
Fordham Corporate Law Institute
New York
22-23 October 1998
Antitrust and Trade Policy Round Table
Proposed answers to Professor Jennys questions
By Jonathan Faull
I am grateful to Professor Jenny for his searching and pertinent
questions. They are the right ones, and have to be answered if the international community
is to make real progress in finding competition policy responses to the challenges of the
global economy.
One should not be surprised by Professor Jennys acute insight
into these issues. His career as a distinguished academic and senior competition official
in France and his international roles as a member of the Group of Experts set up by
European Commissioner Karel Van Miert to report on international aspects of competition
policy and as Chair of the Competition Law and Policy Committee of the OECD and of the
Working Group on Trade and Competition of the World Trade Organisation make him uniquely
qualified to organise and lead discussion of these issues.
1. Is there a need for new tools or regulations to promote
competition in todays newly globalised markets?
There is no body of international competition law under which
agreements or mergers can be approved or forbidden worldwide. The scope for conflicts of
jurisdiction, decision and remedy grow as the world economy globalises. The result is
uncertainty and expense for companies and the prospect of chaos as the taste for
extraterritorial adventure spreads.
Individual countries should develop their own competition laws based on
agreement on core principles.
Collectively the international community should create a framework in
which countries competition authorities can cooperate and coordinate their
activities. The tools (e.g. comity, positive comity) can be developed from those already
contained in bilateral agreements (e.g. EC-US), OECD Recommendations.
2. Underlying this question are a number of sub-questions such
as:
3. Is there evidence that cross-border anti-competitive practices (or
concentrations) are preventing the trading community from reaping the gains from trade
liberalisation to a significant extent?
Yes, the experience of the European Community over the last 40
years shows clearly that anti-competitive activities by commercial enterprises can distort
trade and undermine the benefits of dismantling tariff and non-tariff Governmental
barriers.
These anti-competitive activities can be:
- horizontal restrictive practices (between competitors sharing markets, sources of
supply, etc.)
- vertical restrictive practices (relating to foreclosure caused by supply arrangements,
distribution, licensing, etc.)
- abuses of dominant position
- mergers creating or strengthening dominant positions.
More widely, trade friction is caused by private activities with which
the GATT/WTO provisions are not currently designed to deal. Kodak/Fuji is the most
recent and striking example, but there are many others that are dealt with bilaterally
less publicly. Countries with an active competition policy often handle cases involving
practices with cross-border trade effects.
Friction is also caused by attempts to stretch competition law
extraterritorially (exploring, challenging and many would say violating the frontiers of
international law) by extending rules designed to deal with problems arising in the
domestic territory, affecting domestic consumers, to issues arising elsewhere and
allegedly affecting exports or foreign investment.
4. Which practices cause the most severe problems from the
standpoint of trade and from the standpoint of competition?
It is impossible, and would be wrong, to seek to rank problems in
this way. Mergers, abuses of dominant positions, horizontal market sharing cartels and
vertical restraints foreclosing market access may all cause severe problems for
competition and for trade between Member States.
In a global economy in which domestic markets are open to international
competition, are contested or at least contestable by imports, what affects competition is
often likely to have an impact on trade. It is therefore not surprising in the European
Union context that it has long been settled law that an anti-competitive arrangement
affecting most or all of the market in a Member State ipso facto affects trade
between Member States.
5. To what extent (and under which conditions) can the traditional
tools of domestic competition policy and law be applied (and are applied) to fight such
practices by countries which have such policy and laws?
Enforcement of competition law to keep the process of competition
open and healthy helps to make markets contestable. A market free of anti-competitive
activities of the sort outlined in the answer to 3 above is one that can take its place in
the world trading system. However, the focus of competition law on domestic markets and
consumers and the territorial limits of fact-finding and remedies make it increasingly
difficult for competition authorities to work alone in the global economy. Cooperative
instruments are needed to create networks of competition authorities in a way, which,
while respecting international law on jurisdiction, combines the ability to investigate
and remedy competition problems and helps to avoid conflict.
6. a. To what extent (and under which conditions) can new tools such
as cooperation agreements, exchange of information between competition authorities,
positive and negative comity principles be applied to fight such practices ?
Cooperation agreements, exchange of information between competition
authorities and positive and negative comity principles are very important in the
enforcement of competition law.
There is close cooperation between national competition authorities and
the Commission in the European Union itself and between the Commission and other
authorities (the EFTA Surveillance Authority, the US DoJ and FTC, the Canadian Bureau of
Competition, the competition authorities of the candidate countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and many others). Cooperation agreements providing for discussion and meetings are
useful in themselves since they create a dynamic of common interest and a network of
personal contacts. Agreements to exchange information are limited in most cases by rules
prohibiting sharing of confidential data. The US authorities have statutory powers to
conclude reciprocal agreements to exchange confidential information but in Europe there is
considerable reluctance to negotiate such an agreement at present. The Commission shares
non-confidential data with other authorities. Only where specifically authorised to do so
by the undertakings concerned does it exchange confidential data too: this occurs in
merger cases. The Commission complies scrupulously with the rule of negative or
traditional comity. The European Community has concluded a special positive comity
agreement with the USA, believing it to be an essential instrument in a world of economic
interdependence and a robust alternative to extraterritorial extravagance.
b. How effective can these means actually be and what are their
limits?
They can be very effective. Their limits are the political will of
individual parties in a bilateral relationship, groups of countries in a regional
integration context or the world community at the World Trade Organisation to conclude the
necessary agreements and implement them properly.
7. Is convergence (or harmonisation) of national competition laws
and policies a prerequisite to fight trans-border anti-competitive practices through
the traditional means above-mentioned? Is convergence (or soft harmonisation) a desirable
goal?
Full convergence or harmonisation is not necessary, but agreement
on common principles and objectives certainly is. The EU-US relationship shows that
different laws and occasionally different policy emphasis do not prevent cooperation.
Within the European Union, where a process of soft or voluntary harmonisation is under
way, the business community welcomes similarity of rules throughout what is after all a
single market. Decentralisation and burden sharing between Community and national
authorities and the accession of new Member States are also facilitated by harmonisation.
8. How much consensus is there about what practices are
anti-competitive? If there is no consensus on what is anti-competitive, particularly on
vertical anti-competitive practices, how useful can cooperation agreements, exchange of
information, positive and negative comity principles be to eliminate practices which
restrict trade?
A considerable degree of consensus about some basic issues of
competition policy is necessary for international cooperation to succeed. Understanding of
legitimate differences is also needed, e.g. the ECs stance on vertical restraints
based on market integration imperatives, the particular requirements of developing
countries. Comity requires that account be taken of another countrys interests and
policies. Of course, the more similar those interests and policies are to ones own,
the harder and less acceptable it will be to act against them. Positive comity on the
other hand needs actual agreement about law and policy, because it is only if the country
on whose territory the anti-competitive activities occur shares the concerns expressed to
it by the country whose interests are affected by those activities that the former will be
able to act to the satisfaction of the latter. For example, there would be no point in our
asking the US authorities to deal with an anti-competitive activity in the US which would
be illegal in Europe but is perfectly lawful in the USA.
Discussions so far in the World Trade Organisations Working Group
on trade and competition in Geneva show a heartening degree of interest among nearly all
nations of the world in the development of competition policies and a large number of
countries which have already enacted competition laws and seek to attain similar goals in
implementing them. The interest of developing countries in competition policy is
particularly welcome and is reflected in important work being pursued in parallel in
UNCTAD.
9. a. Is the promotion of competition law and policy in countries
which do not have one worthwhile or is it counterproductive because such laws and
policies can be misused (or used strategically) ?
Promotion of competition law is both worthwhile and necessary. No
doubt laws can be and are misused or used to underpin a national industrial policy which
is inimical to international trade between Member States and competition. That is why each
countrys process should be open, transparent and fair, with provision for judicial
review. It is also why discussion and dialogue are so important bilaterally and
multilaterally in order to foster understanding of competition policy.
b. Is it not true that if (developing) countries want to adopt a
competition law that they will misuse they will do so even if there is no attempt to
promote the adoption of domestic competition laws in a multilateral context ?
It should not be assumed that developing countries are more prone
to misuse their law than any other category of country. Promotion of competition law
provides for opportunities to discuss frankly the merits of competition policy among all
the different types of country in the world. Adoption of laws is certainly not the end of
the process: it is rather part of the beginning, as the EUs experience internally
and more recently with the candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe shows.
10. a. To what extent could (or should) the existing GATT and GATT
related obligations be used to fight cross-border anti-competitive practices ?
All GATT/WTO rules should be applied to the full, but the current
rules were not designed for, and do not reach, many anti-competitive practices. See Kodak/Fuji
and other disputes about trade barriers allegedly caused by private arrangements.
b. To what extent are these principles inconsistent with (or
insufficient to establish) a sound competition law and policy?
The issue is not whether those rules are inconsistent with
competition law and policy; it is rather that the international community has not yet
developed competition law and policy. There are arguments about the economic soundness of
certain GATT/WTO rules or certain national measures taken pursuant thereto, and some of
those arguments are sometimes made in terms similar to those advanced in support of
competition policy, but consideration of consistency requires two sets of rules and one of
them is simply not there yet. This is a question for a future Fordham conference about the
results of the World Trade Organisation Millennium Round!
11. a. Is not the Telecom agreement proof that in the context of the
WTO, there is a possibility to impose obligations related to competition policy on
signatories?
Yes. However, our experience suggests that competition policy
should be coherent and consistent across all sectors of the economy.
I do not doubt the possibility of reaching agreement within the World
Trade Organisation on competition policy obligations: the question is whether there is
sufficient political will today (or soon) to commence negotiations.
b. Why should such obligations be limited to the Telecom sector?
There is no reason why they should be so limited. Of course, the
telecommunications sector has enormous international ramifications, but so do many others
(air and maritime transport, information technology, the entertainment industries, to name
but a few.......)
12. Should the WTO members have an obligation to adopt a domestic
competition law (even if they remain free to decide what kind of law they want to have) in
order to increase transparency and non discrimination in the treatment of domestic and
foreign firms ?
Transparency and non-discrimination would not be enough if each
country chooses the "kind of law" it wants to have. Domestic laws should conform
to internationally agreed principles.
13. What lessons can be learned from the Boeing-Mc Donnell Douglas
case and the Kodak-Fuji case from the standpoint of the relative merits of
competition law and trade agreements to solve cross-border competition problems.
From Boeing, the benefits of cooperation and the limits of
what is likely to be possible internationally. The European Union and the US discussed the
case in detail and understood each others positions very well. Conflict was
ultimately avoided. However, if the European Union prohibits a merger which the US decides
not to challenge, no World Trade Organisation dispute settlement system likely to see the
light of day for many years could decide over their heads whether or not the merger could
go ahead.
Since Kodak/Fuji, the limits of current World Trade Organisation
rules and system should be apparent to everyone. In todays economy, decisions made
by companies are often as important as what Governments are doing in influencing the flow
of trade, if not more so. More work is needed urgently to respond to the process of
economic globalisation which we see every day in international agreements, alliances,
joint ventures, mergers, cartels and abuses of dominant position. Just as the Member
States of the EU realised long ago that many competition problems are simply too big to be
dealt with in the framework of an individual countrys laws and policies, so it is
today even for the EU or, for that matter, the USA, Japan or any other large economy one
wishes to mention.
Of course, it is still the case that the conditions in which
competition takes place are still greatly influenced by Governments. However, as tariff
and non-tariff barriers come down and Governments privatise and withdraw from many
economic activities, it is increasingly what companies do that matters. Recent experience
with US attempts to deal with alleged problems of access to the Japanese film market shows
that what Kodak and Fuji do or do not do is more relevant to the fate of that part of
world trade than what the US and Japanese Governments do.
The World Trade Organisation, successor to the GATT, is where the world
meets to deal with trade and related matters. More than a talking shop, it is a world body
where decisions are taken, based on the rule of law, to ensure that trading rules accepted
after negotiations are complied with. Following a suggestion made by the European Union,
the World Trade Organisation now has a working group considering the relationship between
trade and competition.
While it true that many countries today have competition laws on their
statute books, it cannot be said that these laws are applied coherently and consistently
everywhere. So the EUs World Trade Organisation initiative seeks to persuade the
rest of the world that we should contemplate agreement along the following lines. The
agenda is modest and there are already grounds for confidence that it is attainable. We
need:
- A set of agreed core principles of competition law
- A commitment to create accessible institutions to apply competition law, based on the
rule of law
- A mechanism for international cooperation between competition authorities
- A system to settle disputes about a countrys compliance with World Trade
Organisation standards (not appeals in particular cases).
Finally, I will take the liberty of adding a question of my own:
14. What is at stake here?
I have in the past been a little embarrassed about certain debates
between Europeans here at Fordham, believing that such matters should be discussed
"at home" (at least initially). This embarrassment is a tribute to Barry Hawk
and the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, since so many vital discussions about European
competition law have taken place here over the years.
It is, however, without compunction or hesitation that I bring the
debate about the World Trade Organisation and competition here to the United States.
The world is changing. US antitrust law used to be the only show in
town. I hope that what Europeans have done, written and said over the last 40 years has
done enough to persuade our American friends that the antitrust world is at least bipolar.
It may not have been until the Boeing/Mc Donnell Douglas merger case last year that
some people in this country realised just how true this is. The EU-US relationship in the
competition field has grown quickly into an excellent and successful model of bilateral
relations between like-minded authorities.
But the world is still changing. Followers of the Fordham programme
these last few years will have seen the emergence of many other nations taking an active
part in the world antitrust debate. Washington and Brussels are not alone. We should not
regret this, we should welcome it. There is great interest in competition policy in all
the continents of the world. The news from Genevas multilateral world of the WTO and
UNCTAD and from myriad bilateral and regional discussions is that there is enormous
interest in competition policy, from all parts of the world, including those countries
categorised as post-communist, emergent or developing. Competition policy is, I am tempted
to say, an idea whose time has come.
It is time to look up from our desks and contemplate the world beyond
our frontiers. We have often discussed here controversies about jurisdiction and the
constraints of international law made in and for other times and circumstances. We must
admit that we have not solved the problem of adapting laws made for domestic markets to
the realities of modern world trade in goods and services; still less have we developed a
system of antitrust laws fit for the challenges of the coming century. In addition to the
globalisation of the economy and the particular challenges facing the European Union
(economic and monetary union and a further, unprecedented enlargement), recent
developments in the world economy pose a different sort of challenge.
The antitrust community has a role to play in responding to the recent
economic crises in many parts of the world. If there is no crisis of capitalism in the
Marxist sense, there seems to be a crisis of economic systems built on a certain notion of
the free market but without the discipline, decentralisation and balance between private
endeavour and public service that competition policy as we understand it in Europe seeks
to promote. The very words used by analysts when describing features of the crisis
economies illustrate the point: oligopoly, oligarchy, cronyism....
I am not making extravagant moral claims for competition policy, but I
do suggest that, if properly implemented, it undermines some of the less savoury features
of the economies whose bubbles are bursting. Of course, competition policy is no guarantee
against recession, stock market crashes, corruption, fraud or organised crime. However, in
a competitive market, the commercial decisions most likely to prove successful are those
taken on the basis of economic analysis and judgment, not in pursuit of patronage,
preference or preferment. We should be advocating a role for competition policy in
reconstructing the economies in crisis. Then we can start to build a network of
competition among authorities all over the word, united around common international
standards, concentrating on the defence of competition in domestic markets and working
together to bring competition to world trade as well.
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