


Overall Evaluation of ECHO's Strategic Orientation to Disaster Reduction



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Abbreviations

CEPREDENAC	Co-ordinating Centre for the Prevention of natural Disaster in Central America
CEU	Candidate country for accession to the EU Union
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIESIN	Centre for International Earth Science Information Network
CRED	Centre for Research into the Epidemiology of Disasters
CRID	Regional Disaster Information Centre
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
DIPECHO	Disaster Preparedness programme for ECHO
DMA	Digital Mapping Archive
DPP	Disaster Preparedness and Prevention
DVI	Disaster Vulnerability Index
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
EM-DAT	Emergency and Disaster database from CRED
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FIVIMS	An Inter-agency initiative to promote information and mapping systems on food insecurity and vulnerability
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEO	Global Environment Outlook
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning Service
GIS	Geographical Information Systems
GRAVITY	Global Risk And Vulnerability Index Trends per Year
GPW	Gridded Population of the World
HDI	Human Development Index
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
IRI	International Research Institute for climate prediction, Columbia University.
JRC	Joint Research Centre
OFDA	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
PAHO	Pan American Health Organisation
PreView	Project for Risk Evaluation, Vulnerability Indexing & Early Warning
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
SOPAC	South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission
TORs	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UN ISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY¹

The **first objective** of the present report is to assess the appropriateness of ECHO's strategic orientation to Disaster Reduction and the actions it has managed in relation to it– DIPECHO (ECHO's Disaster Preparedness actions), Mainstreaming and Advocacy-. Have the actions achieved their objectives? The **second objective** is to produce management tools that would allow a better decision- making process to take place. This includes an analysis of the definitions utilised in Disaster Reduction interventions and the production of indicators, criteria and benchmarks to be utilised. The **third objective** is to propose practical and applicable recommendations that would enhance the effectiveness and impact of ECHO in the field of Disaster Reduction.

1. First objective – to assess the appropriateness of ECHO's strategic orientation to Disaster Reduction and the action it has managed

The main aim of ECHO in Disaster Reduction through its DIPECHO activities has been to promote and initiate appropriate short-term Preparedness activities to reduce the impact of natural disaster on the most vulnerable sections of the population and to improve their coping capacity. DIPECHO has put emphasis on the communities at risk as the main stakeholder of Natural Disaster Reduction and not as the object or victims of natural disasters. Out of the trilogy of Disaster reduction actions- prevention, mitigation and preparedness- preparedness is DIPECHO's primary objective (§6), the other two elements being considered by ECHO as accompanying measures on a pilot basis. Mainstream humanitarian operations financed by ECHO may have a preparedness element, but also mitigation and prevention components.

The **main aim** has been achieved. Through DIPECHO, ECHO has taken pioneering steps, by being among the first major donors to work directly with local communities in disaster preparedness, thus anticipating the move to considering local communities as stakeholders. Despite its very modest financing capacities, DIPECHO has attained a reputation of efficiency larger in international fora than in the Commission itself. ECHO has developed its DIPECHO activities as one of its key tools for Disaster Reduction. DIPECHO cannot be artificially transferred (§10) to other EC External Relations services where it would lose most of its legitimacy.

ECHO has developed its DIPECHO strategy in **isolation** (§9) with little understanding within the Commission's other EC External Relations services and even to a degree within ECHO itself. For as long as it is not acknowledged that Disaster Reduction is also a strategic sectoral variable in the development processes, such as for rural development or poverty alleviation, LRRD will not be fully achieved. (§13)

The **specific objectives** of disaster preparedness have been slow to take root due to vagueness in the first DIPECHO Action Plans and ECHO's limited capacities for analysis of Partners' proposals, due to staff limitations and lack of experience. These matters have now mostly been resolved and preparedness based on a strategy of participative approach with local communities or institutions is now satisfactorily implemented. The analysis of the 39 operations (§34) that the consulting team was asked to carry out shows that DIPECHO, through budget line B7-219, now primarily finances at community level floods preparedness

¹ Figures in brackets refer to the main report corresponding paragraphs.

projects with capacity building and institutional strengthening components. The operations are appropriate.

On the other hand, the element of disaster preparedness mainstreamed (§35) into operations, possibly accompanied by elements of mitigation and prevention, under ECHO's principal budget line B7-210 is often difficult to justify. In many instances the preparedness component link is not clearly apparent. The analysis of the operations shows that health, food aid and food security are considered by ECHO as suitable for inclusion of an element of disaster preparedness. Mainstreaming disaster preparedness into aid response can only be easily justified in recurrent disasters where an element of planning can be worked out. In this case off-the-shelf operations can be activated at short notice when the vulnerable population and local institutions are more receptive.

Mainstreaming (§11) is closely linked to **Advocacy**, (§18) the former being to some extent the measurement of the impact of the latter. ECHO's advocacy aims to introduce a "culture" of Disaster Reduction into development. Other EC External Relations services concerned with development have still no clear awareness that Disaster Reduction is not limited to humanitarian assistance. Some officials of the External Relations Directorate General (RELEX), in particular, were of the opinion that RELEX has no real interest in Disaster Reduction because of the existence of ECHO that deals with all its aspects (§12). ECHO's advocacy at the moment is essentially directed to the Commission's other External Relations services. This is not comprehensive enough. Other stakeholders can and should be included in advocacy arrangements (Delegations, Member States, National Authorities, Humanitarian Affairs Committee (HAC) members, Parliament, and other specialised organisations of the UN and Red Cross / Red Crescent family (§21)).

On the other hand ECHO has given the impression that its strategy for Mainstreaming and Advocacy is limited to **LRRD**. (§13) Valuable efforts in this sense have been made recently. The Interservice Group (§14) endeavours to go forward on LRRD integration applying the LRRD Communications (1996, 2001) to the Council and the LRRD Joint Instructions (2003). On a pilot experimental basis it has focused on two main sectors: Health and Food Aid, introducing an important debate right from the beginning that has not managed yet to persuade unconvinced staff in the other EC External Relations services that LRRD is more than an opportunistic affair for phasing out by ECHO.

ECHO, and therefore DIPECHO, is bound to **impartiality** (§16) and cannot be part of a more political process where e.g. respect of human rights would be conditional for assistance. The European Constitution under discussion also hints that humanitarian assistance could come under the umbrella of CFSP. This would probably endanger the impartiality principle.

In the last four years ECHO has demonstrated its **adaptability** (§25) to internal reform processes in accordance with recommendations from the comprehensive evaluation of ECHO in 1999 under article 20 of the humanitarian aid regulation (Regulation 1257/96) and enhanced by the Commission's Reform and the reform of the EC's Financial Regulation.

ECHO has proposed a new format for its Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) (§26), including templates for the submission of proposals and a procedure for the selection of Partners, the latter already being operational. Additional proposals have been made to simplify DIPECHO's procedures. Although for the present ECHO has decided to continue

with individual Action Plans prepared by the respective operational units, one Global Action Plan (§28) could eventually replace the individual Actions Plans. Public calls for proposals from partner and non-partner NGOs could be adapted from the present form, and replaced by a large consultation process exclusively with partner NGOs.

The procedures for the **selection of Partners'** (§29) are basically fixed by Article 7 of Regulation 1257/96. Sound proposals have been made on the basis of the above-mentioned reforms. The most important unresolved issue concerns the selection of local, non-FPA partner NGOs. Due to its legal basis, ECHO cannot have beneficiary country NGOs (local NGOs) as partners at field level. It has to use partner NGOs, which often subcontract to local NGOs. It has no ways of assessing the correctness of the subcontracting agreements between ECHO partners and local NGOs, arrangements that often leads to misunderstanding or even conflicts between the contracting parties. Many valuable local NGOs prefer to abstain rather than participate in DIPECHO activities with ECHO partners because of this issue. Further ECHO has no methodological and other tools to evaluate the local NGOs' professionalism, except the subjective (although often sound) appreciation of the ECHO field experts. Nonetheless ECHO officials strongly recommend that local NGOs (§29 & 30) be included in ECHO partners' proposals for implementing DIPECHO activities due to their local knowledge.

2. Second objective – to produce management tools that would allow a better decision-making process to take place

The second objective is an attempt to design a systematic process of decisions based on objective factors and parameters. It aims at rationalising and explicitly justifying the operations that ECHO will finance. In doing so, the audience it potentially addresses is much wider than the Humanitarian Aid Office itself and includes many other Directorates General (DGs) and services of the Commission and establishes a direct link with the LRRD concept.

ECHO's current perspectives and use of **terminologies** (§40) have been evolving due to influence of lessons learned from practice in the field and DIPECHO partners. The former definition of Disaster Preparedness and Prevention (DPP), recently replaced by Disaster reduction (DR), was not adapted to DIPECHO's objectives. These emphasise the nature of ECHO's involvement in local capacity building of organisations and communities, including improving the capacity and reducing vulnerability of the most vulnerable through participatory approaches, improved understanding and perception of risks and promoting local solutions aided by stakeholders. DPP terminologies are based on the traditional concept of the disaster management cycle where each stage of the cycle (prevention-mitigation-preparedness-response-rehabilitation-development) is a separate field of specialisation and is influenced by a top-down approach where "victims" are assumed to be helpless. The consulting team concludes that the underlying principles of the traditional disaster management cycle approach are not appropriate to DIPECHO, which sees local communities as stakeholders in the Disaster Reduction process, and in consequence basic definitions have been adapted.

The goal of **benchmarking** (§44) is to improve the overall quality of performance by adapting and comparing with better/best practices of established organisations. Noting the specific purposes of benchmarking for ECHO, the consulting team developed and obtained agreement on a table of benchmark indicators (§45).

ECHO took a significant step to address the need for improved prioritisation, in developing a preliminary **Disaster Vulnerability Index (DVI)** (§49). This work is complemented by the detailed work carried out by ECHO desks and field experts resulting in a fine tuning of prioritisation. Noting the limitations of the DVI, specifically: the absence of prioritisation at sub-national levels; the incompleteness of the data relating to coping capacities; that not all hazards are included; and further the unavailability of results of a UNDP Global Risk and Vulnerability Index (GRAVITY) (§50), the consulting team embarked on developing a new model through refinement of ECHO's DVI and adapting the conceptual approach and methodology of GRAVITY.

The consulting team developed this initiative producing **Disaster Risk Indicators (DRI)** (§51). Output includes a ranking of countries (in spreadsheets and in maps) according to relevant criteria (§52). The tables can be automatically updated (§53). The results are also mapped in collaboration with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and displayed on Digital Map Archive through the web. The model produces immediate benefits in identifying priority countries for focusing disaster reduction interventions. Not only ECHO, but also other EC DGs in their programming activities, can use it. Guidelines were produced for using the model and recommendations for updating. Regrettably the consulting team could not link and compare its results with those of UNDP's GRAVITY project as they are not yet available.

The model produces immediate benefits in identifying **priority countries** (§53) for focusing disaster reduction interventions. The countries are classified into categories of levels of disaster risks (*Very High-High-Medium and Low Disaster Risk*). The consulting team recommends that the focus of DIPECHO's assistance be made on the first two categories. The DRI Model also provides sufficient basis in determining the types, prioritisation and relative importance of disaster reduction interventions in each country. Due to the unavailability of data from GRAVITY, the model's primary weakness is that the spatial and geographical relationship of disaster risk (i.e. physical exposure to a hazard type) within a country is inaccurate. Thus, prioritisation of disaster risk at the sub-national level has been extremely difficult if not impossible to accomplish by the consulting team. However, available data from the Centre for Research into the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) for Asian countries have been used to provide preliminary prioritisation at the sub-national level for India and for the Greater Mekong Sub-region. A secondary weakness of the model is the incompleteness of data related to the coping capacity. The consulting team asserted that there is no known database on coping capacity. Instead, they attempted to gather this by engaging ECHO experts in assessing coping capacity of national authorities using a tool they developed themselves. The results are assessed to be informative, but only tentative and incomplete since much important data are unknown and responses are heavily influenced by subjective perspectives.

ECHO's Disaster Vulnerability Index

Using the results of the Disaster Risks Index (DRI) constructed, the consulting team analysed the financing decisions made by DIPECHO to obtain a **comparison of the appropriateness** (§55) of these decisions in the light of the DRI. The conclusion is that the individual Action Plans prepared by ECHO's operational units have been near to accurate in identifying priority countries and types of hazards in relation to the DRI.

- In **Central America**, (§56) according to the DRI, the countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua are categorised as very high disaster risks.
- In the **Andean Community**, (§57) according to the DRI results, none of those targeted by DIPECHO are classified as very high level disaster risk. These countries however have very high level of flood risks and are exposed to high level of earthquake risks which justifies their eligibility.
- In **Southeast Asia** (§58) Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Cambodia are ranked with very high level of disaster risk. The most common type of hazards affecting all these countries is flooding for which the consulting team recommends that priority should be provided to support reduction of flood related disasters. Flooding problem is a trans-boundary issue in Lao PDR, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam, (the Lower Mekong River sub-region).
- In **South Asia**, (§59) Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are in the very high level of risk category with very high level of flood disaster risk which also confirms the validity of DIPECHO's support to this type of hazard. Although sub-national DRI is only conducted for India, the experience of the consulting team suggests that flooding is a trans-border issue in Nepal, India and Bangladesh where the big rivers are shared by these three countries.
- In the **Caribbean Region** (§60) Haiti has very high level of disaster risks as also diagnosed. Additionally, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Cuba are categorised as with high level of disaster risk with very high level of population density as the most common denominator for their vulnerability to natural hazards.
- In **Central Asia**, Tajikistan (§61) is categorised as high disaster risk with very high level of hazards and medium level of vulnerability. The country is exposed to very high flood risk, followed by drought (high risk), windstorm (medium) and earthquake (medium). The vulnerability is at this level due to economic collapse, poverty, and internal armed conflict and left most of the country without appropriate disaster preparedness and response mechanisms.

Two regions have not been analysed: Africa and the Pacific. Amongst Africa's natural disaster risks, it is primarily drought and to a lesser degree flooding and volcanic eruptions which call for concern. Drought is a recurrent problem exacerbated by environmental changes. The budget needed to start to tackle preparedness in sub-Saharan Africa are so great that it could easily consume the total amount of available DIPECHO funding many times over, whilst at the same time the international community does not meet all of Africa's mainstream humanitarian needs. The nature of the Pacific region, consisting of many small, sparsely populated islands, makes the implementation of a DIPECHO Action Plan particularly difficult.

The consulting team also developed a **Matrix of Disaster Risks Interventions** that considers the range of interventions that ECHO and other EC DGs (§66) may provide in a disaster prone country covering the range of Disaster Reduction activities and not just those that ECHO considers as being within its mandate. The matrix for a particular country consists of Disaster Risk, hazard and vulnerability ranking. Coping capacity is assessed and related to possible interventions that would help improving it. Recommendations are provided as guidance for actions.

Third objective – to propose practical and applicable recommendations that would enhance the effectiveness and impact of ECHO in the field of Disaster Reduction

The main underlying strategic issue of DIPECHO is that it has always been considered as a minor part of ECHO's mandate, with a relatively low budget and limited impact. The overall strategy recommended is **to give DIPECHO the importance** that is recognised by most donors but, at present, partly ignored within the Commission. If ECHO's management, the key decision-makers, are not fully committed to increase the impact of DIPECHO's operations and widen its audience among donors and in other international forums, the objective of the present review is not likely to be achieved. A "culture" of disaster reduction within ECHO and the other relevant Commission services is the ultimate objective.

DIPECHO however has to further define its specificity within ECHO, which is Natural Disaster **Preparedness**. Preparedness has to remain within ECHO. Activities in Prevention or Mitigation shall be implemented on a demonstration or pilot basis only; they more properly belong in other EC External Relations services concerned with development. DIPECHO operations' beneficiaries are the local communities and institutions. Man-made disasters, such as technological, are excluded as: they require different managerial and technical expertises, both at ECHO headquarters and at field level; would have to be directed towards national authorities; and they would require significant budgets of their own.

An appropriate Disaster Reduction strategy for ECHO calls for very substantial increases in workloads for ECHO's staff. **A Disaster Reduction Sector**, under the responsibility of a Disaster Reduction Officer within ECHO's Policy Unit should be given the responsibility of designing, programming and co-ordinating ECHO's Disaster Reduction strategy, focusing primarily on Disaster Preparedness.

DIPECHO's existing budget is too small to achieve objectives and raise the awareness and interest of other EC External Relations services to a critical mass. A substantial increase (+ 100%) over the next two years has to be seriously considered to give DIPECHO a weight of its own. This corresponds to recommendations from the European Parliament (Carlotti Report).

DIPECHO is implemented by several individual Action Plans. In the opinion of the consulting team this calls for rationalisation and streamlining into one Global Plan.

Thematic needs assessment missions should take place twice a year in two different Regions with the participation of the proposed Disaster Reduction Sector officer, ECHO task manager, field experts, Partners and National Disaster Management Organisations. Other EC services concerned should be invited to participate.

Selected **Local** NGOs should be given the opportunity to sign the new FPA, strengthening sustainability and attracting the best local expertise and knowledge. The humanitarian imperative requires that any legal barriers to local NGOs becoming ECHO partners be resolved.

DIPECHO has now the tools to achieve the objective of setting **standards in Disaster Preparedness** blending the experience of implementation based on Partners' operations and analysis based on indicators and benchmarking. This objective can be achieved further

through substantial improvements in networking with other Donors and relevant organisations like UNDP, UNEP, ISDR, PROVENTIUM Consortium and IFRC.

Cross cutting issues shall be taken into account inasmuch they target the most vulnerable people. Non-observance of Human Rights is not sufficient to deter DIPECHO interventions for the most vulnerable population. The limit at field level to DIPECHO interventions should be the security of personnel, expatriate and local alike.

Mainstreaming of Disaster Reduction activities into ECHO aid responses should primarily be limited to **recurrent Disasters** only. Off-the-shelf proposals should be given a priority in order to speed up the implementation process.

ECHO's advocacy can only really work when backed by tangible operations. A Disaster Reduction Sector should promote such operations to strengthen advocacy as a core activity.

For the other EC External Relations services, **advocacy** should **be oriented** towards EC Delegations and the National Governments and come back from field level to the External Relations services as a request to include Disaster Reduction in the Country Strategy Paper. The on-going deconcentration process of functions from Brussels to the EC's delegations is a good opportunity to include Disaster Reduction in the Delegation staff's capacity building and briefing in Brussels, taking place at present. Interaction with Parliament should be developed, as well as with HAC Committee members through specially designed workshops.

Semantics should be improved and a systematic use of the correct terminology, based on the definitions introduced by the consulting team, particularly concerning hazards, etc, should be encouraged. Disaster Reduction is to systematically utilise definitions and disaster risks indicators based on Hazards x Vulnerability / Coping Capacities relationships.

Benchmarking is to be constantly improved and amended in order to increase the rigour of quality control and the measurements of performances, as well as to promote a best practice culture. This will be based on an ongoing systematic analysis of the lessons learned and the final evaluations of disaster preparedness operations. The final evaluation of disaster preparedness operations should be improved by including a technical assessment of the output and outcomes.

ECHO should further explore the possibility of better identifying the **coping capacities** of the beneficiaries at national and local levels as well as assessing the risks at sub-national levels. Close collaboration with the UNDP's GRAVITY project to identify coping capacities is strongly advised as the latter takes into consideration the spatial and geographical relationship of disaster risk (i.e. physical exposure to a hazard type) within a country. The input of ECHO's field experts is essential and a questionnaire based on the format appended to this report will have to be further developed and periodically updated.

A **Website library** (pdf format) should be maintained and constantly updated.

In conclusion, in its disaster preparedness actions, ECHO has achieved wide recognition as a professional and competent actor that has anticipated the move by the international community to seeing local communities as stakeholders in disaster reduction instead of as victims. For relatively modest increases in both its budget for disaster preparedness activities

and in the human resources to manage them: ECHO could have a greater impact reaching more vulnerable people; achieve even wider international recognition; and promote the realisation of linking relief, rehabilitation and development, something that has by and large eluded the international donor community. ECHO can be justly proud of its accomplishments in the field of disaster preparedness and mindful that the opportunity to consolidate and expand upon its achievements should be seized upon at the earliest opportunity.

I. Main report

A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1. INTRODUCTION

1. The trend over the last three decades has shown an increase in the number of ‘natural disasters’ and an increasing number of affected populations. However, even though the number of reported disasters has more than tripled since the 1970s, the reported death toll has decreased to less than half¹. The reduction of deaths due to natural hazard events is commendable, resulting mainly from increased capacity in early warning, public awareness, better media involvement and information dissemination and greater efficiency in crisis intervention. ECHO experts and partners observe that the consequences of the disasters last much longer and can be even more painful for the affected populations. Livelihoods are disrupted, properties are destroyed and fragile environments are damaged. The longer term consequences are significant, since affected families suffer from depleted savings, increasing poverty, growing indebtedness and the general worsening of socio-economic conditions. These communities inevitably are less able to cope with the next disaster and humanitarian crisis.
2. The Disaster Reduction concept is not new. Disaster-prone populations have long responded to disasters by developing indigenous coping patterns that are fine-tuned through thousands of years of experience, based on trial and error (terracing, building on high poles, nurseries, etc).
3. In recent years, there has been a major conceptual shift in how people seek to cope with disasters from natural hazards. The main focus ought to be on addressing risks and on humanitarian intervention designed to reduce the vulnerability of communities. This involves an emphasis on achieving disaster risk reduction objectives, with the incorporation of environmental and sustainable developmental approaches. Globally, there is an increasing recognition of the importance of Disaster Reduction being incorporated into development and environmental programmes. At present there are advocacy actions to link Disaster Reduction to environmental programmes, Millennium Development Goals, the process of in-country Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and the donors’ assistance framework promoted notably by the UN.
4. These trends cannot be ignored by ECHO, which is recognised as one of the largest donors to humanitarian assistance programmes. A more proactive stance is necessary, in order to support programmes that will empower societies to be resilient to natural hazards, while ensuring that development efforts do not increase vulnerability to hazards. ECHO, through DIPECHO, has already carved out a niche for itself by engaging partners in capacity building, with a focus on civil societies and local communities at risk – particularly in poor and developing countries. In this report, the

¹ Living With Risk. A global review of Disaster Reduction initiatives, July 2002, UNISDR

consulting team's task is to contribute to improving ECHO's strategy and programmes in Disaster Reduction.

2. OBJECTIVES

5. The **first objective** of the present report is to assess the appropriateness of ECHO's strategic orientation to Disaster Reduction and the operations ECHO has conducted in relation to it, i.e. DIPECHO, Mainstreaming and Advocacy. The **second objective** is to produce management tools that would allow a better decision-making process to take place. This objective includes an analysis of the definitions utilised in Disaster Reduction interventions and the production of indicators, criteria and benchmarks to be utilised (Annexe 4). The **third objective** is to propose practical and applicable recommendations that would enhance the effectiveness and impact of ECHO in the field of Disaster Reduction (Table 1). Furthermore, the audience that ECHO potentially addresses includes many other DGs and services of the European Commission, and other international and multilateral Disaster Reduction Institutions. This objective also links directly with the LRRD concept.
6. In this report, Preparedness is the key concept in ECHO Disaster Reduction issues. Mainstream humanitarian operations financed by ECHO may have a preparedness element, but also mitigation and prevention components. Prevention and mitigation will only be considered as accompanying pilot activities, as in the opinion of the consulting team they are more relevant to development programmes. Man-made disasters, such as technological, are excluded as: they require different managerial and technical expertises, both at ECHO headquarters and at field level; would have to be directed towards national authorities; and they would require significant budgets of their own. **The main focus is therefore on promoting and initiating appropriate short-term Preparedness activities, so as to reduce the impact of natural disaster on the most vulnerable sections of the population and to improve their coping capacity.**
7. **DIPECHO** is a dedicated and specific ECHO Programme for Disaster Preparedness at community level. It has its own budget line (B7-219), which is different from the B-7-210 budget line from which ECHO funds most of its humanitarian interventions, as DIPECHO is not directly linked to ongoing disaster response. The creation of DIPECHO responded right from the start to a need to co-ordinate the EC's Natural Disaster Reduction activities with the main donors. Although it has, developed links and networked with other relevant organisations involved in Disaster Reduction, and carried out advocacy with other European Commission services DIPECHO has not had sufficient human resources to carry out this work to the extent that might be expected of a European Commission service. DIPECHO has empirically developed a strategy of its own, emphasising preparedness operations directed at local communities. Nevertheless, the lack of clear definitions and procedures has resulted in the intertwining of the two programmes, to such an extent that overlapping between mainstream ECHO-funded humanitarian aid operations and DIPECHO's is common and frequent. The confusion comes from the fact that one objective, –Preparedness (under Article 2 (f) of Council Regulation 1257 / 96 concerning Humanitarian Aid), among other objectives of humanitarian aid listed under Article 2, has been singled out as a sub-programme with its own budget line. Preparedness is both a component

and a programme of humanitarian aid. Part of the confusion also stems from the fact that DIPECHO is only one of the concepts utilised in ECHO's strategy. Other concepts in disaster preparedness take the form of mainstreaming preparedness into relief operations, and advocacy. The confusion is extended by the fact that most of ECHO's procedures, though not all, are shared by the two budget lines. Partners too are not always able to understand the similitude and the difference between the objectives and the programmes². ECHO's main operational budget dwarfs the DIPECHO budget and it is easier and quicker to integrate a Preparedness component into an ECHO operation, thus saving on DIPECHO's limited funds.

B. ECHO's THREE MAIN COMPONENTS OF DISASTER REDUCTION

3. DIPECHO

8. **DIPECHO's Mandate:** Preparedness is implicitly included in Council Regulation 1257/96, which governs ECHO. DIPECHO's³ activities are defined in Articles 1 and 2 (f). However, whereas ECHO addresses the response to natural **OR** man-made disasters, through DIPECHO ECHO addresses **ONLY** "Preparedness for risks of 'natural' disasters".
9. **DIPECHO's Isolation.** DIPECHO has developed its strategy in isolation. The isolation is felt at different levels. Within ECHO some staff consider DIPECHO activities to be very time-consuming and not worth the large extra amount of work that these activities require compared to the small budgetary allocations DIPECHO gets. In the consulting team's opinion, within the European Commission, the isolation results from the widely held opinion that DIPECHO has a monopoly on Disaster Preparedness and consequently other services are not really interested. The partners have a wide influence on the selection process of the operations, through the present call for proposals system, where they mainly have the initiative because there are relatively few NGOs who have the necessary expertise to implement preparedness operations and who understand ECHO's financing procedures. Interestingly enough, DIPECHO is very visible and well understood in the UN and the Red Cross / Red Crescent systems, where its activities are well known and commented upon positively, in spite of a low level of networking.
10. **DIPECHO's Institutional Location.** Fundamental questions about DIPECHO and Preparedness are now being debated. The basic question is whether DIPECHO should stay where it is now, that is within ECHO, or whether it should ever be transferred to other DGs, such as AIDCO or RELEX? The other option would be to mainstream it entirely within ECHO, i.e. to piggyback it into humanitarian relief operations. DIPECHO is unique: no other donors are involved in short-term Disaster Preparedness at community level with relatively small operations and linkages to humanitarian operations and within the framework of urgency. DIPECHO has had a great influence on the practical understanding and knowledge of Disaster

² Even the semantic errors: preparation or prevention is commonly utilised by some Partners for preparedness in the title of the operation.

³ DIPECHO is never cited as such. The name was forged later to cover the concept of preparedness as opposed to ECHO's emergency response.

Preparedness. By working at local community level, it has carved out a niche that no other major donor had considered at the time. It has accumulated a wealth of information based on the lessons learned, information that has been the main source of DIPECHO's strategy adaptation. It should be commended for that approach. The value it adds to Disaster Reduction means it is best located within ECHO.

4. MAINSTREAMING

11. Why mainstreaming: Some people believe that Disaster Preparedness activities should be gradually integrated into ECHO's main response operations. This is not the right way to look at the issue, because it is too general an approach. In particular it does not take into account the fundamental difference between recurrent (predictable) natural disaster and sudden, less timely and geographically natural disaster occurrences. Although DIPECHO interventions can be programmed⁴, Preparedness can be – and must be – custom made to the risks that the community in question is facing. It must be directed to regions and communities that are deemed to be vulnerable according to verifiable indicators. (The identification of these risks and regions is the objective of part C of this report.) Should then preparedness be mainstreamed into ECHO's relief operations? Disaster preparedness would lose much of its potential impact if it was only a component of ECHO's mainstream activities and not a programme as it is now. The efforts being made at present to better define Preparedness within the Disaster Reduction issues – a trend shared by most of the donors – would quickly become less relevant. DIPECHO operations for vulnerable communities, recognised as unique by all main donors, would be diluted. Preparedness operations would probably gradually phase out, due to the difficulties of integrating Preparedness with response in most non-recurrent circumstances. ECHO cannot at the same time advocate for Preparedness and tone down its importance and singleness in its policy. The warning from this consulting team about too much mainstreaming has of course to be qualified. Recurrent disasters would certainly qualify for the inclusion of Preparedness into the response. The impact of Preparedness in a recurrent disaster situation is greater, thanks to the immediate awareness of the affected population and of the institutions. Off-the-shelf Preparedness operations are immediately relevant. One exception should be made concerning health. While it is justifiable to piggy-back basic Preparedness in health preventive measures to ECHO emergency operations in camps or among refugees and IDPs, the prevention of epidemic outbreaks is a development issue and thus must stay with the relevant organisations (WHO, Red Cross / Red Crescent, UNICEF, etc.), which are better prepared for such events.

12. Mainstreaming Disaster Preparedness into the other concerned EC external services (EuropeAid Co-operation Office (AIDCO), DG Development (DEV) and External Relations (RELEX): ECHO's efforts to mainstream Preparedness into the development policy of the EU have increased noticeably in the last few years. Other EC external services have found it difficult to include preparedness in their Country Strategy papers as they perceive that the initiative for this should come from the country itself. Once an emergency has subsided the national actors (the Government) have difficulties in avoiding the classical development scenarios that they know well

⁴ That would give some arguments to those promoting the idea of transferring DIPECHO's activities to development instruments such as DG AIDCO.

and do not venture into the Disaster Reduction concepts. The Commission however has reiterated on many instances that links should be established between ECHO issues and development: Linking Relief and Rehabilitation to Development (LRRD) (Two Communications to the Council (1996 and 2001), Joint instructions on LRRD and DPP (2003), and the establishment of an Inter-service Group (2003). A “Culture” of Preparedness has simply not yet made its way into Development issues.

13. So far, in spite of a large amount of efforts and advocacy, the **LRRD** outcome is not encouraging. Why is that so? Development activities are not uniform and do not come under one strategy only. This is the historical heritage of the Commission’s development policy using many financing instruments, e.g. ACP and ALA, TACIS, PHARE and CARDS. The general strategy set up by the Commission is as much based on exceptions to the rules as uniformity and convergence. This opens the door to many interpretations, leading to diverging views between DGs and services and in particular to LRRD applied to Preparedness. Collaboration and co-ordination with AIDCO is easier, e.g. in Latin America, where wide support has been given by AIDCO to Disaster Preparedness. This is encouraging, as it shows that there is an emerging acknowledgement that Disaster Reduction and Preparedness is also a strategic sectoral variable in the development processes, just like rural development and poverty alleviation, LRRD may begin to take off seriously.
14. **The Interservice Group** is trying to push forward the LRRD concept. On a pilot experimental basis, it has focused on two main sectors, Health and Food Aid, thus introducing an important debate right from the start. The group has also selected exclusively countries or regions where ECHO intends to phase out its activities. Last but not least, there is little consideration given to the fundamental difference between natural disasters and man-made (essentially conflicts) ones. As an unintended result, the road map was perceived by certain officials of other services as a method for passing on projects ECHO wished to phase out.
15. The creation of the Interservice Group is an important step forward. Long-term effects, however, will depend on the responses it gives to a number of basic issues that are more factual than fundamental, such as:
 - Lack of a database, particularly for vulnerability assessments (the present report is meant to substantially address this issue).
 - Lack of a joint identification / needs assessment mission.
 - Lack of awareness of national authorities that have to agree on DP priorities in their National Plans.
 - Lack of flexibility and ownership in the LRRD context at various levels.
 - Lack of knowledge of unutilised opportunities at budgetary level (B7-6000 NGO co-financing, Envelope B 9th EDF, ‘Humanitarian Plus’).
 - Lack of knowledge of DP in the deconcentrated delegations.
 - Clarifications of DP concept in AIDCO. DP is understood by some staff as conflict prevention and resolution, influenced by the Feira initiative and priorities being discussed in AIDCO. As such, the scope of co-operation with DIPECHO is very limited. Conflict resolution is very much a RELEX / AIDCO issue.
16. **Mainstreaming and Impartiality:** The impartiality that characterises ECHO, and therefore DIPECHO, must remain. ECHO cannot be limited in its interventions by the

basic requirements that are demanded by the Development instruments of the Commission like Human Rights and be excluded from regions that do not comply. ECHO is the only instrument in the Commission that allows unrestricted access to vulnerable people. It should not be curtailed. There is also concern that the proposals to the Convention could result in humanitarian aid being placed under the umbrella of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This would give conflict resolution an advantage over the natural disaster concept and would tend to include the military caucus into Preparedness. This would probably endanger the impartiality principle.

17. **Mainstreaming conclusions:** The present review has concentrated on setting up a Disaster Reduction strategy and on the design of management tools primarily within a DIPECHO framework. The tools can now be mainstreamed into ECHO and other External Relations services of the Commission. The objectives are to use common definitions, concepts and approaches to Disaster Reduction so as to reduce the gaps in knowledge and awareness that divide the relevant DGs. An additional spin-off of the present review is that a phasing out strategy is now easier to justify if a disaster strikes in a non-priority or a recurrent disasters country or region.

5. ADVOCACY

18. **Role of Advocacy.** Advocacy in ECHO includes the lobbying that the Office is developing towards acceptance that its activities are one step in the overall development efforts of the Commission. Advocacy aims to introduce a 'culture' of Disaster Reduction into development. This awareness that Disaster Reduction is not limited to humanitarian assistance is still not clear in the Commission's External Relations services concerned with development. The ambiguity is maintained by the use of Disaster Prevention and Preparedness (DPP) as a synonym for Disaster Reduction. This leads to the mistaken belief that ECHO also takes care of Prevention (a development issue) and that DIPECHO is exclusively in charge of Preparedness. The ambiguity does not help in promoting a consensual acceptance of a Disaster Reduction culture.
19. **Advocacy and Coherence.** Advocacy of Preparedness should not neglect a coherent approach. DIPECHO should concentrate on Disaster Preparedness analysis and development of concepts and criteria. It should continue to improve its knowledge and development of benchmarking. It should continue to fund local Preparedness operations at community level. It should not however embark on large national or regional Preparedness operations. DIPECHO could define a preparedness strategy based on the lessons learned through the implementation of small operations, and other External Relations services could implement larger Preparedness and Prevention operations integrated into their development strategy and based on DIPECHO findings. If they did so, they would be applying LRRD. The present review is a first milestone in this sense.
20. **Advocacy in the Commission.** Advocacy is still more a matter of personal contacts between individuals in ECHO and individuals in External Relations services rather than a formal policy. Initially, advocacy relied on a simple exchange of information, very often a one-way exercise originating in ECHO. It has now improved, especially between AIDCO and ECHO. The Food Security Unit (F5) is now ready to collaborate

actively in ECHO's activities (the unit chairs the Interservice Group). In June 2003 ECHO organised a workshop on LRRD, with Preparedness components that representatives of RELEX, AIDCO and DG DEV attended. Whether these efforts will result in a stronger commitment to a Disaster Reduction Strategy, including Disaster Preparedness, remains to be seen; but constant advocacy seems at long last to be having some results.

21. **Further Advocacy.** ECHO's advocacy at the moment is essentially directed to the Commission's other External Relations services. This is not comprehensive enough. Other stakeholders can and should be included in Advocacy arrangements. Many functions of the External Services in Brussels are being deconcentrated to the EC's delegations. The delegations have closer contacts with the national authorities and consequently, if convinced of ECHO's approach and complying with the Joint Instruction note, can lobby towards including the concept and culture of Disaster Reduction into their respective national strategies. The ECHO experts in the field will have to co-ordinate with the delegations. The Member States are systematically informed of ECHO's operations via the Humanitarian Affairs Committee and are asked for advice on co-ordination. Member States' collaboration would enhance DIPECHO's impact. More interaction is necessary. DIPECHO can capitalise on the reputation for efficiency it has among other donors. The Advocacy message could also be directed at promoting the collaboration with DIPECHO. This has begun with UNEP (Gravity project) and should be further pursued with IFRC and Provention⁵.

6. DIPECHO'S ADAPTABILITY

22. **Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA).** The selection of a partner, in accordance with the criteria set out in the humanitarian aid regulation, results in a partnership agreement, aimed at establishing a confidence base between ECHO and the partners. The confidence relationship enhances a dialogue, which clarifies the objectives and helps in setting up a better design and a better implementation process for humanitarian operations.
23. **Confidence.** Has confidence been established with the FPA? It has certainly been enhanced. However, the FPA is partly criticised. There is a concern that it has unduly given precedence to large partners at the expense of medium-sized ones. Small partners have difficulty meeting the requirements and obligations of the FPA, especially the financial audits. ECHO has a role to play in maintaining a larger diversity in its selection of partners, both in terms of size and (possibly) nationality. The best way to ensure this diversity is to make sure that smaller specialist NGOs are encouraged to apply.
24. **Dialogue.** Has the dialogue created a better environment leading to better implementation? Yes, but nevertheless the partners complain that there is a lack of clarity in the strategy, which is open to too many interpretations due to a perceived lack of precision. Is a dialogue taking place? Yes. Among the higher hierarchy, ECHO's privileged interlocutor is VOICE, which represents most of the large and medium-size NGOs. The dialogue continues through the participation of the Annual

⁵ A private public partnership including the IFRC, World Bank and Munich RE with the objective of promoting Disaster Reduction.

ECHO Partner Conference, and the Strategic Programming Dialogue with Partners. This dialogue is predominantly a policy dialogue. In the field the dialogue takes place between the partner and the ECHO experts, and the ECHO experts and the desk officers. National field seminars are arranged between DIPECHO and partners to discuss achievements and lessons learned (Caribbean, Central Asia and Andean Community), culminating in a regional seminar. This is extremely important for the drafting of the Actions Plan. Whereas the field dialogue is generally conducted in a professional way, the lessons learned are not always properly reflected in the subsequent Strategy.

25. Adaptations to Changes and Reforms. ECHO in the last four years has demonstrated its adaptability to internal reform processes, in accordance with recommendations from a comprehensive evaluation of ECHO carried out in 1999 under article 20 of the humanitarian aid regulation. It has also embarked on a wide consultation with its own staff, its field experts, and its partners, to better define its strategy and its administrative, financial and monitoring processes. The process has been enhanced by the Commission's Reform of the Financial Regulations (effective January 1st, 2003) which in turn triggered an intensive internal debate concerning the selection of partners, the public call for proposal procedures, the format for proposal requests and the Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) reform. The debate also led to basic proposals for the revision of DIPECHO procedures to replace the individual DIPECHO Action Plans by one DIPECHO Global Plan. ECHO's management has since decided to remain with individual action plans. At the time of the consultants' work, ECHO was in the final stages of brainstorming over the new format proposed for partners' selection criteria, the new FPA format and the review the use of calls for proposals with a view to becoming more efficient in selecting partners and projects.

26. New Framework Partnership Agreement The Commission's Financial Regulation explicitly recognises the FPA as a tool for implementing Technical assistance (TA) services, procurement or works activities, and selection of contractors. For grants, the general rules governing awarding of contracts is waived for ECHO, recognising its specific objectives under articles 184 and 238. The exemption is conditional upon ECHO adopting its own rules for awarding contracts, that must be agreed upon by the College of Commissioners, hence the new FPA procedures. The new FPA proposal is the result of the changes requested by the new regulations. It has a much wider objective than the previous proposal. It aims at both a reinforcement of the partner's selection procedures and at providing management tools for ECHO through an improved template for operation proposals and funding request. (There are in fact three distinct Partnership Agreement documents which take into account the specificities of NGOs, international organisations of the UN system, and the Red Cross / Red Crescent societies.) The new FPA contractual template is applicable to ECHO aid operations and DIPECHO contracts alike. There are some doubts about the capability of partners to avoid two easy traps. The first danger would be to overdo the level of detail and lose most of the practical approach that is requested of ECHO's partners: this would apply to large partners such as the UN or Red Cross-Red Crescent family. On the other hand, the level of details requested in the template may keep out smaller efficient NGOs, or lead to irrelevant answers. While there is no doubt that the contractual template will be useful, it may take some time before it can

be smoothly applied. DIPECHO may also have to engage in an in-depth dialogue with the partners, in order to steer the templates towards an acceptable quality level.

27. **Possible New Operation Proposals and Funding Request** The new proposed format, not approved at time of drafting, is a lengthy (34 pages) and comprehensive document. It must be completed by the candidate requesting funding from ECHO. The document is essentially an application of the log-frame within the PCM. The main objective is to increase the partnership and thus the confidence between ECHO and the partners. The principle is that the Partner 'owns' the operation and in consequence is fully responsible for its implementation. The contract between ECHO and the partners is an outcome based contract rather than an input and activities contract⁶. The goal is to reduce the workload of HQ staff and field experts by concentrating on analysis of data (work tree) demanded from, and provided by, the partner. The aim of ECHO's NGO sector is eventually to be able to computerise most of the information, so that monitoring of implementation could be semi-automatic.
28. **Replacement of Action Plans by one Global Plan.** Another paper being circulated in ECHO's Policy Unit aims at getting a review of DIPECHO procedures, in order to simplify time-consuming and bureaucratic procedures. The current public procurement procedures for the selection of DIPECHO projects are perceived by most stakeholders as burdensome and raise questions about its cost-benefit ratio. There have been suggestions to stop the public call for proposals open to FPA and non-FPA signatories and instead to organise a wide consultation with relevant and interested NGOs, who are signatories of the FPA. The debate also led to basic proposals for the revision of DIPECHO procedures to replace the individual DIPECHO Action Plans by one DIPECHO Global Plan. ECHO's management has since decided to remain with individual action plans. Action Plans should make extensive use of the definitions, criteria, indicators and benchmarks identified in the present report. The process would consist of partners submitting to DIPECHO short concept papers developed after discussion in the field between partners and ECHO experts and desk officers. This would be followed by a meeting at ECHO HQ with partners, for further clarification and discussion on strategy. The objective is to screen the partner's resolution and willingness to present a proposal and to avoid irrelevant proposals, thus saving on time. The advantage is that a real dialogue between DIPECHO and the partners will be established with direct information from the field, thus greatly improving the quality of the proposal. DIPECHO would set the strategic policy framework, discuss and explain it directly to the partners, and only those interested would actually answer. Another result of such a system is that it would probably dramatically reduce the number of partners and introduce a bias towards those partners present in the field and willing to come to Brussels. Small-sized partners could fade away.

7. KEY CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF PARTNERS

29. **ECHO's Criteria.** There are two levels of criteria for selecting Partners. The first one concerns the Partnership Agreement: what are the conditions to be eligible for ECHO funding. The criteria are set out in the Council's Humanitarian Aid Regulation. The second level concerns the criteria for selecting the Partner for a given operation. The

⁶ Contrat de résultats as opposed to contrat de moyens.

criteria set for the selection of Partners in Council Regulation 1257 / 96 are straightforward and relate mainly to the nationality of the Partner (EU Member States), its managerial capabilities, administrative, financial and logistical capacities, its specificity for the planned operations, its past experience, and its impartiality. The criteria for selecting a proposal are based on the project proposals' conformity with the Action Plans and possibly an existing history of successful project management. (At ECHO, the history of a project is recorded in a master document called a 'ficheop'.) A new approach for selecting the Partners in a more comprehensive and transparent manner has been proposed by ECHO's Policy Unit and is under final stage discussion⁷. ECHO's Partners selection will be based on a new template (III-9, APPEL) requesting answers to 57 questions and aiming at establishing the eligibility of the candidate in addition to the basic requirements of Council Regulation 1257/96, article 7. Eligibility is fundamentally based on turn over and past experience in humanitarian assistance, human resources management policy, financial management and code of conduct policy (impartiality, conflicts of interest.). An issue could be that the questionnaire does not fully allow for the integration of the lessons learned from past similar experience or from the Partners' efficiency. The questionnaire should be used as a first approximation to be completed by the operational units' better judgement. The final selection of Partners should always allow for qualitative assessment to be performed jointly by ECHO's desk and field experts. The most important unresolved issue concerns the selection of local, non-FPA partner NGOs. Due to its legal basis, ECHO cannot have beneficiary country NGOs (local NGOs) as partners at field level. It has to use partner NGOs, which often subcontract to local NGOs. It has no ways of assessing the correctness of the subcontracting agreements between ECHO partners and local NGOs, arrangements that often leads to misunderstanding or even conflicts between the contracting parties. Many valuable local NGOs prefer to abstain rather than participate in DIPECHO activities with ECHO partners because of this issue. Further ECHO has no methodological and other tools to evaluate the local NGOs' professionalism, except the subjective (although often sound) appreciation of the ECHO field experts. Nonetheless ECHO officials strongly recommend that local NGOs be included in ECHO partners' proposals for implementing DIPECHO activities due to their local knowledge.

30. **Financial Viability** of the partner. ECHO's Budget Unit has audited 239 projects since October 2002 up to July 2003, including DIPECHO projects. By the end of 2003, 120 partners will be audited. On average, the headquarters of partners are audited once every two years, that is an average of twice during FPA validity span (five years.) Field audits are conducted for certain on-going projects. In addition, 20 NGOs with potentially unacceptable financial risks have been identified and ECHO's management has requested that the list be taken into account when selecting a partner's proposals. Geographical units insist that the listing should not be rejection criteria alone and that they should be weighted against other criteria, such as efficiency and effectiveness. This auditing effort is highly commendable and conducted with a small number of staff. The effort, however, would have little added value and / or impact if positive actions were not taken based on the outcome of the audit activities. ECHO's operational auditors seem to work in isolation, including within ECHO's Budget Unit structures. There are also no clear boundaries between

⁷ The consultant understands that the new format will be applicable as from January 2004 and would be applicable to both 210 and 219 Budget lines.

the role of the geographical units and ECHO's Budget Unit, when the former complains of intrusion of the latter into technical matters.

31. **Previous Recommendations.** Many recommendations have been made in the numerous evaluations that ECHO has conducted and in the individual "ficheops"⁸ concerning the selection of proposals. The selection process also includes a judgement on partners for given operations. The main ones relate to:
 - **Fund-raising.** Many NGO partners, especially the large ones, have a more or less sophisticated fund-raising approach on top of their technical capabilities. This could cause a distortion in the project selection process.
 - **Quality of the Local NGO.** A local NGO often makes the difference in the quality of the services delivered. However, local NGOs might not be interested in co-operating with a European NGO partner of ECHO, because they have little responsibility or recognition in implementation. In addition, subcontracting financial conditions offered by European NGOs are often not attractive.
 - **Track Record in Similar Operations?** Has the partner NGO/local NGO already successfully conducted similar tasks and pursued similar objectives?
 - **Staff.** Is the proposed implementing staff adequate?
32. **EU Food Security Unit (F5).** The Food Security Unit has developed a methodology for selecting its partners based on calls for proposals (III -8, Food Security Selection of Partners). A very detailed 'how to (apply)' document lists the selection criteria and presents the evaluation grid and the corresponding selection marks and scores. The document also lists negatively information that is not needed and which criteria would make the NGO ineligible. This makes it particularly user-friendly. Attached to the call for proposal is a 'Document Technique Pays' (DTP). DTP presents the national Food Security strategy (Government and Commission's), the intervention logic, the sectoral (thematic) policy and the sub-national level implementation. This document is extremely useful to keep the NGOs' proposals focused.
33. **IFRC:** The partners of the IFRC are the National Societies. As such there is no proper "selection" of partners as National Societies already pre-exist in most countries. The IFRC aims however to establish a common code of conduct to which each National Societies should abide. It aims at providing a point of reference and a framework for National Societies capacity building in Disaster Preparedness. It is of little interest to ECHO as a tool for selecting Partners. It is inversely of great interest as a checklist when evaluating IFRC, ICRC or National. It should be distributed to all evaluation consultants targeting the Red Cross family.

8. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ECHO Projects (budget lines B7-210 – aid including emergency food aid – and B7-219 – operational support and disaster preparedness (DIPECHO))

34. **Analysis of Recent DIPECHO Projects.** The consulting team was asked to analyse 46 Projects funded through budget line 219 (DIPECHO) or 210 (Aid). Some of the projects were completed but most of them were on-going or had recently commenced.

⁸ The analysis of the these recommendations would entail an evaluation in itself.

The information provided by ECHO was the ficheop. The analysis was made using ECHO's traditional criteria, i.e. relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact & sustainability and lessons learned. Due to time constraints and the paucity of information for some projects, the analysis focused on the most important issues relating to the relevance of the project and the lessons learned. Each project has been analysed and the results are presented in Annex 6.

35. **ECHO Projects** (Budget line 210) Out of 18 Projects analysed, 4 concerned Food Security, Food Aid or Nutrition, 6 drought response, 2 concerned Earthquakes, 5 concerned health and 1 De-mining. There are very few components of disasters preparedness mainstreamed in the food security and even less in the food aid projects, barely to justify relevance. There is no relevance in the de-mining project, as there is no component of natural disaster preparedness in it. In health, most projects do not include any element of natural disaster preparedness and are mostly related to prevention. Droughts and earthquakes are the only projects that justify some mainstreaming.

TABLE 210 - Selected Funded Projects

Project	Country	Objectives
ECHO/ETH/254/2002/02002	Ethiopia	Food security
ECHO/ETH/210/2001/01008	Ethiopia	Food security
ECHO/AFG/210/2001/01019	Afghanistan	Food aid
ECHO/TJK/210/2002/01011	Afghanistan	Food aid
ECHO/TPS/210/2001/23001	Guatemala	Nutrition
ECHO/KHM/210/2002/01001	Cambodia	Health
ECHO/IND/210/2002/01006	India	Health
ECHO/NPL/210/2002/02002	Nepal	Health
ECHO/TJK/210/2002/01009	Tajikistan	Health
ECHO/TJK/210/2003/01014	Tajikistan	Health
ECHO/TPS/210/2002/22008	Afghanistan	Drought
ECHO/TPS/210/2001/23004	Nicaragua	Drought
ECHO/TPS/210/2002/09002	Nicaragua	Drought
ECHO/TPS/210/2002/09005	Guatemala	Drought
ECHO/IND/210/2002/02006	India	Drought
ECHO/TPS/210/2001/22004	Peru	Earthquake
ECHO/SLV/210/2002/01001	El Salvador	Earthquake
ECHO/LKA/210/2002/02001	Sri Lanka	De-mining

36. **Food Security / Food Aid** There are still important misunderstandings in food sector assistance vs. natural disaster preparedness. Food Security is a long-term development objective. Food Aid is response. Food is also a tool to implement small scale works at community level through Food for Work⁹. This is more prevention than preparedness, though it can be justified as a demonstration of preparedness if coupled with communities' awareness and training. This opportunity makes mainstreaming worthwhile into food security related project. This approach should be actively pursued in co-operation with F5 in AIDCO.

⁹ Food for work is increasingly replaced by cash for work.

37. **Health Projects** are not generally an area where DIPECHO intervenes. Health is not a natural disaster. Health interventions are complex and are better dealt with by International organisations such as WHO and IFRC. ECHO has funded several health projects, e.g. infectious diseases or cholera, procuring drugs and training health personnel. While these activities are extremely useful for prevention at community level, they rarely involve the community itself, and the ownership concept is weak. Health-related volunteering at community level, however, is a valid concept that is widely utilised by the Red Cross / Red Crescent family. This concept is the one that should be mainstreamed into ECHO-funded (budget line 210) operations, though this does not often happen.
38. **Droughts** are the most difficult natural disasters to deal with. They very often call for an emergency response that is met by ECHO (budget line 210). In addition, droughts often affect pastoralists or nomadic populations that are difficult to locate. The main issue concerning droughts is the coping capacity of the communities. Cash or food for work is often utilised as a palliative short-term, though not very sustainable, solution. The extreme other 'solution' applied, or advocated, by some governments is the transfer of populations, as in Ethiopia. The role of DIPECHO in drought situations is to develop preparedness along with coping capacities and solutions (water harvesting, silos improvements, fodder stocks, small-income generation projects, temporary migration to other parts of the country not affected by drought, or even abroad, during the drought period, etc.). Droughts are a challenge for partners and ECHO, and innovative solutions could be tried out on a pilot basis.
39. **Analysis of DIPECHO (budget line B7-219) Operations.** The selection of Projects for analysis includes 11 operations in institutional strengthening – including Community-based activities, eight flood-related operations and one earthquake and health operation. With the exception of the health projects undertaken under DIPECHO, all other projects are relevant and in line with the objectives of the Action Plans, underlining the real improvements that have been introduced by the desks and the field experts alike in preparing the strategy and the objectives for Disaster Preparedness. The operations are all centred on communities, their empowerment and ownership. The 'ficheop' now fully follows the same form, which makes the comparison easier. There are, however, two weak points in the 'ficheop' analysis concerning the impact and the lessons learned:
- (i) **Impact of DIPECHO Operations.** The impact very often mixes the output and the outcome concepts. While the output, which is the results of the activities, is generally well described, the outcome (which is the measure of the changes induced by the project in relation to the general objectives) is very often left aside or superficially analysed. The final evaluation should focus more on the outcome than is routinely done at present. The outcome is closely linked to the project sustainability and this particular relationship should be clearly emphasised.
- (ii) **Lessons Learned.** There is no special entry for the lessons learned in the DIPECHO project final evaluations format. The 'ficheop' final evaluation format gives the impression that it serves more financial than technical purposes, i.e. final payment approval and liquidation of the contract. The lessons learned are the basis for

the drafting of the next Action Plans and for the selection of proposals. The lessons learned should be given a central role in the liquidation of the contract.

C. INDICATORS

9. DEFINITIONS OF DISASTER REDUCTION

40. **ECHO's Disaster Preparedness and Prevention (DPP) Terminologies.** ECHO's current perspectives and use of terminologies from DPP to disaster reduction have been evolving, thanks to lessons learned from practice in the field and DIPECHO partners. DPP terminologies and concepts have been dominant in many ECHO documents and practices since DIPECHO started as a programme. DPP, however, is based on the traditional concept of the disaster management cycle¹⁰ where each component of the cycle-prevention-mitigation-preparedness-response-rehabilitation-development is a separate field of specialisation. With a specialist/expert approach, there was limited incentive for standardisation and agreement on the terms used. Furthermore, the use of definitions under the traditional 'disaster management cycle' is influenced by a top-down approach, where the 'victims' are assumed to be helpless and outside intervention is given emphasis.
41. **The ECHO DPP Terminologies.** The mission has developed a list of terminologies useful for ECHO and other DG services in this report ([Annex II-1, Definitions A, B](#)). The mission provides more specificity for ECHO's action and also suggests additional examples and elaboration. Details on the development of these definitions are presented in Annex 1.




Disaster. A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic and/or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own level of resources. Although disasters are generally categorised as natural or manmade, recent understanding of these events show that most 'natural disasters' are also caused by human interactions with the environment and nature, thus they are not purely 'natural'. The term 'natural disasters', however, is commonly used to refer to events that are triggered by natural hazards.



Hazard. A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon and/or human activity, which may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social, economic disruption and environmental degradation.

Vulnerability. A set of conditions and processes resulting from physical, social, cultural, political, economic, and environmental factors, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards.

¹⁰ Popularised in DM training materials starting in early 1980s



Prevention. Activities and/or physical measures to provide outright avoidance of the adverse impact of hazards or the means to control the hazards at their source whenever possible.



Preparedness. Activities and measures taken in advance by people and organisations to ensure effective mobilisation of response to the potential impact of hazards, including the issuance of timely and effective early warnings, the temporary removal of people and property from a threatened location and the support to indigenous coping capacity of the population at risk.



Mitigation. Structural (physical) and non-structural (non-physical) measures undertaken to protect and/or strengthen vulnerable elements to minimise the adverse impact of natural hazards, environmental degradation and technological hazards.

Coping capacity. The level of resources and the manner in which people or organisations use these resources and abilities to face the adverse consequences of a disaster.

42. Disaster Management Cycle. The underlying principles of the traditional disaster-management cycle approach are not appropriate to the DIPECHO principles. These principles include improving the capacity and reducing the vulnerability of the most vulnerable through participatory approaches, improved understanding and perception of risks and promoting local solutions aided by stakeholders. Recent documents by ECHO reflect the recent changes of definitions, according to the changes made by UN ISDR. However, the use of these terms has not been consistent in several documents. For instance, the term Disaster Preparedness and Prevention (DPP from the Disaster Management Cycle) has routinely appeared in many ECHO documents. But because of the emerging importance of disaster reduction and its underlying comprehensiveness, the term 'disaster reduction' is now more commonly used to replace the term DPP. The consulting team encourages the consistent use of this word within ECHO and other EC External Relations services.

43. Disaster Reduction-The term Disaster Reduction is now used by UN ISDR, UNDP¹¹ to connote broader and greater emphasis to pre-disaster actions of mitigation, prevention and preparedness linked with sustainable development goals. Under this, actions to reduce future disaster risks are also outlined during the post disaster stages of response, rehabilitation and recovery. Rather than treating these as distinct stages, the Disaster Reduction approaches are encouraged in every societal, institutional actions, whether they pertain to a disaster management or regular development activity i.e. poverty alleviation, public health, education, environment and other sectoral themes. For these reasons, the consulting team develops a list of terminologies useful for ECHO and other DG Services in this report (Annex II-1, Definitions **A**, **B**). These terms are not significantly different from UN ISDR and recent ECHO brochures. However, they are modified to put more emphasis on the

¹¹ Disaster Reduction efforts include promotion of standards in risk management, one of which is based on Australian and New Zealand Risk Management Standard (AS/NZS: 4360)

nature of ECHO's involvement in capacity development of organisations and communities. The consulting team provides more specificity for ECHO's action and also suggests additional examples and elaboration.

10. BENCHMARKING


- 44. Background on Benchmarking.** The general purpose of the consulting team under this item is to determine 'what to measure' and 'how to measure it', in order to create consistency among ECHO stakeholders in practicing disaster reduction and producing quality measurements more efficiently. To achieve this consistency, the consulting team has reviewed existing benchmarking practices and indicators, notably those developed by the UNISDR and UNDP, which place an emphasis on measuring 'preparedness' performance. The consulting team has also reviewed existing standards for measuring performance in disaster response, such as SPHERE, UNOCHA, UNDAC methods, etc. But these are not significantly relevant for the consulting team's purpose. Benchmarking is a relatively new field. UN ISDR said that future challenges in disaster reduction include measuring progress, thorough reporting and dissemination, and advocacy based on documented successful practices. Within ECHO, there is also a great demand for better reporting and measurement of performance.
- 45. Table for Benchmarking:** What gets measured gets done! Noting the specific purposes of benchmarking for ECHO, the consulting team proceeded in developing and obtaining agreement from Geographical Units' staff to a table of benchmark indicators. The table (Annexe II-3, Benchmarking **A**, **B**) includes information and analysis on the Applicable Level of Functions, —The basic management function/s necessary to achieve Disaster Reduction, the characteristics of Best Practices in Disaster Reduction, the possible Benchmarks, the recommendations on priority and urgency and the estimated impact on human resources for ECHO.
- 46. Commitment to Quality Improvement:** The process and implementation of benchmarking do not stop following the creation of this table by the consulting team. In fact, this process could be a tedious process for ECHO, which has a culture based on crisis management and immediate management actions necessary for a humanitarian organisation. Thus, if benchmarking for disaster reduction is to make any progress, it will require commitment from ECHO stakeholders, primarily from senior management at ECHO, in order to implement this. Additional efforts and in some cases human resources are required to achieve quality. For this purpose, the consulting team has indicated in the table those that are perceived to be priority and urgent for actions.
- 47. Linkage with UN ISDR Framework for Disaster Reduction.** ECHO would benefit if it participated in on-going process of developing the Framework for Disaster Reduction, led by UN ISDR Secretariat. It is assumed that the framework will be completed within the next two years, but there are immediate benefits for ECHO's participation – including reducing its isolation from the mainstream of Disaster Reduction and greater visibility for its contribution to Disaster Reduction.

11. MODEL FOR DISASTER RISKS INDICATORS

48. The process of DIPECHO programming already includes a method of prioritisation, through diagnostic studies preceding the development of Regional Action Plans. Under this process, stakeholders (including independent evaluators, DIPECHO partners and experts in the field) recommend geographical areas for priority intervention. However, this process is influenced by subjectivity, and risk assessment procedures and terminologies are not yet standardised. For that reason, the consulting team is tasked with developing and preparing a model for disaster-risk assessment that could provide a common reference for programming and decision-making. This task was expected to be the most challenging, since this must be carefully weighed against global experience acquired by other leading institutions, notably within the UN.
49. **Disaster Vulnerability Index.** ECHO's Policy Unit took a significant step to address the need for prioritisation, by developing a preliminary Disaster Vulnerability Index (DVI) in early 2003. This work is complemented by the detailed work carried out by ECHO desks and field experts resulting in a fine tuning of prioritisation. The DVI is based on ranking countries in relation to their proneness to disasters. This was done by analysing historical occurrence, based on CRED data, and the level of human poverty using UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI). The results provide a rough approximation of the disaster risk of a country based on these rather limited indicators. The DVI's main usefulness is in its use of a longer timeframe for establishing trends in disaster proneness and in highlighting poverty as one of the most important causes of vulnerability. This process establishes the need, although implied, to address disaster reduction in correlation with poverty reduction, a concept that is gaining wide acceptance. The DVI's weakness stems from: the limitation of indicators used for ranking; the absence of prioritisation at sub-national levels; the incompleteness of the data relating to coping capacities; and that not all hazards are included. The consulting team's opinion is that more indicators are required for hazard and vulnerability assessment and that the absence of an indicator related to 'coping capacity' is a notable weakness in the DVI.
50. **UNDP's Global Risk and Vulnerability Index Trends per Year (GRAVITY).** To improve on the DVI, the consulting team is tasked with reviewing the results of the new index of vulnerability produced by UNDP, assumed to be completed and available for the consulting team. Regrettably, the results of the project were not available for analysis and will be released only later in 2003. Thus, for the current period, the GRAVITY project's results are of limited use to the consulting team in ranking countries. This is a big setback for the consulting team, since GRAVITY is a long-term project involving numerous institutions and experts specialised in each specific hazard analysed. The main strength of GRAVITY is the integration of the geographical and spatial dimension in the assessment of disaster risk through the compilation of a physical exposure indicator adapted to specific hazard types. The consulting team, however, noted similarities with DVI, since the analysis is also based on the same CRED database. Thus, a preliminary comparison of ranking of countries between the two first 25 countries from DVI-GRAVITY reveal similar trends in ranking of countries. The differences are attributable to the fact that GRAVITY excluded data on 'affected population', judged to be unreliable by UNDP. Moreover,

both have the glaring disadvantage of excluding coping-capacity indicators, data that are not available in any database. Annex II-4, Disaster Risk Indicator Model Methodology provides a more detailed analysis of GRAVITY by the consulting team.

51. **Producing a new model: ECHO Disaster Risk Indicators.** Noting the limitation of the DVI and the unavailability of results from GRAVITY, the consulting team developed a new model through refinement of DVI and by adapting the conceptual approach and methodology of GRAVITY. Additionally, the team accessed the database directly, notably from JRC Ispra and various Internet¹² sources. Though this task was extremely difficult, the consulting team produced a model that is attached in Annex II-4, DRI Model Methodology, Technical Description and Spreadsheets.
52. **Analysis at national level.** The selected indicators for hazard evaluation are the frequency, diversity of hazard types and severity measured by the number of killed and number of affected from the CRED database. The selected indicators for vulnerability are the population density, the Human Development Index, the Human Poverty Index and the Corruption Perception Index. No indicators were available for coping capacity. Therefore an alternative method was developed. A questionnaire was sent to the ECHO field experts calling on their expert knowledge to evaluate five categories of coping capacity. Those categories include planning and organisation, warning and public awareness, preparedness, emergency response, and level of resources. Main data source were the UNDP development report, UNEP GEO portal and the JRC. The results seem to be plausible and compare with the DVI and the GRAVITY results. The results are presented in the table below. DRI number 1 indicates the most disaster prone country, namely Bangladesh.
53. **Accessing and Using the DRI Model:** The overall model is presented in an excel file with 13 different interrelated spreadsheets. However, six (6) result tables have been created to display the results in a printable friendly format. These tables can be automatically updated. The results are also mapped in collaboration with JRC and displayed on Digital Map Archive through the web. Two comprehensive documents describing the methodology and the technical characteristics of the model have been produced and are attached in the (Annexe II-4, Technical Description).



¹² websites consulted are listed in [Annex III-1, List of Websites](#)

Figure 1: Disaster Risk Indicator by category

DRI	Country	DRI	Country	DRI	Country	DRI	Country
1	Bangladesh	34	Mali	67	Myanmar	99	Namibia
2	India	35	Burkina Faso	68	Costa Rica	100	Cote d'Ivoire
3	Ethiopia	35	Sudan	69	St Vincent & The Gren.	101	Kyrgyzstan
4	Haiti	37	Zimbabwe	70	Botswana	102	Tunisia
5	Nepal	38	Swaziland	71	Cameroon	103	Lebanon
6	Pakistan	39	Lao, P Dem Rep	72	Peru	104	Belize
7	Mozambique	40	Georgia	73	Cape Verde Is	105	Congo
8	Malawi	41	Rwanda	74	Central African Rep	106	Maldives
9	Vietnam	42	Zambia	75	St Lucia	107	Kazakhstan
10	El Salvador	43	Thailand	76	Eritrea	108	Grenada
11	Philippines	44	Papua New Guinea	77	Antigua & Barbuda	109	Guyana
12	China, P Rep	45	Iran, Islam Rep	78	Sierra Leone	110	Turkmenistan
13	Sri Lanka	46	Tajikistan	79	Colombia	111	Seychelles
14	Chad	47	Azerbaijan	80	Ukraine	112	Saudi Arabia
15	Tanzania, Uni Rep	48	Morocco	81	Egypt	113	Oman
16	Uganda	49	Dominican Rep	82	Mauritius	114	Gabon
17	Madagascar	50	South Africa	83	Solomon Is	115	Libya
18	Mauritania	51	Fiji	84	Venezuela	999	Afghanistan
19	Kenya	52	Comoros	85	Brazil	999	Anguilla
20	Guatemala	53	Mongolia	86	Guinea Bissau	999	Congo, DR
21	Benin	54	Jamaica	87	Paraguay	999	Cook Is
22	Moldova, Rep	55	Ghana	88	Malaysia	999	East Timor
23	Lesotho	56	Burundi	89	Bhutan	999	Iraq
24	Senegal	57	Angola	90	Panama	999	Kiribati
25	Honduras	58	Albania	91	Argentina	999	Korea, Dem P Rep
26	Gambia, The	59	Guinea	92	Uzbekistan	999	Liberia
27	Nicaragua	60	Ecuador	93	Samoa	999	Micronesia, Fed States
28	Indonesia	61	Cuba	94	Jordan	999	Niue
29	Djibouti	62	Algeria	95	Dominica	999	Somalia
30	Cambodia	63	Vanuatu	96	Syrian Arab Rep	999	Tokelau
31	Niger	64	Bolivia	97	Russia	999	Tonga
32	Nigeria	65	Togo	98	Sao Tome et Principe	999	Turks & Caicos Is
33	Yemen	66	Armenia			999	Tuvalu

DRI: Position in the priority list. 1 is the most disaster prone

999: countries not analysed because of lack of vulnerability information

Table 1: Country prioritisation list. Red is very high priority, blue is high priority, yellow is medium priority and white is low priority.

- 1. Analysis at regional level.** A regional model was developed, based on the aggregated values from the country level. The result were disappointing, since regional trends seem to only reflect homogeneity of a region with regard to occurrence of a specific hazard.
- 2. Analysis at sub-national level.** For the sub-national model, the first aim of the analysis was to refine the national model at sub-national level for the world. Unfortunately, the data from the GRAVITY project, including physical exposure to particular hazards, was not available to us. However, available CRED data for Asian countries was used to provide preliminary prioritisation at the sub-national level, particularly for India and the Greater Mekong Sub-region.





Figure 2: Disaster Risk Indicator in the Mekong River Basin



The selected indicators for hazard evaluation are frequency and diversity of hazards. The selected indicators to assess vulnerability are the population density and the percentage of population living under the national poverty line. The creation of the vulnerability indicators relied on Geographical Information System (GIS) technology and was done in collaboration with the JRC.

Figure 3: Disaster Risk Indicator in India.

12. DIPECHO'S DRI IMPLICATION

54. DRI Model - Usefulness and Limitations. The model produces immediate benefits in identifying priority countries for focusing disaster-reduction interventions. ECHO, as well as other EU DGs, can use it in their programming activities. The countries considered are given specific numbers, denoting their rank in disaster risk. Additionally, the consulting team classified the countries into categories showing level of disaster risk (*Very High-High-Medium and Low Disaster Risk*). The consulting team recommends that the focus of DIPECHO assistance be on the first two categories, i.e. those countries classified as very high and high disaster risk. The DRI model also provides sufficient basis to determine the types, prioritisation and relative importance of disaster-reduction interventions in each country, elaborated in the Matrix of Disaster Reduction Interventions ([Annexe II-5, Matrix of Disaster Reduction](#)) and described briefly in the following section of this report. Due to unavailability of data from GRAVITY, the model's primary weakness is that the spatial and geographical relationship of disaster risk (i.e. physical exposure to a hazard type) within a country is inaccurate. Thus it is very hard or almost impossible for the consulting team to prioritise disaster risk at the sub-national level. However, available CRED data for Asian countries was used to provide preliminary prioritisation at the sub-national level, particularly for India and the Greater Mekong Sub-region. The consulting team recommends that when GRAVITY data is available, it should be incorporated into the model to obtain disaster-risk indicators at the sub-national level. A secondary weakness of the model is the incompleteness of data related to the coping capacity. The consulting team asserted that there is no known database on coping capacity. Instead, the consulting team attempted to gather this data by calling on ECHO experts to assess the coping capacity of national authorities, using a tool developed by the consulting team. The results are considered to be informative, but only tentative and incomplete since much important data is unknown and responses are heavily influenced by subjective perspective. As a result, the consulting team recommends that ECHO undertakes a proper process of assessing coping capacity through further refinement of the tool and deliberate and better facilitation of experts' assessment.

55. Appropriateness of Decisions to DRI. Using the results of the DRI, the consulting team analysed the financing decisions made by DIPECHO, in order to make a comparison of the appropriateness of these decisions in the light of the DRI. Under

this, the process involves thorough review of the Financing Decisions¹³ noting the priority countries, the types of hazards and vulnerabilities and the menu of interventions at the community, national and regional levels. During this process, the consulting team observed that the Action Plans have been fairly accurate in identifying priority countries and types of hazards in relation to the DRI. However, under these Plans, since causes of vulnerabilities and level of coping capacities are expressed in a very general and broad manner, the level of accuracy in comparison to the DRI is observed to be low. Furthermore, most justifications for regional programmes are observed to be weak, as they are often based on political and geographical groupings rather than the commonality of problems and themes of interventions. For that reason, the consulting team notes that the DRI, as set out in detail below, would help future decision-making by ECHO.

56. In **Central America**, the countries of El Salvador (10)¹⁴, Guatemala (20), Honduras (25), and Nicaragua (27) are categorised as very high disaster risks. Hence the priority accorded to these countries under the Action Plan. Costa Rica (68) and Panama (90) are, however, ranked as a medium disaster risk and therefore their inclusion in the DIPECHO priorities is arguable.
57. In the **Andean Community**, none of those targeted by DIPECHO are classified as very high level disaster risks. Ecuador (70) and Bolivia (64) are categorised as high disaster risk, whereas Peru (72), Colombia (79) and Venezuela (84) are classified as medium disaster risk. Additionally, Brazil (95) and Paraguay (87) are at medium disaster risk. However, DIPECHO intervention is specifically justified in Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela for flood-disaster reduction. The same set of countries is exposed to a high level of earthquake risks, which suggest a secondary focus on this type of hazard.
58. In **Southeast Asia**, under the DRI, the consulting team observes that Vietnam (9), the Philippines (11), Indonesia (28) and Cambodia (30) are ranked with a very high level of disaster risk. This ranking justifies their inclusion as DIPECHO priority countries. On the other hand, Lao PDR and Thailand are ranked with a high level of disaster risk, according to the DRI. The consulting team believes that the inclusion of Lao PDR is justifiable, given the inadequate coping capacity of the national and local authorities and the high level of vulnerability of it's the country's population. With a high degree of certainty, the consulting team concludes, based on the DRI, that the most common type of hazards affecting all these countries is flooding for which the consulting team recommends that priority should be provided to support reduction of flood related disasters. The consulting team also notes that flooding problem is a trans- boundary issue in Lao PDR, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam, which suggests primary focus on this region (the Lower Mekong River sub-region).
59. In **South Asia**, DRI puts Bangladesh (1), India (2), Nepal (5), Pakistan (6) and Sri Lanka (13) in the very high level of risk category, confirming the justification for DIPECHO support in these countries. All these five countries are exposed to a very high level of flood disaster risk, also confirming the validity of DIPECHO's support for this type of hazard. A regional programme that supports community-level projects

¹³ DIPECHO Action Plans

¹⁴ Number in (parenthesis) denotes ranking in the DRI list. The lower number indicates higher level of DRI

in these areas is also justified. The consulting team notes that a number of partners with cross-border local projects in flood-prone communities are already addressing these DRI conclusions. However, the statement of the role of the regional programme cited in the Action Plan¹⁵ appears to have limited correlation with the trans-border issue; nor does it have specific focus on flood-disaster reduction.

60. In the **Caribbean Region**, the results of the DRI confirm that Haiti (4) has a very high level of disaster risk, as diagnosed under the Action Plans. So the priority accorded to this country is justifiable, mainly for windstorm and flood-disaster reduction, and secondarily for drought-risk reduction. Additionally, the Dominican Republic (49), Jamaica (64) and Cuba (61) are categorised as being at a high level of disaster risk, as they all share a very high level of population density for their vulnerability to natural hazards. The consulting team notes, according to the DRI, that the DIPECHO support for windstorm and flood reduction is justified in these countries, due to their very high level of exposure to windstorms and a high level of exposure to floods. However, the DRI results for Cuba indicate that earthquake is a low risk¹⁶, contradicting the basis for DIPECHO involvement in the country. Additionally, the preliminary results of the DRIC indicate that Cuba has a very high level of coping capacity, which calls into question the selection of Cuba for earthquake risk reduction¹⁷, according to the DRI/DRIC.¹⁸
61. For **Central Asia**, the DRI shows that Tajikistan (46) is categorised as at high disaster risk, with a very high level of hazards and a medium level of vulnerability. The DRI also shows that the country is exposed to a very high flood risk, followed by drought (high risk), windstorm (medium) and earthquake (medium). With the exception of drought, the DIPECHO Action Plan has noted the relevance of these hazards. The DRI also confirms the level of vulnerability of this country due to economic collapse, poverty, and internal armed conflict. These factors, combined with systemic weaknesses in government structures, have left most of the country without appropriate disaster-preparedness and response mechanisms. Although legislation is in place, the response structures at the village, district and regional levels lack the necessary equipment and skills. Furthermore, many communities either ignore or are unaware of the threats facing them. For these reasons, the consulting team notes that, according to the DRI, the DIPECHO intervention in Tajikistan is justified.
62. Two regions have not been analysed: Africa and the Pacific. Amongst Africa's natural disaster risks it is primarily drought and to a lesser degree flooding and volcanic eruptions which call for concern. The drought is a recurrent problem exacerbated by environmental changes. The budgetary needs to start to tackle preparedness in sub-Saharan Africa are so great that it could easily consume the total amount of available DIPECHO funding many times over, whilst at the same time the international community does not meet all of Africa's mainstream humanitarian needs. The Pacific region, consisting of many small, sparsely populated islands make the implementation of a DIPECHO Action Plan particularly difficult.

¹⁵ ADPC regional project for South Asia

¹⁶ <http://www.cred.be/emdat/profiles/natural/cuba.htm>

¹⁷ Third Action Plan

¹⁸ DRIC: Disaster Risk Index adjusted for coping capacities

63. **Regional programmes** The Action Plan recommends focus on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with a small project intervention in Uzbekistan. This however contradicts the ranking of these countries according to the DRI. Because there is no DRI sub-national analysis, the consulting team could not confirm the presence of trans-border problems identified in the Action Plan, though these problems exist and are well known by the desk officer. This is an example where the knowledge of the staff has to evaluate and eventually adapt the results of DRI to the objective situation of the country. The Action Plan however states that the Ferghana Valley is a region that spans all three countries and may share common disaster risk configuration

13. DISASTER REDUCTION INTERVENTIONS

64. **Current practice in determining DPP Interventions.** DIPECHO Action Plans consist of categorisation, identification and prioritisation of preparedness intervention for dealing with disasters by geographical region and to some extent by country. Due to limited resources and influence of partners, the scope of interventions is focused on capacity building, and community-level preparedness measures; these create an important niche for DIPECHO. For that reason, however, DIPECHO suffers also from isolation.
65. **Improvements and broadening the scope.** Opportunities for synergy are therefore lost, due to the limitations fixed by the Action Plans. To address this issue, the consulting team was tasked with giving its expert opinion, using the DRI model and available reports to develop a matrix that will consider the range of interventions that ECHO and other EU DGs may provide in a disaster-prone country. So the consulting team covers the range of disaster-reduction activities, and not just those that ECHO considers as being within its mandate. The output of the consulting team is completed and set out in Annex II-5, Matrix of Disaster Reduction Interventions, A, B, C.
66. **Contents of the Matrix and their usefulness to the EC.** For practical reasons, the consulting team-selected countries categorised as a priority, such as countries classified as very high and high disaster risk based on the model. The selected countries are those also targeted for DIPECHO assistance. The matrix for a specific country that has been analysed consists of:
- **Disaster Risk Ranking**-ranking derived from the DRI model incorporating Hazard and Vulnerability Indicators.
 - **Hazard Ranking**-an indicator incorporating frequency, severity and diversity of types of hazards based on data from CRED database covering years: 1980-2001.
 - **Types of Hazards**-indicators of hazard ranking according to types of hazards analysed, currently limited to four (4) types, i.e. flood, windstorm/cyclones/hurricanes, drought, and earthquake.
 - **Vulnerability Ranking**-an indicator incorporating Human Development Index (HDI-2001), population density and corruption perception index.
 - **Coping Capacity**- A set of indicators to assess the relationship of coping capacity of national authorities to disaster risk with particular reference to 1) Policy Planning and Political Will; 2) Hazard Monitoring, Early Warning and Public Awareness; 3) Sectoral Preparedness, Community based disaster preparedness; 4) Response

Planning, Co-ordination, and Execution; and 5) Resources for Preparedness and Emergency Response.

- **Interventions:** Major headings include interventions before, during and after a disaster. This is not an exhaustive/comprehensive list of Disaster Reduction interventions necessary to minimise or eliminate disaster risk. Instead, the list is more focused on the premise that by “improving coping capacity”, a particular country can better manage the consequences of future disaster risks. The list is also influenced with the notion that ECHO interventions are time bounded in accordance with the original mandate. The list however advocates for other DGs (RELEX and AIDCO) involvement in longer term associated actions of policy planning, capacity development, and post disaster rehabilitation programmes.
- **Recommendations and relationships of data elements in the matrix:** The consulting team provides elaborate explanation of the recommendations for Disaster Reduction in a particular country as guidance for action. This is largely based on experts’ opinion using a review of inventory of on-going and past Disaster Reduction programs in these countries. Information is sourced from the UN ISDR publication Living With Risk, and the detailed country profile programmes on Disaster Reduction provided to the consulting team by UNDP.

D. CONCLUSIONS

67. Has ECHO’s strategy for Disaster Reduction been appropriate to the objectives and have the operations it financed achieved the expected outcomes? Have the concepts, DIPECHO, Mainstreaming and Advocacy, been efficient? Have tools for Disaster Management decision- making been identified and produced? Can the Strategy be further improved? Following the recommendations of the comprehensive evaluation of ECHO in 1999 (Article 20 evaluation), ECHO’s strategy has been to concentrate on its basic mandate: response (ECHO mainstream) and Preparedness (DIPECHO). Prevention and mitigation, the other two components of the Disaster Reduction trilogy, are only accompanying measures implemented on a pilot or demonstrative basis. Coming back to its basic mandate has enabled ECHO to be more effective and to focus better on its objectives. ECHO has now a clear strategic knowledge of what it aims to achieve within its response mandate, based on experience and considerable internal discussions. In matter of preparedness however much is still to be defined and understood for the three components analysed in this report.

DIPECHO

68. Disaster Reduction is a challenge that involves many international organisations, as Disaster Reduction policies and measures have direct and positive effects on poverty alleviation – which are now the main concern of development. ECHO has been slow in meeting this challenge and making strategic decisions on its Disaster Reduction objectives.
69. DIPECHO remained isolated in its efforts to define its role in Disaster Reduction. Its networking with other relevant Disaster Reduction actors has been limited.

70. Disaster Preparedness is the objective of DIPECHO. It is mainly directed at local communities through a participative approach, enhancing their empowerment and ownership, reducing their vulnerability and developing their coping capacities.
71. No other major organisations or international donors predominantly target local communities and stakeholders specifically in Disaster Preparedness. In spite of its low budget, DIPECHO has created a niche for its activities. Other donors recognise the pioneering work that it has accomplished.
72. DIPECHO has developed its niche in a context of Disaster Reduction that is now streamlined into a 'culture' of Disaster Reduction within ECHO. This added value would be lost if DIPECHO's preparedness activities were ever to be transferred to other Commission services.
73. DIPECHO is adaptable. A debate is taking place at present in ECHO on the introduction of new templates for the registration of partners (FPA) and requests for funding that would equally affect DIPECHO and mainstream ECHO aid operations. Similarly, a proposal has been made to replace DIPECHO's Action Plans by one Global Plan. Managerial decisions on all these issues have not been taken yet.
74. DIPECHO-funded operations through budget line B7-219 increasingly meet the objectives of disaster preparedness, in accordance with the Action Plans, thanks to better needs assessments, the experience of the desk officers and field experts, and better screening of the partners' proposals.

MAINSTREAMING

75. Too much mainstreaming of preparedness into ECHO's aid operations would be prejudicial to DIPECHO's specific objectives, reducing its audience for lack of clarity and specificity.
76. Mainstreaming Preparedness into External Relations services to the point of integration would endanger DIPECHO's specific small scale participative community level approach among the Commission's policies, as development cannot easily accommodate small operations.
77. As long as a "culture" of Disaster Reduction is not predominant and understood in the Commission, the LRRD debate will not really take off. In consequence the Interservice Group faces more constraints than it offers solutions.
78. Impartiality is an intangible factor that can only be limited by the degree of security of the humanitarian workers. Neutrality is a spin off of impartiality. Both concepts do not exclude networking with organisations specialised in Human Rights defence.
79. The foreseen amalgam made by the Convention between Humanitarian Assistance and CFSP is highly damaging to impartiality and neutrality.

ADVOCACY

80. Advocacy by ECHO has so far been mainly limited to other Commission services. More attention should be paid to other target groups, Member States, Delegations and potentially beneficiary Countries.
81. Advocacy efforts have been better received by certain officials in AIDCO than in RELEX.
82. A potentially fruitful collaboration could be developed between DIPECHO and AIDCO's Food Security Unit.

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT TOOLS

83. Current DPP terminologies are based on the traditional concept of the disaster management cycle, where each stage of the cycle (prevention-mitigation-preparedness-response-rehabilitation-development) is a separate field of specialisation and influenced by a top-down approach where 'victims' are assumed to be helpless.
84. The term Disaster Reduction is now used by UN ISDR and UNDP to mean broader and greater emphasis on pre-disaster actions of mitigation, prevention and preparedness linked with sustainable development goals. The consulting team concludes that the underlying principles of the traditional disaster management cycle approach are not appropriate to the DIPECHO principles.
85. Benchmarking for best practices is a relatively new field. Within ECHO, there is an increasing demand for better reporting and measurement of performance, with emphasis on monitoring results and impact.
86. One of the future challenges in disaster reduction is the ability to measure progress, promote benefits and ensure quality. Without systematic benchmarking and monitoring of indicators, these will be difficult to achieve.
87. The process of DIPECHO programming already includes a method of prioritisation, through diagnostic studies preceding the development of Regional Action Plans. However, this process is influenced by subjectivity and risk assessment procedures, and terminologies are not standardised.
88. ECHO took a significant step to address the need for improved prioritisation, in developing a preliminary Disaster Vulnerability Index (DVI). The results provide a rough approximation of the disaster risk of a country, based on limited indicators. The consulting team's opinion is that more indicators are required for hazard and vulnerability assessment and notes that the indicator related to coping capacity is excluded from the DVI.
89. Regrettably, the UNDP-GRAVITY project results, assumed to be completed and available for the consulting team, were not available for analysis and will be released by the end of 2003. Thus, for the current period, the GRAVITY results are of limited use to the consulting team when it comes to ranking countries. In consequence the

consulting team developed a new model through refinement of DVI and by adapting the conceptual approach and methodology of GRAVITY.

90. Action Plans, with their current ambiguity in vulnerability assessment and analysis of coping capacity, need to improve on these types of diagnosis. Assessments should not ignore the relevance of social, economic and political conditions to the configuration of disaster risks. The consulting team further recommends the proper assessment of the coping capacity of national authorities, using the tool provided.
91. Potential synergy for DIPECHO with other interventions has not been created, due in part to the limitations stemming from Action Plans.

E. STRATEGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

92. The strategy, which is based on the conclusions of the present review, is summarised in **table 2**. The strategy lists the overall strategy, related main issues, recommendations, operational strategy and impact. (Only the overall strategy is listed here: kindly refer to the attached table 1 below for details.) The strategy takes into consideration the four main components of the TORS: DIPECHO, Mainstreaming, Advocacy and the Strategic Decisions Tools.
93. The main underlying strategic issue of DIPECHO is that it has always been considered a secondary part of the ECHO mandate, with a low budget and limited impact. The strategy is to **give DIPECHO the importance** that is recognised by most donors, but, strangely enough, is only partly acknowledged within the Commission. If ECHO managerial decision-makers are not fully committed to increase the impact of DIPECHO operations and its audience, then the objective of the present review is not likely to be achieved.
94. DIPECHO's **budget is too small** to achieve its objectives and raise the awareness and interests of other External Relations services by achieving a critical mass. A substantial increase (+ 100%) over the next two years should be seriously considered in order to give DIPECHO a weight of its own. Operations should be selected on the understanding that such a budgetary increase is possible. A budget increase will strengthen the coherence of the selection and prepare for more focused interventions geographically and in terms of beneficiaries.
95. The consulting team's recommended Disaster Reduction strategy will result in a substantial increase in workload for ECHO's staff – both from the field and headquarters. The upgrading of ECHO's Disaster Reduction policy has to be accomplished by using one central body to coordinate strategy and policy to ensure coherence and consistency. **A Disaster Reduction Sector within ECHO's Policy Unit** should be given the responsibility of designing, programming and co-ordinating Disaster Reduction strategy, focusing primarily on Disaster Preparedness. Implementation and Country Technical Papers drafting will stay with the geographical units, but a Disaster Reduction Sector should draft the Global Strategy. This sector should manage the disaster risks and benchmarks indicators, by being engaged in accessing and updating the model. This would require being involved in

networking activities with other disaster reduction actors, as well as being responsible for Mainstreaming and Advocacy activities.

96. DIPECHO procedures are too heavy and cumbersome and they are sometimes ambiguous or contradictory, hence the need for rationalisation and streamlining. The numerous Action Plans with various timeframes should be replaced with a unique **DIPECHO Global Plan**, based on the priorities defined by DRI and a thematic approach backed up with Country Technical Papers setting up the national strategy for Disaster Reduction. The relationship with the partners should be revised, along the lines set out in detail by ECHO's Policy Unit. These two proposals are not contradictory and can easily be streamlined.
97. **Thematic needs assessment** missions should take place twice a year, in two different regions, with the participation of the Disaster Reduction Sector officer, an ECHO task manager, field experts, partners and National Disaster Management Organisations. AIDCO should be invited to participate. The themes should not be limited to the ones considered in this review (floods, windstorms, earthquakes, droughts).
98. Selected local partners must be given the opportunity to sign the new FPA, legal restrictions permitting, in order to strengthen sustainability and attract the best local expertise and knowledge.
99. Cross-cutting issues should be taken into account, since they target the most vulnerable people. Non-observance of **human rights** is not sufficient to deter DIPECHO interventions for the most vulnerable populations, as ECHO is impartial. However, ECHO should report human rights infringements and share this information with legally mandated human rights organisations, albeit on a confidential basis. The only limits to DIPECHO interventions in the field, if sufficient funds and partners with adequate capacity are available, would be related to the security of its personnel, both expatriate and local.
100. DIPECHO's strategy for improving its impact and better targeting its beneficiaries should be backed by a constant process of **quality improvement**. This would be based on benchmarking indicators for Disaster Reduction, and best practice measurements, which eventually will be adopted by other Commission services.
101. To date, ECHO has been a donor organisation funding operations in Disaster Preparedness through budget line B7-219 (DIPECHO). Lessons have been learned and applied in the selection of operations and Partners. There has been little value added in the field of Disaster Reduction analysis. ECHO, through DIPECHO, has been more reactive than proactive in the selection of preparedness operations, depending more on the partner's proposals than on its in-house knowledge of disasters. The work initiated with the present review must now continue. This is the opportunity for DIPECHO to have new strategic objectives, **widening its involvement in Disaster Reduction** and reaching a new audience by developing its networking. ECHO will have to add a Disaster Reduction analysis-funding component to its regular activities. The ultimate goal is to reach a consensus among donors that ECHO's practical approach to Disaster Preparedness sets the standards. ECHO now has the tools to achieve that objective blending implementation, based on

partners' operations and analysis based on indicators and benchmarking. It should network more with organisations involved in Disaster Reduction analysis, such as UNDP, UNEP, ISDR, PROVENTIUM Consortium and IFRC.

MAINSTREAMING

102. DIPECHO has to be **mainstreamed into the Disaster Reduction network**. It is now isolated within ECHO, within the Commission and within the Member States. One of the first main tasks for the Disaster Reduction Sector is to gradually put an end to that isolation. Ending isolation within ECHO will begin at HQ, with instructions from management backed up by an internal Disaster Reduction workshop seminar directed at ECHO staff and field experts alike. Ending isolation from other Commission services will require maintaining focus on the Interservice Group, identifying LRRD opportunities or joint operations, especially with the Food Security Unit. New possibilities should be explored for linkages with TACIS and the Civil Protection Unit in DG ENV. In this latter case, DIPECHO could draw on Member States' experience in Disaster Reduction.
103. Mainstreaming of Disaster Reduction activities into ECHO response should be limited to **recurrent disasters** only. Off-the-shelf proposals should be given priority, in order to speed up the implementation process.
104. A **website library** (pdf format) on DR should be maintained and constantly updated.

ADVOCACY

105. **Advocacy** can only really work if it is backed by **objective operations**. The proposed Disaster Reduction Sector should promote such operations in order to strengthen Advocacy. The sector should identify promotional activities with AIDCO on a pilot basis, either undertaken as a component of a development project, or as a joint operation.
106. For the External Relations DG, advocacy should now be **oriented towards the delegations** and the national Governments and to External Relations as a request to include Disaster Reduction into the CSP. The on-going deconcentration process is a good opportunity to include Disaster Reduction in the delegation staff capacity building and briefing at Brussels HQ, currently taking place. Contacts with the European Parliament and with HAC committee members should be developed through specially designed workshops.

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT TOOLS

107. **Semantics** should be improved and systematic use of the correct terminology utilised, as defined in this report. Disaster Reduction should systematically utilise definitions and disaster risk indicators based on Hazards x Vulnerability / Coping Capacities relationships. It should promote clarity and standardisation in disaster-reduction strategy planning and practice, widen consensus on prioritisation of target

countries and disaster reduction interventions and finally improve decision-making using systematically collected data.

108. **Benchmarking** should be constantly improved and amended, in order to increase the rigour of **quality control** and the measurements of performances, as well as to promote a best-practice culture. It will come under the responsibility of the DR Sector
109. **Linkages** should be developed with other relevant organisations active in DR for mutual cross-fertilisation processes, particularly with UNDP's GRAVITY project and UNISDR collaborative activities. It should come under the responsibility of the new DR Sector proposed by the consulting team.
110. The **DRI**, as presented in this report, is not perfect. But it can be improved. ECHO will have to further explore the possibility of better identifying the coping capacities of the countries at national and local levels, as well as assessing the risks at sub-national levels. A close collaboration with UNDP's GRAVITY project is essential, as the latter takes into consideration the spatial and geographical relationship of disaster risk (i.e. physical exposure to a hazard type) within a country.
111. The **Matrix on Disaster Reduction** is useful as a guideline to demonstrate the relationship between risk analysis (hazard, vulnerability and capability) and risk-reduction interventions. Proper use of this matrix will promote discipline in identifying the proper interventions based on a) analysis, and b) successful practices in other communities. But as a guideline, it should not be used with rigidity and must adapt to the changing disaster risks configuration of a particularly country. Experience shows that risk conditions are dynamic and may change over a period of time.
112. The consulting team provides a user-friendly annex describing the **websites** consulted. ECHO may use this for additional information and references. The consulting team observes that there are a significant number of websites related to disaster reduction; not all of them have been consulted. It is recommended that a more systematic tabulation of websites; based on this initial set, be pursued by ECHO and made accessible on a constant ongoing basis.
113. **In conclusion**, in its disaster preparedness actions, ECHO has achieved wide recognition as a professional and competent actor that has anticipated the move by the international community to seeing local communities as stakeholders in disaster reduction instead of as victims. For relatively modest increases in both its budget for disaster preparedness activities and in the human resources to manage them: ECHO could have a greater impact reaching more vulnerable people; achieve even wider international recognition; and promote the realisation of linking relief, rehabilitation and development, something that has by and large eluded the international donor community. ECHO can be justly proud of its accomplishments in the field of disaster preparedness and mindful that the opportunity to consolidate and expand upon its achievements should be seized upon at the earliest opportunity.

ECHO STRATEGIC ORIENTATION TO DISASTER REDUCTION				
	MAIN ISSUES	RECOMMENDATIONS	OPERATIONAL STRATEGY	IMPACT
1. OVERALL STRATEGY				
1.1. DIPECHO to remain in ECHO	Options: Transfer to Development (AIDCO) or Integrated within ECHO	DIPECHO to strengthen its specificity in Disaster Reduction 'within ECHO	DIPECHO workshop to include ECHO Units and experts to define common concepts on base of present report	Strengthen coherence with ECHO Keep focus on preparedness
1.2. Define areas and limits of DIPECHO Disaster Preparedness operations	Does Preparedness includes Mitigation / Prevention? Conflict prevention entails political choices infringing on impartiality Technological disasters involve large civil defence / Protection responses Africa Disasters mainly structural (Famine= ECHO / Food Security) or climatic provoking conflicts (drought) Large development projects on-going (EDF) Need assessments identification.	Mitigation /Prevention only as pilot No man-made conflicts No technological disasters No involvement in Africa Joint sectoral (thematic) missions AIDCO, RELEX, Delegation, field experts	Mitigation operations only as a % of total costs (20%) Prevention costs ibid: both cost not cumulative Excludes civil wars, conflict mitigation, prevention of conflicts Small consequences of technological disasters eligible . e.g. uranium deposits in Central Asia Exceptions for Horn of Africa drought with LRRD objectives with Food Security as component mainstreamed in ECHO operations Two Hazards themes per year within two geographic regions. Modus operandi= workshops with main stakeholders	Train and develop ownership / empowerment Avoids overlaps with RELEX Avoids complex technical involvements Emphasis on recurrent disasters: preparedness included in response Coherence with Commission's DGs' Joint exposure and involvement of wider audience, improvements in LRRD links
1.3. Define Stakeholders	National level often too large for NGOs Think global act local Increase value added of intervention	DIPECHO directed to local levels (communities, municipalities, local emergency services) or directly National disaster preparedness related operations	Select operations with high level of local participation Support Civil Defence, Red Cross in preparedness operations. only Systematically include beneficiaries in all operations	Empowerment, ownership, sustainability, accountability Keep focused on preparedness mandate Concentrate operations locally, no dispersions of efforts
1.4. Review Budget	Limits on level AND number of operations with available budget (breakdown of decisions)	Increase budget	Maintain dialogue with Parliament (Carlotti report) Timeframe up to 12 months, on exceptional basis 18 months motivated at commencement. Expansion only to same partner and staff, same programme in contiguous area	Increase operational capabilities Streamline Partners performances Awareness of MS through Parliament Economy of scale and maximisation of impact through concentration
1.5. Review procedures	5 unrelated Action plans, with different implementation calendar leading to loss of time, human resources, unbalanced decisions	One Global Plan for DIPECHO One Technical Country Paper (can be regional e.g. Caribbeans)	Prepared by DIPECHO sector Prepared by ECHO experts and geographical units, reviewed for coherence by DIPECHO sector.	Overall coherence of strategy, common time implementation schedule, cross-fertilisation between regions Identification of national DP policies, framework for Partners' guidance, evaluate proposals conformity with strategies
1.6. Implement new FPA	Core changes in new FPA objectives as compared to previous one: it is now also a management tool	New FPA to be adapted to DIPECHO specific objectives New FPA to be utilised as management tool	Reviewed by ECHO 4 DIPECHO sector	Improved implementation monitoring , partners' performances comparisons, improved Partners'confidence, results'oriented implementation,
1.5. Include selected local Partners	Sustainability of DIPECHO operations (Local networking and interest)	Identify local Partners Accept selected local Partners in New FPA	FPA for local Partners Review FPA to include local Partners (ECHO 4)	Access to best qualified local Partners, institutional and HR Training and strengthening, sustainability
1.6. Consistent and systematic utilisation of mainstream definitions and disaster risks indicators based on Hazards X Vulnerability/Coping Capacities relationships	Confusion and outdated DPP concepts, terminologies and definitions. Design of decision making tools. Lack of assessment of coping capacities (model for national and subnational)	Use of mainstream concepts and definitions with UNISDR Inter-agency task forces Use of the DRI model by ECHO, and other DGs Improve designs, in hazard, vulnerability and coping capacities assessment	Functional collaboration with UNISDR Inter-agency task forces DRI as a planning tool for ECHO and other DGs JRC mapping support to EC	Promotes clarity and standardisation in disaster reduction strategy planning and practice. Consensus on prioritisation of target countries and disaster reduction interventions. Improved decision making using systematically collected data.
1.7. Improve overall DIPECHO quality using benchmarking indicators for disaster reduction (DR)	Lack of systematic and comprehensive information on DR Integrate disaster risks management practices into EU activities Establish focus and priorities by setting common points of references Develop best practices culture	Develop and improve benchmarking and best practices measurements	ECHO 4 Advocacy on benchmarking practices Monitoring and evaluation according to benchmark indicators	Improve systematic planning and monitoring of disaster reduction practices within EU
1.8. Cross cutting issues to target most vulnerable	Children, gender, LRRD, environment, security, Human Rights	Integrate cross cutting / Vulnerability in selection processes. Human rights for reporting purposes only (impartiality.)	Identify most vulnerable during small Joint sectoral missions	Comprehensive DR policies, integrates socio-economic factors, relieves poverty alleviation and dependency, helps define culture of disaster
1.9. DIPECHO up-graded to sector level	No references to past experiences (Unit Level): tasks wider, new objectives, lessons learned, heavier workload)	DIPECHO Sector to be lodged within ECHO 4. Main functions: planning and database mngt, coherence with other EU instruments, evaluations and lessons learned, networking	One sector desk officer, one database management specialist	One DIPECHO Resource Person, co-ordination of policy, central programming,

ECHO STRATEGIC ORIENTATION TO DISASTER REDUCTION				
	MAIN ISSUES	RECOMMENDATIONS	OPERATIONAL STRATEGY	IMPACT
2. MAINSTREAMING				
2.1. Mainstream DIPECHO into Disaster Reduction networks				
2.1.1.Reduce isolation within ECHO	DIPECHO operations "dwarfed" by ECHO's Limited interest of significant number of staff Confusion on Budget lines Competition between Units for funding Confusion on competence between operational Units and Unit 6 for proposals analysis	DIPECHO Sector to advocate and implement co-operation DIPECHO Sector to conduct awareness workshops Stricter observance of budget lines Arbitrate and balance budget funding Define limits of competence	DIPECHO internal workshop Workshops with operational and Budget Units DIPECHO mainstreaming in ECHO operations duly justified Proposals geographic units, co-ordination DIPECHO Sector Operational units=operations management, Unit 6=financial conformity.	Coherence in ECHO mandate, co-ordination of response and preparedness All ECHO staff aware of DIPECHO role and objectives Further clarifications / and distinctions in DIPECHO operations Balanced overall budget distribution Clear competence breakdown
2.1.2 Reduce isolation within EU.	Limited financial resources brings little interest Little coherence and complementarity with RELEX AIDCO No mention of DP in TACIS though DIPECHO intervenes in TACIS countries Little contacts with Civil Protection (DG ENV)	Increase budgetary limits framework Continue implementing Communications, Joint Instructions Interservice Group. Establish contacts with TACIS Establish contacts with DG ENV	Follow up on Parliament recommendations Organise fixed dates for Interservice meetings (twice a year coupled with Joint Sectoral missions) Civil Protection (DG ENV) to present proposals in DP	Increase DIPECHO interventions Raise awareness on DIPECHO, increase LRRD, increase in-house networking Coherence with other development / TA programmes DP included in TACIS Indicative Programme, Annual Plan Integrate MS experience in Disaster Preparedness
2.1.3. Isolation with other DR main players	DIPECHO late in DR analytical concepts Avoid redundancy in works, studies, concepts. Visibility O.K.	Integrate DP caucuses, think thanks, networks, research org. Streamline DR definitions and concepts with other major players: Red Cross, UNDP, UNEP	DIPECHO to finance relevant researches in DPP e.g. gravity further analysis, JRC collaboration, attend relevant workshops	Active participation in in DPP research, increase active networking increase visibility, generate better proposals from relevant Partners
2.2. Mainstream DIPECHO operations into ECHO's responses	To which extent blend emergency (ECHO) and DIPECHO operations	Integrate DIPECHO's operations in immediate ECHO response as preparedness for (future) disasters, only for recurrent ones	Available off-the-shelf operations that can be activated under short notice, Implement in the immediate aftermath of response	Available contingency preparedness operations, integrated response
2.3. Systematic use and improvements of Digital Map Archive (DMA)	No software available on ECHO premises	Develop collaboration with JRC	Establish joint programme of work	Generate mapping at short notice, back stopping in DMA
2.4. Develop web site on DR	Continuous improvements and up-dating	Designate DIPECHO website manager	Web site management to be established within DIPECHO Sector, alternatively train ECHO website manager	In-house website management, establishment of DP reference library on line
2.5. Expand DIPECHO role into Disaster Reduction analysis	Follow up on Disaster Reduction concepts	Mainstream Disaster Reduction analysis into DIPECHO's objectives	Funding relevant institutions in Disaster Reduction research	Networking with Disaster Reduction Institutions, blend practical and thematic research, set DIPECHO as a standard in Disaster Preparedness.
3. ADVOCACY				
3.1. Pursue Advocacy within the EU DGs	Improve attendance in Interservice Group Improve understanding of DIPECHO's objectives Streamline adherence to Joint Instructions	Strategic alliance with Food Security Unit (F5) on a pilot basis	Identify and implement joint operations with food security drought in the Horn of Africa	Initiate joint practical operations, learn process, consolidate policy
3.2. New targets	Identify pilot LRRD operations DIPECHO easier to link with LRRD (less emergency, more planning) RELEX CSP to include DP	Improve dialogue with RELEX and AIDCO Identify new actors: Civil Protection	DIPECHO Sector to design an advocacy "how to" booklet, , DIPECHO Sector to participate in sectoral Joint Missions	Identify objectives of Advocacy DIPECHO Sector to develop and integrate field contingencies
3.3. New audience	Countries' awareness of DPP Delegations' awareness of DPP Member States' awareness of DPP Parliament's awareness	Promote awareness of National Authorities to DP Develop Delegations' interest in DPP operations Raise awareness of MS in DP Analyse budget increase targets and limitations	Train ECHO experts in the field Include DP workshops in Delegation Staff training in the framework of Deconcentration training sessions in Brussels Workshop for HAC committee members Increase contact with relevant MEP's	Streamline DIPECHO and unify DIPECHO message Enrol Delegation in advocacy efforts, insure correctness of message Develop DP networking with MS relevant Institutions, streamline and co-ordinate with MS programmes Develop awareness with Parliament, and MS increase opportunities to increase budget,
3.4. Promote Disaster Reduction Indicators in	Little awareness on indicators methodology Little confidence in indicators usefulness	Advocate adoption of methodology and results in development DGs for Disaster Reduction analysis and strategy	Disseminate methodology and results, organise awareness workshops, discuss improvements.	Raise DIPECHO to a reference level, cross-fertilisation with efficiency