

FINAL REPORT

ECHO-funded WFP programme in Tanzania

October 4-12, 2002

QUEST-Consult

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PROGRAMME EVALUATED

Evaluated action: Assistance to refugee populations in Tanzania

Evaluation of the part of World Food Programme activities funded by ECHO

(Afghanistan, Eritrea, Serbia, and Tanzania)

Country: Tanzania

Operation Contract: ECHO/TZA/210/1999/01001

ECHO/TZA/210/2000/01005 ECHO/TZA/210/2001/01005 ECHO/TZA/210/2002/01004

Total amount: EURO 40,000,000

Sector: Food aid

Consultant/Evaluators: QUEST-Consult, Mr W Klaassen, Team Leader and Logistics and Mr A van der

Heide, Nutrition

Period of evaluation: The Tanzania evaluation was carried out from October 4-12, 2002.

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

The global objective requested an assessment of the set-up and impact of the WFP programmes in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Tanzania and Serbia and the part played in them by the ECHO contribution.

METHODOLOGY OF THE WFP TANZANIA EVALUATION

The evaluation involved visits to the different headquarters in Brussels and Rome followed by a nine-day (9) field visit to Tanzania. This included meetings with key staff in WFP, the Implementing Partners (IPs), the regional office of ECHO in Nairobi, the regional office of WFP in Kampala, with GoT officials and beneficiaries. There were visits to warehouses, Extended Delivery Points (EDPs) and Final Delivery Points (FDPs). Finally there were joint debriefing meetings.

The time allocated to the evaluation (9 days including international travel) was very limited and this constrained the consultants; there was time to study all aspects of their assignment, but a limit to the extent to which they could evaluate in depth.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Food aid, food security and nutrition sector

The food aid operation for refugees in Tanzania is run correctly, based on needs assessments, targeting and monitoring carried out by UNHCR, WFP and IPs. The programme is executed with a considerable degree of professionalism. Chronic malnutrition rates seem high but the aetiology is not known. JFAM reports have mentioned this phenomenon already and proposed more in-depth analyses but is also aware of its complex aetiology. The first measure taken has been to carry out twice yearly nutrition surveys. Other health indicators such as child mortality and morbidity are low. Food (in)security at the household level is not an issue because families are fully dependent on food aid. Reductions in the food basket have occurred mainly due to pipeline problems and a lack of donations. However, with normal inputs of seeds, tools and land, refugees could become fully food-secure within two years. This is a political issue. The targeting of beneficiaries is normally done correctly but an annual re-registration exercise is desirable to check on "recyclers", this is the responsibility of the UNHCR.

As more information is needed about the causes of malnutrition it is recommended that the aetiology of the rather high chronic malnutrition rates be identified - JFAM reports have mentioned this already.

Implementing Partners

The Implementing Partner for WFP is UNHCR who in turn contracts IPs to carry out the distributions. The relationship between WFP and UNHCR is formulated in the Memorandum of Understanding, a highly relevant document, dated July 2002 (annex 8), which regulates the relations and operations of both organisations. At field level, monitoring on the effectiveness of the arrangements between WFP and UNHCR is needed to ensure that organisational repetition does not occur; repetition leads to duplications, unclear reporting and lack of cost effectiveness. The key question here is whether it is feasible, it seems feasible, -for WFP to take charge of the food distribution. This would make the chain

of organisation shorter and, probably, more effective and efficient. It would reduce the number of international agencies, each now with numerous international staff in the field as well as each having their own infrastructure yet all dealing with the same programme. UNHCR in Tanzania is one such agency. It is therefore recommended that ECHO support the idea of a pilot project in which WFP is in charge of all transport and distribution -through its IPs- to the beneficiaries.

Disputes have developed between UNHCR and IPs concerning budget cuts imposed on UNHCR, which UNHCR passed onto the IPs without applying cuts to its own budget. The IP's sustainability was threatened, they stood firm and finally an agreement was made with UNHCR. These kinds of processes seem to be beyond the control of the donor and WFP, and should be avoided. Refer to recommendation 3. The recommendation is that the relations between the Contracting Agency and Implementers needs to be monitored to ensure that they do not affect the programme negatively.

It is positively acknowledged by the consultants that ECHO's relations and co-operation with UN agencies will in future be shaped by the new UN-EC Framework agreement¹ while the roles of UNHCR and WFP are defined by the overall MoU², as mentioned above.

The WFP-Tanzania programme is strong in areas where WFP is often weak; it assesses from the household level upwards; the assessments are analytical and profound; the programme is responsive to the needs of beneficiaries. It is important that WFP is conscious of the skills it has acquired, and does not lose them when new organisations get involved with the implementation.

An area of sound operation is the JFAM mission, which creates a basis for good co-operation, co-ordination and consultation during the implementation.

Logistics and pipeline management

The logistics system is functioning well. Arrangements are clear and the activities in ports, warehouses and during transport are up to standard. Controls are in place and applied. The pipeline is functioning well technically but there were shortages in the year 2000 and distributions were reduced by 40% then raised to 80%. Food rations to vulnerable groups were kept at 100% as a safety net. There were examples of management making decisions on the basis of pipeline software outputs, enabling them to reduce the impact of shortages on vulnerable groups. Pipeline performance improved over 2001 but incidentally shortages still occurred in 2002.

Management in WFP-TZ has given positive examples of using the pipeline information in conjunction with COMPAS in an effective way in order to avert shortages. The management information systems are up to standard and well applied.

In some programmes uncertainty exists about the best placement and profile of the Pipeline Manager in the country offices. It is recommended that HQ deal with this problem. The generic profile, the tasks, responsibilities and authority of the Pipeline Manager need to be spelt out more clearly.

The 'Logistics' budget-line in the ECHO-WFP budget is high while there is insufficient information and explanation of the quotes. The reporting and flow of information from WFP-HQ to ECHO leaves much to be desired while the reporting from WFP-CO to HQ is much more detailed, both in terms of quality and quantity. There is a dire need to address the issue of transparent planning of projects, including budgets and communications. WFP should provide details of the way the transport budget-line has been arrived at in its plan and has been accounted for at the completion of the operation. As well as planning and budgeting, WFP should improve the quality of its reporting.

¹ Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement between the European Community, represented by the Commission of the European Communities and the United Nations, 2002

² Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP), July 2002

Organisational sector: improvement of strategy and context of future ECHO-WFP cooperation

ECHO-WFP local and regional level

ECHO-WFP staff relations at country level are sound, have strong professional standards and are based on good personal relationships. It is apparent that working relations get better when staff in different organisations communicate on a personal level. Both organisations should recognise that personal relations between staff may, in many cases be instrumental for improved professional relations. Steps should be taken to create conditions to achieve this.

During the planning phase, the ECHO Regional Office in Nairobi played a positive role in support of the ECHO office in Dar es Salaam. It participated meaningfully in the JFAMs as an observer and has in this way influenced the proposed activities.

Proposed Senior Technical Group

It has been observed that at headquarters level, WFP and ECHO could well improve and optimise their communication on planning, communicating and co-ordinating. This is largely related to the profound differences in systems and procedures utilised by the two organisations.

It is recommended that a joint Senior Technical Group, consisting of highly powered technical officials from the HQ level be established. The Group will study the different ways ECHO and WFP experience impediments in their co-operation and identify areas of comparative advantage and worthwhile co-operation between the organisations.

Areas for consideration of the Group would include: how to put into operation the outcome of the 'strategic dialogue'; an assessment for implementation of the recommendations of this evaluation report; the incompatibility of the regulations for project applications; financial administration and reporting; harmonising the perceived difference between the PRROs -which are regarded by WFP as its project document- and the project proposals as expected by ECHO, which are different in format and nature; revision of the needs assessment; ways to institutionalise best practice; communication between both organisations -who communicates with whom on which levels of authority about which matters.

The above recommendation, to establish a Senior Technical Group, has been superseded by the UN-EC Framework Agreement¹ and its implementation should be within the understanding of the agreement.

Given the limited time available for the visit to the country it is suggested that a detailed study be implemented to address the indicative finding that the cost-effectiveness of WFP is relatively low, a study focussing on operational factors as well as financial matters.

Communication between ECHO and World Food Programme

It was observed and confirmed by staff in both organisations that communication leaves much to be desired. Improvement is a priority. Obviously the ToR of this evaluation did not allow the evaluators to provide a full organisational study. It is for that reason that the report only mentions the key areas of focus for improvement of mutual vision and communication between the organisations.

- i) WFP has pointed out that its organisation is in the process of decentralisation and hence has different characteristics to ECHO, which has a decentralised structure;
- ii) It is recommended that the effects of decentralisation in the WFP be assessed and differences between WFP and ECHO be assessed from this point of view. It is important to take as a starting point that successful decentralisation requires the reshuffling of the following: tasks and responsibilities, means and resources, capacities, competence and authority;
- iii) The dual character of ECHO -as felt in WFP- its operational role in the field and its role as a donor, needs discussion and clarification;

¹ Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement between the European Community, represented by the Commission of the European Communities and the United Nations, 2002

- iv) The format and content of the WFP project documents (PRROs and EMOPs) is different from the project format that is required by ECHO. Harmonising these would alleviate much of the current communication problems;
- v) Within WFP a clearer understanding by staff is needed of the internal communication and responsibilities of the four levels in the organisation: HQ, Regional Bureau, Country and Area Offices. In similar vein, the relations in ECHO between HQ, region and field should be made more explicit;
- vi) An outline should be prepared and made available to staff in both organisations answering the question as to 'who will communicate with whom about which authority on which issue';
- vii) In general, personal professional communication and exchanges are recommended between staff in both organisations. It would be advisable for instance that the WFP-Liaison Office would meet regularly with ECHO staff to address general issues.

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

- 1. **Linking relief and development**: Linking relief and development, in the restrictive environment of the camp with the profound limitations on self-reliance activities for refugees and the aid organisations, is not feasible. While it is recognised that this is the policy of GoT, a policy which has not changed despite the attempted influence of WFP and other organisations. It needs to be stressed that refugees as well as organisations may end up becoming totally dependent on the routine actions of handing out and receiving food. Safe and secure repatriation and resettlement in the country of origin is the only other way out for the refugees to build their lives again.
- 2. **Gender**: Gender awareness in the JFAMs, the camp management and the planning and execution of the distribution has considerably improved the quality of the programme. Women participate in all steps of planning and decision-making, both women in the aid organisations and beneficiary representatives.
- 3. **The elderly**: Care of the elderly in traditional societies is normally the responsibility of the male children of the family, a pattern disrupted by the displacement of refugees. Food aid programmes should indeed pay special attention to this vulnerable group; in the camps they get extra attention if necessary.
- 4. **Children**: Children get special attention through a system of nutritional surveys carried out once a year. Special feeding programmes for children make severe malnutrition rates amongst the child population in the camps relatively low. However, moderate malnutrition rates are high and in areas outside the camps not benefiting from food aid there are much higher malnutrition rates.
- 5. **Environmental concerns**: Camps now have densely concentrated populations. There is a heavy toll on the natural surroundings and resources. This needs special attention as it can exhaust local resources and also lead to competition between the host population and refugees. ECHO is aware of these environmental concerns. However, durable solutions and inputs are not included in the funding of WFP food aid programme. Projects with an environmental focus, including reforestation, introduction of fuel-saving cooking devices have been funded through other EC instruments including the European Development Fund and other agencies, e.g. UNHCR.
- 6. **HIV/AIDS**: UNHCR is aware of the existence and dangers of AIDS in the camps where many people live closely together. UNHCR and other IPs specialising in health or related activities are carrying out awareness programmes. The prevalence of HIV is regularly collated and published in the UNHCR health bulletins. A problem occurring in the camps related to HIV-prevalence is the regular raping of women and young girls. WFP supports the AIDS health programmes; a high prevalence of HIV- infections means future problems with food security.

LESSONS LEARNT

1. An important lesson learnt is that to be productive, a professional and extended needs assessment has to be carried out jointly with other partners and with the donors as observers. The resulting document can serve as a scenario for implementation. ECHO's participation as an observer is of great importance both for the UNHCR and the WFP so that there is an input of donor preferences.

- 2. No other pre-conditions are recommended. The programme is relatively cheap per capita, is not controversial politically and contributes to peace in the region.
- 3. The main lesson to be drawn is that the model used in relation to the refugees is, after years of intervention, still valuable. The programme has improved its performance and has strong components. Now, though, adaptations must be worked out preparing for possible repatriation and resettlement.