cash handouts financed by another donor to restart livelihoods were also made with agreement of the community that there would be action to clear roads, and undertake other works that would facilitate the restart of trade.

(§ 88) It is difficult to assess how efficiently resources were used in implementing these distribution projects. SC-UK does not report on how they deploy staff or on how they use resources for logistics, and it is not possible to see from proposals how operations are costed. It is in SC-UK's own interest to ensure efficiency of resources, and they might consider putting in place monitoring procedures to do this. SC-UK has considerable experience of large scale distribution activities yet they do not appear to have conducted a review of their experience or produced any state of the art document.

5.2. Health

5.2.1. Relevance

(§ 89) In Pakistan and South Sudan SC-UK has restricted itself to preventive health with the distribution of mosquito nets, blankets and warm weather clothing. The materials seemed appropriate for preventing the most common ailments in the areas of intervention. For different reasons in the two countries, a preventive health strategy seemed more appropriate than a curative one. In Pakistan the populations served by SC-UK were within reach of primary healthcare facilities in the towns. In South Sudan, the spread of the population makes it difficult to provide curative services. In Liberia primary healthcare was made available to people in IDP camps under the DG ECHO/SC-UK partnership, and more recently there has been collaboration to re-establish Ministry of Health clinics in rural areas where returnees are settling. The current DG ECHO project is rehabilitating infrastructure, supplying drugs and medical equipment, and training clinic staff. All of these are essential to restarting services. Most clinic staff are newly qualified, and need intensive support.

5.2.2. Coverage[5]

(§ 90) In Liberia, SC-UK is supporting services in 11 clinics in three counties with funds from DG ECHO[6]. The total catchment population of the clinics is estimated at 75,643. The evaluation team visited two clinics where some 26% of the catchment population had attended over the past 18 months. Poor roads and long distances make the clinics inaccessible to large numbers of people.

5.2.3. Effectiveness

(§ 91) SC-UK has an experienced team of health professionals rotating around the clinics to provide ongoing support, monitoring and training. The two clinics visited appeared to be well managed with properly maintained registers of patients, prescriptions and stock lists of drugs. There was mapping of progress towards vaccination targets, and monitoring of compliance with Ministry of Health protocols for diagnosis and treatment. There were programmes of training for staff and for TBAs, and programmes of health education for community groups.

(§ 92) Despite high turnover of clinic staff, it has proved possible to maintain levels agreed with the Ministry much of the time. Attendance varies from one clinic to another and while some clinics are under-staffed, others are over-staffed. In view of the importance of staff training within this project it is unfortunate that the proposal contained no indicators of the effectiveness of training activities.

(§ 93) The project makes some provision for training the Government's county health teams to assume responsibility for monitoring clinics and to set up systems for disease surveillance. Little progress has been made with this because health structures at the county level are not sufficiently re-established.

5.2.4. Efficiency

(§ 94) Staff resources seem to be efficiently deployed in this project, but the staff establishment is quite large, and after 18 months of training, it should be possible to downsize. Because provision has been made within this project to pay incentives to staff of government clinics, it will not prove easy to find an exit strategy. This is an issue to which both DG ECHO and SC-UK need to give attention.

5.3. Child protection

5.3.1. Relevance

(§ 95) The current work being done in Liberia and South Sudan through the DG ECHO/SC-UK partnership illustrate two different approaches to child protection. Work done in

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[5] See section on emergency distribution for preventive health
[6] A further 5 clinics are being supported by DFID

Pakistan with funds of another donor illustrate yet a third. In Liberia, emphasis is being placed on building community capacity for monitoring children at risk.

(§ 96) In Sudan the emphasis is more on building community structures to support the reintegration of separated children. To some extent this comes about because the countries are at different points in the emergency cycle. In the past, work in Liberia also had its primary emphasis on reintegration. The danger that children can still get pulled into further fighting in the sub-region, however, gives a special justification for the current focus on monitoring. In Pakistan the emphasis has been on creating structures through which local communities can discuss child protection issues with relevant Ministries, and on creating a forum for the voices of children themselves to be heard.

(§ 97) Differences of emphasis should not be allowed to mask the fact that reintegration, monitoring of children at risk, and helping children to be heard are elements of projects in all three countries. There is also monitoring and reporting of child rights abuses. All of these are necessary because in all countries there are children who are separated[7], children who are at risk of separation, and children who, if they are not listened to, will become frustrated and resort to violent means to secure their rights.

5.3.2. Coverage

(§ 98) In South Sudan child protection activities are being carried out at Koch and Mayom where large numbers of children were demobilized from barracks and where large numbers of returnees transit on their way to Western Nile. There is tribal fighting in the area which also causes separation of children. In 2005, the project aimed to support 1,350 children, and in 2006, 850 children. In Liberia, the current project is operating in four counties, and aims to provide protection for 10,000 children.

5.3.3. Effectiveness

(§ 99) Building the capacity of communities to monitor children at risk takes time and resources. SC-UK's aim to work in four counties of Liberia simultaneously was very ambitious. This is particularly so because the work was to be carried out in two counties by a local partner which had limited experience and capacity for the work.

(§ 100) Some progress has been made in some areas. A number of Child Welfare Committees have been created within local communities and trained to do monitoring work. The effectiveness of these committees can be judged only by the proportion of at-risk children who are identified, and there are no independent estimates of numbers of children at risk. Many more children are currently being identified by SC-UK staff than by the child welfare committees.

(§ 101) In South Sudan because of disturbances some difficulties were encountered in locating the beneficiary population originally intended and only 178 of the 1,350 were documented. Small community based income generating projects were started to help support the families or foster-families of the children. During the current year, some more

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[7] In Pakistan some children were placed in Madrassas.

children have been brought into the programme and a livestock rearing project has been put in place as the principle means of support. Beneficiary families receive 3 goats which should boost the family livelihood by yielding a supply of milk for consumption or for sale. When the goats breed the offspring are passed on to another family, thus ensuring a gradual cascade of the programme. The 2005 report does not provide information about the income from the community based projects or how this has been used to benefit children. It is becoming urgent for SC-UK to document the past two years work and to assess how effective this kind of model is for benefiting vulnerable children.

5.3.4. Efficiency

(§ 102) SC-UK's concern to spread child protection networks as wide as possible in Liberia is understandable. As it is, they undertook a task that exceeded their capacity. A solution would have been to focus training in the first instance on communities where children are most at risk (perhaps along the Ivory Coast border), and to have concentrated more resources on building the capacity of a local partner. In communities where children were less at risk, some community sensitization to protection needs might have been ridden on the back of livelihood activities.

(§ 103) Building capacity within local communities for child protection is a task that takes time. In a country like Liberia, a critical balance has to be struck between investment in the medium term and answering the more immediate needs such as the tracing and reintegration of children separated by war. SC-UK's programme is addressing both needs. Both should be considered important parts of an emergency response, since without the longer term investment to reinforce the community's sense of responsibility for children and giving children the sense that their needs are respected, it is doubtful that the peace can be durable.

(§ 104) In South Sudan it is important for SC-UK to give some consideration to the cost efficiency of the models they are developing for supporting vulnerable children. This should now be possible for at least the activities begun in 2005. The project involves a substantial element of training for community based child protection networks. Yet there appears to be no training foreseen for the staff, most of whom seem to be hired on very low salaries by SC-UK standards, and have very little experience. Although the Ministry of Social Welfare is not yet deployed on the ground, more weight could be got behind the project if training in child protection were provided to some key local government workers.

5.4. Capacity and Institution Building for improving livelihoods

5.4.1. Relevance

(§ 105) SC-UK's initiative of building the Livelihoods Assessment Forum (LAF) in South Sudan dates back several years. It is relatively recently that it has been pursued through the partnership with DG ECHO. Its purpose is to provide up-to-date information on the vulnerability of households across the country to economic shocks. A large number of household economy assessments have been assembled to establish a baseline of economic

activity and a simple set of indicators is used by members of the forum to track environmental and man made shocks that could disturb economic activity. Some two years ago, arrangements were made to institutionalize LAF within the South Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation (SSCSE). The main focus of project activities for 2006 has been placed on increasing the capacity of the SSCSE to manage LAF, and of Local Government Authority (LGA) staff to contribute to it. Potentially, information provided by the forum could be of considerable use in deciding where emergency and development assistance can best be targeted in rural areas and the form it should take. The relevance of the work will depend in the end on the willingness of the major future actors in livelihood sector (e.g. FAO) to buy into the information and to use it to advantage in their own interventions.

(§ 106) The main capacity building initiative for 2006 is the training of local government staff and local NGO staff in livestock rearing and agriculture in South Sudan[8]. This will be accompanied by a number of training initiatives in health hygiene and nutrition, and a number of studies to inform future programme planning. While the inter-relation of the activities may not be entirely clear, each in its way appears to address a priority need.

5.4.2. Coverage

(§ 107) LAF has an institutional composition of INGOs, WFP, FEWSNET and local government authorities. These institutions contribute information to the forum from locations across South Sudan, but many areas of the country are not covered. Other institution building and training activities foreseen in the 2006 DG ECHO project are being implemented in Upper Nile and are intended to benefit 50,000 people. It is not clear how this figure has been reached.

5.4.3. Effectiveness

(§ 108) LAF holds quarterly meetings to review and update information on livelihoods across South Sudan. Much work still remains to be done to develop LAF as a fully comprehensive livelihoods information network for South Sudan. At a meeting attended by members of the evaluation team there was representation from only a few LGAs, and it was apparent that staff lacked understanding and practice in the use of risk indicators. The bulk of work was being shouldered by a small number of INGOs.

(§ 109) The president of the SSCSE is enthusiastic about LAF, but the SSCSE is nevertheless a young institution with very little capacity of its own to sustain LAF. The funds made available to SC-UK by DG ECHO to support staff inside the SSCSE may make it possible to build additional capacity in the short term, but it seems unlikely that the government could make its own funds available to sustain work beyond this.

(§ 110) Over the years, the SC-UK's initiative with the LAF has had success in uniting a number of NGOs and other institutions around the *cause* of protecting and strengthening the livelihoods of the rural poor as an alternative to providing them with food aid or inappropriate agricultural inputs. While this is an important achievement, it is less clear

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[8] Some other capacity building activities in Liberia are described in sections on health and child protection

what tangible impact it has had on the livelihoods of rural people in South Sudan. To achieve such impact, the information produced by LAF has to be fed into the planning of interventions in the food security and livelihood sector. It remains to be seen whether LAF can move from being an organization essentially focused on research, training and advocacy to one which can engage with the policies of organizations such as the FAO who will be one of the most important players of the future in the food security and livelihoods sector.

(§ 111) The effectiveness of other capacity building activities within the 2006 DG ECHO project will necessarily be affected by the late signing of the project, and the delayed start-up of many activities. Activities have been further disrupted by inter-tribal conflicts in the area of operations. Some livestock training and agricultural training activities have already been carried out, as has part of a nutritional survey. The project document does not quantify the amount of training that was to be carried out, but from the costs of the project it can be surmised that very large amounts were planned. Disregarding the late start up, the project would appear to be unduly ambitious for completion within a year.

5.4.4. Efficiency

(§ 112) The transition from the emergency phase of operation to the post emergency phase requires SC-UK to go through a restructuring and redeployment of its staff in Sudan, and it is clear that this is not proving easy. Carrying out training activities of the kind foreseen in the current DG-ECHO project requires technical staff to be on the ground, and not managing operations from an office several hundred kilometres away as they could justifiably do in the emergency phase. Some progress is being made with redeployment, but given the difficulties, there is a need for SC-UK to consider whether it is trying to spread its activities too wide. The effectiveness of training projects depends on achieving a certain concentration of effort within an area. Trainees need to be followed up on the ground to make sure that they incorporate new learning into practice.

6. Lessons from methodologies of interventions

6.1. The timeliness of SC-UK's response on the ground

(§ 113) Although it took several weeks for SC-UK to scale up fully its distribution operation in Kashmir, it was carrying out assessments in Muzzafarabad and Bagh within three days of the earthquake.

(§ 114) Shortly after that, it started establishing forward bases. Because of the large number of humanitarian actors on the ground in the early days, it required forethought and planning to get aid to where it was really needed. SC-UK might have become operational earlier if it had managed to put key personnel on the ground in larger numbers and if it had made better use of local knowledge to speed up procurement and to establish lines of logistics. SC-UK's response was nevertheless timely. The initial investment in planning enabled SC-UK to build up the capacity to reach a large number of beneficiaries before the onset of the snows. In Liberia and South Sudan, too, responses have for the most part been timely. Flexibility has been shown in adjusting to changes on the ground with successive phases of the emergency. In the livelihood sector, work has been well coordinated with the agricultural cycle.

(§ 115) Nevertheless in both Liberia and South Sudan, some difficulty has been experienced in making the transition from an emergency mode of operation to a post-emergency one. Dependency on local partners to achieve the geographical coverage desired, and insufficient attention to building the necessary technical capacity, have made it difficult for SC-UK to carry out the child protection activities of the current DG ECHO project in Liberia. In South Sudan, too, there have been problems in making the transition. Delays have been experienced in getting staff deployed from the base at Lokichoggio in Kenya, and in establishing the management systems in the field that are necessary for the intensive capacity building work that could be expected with an DG ECHO project of the current size. In both countries, the difficulties experienced have multiple causes that are examined in the annexes to this report. In both cases, however, it is clear that SC-UK was over-ambitious in the geographical coverage it had sought to achieve in the immediate post-emergency era.

(§ 116) Distributing relief items across two states of Southern Sudan is a different task from carrying out training and capacity building activities across the same territory. Putting in place community based child protection structures among returnees in three counties of Liberia is a different task from putting them in place in IDP camps. SC-UK needs to beware the dangers of being spread widely without the concentration to do good quality work. It also needs to beware the dangers of going to scale before having perfected the model. DG ECHO too needs to be vigilant to these dangers.

6.2. Adjusting response to particularities of the emergency

6.2.1. Pakistan

(§ 117) The purpose of the initial SC-UK response to the acute emergency in Pakistan was to meet basic needs for shelter and non-food items, and at the same time to create friendly

spaces for children. The response was made in the urban and rural areas around the badly destroyed towns of Muzzafarabad and Bagh. NFI and shelter items were distributed in the rural areas while child friendly spaces were established in the first instance for children in the makeshift IDP camps that emerged in the towns. The strategy was designed to complement the work of other humanitarian actors, many of whom could not put in place the logistics to reach the rural areas, and did not prioritise the support needs of children. As soon as primary needs of shelter had been met, and the weather conditions allowed it, SC-UK turned its attention to helping communities reinstate livelihoods through cash transfers. It also initiated a programme to construct temporary classroom accommodation and provide school materials. SC-UK's response strategy fitted well with the shift in needs from emergency relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction. Nevertheless, its decision to embark at this latter stage on work of a more developmental nature including the building of community institutions for child protection and school management have tied it unwittingly into a longer term commitment. Some of the work may prove difficult to sustain and may be judged retrospectively to have been premature.

6.2.2. Liberia

[§ 118] During the emergency and immediate post-emergency phases, SC-UK has had to maintain the flexibility to move the location of its work depending on the movements of displaced populations. For several years of the emergency much of the work was carried out in IDP camps. It included distribution of food, provision of health care, and the establishment of child welfare committees and children's clubs.

[§ 119] During 2003 displaced people sought refuge in safer areas, and assistance was provided to populations on the move. In the more immediate post emergency phase, DG ECHO's funds and those of other donors have been used by SC-UK in pursuit of an approach to rehabilitation and reconstruction that involves three elements. First, the provision of seeds and tools to assisting refugees and IDPs re-establish their livelihoods at the place of return; second helping the government re-establish rural health services; third establishing local community structures for child protection; and supporting the reintegration of separated children including those associated with fighting forces.

[§ 120] In Liberia action has had to be organized around the need to make people feel the peace dividend. This has been important in activities both with children and with adults. For the children, SC-UK is working to provide an accelerated learning programme which enables those who have been out of school to complete the primary programme in three years.

6.2.3. South Sudan

[§ 121] During the emergency the central objective was to sustain livelihoods among agro-pastoralists who are especially vulnerable to conflict because they need to move with livestock. SC-UK did this within the limits of the assistance that was available which was seeds and tools. It distributed these to households across two large regions of South Sudan, while at the same time seeking to raise awareness within the humanitarian

community to the need for alternative forms of assistance, and for better methods of assessing the economic vulnerabilities of communities.

(§ 122) Another line of action was the operation of tracing networks to reunify separated children across lines of fighting between north and south. In the immediate post emergency context distributions of seeds and tools were continued for returnees, but none have been made in the current year and the focus has shifted to institution and capacity building for livelihoods development with local authority staff and national NGOs. A programme of community care has been put in place to meet the needs of separated returnee children, and this is complemented by initiatives to open up educational opportunities for children through programmes of teacher training.

6.3. Coordination with the broader humanitarian community

(§ 123) Activities seem to have been well coordinated with those of other humanitarian agencies. In Pakistan, Liberia and South Sudan, SC-UK has been active within the established coordination systems and taken its turn in chairing meetings. It has MoUs for collaboration with various governmental, non-governmental, and inter-governmental partners in all three countries. Differences of principle with some major partners such as WFP have hampered coordination at certain points in time.

(§ 124) Good coordination at national level, however, needs complementing with equally good coordination at local level and global level. Despite good coordination at national level, SC-UK seems to have failed to realize in South Sudan that another NGO was making distributions of agricultural inputs in the same area of operation.

(§ 125) In Pakistan SC-UK found that another NGO which was also UK based and also receiving funds from the DEC had organized a distribution of shelter items in the same theatre of operation without first discussing this with SC-UK. Strengthening relations between the two NGOs on home soil might have helped to encourage better communication in the field.

6.4. The SC-UK's activities and LRRD

(§ 126) Both South Sudan and Liberia have now entered a phase of LRRD. Substantial funds have been voted for reconstruction in South Sudan, much of it through a Multi-donor Trust Fund. Funds from the EU have been made available for a number of projects which are to be managed by UN agencies with NGOs as implementing partners.

6.4.1. South Sudan

(§ 127) SC-UK is already implementing one project with EU funds that have been channelled through UNDP. These funds are for capacity building in several sectors but principally in the livelihoods sector. Two further grants have been made by the EU to FAO for work in food security, and it is likely that NGOs will have access to some of these funds next year.

6.4.2. Pakistan

(§ 128) For Pakistan there are neither DG ECHO funds nor any other funds available from the EU for work by NGOs. SC-UK is nevertheless continuing with a programme for reconstruction of schools. Until the government agrees standards for the construction of permanent buildings, SC-UK will have to consider putting resources into semi-permanent ones, although this is not the ideal use of resources. SC-UK hopes to obtain further funds for its work in reinstating livelihoods, and intends to continue its work in child protection. In both the education and child protection sectors, it has already made a brave thrust forward into work of a more developmental nature with the constitution of community structures that enable communities to dialogue better with the government on needs.

6.4.3 Liberia

(§ 129) For Liberia, no EU funds other than those of DG ECHO are at present available to NGOs for LRRD. Nevertheless SC-UK is using other funds to collaborate with the Ministry of Education to provide an accelerated learning programme that enables out-of-school youth to complete the primary grades in three years rather than six. It has plans for supporting more Ministry of Health clinics, and for establishing young farmers' centres.

(§ 130) It intends to continue to support the reintegration of children and to work with the police, and the Ministry of Social Affairs to build better care structures for separated children. All four lines of work are important for consolidating the peace, and should be central to any LRRD strategy.

7. An integrated approach to meeting the needs of children in emergencies

(§ 131) SC-UK's approach to improving the lives of children is through inter-related initiatives in four thematic areas: Health, livelihoods and nutrition, child protection and education. The experience shows that through interlinking activities across sectors, it is possible to get value added.

7.1. Pakistan

(§ 132) DG ECHO's funding has been used to fund shelter and the distribution of NFI. SC-UK regards this work as a supporting strategy for what can be achieved in the other four thematic areas. Provision of shelter and of household utensils has helped to protect the health of children and their caregivers, and it has provided a sense of security from which people could restart livelihoods. The mobilization that took place around the shelter distributions and the subsequent distribution of cash grants made it possible to engage communities with the wider tasks of reconstruction.

(§ 133) It also helped them engage with the needs of children. Many children were traumatised by seeing buildings collapse on family and friends. Some children were, themselves, dragged from collapsed buildings. The child friendly spaces that were constructed in makeshift encampments provided a safe haven for children in what had become a dangerous environment. It was a place where children could work through with their peers what had happened in their lives. SC-UK's initiative to start emergency schooling helped children regain the sense that school could be a safe place.

(§ 134) SC-UK is now trying to build on the community mobilization that came out of a disaster to pursue goals of a more developmental nature in the education sector. Progress in recovery has been made through a dynamic of inter-related activities, but there has been a need for constant vigilance to detect new emerging risks for children. One such risk was that of children becoming separated because their parents would put them in the residential madrassas for safe-keeping.

7.2. Liberia

(§ 135) In a country deeply impoverished by war, improvements in the lives of children requires improvements in livelihoods. For some of the most destitute, this meant food aid. Without this younger children would die and older ones resort to dangerous forms of labour to support their families. There were nevertheless two other important threads to the strategy:

(§ 136) Firstly, there needed to be awareness among communities and a sense of pride that children could be cared for, and offered an alternative to involvement in violence; secondly, care and assistance with reintegration have to be provided for children who have been involved with fighting forces or become separated for other reasons;[9] thirdly, community structures had to be put in place to help monitor and support children who are

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[9] It is here that work to provide out-of-school youth with educational opportunities comes to the support of work in the child protection sector.

at risk. Work funded by DG ECHO in the livelihoods sector and that funded in the child protection sector were carried out in mutually supportive ways. Staff making distributions of seeds and tools in communities created a readiness for people to listen to child protection messages.

(§ 137) Those working on child protection helped in the identification of families with acute needs for livelihood support. Providing the underpinning has been work in the health sector to avoid further destitution by sickness, to protect children from risky coping strategies and sexually transmitted illnesses, to provide maternal and child health services, and ensure under-fives are vaccinated against killer diseases. At the centre of community participation have been children themselves helping to carry health messages, provide information on the vulnerable, and raising awareness of their problems and needs.

7.3. South Sudan

(§ 138) Again the work done with DG ECHO funding in the livelihood sector and that done in the child protection sector are mutually supporting. Here, those working in the livelihood sector have joined with those in child protection to help angle livelihood support at the most vulnerable of children. Meanwhile community networks are being created to assist with the identification of vulnerable children, to provide temporary care and carry out tracing for separated children. The education programme meanwhile is providing accelerated learning opportunities to children who are vulnerable to exploitation because they have missed schooling and literacy classes for women who have poor livelihood opportunities.

7.4. Recommendations

a. SC-UK and DG ECHO should clarify what are the requirements with respect to speed of response when receiving funds under a *primary emergency decision.*
b. DG ECHO should look at whether it is possible to provide a wider range of support to livelihoods so as to better address the needs of those who are not agriculturalists.

8. Lessons Learned

8.1. [§ 139] The Pakistan earthquake response was the first occasion when DG ECHO and SC-UK collaborated to implement a *primary emergency decision* of the Commission. The intervention was carried out with high professionalism and was successful in carrying humanitarian assistance to needy people in areas that were difficult to access. Concerns nevertheless arose whether there was compliance with the requirements of a primary *emergency decision* for very rapid intervention. SC-UK was carrying out assessments in Muzzafarabad and Bagh within three days of the earthquake, started to establish forward bases very shortly after that and had a fully scaled up distribution system in Bagh within a month. There is need for greater clarification of what the compliance requirements are under a primary emergency decision.

8.2. [§ 140] SC-UK did not find it easy to coordinate the work of its emergency response team in London with that of its country office in Islamabad in Pakistan. SC-UK does have clear rulings for deciding lines of authority in emergencies. In practice, however, there is need to consider how an emergency response can be coordinated with the regular country programme, and eventually assimilated into this. Unsatisfactory coordination raises risks of an emergency operation evolving into one of longer term development that cannot be sustained.

8.3. [§ 141] It is important to make preparations not only for an emergency but also for the end of an emergency. Without this there may not be readiness to engage with the tasks of capacity and institution building in the post emergency phase. To get the necessary concentration of expertise on the ground may require changes to staff establishment, redeployment of staff and intensive training of local partners.

8.4. [§ 142] There is a need to be realistic about the geographical spread of activities that can be achieved in an immediate post-emergency context. It is important not to spread resources too thin. Capacity and institution building usually needs a concentration of resources that aid distributions do not need. Training has to be followed up with support on the ground and with monitoring. In any case, it is better to get the model before going to scale. This avoids making the same mistake several times in different places.

8.5. [§ 143] If the household economy assessment comes to be seen as a *cause* or as a method of needs assessment that stands in opposition to others, it may provoke resistance and alienate certain important partners. Collaboration with partners is paramount. Bearing in mind that it is the underlying approach to emergency response and development that is important and not the tool, emphasis might be better placed on reaching agreement with partners on a common approach in the first instance. Agreement on assessment methods can come later.

8.6. (§ 144) Sometimes more is achieved by providing assistance with the implementation of plans that are a little less than ideal rather than advocating for the ideal. For a fragile government such as the one in Liberia, conflicting messages on how to plan for food security could cause confusion, delay the planning process, and hold up the funding of food security projects.

8.7. (§ 145) Current donor assistance for restarting livelihoods is very restricted in form and not always relevant. Beyond agriculture there is need to consider the needs of people who make their living from trade and from pastoral activities. One approach to helping these people is through cash distributions. Another is through vouchers that they can exchange for a pre-agreed range of goods.

8.8. (§ 146) In many post-conflict situation, there are children who continue to be especially vulnerable. This is particularly true of children who have been with fighting forces or those who are separated for other reasons. In some circumstances there are children at risk of being drawn into fighting forces in neighbouring countries. In the aftermath of emergencies there are other heightened risks such as gender based violence. A continuing commitment to child protection is therefore needed in the post-emergency era, and it can be expected to have a peace dividend.

8.9. (§ 147) In both conflict and post-conflict situations, effective child protection requires awareness raising and capacity building with communities. This takes time and is not achieved in a single DG ECHO funding cycle. It should not however be dismissed as a development objective, and something that has no place within an emergency response strategy. Without an investment for the medium term, the emergency risks running into another cycle.

8.10. (§ 148) The current situation in Liberia and Pakistan calls for greater donor support for NGOs through the phase of LRRD.

Acronyms

CAFF	Children Associated with Fighting Forces
CBCPN	Community Based Child Protection Network
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCF	Christian Children's Fund
CGI	Corrugated Galvanised Iron
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CROG	Child Rights Observatory Groups
CWC	Child Welfare Committee
DEC	Disasters and Emergency Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
ECE	Early Childhood Education
DG-ECHO	Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning System
GIM	Global Impact Monitoring
GoL	Government of Liberia
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HEA	Household Economy Assessment
HR	Human Resources
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IRC	International Relief Committee
LAF	Livelihoods Assessment Forum
LGA	Local Government Authority
LRRD	Linking Relief with Rehabilitation and Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund

MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OFDA	Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
OLS	Organization Lifeline Sudan
PHAST	Primary Health and Sanitation Trainers
PHSI	Preventive Health and Sanitation Items
RRP	Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme
RSH	Reproductive and Sexual Health
SC-UK	Save the Children United Kingdom
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SSCSE	South Sudan Commission for Statistics and Evaluation
SSRC	South Sudan Relief Committee
STDs	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
TBA	Traditional Birth Attendant
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VSF	Vétérinaires sans Frontières
WFP	World Food Programme