

**EVALUATION OF ECHO's CO-OPERATION WITH  
THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED  
CRESCENT SOCIETIES (IFRC) AND IFRC ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY  
ECHO, INCLUDING THE PARTNERSHIP AND ACTIVITIES WITH  
CERTAIN EU RED CROSS NATIONAL SOCIETIES.**

June 29 – September 05, 2004

## **Evaluation Report**



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**This Evaluation Report has been financed by and produced at the request of the  
European Commission (ECHO/EVA/210/2004/01206).**

The comments contained herein reflect the opinions of the consultants only.

The cost of this evaluation was 136.000 Euros (=0.03 % of the budget evaluated).

**December 2004**

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ACRONYMS	
ADB	Asian Development Bank
CAS	Co-operative Assistance Strategy
CBDP	Community-based Disaster Preparedness
CBFA	Community-based First Aid
DMIS	Disaster Management Information System
DOTS	Directly Observed Treatment
DP	Disaster Preparedness
DR	Disaster Response
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EUNS	European Union National Society
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
FACT	Field Assessment and Co-ordination Team
FPA	Framework Partnership Agreement
FRC	Finnish Red Cross
FS	Food Security
GP	Global Plan
HF	High Frequency
HLS	Humanitarian Logistical System
ICG	Informal Consultative Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IRCM	International Red Cross Movement
IRCS	Iranian Red Crescent Society
LRRD	Linking Relief and Development
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MCTC	Mother to Child Transmission (of HIV)
MOE	Ministry of Emergency
MOH	Ministry of Health
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
MT	Metric Tonnes
NDRT	National Disaster Response Team

NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NITS	National Intervention Team
NRC	Netherlands Red Cross
ONS	Operating National Society
PADRU	Pan-american Disaster Response Unit
PHAST	Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation
PHC	Primary Health Care
PNS	Participating National Society
PSF	Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres
RAS	Regional Co-operation Assistance Strategy
RC	Red Cross or Red Crescent
RCBL	Red Cross Bureau de Liaison
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team
RFU	Regional Financial Unit
RITS	Regional Intervention Team
RRO	Refugees Relief Operation
RRU	Regional Reporting Unit
SPRAA	Special Programme for Refugee-affected Areas
SRC	Spanish Red Cross
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TA	Technical Assistant
TAJRC	Tajiki Red Crescent
TANZRC	Tanzanian Red Cross
TB	Tuberculosis
USD	US Dollars
VCA	Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis
VHF	Very High Frequency

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Project title: **Evaluation of ECHO's Cooperation with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and IFRC activities funded by ECHO, including the partnership and activities with certain EU Red Cross National Societies.**

Implementing agency: ECHO

### 1. Introduction

1. This is a regular, scheduled evaluation of ECHO funding (2000 to 2003) of different members of the International Red Cross Movement (the Movement). Activities (projects) in three countries were non-randomly selected by ECHO for the evaluators to visit, i.e., Tajikistan, Tanzania and Iran. The headquarters of the Netherlands, the Spanish and the Finnish Red Cross (RC), as well as that of the Red Cross/EU Office (otherwise known as Bureau de Liaison in Brussels (RCBL) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Secretariat in Geneva were also visited. This, among other, to assess the interrelationships and the quality of partnerships and co-ordination issues among Federation members. The individually evaluated projects' relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability are presented in ad-hoc fiches in Annex 2. The experience ECHO should draw from the deployment of nine ERUs during the Bam earthquake is then linked with some key recommendations for ECHO in this domain. Alternatives for the IFRC's use of thematic funding are also proposed.

### 2. Methodology

2. After briefings in Brussels, and after reviewing available documents at ECHO headquarters, the evaluators prepared three instruments for their evaluation work, namely:

- a "Logic of the Proposed Evaluation Frame" (with evaluation questions/issues and how they were to be assessed),
- an "Individual Project Evaluation Fiche", and
- a format for an "Evaluation Report – Individual Project Executive Summary".

The methodological tools used for evaluation purposes are presented in Annex 3.

### 3. Key evaluation findings

*(Findings are presented in three levels as per the ToR)*

#### 3.1. Global strategy level

3. **Operational role of the IFRC Secretariat:** From what was seen, the Secretariat has not yet sufficiently shifted away from fundraising and operational roles in the field. It has had a hard time finding donors willing to fund just co-ordination and capacity building activities and, therefore, still depends on the overhead it receives from implementing projects. This notwithstanding, the Secretariat still effectively gives direction to the RC Movement and co-ordinates member national societies well. The Secretariat and all parties to this evaluation are indeed good ECHO partners. It influences learning through the action of hundreds of RC delegates working with operating national societies (ONSs) worldwide.

4. **Partnerships** between the Secretariat and the three European national societies (EUNs) visited are cordial. Relations ECHO/Secretariat, partner EUNs and RCBL are very good. IFRC/ICRC relations are also smooth; the mutual responsibilities, direction and co-ordination between the two are regulated by the 'Seville Agreement'. IFRC Secretariat/RCBL/EUNs relations have seen an important leap forward with the finalisation of Guidelines on how to apply for ECHO funding. In-country IFRC Delegation relations with the respective ONS in the three countries visited showed a mixed picture; the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST) and the Tanzanian RC made it clear they wanted to be treated more as equal partners. Both societies have come a long way in improving their skills, so discussions on this issue have been kept frank and without hostilities. The Iran Red Crescent Society (IRCS) is very strong and the IFRC Delegation in Teheran plays a more complementary technical and advisory role. Neither Tajikistan nor Tanzania presently have a Co-operation Agreement Strategy (CAS) laying the ground for the relations between the different members of the IFRC active in the country. Secretariat/EUNs/ONSs relations with outside institutions were found to be excellent, the latter also have good connections with national and regional government authorities. The relations with UN agencies in the humanitarian field were found to also be close and the same is true for relations with a host of European NGOs.

5. The capacity of the different RC family members assessed to respond to **the needs of beneficiaries** was found to be very good in all cases. Meeting the capacity building needs of ONSs by the Secretariat and the EUNs visited has been a slow, but nevertheless steady process which has concentrated more on the headquarters of the ONSs than on its branches; much remains to be done in capacity building and decentralisation. In Tajikistan and Tanzania, there is congruence between the ECHO country **Global Plans** and the respective RC plans.

### 3.2. Operational strategy level

6. **Disaster response and preparedness:** The RC network represents a highly added value to disaster response (DR) and disaster preparedness (DP) given the ubiquitous geographical presence of the RC and its volunteers has; there is a need to harmonise DP policies though, for everybody to use a standard package in their training. 'Strategy 2010' made DP an area to concentrate more on for the IFRC members. Every ONS is now supposed to have a DP programme. The capacity to respond to disaster varies for the three countries visited though: **In Tajikistan**, the DP capacity of the RCST is judged to be poor; communities are not prepared to cope with or protect themselves from disasters. Basic relief items are not pre-stocked in anything near needed levels; the number of trained human resources in DP needs to be upgraded. Tajikistan has not completed a national DP Plan. The few ongoing (mostly Dipecho-funded) mitigation micro-projects are seen as a clear added value. **In Tanzania**, the level of DP of the Tanzanian RC is also poor since not much training has been done; moreover, pre-positioned stocks and transport are nearly inexistent. No early warning system is in place. Trained human resources in DP can be found in only nine of the 20 provincial branches. **In Iran**, the levels of DP and DR are quite impressive. Iran has completed a national DP Plan. Stocks are indeed pre-stocked at rather high levels; this capacity is distributed over the national territory. After the DR in Bam, the IRCS must now fill the gaps created in its pre-positioned DP stocks. The number of trained human resources in DP had reached over 2 million volunteers in 2003. A well set-up early warning system exists.

7. **Channelling and use of ECHO funds:** The channelling of funds from ECHO all the way to the respective ONS using them happens quite smoothly and is comparable in efficiency to other ECHO/NGO projects elsewhere in the world. The Secretariat manages a non-earmarked Disaster Relief Emergency Fund that allows it to start up an initial response in cases of major disasters. EUNSS often send financial delegates to ONS countries to backstop the latter financial staff. In general, the evaluators consider the accounting systems used for the projects as adequate, but they still need to be upgraded.

8. **Specific institutional and operational issues:** The IFRC Secretariat provides up-to-date information on emergency situations the world over. For it, it uses its **Disaster Management Information System (DMIS)** which also acts as a global early warning system.

9. The Secretariat's **Humanitarian Logistical Software** (designed with the FRITZ Institute in California's help) is a global data base on suppliers and supply times that also tracks relief goods and stocks. Evaluators consider the latter an effective tool.

10. ECHO has framework partnership agreements (FPAS) with the ICRC, the IFRC Secretariat and 15 EUNSS. Specific details about the three EUNSS visited and the Secretariat in Geneva are found in the main text. EUNSS greatly contribute to the international activities of the Movement; some support the international components directly (**multilateral approach**), others prefer bilateral actions. In the long run, the **bilateral approach** can be an added value if actions are well co-ordinated; non-co-ordinated bilateral approaches should be avoided mostly to prevent donor driven situations.

11. In the projects evaluated, ECHO and its partners have been able to secure only a limited linking of relief, rehabilitation and development (**LRRD**) mechanisms fostering sustainability. Fostering LRRD, the EC has created a great expectation among its partners and beneficiary countries. But gaps still exist. **In Tajikistan's** longstanding food aid project, the prospects for LRRD are indeed poor; no government agency is in a position to pick up the costs of the commodities distributed and beneficiaries are quite helpless to generate needed income. The IFRC Delegation and the RCST are now trying to move out of food aid distribution and of the supply aspects of the health project and move more into organisational development and capacity building activities. In the health project in Khatlon, the drug distribution component has also created dependency. However, its community-based first aid component has a much higher chance, of sustainable impact. Dipecho and TACIS have the potential to play an important role in LRRD in Tajikistan. ECHO has been funding emergency operations in Tajikistan since 1995 and Dipecho projects since 2003. The new TACIS poverty alleviation facility was introduced in six districts in 2003. The IFRC Delegation in Dushanbe has not yet applied for TACIS funding. Given ECHO's planned phasing down in Tajikistan, co-ordination between these different instruments needs to be stepped up. Co-ordination of these needs to be formalised through a country strategy paper. **In Tanzania**, the situation is one of almost total dependency. LRRD has started to be partially addressed by funding from the European Development Fund. For ECHO to get involved in the voluntary repatriation and reintegration process is, in a way, in the spirit of LRRD.

12. The **quality of the reports to ECHO** is adequate; their delivery has seen some delays, but not much different from delays seen in NGO-implemented projects. The **internal monitoring** of the projects evaluated was judged to be good overall.

In the three countries visited, ECHO **visibility** is, in general, good.



**13. Operational issues of the ONSs in Tajikistan and in Tanzania:** In Tajikistan, in 2003, ECHO funded 17 relief projects and eight Dipecho projects. Dipecho projects were not implemented by the RC until 2004. They involved other ECHO partners (mainly NGOs). For the EC, Tajikistan is considered a case study for LRRD involving humanitarian aid operations of ECHO, Dipecho (ECHO), Food Security (AIDCO) and TACIS (AIDCO). The RCST is only very slowly moving from relief to development work, but is eventually catching up. It is involved more as a subordinate body in the ECHO-funded projects: the IFRC Delegation is clearly leading, somehow in a benign top-down manner (benign in the sense that it is not the base of conflict). 95% of the funding of the RCST comes from donors. The IFRC Delegation and the RCST have constructive relations with the ECHO TA in Dushanbe. That was also the case between the IFRC Head of Delegation and the leadership of the RCST. In Tanzania, the government policy towards refugees has hardened over the period under evaluation. The Tanzanian RC funding is overwhelmingly for refugee operations, but this is now slowly changing. The Tanzanian RC and the IFRC Delegation had long arguments over how much the implementation of the ECHO-funded project should be handed over to the former. They reached an agreement in 1997 in what was called 'The London Agreement'. The parties, in general abided by it ever since, despite off-and-on tensions the two organizations had in the last four years. LRRD is really not applicable to this project since alternatives are almost nil: the link is to repatriation and not to development. This is an argument for ECHO to become more involved in repatriation and reintegration activities. In 2002, the Tanzanian RC, with IFRC Delegation help, prepared a Strategic Development Plan to 2007. Evaluators found it to be of high quality.

**14. Advantages of actions funded through the IFRC:** Contracts with IFRC members have a big advantage for ECHO in terms of the established presence the member societies (and/or the Secretariat) have in the countries where the ECHO projects are implemented. This is indeed a great strategic advantage. Moreover, the Secretariat and the EUNSSs have a proven capability of deploying specialized international delegates. These delegates sent to ECHO-funded projects are more often European and male.

### 3.3. Sectoral strategy level

15. Sectoral food, health and water aspects of the projects evaluated: In Tajikistan, the Finnish RC food aid project in Dushanbe (giving food handouts to needy urban beneficiaries) has experienced cuts in coverage given ECHO's and the RC Society of Tajikistan's intention not to continue their involvement in food distribution activities. During the years under evaluation, good community-participation was actually achieved with local RC branches having taken a good part of the responsibilities in the distribution; in the process, their capacities have been greatly developed. The ECHO-funded health project in Khatlon has received ECHO funds since 1997. It has a big medical supplies distribution component (to rural facilities) which is not sustainable; it also has a new community-based first aid (CBFA) component which is promising in terms of sustainability. Since 2000, the drugs and medical supplies are procured by PSF. In Tanzania, evaluators expressed their concern about the current daily food ration to refugee camps only covering 1,860 kilocalories instead of the recommended 2,100. The ECHO-funded refugee camps health/water and sanitation project has had ECHO support for ten years; from 2000-2003 it ran all health operations in five camps. The project represents a big operation that takes care of all inpatient and outpatient needs of refugees. Outreach activities go all the way to the household level including all elements of maternal and child health, including HIV/AIDS activities. The project also manages water and sanitation needs of the camps and has specialized teams working in each

of these areas. Both Tanzanian and refugees staff run all operations. Details can be found in Annex 2.

16. **Cross cutting issues:** After an internal task force on **gender** and country-of-origin of staff, the Secretariat in Geneva concluded a better gender balance should be reached at senior management levels. (A bias in favour of staff coming from European countries was also identified). **In Tajikistan**, evaluators found no gender discrimination in the food aid and health projects. **In Tanzania**, there are active women's protection activities ongoing and organised women's groups are participating. However, women participation could be improved at decision making levels. **Children** are only indirect beneficiaries of the food aid project in Tajikistan; in the Khatlon project, children's issues are addressed as part of the Maternal and Child Health (MCH) programme. In Tanzanian camps, children do receive the needed attention. Child protection issues seem to be handled more in the health than in the psycho-social domain. In Tajikistan, the **elderly and handicapped** are priority candidates for receiving food aid. The health project keeps a small part of the drugs specifically for these groups. On **HIV/AIDS**, the IFRC worldwide has been very active for years. Work has now focused more on home-based care and orphans. HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria are now incorporated into CBFA training. **TB and malaria** are clearly concerns actively addressed in the Tanzanian camps. In Tajikistan's health project, much less, but still some, is done for HIV/AIDS; TB is a serious problem in the country and statistics are very poor; not much is being done for TB yet. Environmental concerns are not so relevant in the projects in Tajikistan. In Tanzania, too much procrastination has stood in the way of sustainable action: The concerns refer to the sourcing of fuel wood for the camps.

### 3.4. Emergency Response Units (ERUs)

17. The IFRC Secretariat already conducted an evaluation of ERU operations in Bam in May 2004. ERUs are very expensive to assemble, store, maintain and deploy. Only participating national societies (primarily EUNSSs) have ERUs; they have been used since the mid 1990s. ERUs include pre-trained and fully self-contained teams and pre-packed stocks; they can be mobilised within 48-72 hours. ERUs are fully self-supporting for the first month and can be deployed for up to four months; Field Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT) missions are deployed by the Secretariat immediately after a major disaster. If the FACT recommends the deployment of one or more ERUs, specific requests are then sent out by the IFRC Secretariat. There are presently six types of ERUs available: water and sanitation, basic health care, referral hospital, logistics, telecommunications and relief. In Bam, nine ERUs supported by 12 RC national societies were deployed. The operation represented the largest ERU deployment ever.

18. As regards the future use of the remaining ERU hardware and materials left behind, the question now is how the IRCS should use the donated remnant hardware. After each use, the IFRC Secretariat or Delegation and the respective EUNSSs should determine the condition of remnants, their potential use and functions, needs for replenishment and needs for additional training. Replenishment of relief stocks remains a big priority for the Iran RCS; it must urgently replenish used food and non-food items (in Bam).

19. The prime advantage of ERUs is the speed with which a small team can form and begin working in-situ. Their shortcomings, on the other hand, are, for example, the late integration of ONS personnel, local ONS staff not knowing what is expected of them in an ERU, and the criteria not defined for what to do with hardware left behind. Evaluators found out that actually pre-positioning ERUs in risk-prone regions of the world would not significantly shorten the early response time of ERUs. So, for the time being, evaluators are of the strong opinion that EUNSS and the American RC seem to have an advantage on these grounds (stocks well maintained and the logistics of -very rapid response well worked out).

## 4 Key Conclusions and Lessons Learned

### 4.1. Global strategy level (Roman numbers are as in the main text)

- i. The overall conclusion the evaluators draw from this evaluation is a positive one: The ECHO/IFRC Secretariat (and its members) relationship has been a good one over the four years under scrutiny.
- ii. The internal relationships among IFRC members and their Secretariat have perhaps more room for improvements, but have largely also been good and, most importantly, have not hindered ECHO-funded projects implementation in the field.
- v. A clear planned trend from humanitarian relief to a development-orientation is seen in two of the three EUNSSs evaluated (Netherlands and Spanish RC).
- vi. For all the national societies visited, it is true that they have indeed incorporated the 'Strategy 2010' principles into their respective national strategies.
- viii. To apply for ECHO funds, EUNSSs now go through RC/EU Office who negotiates which one of them applies for any given ECHO project.
- ix. The three projects evaluated (plus the Emergency Response Units in Iran) had a good intervention logic, answered the needs of the beneficiaries being served and are judged to have been successful.

### 4.2. Operational strategy level

- i. Historically, IFRC interventions have essentially been on disaster response; now, there is a greater progressive operational shift towards disaster preparedness.
- ii. The IFRC/EUNSSs global disaster response capacity is judged to be high; progress is still needed in providing support to ONSs in DP.
- iii. The IFRC Secretariat has been actively promoting the adoption of the **SPHERE standards** by all its members, by NGOs and by the donor community overall.
- iv. The projects evaluated have been able to secure only limited LRRD.v. ECHO contracts with IFRC members have operational advantages compared with NGO contracts given the ONSs branches presence in the field.
- vi. The projects evaluated are relevant, well managed, and the staff is highly motivated.

### 4.3. Sectoral strategy level

- i. Targeted populations fully depend on external assistance in both projects evaluated in Tajikistan and in the one in the camps in Tanzania. Alternative measures are acknowledged to be scarce.
- ii. No gender discrimination was found in both projects in Tajikistan and, in Tanzania, evaluators thought women participation could be improved at decision-making levels.
- iii. Environmental concerns are of importance in the Tanzanian camps.

### 4.4. Emergency Response Units (ERUs)

- ii. In disasters, international relief goods are to be deployed on the basis of identified needs by the local ONS. Too many expatriates and projects do become overwhelming and risk overlapping/duplicating services.
- iv. The ERU hospital and clinics, as well as the watsan units used, helped to prevent epidemic outbreaks; some were used for longer periods than the one initially planned for.
- vi. ECHO funding is considered a definite added value as it is available quickly and ERUs do need the back up of a donor. This clearly highlights the importance of ECHO's primary emergency decision of last December.
- viii. The handover process should be planned from the beginning of the ERU deployment and, for this purpose, the appointed local IFRC team leader should facilitate negotiations as ERU team leaders are often overwhelmed with operational tasks.
- x. One of the ultimate goals of ERUs must always be to increase the local capacity and to reduce dependence on expatriate staff so that the ERU deployments become more cost-effective and sustainable.
- xi. The presence of the IRCS with the force of all its network clearly increased the efficiency and impact of the IFRC's response in Bam.

## 5. Key Recommendations for ECHO and Red Cross Family Members

*Below are listed the most important recommendations to be followed up by ECHO and the different members of the Red Cross Family.*

*The complete lists of recommendations is found in the main text.*

*(Numbers correspond to the numbers in the main text, are discontinuous, because they only correspond to the ones considered most important; numbers after each recommendation refer to the paragraph they relate to in the main text)*

### 5.1. Global strategy level

- ECHO1 In the cases of ECHO contracts where the ECHO RC partner is not the one implementing the project, after the second contract year of such an arrangement, ECHO is to ask the RCBL to call a meeting to decide on one RC partner only to continue this activity, i.e., the one that will directly work with the respective ONS. (3.1.4.) 14

- ***ECHO4*** The Strategic Partnership meetings between ECHO, the EUNSSs, the RCBL and the Secretariat are an excellent stage to discuss major policy, strategic and operational issues including the recommendations of this evaluation report. (3.1.5) 15
- ***IFRC2*** In the immediate future, the IFRC Secretariat to concentrate on seeking ECHO funding for co-ordination and capacity building activities and operational funding to mostly work in areas where the EUNSSs do not have an operational presence (or an interest), as well as addressing the 'forgotten crises'. (3.1.5.) 18
- ***IFRC3*** EUNSSs to be more actively involved in the final selection process of delegates to be sent to the field in the case when the EUNS is the ECHO partner, but the Secretariat is the direct counterpart of the implementing ONS. [It would be preferable the EUNSSs propose non-European delegates for these positions]. (3.1.5.) 18
- ***IFRC5*** Invoking a spirit of true partnership, both the IFRC Secretariat and the EUNSSs must resist donors attempts to drive them when it comes to launching or adjusting (upwards or downwards) their programme activities, especially when it comes to the number of beneficiaries. (3.1.10) 28

## **5.2. Operational strategy level**

- ***ECHO9*** To effectively promote LRRD in Tajikistan as a case study, ECHO/Dipecho, TACIS and the Food Security Programme to continue meeting regularly in Brussels, in Almaty and in Dushanbe to annually set (and semi-annually monitor) a co-ordinated strategy; a RELEX representation is also desirable in the Brussels meetings. (3.2.6) 86
- ***ECHO11*** ECHO to continue to annually revise its phase-down strategy and plan in Tajikistan in consultation with other donors and partners; Punctual needs assessments will need to be commissioned to fine-tune this phase-down. (3.2.6.) 94
- ***IFRC6*** In the next five years, the Secretariat to progressively move more to do co-ordination and capacity building work in ONS countries (concomitantly moving away from directly implementing projects with ONSs). (3.1.1.) 9
- ***IFRC11*** The Secretariat to develop a mid-term policy on joint training for FACT members, RDRT and NDRT team members (from countries at high risk of disasters) and ERU team leaders. (3.2.6.) 73
- ***EUNSS5*** Standard project monitoring activities based on using the logical framework as a management tool are to be formalized and carried out regularly. Continue the practice to review recommendations made by such monitoring exercises (a few months after they are made) so as to verify if they have been implemented. (3.2.6.) 81 and 82
- ***ONS1*** All ONSs must have disaster preparedness training ongoing in the next three years; modules already exist for this training. (3.2.1) 35
- ***ONS2*** Carry out a DP needs assessment among branches and assess their respective training needs in this area. (3.2.3) 54

*[See twelve further specific recommendations for Tajikistan and nine for Tanzania in the main text]*

### 5.3. Sectoral strategy level

- *ECHO13*. As regards Dipecho funding, NGOs funded by Dipecho to always demonstrate efforts have been made to partner or co-implement the project with the respective ONS so as to strengthen the branch in the district they are working in; this, in an effort to increase sustainability. (3.3.1.) 121
- *ECHO14* Since Tajikistan is a test case for LRRD, the different EC stakeholders must jointly define what relief, what rehabilitation and what development they want to and can engage-in there. Then, they have to decide how to do what they decide to do. For a smooth progression they have to consider the local capacities rather than have decisions made politically at the different headquarters. Continuing holding regular meetings is recommended to adjust the integrated approach to poverty alleviation to be followed and to reinforce the LRRD chain in response to the EC's stated policy. Further, the EC's organisational and management structure must be staffed adequately to better co-ordinate the LRRD process. (3.3.1.) 122
- *ECHO15* Consider making the good HIV/AIDS work the IFRC is currently doing eligible for ECHO funding; this will have a good visibility impact. (3.3.6.) 138
- *TAJRC13* The RCST to work with the seven Dipecho funded NGOs to harmonise/standardise their approaches to disaster preparedness; this, as a basis to prepare a national DP strategy for everybody to follow in the future. (3.3.1.) 121

### 5.4. Emergency Response Units (ERUs)

- *ECHO16* ECHO not to fund ERU operations deployed outside the IFRC Secretariat ERU selection process (i.e., deployed without the 'green light' from the Secretariat). (3.4.1) 142
- *ECHO17* ECHO, with the IFRC Secretariat to set up a task force to decide the best modalities in which ECHO can financially support the ERU efforts. An ECHO revolving fund for ERUs could be one such mechanism. Evaluators favour a continuation of primary emergency decisions funding the deployment of specific ERUs in big disasters (with potential follow-up funding as was the case in Bam); they also favour ECHO considering the yearly financing of several joint training workshops for FACT and ERU team leaders, plus RDRT and NDRT team members from countries at high risk of disaster. (3.4.1) 152
- *IFRC15* All disaster prone ONSs should have a basic introductory course on FACT/ERU deployment procedures so as to know what exactly is expected of their staff from the moment these arrive. (3.4.1) 145
- *IFRC16* The decision-making process in Geneva on which ERUs are deployed should foster joint deployments and avoid any competition among EUNSs. (3.4.1) 147
- *IFRC18* After ERU deployments, the IFRC Secretariat or Delegation to always make sure an inventory of all hardware left behind is carried out to decide what is still functional/working in order to decide whether to replenish it and to determine the way in which and where those components can be used. Ideally, at that time, ONS staff should be trained on how to manage the remaining components of the hardware. (3.4.1) 149

- *IFRC19* As regards the pre-placing of ERUs hardware (ergo units simpler than conventional ERUs) and the training of ad-hoc local teams in disaster-prone areas in partnership with certain ONSs, this capability should first be established for use within national boundaries before considering these “ERUs” for upgrading for international deployment. ERU-holding EUNSs can partner with the respective ONSs to help the latter set up this capacity and carry out the first deployments jointly. A special task force of the ERU Working Group to be set up to propose a comprehensive policy for the near future regarding this ‘regional or national pre-positioning of ERU materials. (3.4.1) 149
- *IFRC21* In the near future, the ERU Working Group to decide what exactly are the respective ONSs to do with the hardware left behind by ERUs. Will there always be follow-up EUNS post disaster training of the staff of the ONS in the use of the equipment left behind? Who will pay for this? Who will pay for the replenishment of consumables of the ex-ERU? (3.4.1) 152
- *IFRC22* Participating national societies (PNSs) unilaterally arriving at a major disaster area through bilateral arrangements should be sternly reminded by the Secretariat of agreed procedures; this, because this leads to an artificially donor-driven division of disaster relief work. Existing Secretariat procedures do already select the best-positioned PNS to be invited to contribute. (3.4.2.) vii
- *EUNS6* The deployment of joint ERUs is desirable [as was recently done with ECHO funding (dealing with just one of them as the main contractor) for the hospital in Bam]. In these cases, they can share human resources, equipment and management and thus mutually reinforce each other with their respective expertise; common training and co-ordination between the two ERU teams should start as soon as possible (if they have not done so yet), way before the joint ERU is called to deploy. (3.4.1) 144
- *ONS3* All ONSs of disaster-prone countries to undergo a basic ERU introductory training for national and provincial staff to understand what is expected of them if an ERU is deployed. (3.4.1) 152

## 6. Thematic funding

Since late 2003, ECHO has made thematic funding resources available to international organisation partners. Thematic funding is a source of non-country-earmarked, one-time funding facility. It was created to fulfil specific capacity gaps; The thematic funding purpose is primarily to support global activities of international organisations in order to increase their technical capabilities to better serve the end-beneficiaries. It is designed to be easily replicable and to benefit people worldwide or in large vulnerable geographical regions. The approximate overall envelope for thematic purposes is 23, 5 million Euros for 2005.

ECHO and the IFRC are presently discussing the way thematic funding could be used for capacity building purposes. The present evaluation ToR required to look into the different possibilities and to formulate concrete recommendations.

Numerous RC staff in the countries visited were asked their opinion regarding the priorities they saw for using thematic funding resources. The vast majority of them saw a need to strengthen the IFRC's DP and mitigation work from the international all the way to the RC branch level.

There was little support (except for the staff in Iran) for the regional pre-positioning of DR stocks although not so for pre-positioning stocks for national DP purposes (*See above*). Evaluators are also disinclined to recommend this regional pre-positioning for various reasons (*also given in paragraph above*):

- given the EC's financial regulations it is complicated to finance stock pre-positioning;
- the stocking of DR commodities worked for PADRU in Latin America due to special circumstances: an important support from Amcross plus the availability of remnants from Hurricane Mitch and the location of already available empty warehouses in the (duty free) Panama Canal Zone. [These unique peculiarities make it questionable for such a structure to work elsewhere as well all other positive DP functions PADRU is fulfilling notwithstanding];
- any new regional depot will have to resolve national customs, immigration, air transport, maintenance costs and other issues before becoming viable;
- the actual time saved to get emergency supplies from a regional warehouse compared with the time for these supplies (e.g., an ERU) to arrive from a PNS is roughly equal to the time it takes to fly from the PNS warehouse to the regional depot: ergo a matter of only hours! (dispatching supplies from a PNS to an emergency spot is already streamlined to a matter of less than 48 hours);
- finally, for the first couple of years, any new regional depot will still need substantial backstopping from a PNS with experience.

Evaluators are convinced that, to increase response capacity, DP and mitigation activities are indeed a good, cost-effective and potentially innovative cross-cutting area for the IFRC to use thematic funding resources. This, since it already has the expertise in this work, but really needs the additional resources to significantly expand it. [Such a use also fits the 'ECHO Aid Strategy 2004' that says: "...*ECHO also works at promoting DP - as part of an overall Commission Disaster Prevention and Preparedness approach- in order to reduce both vulnerability and exposure of people to risks and disasters, as well as to reduce economic costs of such disasters*". (p.3)

To gainfully use thematic funds, the IFRC Secretariat should send a proposal to ECHO with an objective roughly worded along the following lines :

To complement the IFRC's Secretariat already efficient DR and overall DP activities, the Secretariat to (re)organize its work internally so as to significantly and specifically strengthen and expand its DP and mitigation activities targeted at the most disaster-prone countries (and most vulnerable districts within them.

Such an expansion calls for the Secretariat to, among other, carry out the following activities:

- target eight to twelve poor countries (especially among those with 'forgotten crises' or with appeals that were never covered and among those in which ECHO has had no visible presence focusing specially on the least developed countries according to the Human Development Index of UNDP. (Two complementary procedures can be used for this selection: the Disaster Risk Indicators Mapping of Dipecho and the DR/DP questionnaire the Secretariat has sent out to all national societies and that it is still tabulating)<sup>1</sup>;

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<sup>1</sup> Within the top twenty of the Dipecho mapping are: Ethiopia, Mozambique, Malawi, Chad, Tanzania, Uganda, Madagascar, Mauritania and Kenya in Africa.



- carry out specific DP/mitigation training needs assessments in the countries selected;
- use intensive training and simulations to work with the selected ONSs in those disaster-prone countries to strengthen their current weak DP/mitigation capabilities (i.e., addressing capacity gaps);
- in those countries, also do DP/mitigation training and work with the branches in the most risk-prone areas (a course of action that will also strengthen the ONSs decentralization of decision-making efforts the IFRC Secretariat and ECHO are interested in);
- adapt and translate the IFRC existing nine DP training manuals (already in four languages) to fit the specific training needs of the ONSs selected;
- organise exchange visits (for technical capacity building purposes) from RC staff of the countries selected to countries that already have good decentralized DP/mitigation programmes (i.e., horizontal transfer of knowledge).<sup>2</sup>

As a means to carry out these and other ad-hoc activities, the IFRC Secretariat should set up a special task force/implementation unit to plan for, implement and monitor the use of ECHO thematic funding funds.

As a result of these thematic funding funded activities (directly managed and co-ordinated by the IFRC Secretariat) at-risk ONSs, their branches and selected communities will:

- be ultimately made more aware on the positive role their direct action can have,
- participate in carrying out needs assessments (vulnerability and capacity analyses),
- see their early warning, DR and DP capacities strengthened,
- be better prepared to face natural disasters when they hit, with clear predefined instructions on how to proceed,
- avoid a number of the predictable casualties and thus save lives through becoming engaged in mitigation activities at community level,
- significantly improve DP and participatory, self-reliant mitigation activities (actually increasing their capacity to respond to crises in disaster prone areas plus most possibly resulting in a quite good level of medium-term sustainability),
- strengthen the capacities of and the number of RC volunteers in many RC branches in the most disaster prone districts,
- save on/reduce the operational costs of disaster responses as local capacities will be increased.

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Further, although the following countries are not part of the top twenty Dipecho mapping, ECHO had manifested an interest to increase its presence in the South Pacific. In the same mapping, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Fiji appear as priorities although after the 60<sup>th</sup> global priority. This notwithstanding, ECHO is interested in these countries as they are isolated countries and with no ECHO presence despite clear pockets of need

<sup>2</sup> The DIPECHO mechanism cannot serve these purposes: DIPECHO is a vertical approach to promote DP activities in specific countries, involving a larger number of ECHO partners who are working directly at grass-root levels (with the end-beneficiaries). Under the present proposal for thematic funding, the approach is global and horizontal. It supposes an organisational set-up at the Secretariats' level and DP/DR training-mainstreamed activities with ONS and their branches in a vast geographical area. The scheme as proposed can be easily adapted for replication by the Secretariat in other geographical areas.

All these results represent a big step forward since they contribute to reinforce the resilient capacities of beneficiaries and are thus clearly in the interest of both ECHO and the IFRC.

Finally, it is a good idea for the IFRC Secretariat to also use a small part of thematic funding to support the joint training of FACT/ERU/RDRT/NDRT team members (including qualified trainees from ONSs) as proposed in recommendation IFRC14 above.

It is, therefore, recommended that ECHO 4 and the IFRC Secretariat conclude their negotiations on thematic funding and consider the options presented here to eventually amend the formal proposal on thematic funding already in for ECHO consideration.

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## EVALUATION REPORT

### FINAL (DECEMBER, 2004)

Project title: **Evaluation of ECHO's Cooperation with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and IFRC activities funded by ECHO, including the partnership and activities with certain EU Red Cross National Societies.**

## 1. Introduction

1. This is a regular, scheduled evaluation of ECHO funding (2000 to 2003) of different members of the International Red Cross Movement (the Movement), i.e., the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and three European Union Red Cross Societies (EUNSSs), namely the Netherlands, the Spanish and the Finnish Red Cross societies. (NLRC, SRC and FRC respectively).

2. Pertinent data on the Movement members' interrelationships, on the main sectors they cover in their worldwide operations, on the role of their different members as recently redefined can be found in the 'Seville Agreement' (International Red Cross Movement, 1997), in the 'Strategy 2010 to improve the lives of vulnerable people by mobilizing the power of humanity' (IFRC, Geneva, 1999) and the 'Strategy for the international Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (IFRC, Geneva, 2000). As regards the strategic orientations of the IFRC, evaluators agree with the findings of the DFID/IFRC Strategic Partnership evaluation document of January 2002 (Section 3.2., pp. 25-26).

3. Activities (projects) in three countries were non-randomly selected by ECHO for the evaluators to visit, i.e.,

- Tajikistan (with an NLRC health and a FRC food aid project, both executed by the local IFRC Delegation),
- Tanzania (with an IFRC Delegation/SRC<sup>3</sup> refugee health project) and
- Iran [to explore how ECHO can become more involved in the funding of Emergency Response Units (ERUs)].

The headquarters of the NLRC, the SRC and the FRC, as well as that of the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva were visited.

Further, two meetings with the Red Cross /EU Office (also known as Red Cross Bureau de Liaison (RC/EU) in Brussels were also held. (*See Annex 1 for a detailed evaluators' itinerary and their main activities*)

4. The current evaluation represents but a small (and not representative) sample of all ECHO/Red Cross-funded projects (some 60 of them worldwide); it nevertheless gives a good insight on how they work.

5. The evaluators were able to assess the interrelationships and the quality of partnerships and co-ordination issues among Federation members, including the IFRC Secretariat, EUNSSs and Operating National Societies (ONSs) in the three developing countries visited.

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<sup>3</sup> As from 2004

The individually evaluated projects' relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability (including conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations) are presented in detail in specially designed fiches in Annex 2.

6. A special section covers the experiences the evaluators think ECHO should draw from the deployment of nine ERUs during the Bam earthquake in Iran; this is linked with some ad-hoc recommendations for ECHO in this domain. Recommendations are also proposed on how most effectively the IFRC Secretariat can apply for ECHO thematic funding resources.

## 2. Methodology

7. After briefings in Brussels, and after reviewing available documents at ECHO headquarters, the evaluators prepared three instruments for their evaluation work, namely:

- a "Logic of the Proposed Evaluation Frame" (with evaluation questions/issues and how they were to be assessed),
- an "Individual Project Evaluation Fiche", and
- a format for an "Evaluation Report – Individual Project Executive Summary".

These three documents were approved by ECHO and are presented in Annex 3.

## 3. Main Findings

8. The ToR called for doing the respective assessments and for presenting the findings of the evaluation at three levels. The report is therefore organised around these three evaluations pillars: global strategy level (level 3 of the ToR), operational strategy level (level 2 of the ToR) and sectoral strategy level (level 1 of the ToR). (*See Annex 4*)

### 3.1. Global Strategy Level

The evaluators' global survey came up with the following:

#### 3.1.1. Operational role of the IFRC Secretariat

9. As much as the IFRC documents 'Strategy 2010' and the ensuing 'Change Strategy for the IFRC Secretariat' call for the IFRC Secretariat to shift away from operational roles in the field and shift fundraising ('resources mobilisation in IFRC parlance') to a more Federationwide-focused approach this is not yet what evaluators found although the intention may well be there. It is expected that these functions will progressively, from now-on, be decentralized to IFRC Delegations (at the same time also expecting Participating National Societies (PNSs) and ONSs to fundraise). [Some of the interviewees actually perceive a flaw in the document 'Change Strategy for the Secretariat', i.e., it calls the IFRC Secretariat to move away from running operations and more into co-ordination and capacity building work. But it also says that the funds for this latter work are to come from IFRC Secretariat operations: an apparent contradiction that needs to be addressed]. Behind all this is the fact that the IFRC Secretariat finances were seriously strained after the American Red Cross withdrew its statutory contributions to the IFRC Secretariat. Despite reorganisation efforts to cut costs having been implemented after that already, the IFRC Secretariat still depends in good part on the overhead it receives from actually implementing projects. As much as it would like to concentrate on co-ordination among and capacity building activities for its member societies, the IFRC Secretariat has had a hard time finding donors willing to fund just those activities; it thus still depends on overheads generated by implementing projects either as the main contract signatory or sub-contracting the execution of projects for which EUNSS

are signatories but do not have a physical presence/previous experience in a given country. (It is noted here that there are a few situations in which the IFRC Secretariat still is the most appropriate applicant for funding for projects in the field). (*See recommendations ECHO1 and IFRC6*)

### **3.1.2. Role of the IFRC Secretariat in giving direction and co-ordinating ECHO projects**

10. The above fact notwithstanding, the IFRC Secretariat still clearly provides practical leadership in global resources mobilisation and also still takes a strong responsibility in training activities, as well as in co-ordinating the deployment and operation of Field Assessment and Co-ordination Teams (FACT), of other regional teams and of ERUs. To this should be added that, in Emergency Response, the IFRC Secretariat fulfils its statutory operational role well to organise, direct and co-ordinate international relief. Evaluators are thus of the opinion that the IFRC Secretariat effectively gives direction to the Federation and carries out important co-ordination functions among member national societies. This is for sure true in the case of the three ECHO-funded projects now being evaluated (food aid project in Tajikistan and health projects in Tajikistan and in Tanzania), as well as in the case of the IFRC Secretariat having successfully co-ordinated the nine ERUs deployed in Bam. The IFRC and all parties to this evaluation (all components of the International Federation) are indeed good ECHO partners.

### **3.1.3. The IFRC Secretariat's role in policy development/advocacy, promoting humanitarian values, introducing innovation and quality standards**

11. Other areas the evaluators corroborated the IFRC is an important actor in (i.e., the IFRC Secretariat and all its members) are the areas of humanitarian aid policy development, advocacy actions vis-a-vis governments, the enforcement of codes of conduct in disasters, the promotion of (the same) humanitarian values (ECHO stands for), the sharing of knowledge and new ideas/influencing learning (especially through the action of the hundreds of Red Cross delegates working with ONSs worldwide), and the promotion of quality standards -- importantly using the 'SPHERE Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards' in all the projects the evaluators assessed.

### **3.1.4. Quality of the relations among members of the RC family**

12. As regards the relations/partnership observed between the IFRC Secretariat and the three EUNSSs visited in relation to ECHO-funded projects, evaluators found that these are indeed complementary in their actions and, in general, also cordial. Overall, evaluators feel that Operating National Societies (ONSs, i.e., societies operating in their own countries) and Participating National Societies (PNSs, i.e., those societies that participate with resources in support of those operations) accept the IFRC Secretariat's co-ordination guidance, even if they sometimes do not fully live up to it and, in a couple cases encountered, go on bilateral relationships with donors or with ONSs (either as part of an IFRC decision or independently). [An example of arrangements outside IFRC Secretariat decisions is: the Japanese RC having twice deployed ERUs bilaterally.

13. The case often arises in which a EUNS is the main ECHO partner and the IFRC through its IFRC Delegation, together with the respective ONS, implements the project (e.g., the two projects evaluated in Tajikistan). The IFRC Secretariat has a programme support recovery clause by which it charges 6.5% programme support recovery rate to all contributions (cash, kind and human resources) which are administrated by the IFRC Secretariat. This policy applies also to ECHO contributions. When a EUNS is the contract holder this rate applies for the parts of the ECHO contract which are administrated by the

IFRC Secretariat. The respective ONSs do not participate in the overheads received by the IFRC. (See recommendation No. IFRC1\*)

**Note: All recommendations hereafter with an asterix\*, can be found in Annex 5: 'Recommendations not directly related to ECHO'**

14. It strikes the evaluators that the very longstanding arrangement in Tajikistan (or elsewhere) with two EUNs being the actual recipients of ECHO funds, but arranging for the IFRC Secretariat to handle the execution of the respective projects, makes no sense in the long run (any time past, perhaps the first two years, of such an arrangement). (See recommendation ECHO1)

### **3.1.5. Detailed account of the relations among the members of the RC Family interviewed**

15. Evaluators thought the **relations of ECHO with the IFRC Secretariat, partner EUNs and the Red Cross/EU Office** were very good in the cases they assessed. Since 2004, EUNs and the IFRC Secretariat apply for different sources of ECHO funding; EUNs tap the same ECHO resources as ECHO partner NGOs do and have the same FPAs as NGOs; the ICRC Secretariat has an FPA along the same lines than UN agencies and the ICRC Secretariat have. These international agencies' FPAs (framework partnership agreements) have greatly simplified reporting requirements, a fact the IFRC Secretariat gratefully acknowledges. [Since EUNs are not strictly NGOs, but provide auxiliary public services to the governments of their respective countries, it may be explored, evaluators were told, for their FPAs to be made somewhat different from those of European NGOs]. (See recommendation ECHO 4)

16. The **IFRC/ICRC relations** also seemed to the evaluators to be smooth and cordial; they both espouse/share mostly of the same principles/ approaches. Each goes about their specific, but interdependent mandates and no problems arise.

Founded in 1863, the ICRC assists and protects victims of conflicts and internal strife based on international humanitarian law, the fundamental principles and the Right of Initiative that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additional protocols<sup>4</sup> confer.

The IFRC, founded in 1919, has 181 national society members; it co-ordinates and directs international assistance to victims of natural and technological disasters and to refugees with an emphasis on health. It represents the international body of all recognised Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies.

17. Evaluators found relations in the field were also good and sharing of operational information was done frequently. Lead-agency role of the Committee or the Federation was not an issue in the countries visited. Since November 1997, the responsibilities for general direction and coordination of international relief activities and the strengthening of the International RC Movement (development and functional co-operation) are regulated by the Seville Agreement<sup>5</sup>. In organizational development, common approaches and a harmonized planning are used by both agencies, this contributing to a co-ordinated capacity building effort for the various national societies.

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<sup>4</sup>Signatory States are Parties to the Geneva conventions [www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org)

<sup>5</sup> This agreement, that was adopted by consensus, in resolution 6 of the Council of Delegates in Seville, on the 26th of November 1997, determines the organization of the international activities of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement governed by the values and principles which guide the Movement. For more details refer to <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JP4Y>

Evaluators did not seek meetings with the ICRC in Geneva though and explored this relationship mostly in their Iran trip where they met the ICRC Representative. (*See recommendation IFRC1*)

18. The **IFRC/RC/EU/EUNSS relations** have seen an important leap forward with the finalisation (April 2004) by the RC/EU of its 'Guidelines for applying for ECHO funding: EUNSS and IFRC collaboration with ECHO'. This document --agreed by the IFRC Secretariat and all EUNSS in principle-- standardizes the procedures to follow to decide which member of the IFRC is best suited and will apply for a certain specific ECHO funding; it basically sets clear participatory steps to be followed in the consultative process leading to the preparation of a proposal for ECHO and thus avoids any competition for funds within the IFRC. (*See recommendations ECHO2, RC/EU1 and IFRC2*)

The NLRC and the FRC told the evaluators they would welcome having a greater say in the selection of RC delegates sent to ECHO projects for which they are the contract holders, but have subcontracted the implementation to the IFRC Secretariat. (*See recommendation IFRC3*)

19. The **relations of in-country IFRC Delegations with the respective ONSs** in the three countries visited showed a mixed picture to the evaluators. Both the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST) and the Tanzanian RC made it clear they wanted to be treated more as equal partners, even as they recognized their shortcoming to fully take up some of the ECHO contract responsibilities. Both societies have come a long way in improving these skills as more project-funded IFRC delegates have been leaving in the last two years. Although this issue of being given more responsibilities always comes up in the IFRC Secretariat and IFRC Delegations/ONS discussions, it has not led to impasses in carrying out ECHO contractual work or in their mutual relationship: channels have been kept fully open and frank without signs of hostility. In the case of Iran, the Iran Red Crescent Society (IRCS) is indeed a very strong one and it is clearly the local IFRC Delegation that plays the complementary technical and advisory role in a very cordial, yet rather formal, relationship (e.g., although less so since the Bam operation, for the IFRC delegates to contact any department of the IRCS, they have to formally go through the IRCS's International Affairs Department - the IFRC's Delegation direct counterpart). (*See recommendations IFRC4 and IFRC2\**)

20. Neither Tajikistan nor Tanzania presently have a Co-operation Agreement Strategy (CAS), as much as this would help laying the ground for relations between the different members of the IFRC in the respective country. (Tajikistan is signatory of a Central Asia regional assistance strategy (RAS) entitled "Strategic Direction 2+2"). (*See recommendations ONS1\* and TAJRC1\**). Whether Iran would benefit from/need a CAS was not explored (not in the ToR).

21. As relates to EUNS/ONS relations, limited direct contacts exist between the NLRC, the FRC and the RCST (as regards the ECHO-funded projects evaluated) and these are professional and cordial; they occur mostly during yearly or twice a year visits by these EUNSS to Dushanbe. The NLRC has a bilateral project with the RCST using its own funds and relations are indeed very good in that RC branch strengthening project.

In Tanzania, evaluators vouch for the excellent start-up relationship established between the Spanish RC and the Tanzanian RC as this EUNS took over from the IFRC Delegation the entire refugee relief operation in January 2004. (*See recommendation IFRC2\**). [This relation was not explored for Iran].

### **3.1.6. IFRC members and their relations with other institutions**

22. As regards the IFRC Secretariat, EUNSS, ONSs relations with outside institutions, all of them were found to have excellent relations, as well as connections with national and regional government authorities. The ONSs assessed are actually mandated by their respective governments to manage disaster preparedness and response and are thus well connected.

The relations with UN agencies working in the humanitarian field were also found to be close; coordination meetings are held regularly with these agencies.

The same is true for the relations with a host of European NGOs --many of them recipients of ECHO funding. In Dushanbe, in a special meeting, the evaluators actually met with most ECHO partner NGOs for half a day (See Annex 6). The same was not possible in Tanzania since few of these NGOs have an office in Dar es Salaam. In Iran, evaluators want to highlight a good co-ordination between the IFRC Delegation and UNDAC, so much so, that an unprecedented joint flash appeal was prepared for the Bam earthquake.

### **3.1.7. IFRC members' capacity to respond to the needs of beneficiaries**

23. Further, it can be stated quite categorically that the capacity of the different RC family members assessed to respond to the needs of beneficiaries was found to be very good in all cases. Nevertheless, evaluators want to point out that vulnerability and capacity analyses (VCAs) they came across had been carried out emphasizing less the strengthening of organisational and behavioural capacities of the beneficiaries than focusing on the concrete (physical) basic needs regarding their actual vulnerability. (*See recommendation IFRC8*)

### **3.1.8. Role of the IFRC in meeting capacity building and decentralisation needs of ONSs**

24. Meeting the capacity building needs of ONSs by the IFRC Secretariat and the EUNSS visited has been a slow, but nevertheless steady process both in Tajikistan and in Tanzania. The process has concentrated more on the headquarters of the national society than on its branches. In branch development work in both countries, evaluators saw more bilateral EUNSS than IFRC Delegation projects tackling this challenge; these efforts were not necessarily unco-ordinated. In Tanzania, most efforts have concentrated in branches near the camps where the IFRC project was active in refugee work, to the neglect of the other many branches. Much remains to be done on capacity building and decentralization, but it is acknowledged that it is not easy to find donor funding for this. Evaluators are not clear whether there is a subconscious resistance to decentralisation by the leadership of ONSs to keep the power centralized or whether this leadership genuinely thinks branches are too weak to take their own decisions. Capacity building and decentralisation are intimately linked especially in all aspects related to governance which needs to be democratised in the three recipient countries visited. (*See recommendation IFRC4*)

### **3.1.9. Relevance of ECHO Global Plans to project work implemented by IFRC partners**

25. It can be safely said that, in Tajikistan and in Tanzania, there is congruence between pertinent parts of the ECHO country Global Plans and the respective RC plans (mostly prepared by the respective ONS with IFRC Delegation support). No contradictions or major duplications were found. This was corroborated by the ECHO TAs in both countries. As said, in both countries, a co-operation agreement strategy (CAS) would probably have been more desirable to make the above statement have even more weight. (*See recommendations ECHO5, ONS1 and TAJRC1\**)



### 3.1.10. Relative importance of ECHO funding

26. Evaluators analysed the relative importance of ECHO funding to the Federation between 2000 and 2003 when it reached 279 M€ of which 52% went to the ICRC, 15% to the IFRC Secretariat and 33% to EUNs (See Figure 1 ECHO funding allocations to the International Red Cross Movement members (Amounts in Euros))

It needs nevertheless to be noted that the overall ECHO funding allocation trend to these RC family members has substantially varied. (For details refer to Annex 7)

#### a. ICRC

27. Funding to the ICRC from 2000 to 2003 doubled from 25.9 M€ to 53 M€. The percentage of the ECHO funds to the ICRC rose from 6% in 2000 to 10% in 2003 due to the revision of the framework partnership agreement (FPA) terms and conditions, as well as the increased ECHO funding of major internal conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, ECHO, through its Thematic funding envelope, has recently started financing part of the ICRC's protection activities in Africa with an envelope of 10 M€

#### b. IFRC

28. During this same period under review, ECHO contributions to the IFRC Secretariat fell by 50% from 16.5 M€ in 2000 to 7.9 M€ in 2003 as the IFRC Secretariat has delegated to EUNs more operational programmes. Even with this down trend, ECHO remains the IFRC's largest multilateral donor<sup>6</sup>. (See recommendation IFRC5). It must also be noted that the IFRC Secretariat has recently signed the international organisations FPA, but has not yet received allocations from the new ECHO thematic funding envelope launched at the end of 2003.




Figure 1 ECHO funding allocations to the International Red Cross Movement members (Amounts in Euros)<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> This information does not correspond to paragraph 1.3. point 12, p.3 of the evaluators ToR; it has been drawn from the <http://www.ifrc.org> web page. In 2002, ECHO was the fourth largest donor responding to IFRC appeals (following the British, Norwegian and Swedish governments). In 2003, ECHO was the third, overtaking Sweden and contributing to 11% of the funds provided by the top 20 donors.


<sup>7</sup> Tables 1 and 2 have been elaborated on the basis of the amounts provided by the RC Bureau de Liaison in Brussels, July 2004.

**c. EUNSS**

29. During the same period, the German, Spanish, Netherlands and Danish RCs received 75% of the ECHO funding to EUNS (See annex 7). ECHO allocations to EUNSS decreased by 10% from 23.8 M€ in 2000 to 21.4 M€ in 2003. Globally, funding to the IFRC Secretariat and EUNSS has fallen from 9% to 6% of the total ECHO annual budget. (See Figure 2)

30. Most of the EUNSS received ECHO funding, but 3 funding trends must be highlighted:

- ECHO funding has sharply decreased for the majority of the EUNSS that signed the FPA (9 out of 15).
- It has increased just for the Finnish (quintuplicated), the Netherlands (increased by one third) and the Danish RC (nearly triplicated).
- In 2003, nearly half of the EUNSS did not receive any ECHO allocations for their international humanitarian relief operations (Austrian, British, Hellenic, Irish, Italian, Luxembourg, and Portuguese RC). During the full four-year period analysed, the Hellenic, Irish and Luxembourg RC never received ECHO funding. It is here noted that some EUNSS have limited international operations while others essentially rely now on private donations and government funding (See recommendations ECHO3 and EUNS1)



**Figure 2 Proportion of ECHO funding to EUNSS: 2000-2003**

31. As regards the proportion of ECHO funding going to the three EUNS visited, the following was found:

**Netherlands RC:** From 2000 to 2003, ECHO funding to the Netherlands RC<sup>8</sup> increased by 31%; the NLRC received the third largest contribution of ECHO to EUNSS. It is noted that the Netherlands Government financing of humanitarian aid through its national RC society

<sup>8</sup> The Netherlands RC has been running ECHO-funded projects since 1992.

has decreased; it refers the NLRC to apply for ECHO funding in the cases where countries or themes are not a priority to the Dutch Government..

**Finnish RC:** During the review period, ECHO allocations to the Finnish RC rose sharply by 425% and its ERU field hospital deployment was funded. In 2003, this allocation represented a 10% of the total budget for its international activities<sup>9</sup> while 60% was funded directly by the Finnish Government. The Finnish RC received the fifth largest contribution of ECHO to EUNSSs.

**Spanish RC:** ECHO funding to the Spanish RC fell by 45%, but even so, this society was still the second largest recipient of ECHO funds to EUNSSs. ECHO funding now represents 14% of the Spanish RC overall budget for international activities<sup>10</sup> and, only since 2002, does ECHO contribute less to these activities than the Spanish Government. Funding of the same international activities still relies heavily on voluntary, private and decentralized fundraising in the country though.

**d. ECHO funding of the IFRC Secretariat/EUNSSs and ONSs in the countries visited**

*For details see Annex 7*

**3.1.11. Key conclusions/lessons learned:**

- i. Overall, the evaluators draw a positive conclusion: The ECHO/IFRC relationship has been a good one over the four years under scrutiny; it deserves further nurturing among other along the lines of disaster preparedness, ONS capacity building and branch development, and forgotten crises. (*See recommendations ECHO4*)
- ii. The international relationship among IFRC members and their IFRC Secretariat have perhaps more room for improvements (as addressed in the recommendations hereunder), but have largely also been good and, most important, have not hindered ECHO-funded projects implementation in the field.
- iii. No serious duplications were found during the entire evaluation mission (*See recommendations ECHO5*)
- iv. At some time during the period under review, some European RC national societies relied more on ECHO than on their own governments' funding for international operations (Not the case of the NLRC).
- v. The Finnish RC carries out the majority of its international operations in humanitarian relief activities. The Netherlands RC has a more balanced approach (with development activities) while the Spanish RC - run activities are clearly more development oriented.
- vi. For all the national societies visited, it is true that they have indeed incorporated the 'Strategy 2010' principles into their respective national strategies.
- vii. According to the Strategy for Change of the IFRC Secretariat, some EUNSSs, such as the Netherlands RC and the Spanish RC adopt a more bilateral approach in their international work (*See recommendations ECHO6 and EUNSS2*)

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<sup>9</sup> As an average, during the review report, 80 to 85% of the budget was dedicated to relief operations (including DP and training activities).

<sup>10</sup> RC/EU figures do not match with the ones given by the Spanish RC and audited by Price Waterhouse Coopers, e.g., from 9.8 M€ in 2000 to 4.9 M€ in 2003. According to this data, ECHO funding to the Spanish RC international activities dropped from 21% of its activities in 2000 to 14% in 2003. Over the same period, the international activities' budget has fallen from 46.6 M€ to 35.6 M€. The Spanish RC has followed an innovative decentralized fundraising strategy in which provincial and local authorities fund the international activities through the provincial branches.

- viii. Before the ICRC and the IFRC Secretariat signed the International Organisations new ECHO FPA in December 2003, several EUNSSs negotiated with the IFRC Secretariat to apply for ECHO funds. EUNSSs have historically competed among themselves, but the process was loosely and now always brokered by the RC/ EU Office before one of them applies to an ECHO project.
- ix. It is the evaluators' view that, overall, there is a good congruence of the operations evaluated and the humanitarian aid objectives of ECHO. All members of the Federation assessed showed intimate knowledge of the problems in the localities they were working-in and had a well recognized presence as credible, well connected and highly respected actors in the countries where they operated. The three projects evaluated (plus the ERUs) had a good intervention logic, answered the needs of the beneficiaries being served and were judged to be effective and successful, regardless of the problems found and described further down in this Report.
- x. The surge of conflict spots around the world explains in good measure the trend of ECHO funding going more to the ICRC than the IFRC in the years under review.

### 3.1.12. Recommendations

#### For ECHO:

- ECHO1 In the cases of ECHO contracts where the ECHO RC partner is not the one implementing the project, after the second contract year of such an arrangement, ECHO is to ask the RC/EU Office calls a meeting to decide on one RC partner only to continue this activity, i.e., the one that will directly work with the respective ONS. (In other words, from the third year on, ECHO would only fund the direct implementer working with the respective ONS). (3.1.4) 14
- ECHO2 To strengthen the new RC/EU Office Guidelines for Applying to ECHO Funding, the RC/EU Office requests that ECHO does not 'write-off' EUNSSs that have not gotten an ECHO contract in two years. (3.1.5) 18
- ECHO3 ECHO funding to the IFRC members to regain levels closer to those seen in 2000; the funding to be more balanced among the EUNSSs in relation to their respective operational capabilities (helped in this by the RC/EU Office). (3.1.10) 30
- ECHO4 Periodic meetings are recommended between ECHO, the EUNSSs, the RC/EU Office and the IFRC Secretariat; they are an excellent stage to discuss major policy, strategic and operational issues including the recommendations of this evaluation report. Issues pertaining the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GDH) Initiative should also be discussed at this level. At field level, ECHO TA/IFRC implementing member scheduled periodic meetings are also recommended. (3.1.5) 15
- ECHO5 Where this is not already the case, when the ECHO TA goes to the field to monitor a RC project, the TA is to try to secure his/her EUNS or IFRC Delegation counterpart comes along. (3.1.9) 25
- ECHO6 Bilateral RC projects to be funded by ECHO in countries where such an approach is advantageous (in consultation with the RC/EU Office who will have checked with the IFRC Secretariat and the respective ONS). (3.1.11) vii

#### For the RC/EU Office:

- RC/EU1 EUNSSs to formally ratify their acceptance of the April 2004 Guidelines for Applying to ECHO Funding. (3.1.5) 18

### **For the IFRC Secretariat:**

- ***IFRC1*** The IFRC Secretariat and PNSs to work with the ICRC on needed amendments/addenda to the 'Seville Agreement' that allow them, on a case by case basis, to fundraise and work in a country 'in conflict' (where the ICRC is the lead agency), but in areas of the country away from the actual conflict that need humanitarian aid. (3.1.5) 16
- ***IFRC2*** In the immediate future, the IFRC Secretariat should concentrate on seeking ECHO funding for co-ordination and capacity building activities worldwide and operational funding to mostly work in areas where the EUNSS do not have an operational presence (or an interest), as well as addressing the 'forgotten crises'. (3.1.5) 18
- ***IFRC3*** EUNSS to be more actively involved in the final selection process of delegates to be sent to the field in the case when the EUNS is the ECHO partner, but the IFRC Secretariat is the direct counterpart of the implementing ONS (e.g., Tajikistan). [It would be preferable the EUNSS propose non-European delegates for these positions as long as they meet ECHO requirements]. (3.1.5) 18
- ***IFRC4*** The IFRC Secretariat and IFRC Delegations needs to work with the respective ONSs to delineate a concrete plan for further branch development and decentralisation of decision making and how willing PNSs could support this effort; such a plan is to outline priority geographic areas and the contents that this reorganization work should cover. (Community-based disaster preparedness work seems to be an excellent vehicle to foster branch development). (3.1.5) 19
- ***IFRC5*** Invoking a spirit of true partnership, both the IFRC Secretariat and the EUNSS must resist donors attempts to drive them when it comes to launching or adjusting (upwards or downwards) their programme activities, especially when it comes to the number of beneficiaries (as, for example was, in part, the case in both the food aid and health projects in Tajikistan). (3.1.10) 28

### **For EUNSS:**

- ***EUNSS1*** Stronger EUNSS to transfer know-how to upgrade international operations of less developed PNSs through joint programmes, deployment of delegates and training, (3.1.10) 30
- ***EUNSS2*** EUNSS to respect the non-competition and best-positioned clauses of the RC/EU Guidelines. (3.1.11) vii

### **For ONSs: None.**

## 3.2. Operational Strategy Level

### 3.2.1. Disaster response, disaster preparedness: Overall aspects

32. Historically, IFRC interventions have essentially been on disaster response (DR) and disaster preparedness (DP) both seen as key duties under the co-ordination of the IFRC Secretariat. The way evaluators see things, there is now a progressive and more explicit operational shift towards DP. The IFRC Secretariat has, therefore, set DP as a higher priority to address worldwide needs. DP work lends itself to ongoingly build-up the branch capacities of the ONSs; it is deemed cost-effective and sustainable. There is a need to harmonize DP policies though, for everybody to use a standardised package in their training. National disasters preparedness plans must still be put in place in most disaster prone countries. The RC network represents a highly added value to DP and DR given the ubiquitous geographical presence of the RC and its volunteers. Altogether, worldwide, the national societies comprise 300,000 employees and 97 million trained volunteers at community level who provide assistance to some 233 million beneficiaries each year. *See note [1] in Annex 8.*

33. The IFRC Secretariat launches/approves international emergency appeals<sup>11</sup> to raise funds for relief operations; it then mobilises the human resources and the relief items needed. The IFRC Secretariat/EUNSS global disaster response capacity is judged to be high as ERUs are constantly on standby for deployment. These Units consist of pre-assembled emergency relief items and fully trained stand-by technical teams that can be airlifted to and be operational in an area of a major disaster in 48-72 hours. Section 3.4 of this report is fully devoted to ERUs. The Operations Support Department of the IFRC Secretariat is the one who decides on and approves the ERUs to be deployed. (*See table of available ERUs ready to deploy in October 2003 in Annex 9*). The department also sends the FACT missions and regional disaster response teams (RDRT) using funds from the PNS where the chosen members come from and/or its own Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF). The department also checks all emergency appeals before they are sent to the Secretary General for signature.

34. *For a general description of how the IFRC Secretariat, EUNSS and ONSs respond to disasters, see note No. [2] in Annex 8.*

35. 'Strategy 2010' made DP an area of greater efforts for the IFRC members; they have already done extensive DP work, for example, in Bangladesh. The IFRC Secretariat sees DP as tackling 'hazards and vulnerabilities' and is active in both areas though the focus so far has been mostly on hazards. Consequently, more work is done on systems and organizational work; vulnerability work calls for actions centred more on livelihood aspects. Every ONS is now supposed to have a DP programme. There are nine training modules already available (in four languages). The IFRC Secretariat also has nine training manuals on disaster response plus a simulation module; both sets have corresponding trainers' guides. In 2002-2003, the IFRC Secretariat sent out DP and DR questionnaires to 123 country societies and almost all are in need of further support. (*See recommendations IFRC7 and ONS1*)

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<sup>11</sup> The 2002-2003 Federation's Appeal was launched to fund 72 humanitarian assistance programmes. In addition, on average, the Federation launches 30 new emergency appeals each year as disasters strike; it also supports smaller operations from its disaster relief emergency fund.

36. Disaster preparedness (operational aspects) is an area the evaluators concentrated on to get a clear picture. From the IFRC Secretariat's perspective, DP refers to measures taken to prepare for and reduce the effects of disasters. That is, to predict and - where possible - prevent them, mitigate their impact on vulnerable populations and respond to and effectively cope with their consequences. *For more details, see note No. [12] in Annex 8.*

37. As regards timeliness of **disaster response (operational aspects)**, evaluators can only make comments on what they were able to assess a-posteriori in Bam. The IRCS has to be commended for the speed of response in the evacuation of seriously injured victims of the earthquake. In the 48 hours following the disaster, they had evacuated 14,000 casualties both by air and by land. Despite its good organization, the IRCS could not cope with all DR needs and that is why they called on the IFRC Secretariat to deploy needed ERUs. *(See section on ERUs)*

### 3.2.2. Specific disaster response set-up of the IFRC

38. As related to the capabilities the IFRC Secretariat has to **provide up-to-date information on emergency situations** the world over, these were judged to be fully up-to-par. The monitoring of the same emergency situations is not less important and the IFRC Secretariat set up a Disaster Management Information System (DMIS)<sup>12</sup> in November 2001. This information system also impressed the evaluators positively. It is still only used by some 2000 people worldwide (by subscription only). Historically, it was set up as a follow up to 'Strategy 2010' and in response to the need for informed decisions, speed and efficient operational readiness. The DMIS is a web-based working tool accessible only to Red Cross and Red Crescent staff working in National Societies<sup>13</sup>, all IFRC Delegations and IFRC Geneva headquarters (also some ICRC staff are registered). This is a system from which users are able to access real time information on disaster trends, online internal and external operational resources, tools and databases. It intends to address the complexity of information exchanges in the humanitarian community to support monitoring, disaster preparedness and response for the whole Federation's Red Cross and Crescent society's network at a global level. It is also an alert system that provides information when to launch an emergency operation. The DMIS does not receive direct funding from ECHO but is updated with several Reliefweb ([www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)) and IRIN (OCHA) reports that do receive ECHO thematic funding. *(See recommendations EUNS3 and IFRC6\*)*

39. The IFRC and its 181 members eventually have a **presence** in the majority of humanitarian emergency situations and disasters (and refugees' influxes) where they **cover the different needs of beneficiaries** - and that fall under the IFRC mandate. Co-ordination is supposed to be achieved by setting up Co-operation Agreement Strategies (CAS). The CAS concept was introduced in 1999. A CAS presents the national humanitarian situation, the existing funding and assistance, the national society context, the priorities of the IFRC assistance, the national society activities supported by donors (particularly donors of the Movement) and a budget overview. Only about 30% of the eligible countries have started one. Therefore, EUNSSs should be more proactive in integrating their projects into the CAS process and in helping establish such a process where it does not yet exist. *(See recommendations TAJRC1\* and TANZRC14\*)*


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<sup>12</sup> <https://www-secure.ifrc.org/dmis/home.asp> . The site has different sections including monitoring where field emergency reports are posted; special focus pages provide operational information. Preparedness topics offer linkages to specific DP cases. Activities and tools such as co-operation agreements, disaster profiles, DP tools, project reviews, disaster management training and events are also covered. The DMIS presently has 1,850 users.

<sup>13</sup> 56% of DMIS users are from National Societies, 27% are from the IFRC Delegations and 16% from the IFRC Secretariat and less than 1% from ICRC.

40. As regards **early warning systems** being in place, internationally, the IFRC Secretariat has the DMIS in place. Primarily though, monitoring and early warning are the function of national societies and of the IFRC regional disaster management coordinators. Nationally, the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST) and the Tanzanian RC have poor such systems. Conversely, the IRCS has a good early warning system.

41. The components of a **rapid response capability** are many. The figure below roughly illustrates its components:



*Figure 3 IFRC Response in Disaster Cycle*

42. A **Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF)**<sup>14</sup> exists. It is a non-earmarked rotation fund that has a present balance of 7 million CHF (and a target of 10 M CHF). It allows the IFRC Secretariat to start up the initial response for major disasters, funding non-visible and forgotten crises.

43. The IFRC/national societies rapid response tools in disaster relief include **Regional Disaster Response Teams (RDRT)**<sup>15</sup> that are multi-disciplinary and multinational (NDRTs are the national counterparts). They are available for deployment within 24 hours and can be assigned to missions of up to 6 weeks. *For details see note No. [10] in Annex 8.*

44. They also include **Field Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT)**<sup>16</sup> that are also multinational, with technical competence, regional knowledge and ability to timely and professionally respond to disaster situations. They are also available for deployment within 12 to 24 hours and can be assigned to missions of up to one month<sup>17</sup>. The role of FACTs is to carry out an immediate assessment of the needs of the people affected by the disaster. FACT missions facilitate and co-ordinate the start-up of relief activities. They may request ERUs

<sup>14</sup> In 2001, DREF funded 43 emergencies; in 2002, 52 and in 2003 34.

<sup>15</sup> They are mainly experienced disaster response practitioners in neighbouring national societies. 389 persons were sent from 2000 to 2003. They presently can cover Central America, Southern Africa, the Great Lakes Region in Africa, Central Europe, Central Asia, the Indian sub-continent and South East Asia.

<sup>16</sup> These FACT teams are a core group of experienced Red Cross/Red Crescent disaster managers from within the Federation and National Societies with different expertise in relief, logistics, health, nutrition, public health and epidemiology, water and sanitation, finance, administration and psychological support. They have language capabilities and have taken a specific ten days training to become members of FACT teams. When deployed, they adopt a multifaceted and flexible approach to emergencies: assessment, co-ordination, planning, reinforcement of existing structures, visibility and implementation

<sup>17</sup> As of July 2004, EUNSSs had a total of 166 FACT trained personnel. (the three largest being the British, Danish and Finnish RC). Europe is the region that has most FACT trained personnel. Their number overtakes the 134 persons trained in other regions of the world, partly due to the elevated training costs and related sponsoring.



and co-ordinate their deployment, advise on and request other human and material resources and co-ordinate the assistance provided by the IFRC in response to the disaster. *See note [11] in Annex 8.*

45. As regards using **SPHERE standards**, the IFRC has been actively promoting the adoption of these standards by all its members, by NGOs and by the donor community. Evaluators saw how these standards were applied from the very beginning in the operations in Bam. In Tajikistan, the FRC project must still adopt supply chain management and quality control minimum standards to avoid the type of procurement problems previously reported. In Tanzania, the services provided in the camps are well above SPHERE standard; this could become a deterrent to repatriation given the very poor conditions on the other side of the border.

### **3.2.3. Disaster preparedness, disaster response and community health capabilities in the countries visited**

46. Evaluators found that the capacity to respond to disasters varies for the three countries visited. The three ONSs visited can be said to, indeed, have a good knowledge of the local situation and of risk problems. This did not always mean that their level of preparedness was commensurate to that knowledge.

47. In Tajikistan, Tanzania and Iran evaluators confirmed that DP capacities vary substantially. They noticed that DP activities are not only supported by the IFRC Secretariat and EUNSSs, but also by other donors and NGOs. DP work plays a crucial role in decreasing people's vulnerability and strengthens their coping capacities. *See note No. [3] in Annex 8.*

48. **In Tajikistan**, most of the disasters are related to water: landslides, mudflows, floods and drought. The country is also considered as a high seismic-prone area<sup>18</sup>. The disaster preparedness capacity is judged by the evaluators to be poor considering the high disaster proneness and the enormous needs of the country. Most disasters are of small scale, and affect scattered communities. As the poverty is widespread, communities are not prepared to cope with or protect themselves from disasters. Therefore, the evaluators consider that community-level disaster reduction and preparedness is of key importance in this context. Certainly the efforts of the IFRC will not be enough. The RCST intends to prepare its own DP plan, but also works in partnership with the Ministry of Emergency (MoE) who is finalising a national disaster preparedness plan with external assistance by November 2004. The Ministry of Emergency has a limited budget and very limited available stocks of relief supplies. At provincial level, the RCST has seven strategic disaster centres and has trained seven disaster response teams (staff and volunteers are trained for disaster assessment and first aid). It covers the country through a network of 69 local branches and their respective volunteers. In each district, only the (few) stronger branches with trained volunteers contribute to disseminate community-based disaster preparedness. Simulation exercises are jointly carried out between the MoE provincial staff and the RCST but there is a clear need to evaluate the level of training among the branches and to address their dependency on external resources; funding gaps in those branches also need to be assessed. Stocks are not pre-stocked in anything near needed levels despite the country being so disaster-prone (3,000 disasters per year). The number of trained human resources in DP needs to be upgraded. Funding for these

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<sup>18</sup> According to paragraph 61 p. 34 of the Evaluation of ECHO's Strategic Orientation to Disaster Reduction (December 2003), the country is categorised as high disaster risk with very high level of hazards and medium level of vulnerability. The country is exposed to very high flood risk, followed by drought (high risk), windstorm (medium), and earthquake (medium). The vulnerability is at this level due to the country's economic collapse, poverty and internal armed conflict that left most of the country without an appropriate disaster response and prevention mechanisms.

activities has not been encouraging. *For more details, see notes No. [4], [5] and [6] in Annex 8 and see Annex 15. (See recommendation ONS2)*

49. Dipecho allocated 3 million Euros in 2003 for DP activities in three Central-Asian countries (2.5 mill in 2004); it awarded 10 contracts. In Tajikistan, Dipecho-funded DP activities are carried out by seven NGO projects in three regions (in 2004, the NLRC was funded for one such project as well); only in 2004, will the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST) start one Dipecho-funded project. A need exists for greater coherence of these projects because, as efforts get under way to set a national DP policy, it is complicated to deal with different approaches being used by different NGOs. The seven RCST strategic disaster centres have warehousing facilities. The ones visited received a mixed review. *(See note No. [7] in Annex 8 for details)* The availability of means of transport is limited with only few vehicles available to cover all the territory; moreover, the fleet is poorly maintained. Communications in case of a disaster are weak due to the fact that VHF and HF radio frequencies are not available to all parties involved in DP. Furthermore, radio communications are difficult due to the topographic characteristics of the country and insufficient number of repeaters. Phone communications exist, but are not available in all branches; e-mail is not used in the provinces visited. Potentially, with reliable communication the branches could contribute to better trigger disaster management responses such as evacuations, mobilization of relief stocks and deployment of search and rescue teams.

50. Tajikistan has not completed a National DP Plan; several organizations are working with different DP training modules and different DP procedures. This will lead to different knowledge, capacities and levels of preparedness and early warning and, therefore, risks leading to a very heterogenous National DP Plan. The draft plan being worked on will be sent to the MOE by November 2004 and will certainly involve the RCST. *(See recommendation TAJRC6\*)*

51. The few ongoing mitigation micro-projects are seen as a clear added value by the local communities as they participate in the planning and implementation of activities that reduce their vulnerability to disasters and that reinforce their DP capacity. These (mostly Dipecho-funded) projects represent a key physical and economic input and can potentially keep on running beyond these projects' life-span. *(See recommendations TAJRC2\* through 6\*)*

52. **In Tanzania,** For DP and DR-related activities, the Tanzanian RC works with the Prime Minister's Office; for all refugee related matters, it works with the Ministry of Home Affairs<sup>19</sup>. In the National Disasters Preparedness Plan, the Tanzanian RC is responsible for the sensitisation and mobilization of the population and for mitigation, preparedness and response activities. *See note No [8] in Annex 8.*

53. According to information received, outside the Refugees Relief Operations area, the levels of DP of the Tanzanian RC are poor as training has not been done; moreover, transport for relief emergency operations is nearly inexistent. No early warning system is in place either. Nevertheless, a DP public awareness campaign through the media was on from 2001 to 2003 and a drawing competition for children as successfully completed. Pre-positioned stocks are not in anything near needed levels in other areas than those covered by the refugee operations. Trained human resources in DP can be found in nine of the 20 provincial branches. Community-based DP efforts have not been started. None of the branches are trained on Sphere standards. [It is noted that DP is not an objective of the ECHO-funded

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<sup>19</sup> USAID has funded a project to strengthen the Tanzanian Disaster Preparedness and Response Capacity through the Tanzanian RC, the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Health. The Tanzanian RC has been given the responsibility to develop, organize and co-ordinate the training of institutions that deal with the provision of first aid in emergencies in seven regions.

project in Tanzania].

54. Warehousing was not visited at provincial level out of the Refugees Relief Operations area, but according to information received, facilities are not present in all branches. The availability of transport resources out of headquarters and the Refugees Relief Operations area is low if not inexistent. Communications in case of a disaster are poor and essentially rely on telephone communication; this needs to be addressed soonest. *See map in Annex 15. (See recommendations ONS2 and TANZRC1\* through 7\*)*

55. **In Iran**, the ERU activity looked-into is a disaster response par-excellence (*see section on ERUs below*). The levels of disaster preparedness are quite impressive. The Iranian Government has established a national disaster response committee based in the Ministry of Interior; it has several sub-committees. The IRCS is a member of this committee and heads the Rescue and Relief sub-committee. The IRCS levels of DP and DR capacity are judged to be of very high level having a functional and well structured set-up as a result of responding to several disasters every year. Iran has completed a National DP Plan.

56. DP activities are functional and well structured; the evaluators observed a very good application of the Disaster Management concept in Iran. Stocks are indeed pre-stocked at rather high levels. Normally, the Iran RCS has the capacity to respond immediately to the needs of 2% of the Iranian population. This capacity is distributed over the national territory. Only 3% of the total stocks are positioned in Teheran. (Teheran is considered very vulnerable to a major earthquake and four contingency plans have already been developed). After its DR in Bam, the Iran RCS, must now re-fill the gaps in its pre-positioned DP stocks. Presently, it is down to 25% of the original DP stocks; it can cover just 100,000 victims in case a disaster hits the country. The priority item to replenish is family tents.

57. In 2003, the number of trained human resources in DP had reached over 2 million volunteers and plans are to reach 2.4 million by the end of 2005. The IFRC Secretariat series of DP training modules has been translated into Farsi. At community level, 1.5 million persons have been trained using community-based disaster preparedness (CBDP).

58. In Teheran, warehousing (visited by the evaluators) is known to be one of the best in the world (*See note No. [9] in Annex 8*). The availability of land and air transport resources is impressive. The Iran RCS has 4,000 of its own vehicles, a relevant number of 20 MT, 40 MT trucks and trailers. A helicopter fleet of five and is presently buying three more. Communications in case of a disaster are very efficient due to VHF, HF, and telephone communications in place connecting provincial branches and covering the whole country.

59. A well-set-up early warning system exists and is located in the IRCS crisis room in the Teheran Relief and Rescue Organisation. The branches receive meteorological and seismological monitoring information directly through 1,000 stations throughout the country communicating the exact location and magnitude of earthquakes or floods. All related information is then compiled using GIS technology and is processed to optimise DR.

60. As regards **capacities in community health**, in Tajikistan and Tanzania, the capacity of the IFRC Delegation/ONSs to carry out community health activities is judged by the evaluators to be high. **In Tajikistan**, a community-based first aid training plan for RC volunteers is still in full swing and evaluators attended one of their training sessions in the field. The ECHO-funded project has so far trained some 3600 of these volunteers. This component of the ECHO project in Tajikistan is scheduled to grow as the drug distribution of rural facilities component is scheduled to phase out. (*See recommendation TAJRC8\**) **In Tanzania**, in the five refugee camps visited (and in surrounding Tanzanian villages), evaluators were positively impressed by the community health component of the overall health intervention the ECHO-funded project pays-for in these camps, as well as of more punctual

public health interventions in outside villages. In the camps, teams are trained to do home visiting in the spirit of community health workers and are very effective at that. HIV/AIDS work (indirectly paid by ECHO through UNICEF) also has a prominent and successful role in the camps. (*See recommendation TAJRC9\**)

#### 3.2.4. LRRD

61. Evaluators also looked hard on LRRD (linking relief, rehabilitation and development) issues. They think that, in the projects evaluated, ECHO and its partners have been able to secure only limited LRRD mechanisms fostering sustainability.

62. In **Tajikistan's** longstanding food aid project the prospects for LRRD are poor. It has progressively led to beneficiary dependency on the IFRC Delegation/Finnish RC as donors. When ECHO reduced funding, the number of beneficiaries was reduced by 30%. The Ministry for Social Service does not yet have the capacity to take over the beneficiaries' case-load. No food security component has been introduced in Dushanbe as it is not feasible according to the partners interviewed; the 2001 pilot food security project in RRS province failed as the IFRC Delegation did not have relevant experience to run such a programme. A vulnerability and capacity assessment is much needed for this project. Also, small income generation projects should be made available to the women-headed households while the elderly need to continue to receive total in-kind assistance. Tajikistan's Dipecho projects have a high potential for multiplier effects and, if well co-ordinated with other EU budget lines, a strong potential for LRRD. An LRRD workshop was held in Dushanbe in December 2003; all relevant EC services attended; disaster preparedness issues were unfortunately not addressed at this meeting.

Following a recent internal RC evaluation report (the Hurford Report), the IFRC Delegation and the RCST are trying to move out of food aid and of the supply aspects of the health project and move more into organisational development and capacity building activities.

In the health project in Khatlon, although drugs have kept clinics functioning, the drug distribution component has also created chronic dependency. The ECHO partners want to phase down this component; finding an alternative donor covering the scope of ECHO coverage in pharmaceuticals will be very difficult. Only the government, now planning to introduce a fee for service system, can become a reliable long-term provider of drugs for rural facilities (not before 2007, it is reckoned). As regards the community-based first aid component of the project, this one has a much higher chance of some sustainability. (*For details, see the respective evaluation fiches in Annex 2*)

[It is noted that only two out of 17 ECHO projects funded in 2003 were evaluated; the LRRD situation of the other 15 was not looked into by the evaluators, but they were told the situation is better. Evaluators also understand that ECHO is not the only actor in LRRD and that LRRD is new in Tajikistan and integrating it fully into existing strategies will take beyond 2006 or 2007; they are also aware that LRRD by itself does not guarantee sustainability].

63. In **Tanzania**, again, given that the ECHO project covers the vast majority of health expenditures in the camp, the situation is one of almost total dependency. The training of refugees as RC volunteers (mostly in first aid) is considered to be in the spirit of LRRD, because they will use these skills when repatriated.

64. In **Iran**, after the emergency phase, the rehabilitation phase has not yet started as physical construction will only restart after seismic plates adjust (this is planned for December 2004). Therefore, the reconstruction phase is on standby. ECHO and other EU financial instruments do not plan to move into this rehabilitation. The World Bank plans to fund the Bam Emergency Reconstruction through the Iran Ministry of Economic Affairs, and

is expected to take the decision on this during its Board meeting on October 28, 2004 (*see Project Information Document appraisal stage rpt n. AB1053*). (*See recommendations IFRC9 and IRCS4\**)

### **3.2.5. Channelling and use of ECHO funds; procurement procedures; accounting systems; communications and visibility:**

65. An important operational issue to look at was how ECHO channels funds to its EUNS partners and **how these partners channel funds** to the IFRC Secretariat, as well as how the IFRC Secretariat channels them to the local IFRC Delegation and how this one channels them to the respective ONS for use. What was found is that this channelling of funds happens quite smoothly and is comparable in efficiency to what the team leader has seen in ECHO/NGO projects elsewhere in the world. Evaluators did not find any major inefficiency. Delays in the release of ECHO contract funds and start-up dates of the same every year are frequent both in Tajikistan and Tanzania. (*See recommendations ECHO8 and TAJRC7\**)

66. An important operational aspect evaluated is the one looking into the issue of **controls and inputs/commodities procurement** procedures. The FRITZ Institute in California provided the IFRC Secretariat its expertise for free and helped it set up the new website-based Humanitarian Logistical Software (HLS) which includes, among other, a global database on suppliers, prices and supply times. HLS also tracks relief goods and stocks. The important operational aspect of controls and standardized procurement procedures are taken care of by the software. The evaluators consider the latter an effective process and tool to track and control the in-cash and in-kind donations (inputs/commodities), to provide timely information on the movement of goods and services to beneficiaries thus enhancing the analysis and decision-making process across the relief chain. To the evaluators' surprise, Nestle is co-operating with the HLS by supplying the software that calculates the nutritive value of rations ('Food Basket Calculator'); Nestle's name appears in that part of the HLS shown to the evaluators.

To facilitate timely procurement of key non-food items at competitive prices (and according to the ICRC/IFRC Emergency Items 2002 Catalogue on specifications<sup>20</sup>), framework agreements<sup>21</sup> have been signed with several international suppliers. These agreements eliminate the necessity for a tender process when an emergency requires urgently meeting major procurement needs. (*See recommendations IFRC8 and 9, EUNS4 and IFRC3\**) [It should be noted that the IFRC Secretariat could become a procurement centre to meet the requirement that EUNSs have as per the new ECHO FPA. This has represented a major issue for ECHO 6 as several EUNSs and ONSs cannot comply with all the requirements of Annex 5 of the FPA].

67. **Accounting systems** used by the projects evaluated show that, in ONS countries, one special account is opened for each ECHO project. ONSs get quarterly disbursements from that account after submitting acceptable quarterly financial reports. Evaluators found that the accounting software used by the Netherlands RC is not capable of direct interchange of data with that used by the IFRC Delegation in Tajikistan. EUNSs often send financial delegates to ONS countries to backstop the latter financial staff in preparing adequate financial reports.

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<sup>20</sup> This catalogue lists 2000 key relief items based on operational, technical and financial characteristics with common codification. A new version of the Emergency items catalogue is presently being updated and should be published by September 2004.

<sup>21</sup> Under these agreements, suppliers guarantee to maintain set cost costs for a specified period and generally agree to reserve and store a certain quantity of the product. In operational terms this means that items are available when an emergency comes up and a guaranteed stock is available at any time. The goods are paid when drawn from stock to final delivery point.

ONS financial staff complained to evaluators that some small expenses are difficult to get receipts for in emergencies. (*See recommendations ECHO7, ECHO8 and IFRC10*)

In general, the evaluators consider the accounting systems used for the projects as adequate, but that they still need to be upgraded (several existing shortfalls have been addressed by partners; incompatibility of software and small delays in the reporting were, for instance, stressed). The IFRC accounting systems have been constantly upgraded, including some changes in software which have posed some problems to EUNSSs as regards software compatibility. The Tanzanian RC also experienced a problem in software compatibility between the system used by the IFRC Delegation in Dar es Salaam and the Tanzanian RC branch in Kigoma. Now the system being put in place is compatible with ECHO/Spanish RC systems. During the period reviewed, field accounting systems were still manual, but now this issue is being addressed.

Original invoices are a key issue of contention that needs to be addressed. Certified copies (e.g. by the IFRC Delegation, the EC IFRC Delegation, a local auditing firm, or the consular services of a Member State) should be accepted by ECHO provided it issues such new regulations. The expenses incurred by the IFRC Delegations and EUNSSs due to this are high. All originals cannot be made available as the IFRC Delegation is audited locally too. (*See recommendation ECHO7*)

68. As relates to **communications**, especially those between the field and national headquarters of ONSs and between the latter and the IFRC regional Delegations and Geneva offices and/or EUNSSs headquarters, evaluators can say that the quality of the communications chain the IFRC Secretariat and IFRC Delegations, as well as the one existing between the EUNSSs and their delegates or IFRC Delegation is good. The communication channels between the respective ECHO TA and her/his local RC partners is open and fluid as well. Changes to project contents have been decided directly between ECHO and its RC partners in the field, as well as at headquarters level.

69. The **visibility** issue is a standard issue explored in ECHO evaluations. Evaluators can vouch that, in the three countries visited, ECHO visibility is, in general good. Stickers, billboards, T-shirts and other such devices were seen where appropriate, including in project vehicles. Under the new FPA, the IFRC Secretariat is discussing an MOU with ECHO addressing visibility issues.

In Tanzania, it came to the evaluators' attention that a video shot about the project in the camps a couple of years ago - importantly geared for the Tanzanian TV and public - has not been shown on local TV. (*See recommendation TANZRC6*)

Also an issue of visibility can be the fact that the respective profiles of the EUNSSs found by the evaluators in the web are in need of an update since information is old (quite a bit of the data contained is 3 years old)<sup>22</sup>.

Somehow more distantly related, but still a visibility issue to be pointed out is the fact that the hardware left behind by ERUs (boxes and equipment) and now warehoused by ONSs is still labelled "ERU" despite the fact that they are NOT part of an ERU any longer.

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<sup>22</sup> For the Netherlands RC see [www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf\\_profile.pl?nlprofile.pdf](http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_profile.pl?nlprofile.pdf); for the Finnish RC see [www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf\\_profile.pl?fiprofile.pdf](http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_profile.pl?fiprofile.pdf) and for the Spanish RC [www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf\\_profile.pl?esprofile.pdf](http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_profile.pl?esprofile.pdf)

### 3.2.6. Specific institutional operational issues

#### a. EUNSSs

70. An additional operational comment is offered here: ECHO has FPAs with the ICRC, the IFRC Secretariat and 15 EUNSSs (plus the Norwegian RC). The respective FPAs allocate a 7% overhead to each partner. But, additionally, **EUNSSs** can also charge ECHO some direct costs of their administrative costs at their headquarters on top of the 7% overhead they get on ECHO projects, provided they justify these resources are needed to run the project.

71. **Netherlands RC:** In Tajikistan, the Netherlands RC (NLRC) has worked with ECHO since 1995 but has had some presence --although not an office-- in Tajikistan since 1994. It now works in 40 countries the world over and is now in the process of reducing this number (Tajikistan is one of them) with a focus both on humanitarian and on increasingly working on development issues. The NLRC, together with the Flemish RC in Belgium, has a self-financed logistics ERU ready for deployment (not used in Bam). The Netherlands Government funding of the NLRC has been cut dramatically since 2000 (from 15 to 2 million Euros per year); it now contributes much more through multilateral agencies. From 1995 to 1997, ECHO supported mostly hospitals in Tajikistan; then, from 1997 to 2000 it increased its support to rural health facilities and the training of their staff in adequate prescribing; from 2001 on, it has added funding to community-based first aid training (CBFA); in 2004, the NLRC got Dipecho funding for DP work. The procedure is as follows: The NLRC signs a yearly MoU ('Pledge Management Note') with the IFRC Delegation to let the latter implement the project on its behalf. According to the NLRC, it advances funds for the project if ECHO funds are late in arriving. (The ECHO TA in Dushanbe contests this fact). The IFRC Delegation sends quarterly financial reports to The Hague (via Ankara) so they can be forwarded to ECHO. Currently, one very well informed senior officer in The Hague follows the project in Tajikistan (evaluators met extensively with her). In Dushanbe, the NLRC has one health delegate (paid by the ECHO project), one relief operations delegate (paid by the Netherlands Government), one development delegate (paid by the NLRC) and one disaster management delegate to come (paid by the Dipecho project). With the growing importance CBFA activities are acquiring, the NLRC is considering implementing this ECHO-funded project bilaterally starting in 2005 or 2006. The NLRC's international work is now focused 60-70% on humanitarian work (core) and 30-40% development work including capacity building; development work is mainly through bilateral contacts. Since 2002, the NLRC has a bilateral development project in Tajikistan strengthening two RCST branches (with Netherlands Government funding). *Further comments on the Netherlands RC can be found in note No. [14] in Annex 8.*

72. **Spanish RC:** The Spanish RC (SRC) has a pro-active and well funded long-term commitment to development work (more so than what the evaluators found in the other two EUNSSs they visited); they spend 70% of their international budget on development activities. In 1994, they spent 3% of their total budget in international activities and had 17 projects; in 2004, it is 15% and they have around 565 active projects in 60 countries (many of them outside CASs, either because there is none or because the CAS only covers work in the four core areas of Strategy 2010 and the SRC project is in another area). At any given time, they now have 70-100 delegates deployed worldwide. [Note that, for many EUNSSs, the tendency now is to send more 'project-manager-type-delegates' (generalists) than 'sectoral-specialist-delegates'; they try to find the latter locally]. They also keep a revolving fund for pre-financing projects like the ECHO project evaluated. Unique to the SRC is the fact that the provincial branches earmark 1-2% of their budgets to international activities. In 2003, ECHO funded the SRC at a level of around 4 million Euros (out of a total of 149 million earmarked). The SRC has no projects implemented by the IFRC Secretariat and is not implementing any

project on behalf of the IFRC Secretariat (the last such one was in 2000 in the Balkans). The SRC has four ERUs: basic health, logistics, telecommunications (its equipment went to Bam) and watsan (with five autonomous mobile units, all deployed in Bam with own funds). They have 200 trained ERU team members; a re-training for them took place as recently as September 2004 (attended by one of the evaluators). The SRC has followed up the deployment of ERUs within-country training of nationals as in the case of the Gujarat earthquake. Although the SRC took over the ECHO health project in Tanzania in January 2004, negotiations actually started in November 2002. *Further comments on the Spanish RC can be found in note No. [15] in Annex 8. (See recommendation EUNS5\*)*

73. **Finnish RC:** Evaluators visited the Finnish RC (FRC) warehouse in Tampere where they got a detailed briefing on ERU operations. They also visited their headquarters in Helsinki. The FRC has in the past organised 5-days ERU and FACT team leaders training sessions for all ERU-holding countries. The participants are selected by the IFRC Secretariat. They are planning to hold 3-4 such trainings a year. This is an amenable activity for ECHO to consider funding in their aim to get involved in future ERU deployments. Given that the German RC also has intentions to do something similar, the IFRC Secretariat needs a long-term policy on this type of training, among other, related to which (and from which RC societies) participants should be invited. This training achieves a good coordination between FACT and ERU teams. *(See recommendation IFRC11)*

The Finnish health ERU is special in that it stores all its components --including all perishables (this being different from the SRC that has framework contracts with certain suppliers for the latter). They can thus pick from the shelves exactly what they need in a given emergency.

In Bam, the FRC deployed its hospital together with the Norwegian and Austrian RC (the latter provided safe water for the hospital); the FRC was the signatory of the two ECHO contracts that helped finance this ERU (Dec 2003 and March 2004). The hospital is still functioning -but has now moved from tents to containers. Current ECHO funding for the hospital goes to mid-October 2004 and operations have been fully handed over to the IRCS (since April). The FRC and their Norwegian counterparts are now working on a permanent collaborative arrangement to, in the future, jointly deploy ERU hospitals; preliminary recommendations exist to this effect. The FRC considers the ECHO funding received crucial for the success of the hospital they deployed and operated in Bam; they appreciate ECHO's speed and flexibility in handling their request for this funding. Overall, ECHO funds account for about 10% of the FRC funding.

The FRC has a long-standing relation with the Estonian RC and has trained delegates from there. The FRC is willing to help newly EU-ascended Estonia to have its RC organize an international department. *Further comments on the Finnish RC can be found in note No. [16] in Annex 8. (See recommendation IFRC4\*)*

74. EUNSSs greatly contribute to the international co-operation activities of the Movement. Some support the international components directly others see their own interest in having a higher profile in international co-operation, bilateral action, for them, represents a key issue for their visibility and their own fundraising purposes. [Some EUNSSs feel inclined to respond multilaterally in DR cases and feel more inclined to respond bilaterally in DP and more development-linked projects]. In the latter case, both the Netherlands and Spanish RC are more oriented towards running bilateral projects as a way of working closer with ONSs. But if not co-ordinated, several bilateral contracts can easily become an operational burden to ONSs' capacity; their organisational development strategy can become fragmented. Therefore, due to different external pressures, and to consolidate the coherence of the IFRC, this issue must be addressed to find a mutually acceptable balance.



75. In the long run, the bilateral approach can be an added value as well -- if actions are well co-ordinated. But through bilateral contracts, some ONS branches may become well developed as others can easily remain uncovered. The IFRC Secretariat must thus clearly outline the added value of the bilateral versus the multilateral approach<sup>23</sup> to safeguard the quality and effectiveness of responses. Non co-ordinated bilateral approaches should be avoided also to prevent donor driven situations.

76. The directors of the major EUNSS International programmes (plus the Canadian, the Japanese and the American) regularly meet in an Informal Consultative Group (ICG). Moreover, during major disasters, they and the IFRC Secretariat are in daily telephone contact.b. IFRC Secretariat:

77. The ONSs of a given region together with the IFRC Secretariat organize statutory regional conferences supported by the respective IFRC regional Delegation (12 of them worldwide) to discuss issues of common interest and to delineate their national two-year plans. (The IFRC Secretariat and Delegation often help ONSs general assemblies to prepare their new plans).

78. Since 2001, the IFRC Secretariat has been doing important work on reducing discrimination and changing behaviours on humanitarian values; they have set up a web page, produced training materials and a data base. In 2003, they started to more proactively work on the human rights-based approach to development.

79. Further, the IFRC Secretariat is also working on a long-term project to analyse the legal environment applicable to international disaster response operations. This is the IDRL Programme which is examining ways in which national legal/policy/disaster management frameworks can be better harmonised with international standards to facilitate the fast provision of international assistance.

80. On logistics, ECHO has asked the IFRC Secretariat to become a 'procurement centre' (as UNICEF and MSF already are) for all IFRC members (and other ECHO-funded NGOs); this would help them by avoiding having to follow 'Annex 5' regulations in ECHO contracts. [Note: Since the submission of the first draft of this Report, the IFRC Secretariat has become a procurement centre].

Also on logistics, the IFRC Secretariat has a car leasing facility in Abu Dhabi with about 200-300 vehicles; it leases the same to RC projects the world over. [Note: The IFRC Secretariat has now proposed to change the system from a leasing facility to a vehicle rental programme].

81. Moreover, DFID recently assessed its relationship with the IFRC Secretariat ('Evaluation of the strategic partnership between DFID and the IFRC', Valid, January 2002). Related to this, it is noteworthy that the IFRC Secretariat currently is systematically reviewing all the latest evaluation reports of its projects with the intention to follow-up on whether the recommendations made have been applied. (*See recommendation EUNS5*)

82. The **monitoring of IFRC projects** is the responsibility of IFRC regional IFRC Delegations; logical frameworks, that are now mandatory, are used for such monitoring. The ToR for final evaluations of IFRC projects are mostly written at headquarters though. (*See recommendation EUNS5*)

83. In October 2003, the IFRC Secretariat developed a food security and nutrition policy for Africa in relation, in part, with its HIV/AIDS projects in the continent.

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<sup>23</sup> Ref. is made to The strategic objective n.2 of the Strategy for the Movement is to "Improve the Movement's effectiveness and efficiency through increased co-operation and coherence" and the action n.7 is to improve and co-ordinate the Movement's response to emergency.

84. The IFRC Secretariat more systematically works in watsan only since 1993, but related activities existed before. Now it has such activities in 25 countries and 18 watsan delegates worldwide. These projects often start as relief watsan projects and then turn into sectoral development projects. They always apply SPHERE standards explicitly and apply what has been called a PHAST approach (participatory hygiene and sanitation transformation). The IFRC Secretariat has watsan delegates in four of its regional IFRC Delegations, and it pre-positions needed hardware in those four regions. (*See recommendations IFRC12 and IFRC5\**)

85. The IFRC Secretariat has had strained relationships with the Burundian RC despite having actively tried to mend differences. This is regrettable since an active programme of repatriation is under way right now in the Tanzanian border.

85a. The IFRC Delegation in Dar es Salaam was scheduled to close after the ECHO project was handed over to the SRC. But now it was decided that it would stay; for the time-being only a national staff is in charge since the head of IFRC Delegation left in July 2004. The IFRC Delegation will now be under a new sub-regional office in Kampala.

**b. ONSs:**

**Red Crescent society of Tajikistan (RCST):**

86. In 2003, ECHO funded 17 projects in Tajikistan. For the EC, Tajikistan is considered a case study in which it is trying to make work a closer LRRD working sequence involving ECHO, Dipecho, Food Security and TACIS. (*See recommendations ECHO9 and ECHO10*)

87. The RCST is only very slowly moving from relief to development work, but is eventually catching up. It has 69 branches (7 regional). Branches have little say in the decision-making of the society.

88. Although involved in aspects of programme design, implementation and monitoring, the RCST participates more as a subordinate body in the ECHO-funded projects; the IFRC Delegation is clearly leading, somehow in a benign top-down manner. Whether needed or not, there is a certain dependence created on expatriate delegates. It may well be that the local staff need additional skills, especially in managing the requirements of donor reporting and procurement, but they can certainly progressively take more responsibilities especially once the IFRC Delegation completes some training on these aspects. The RCST branches are not at all involved in decision-making. (*See recommendation TAJRC14\**)

89. Around 590 primary health care (PHC) facilities get free drugs and medical supplies from the ECHO project (except drugs for TB). Medicines distributed cover only 20-40% of the needs of these facilities and are distributed once or twice a year. Supplies are reliable and of good quality, but are not based on the size of the population each facility covers; the composition of the kits can be adjusted to better supply the drugs most in need (with regional branches participation).

This health project has been a continuation of a project started in 1997. It covers 21/24 districts in Khatlon, in some with drugs distribution only and in some with that distribution plus community-based first aid (CBFA).

90. The health project is effective in keeping participating PHC facilities running and improvements have indeed been seen in drug prescription practices and a more rational use of drugs; it is not sustainable though and more could be done on capacity building; its impact has been poorly measured (although now an assessment is under way) and targeting of the most vulnerable is only evident in the project's shift to rural facilities; the integration of curative and preventive activities are only now beginning to happen (since the CBFA component started).

91. The MOH is setting up a drug procurement centre (they have a national pharmaceutical task force: chaired by WHO who in the past received ECHO funds for co-ordination); with the MOH further receives PSF and ADB support, but the effort to set up the centre may take 2-3 years. The ECHO-funded health project was internally evaluated in 2003. Evaluators found that most members of the health department at the RCST had not read the report since it was not translated. A number, but not all of its recommendations are being implemented.

92. The food aid project literally is a vital addition to the livelihood of elderly vulnerable recipients, as well as for women heads of household. The social support system that sustains them very much depends on these food handouts. That is why the evaluators do hope alternatives are found before the funding scaling down takes effect with grave consequences for current beneficiaries.

93. This concern, because in 2002, an IFRC internal report (the Hurford Report) did conclude that the IFRC Delegation's work in Dushanbe was not in line with the RC overall mission in its work through the ECHO-funded projects in Tajikistan. It recommended they cut back on the high technology water projects and phase out of food aid activities, as well as of the drug distribution activities. By 2004, the IFRC Delegation had cut the number of facilities receiving drugs and had shifted this function to the rural areas; they were exploring ways how to get out of their role in food aid in Dushanbe; they had clearly emphasized more their work on CBFA (with a greater development focus). In all these actions, the IFRC Delegation is preparing itself for announced cutbacks in ECHO funding in the coming years.

It is noted that ninety five percent of the funding of the RCST comes from donors; they clearly have to increase their fundraising. (*See recommendation ONS2\**)

94. Since 2001, there has been no CAS in Tajikistan, but the 'Central Asia Strategic Direction 2+2' document (March 2003) is used as a guide. The IFRC Delegation holds annual partnership meetings with all PNSs involved in the country to co-ordinate work.

[The Echo Dushanbe office also holds regular meetings with all its partners]. (*See recommendation ECHO11*)

95. The IFRC Delegation and the RCST have good and cordial relations with ECHO TA in Dushanbe. The IFRC Head of IFRC Delegation also has good relations with the leadership of the RCST. (*See recommendations TAJRC1 through 11 and TAJRC1\* and 8\* through 12\**)

*Further comments on specific operational issues of the RCST can be found in note No. [17] in Annex 8. Also, for further background on the Tajiki health project, see note No. [18] in the same Annex.*

#### **Tanzanian Red Cross Society (TRCS):**

96. The Government of Tanzania policy towards refugees has hardened over the period under evaluation. Officially, no more refugees are accepted, no land is given to them and seeking work outside the camps is not officially allowed.

97. The Tanzanian RC and the IFRC Delegation had long arguments over how much the activities of the ECHO-funded project should be handed over to the former. They reached an agreement in 1997 in what was called 'The London Agreement'. It called for less top-down management, more aggressive capacity building of local staff and for a decrease in the number of delegates. The parties, in general abided by it ever since, despite off-and-on tensions the two organizations had in the last four years - which although undeniable, never affected project operations in the field. Turnover of delegates can be said to have been high in the years evaluated.

98. The IFRC Delegation announced several times in the last two years it was going to pull out from implementing this ECHO project, but eventually did not until negotiations with the SRC ended in a successful handover. Now that the SRC has taken over from the IFRC IFRC Delegation and the IFRC will play a new role (co-ordination and organizational development), the London Agreement needs to be replaced by a new MoU (now under preparation). The relations between the SRC and the Tanzanian RC have come to a very good start.

99. The TRC funding is overwhelmingly for refugee operations; but this is now slowly changing. In Tanzania, from 2000 to 2003, ECHO funded many other implementers than the IFRC and had a direct or indirect presence in the 13 camps in the border.

The ECHO audit of the IFRC Secretariat's project carried out in 2002 disallowed 137,000 Euros which the IFRC Delegation had to absorb. Evaluators followed up on the recommendations of that audit, point by point, and found most of them having been addressed.

100. The ECHO TA has estimated it spent 31.5 Euro/year per refugee in the camps served. This amount will conceivably be needed in the future as well so that the Global Plan for Tanzania can hardly now go for a partial exit strategy (unless repatriations catch up significantly).

101. The UNHCR co-ordinates all refugee operations. The UNHCR relations with the IFRC Delegation, the Tanzanian RC and the ECHO TA are very good. The Tanzanian RC is seen as having a good national base and presence to work with; it also has political leverage in the country allowing them to better push through some of their plans.

Compared with other health NGOs the ECHO project uses a higher percentage of Tanzanian staff over refugee staff in the camps.

102. Voluntary repatriation of Burundian refugees from ECHO-funded camps started in 2002; in the first 20 months, 60,000 camp dwellers returned home, but some came back so the net number was lower. Since December 2003, around 9,000 refugees are returning every month and this number was still current when evaluators visited. A mass return is not expected for now. ECHO funds the UNHCR in Burundi for resettlement, but the health care delivery system there is in shambles. The Burundian RC is also in disarray and this explains the SRC's current efforts to train RC volunteers in the camps in first aid. The UNHCR was asking ECHO to try to help in this imminent health need across the border especially since the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) inside Burundi is greater than the number of refugees in Tanzania. EuropeAid gives the UNHCR 25 million Euros in Burundi for resettlement activities (till 2005). Almost no repatriation activities are on for Congolese refugees. (*See recommendation TANZRC7*)

103. All actors on health issues in the border meet regularly. UNICEF funds the Tanzanian RC directly for maternal and child health (MCH) services in the camps (provided by ECHO-paid staff). UNICEF considers the narrative and financial reporting by the Tanzanian RC to them to be satisfactory.

104. The Japanese RC will shortly be disbursing funds to bolster the Tanzanian RC efforts (for AIDS work with women, to construction and rehabilitation of buildings and laboratory equipment plus the provision of four vehicles). The same is true for the American Agency for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) to disburse through the American RC (for health and watsan activities).

105. The ECHO TA in Dar es Salaam considered that the Tanzanian border camps could do better than achieving the SPHERE standards since they were in no emergency/disaster situation. The goals set for health and nutrition indicators for 2004 are thus above SPHERE.

106. Project-related reports (narrative and financial) are now drafted by TRC staff and reviewed by the IFRC Delegation before being sent to the IFRC Regional Office in Nairobi for checking.

107. ECHO has not funded the Tanzanian RC for water activities since 2001. Nevertheless, the Society received a grant from EuropeAid during the period under evaluation to resolve the water problems of Lugufu II camp. All sources interviewed by the evaluators agreed that the Tanzanian RC made a series of mistakes in handling this work. To their defence, the Tanzanian RC argued that part of the responsibility lies with the IFRC Regional IFRC Delegation watsan team based in Nairobi and the Mozambican contractor they hired to do the work. Evaluators did not have a chance to interview the Nairobi watsan delegates. (It is not the scope of this evaluation to go into more details of this, but evaluators, upon the ECHO Headquarters Tanzania Desk request, did look into this matter and therefore got the full picture). Now, the SRC, with mostly its own funds, is resolving the problem in what looks to evaluators a very comprehensive way.

108. LRRD is really not applicable to this project since, at this stage, alternatives are almost nil: the link is to repatriation and not to development. This is an argument for ECHO to become more involved in repatriation and reintegration activities.

109. Evaluators added their voice to others worried about the low salaries of medical staff in the field (in some cases 50% of what other NGOs pay); this contributes to their (too) fast turnover. (*See recommendation TANZRC8*)

110. As regards branch development work, the latter only started actively in 2002. Three Tanzanian RC appeals launched since then to cover costs of this activity have been unsuccessful. (*See recommendations TANZRC9 and ONS2\**)

111. In 2002, the Tanzanian RC, with IFRC Delegation help, prepared a Strategic Development Plan to 2007. Evaluators found it to be of high quality including a very honest Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis. Funding for its implementation has also not been forthcoming. More democratic governance procedures called for by the Plan have to be insisted on in the near future. (*See recommendations TAJRC1\* and TANZRC14\**)

112. Evaluators asked the Tanzanian TRC staff to give them an estimate of their own (non-donor) annual funding for the last four years. The tables prepared showed this amount to be in the vicinity of 100,000 USD for each of those years.

113. In Kigoma, the project vehicles fleet is old and breakdowns occur frequently. American and Japanese RC funds are being considered for a partial renewal.

114. January to May, the project seldom implements new activities, because 12 months project funds usually become available thereafter. Starting this year, the project procures sufficient drugs and fuel to carry-them-over over these four months. The project had a financial delegate who left in June 2003; there were in total three such delegates since 2000; the SRC has also brought in a financial delegate. A 2001-2002 audit is available, but the IFRC Delegation never got to see it. A 2002-2003 audit is urgently pending.

115. In 2002-2003, EuropeAid funded six NGOs in Tanzania; they considered the Tanzanian RC to have been the most difficult of these partners despite their semi-annual reporting having been prompt and audits of the project having only shown a few missing invoices that were disallowed (=3,500 Euros).

116. As regards the local Tanzanian population around the camps, it is reckoned that they have benefited from refugee operations: health, sanitation, employment and business opportunities. The question is what they will get when the refugees leave. (*See recommendations TANZRC1, through 5 and TANZRC8\* through 15\* and 17\**)

*Further comments on specific operational issues of the Tanzanian RC can be found in note No. [19] in Annex 8.*

### **3.2.7. Advantages and disadvantages of actions funded through the IFRC members:**

117. From an operational perspective, the evaluators tried to elucidate what type of efficiencies/inefficiencies ECHO contracts with the IFRC Secretariat or with EUNSSs had when comparing these with contracts ECHO has with partner NGOs. It was already stated above that no inefficiencies were found in the channelling of funds. As regards reporting quality and timeliness, evaluators found some delays reported, but judge them not to be much different from delays seen in NGO-implemented projects.

118. Contracts with IFRC members have a big advantage for ECHO in terms of the established presence the member societies (and/or the IFRC Secretariat) have in the countries where the ECHO projects are implemented. This presence differs from the presence EU NGOs have in that the RC has many branches and active volunteers nationwide. This is indeed a great strategic advantage for partnerships with the IFRC Secretariat and IFRC members. Moreover, the IFRC and the EUNSSs have a proven capability of deploying specialized international (project paid) delegates the world over. This latter fact is an advantage, but, alas, can also be a problem when the turnover of these delegates is fast. The three countries visited did, at some time or another, have fast turnover problems. When the skills of local ONSs staff are not up to par, ECHO-funded projects have (and do) hire (d) assistants to the international delegates; these often stay, if the delegates rotate, and provide some type of institutional memory. But often the ONS counterpart staff complains that these assistants duplicate what they are supposed to do and resent the fact that the assistants stay on the job when the position of the delegate has been terminated altogether (e.g. in Tajikistan). Issues of capacity building of national ONS staff are clearly involved here. (*See recommendation TAJRC14\**)

### **3.2.8. Key conclusions/lessons learned**

**Key conclusions/lessons learned for the operational level** can be summarised as follows:

- i. Historically, IFRC interventions have essentially been on disaster response; now, there is a greater progressive operational shift towards disaster preparedness.
- ii. The IFRC Secretariat/EUNSSs global disaster response capacity is judged to be high; progress still needed in providing support to ONSs in DP.

- iii. The IFRC Secretariat has been actively promoting the adoption of the **SPHERE standards** by all its members, by NGOs and by the donor community.
- iv. The projects evaluated have been able to secure only limited LRRD.
- v. ECHO contracts with IFRC members have operational advantages compared with NGO contracts given the ONSs branches presence in the field.vi. The projects evaluated are relevant, well managed, and the staff is highly motivated.
- vi. The origin of the international delegates sent to ECHO-funded projects is more often Europeans and males.<sup>24</sup> (*See recommendation IFRC12a*)

## Operational recommendations

### For ECHO:

- *ECHO7* In financial reports by RC partners, ECHO to accept certified copies of receipts and invoices in cases ECHO new ad-hoc regulations are followed; the simplifying of procedures for, when justified, waving rules of origin is also desirable. Moreover, in qualified cases, ECHO to consider accepting reports by local certified accounting firms. (3.2.5) 67
- *ECHO8* ECHO to accept the fact that EUNSSs can sometimes not open special accounts for contract monies received from ECHO as long as they accurately account for interest earned on ECHO funds. (3.2.5) 65 and 67
- *ECHO9* To effectively promote LRRD in Tajikistan as a case study, ECHO/Dipecho, TACIS and the Food Security Programme to continue meeting regularly in BXL, in Almaty and in Dushanbe to annually set (and semi-annually monitor) a co-ordinated strategy; a RELEX representation is also desirable in the Brussels meetings. (3.2.6) 86
- *ECHO10* In Central Asia, EC individual country strategy papers and regional strategy papers to take into account that ECHO is planning to phase down some activities in Tajikistan and Dipecho has, as of now, questionable funds for 2005. (3.2.6) 86
- *ECHO11* ECHO to continue to annually revise its phase-down strategy and plan in Tajikistan in consultation with other donors and partners; Punctual needs assessments will need to be commissioned to fine-tune this phase-down. (3.2.6) 94

### For the IFRC Secretariat:

- *IFRC6* In the next five years, the IFRC Secretariat progressively move more to do coordination and capacity building work in ONS countries (concomitantly moving away from directly implementing projects with ONSs). For this, the IFRC Secretariat has to find stable and sufficient funding; the same could in part come from EUNSSs partnering with ECHO and sub-contracting coordination and capacity building functions to the IFRC Secretariat through its 12 regional IFRC Delegations. The question remains whether ECHO could find a way to fund the IFRC Secretariat directly for these activities in disaster-prone countries. (3.1.1) 9
- *IFRC7* Disaster preparedness activities not to neglect actions to decrease the population's vulnerabilities and to reinforce local coping capacities. (Evaluators saw too much emphasis on actions to primarily decrease hazards). (3.2.1) 35

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<sup>24</sup> In Tajikistan, in 2000, almost all international delegates were European; now, the majority are non-Europeans; the evolution was as follows: 9/24 non-Europeans in 2000, 2001 14/26, 2002 14/18, 2003 11/14. Their gender balance has deteriorated (9/24 females in 2000, 10/26 in 2001, 6/18 in 2002, 3/14 in 2003). In Tanzania, the gender balance was 7/20 females in 2000, 7/18 in 2001, 2/6 in 2002 and 2/6 in 2003. The ration for non-European delegates was 13/20 in 2000; 6/26 in 2001; 3/6 in 2002 and 4/6 in 2003.

- IFRC8 Vulnerability and Capacity Analyses (VCA) to always be carried out early on in DP and DR projects to facilitate LRRD. (3.1.7) 23 and (3.2.4) 61
- IFRC9 Make the HLS Software available to all EUNSSs involved in DR operations. (3.2.5) 66
- IFRC10 Progressively work on compatibilising accounting software for all IFRC members (hopefully also fitting with ECHO financial reporting requirements). (3.2.5) 67
- IFRC11 The IFRC Secretariat to develop a mid-term policy on joint training for FACT members, RDRT and NDRT team members from countries at high risk of disasters and ERU team leaders. (3.2.6) 73
- IFRC12 For technical assistance with water projects in the field, the IFRC Secretariat to always send engineer together with a hygiene educator. (3.2.6) 84
- IFRC12a The IFRC Secretariat to follow what it favours and take needed steps to balance diversity in the selection of international delegates in favour of non-European and female delegates; this includes EUNSSs proposing qualified candidates with such characteristics that fulfil ECHO requirements. (3.2.8) vi

#### **For EUNSSs:**

- EUNSS3 Encourage the use of the DMIS among desk officers and delegates. (3.2.2) 38
- EUNSS4 Apply the HLS software to more effectively respond to IFRC appeals. (3.2.5) 66
- EUNSS5 Standard project monitoring activities based on using the logical framework as a management tool are to be formalized and carried out regularly. Continue the practice to review recommendations made by such monitoring exercises (a few months after they are made) so as to verify if they have been implemented. (3.2.6) 81 and 82

#### **For ONSs:**

##### **General:**

- ONS1 All ONSs must have disaster preparedness training ongoing in the next three years; modules already exist in four languages for this training. (Note that the IFRC Secretariat has no records - and should have- of which ONSs have already had such training worldwide). (3.2.1) 35
- ONS2 Carry out a DP needs assessment among branches and assess their respective training needs in this area. (3.2.2) 42 and (3.2.3) 54

**Tajikistan:** All the recommendations hereunder refer to paragraphs (3.2.3) 48-51 and (3.2.6) 87-95)

- TAJRC1 Continue on its plans to progressively get out of funding drug procurement for Khatlon PHC facilities and food aid for Dushanbe vulnerable population, but alternative sources of funding have to be secured for these still dependent activities until the government can become a reliable provider of drugs for rural facilities.
- TAJRC2 If drug procurement is to be downsized in the near future, prefer reducing the size of the kit each facility receives over totally cutting drug supplies to a certain percentage of facilities to keep full kits distribution for a smaller number; involve regional branches in this decision.
- TAJRC3 The number of kits delivered to each facility has still to be based on the actual population each facility covers (requires defining how big a population the existing kits are supposed to cover over the period before the next kits are delivered).



- TAJRC4 Assess the number of doctors, feldshers (assistant doctors) and nurses that did not yet participate in rational prescribing and clinical guidelines training workshops (even if a minority) and schedule them to attend one as soon as possible.
- TAJRC5 Concentrate efforts on strengthening the activities already started in first aid training of RC volunteers in Khatlon; to avoid a missed opportunity, expand this training of volunteers to cover not only first aid, but also disaster preparedness -- always using participatory teaching methods.
- TAJRC6 Now that the IFRC Delegation watsan delegate has left, national watsan staff of the RCST to ASAP take over responsibility of the watsan activities (not ECHO-funded) from the assistants to the departed delegate who are still on the job.
- TAJRC7 As soon as possible, apply for TACIS funding in Almaty.
- TAJRC8 Together with other agencies, redouble advocacy efforts with the MOHealth, MOFinance, Parliament, the Office of the President and other relevant political structures to secure funding for the supply of drugs for rural facilities in Khatlon.
- TAJRC9 The IFRC Dushanbe Delegation to hand over more responsibilities and involve regional branches. Capacity building at oblast branches is still an acute need in order to decentralise responsibilities; also needed are more women as heads of branches.
- TAJRC10 Appoint a national project coordinator to co-direct each of the two projects with the respective IFRC delegate.
- TAJRC11 RCST regional branches to be invited to the annual partnership meetings in Dushanbe with all PNSs and to help finalise the national early warning and DP plan.

**Tanzania:** All the recommendations hereunder refer to paragraphs (3.2.3) 52-53 and (3.2.6) 96-116)

- TANZRC1 Together with the Spanish RC and a representative from the IFRC Secretariat, request a meeting with the ECHO TA in Dar es Salaam to explore how ECHO can help in the funding of the ongoing Burundian refugees repatriation effort (on both sides of the border). [Through the corresponding UNHCR Appeal?] Also discuss: a) the level of ECHO funding deemed appropriate to cover all health needs in six camps in 2005 (according to repatriation data); and b) contingency plans for WFP funding of food rations if EC Food Security funds are not forthcoming in 2005.
- TANZRC2 Make copies of the 2000-2001 audit available to the IFRC Delegation, the Spanish Red Cross and the ECHO TA. Commission the 2002-2003 audit as soon as possible and share it with the above.
- TANZRC3 Work on the finalisation of an early warning and a disaster preparedness plan for the whole country.
- TANZRC4 Given that the current ration mostly has the needed vitamins and minerals in the corn-soy-blend distributed health personnel in the camps should develop and promote alternative tasty recipes to make adults as well as children consume this commodity to assure their micronutrient minimum intake.
- TANZRC5 Branch development work in the districts where the camps are located is crucial since there will otherwise be nothing left behind after the camps are closed. Nutritional, health and watsan support to this Tanzanian population should also continue.
- TANZRC6 On the issue of visibility, The Tanzanian RC has not yet had the (expensive) project video shot over a year ago shown on Tanzanian TV; it should do so as soon as possible.

- **TANZRC7** The Tanzanian RC, the SRC and the ECHO TA should meet to explore chances of funding repatriation activities on the Tanzanian side of the border.
- **TANZRC8** A task force to be set up to ASAP discuss staff salary adjustments.
- **TANZRC9** RC partners donating to refugee activities in the border to be asked to set aside 5-7% of their donation for refugees for Tanzanian RC to use in branch development work elsewhere.

### 3.3. Sectoral Strategy Level

#### 3.3.1. Sectoral food, health, water and LRRD aspects in the projects evaluated in Tajikistan and Tanzania

##### a. Tajikistan

119. In Tajikistan, the Finnish RC project was evaluated. The project has experienced cuts in coverage that may negatively affect the relationship of the RCST with the target groups; this is resulting in difficult conditions for the field staff and the beneficiaries considering the chronic dependency on food aid that has been created though for 95% of the target population. On a few occasions, commodities were not made available on time due to procurement delays. Food rations ended up not always reaching the targeted recipients efficiently due to traditional coping mechanisms in which food is shared by those who receive it. The positive community participation evaluators had read about was actually achieved. Capacity development of the respective RCST branches has been an added value of the project. The underlying causes that lead to the need of the project (overall poverty, extremely low pension/retirement and welfare benefits) have not been addressed and evaluators understand alternative measures are scarce; external inputs, therefore, continue to be necessary. Cross-cutting issues have been addressed well by the project. (*See Annex 3 for full details*) There have been other ECHO-funded actors as well in the food/feeding and health/watsan sectors in Tajikistan. Evaluators met with them and a report of that meeting can be found in Annex 6.

120. The mostly Khatlon province, longstanding ECHO-funded health project was assessed. ECHO has funded this project since 1997; in 2001, ECHO accepted to fund its new CBFA component. There are 19 monitoring teams to follow the project; this may be expensive to have, but they are very needed and useful (e.g., prescribing practices have improved). Since 2000, drugs (pre-packed and bulk generic medicines plus medical supplies) are procured by PSF. (*See Annex 2 for full details*) (*See recommendation TAJRC13\**)

121. As regards LRRD in Tajikistan<sup>25</sup>, Dipeccho and TACIS have the potential to play an important role in LRRD. ECHO has been funding Tajikistan since 1992 and Dipeccho since 2003<sup>26</sup> (where it has been very successful in fostering DP: its funds train communities at high risk on prevention and preparedness, as well as carrying out mitigation activities such as tree planting, dykes, bridges reinforcement). The new TACIS poverty alleviation facility was introduced in six districts in 2003 (total 6.5 M€). The IFRC Delegation has not yet applied for TACIS funding. (*See recommendation ECHO13 and TAJRC12 and 13*)

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<sup>25</sup> Tajikistan is the poorest of the New Independent and Central Asian States.

<sup>26</sup> The Central Asia DIPECHO strategy contains a series of DP measures for Tajikistan and its Central Asian neighbours.

122. It is to be pointed out that the operational and financial responsibilities, in these 3 financial instruments differs. ECHO and Dipeccho are coordinated in the field and from Dushanbe while TACIS is a regional co-operation agreement with an added national support. The main issue is that TACIS is not primarily designed for poverty alleviation and mainly fosters transfer of know how, especially in administrative and legal reform matters: 80% of its budget is assigned to services and only 20% to needed equipment. Fostering LRRD, the EC has created a great expectation among its partners and beneficiary countries. But gaps still exist in the funding between ECHO, Food Security<sup>27</sup> and DIPECHO. *See map in Annex 15. (See recommendation ECHO14)*

123. According to ECHO's Global Plans the LRRD process, i.e., relief, rehabilitation and development activities must be contiguous rather than consecutive. Given the Tajiki context, evaluators think that the benefits of TACIS Track 3 Poverty Reduction operations are unlikely to be felt until 2005. Therefore, over the next few years, the balance and timing of humanitarian and development assistance is of critical importance to ensure that the two activities mutually reinforce each other. On the other hand, given ECHO's planned phasing down in Tajikistan, co-ordination between these different instruments needs to be kept up in order to ensure maximum synergy between recent ECHO-funded activities and future Food Security, Rehabilitation and TACIS financing. The ECHO TA in Dushanbe believes that many of ECHO's current partners have the expertise and capacity to foster longer-term development projects in Tajikistan. The coordination of the phasing down needs to be formalised through a country strategy paper<sup>28</sup> and through ECHO liaising with AIDCO and RELEX to define priority sectors and key partners; some of these potentials are now being discussed.. *(See recommendations ECHO9, ECHO10 and ECHO11)*

## **b. Tanzania**

124. In Tanzania, although not an issue directly pertaining the ECHO-funded project, evaluators expressed their worry to local stakeholders in different agencies (ECHO TA, IFRC Delegation, Tanzanian RC, UNHCR and WFP) that the current daily food ration to refugee camps only covers 1,860 kcals instead of the internationally recommended 2,100 (despite the fact that all children get full and not half rations). This is particularly worrisome for the Lugufu camps since the evaluators confirmed that these refugees have virtually zero access to land and to outside-camp earned income. This is mentioned, because --although the Red Cross is not in a position to influence much the food aid sector-- this situation is impinging both on child and adult malnutrition which, in turn, translates into health problems for which the ECHO-funded project is responsible. Assurances were given to evaluators by WFP in Dar es Salaam that this situation was going to be re-evaluated in October/November 2004 and a decision will be taken accordingly. [WFP also suffers from financial constraints for this operation, particularly since the Darfur crisis. Add to this the fact that ECHO decreased its contributions to WFP by 10 million Euros as Food Security funds from the EC picked up this slack in 2003; in 2004, Food Security could only come up with 7 million (not yet a hard pledge as of this evaluation) thus giving the WFP a shortfall of 3 million Euros. There is no assurance of any Food Security funds for WFP for 2005.] Altogether, the EC (through

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<sup>27</sup> In 2001, DG Development allocated €1 million for food security programmes to be implemented in 2002-2003 by international NGOs who are also ECHO partners. In December 2001, the Commission announced a doubling of TACIS funding for Central Asia and the return of TACIS to Tajikistan. In November 2002, AIDCO launched a 5 M€ call for proposals for food security operations to be implemented from mid 2003 on by international NGOs. The call for proposals specifically called for synergy between the different EC instruments.

<sup>28</sup> The inclusion in the Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Central Asia of a Poverty Reduction Strategy, "focusing on poverty alleviation, community and rural development and centred on the most vulnerable groups" is a good first step.

different instruments) covers 3-4 months/year of the total WFP needs for the 13 border camps. (*See recommendation ECHO12*)

125. The also longstanding ECHO-funded refugee camps health/water and sanitation project was evaluated. ECHO has supported this project for ten years in five camps. (The water sector support was discontinued in 2001) From 2000 to 2003, 40% of the costs were born by grants from the Japanese and American RC to the IFRC Delegation. During the same period, the Tanzanian RC had 700 staff and the project operation was very big since it ran all health operations in the five camps (hospital, clinics, laboratories, nutrition rehabilitation centres and morgues, among other). The health expenditure per capita per year in the camps was estimated last year to be 10.7 Euros. It is noted that the IFRC Head of Delegation visits to the camps were very few in the last year of his tenure, a time when the number of total delegates in the field decreased.

126. In Lugufu II EuropeAid gave a grant to the Tanzanian RC to improve water supply; results were deemed to be poor. Now, the SRC with its own funds plus some ECHO funds is redesigning the system and putting it in place. (*See Annex 2 for details*)

127. In the border camps, leaders, women's groups and beneficiaries (the latter visited in their homes) asked for more clothing, soap and toiletries, sanitary napkins for women and other NFIs in desperately short supply. The usual complains about the monotony of the diet (or food supplements in the case of the project in Dushanbe) were also heard profusely.

128. As regards LRRD, the ECHO TA was of the opinion that LRRD has started to be partially addressed by the use of the European Development Fund in four ways: a) through the Special Programme for Refugee-affected Areas (SPRAA)<sup>29</sup>; b) by Cotonu's Article 73 (ex- Lome Article 255) supporting some of the camps on educational, environmental, health and water/sanitation activities; c) by the transfer of food aid to the EC FSLB/DG Development/EuropeAid Co-operation Office (in 2004), and d) by a 25 M€ allocation under Cotonu's Article 73 to the UNHCR (2001-2003) to prepare for and assist in the repatriation of refugees to Burundi. In this sense it is of particular interest for the European Commission (EC) to consider the RC network that can participate in the repatriation and reintegration process of refugees. ECHO's intervention in Tanzania is entirely focused on the refugee programme. For ECHO to get involved in the voluntary repatriation and reintegration process is, in a way, in the spirit of LRRD. Refugee need to build-up their skills to facilitate their possible reintegration; more income generation and training activities (e.g., in first aid and agriculture) are just examples of what such an involvement could cover.

[Note: Food aid, non-food items and firewood are not within the responsibilities assumed by the RC in the Tanzanian refugee programme].

### **3.3.2. Other sectors in need of funding**

129. In both countries, evaluators did inquire about needs in sectors/areas other than the ones above and it was quite categorical that needs exist in the area of disaster preparedness (DP). People interviewed did ask evaluators how ECHO/Dipecho could help in this endeavor. It is thus re-emphasized that ECHO projects are expected to support operations that contribute to the longer-term self-reliance of the most vulnerable communities they serve thereby facilitating the LRRD process.

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<sup>29</sup> The SPRAA allocation was 22 M€(1997-2003) & 2 M €(2001-7) for socio-economic infrastructure, transport and environmental protection.

### **3.3.3. Coverage of humanitarian needs**

130. All in all, the degree of coverage of the humanitarian needs targeted by the ECHO-funded projects, both in Tajikistan and Tanzania is judged to be adequate. This is no different from what has been seen in ECHO/NGO-funded projects elsewhere in the world.

### **3.3.4. Capacity to adapt and quality of monitoring and reporting**

131. As regards the IFRC-implemented projects in Tajikistan and Tanzania, evaluators found that they have indeed all shown the needed flexibility to adapt to changing needs and situations. The respective EUNS partners have been forthcoming in accepting these adaptations and ECHO has been flexible in approving budget reallocations in relation to these adaptations. (*Also see the respective fiches in Annex 2*). ECHO reporting formats have changed in almost every FPA since 2000. The RC/EU Office has carried out training for EUNSs staff to apply the new FPA regulations.

132. The internal monitoring of the projects evaluated was judged to be good overall. In many cases, it results in ad-hoc reports, some of which the evaluators reviewed and found contributory to make needed adjustments. (*For details on monitoring see fiches in Annex 2*)

133. Overall, narrative and financial reporting were found to be of good quality. A sample of them were read for the four years under evaluation; the 'fiche-ops' of ECHO (all of them read) also found this to be the case. Timeliness of these reports had some variations, but never resulted in serious delays. The situation with the reports from Tajikistan is special. Once jointly prepared by the RCST and the IFRC Delegation in Dushanbe they go to a regional IFRC facility in Ankara for review and quality assurance; if changes are needed, the reports are sent back. Once Ankara regional reporting and financial unit (RRU and RFU respectively) approves them, reports are sent to the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva and to respective ECHO partner EUNS for further comments and ultimately for eventual submission to ECHO by the contracted deadline. This procedure was found to result in an average 4-6 weeks delay in the arrival of the reports to Brussels. (*See recommendation IFRC13*)

### **3.3.5. Role of other ECHO partners in Tajikistan**

134. Evaluators met with representatives of nine NGOs while in Dushanbe. After introductions, the evaluators explained the aims of their evaluation of the IFRC. They were told evaluators wanted to get acquainted of what NGOs were doing with ECHO funding and to also compare their achievements and shortcomings with those of the IFRC-executed projects, as well as co-operation and convergence issues; they also wanted to explore the relations of each with the local ECHO office. (*See Annex 6 for details*)

### **3.3.6. Cross cutting issues**

135. On **gender issues**, ECHO's and the IFRC policies reviewed are quite congruent. In 2003, the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva set up an internal task force on gender and country-of-origin of staff and found that only 1/5 of senior officers were female and most lower assistant positions were filled by women. There was also a bias in favour of staff coming from European countries. (*See recommendation IFRC7\**)

In the implementation of these policies by the projects assessed in Tajikistan, evaluators found no gender discrimination in the food aid and health projects. The gender breakdown for the recipients of food aid was 32% female (mostly independently living elderly retired women with no family support and the rest women-headed households). In the CBFA training of RC volunteers in Khatlon, the percentage of women was 70%. However, the two projects under implementation do not have pro-active gender mainstreaming and sensitisation components.

In Tanzania, in the camps visited, the evaluators found there are active women's protection (sexual and gender-based violence) activities ongoing. However, although organized, women are participating, to a limited degree, in decision making in the respective camp committees. In Lugufu, there are strong and outspoken women's organizations with which evaluators met.

136. **Children** are only indirect beneficiaries of the food aid project in Dushanbe (e.g., children of women-headed households). The selection criteria have more to do with the aged/handicapped and with the characteristics of the head of household (e.g., female). In the Khatlon project, children's issues are addressed as part of the active MCH programme.

In the Tanzanian camps, children do receive the needed attention in the health project, also with active MCH programmes. A special nevirapine-based MCTC programme is funded by UNICEF and is very successful in testing/counselling couples and then treating the positive cases. Child protection issues seem to be handled more on the health than on the psychosocial domain.

137. In Tajikistan, **the elderly and handicapped** are priority candidates for the food aid project. The health project keeps a small portion of the drugs specifically for these target groups. In the Tanzanian camps, these two groups also get priority when NFIs are distributed on an ad-hoc basis (e.g., clothes); these groups are targeted as 'extremely vulnerable individuals'; some schools have special teachers for handicapped children.

138. In 1998, the IFRC Secretariat set up ERNA, an organization (now headquartered in Bratislava) to coordinate, train trainers and promote work in **HIV/AIDS**; ERNA now is active in 34 countries. The first HIV/AIDS policy of the IFRC dates back to 1987; it was revised in 2003, but 80% of the original content was still kept, because it is still valid. The policy calls on all ONSs to get involved in HIV/AIDS work; safe blood transfusions is an important activity retained. To this has been added peer youth education, and an ad-hoc manual exists for that in 14 languages. In 2003, the IFRC-supported anti-retroviral treatment. ECHO finances none of this. An important focus of HIV/AIDS work of the IFRC Secretariat is home-based care and orphans. HIV/AIDS (as well as TB and malaria) are now incorporated into CBFA training. Home-based care includes household food security issues, income generation activities, psychosocial support and harm reduction.

**HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria** are clearly concerns actively addressed in the Tanzanian camps. The HIV/AIDS awareness of the refugees interviewed is high and an active community education and condom distribution programme is in place. TB prevention and control follow the Tanzanian MOH protocols and receives the drugs from that programme. Malaria is the number one cause of morbidity in the camps. The Tanzanian MOH has not yet adopted the Artesunate treatment regime recommended by WHO; therefore, the camps cannot use this medicine. The distribution of impregnated bed nets was started and discontinued in 2002 due to a high percentage of them having been found in the open market after distribution (as a consequence of food ration cuts and inadequate education). Only in June 2004 was a limited distribution programme restarted - exclusively for pregnant women in antenatal care and unaccompanied minors (ECHO-UNICEF-UNHCR collaboration). In meetings with camp leaders and women's groups evaluators were asked to intercede for a more massive distribution of and education on these nets to be undertaken. But a clear (UNICEF/UNHCR) strategy already exists to monitor the current distribution and to go to scale if results are positive. Indoor spraying of homes was discontinued after a small study in the camps showed it to be ineffective.

In Tajikistan's health project, much less, but still some, is done for HIV/AIDS; health education does touch the topic and condoms are made available. TB is a very serious problem in the country (also in Khatlon); statistics are very poor. Not much is being done for it yet

although new funding from the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS and TB has started being invested. Only now, more DOTS (directly observed treatment) programmes are coming on line with donor funding (so far, since 2002 only in Dushanbe and Leninski covered by Project HOPE). ECHO was the first funder of IFRC on TB in the country (1999), but on preventive actions and social support of patients. Later, Norwegian RC funds have taken over. (*See recommendation ECHO15 and IFRC7\**)

139. The **security of humanitarian workers** has not been an issue in both Tajikistan and Tanzania in the years under evaluation. Security remains an important operational challenge in carrying out humanitarian activities in a changing environment. The quality of the security cells of the IFRC and the ICRC has markedly improved in recent years<sup>30</sup>.

In Tanzania, security has not been a problem for RC staff since 1999, year in which a group of armed bandits attacked the Tanzanian RC administration staff members in Kasulu. Refugees interviewed reported attacks from bandits in Lugufu I and II earlier in 2004 in which one child was killed. The humanitarian space has nevertheless been adequate and respected. No access problems have been reported due to security issues. Furthermore, clear security guidelines are given to delegates related to the specific context in the area they are assigned.

140. **Environmental concerns** are not really relevant in both projects evaluated in Tajikistan. In Tanzania, they are indeed and too much procrastination has stood in the way of sustainable action. The concerns refer to the sourcing of fuel wood for the camps. The problem is more manifest and acute in the Kigoma camps where authorities have instructed camp dwellers to only get the same from a designated area 15 km away from the camp due to risks of deforestation (and competition with local Tanzanian population). This has meant great hardship for camp dwellers. No transportation has been made available to them for this purpose.

In the Lugufu and Mtabila camps, CARE and Danida are managing a reforestation-for-fuelwood project. Not all camp dwellers comply with recommendations CARE has made on the gathering of this wood. (*See recommendation TANZRC16\**) Only very initial efforts have been made by CARE to introduce fuel-efficient cooking stoves.

### 3.3.7. Key conclusions/lessons learned

Key conclusions/lessons learned for the sectoral level can be summarised as follows:

- i. Targeted populations fully depend on external assistance in both projects evaluated in Tajikistan and in the one in the camps in Tanzania. Alternative measures are acknowledged to be scarce.
- ii. No gender discrimination was found in both projects in Tajikistan and, in Tanzania, evaluators thought women participation could be improved at decision-making levels.
- iii. Environmental concerns are of importance in the Tanzanian camps (and are the primary responsibility of the UNHCR).

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<sup>30</sup> See the 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent –Workshop 11, Pierre Krahenbul, ICRC Director of operations.

### 3.3.8. Recommendations

#### For ECHO:

- ECHO12 ECHO to discuss the issue of 2005 food security funding for WFP in Tanzania with Food Security officials in Brussels. (3.3.1) paragraph 124
- ECHO13 As regards Dipecho funding, NGOs funded by Dipecho to always demonstrate efforts have been made to partner or co-implement the project with the respective ONS so as to strengthen the branch in the district they are working in; this, in an effort to increase sustainability. (3.3.1) 121
- ECHO14 Since Tajikistan is a test case for LRRD, the different EC stakeholders must jointly define what relief, what rehabilitation and what development they want to and can engage-in there. Then, they have to decide how to do what they decide to do. For a smooth progression they have to consider the local capacities rather than have decisions made politically at the different headquarters. Continuing annual meetings are recommended to adjust the integrated approach to poverty alleviation to be followed and to reinforce the LRRD chain in response to the EC's stated policy. Further, the EC's organisational and management structure must be staffed adequately to better co-ordinate the LRRD process. (3.3.1) 122
- ECHO15 Consider making the good HIV/AIDS work the IFRC is currently doing eligible for ECHO funding; this will have a good visibility impact. (3.3.6) 138

#### For the IFRC Secretariat:

- IFRC13 To avoid frequent delays, ECHO project draft reports (narrative and financial) now sent to Ankara for review before being forwarded to the IFRC Secretariat and the Finnish and Netherlands RC should be sent to Geneva, Helsinki and The Hague (and ECHO Dushanbe) at the same time they are sent to Ankara; If the manpower exists in Turkey, comments by all these to be then sent to Ankara for them to finalise these reports for ECHO. (3.3.4) 133

For EUNSS: *See Annex 2*

#### For ONSs:

- TAJRC12 Continue insisting that all NGOs that have Dipecho funding in Tajikistan and remind them that ECHO requires them to work with and strengthen the respective branches of the RCST in the districts (even if currently weak); make future plans accordingly. (The ECHO TA in Dushanbe to continue insisting). (3.3.1) 121
- TAJRC13 RCST to work with the seven Dipecho funded NGOs to harmonise/standardise their approaches to disaster preparedness; this, as a basis to prepare a national DP strategy for everybody to follow in the future. (3.3.1) 121



### 3.4. Emergency response units (ERUs)

(Also see Annex 12)

#### 3.4.1. Key findings

141. In Bam, Iran, ECHO financed a primary emergency decision on December 29, 2003 (2.3 million Euros total and 0.83 million for ERUs) and then, in February 2004, funded six RC projects (out of 13 total) for 6.2 million Euros (two watsan, two psychosocial and two health).

142. A full description of the deployment in Bam of nine ERUs from 12 PNSs or their evaluation is not the purpose of the ToR of this evaluation. Therefore, here, evaluators offer a constructive critical analysis of the operations. The IFRC Secretariat already conducted an excellent evaluation of the operations ('Operations Review of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Response to the Earthquake in Bam, Iran, May 2004) assessed the planning, management and coordination of the emergency response between December 26, 2003 and February 29, 2004 and also made recommendations to improve the overall performance of disaster responses in major disasters. (See recommendations ECHO16 and IFRC13)

143. ERUs are very expensive to assemble, store, maintain and deploy, especially if not used for a long time. Only PNSs (primarily EUNSSs) have ERUs; they are expected to be on the ground in the first 72 hours after a major disaster and operate on the ground for 6-8 weeks without replenishing consumables (usually for a maximum of four months, but can occasionally go further –like in Bam). There are standardized procedures to launch an ERU (54 of them launched since 1996). The newest ERU is the 'Relief ERU' (so far only held by the American RC); it identifies the needs for the hardware arrived at the airport(s) and tells logistics what to send, where and when and how to distribute the goods to then track these supplies until they arrive where they should go. Evaluators learned that, ideally, ERUs should be modular so that only those components needed are actually shipped. The SRC has a modular watsan ERU in that, once they are in place, they can deploy five water purification units to different locations (as they did in Bam).

144. The IFRC Secretariat and several EUNSSs have designed and used ERUs since the mid-1990s to complement the disaster response capacity of ONSs in the countries affected by major disasters. The respective EUNSSs sponsor<sup>31</sup> and compile these units while the international bodies of the Movement coordinate their deployment (the IFRC Secretariat, following a natural disaster or a refugee influx, or the ICRC during conflict). Together they have standardised these units and the precise procedures to be followed. These ERUs include pre-trained and fully self-contained teams of technical specialists and pre-packed stocks of standardised equipment ready for immediate use. ERUs are fully self-supporting for the first month of a relief operation and can be deployed for up to four months. The personnel, pre-alerted, guarantees to be available on short notice within 48 hours of a deployment order, and the full unit can be mobilised within 48-72 hours to provide a range of services in all cases the local infrastructure is severely damaged, overwhelmed or inexistent. (See recommendations EUNSS6, 7 and 8)

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<sup>31</sup> They do not just cover the costs of the hardware and software during training and operations; they are also responsible to put each team together guaranteeing their professional qualifications.

145. Field Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT)<sup>32</sup> missions are deployed by the IFRC Secretariat immediately after a major disaster. If the FACT recommends the deployment of one or more ERUs, specific requests are then sent out by the IFRC Secretariat Special ERU Task Force to the respective EUNS(s) for the type of ERU(s) required. (*See recommendations IFRC14 and 15*) ERU deployment factors have been set. *See note [1] in Annex 11. Also see Annex 12.*

146. There are presently six types of ERU available, each offering different specialised software and hardware services: water and sanitation, basic health care, referral hospital, logistics, telecommunications and relief. For details, see note [2] in Annex 11. Furthermore, for an ERUs deployment history, see note [3] and for an account of what happened in the earthquake in Bam, see note [4] in the same Annex.

147. The prompt international response<sup>33</sup> to the earthquake in Bam meant that, following the immediate Iran RCS request for international assistance, the IFRC Secretariat, and several national societies mobilised significant human and material resources to support the ongoing relief operation. As part of the Federation's support to the IRCS disaster response efforts for the Bam survivors, 95 international teams were flown in, 1,950 expatriates were deployed. 170 international relief flights reached the area and 4,500MT of relief items were consigned. (*See recommendation IFRC16*)

148. Within 72 hours, the FACT<sup>34</sup> mission on site co-ordinated the deployment of nine ERUs supported by 12 RC national societies; they provided a full range of support functions and services, as well as responding to most sectoral needs of the affected population. The operation represented the largest ERU deployment ever.<sup>35</sup> For a sector by sector description of operations, see note [5] in Annex 11 and for the different memoranda signed and for details on the handover process of the ERUs see note [6]. (*See recommendations IFRC17 and EUNS9*)

149. As regards the future use of the remaining ERU hardware and materials left behind, the question now is how the IRCS will use the donated remnant hardware: this is one of the main challenges for an efficient handover process<sup>36</sup>. Remaining hardware and materials are not complete; some have been used for more than 4 months and spare parts are generally not available in the local market. If the handover of ERUs is to be considered as an opportunity to upgrade the IRCS disaster preparedness and response capacity (and not just to have valuable hardware dumped in regional, national or provincial warehouses just occupying space), the IFRC Delegation and the respective EUNSSs, in cooperation with the IRCS, should now a-posteriori determine the condition of remnants, their potential use and functions, needs for replenishment and needs for additional training. Furthermore, as the evaluators highlighted over and over, ERUs are part of a process in which the combination of software and hardware, standardised operational procedures, are essential. Specialised personnel must be

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<sup>32</sup> The disaster assessments of FACT missions form the basis for programming the response and appeal for international support.

<sup>33</sup> The Iranian Government launched an appeal for international assistance for international search and rescue teams (with detection equipment to finding survivors), medical field hospitals, water purification equipment, electric generators and mobile heating equipment, tents and blankets. This led to an open sky policy with massive international response that overwhelmed the national management capacity of incoming relief goods.

<sup>34</sup> IFRC/FACT and UNDAC coordinated their assessments and launched a joint UN/IFRC flash appeal.

<sup>35</sup> The 2<sup>nd</sup> largest being the Bhuj earthquake in 2001 in which 6 ERUs, directly involving 8 RC national societies were deployed within 48 hours.

<sup>36</sup> When the ERU referral hospital services close down, the Iranian RC has committed itself to incorporate the hospital into its disaster preparedness and response system at national headquarter level.

trained<sup>37</sup> to use and deploy these remaining components of hardware. An identified risk is that too few IRCS staff are available or have the technical profile to properly use to the maximum the remnants of the different ERUs.

To conclude, this represents a good opportunity to better develop the IRCS resources and expertise for their use in any future national and/or international relief effort. (*See recommendations IFRC18 and 19, IRCS1 and IRCS1\*, 2\* and 3\**)

150. As regards the pre-positioning of DP stocks, Iran is one of the most disaster prone countries worldwide. After the Bam operation, replenishment of relief stocks remains a big priority and an enormous challenge for the IRCS as replenished stocks are the basis to recover its disaster preparedness capacity. (The priority item indicated was family tents<sup>38</sup>).

It is noted that the IRCS mobilised more than 50% of its national disaster preparedness stocks for relief assistance in Bam, distributing more than 40 M€ worth of food and non-food items in a two month period (a table with present stocks, items donated in the pipeline and priority items for replenishment was asked for by the evaluators both from the IRCS and the IFRC Delegation, but was not provided). Even if the IRCS has a nationwide disaster preparedness capacity second to none --through the network of its 340 branches and with a considerable manpower of 2 million volunteers and 1.2 million young members trained in disaster preparedness and first aid that can act in disaster response operations with a good land and air logistic fleet-- it must urgently re-pre-position food and non-food relief items. One must here consider that Iran has a good national production capacity to replenish some of these stocks. A plan must be drawn for this in the coming months. (*See recommendations IFRC20, IRCS2, IFRC8\* and 9\*, EUNSI\*, 2\* and 3\**)

151. The prime advantage of ERUs is the speed with which a small team can form and begin working in-situ using pre-stocked, ready-to-use hardware. Their shortcomings, on the other hand, can be said to have been, for example, the late integration of IRCS personnel, some co-ordination problems to cope with real on-location needs, local ONS staff not knowing what is expected of them in an ERU, and the criteria not defined for what to do with hardware left behind (with this hardware not to be used for deployment abroad in a first stage). It should also be noted that ERU staff are volunteers deployable only for up to 4 weeks, a time after which they are replaced by colleagues. (*See recommendation EUNS4\**)

152. As a reference, one must mention PADRU (the Pan-american Disaster Response Unit) in the Canal Zone run by the IFRC Delegation in Panama. PADRU is not an ERUs depository and was born after hurricane Mitch. It is intended to improve the disaster response capacity of ONSs in the region and to co-ordinate disaster relief in the region, as well as foster DP; it has a warehouse and a logistics unit that also trains national and regional intervention teams (NITS and RITS). PADRU has received EU materials left behind by EUNSS in countries in the region. Noteworthy are two facts: a) The IFRC Asia/Pacific Regional IFRC Delegation is considering setting up a PADRU-like unit either in Bangkok or Kuala Lumpur, and b) Donor pressures and the high media profile of ERU deployments make them not always correspond to the most urgent needs to be addressed. (*See recommendations ECHO17, IFRC21 and ONS3*)

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<sup>37</sup> Training workshops for Iranian RC staff, on ERU basic and specialised concepts are planned for. The IFRC has planned a training on the watsan ERUs for September 2004 and the German RC has planned a training in mid December on the basic health care unit. Training should be co-ordinated with IFRC to avoid unnecessary duplications (the IFRC has budgeted 40,000 CHF for ERU training).

<sup>38</sup> According to the IFRC pipeline report in May 2004, the IFRC delivered in Bam 3,400 kitchen sets, 24,060 hand towels, 3,003 family tents, 22,800 blankets and 1 rubhall as a warehouse tent.

153. Finally, evaluators found out that actually pre-positioning ERUs in risk-prone regions of the world would not significantly shorten the early response time of ERUs. A number of issues - pertaining to, for example, customs clearances, availability of charter airplanes on a very short notice, over-flight permissions for these airplanes over countries en route, the negotiation in-advance with suppliers of perishables in the ERUs (i.e., pre-positioning of contracts), the quality of the ERUs maintenance operations-- are all still problems. So, for the time being, evaluators are of the strong opinion that EUNSS and the American RC seem to have an advantage on these and other grounds. (*See recommendation IFRC19*)

### 3.4.2. ERUs: Key conclusions/lessons learned

- i. Good planning and preparedness can and do help reduce the impact of a disaster.
- ii. The volume of national and international relief goods sent in Bam was beyond the capacity of the IRCS to manage systematically, and warehouse space was insufficient and inadequate<sup>39</sup>. (The IRCS ended up having to coordinate 80 foreign agencies). Therefore, these goods (as well as ERUs) are to be deployed on the basis of identified needs by the local ONS. Too many expatriates and projects do become overwhelming and risk overlapping/duplicating services. External humanitarian aid should not become an additional management burden for the ONS. (*See recommendations IFRC22 and ONS4*)
- iii. ERUs improve the speed and efficiency to respond to disasters only if and when customs clearances do not represent a bottleneck and funding is readily made available. [The IFRC Secretariat is exploring these issues through its International DR Laws (IDRL) initiative] (*See recommendation ONS5*)
- iv. The ERU hospital and clinics, as well as the watsan units used helped to prevent epidemic outbreaks; some were used for a longer period than the one initially planned for. (*See Annex 11 and see recommendation EUNS10*)
- v. Cooperation within the IFRC was highly valued and found to be satisfactory by the interviewed staff across the board.
- vi. ECHO funding is considered a definite added value by all the staff interviewed as it is available quickly and ERUs do need the back up of a donor. This clearly highlights the importance of the primary emergency decision of last December.
- vii. As the evaluators verified, budget planning is not always precise when applying for a primary emergency decision. This was the case with the field hospital in Bam as funding requested ended up covering the expenses of only 15 days instead of 3 months. The 2<sup>nd</sup> decision adopted in March 2004 had to cover expenses retroactively from the 16<sup>th</sup> of January to September 2004. The structure (now moved from tents to container-based clinics and wards) will remain in place until the local government health facilities have been re-opened (expected in March 2005). (*See recommendations IFRC 23, EUNS11 and IRCS3*)
- viii. The handover process should be planned from the beginning of the ERU deployment and, for this purpose, the IFRC team leader should facilitate negotiations either with the ONS or the appointed government authority as ERU team leaders are often overwhelmed with operational tasks. (*See recommendation IFRC24*)

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<sup>39</sup> For further information on coordination issues refer to "Improving NGO coordination: lessons from the Bam earthquake", Jenty Wood, p.27-30, in Humanitarian Exchange, n. 27 July 2004, Humanitarian Practice Network [www.odihpn.org](http://www.odihpn.org)

- ix. Frequent rotations of IRCS staff belatedly assigned to ERUs resulted in precious know-how being only partially acquired.
- x. One of the ultimate goals of ERUs must always be to increase the local capacity, and to reduce dependence on expatriate staff so that the ERU deployments become more cost-effective and sustainable.
- xi. The presence of the IRCS with the force of all its network clearly increased the efficiency and impact of the IFRC response in Bam. (*See recommendations IRCS4 and IRCS5\**)
- xii. Although a number of PNSs pursued bilateral projects, the IRCS expressed its preference for the multilateral approach.

### 3.4.3. Recommendations

All of the above, makes the evaluators conclude that, in their view - and for **ECHO** - the best position to take vis-a-vis ERUs would be for:

- ECHO16 ECHO not to fund ERU operations deployed outside the IFRC Secretariat ERU selection process (i.e., deployed without the 'green light' from the IFRC Secretariat). (3.4.1) 142
- ECHO17 ECHO with the IFRC Secretariat to set up a task force to decide the best modalities in which ECHO can financially support the ERU efforts. An ECHO revolving fund for ERUs could be one such mechanism. In cases where ECHO concurs with the dire needs in a major disaster, evaluators favour a continuation of primary emergency decisions funding the deployment of specific ERUs (with potential follow-up funding as was the case in Bam); they also favour ECHO considering the yearly financing of several joint training workshops for FACT and ERU team leaders, plus RDRT and NDRT team members from countries at high risk of disaster. The Finnish and German RC societies have had positive experiences in this training in the last two years. [The IFRC Secretariat actually needs a long-term policy on this joint training]. (3.4.1) 152

**From a wider perspective** than that for ECHO only, **evaluators recommend** the following about ERUs:

#### **For the IFRC Secretariat:**

- IFRC13 Evaluators support the recent decision that the IFRC office head in the disaster site be a national or a regional RC staff ("the one who wears the IFRC badge"). (3.4.1) 142
- IFRC14 FACT missions not to just to assess-coordination-issues, but also to provide clear and hopefully detailed needs-assessments-of-services-and-support required by the ONS in the disaster country (and to pass this on to the IFRC Secretariat) taking into consideration the international response of other organisations. This will contribute to better integrate ERUs especially if progressively more FACT/RDRT/NDRT/ERU team leaders are trained together thus promoting a common understanding of all these crucial actors in the field. (3.4.1) 145
- IFRC15 All disaster prone ONSs should have a basic introductory course on FACT/ERU deployment procedures so as to know what exactly is expected of their staff from the moment these arrive. (Information in the DMIS or in the IFRC website alone is not sufficient for ONSs to get a clear understanding). (3.4.1) 145

- *IFRC16* The decision making process in Geneva on which ERUs are deployed should continue to foster joint deployments and avoid any competition among EUNSSs. (3.4.1) 147
- *IFRC17* Standardised MoUs for ERU handovers to be designed and adopted for use in all disasters where ERUs are deployed (so only minor adjustments to the text are needed to adapt the MoUs to local circumstances). Make sure the texts of these MoUs meet minimum ECHO regulations (in case ECHO funds them). Standardised handover procedures will reduce the management workload during the emergency. (3.4.1) 148
- *IFRC18* After ERU deployments, the IFRC Secretariat or IFRC Delegation to always make sure an inventory of all hardware left behind is carried out to decide what is still functional/working in order to decide whether to replenish it and to determine the way in which and where those components can be used. Ideally, at that time, ONS staff should be trained on how to manage the remaining components of the hardware. (3.4.1) 149
- *IFRC19* As regards the pre-placing of ERUs hardware (ergo units simpler than conventional ERUs) and the training of ad-hoc local teams in disaster-prone areas in partnership with certain ONSs, this capability should first be established for use within national boundaries before considering these “ERUs” for upgrading for international deployment. ERU-holding EUNSSs can partner with the respective ONSs to help the latter set up this capacity and carry out the first deployments jointly. A special task force of the ERU Working Group to be set up to propose a comprehensive policy for the near future regarding this ‘regional or national pre-positioning of ERUs’. (3.4.1) 149
- *IFRC20* The IFRC Delegation in Teheran to formally invite the ICRC in Teheran to become a partner of the IFRC Delegation and of the IRCS in the setting up of the Federation’s Strategic Relief Centre in that city. Before that, the centre should receive assurances from the government that international movement of disaster relief items and persons will be facilitated in the country’s borders. (3.4.1) 150
- *IFRC21* In the near future, the ERU Working Group to decide what exactly are the respective ONSs to do with the hardware left behind by ERUs. Will there always be follow-up EUNS post disaster training of the staff of the ONS in the use of the equipment left behind (as stipulated in the Bam MoU)? Who will pay for this? Who will pay for the replenishment of consumables of the ex-ERU? (3.4.1) 152
- *IFRC22* PNSs unilaterally arriving through bilateral arrangements should be sternly reminded by the IFRC Secretariat of agreed procedures; this, because such behaviour leads to an artificially donor-driven division of disaster relief work. Existing IFRC Secretariat procedures do select the best-positioned PNS to be invited to contribute. (3.4.2) ii
- *IFRC23* The IFRC Delegation to help the IRCS to address its funding gap for the Bam hospital (now in containers) to carry them financially to at least March 2005. (Evaluators were told a meeting will be held in November to look at alternatives). (3.4.2) vii
- *IFRC24* A new ‘handover manager’ position to be integrated in the disaster area IFRC Coordination Team to assure smooth and prompt handover procedures. (Includes the early finding of suitable ONS staff to be integrated into the work of the respective ERUs as early as possible). (3.4.2) viii

### For EUNSS holding ERUs:

- EUNSS6 The deployment of joint ERUs is desirable (as was recently done with ECHO funding and one main contractor for the hospital in Bam). In these cases, they can share human resources, know-how, management and equipment and thus mutually reinforce each other with their respective expertise; further common training and coordination between the two ERU teams (as already done by the Finnish and German RC and their respective partners) should be organised if not done so yet --way before the joint ERU is called to deploy. (3.4.1) 144
- EUNSS7 ERUs are only to be deployed when the IFRC Secretariat gives the green light. (3.4.1) 144
- EUNSS8 The same ERU hardware components in different EUNSSs warehouses to have shared codes so they can be shipped in a modular fashion responding to the exact identified needs (as all hardware components are not always necessary). (3.4.1) 144
- EUNSS9 A collective debriefing of all ERU team leaders deployed in Bam and other recent major disaster-affected areas would be helpful to share lessons learned and to make pertinent recommendations. (3.4.1) 148
- EUNSS10 If an ERU stays in operation for over four months, for sustainability, at least one (or some) of the staff trained locally to be a local resident (or from the same region). (3.4.2) iv
- EUNSS11. The planned ERU training of the Bam hospital staff by the Norwegian RC to be held around one month before the hospital closes so the staff trained packs the ERU boxes and knows all about them in the future. (3.4.2) vii

### For ONSs in general:

- ONS3 All ONSs of disaster-prone countries to undergo a basic ERU introductory training for national and provincial staff to understand what is expected of them if an ERU is deployed. (3.4.1) 152
- ONS4 ONS not to get overwhelmed by external demands not related to the IFRC's International Appeal and by PNS's bilateral responses not answering specifically to the identified needs. (3.4.2) ii
- ONS5 Evaluators were exposed to the severe shortcomings of an 'open sky policy' immediately after a major disaster. The inefficiencies, waste, duplications, logistical nightmares and excess resources received should be avoided. A 'qualified open sky policy' in which what to send and when to send is negotiated with donors before they load their planes should be applied. The IDRL Programme could look into this issue. (The diplomatic and political implications are understood, but the negative aspects of the lessons learned in Bam are powerful as well). (3.4.2) ii

### For the Iran Red Crescent Society:

- IRCS1 The IRCS to assign specialised staff to be in charge of the ERU hardware handed over. It is to permanently hire specialised water and sanitation technicians into its staff. This staff to be specifically trained on the hardware and then to recommend to the IRCS leadership what best to do with this material. (3.4.1) 149
- IRCS2 The IRCS to follow-up on the World Bank's board decision (expected October 28, 2004) on funding the Bam Emergency Reconstruction Project. Follow-up to be done through the Iranian Ministry of Economic Affairs, The 2<sup>nd</sup> objective of the project is to improve emergency preparedness in the province of Kerman and the District of Bam (see Project Information Document, appraisal stage, rpt n. AB1053). (3.4.1) 150

- **IRCS3** The present staff of Bam hospital to be offered becoming RC volunteers so they can be called upon to work on a similar hospital in case of a new emergency. (3.4.2) vii
- **IRCS4** The IRCS to progressively work on a more decentralised decision-making structure, more inclusive of the branch level; this will require setting up and following a comprehensive new organisational development plan. (3.4.2) xi

### 3.5. Recommendations for thematic funding

154. Since late 2003, ECHO has made thematic funding resources available to international organisation partners. Thematic funding is a source of non-country-earmarked, one-time funding facility. It was created to fulfil specific capacity gaps; The thematic funding purpose is primarily to support global activities of international organisations in order to increase their technical capabilities to better serve the end-beneficiaries. It is designed to be easily replicable and to benefit people worldwide or in large vulnerable geographical regions. The approximate overall envelope for thematic purposes is 23, 5 million Euros for 2005.

155. ECHO and the IFRC are presently discussing the way thematic funding could be used for capacity building purposes. The present evaluation ToR required to look into the different possibilities and to formulate concrete recommendations.

156. Numerous RC staff in the countries visited were asked their opinion regarding the priorities they saw for using thematic funding resources. The vast majority of them saw a need to strengthen the IFRC's DP and mitigation work from the international all the way to the RC branch level.

157. There was little support (except for the staff in Iran) for the regional pre-positioning of DR stocks although not so for pre-positioning stocks for national DP purposes (*See paragraph 152 above*). Evaluators are also disinclined to recommend this regional pre-positioning for various reasons (*also given in paragraph 153 above*):

- given the EC's financial regulations it is complicated to finance stock pre-positioning;
- the stocking of DR commodities worked for PADRU in Latin America due to special circumstances: an important support from Amcross plus the availability of remnants from Hurricane Mitch and the location of already available empty warehouses in the (duty free) Panama Canal Zone. [These unique peculiarities make it questionable for such a structure to work elsewhere as well all other positive DP functions PADRU is fulfilling notwithstanding];
- any new regional depot will have to resolve national customs, immigration, air transport, maintenance costs and other issues before becoming viable;
- the actual time saved to get emergency supplies from a regional warehouse compared with the time for these supplies (e.g., an ERU) to arrive from a PNS is roughly equal to the time it takes to fly from the PNS warehouse to the regional depot: ergo a matter of only hours! (dispatching supplies from a PNS to an emergency spot is already streamlined to a matter of less than 48 hours);
- finally, for the first couple of years, any new regional depot will still need substantial backstopping from a PNS with experience.



158. Evaluators are convinced that, to increase response capacity, DP and mitigation activities are indeed a good, cost-effective and potentially innovative cross-cutting area for the IFRC to use thematic funding resources. This, since it already has the expertise in this work, but really needs the additional resources to significantly expand it. [Such a use also fits the 'ECHO Aid Strategy 2004' that says: "...ECHO also works at promoting DP - as part of an overall Commission Disaster Prevention and Preparedness approach- in order to reduce both vulnerability and exposure of people to risks and disasters, as well as to reduce economic costs of such disasters". (p.3)

159. To gainfully use thematic funds, the IFRC Secretariat should send a proposal to ECHO with an objective roughly worded along the following lines :

To complement the IFRC's Secretariat already efficient DR and overall DP activities, the Secretariat to (re)organize its work internally so as to significantly and specifically strengthen and expand its DP and mitigation activities targeted at the most disaster-prone countries (and most vulnerable districts within them.

160. Such an expansion calls for the Secretariat to, among other, carry out the following activities:

- target eight to twelve poor countries (especially among those with 'forgotten crises' or with appeals that were never covered and among those in which ECHO has had no visible presence focusing specially on the least developed countries according to the Human Development Index of UNDP. (Two complementary procedures can be used for this selection: the Disaster Risk Indicators Mapping of Dipecho and the DR/DP questionnaire the Secretariat has sent out to all national societies and that it is still tabulating)<sup>40</sup>;
- carry out specific DP/mitigation training needs assessments in the countries selected;
- use intensive training and simulations to work with the selected ONSs in those disaster-prone countries to strengthen their current weak DP/mitigation capabilities (i.e., addressing capacity gaps);
- in those countries, also do DP/mitigation training and work with the branches in the most risk-prone areas (a course of action that will also strengthen the ONSs decentralization of decision-making efforts the IFRC Secretariat and ECHO are interested in);
- adapt and translate the IFRC existing nine DP training manuals (already in four languages) to fit the specific training needs of the ONSs selected;
- organise exchange visits (for technical capacity building purposes) from RC staff of the countries selected to countries that already have good decentralized DP/mitigation programmes (i.e., horizontal transfer of knowledge).<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Within the top twenty of the Dipecho mapping are: Ethiopia, Mozambique, Malawi, Chad, Tanzania, Uganda, Madagascar, Mauritania and Kenya in Africa. Further, although the following countries are not part of the top twenty Dipecho mapping, ECHO had manifested an interest to increase its presence in the South Pacific. In the same mapping, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Fiji appear as priorities although after the 60<sup>th</sup> global priority. This notwithstanding, ECHO is interested in these countries as they are isolated countries and with no ECHO presence despite clear pockets of need

<sup>41</sup> The DIPECHO mechanism cannot serve these purposes: DIPECHO is a vertical approach to promote DP activities in specific countries, involving a larger number of ECHO partners who are working directly at grass-root levels (with the end-beneficiaries). Under the present proposal for thematic funding, the approach is global and horizontal. It supposes an organisational set-up at the Secretariats' level and DP/DR training-mainstreamed activities with ONS and their branches in a vast geographical area. The scheme as proposed can be easily adapted for replication by the Secretariat in other geographical areas.

161. As a means to carry out these and other ad-hoc activities, the IFRC Secretariat should set up a special task force/implementation unit to plan for, implement and monitor the use of ECHO thematic funding funds.

162. As a result of these thematic funding funded activities (directly managed and co-ordinated by the IFRC Secretariat) at-risk ONSs, their branches and selected communities will:

- be ultimately made more aware on the positive role their direct action can have,
- participate in carrying out needs assessments (vulnerability and capacity analyses),
- see their early warning, DR and DP capacities strengthened,
- be better prepared to face natural disasters when they hit, with clear predefined instructions on how to proceed,
- avoid a number of the predictable casualties and thus save lives through becoming engaged in mitigation activities at community level,
- significantly improve DP and participatory, self-reliant mitigation activities (actually increasing their capacity to respond to crises in disaster prone areas plus most possibly resulting in a quite good level of medium-term sustainability),
- strengthen the capacities of and the number of RC volunteers in many RC branches in the most disaster prone districts,
- save on/reduce the operational costs of disaster responses as local capacities will be increased.

All these results represent a big step forward since they contribute to reinforce the resilient capacities of beneficiaries and are thus clearly in the interest of both ECHO and the IFRC.

163. Finally, it is a good idea for the IFRC Secretariat to also use a small part of thematic funding to support the joint training of FACT/ERU/RDRT/NDRT team members (including qualified trainees from ONSs) as proposed in recommendation IFRC14 above.

164. It is, therefore, recommended that ECHO 4 and the IFRC Secretariat conclude their negotiations on thematic funding and consider the options presented here to eventually amend the formal proposal on thematic funding already in for ECHO consideration.

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