

euro-barometre

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

EURO-BAROMETER No 8

Initial results

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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
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AS WITH EARLIER POLLS IN THE EURO-BAROMETER SERIES THIS SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION WAS CARRIED OUT AT THE REQUEST OF THE DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INFORMATION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES.

IN OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1977 AN IDENTICAL SET OF QUESTIONS WAS PUT TO SOME 8 936 PEOPLE REPRESENTING A CROSS-SECTION OF THE POPULATION AGED 15 AND OVER IN THE NINE COMMUNITY COUNTRIES.

THE POLL WAS CONDUCTED BY EIGHT SPECIALIST INSTITUTES, ALL MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY. THE NAMES OF THE INSTITUTES AND RESEARCH SPECIALISTS ARE LISTED IN THE ANNEX TOGETHER WITH THE RELEVANT TECHNICAL DETAILS.

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PRACTICE FOR THIS TYPE OF SURVEY THE COMMISSION DISCLAIMS ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUESTIONS, RESULTS AND COMMENTARIES.

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I.

THE GENERAL MOOD OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC

An increasing number of countries, both inside and outside the Community, are now conducting regular opinion polls to find out how members of the public feel about their standard of living and what is now called "the quality of life". It has in fact been established that there is a very close tie between the views of individuals and groups on their respective situations, present, past and future, in all areas of human activity, and their general behaviour.

In addition to the Euro-Barometer series the European Commission has conducted a number of opinion polls in recent years to further research of this nature¹.

There is obviously no way in which the replies to a few questions can be considered to give a comprehensive picture of changes in the "subjective" views and expectations of individual members of the public, but it seemed worth repeating a number of questions asked in previous polls in an attempt to throw some light on the pattern of social and political attitudes just a few months before elections to the European Parliament.

Questions repeated in October/November 1977 covered:

- . satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the life we lead;
- . prospective changes in living standards over the next five years;
- . satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the way democracy works;
- . basic socio-political options: revolution, reform or defence against the forces of subversion;
- . relative risk of a third world war or an increase in civil disorder.

Two new questions were also asked in an attempt to gauge public attitudes towards movements concerned with environmental protection and women's liberation.

¹ These included the survey on Awareness of poverty in Europe (Brussels, March 1977) conducted at the request of the Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs as part of the programme to combat poverty. Part I on incomes and Part II on living standards are of particular interest.

1. THE LIFE WE LEAD

"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?"

This was the seventh poll in which this question had appeared since it was first asked in the autumn of 1973. Analysis of the findings of the 1973 poll showed that the answer constitutes a very important pointer in terms of social dynamics: the question itself is couched in such general terms that the answer conveys a sort of aggregate sentiment compounded of a series of specific satisfactions/dissatisfactions or, to put it another way, explicit or implicit comparisons between individual realities (work, leisure, income and so on) and corresponding aspirations.

The conclusions reached in respect of previous polls remain valid: little significant change in aggregate satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the passing of time; significant and persistent variations in the average levels of satisfaction recorded in the different countries; fairly consistent spread of satisfaction between the social groups within each country¹.

As in previous polls Denmark, followed by the other "smaller" Community countries, emerged as having a vast majority of "satisfied" and even "very satisfied" citizens. Germany is just above the average, while France is below and Italy well below. After a temporary fall-off in satisfaction in the second half of 1975 the United Kingdom has regained its 1973 pre-economic crisis level.

(See Tables 1 and 2)

¹See the following surveys published by the Commission of the European Communities:

- Satisfaction et insatisfaction quant aux conditions de vie dans les pays membres de la Communauté européenne (June 1974) (FR);
- Women and men in Europe (December 1975) (DE, EN, FR) pp. 137-150;
- Awareness of poverty in Europe (March 1977) (DE, EN, FR, IT, NL) pp. 35-74;
- Euro-Barometer No 7 (July 1977) pp. 2-4.

Table 1

SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH THE LIFE WE LEAD

(October/November 1977)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very satisfied	46	53	24	13	42	8	38	44	30	22
Fairly satisfied	44	41	61	60	47	54	51	48	57	57
Not very satisfied	6	5	12	19	6	27	9	5	10	15
Not at all satisfied	3	1	2	7	5	11	1	2	3	5
Don't know	1	.	1	1	.	.	1	1	.	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	3.34	3.45	3.07	2.81	3.26	2.60	3.27	3.35	3.16	2.97

¹ Average weighted by respective populations aged 15 and over.

² "Very satisfied" = 4, "fairly satisfied" = 3, "not very satisfied" = 2, "not satisfied at all" = 1; "don't knows" are not included.

Table 2

SATISFACTION WITH LIFE: RATING BY COUNTRY

(Change between 1973 and 1977)

Order	September 1973		1975 ¹		1976 ¹		1977 ¹	
1.	DK	95%	DK	90%	DK	93%	DK	95%
2.	N	93	B	89	B	90	N	92
3.	IRL	92	IRL	88	N	90	B	90
4.	B	92	N	86	IRL	88	L	89
5.	L	89	D	79	L	88	IRL	88
6.	GB	85	F	75	UK	83	UK	84
7.	D	82	L	72	D	81	D	83
8.	F	77	UK	71	F	71	F	71
9.	I	65	I	58	I	56	I	61
EC average		79		76		75		77

¹ Aggregate of results for both six-monthly polls.

A more detailed analysis of the results shows that on the whole the general feeling of satisfaction/dissatisfaction varies very little from one social group to another. Even the variables which would seem to have a slightly closer bearing on general satisfaction, such as the locality in which the contact lives (village, small or large town) and income bracket in particular, turned out to be much less decisive than nationality. On the other hand the higher the average level of dissatisfaction in the country as a whole, the more the degree of general satisfaction/dissatisfaction was conditioned by income bracket: this is demonstrated clearly in the case of Italy.

(See Tables 3 and 4)

Table 3

SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH THE LIFE WE LEAD
RELATED TO SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

	Satisfied		Dissatisfied		Don't know	Total	Index ¹
	++	+	-	--			
<u>Total</u>	22%	57%	15%	5%	1%	100%	2.97
<u>Sex and age</u>							
Men	20	58	16	5	1	100	2.95
aged:							
15-24	17	60	17	6	.	100	2.89
25-39	19	61	16	4	.	100	2.95
40-54	18	59	17	5	1	100	2.95
55 and over	26	52	16	5	1	100	3.01
Women	24	56	14	5	1	100	2.99
aged:							
15-24	24	56	13	6	1	100	3.00
25-39	23	57	15	4	1	100	3.00
40-54	22	58	14	5	1	100	2.98
55 and over	26	52	15	6	1	100	2.99
<u>Education</u> ²							
Elementary	21	55	17	6	1	100	2.92
Average	24	59	13	4	.	100	3.03
Advanced	23	58	14	4	1	100	3.00
<u>Area lived in</u> ³							
Village	24	57	13	5	1	100	3.01
Small town	24	55	16	4	1	100	3.00
Large town	18	57	17	7	1	100	2.87
<u>Income</u> ⁴							
Modest	21	49	21	8	1	100	2.83
Below average	20	56	17	6	1	100	2.91
Above average	20	59	16	4	1	100	2.96
Well off	25	60	12	3	.	100	3.07

Table 3 (contd)

	++	+	-	--	Don't know	Total	Index
<u>Leadership rating</u> ⁵							
Non-leaders (--)	21	56	16	6	1	100	2.92
(-)	23	57	15	4	1	100	3.00
(+)	22	59	15	4	.	100	2.98
Leaders (++)	25	52	15	7	1	100	2.95

¹See footnote 1 to Table 1.

²Based on age on completion of full-time education: at least 15 but under 16, 16 to 19, 20 and over (or still studying).

³Based on category selected by contact.

⁴Grouped on the basis of the breakdown of income in each country: far below average; not quite so low but still below average; near average; above average. In the Community as a whole the above categories accounted respectively for 22%, 19%, 32% and 27% of contacts revealing their family income (i.e. 82% of all those interviewed).

⁵Index produced by combining the answers to two questions, one on frequency of political discussions and the other on capacity to persuade others. See Euro-Barometer No 7, p. 10.

Distribution of the population interviewed by leadership rating is approximately as follows:

		Aggregate of polls May and Oct./Nov. 1975		Aggregate of polls May and Nov. 1976		Aggregate of polls April/May and Oct./Nov. 1977	
		%	Number (N)	%	Number (N)	%	Number (N)
Leaders	++	13	2427	14	2514	13	2361
	+	29	5446	29	5228	31	5547
	-	31	5892	32	5584	34	6171
Non-leaders	--	27	4995	25	4519	22	3967
<u>Total</u>		<u>100</u>	<u>18 760</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>17 845</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>18 046</u>

Table 4
SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH THE LIFE WE LEAD
RELATED TO FAMILY INCOME

(By country: October/November 1977)¹

	Very or fairly satisfied	Not very or not at all satisfied	Index ²
DANMARK	94%	6%	3.45
R --	92	8	3.30
R -	94	5	3.46
R +	96	4	3.50
R ++	96	4	3.55
Difference between two extremes	4	4	0.25
NEDERLAND	92%	7%	3.35
R --	91	9	3.28
R -	91	9	3.24
R +	93	5	3.40
R ++	93	6	3.43
Difference between two extremes	2	3	0.15
BELGIQUE/BELGIE	90%	9%	3.34
R --	83	14	3.19
R -	88	12	3.20
R +	91	8	3.40
R ++	95	4	3.54
Difference between two extremes	12	10	0.35
LUXEMBOURG ³	89%	10%	3.27
R --	(76)	(18)	(3.17)
R -	(87)	(13)	(3.16)
R +	(92)	(8)	(3.33)
R ++	(96)	(4)	(3.44)
Difference between two extremes	(20)	(14)	(0.27)
IRELAND	89%	11%	3.26
R --	83	17	3.17
R -	86	13	3.24
R +	91	9	3.26
R ++	90	10	3.33
Difference between two extremes	7	7	0.16

Table 4 (contd)

	Very or fairly satisfied	Not very or not at all satisfied	Index
UNITED KINGDOM	87%	13%	3.16
R --	84	16	3.13
R -	84	16	3.09
R +	87	12	3.14
R ++	93	6	3.28
Difference between two extremes	9	10	0.15
DEUTSCHLAND	85%	14%	3.07
R --	74	25	2.91
R -	86	13	3.08
R +	87	12	3.09
R ++	87	12	3.12
Difference between two extremes	13	13	0.21
FRANCE	73%	26%	2.81
R --	68	32	2.74
R -	64	32	2.67
R +	74	25	2.78
R ++	79	21	2.88
Difference between two extremes	11	11	0.14
ITALIA	62%	38%	2.60
R --	44	56	2.31
R -	61	39	2.57
R +	66	34	2.67
R ++	74	26	2.77
Difference between two extremes	30	30	0.46

¹ Countries listed by average value of satisfaction index.

² See footnote 1 to Table 1.

³ Breakdown of results must be interpreted with caution owing to the size of the sample (N = 344).

2. EXPECTED TREND IN LIVING STANDARDS

"Do you think that your everyday conditions will improve over the next five years or not? A lot or a little?"

This question is very different from the previous one, firstly in that it refers to "everyday conditions", a concept much less vague than "the life you lead", and secondly in that it involves a look into the future, an advance assessment of what might happen over the next five years.

Top of the optimists' league in the autumn of 1977 were Ireland and the United Kingdom with Germany in third place. Denmark and Italy, at opposite ends of the satisfaction/dissatisfaction with life scale, share a relatively rosy view of what life has in store. Optimists are also in the majority elsewhere, although unease was expressed by the Dutch, the French and the Belgians in alarming proportions.

(See Table 5)

By comparison with the spring of 1976, when the same question was last asked, there has been an increase in optimistic replies in all countries with the exception of Belgium.

The difference between the number of optimistic and pessimistic replies, or in other words "net optimism", has increased significantly in the United Kingdom over the last year and a half.

(See Table 6)

Table 5

IMPROVEMENT OR DETERIORATION IN LIVING STANDARDS
OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

(October/November 1977)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Think living standards:										
will improve a lot	11	11	8	8	20	7	10	8	20	11
will improve a little	28	39	49	37	53	47	39	24	45	43
will get a little worse	18	22	13	23	11	22	27	20	12	17
will get a lot worse	12	3	2	8	3	5	6	6	3	5
Can't make up mind	21	19	26	16	11	15	13	36	15	19
Don't know	10	6	2	8	2	4	5	6	5	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.55	2.77	2.87	2.60	3.04	2.68	2.65	2.60	3.02	2.78

¹Weighted average.

²"Yes, will improve a lot" = 4; "will get a lot worse" = 1.

Table 6

TREND IN OPTIMISM/PESSIMISM
ABOUT THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING STANDARDS¹

	May/June 1976			October/November 1977		
	Think living standards will:		Diffe- rence	Think living standards will:		Diffe- rence
	improve	get worse		improve	get worse	
Ireland	66%	20%	+46	73%	14%	+59
United Kingdom	55	24	+31	65	15	+50
Deutschland	49	18	+31	57	15	+42
France	46	27	+19	45	31	+14
Luxembourg	44	19	+25	49	33	+16
Italia	41	25	+16	54	27	+27
Belgique/België	39	27	+12	39	30	+ 9
Danmark	34	- ²	- ²	50	25	+25
Nederland	25	35	-10	32	26	+ 6

¹ Countries listed by relative frequency of optimistic replies in May/June 1976.

² Owing to an error in the wording of the reply codes these results are not available.

Expectations with regard to living standards would seem to be conditioned primarily by age and, to a lesser extent, by income: the older a person is and/or the lower his/her income, the more pessimistic he or she tends to be about the future. (See Table 7)

Attitudes towards the future are further conditioned by feelings about the present: pessimism tends to be more widespread among the ranks of the dissatisfied than the satisfied. (See Table 8)

In other words by analysing the replies to both questions (satisfaction/dissatisfaction and optimism/pessimism) it is possible to divide contacts into four categories¹.

	Optimists	Pessimists
Satisfied	I (45%)	II (14%)
Dissatisfied	III (8%)	IV (8%)

Subsequent surveys should quite clearly concentrate on category IV, the "dissatisfied pessimists", which accounts for 8% of the population in the Community as a whole, ranging from under 5% in the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland to 11% in France and 14% in Italy.

(See Table 9)

¹"Can't make up minds" and "don't knows" (25%) are not included.

Table 7

EXPECTED TREND IN LIVING STANDARDS OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS
RELATED TO SEX, AGE AND INCOME

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

	Optimists		Pessimists		Can't make up mind or don't know	Total	Index ¹
	++	+	-	--			
Total	11%	43%	17%	5%	24%	100%	2.78
<u>Sex and age</u>							
Men	12	43	18	6	21	100	2.78
aged:							
15-24	24	51	8	3	14	100	3.12
25-39	15	51	15	4	15	100	2.92
40-54	9	42	20	7	22	100	2.68
55 and over	4	31	26	8	31	100	2.45
Women	9	43	17	4	27	100	2.79
aged:							
15-24	22	52	9	3	14	100	3.08
25-39	12	49	14	2	23	100	2.92
40-54	5	44	17	4	30	100	2.70
55 and over	3	30	23	7	37	100	2.45
<u>Income</u>							
Modest	6	31	24	7	32	100	2.53
Below average	8	44	18	4	26	100	2.74
Above average	10	48	16	5	21	100	2.81
Well off	14	49	15	3	19	100	2.91

¹ See footnote 2 to Table 5.

Table 8

EXPECTED TREND IN LIVING STANDARDS OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS
RELATED TO SATISFACTION WITH THE LIFE WE LEAD

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

	Optimists		Pessimists		Can't make up mind or don't know	Total	Index ²
	++	+	-	--			
Total	11%	43%	17%	5%	24%	100%	2.78
For every 100 who claim to be:							
Very satisfied	15	43	12	2	28	100	2.98
Fairly satisfied	10	47	17	2	24	100	2.84
Not very satisfied	8	36	26	10	20	100	2.52
Not at all satisfied	9	23	26	24	18	100	2.20

²See footnote 2 to Table 5.

Table 9
SATISFACTION/DISSATISFACTION AND OPTIMISM/PESSIMISM
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY¹

(For every 100 interviewed)

		<u>Optimists</u>		<u>Pessimists</u>	
NEDERLAND (N = 943)	Satisfied	30%	(279)	23%	(216)
	Dissatisfied	4%	(25)	3%	(26)
DANMARK (N = 992)	Satisfied	51%	(473)	22%	(221)
	Dissatisfied	2%	(23)	3%	(29)
UNITED KINGDOM (N = 1351)	Satisfied	58%	(786)	11%	(153)
	Dissatisfied	6%	(79)	4%	(52)
IRELAND (N = 997)	Satisfied	67%	(674)	9%	(88)
	Dissatisfied	5%	(48)	5%	(48)
DEUTSCHLAND (N = 999)	Satisfied	50%	(502)	9%	(94)
	Dissatisfied	6%	(61)	5%	(53)
BELGIQUE/BELGIE (N = 1006)	Satisfied	38%	(379)	25%	(248)
	Dissatisfied	1%	(13)	6%	(56)
LUXEMBOURG (N = 344)	Satisfied	47%	(160)	26%	(88)
	Dissatisfied	3%	(9)	6%	(22)
FRANCE (N = 1149)	Satisfied	35%	(403)	19%	(222)
	Dissatisfied	10%	(113)	11%	(131)
ITALIA (N = 1155)	Satisfied	38%	(439)	13%	(148)
	Dissatisfied	16%	(181)	14%	(165)

¹ Countries listed by relative frequency of dissatisfied/pessimistic replies from interviewees as a whole. The figures in brackets show the basis on which calculations were carried out, viz. the number of interviewees falling into each of the four categories.

"Can't make up minds" and "don't knows" are not included.

3. THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS

"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (in your country)?"

As with the very first question in the poll the answer to this question constitutes an important pointer in terms of social and political dynamics. But despite the positive correlation between satisfaction with life and satisfaction with the way democracy works or, in other words, the political system, the second of the two has relatively little to do with the quality of life and develops differently.

Once again the smaller countries were among the most satisfied, but for the third time running it was Germany which headed the list, with almost 80% of its population "very satisfied" or "fairly satisfied", having risen from a mere sixth place (44% satisfied) in the autumn of 1973. Over the same period Britain jumped from eighth to sixth position (62% satisfied as compared with 44%). France was still second from the bottom, although its overall score increased very slightly. It is the Italians who are least satisfied with their political system, although the curve here rose in the autumn of 1977 (19%) from the all-time low recorded in the spring of the same year (12%); however, it still falls short of the level recorded in September 1973 (27%).

(See Tables 10 and 11)

Table 10

SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS

(October/November 1977)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very satisfied	8	10	9	5	12	1	24	9	8	6
Fairly satisfied	43	57	69	44	57	18	44	55	54	48
Not very satisfied	18	24	16	29	16	45	20	26	21	26
Not at all satisfied	10	6	2	11	6	33	4	6	9	13
Don't know	21	3	4	11	9	3	8	4	8	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.62	2.73	2.89	2.48	2.84	1.87	2.95	2.70	2.66	2.51

¹Weighted average.

²"Very satisfied" = 4; "not at all satisfied" = 1.

Table 11

SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS:
RATING BY COUNTRY

(Change between 1973 and 1977)

Order	September 1973		Oct./Nov. 1976		April/May 1977		Oct./Nov. 1977	
1.	B	62%	D	79%	D	78%	D	78%
2.	IRL	55	N	67	L	71	IRL	69
3.	L	52	IRL	59	N	67	L	68
4.	N	52	L	55	DK	63	DK	67
5.	DK	45	DK	55	IRL	62	N	64
6.	D	44	B	53	UK	58	UK	62
7.	GB	44	UK -----	51	B	56	B	51
8.	F	41	F	42	F	45	F	49
9.	I	27	I	14	I	12	I	19
EC average		42		51		51		54

Is it then possible to identify exactly who are satisfied and who are dissatisfied with the way democracy works? None of the criteria normally used in this type of analysis (sex, age, level of education, income bracket, and so on) appears to have a direct bearing. Admittedly, the "very dissatisfied" ratio is higher among opinion leaders, but the link is tenuous, except in Italy, and does not apply in Germany, where the trend is reversed, the degree of satisfaction with the social and political scene being at least as high among opinion leaders as among the general public. In an attempt to come to grips with the public's attitude towards the system (or the political set-up, or the government in power as the case may be) it is necessary to carry out a series of more detailed analyses based on deeply-rooted personal ideologies or "systems of values"¹.

This also involves analysing the pattern of replies to another question, sufficiently sensitive to make it a highly reliable indicator of existing tensions (as well as a potential pointer to future conflicts).

¹ The term "values" is used here to indicate basic personal attitudes and ideologies reflecting experience acquired in the past and influencing choices to be made in the present, providing greater insight into problems to be dealt with and conditioning behaviour by providing justification and motivation for action; by comparison with attitudes to current issues, particularly on the social and political fronts, these values are more vital, more central, more durable and more comprehensive.

Works on this subject include:

- John P. Robinson and Phillip R. Shaver: Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, Institute for Social Research, 1969) p. 410.
- J.R. Rabier: Satisfaction et insatisfaction quant aux conditions de vie dans les pays de la Communauté européenne (Brussels 1974) p. 59.
- Ronald Inglehart: The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton University Press, 1977) pp. 29, 139-148.

4. REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, REFORM OR DEFENCE AGAINST THE FORCES OF SUBVERSION

"On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-à-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion.

- The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action.
- Our society must be gradually improved by reform.
- Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces."

Analysis of the answers would seem to confirm the sensitivity of this indicator of social and political tensions, as well as its value in describing and explaining basic attitudes towards society, especially as we are able to compare answers given in six of the Community countries right back to 1970.

"Revolutionary action" is still very much a minority option and would seem to be losing what little support it has: in Italy it polled 10% as against 13% in November 1976 and in France 8% as against 14% in April/May 1977.

The diametrically opposed option, namely "defence against subversion", continues to gain ground but at a slower rate. However, it is worth pointing out that in Germany five in every ten and in Denmark four in every ten were in favour of this approach.

The "reformist" option is still supported by the majority in all countries except Germany, where it has been systematically declining since early 1970 falling from 70% to 41%. The pattern which has emerged over the past few years would suggest that this "reformist consensus" is being threatened both by the small but active group of revolutionaries and by the protagonists of the established order, stalwart pillars of society, doubtless motivated in turn by the actual or alleged influence of the opposite camp.

(See Table 12 and Graph 1)

It would obviously be rash to make any attempt to predict future developments, but a fairly detailed analysis of what goes to make up social and political attitudes could well throw some light on the matter.

Table 12

BASIC ATTITUDE TO SOCIAL CHANGE BY COUNTRY

(Change between 1970 and 1977)


	B	D	F	I	L	N	EC (The Six) ¹	DK	IRL	UK	EC (The Nine) ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
"The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action" ¹											
February/March 1970	3	2	5	7	1	6	5				
November 1976	5	2	13	13	2	5	9	4	7	7	8
April/May 1977	6	2	14	11	3	5	8	3	5	8	8
October/November 1977	4	2	8	10	4	4	6	3	7	6	6
"Our society must be gradually improved by reforms" ²											
February/March 1970	69	70	78	73	65	75	73				
November 1976	65	52	64	66	49	56	59	51	60	60	60
April/May 1977	66	43	62	58	56	58	55	52	61	59	55
October/November 1977	60	41	65	61	55	55	55	55	54	55	55
"Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces"											
February/March 1970	14	20	12	11	27	15	15				
November 1976	19	39	18	18	32	32	26	38	23	25	26
April/May 1977	18	48	19	28	32	32	32	39	26	26	31
October/November 1977	19	50	22	27	28	37	34	40	26	28	32
Don't know											
February/March 1970	14	8	5	9	7	4	7				
November 1976	11	7	5	3	17	7	6	7	10	8	6
April/May 1977	10	7	5	3	9	5	5	6	8	7	6
October/November 1977	17	7	5	2	13	4	5	2	13	11	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹Weighted average.

²1970: "by intelligent reforms".

Graphique No 1/Graph 1

ATTITUDES FONDAMENTALES A L'EGARD DE LA SOCIETE/
BASIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIETY



(1) Non réponses exclues / "don't knows" not included.

As the previous survey showed¹, answers to this question were affected very little by sex, age, income and education: young people of both sexes and those with a higher level of education were slightly more inclined to opt for revolution, while older people and those with a lower level of education were more inclined to opt for defence against the forces of subversion.

Generally speaking, there was a positive correlation between leadership rating (and by extension political commitment) and support for revolution, while the desire to protect society against the forces of subversion tended to be more widespread among non-leaders. But even this is not true for all countries, as can be seen from Table 13, which gives a breakdown of replies by country and leadership rating².

The "reformist" option, most popular in all countries except Germany, was more common among opinion leaders than the general public in Denmark, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.

The "revolutionary" option, supported by a very small minority, was more popular among opinion leaders in France, Italy and Denmark.

Support for "defence against subversion", a sort of "populist" option, was more widespread among the general public in all countries; this was particularly true in the case of Denmark. (See Table 13)

Looking at the pattern to emerge over the last twelve months, i.e. since the autumn 1976 poll, we can see that the only significant changes are the drop in the number of revolutionaries among opinion leaders in France (from 24% to 14%) and the increase in the number of supporters of "defence against subversion", likewise among opinion leaders, in Germany (up from 33% to 50%). (See Table 14)

There is little point in analysing these changes in depth in view of the size of the samples, but they do bear out the need to distinguish where possible between movements of opinion involving mainly leaders, i.e. those who tend to be more sensitive to "changes in climate", and those involving the general public.

¹ See Euro-Barometer No 7, July 1977, pp. 13 and 14.

² To make it easier to interpret the results, the four leadership ratings have been reduced to two: non-leaders (--) and (-) and leaders (+) and (++).

Table 13

BASIC ATTITUDE TO SOCIAL CHANGE
BY LEADERSHIP RATING¹

(October/November 1977: "Don't knows" are not included)

Country	Reforms	Defence against the forces of subversion	Revolutionary action
BELGIQUE/BELGIE	<u>73%</u> non-leaders 68 leaders 78	<u>22%</u> <u>26</u> 18	<u>5%</u> 6 4
FRANCE	<u>69%</u> non-leaders 70 leaders 67	<u>23%</u> <u>26</u> 19	<u>8%</u> 4 <u>14</u>
LUXEMBOURG	<u>63%</u> non-leaders 64 leaders 62	<u>33%</u> 32 33	<u>4%</u> 4 5
IRELAND	<u>62%</u> non-leaders 62 leaders 61	<u>30%</u> 31 29	<u>8%</u> 7 10
ITALIA	<u>62%</u> non-leaders 61 leaders 63	<u>28%</u> <u>31</u> 23	<u>10%</u> 8 14
UNITED KINGDOM	<u>62%</u> non-leaders 61 leaders 62	<u>32%</u> 31 33	<u>6%</u> 8 5
NEDERLAND	<u>57%</u> non-leaders 53 leaders 59	<u>39%</u> <u>42</u> 37	<u>4%</u> 5 4
DANMARK	<u>56%</u> non-leaders 50 leaders 62	<u>41%</u> <u>49</u> 32	<u>3%</u> 1 <u>6</u>
DEUTSCHLAND	<u>44%</u> non-leaders 41 leaders 48	<u>54%</u> <u>57</u> 50	<u>2%</u> 2 2

¹ Countries listed by relative frequency of "reformist" replies.

Table 14

BASIC ATTITUDE TO SOCIAL CHANGE
BY LEADERSHIP RATING¹

(October/November 1976: "Don't knows" are not included)

Country	Reforms		Defence against the forces of subversion		Revolutionary action	
BELGIQUE/BELGIE	<u>73%</u>	non-leaders 71	<u>22%</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>5%</u>	4
		leaders 76		17		7
FRANCE	<u>67%</u>	non-leaders 72	<u>19%</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>14%</u>	7
		leaders 62		14		<u>24</u>
LUXEMBOURG	<u>59%</u>	non-leaders 58	<u>39%</u>	41	<u>2%</u>	1
		leaders 59		37		4
IRELAND	<u>67%</u>	non-leaders 65	<u>25%</u>	26	<u>8%</u>	9
		leaders 69		24		7
ITALIA	<u>68%</u>	non-leaders 70	<u>19%</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>13%</u>	8
		leaders 65		15		<u>20</u>
UNITED KINGDOM	<u>65%</u>	non-leaders 65	<u>27%</u>	28	<u>8%</u>	7
		leaders 64		28		8
NEDERLAND	<u>61%</u>	non-leaders 59	<u>34%</u>	34	<u>5%</u>	7
		leaders 61		35		4
DANMARK	<u>55%</u>	non-leaders 54	<u>41%</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>4%</u>	2
		leaders 57		36		7
DEUTSCHLAND	<u>56%</u>	non-leaders 50	<u>42%</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>2%</u>	2
		leaders 64		33		3

¹ Countries listed in the same order as in Table 13 to facilitate comparison.

Is it possible to go any further and attempt to analyse the exact significance of the specific individual in a specific political setting supporting one of the three options rather than either of the two others?

We would not claim to do exactly that but analysis does show that this basic socio-political attitude is conditioned more by satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the way democracy works than by satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with life in general, and that there is no significant link with expected changes in living standards. It is not surprising that the majority of protagonists of revolutionary action tend to be extreme leftists; however, the opposite is not true as those in favour of defence against the forces of subversion are no more to the right than the population in general. Basic ideologies, however, play an important part: 20% of the supporters of revolutionary action were "post-materialists" as compared with 8% of contacts, in general and a mere 3% of supporters of "defence against subversion"¹.

(See Table 14a)

In short, pending further analysis, the forms of action chosen with a view to changing society would seem to reflect both deeply-rooted personal philosophies (value systems, political ideologies and so on) and reactions to current economic climates. They are also strongly influenced by age, but these differences may well even out in the long term (with the "passing of youth"); on the other hand, this generation gap may well have a strong bearing on social dynamics.

Be that as it may, a systematic and detailed investigation of this indicator is strongly recommended in each of the countries concerned.

¹The value systems used here as explanatory variables reflect two opposing views of life: that of the "materialists", whose main concern is to preserve the status quo (material possessions and security), and that of the "post-materialists", who are more concerned with what is generally called "the quality of life". For details of how this index was produced, see Euro-Barometer No 7, pp. 15 and 16, and La perception de la misère en Europe (Brussels 1977) pp. 111-123.

Table 14a

BASIC ATTITUDE TO SOCIAL CHANGE
SEARCH FOR EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

Total For every 100 who opted for: revolution reform defence against forces of subversion	1. Satisfaction with the life we lead					
	Satisfied		Dissatisfied		Don't know	Total
	++	+	-	--		
	22%	57%	15%	5%	1%	100%
	16%	41%	23%	19%	1%	100%
	21	58	16	4	1	100
Total For every 100 who opted for: revolution reform defence against forces of subversion	2. Trend in living standards over next five years					
	Will improve		Will get worse		Can't make up mind or don't know	Total
	a lot	a little	a little	a lot		
	11%	43%	17%	5%	24%	100%
	18%	37%	18%	13%	14%	100%
	11	45	18	4	22	100
Total For every 100 who opted for: revolution reform defence against forces of subversion	3. Satisfaction with the way democracy works					
	Satisfied		Dissatisfied		Don't know	Total
	++	+	-	--		
	6%	48%	26%	13%	7%	100%
	3%	17%	31%	46%	3%	100%
	5	49	30	11	5	100
Total For every 100 who opted for: revolution reform defence against forces of subversion	9	53	23	10	5	100

Table 14a (contd)

		4. Position on political spectrum based on personal assessment (1 = left, 10 = right)					
		Left (1-3)	Centre (4-7)	Right (8-10)	Don't know	Total	Mean score
Total		16%	56%	17%	11%	100%	5.52
For every 100 who opted for:							
revolution		<u>46%</u>	31%	12%	11%	100%	<u>3.91</u>
reform		18	58	14	10	100	5.32
defence against forces of subversion		9	59	25	7	100	<u>6.14</u>
		5. "Materialist" or "post-materialist" system of values					
		Materialist	A bit of both	Post- materialist	Don't know	Total	
Total		41%	45%	8%	6%	100%	
For every 100 who opted for:							
revolution		23%	52%	<u>20%</u>	5%	100%	
reform		38	48	10	4	100	
defence against forces of subversion		47	43	3	7	100	

¹ This index is produced by combining the answers to a question on priority action for the next ten years. The following alternatives were offered: maintenance of law and order, giving people more say in government decisions, fighting rising prices and protecting freedom of expression. (See Euro-Barometer No 7, pp. 15 and 16)

5. RELATIVE RISK OF A THIRD WORLD WAR OR AN INCREASE IN SOCIAL TENSIONS
LEADING TO CIVIL DISORDER

"Here is a sort of scale. Would you, with the help of this card, tell me how you assess the chances of a world war breaking out in the next ten years?"

<u>World war within the next ten years</u>	100
	90
	80
	70
	60
	50
	40
	30
	20
	10
<u>No danger of war in next ten years</u>	0"

"And now, using this scale, could you indicate to me to what extent you think there is a danger over the next ten years of an increase in tensions in (your country) leading to actual civil disorder?"

<u>Civil disorder certain</u>	100
	90
	80
	70
	60
	50
	40
	30
	20
	10
<u>No danger of civil disorder</u>	0"

The first of these two questions was asked as far back as July 1971 but only in the six countries which were then Community members. The second question is new as the wording used in 1971 was "risk of a serious economic crisis".

The first point to emerge is that in all the countries concerned the risk of an increase in social tensions leading to civil disorder was considered much higher than the risk of a third world war. On average, in the Community as a whole, 32% of those interviewed felt that there was no danger of a further outbreak of war, while only 9% felt the same about civil disorder; conversely, 24% felt that a world war was more likely to break out than not, while 54% foresaw the possibility of civil disorder.

Fears on the war front were most widespread in the Netherlands and least widespread in Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland.

On the civil disorder front Italy and the Netherlands again were the most pessimistic.

(See Tables 15 and 16)

Since 1971 awareness of the likelihood of an outbreak of war has increased slightly in all the countries involved in the survey, but especially Belgium and the Netherlands. As far as civil disorder is concerned there are no figures for 1971 but there is evidence of a slight upward trend in the awareness of internal problems.

(See Tables 17 and 18)

Table 15

ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK OF A THIRD WORLD WAR
IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS

(October/November 1977)

		B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
World war certain	100	3,3	3,2	1,8	2,3	2,6	2,7	1,7	1,9	3,6	2,6
	90)										
	to)	14,2	5,6	10,3	10,1	10,1	11,2	8,4	14,5	8,5	10,3
	60)										
	50	11,5	9,5	9,3	14,2	10,7	8,8	15,7	19,0	10,0	11,0
	40)										
	to)	29,7	19,1	49,5	33,3	25,2	35,7	33,1	45,1	27,0	36,5
	10)										
No danger of world war	0	26,9	47,9	21,0	28,1	46,1	38,6	32,3	16,5	44,6	32,1
Don't know		14,5	14,6	8,0	11,9	5,1	3,0	8,7	2,9	6,2	7,4
Total		100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Index ²		3.03	1.85	2.72	2.76	2.24	2.38	2.53	3.41	2.21	2.57

¹Weighted average.

²Calculated on the basis of the ten-point codes listed on the cards shown to contacts. "Don't knows" are not included.

Table 16

ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK OF AN INCREASE IN SOCIAL TENSIONS
LEADING TO CIVIL DISORDER IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS

(October/November 1977)

		B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Civil disorder	100	3,1	5,6	3,7	3,8	4,8	9,7	1,2	4,0	8,5	6,1
certain	90										
	to	28,9	14,9	27,8	27,8	19,6	39,3	16,2	37,2	26,4	30,2
	60										
	50	14,7	15,5	17,5	21,7	15,1	14,5	16,9	20,3	15,9	17,3
	40										
	to	25,0	30,3	41,0	30,1	25,8	26,3	31,9	32,2	28,2	31,5
	10										
No danger of civil	0	14,5	22,8	5,2	6,1	27,8	7,7	27,0	4,6	16,3	9,3
disorder											
Don't know		13,8	10,7	4,7	10,4	6,7	2,7	6,7	1,9	4,6	5,7
Total		100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Index ²		4.38	3.52	4.54	4.80	3.57	5.47	3.10	5.14	4.55	4.79

¹Weighted average.

²Calculated on the basis of the ten-point codes listed on the cards shown to contacts. "Don't knows" are not included.

Table 17

ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK OF A THIRD WORLD WAR
IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS

(The Six: Change between 1971 and 1977)

Probability	B		D		F		I		L		N	
	1971	1977	1971	1977	1971	1977	1971	1977	1971	1977	1971	1977
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
100	2,0	3,3	0,6	1,8	2,0	2,3	3,5	2,7	1,0	1,7	1,0	1,9
90)												
to)	5,0	14,2	9,7	10,3	8,0	10,1	8,8	11,2	5,0	8,4	8,0	14,5
60)												
50	8,0	11,5	10,9	9,3	13,0	14,2	7,0	8,8	13,0	15,7	13,0	19,0
40)												
to)	31,0	29,7	40,5	49,5	30,0	33,3	33,2	35,7	23,0	33,1	37,0	45,1
10)												
0	40,0	26,9	30,4	21,0	32,0	28,1	37,7	38,6	42,0	32,3	27,0	16,5
Don't know	14,0	14,5	8,0	8,0	15,0	11,9	9,8	3,0	16,0	8,7	14,0	2,9
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Index ¹	1.86	3.03	2.44	2.72	2.47	2.76	2.34	2.38	1.95	2.53	2.38	3.41

¹ See footnote 2 to Table 15.

Table 18

ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK OF A SERIOUS ECONOMIC CRISIS
IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS

(The Six: July 1971)

Probability	B	D	F	I	L	N	EURO 6 ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
100	4,0	4,4	5,0	7,5	3,0	3,0	5,3
90)							
to)	26,0	31,2	30,0	34,4	17,0	27,0	31,3
60)							
50	16,0	18,3	20,0	13,8	27,0	18,0	17,4
40)							
to)	31,0	30,6	21,0	26,5	23,0	33,0	27,1
10)							
0	10,0	9,1	6,0	6,1	15,0	5,0	7,2
Don't know	13,0	6,4	18,0	11,7	15,0	14,0	11,9
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Index ²	4.45	4.78	5.24	5.39	4.06	4.72	5.05

¹Weighted average.

²See footnote 2 to Table 16.

Fear of an outbreak of war or civil disorder seems slightly more common among women than men, and among the ranks of the better educated (students included) than other members of the public. The attitude to be found among the female intelligentsia, call it concern, anxiety or "Angst", will be investigated at a later date.

(See Table 19)

A further point to emerge is that the advocates of revolutionary action as a means to social change¹ are much more aware than their fellow citizens of the danger of an outbreak of war and/or civil disorder in the years ahead².

(See Table 20)

¹ See pp. 19-27.

² The demonstration of a positive correlation between two variables does not necessarily mean that the relation between the two is causal.

Table 19

ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK OF WAR OR CIVIL DISORDER
RELATED TO SEX AND EDUCATION

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

Index ³	Total men and women	Men				Women			
		Total men	Education			Total women	Education		
			Elementary	Average	Advanced		Elementary	Average	Advanced
Awareness of risk of war	2.57	2.44	2.38	2.41	<u>2.61</u>	2.69	2.60	2.73	<u>2.93</u>
Awareness of risk of civil disorder	4.79	4.64	4.56	4.60	<u>4.87</u>	4.93	4.67	5.00	<u>5.39</u>

³ See footnote 2 to Table 16.

Table 20

ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK OF WAR OR CIVIL DISORDER
RELATED TO CHOICE OF ACTION AS A MEANS TO SOCIAL CHANGE

(October/November 1977)

Country	Reform	Defence against forces of subversion	Revolutionary action
B	war	3.06	4.13
	civil disorder	4.52	5.40
DK	war	1.77	3.61
	civil disorder	3.35	7.00
D	war	2.62	(3.94)
	civil disorder	4.63	(5.39)
F	war	2.56	3.65
	civil disorder	4.65	6.47
IRL	war	2.17	2.33
	civil disorder	3.57	4.41
I	war	2.12	3.06
	civil disorder	5.20	6.60
L	war	(2.61)	(2.36)
	civil disorder	(3.35)	(2.55)
N	war	3.30	3.82
	civil disorder	5.01	6.10
UK	war	2.22	2.71
	civil disorder	4.39	5.10
EC	war	2.43	3.30
	civil disorder	4.69	6.04
% support for each option in EC as whole "Don't knows" not included		59%	35%
			6%

6. VIEWS ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND WOMEN'S LIBERATION

The last few years have seen the birth and growth of two categories of socio-political movements preaching social change: the first advocates the liberation of women and the second the protection of the environment.

Euro-Barometer was the first opinion poll in which questions on these issues were put to members of the public simultaneously in several countries.

"What is your opinion of the movements which have come about recently and whose aim is the protection of the environment, the struggle against pollution, protection of the countryside, etc. Very high opinion, quite good opinion, rather poor opinion or very poor opinion?"

"What is your opinion of the movements which have come about recently and whose aim is the liberation of women? Very high opinion, quite good opinion, rather poor opinion, very bad opinion?"¹

In all Community countries movements for the protection of the environment are undoubtedly more highly rated by the general public, men and women alike, than women's lib movements. Between six and nine of every ten interviewed (on average 78%) had a high opinion of them, as compared with four to six in every ten (46% on average) in the case of women's lib. The difference in popularity rating between the two movements was slightly higher in Denmark where feelings towards the "ecologists" are very warm (95%) and slightly less high in Ireland where support is less whole-hearted (64% of the general public are still in favour).

(See Table 21)

It is not possible to conclude all that much merely from examining the average frequency of replies in each country, but it is interesting to note that Luxembourg, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands occupy the top four places on the supporters' table for both movements while the United Kingdom is second bottom in the one and bottom in the other.

(See Table 22)

All the above results are given in Table 23, but to have a really clear picture of the situation it would be necessary to analyse them in greater detail.

¹The two questions were kept apart in the questionnaire to avoid biasing the answers.

Table 21

OPINIONS IN FAVOUR OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND WOMEN'S LIBERATION
BY SEX AND COUNTRY

(October/November 1977)

	Very high or quite good opinion				Difference	
	Environmental protection		Women's liberation			
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Belgique/België	81%	77%	56%	55%	25	22
Danmark	94	95	48	52	46	43
Deutschland	80	78	35	41	45	37
France	78	84	55	57	23	27
Ireland	64	64	43	47	21	17
Italia	78	79	44	46	34	33
Luxembourg	91	92	54	67	37	25
Nederland	80	86	59	62	21	24
United Kingdom	74	71	43	41	31	30
Community	78%	79%	45%	47%	33	32

Table 22

VIEWS ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND WOMEN'S LIBERATION:
RATING BY COUNTRY¹

(October/November 1977)

Order	Environmental protection		Women's liberation	
1.	DK	3.67	L	2.88
2.	L	3.60	B	2.83
3.	B	3.41	N	2.70
4.	N	3.26	DK	2.66
5.	I	3.19	F	2.64
6.	--- D ---	3.16 ---	IRL	2.55
7.	F	3.12	D	2.51
8.	UK	3.05	I	2.43
9.	IRL	2.92	UK	2.40
EC average		3.16		2.52

¹The index is worked out by applying the coefficient four, three, two or one to the replies "very high opinion", "quite good opinion", "rather poor opinion" and "very poor opinion" respectively. "Don't knows" are not included.

Table 23

VIEWS ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
WOMEN'S LIBERATION

(October/November 1977)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>Environmental protection</u>										
Very high	46	70	29	25	19	32	63	42	23	30
Quite good	33	25	50	56	45	46	28	42	49	48
Rather poor	7	2	10	9	16	9	4	10	13	10
Very poor	2	1	2	3	5	3	1	3	3	3
Don't know	12	2	9	7	15	10	4	3	12	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	3.41	3.67	3.16	3.12	2.92	3.19	3.60	3.26	3.05	3.16
2. <u>Women's liberation</u>										
Very high	14	19	6	7	9	8	16	10	4	7
Quite good	42	31	32	49	36	37	44	51	39	39
Rather poor	17	26	26	23	29	33	23	25	33	28
Very poor	5	11	7	8	9	14	2	6	12	10
Don't know	22	13	29	13	17	8	15	8	12	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.83	2.66	2.51	2.64	2.55	2.43	2.88	2.70	2.40	2.52

¹Weighted average.

²"Very high opinion" = 4; "very poor opinion" = 1.

A detailed study of attitudes towards women's liberation movements would be outside Euro-Barometer's terms of reference but will be included with the findings of the survey entitled Women and men in Europe - 1978: Comparative study of social and political attitudes¹.

Opinions with regard to environmentalist movements will, however, be dealt with here. As we have seen above, there is very little difference between the attitudes held by men and those held by women: the most that can be said is that where there was an observable difference women were slightly warmer in their support than men. The type of area lived in, income bracket, even leadership rating made little difference. The age factor worked differently for men - younger contacts were more in favour - and women - little significant link. Level of education, on the other hand, was of direct importance for men and women alike: the higher the level of education, the warmer the support.

(See Table 24)

Curiously enough, reactions to ecologists were conditioned very little by contacts' political leanings. Supporters of the "revolutionary" option were slightly less in favour than the general public and, contrary to what might have been thought, it was the optimists with high hopes of an improvement in living standards who turned out to be the most in favour.

Two variables emerged as having a direct bearing on reactions to environmental protection movements: satisfaction with the way democracy works and the materialist/post-materialist system of values. However, although satisfaction with the social and political scene is generally much less prevalent among "post-materialists" than "materialists"², it emerged from this particular exercise that, as expected, "post-materialists" thought more highly of ecologists than did "materialists"; similarly, those who were satisfied with the way democracy works in their respective countries were, generally speaking, also more in favour than those who were not very or not at all satisfied with the general system, political setup and/or government in power.

Results would seem to suggest that attitudes towards environmental protection are generally favourable but complex and that implications probably vary from country to country (and possibly also within one and the same country).

¹This survey was conducted at the request of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Information as a follow up to a similar survey, the results of which were published under the title Women and men in Europe: Comparative attitudes towards a number of social problems (Brussels, December 1975) (DE, FR, EN).

²See Inglehart: The Silent Revolution, op. cit. pp. 136-148, with particular reference to pp. 142 and 144.

Table 24

VIEWS ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
RELATED TO SEX AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

	Total men and women	Men				Women			
		Total men	Education			Total women	Education		
			Elementary	Average	Advanced		Elementary	Average	Advanced
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very high opinion	30	30	28	29	36	30	27	30	36
Quite good opinion	48	48	48	48	47	49	47	53	49
Rather poor opinion	10	12	11	14	9	8	9	8	7
Very poor opinion	3	3	4	4	3	2	2	2	2
Don't know	9	7	9	5	5	11	15	7	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ¹	3.16	3.12	3.10	3.08	3.22	3.19	3.16	3.21	3.28

¹See footnote 2 to Table 23.

Subject to a more detailed examination of the issue¹ it would seem that ecologist supporters currently include "post-materialists" (the Netherlands, France and Belgium), those who are satisfied with the way democracy works (Germany) - democracy after all gives ecologists the opportunity to speak and be heard - and even those who are not very satisfied with the way democracy works (the Netherlands and to a certain extent France).

(See Tables 25 and 26)

¹And a comparison with attitudes towards women's liberation movements.

Table 25

INDEX OF SUPPORT FOR ECOLOGISTS
RELATED TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CRITERIA¹

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

1. <u>Position on political spectrum (left/right) based on personal assessment (1 = left, 10 = right)</u>	
Left (1-3)	3.19
Centre (4-7)	3.14
Right (8-10)	<u>3.15</u>
Difference between two extremes	0.04
2. <u>Basic attitude to social change</u>	
Revolution	3.04
Reform	3.20
Defence against forces of subversion	<u>3.13</u>
Difference between two extremes	- 0.09
3. <u>Change in living standards over next five years</u>	
Will improve a lot	3.23
Will improve a little	3.18
Will get a little worse	3.09
Will get a lot worse	<u>3.02</u>
Difference between two extremes	0.21
4. <u>"Materialist"/"post-materialist" ideology</u>	
Materialist	3.14
A bit of both	3.16
Post-materialist	<u>3.32</u>
Difference between two extremes	- 0.18
5. <u>Satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the way democracy works</u>	
Very satisfied	3.34
Fairly satisfied	3.19
Not very satisfied	3.12
Not at all satisfied	<u>3.03</u>
Difference between two extremes	0.31

¹For details of how the index was produced see footnote 2 to Table 23.

Table 26

INDEX OF SUPPORT FOR ECOLOGISTS
RELATED TO IDEOLOGY
AND SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS¹

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC
1. <u>Ideology</u>										
Materialist	3.32	3.63	3.18	3.05	2.91	3.19	3.68	3.21	3.06	3.14
A bit of both	3.44	3.67	3.17	3.12	2.92	3.17	3.61	3.16	3.06	3.16
Post-materialist	3.56	3.80	3.15	3.33	2.90	3.27	(3.53)	3.62	3.19	3.32
Difference between two extremes	-0.24	-0.17	0.03	-0.28	0.01	-0.08	(0.15)	-0.41	-0.13	-0.18
2. <u>Satisfaction with the way democracy works</u>										
Very satisfied	3.65	3.66	3.49	3.04	3.01	(3.80)	3.65	2.98	3.23	3.34
Fairly satisfied	3.42	3.68	3.18	3.13	2.92	3.26	3.63	3.20	3.11	3.19
Not very satisfied	3.37	3.63	2.94	3.18	2.94	3.20	3.61	3.31	2.90	3.12
Not at all satisfied	3.36	3.71	(2.35)	2.89	2.67	3.13	(3.08)	3.27	2.84	3.03
Difference between two extremes	0.29	-0.05	1.14	0.15	0.34	(0.67)	(0.57)	-0.29	0.39	0.31

¹For details of how the index was produced see footnote 2 to Table 23.

II.

ATTITUDES TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND TO DIRECT ELECTIONS

In addition to the usual questions repeated at regular or irregular intervals Euro-Barometer No 8 included a general question on the pattern of understanding between member countries of the European Community, a question on Community enlargement (to include Greece, Portugal and Spain) and a question on the possible introduction of European radio broadcasts to provide the public with information on elections to the European Parliament.

1. PATTERN OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES

"In your opinion, over the last twelve months, has the understanding between the countries of the European Community (Common Market) in general increased, decreased or stayed about the same?"

In the Community as a whole more than half of those interviewed either opted for the neutral answer ("stayed same": 38%) or gave no answer at all (15%). In all the countries except Denmark and the Netherlands most of those who had noted a change felt that it was for the better.

(See Table 27)

The answers to this question provided a useful pointer to the general climate of opinion on "European affairs": they are largely conditioned by the current economic situation and to a great extent reflect the nature of the information broadcast by the press, radio and television.

Opinion leaders generally were much more outspoken than the general public, although the actual opinion expressed varied from country to country: in Belgium, the United Kingdom and Germany it was felt that mutual understanding had increased, while in France and the Netherlands the opposite view won the day. In Italy opinion leaders were to be found swelling the ranks of both camps but there was a slight majority who felt that relations had progressed rather than regressed.

(See Table 28)

Table 27

PATTERN OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS

(October/November 1977)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>For every 100 interviewed</u>										
Understanding has:										
Increased	21	19	26	24	<u>42</u>	<u>35</u>	28	14	32	28
Decreased	18	<u>31</u>	24	16	9	18	19	24	17	19
Stayed same	34	40	36	<u>46</u>	38	22	41	<u>48</u>	42	38
Don't know	<u>27</u>	10	14	14	11	<u>25</u>	12	14	9	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2. <u>For every 100 who noted a change</u>										
Understanding has:										
Increased	53	38	53	60	<u>82</u>	66	59	37	66	59
Decreased	47	<u>62</u>	47	40	18	34	41	<u>63</u>	34	41
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹Weighted average

Table 28

PATTERN OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS
BY LEADERSHIP RATING
(October/November 1977)

		Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
BELGIUM	Progression	12%	18%	27%	<u>37%</u>
	Regression	12	21	21	21
	Stayed same, don't know	76	61	52	42
DENMARK	Progression	17%	22%	19%	17%
	Regression	28	30	33	34
	Stayed same, don't know	55	48	48	49
GERMANY	Progression	17%	26%	30%	<u>32%</u>
	Regression	19	20	29	26
	Stayed same, don't know	64	54	41	42
FRANCE	Progression	21%	23%	30%	20%
	Regression	10	14	19	<u>26</u>
	Stayed same, don't know	69	63	51	54
IRELAND	Progression	34%	40%	56%	44%
	Regression	9	7	9	15
	Stayed same, don't know	57	53	35	41
ITALY	Progression	23%	35%	39%	<u>46%</u>
	Regression	12	18	18	<u>29</u>
	Stayed same, don't know	65	47	43	25
LUXEMBOURG	Progression	23%	31%	27%	30%
	Regression	15	16	19	30
	Stayed same, don't know	62	53	54	40
NETHER- LANDS	Progression	13%	13%	16%	12%
	Regression	25	19	22	<u>37</u>
	Stayed same, don't know	62	68	62	51
UNITED KINGDOM	Progression	25%	30%	38%	<u>44%</u>
	Regression	15	18	17	20
	Stayed same, don't know	60	52	45	36
COMMUNITY ¹	Progression	21	28	32	33
	Regression	14	18	22	26
	Stayed same, don't know	65	54	46	41

¹Weighted average

2. VIEWS ON AND COMMITMENT TO
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

"Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"

"And do you think that membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad thing in the light of (your country's) future in the next ten or fifteen years?"

"If you were to be told tomorrow that the European Community (Common Market) had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or relieved?"

The above three questions were intended to throw light on the public image of the European Community (better known to the general public as the "Common Market") and the degree of commitment. The first question is asked every six months in Euro-Barometer and at even more regular intervals by other institutes conducting public opinion surveys; the last has been asked on a number of occasions in recent years, while the second question was intended to check whether or not the Community image would stand the test of time¹.

The Common Market: a good thing or a bad thing

Attitudes to Community membership vary very little from one half-year to the next: on average six in ten in the six founder member countries and in Ireland felt that the Community was "a good thing". (The only difference in the distribution of votes between Ireland and the "Six" was that two in every ten Irish felt that the Common Market was a "bad thing" as compared with one in ten in the original member countries.)

In Denmark the positive opinion just carried the day and no more: 37% as compared with 33%, while the reverse was true in the United Kingdom: 35% as compared with 37%.

¹In France an opinion poll conducted early in 1958 revealed that the probability of a favourable balance between the potential positive and negative effects of the Common Market on the French economy was rated higher over a fifteen-year period than over a five-year period (see Sondages, 1972, No 1-2, p. 56). In Great Britain surveys conducted during the campaign leading up to the 1975 referendum revealed the major importance of the argument "the future for British children" in shaping favourable attitudes towards Community membership (see Gallup Political Index, No 179, June 1975, p. 30).

Changes, some more significant than others, since the previous poll in April/May 1977 are given below:

	Feel that the Common Market is "a good thing"	
	April/May 1977	November 1977
Belgium	69%	60%
Denmark	30	37
Germany	54	59
France	64	57
Ireland	57	59
Italy	71	70
Luxembourg	84	73
Netherlands	80	74
United Kingdom	35	35
COMMUNITY	57	56

Table 29 and Graph 2 give further information on changes in attitude towards the European Community since 1973¹.

Graph 3 deals specifically with Denmark and traces intentions to vote for or against Community membership back to 1972².

¹For further details see Table 1 in the Annex.

²Figures provided by Gallup Markedsanalyse.

Table 29

THE COMMON MARKET: A GOOD THING OR A BAD THING

	Good thing	Bad thing	Neither good nor bad	Don't know	Total
EURO 6¹					
September 1973	63%	4%	19%	14%	100%
November 1974	69	6	17	8	100
November 1975	67	4	22	7	100
November 1976	61	5	26	28	100
April/May 1977	64	6	21	9	100
November 1977	63	7	22	8	100
IRELAND					
September 1973	56%	15%	21%	8%	100%
November 1974	50	24	22	4	100
November 1975	67	12	17	4	100
November 1976	50	22	22	6	100
April/May 1977	57	17	22	4	100
November 1977	59	19	19	3	100
DENMARK					
September 1973	42%	30%	19%	9%	100%
November 1974	33	35	25	7	100
November 1975	41	27	24	8	100
November 1976	29	34	28	9	100
April/May 1977	30	30	30	10	100
November 1977	37	33	24	6	100
UNITED KINGDOM²					
September 1973	31%	34%	22%	13%	100%
November 1974	36	35	20	9	100
November 1975	50	24	18	8	100
November 1976	39	34	21	6	100
April/May 1977	35	40	22	3	100
November 1977	35	37	23	5	100
COMMUNITY					
September 1973	56%	11%	20%	13%	100%
November 1974	60	14	18	8	100
November 1975	63	9	21	7	100
November 1976	55	13	25	7	100
April/May 1977	57	14	21	8	100
November 1977	56	14	23	7	100

¹Weighted average


²Northern Ireland was not included in 1973 and 1974.

Graphique No 2 / Graph No 2

LE MARCHE COMMUN EST "UNE BONNE CHOSE" /

COMMON MARKET IS "A GOOD THING"

1973 - 1977




(A) GREAT BRITAIN 1973-1974

Graphique No 3 / Graph 3

VOTERAIENT POUR OU CONTRE L'ADHESION DU DANEMARK /

WOULD VOTE FOR OR AGAINST DANISH MEMBERSHIP

1972 - 1977



As things stand at present
or in the long term ...

In fact, except in the United Kingdom and Ireland, positive votes were constant irrespective of whether they were given in terms of the present or the long-term future¹. In Ireland the difference was slight but significant: "a good thing" now, 59%; "a good thing" for the future, 64%. The difference in the United Kingdom was more pronounced: as things stand at present membership was considered "a bad thing" by 37% and "a good thing" by 35%, while on a long-term basis the situation was reversed and supporters outnumbered opponents by 48% to 26%.

(See Table 30)

¹ In the Community as a whole nine in ten who replied "a good thing" to the first question gave the same answer to the second question. And more than 20% of those who adopted a negative or dubious approach to Community membership as things stand at present felt that it would be "a good thing" in ten or fifteen years' time. The time factor is even more important in the United Kingdom where 38% of those who, as things stand at present, are unwilling to come out either for or against membership felt that in the long term it would be "a good thing".

For every 100 who
feel that as things
stand at present
British membership
is:

A good thing
A bad thing
Neither good
nor bad

Feel that British membership in 10-15 years' time will be:			don't know	Total
a good thing	a bad thing	neither good nor bad		
95%	.	2%	3%	100% (477)
14	65	9	12	100% (495)
38	9	41	12	100% (317)

Table 30

THE COMMON MARKET: A GOOD THING OR A BAD THING
(October/November 1977)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>1. As things stand at present</u>										
A good thing	60	37	59	57	59	70	73	74	35	56
A bad thing	5	33	7	9	19	5	3	5	37	14
Neither good nor bad	19	24	24	28	19	18	17	16	23	23
Don't know	16	6	10	6	3	7	7	5	5	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>2. In ten or fifteen years' time</u>										
A good thing	59	34	58	58	64	72	73	75	48	59
A bad thing	5	30	7	6	15	5	4	4	26	11
Neither good nor bad	17	13	21	22	12	16	11	15	14	18
Don't know	19	23	14	14	9	7	12	6	12	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹Weighted average

Commitment to the Community

As was to be expected, there was less positive commitment to the Common Market than mere expression of general support: 56% of those interviewed felt that it was "a good thing" but only 45% said they would be "very sorry" if it were scrapped.

Here again there was a significant difference between the views expressed by the six founder members of the Community and the three new members: while in the "Six" only 5% on average expressed the most hostile reaction ("relieved"), this same reaction was expressed by 18% in Ireland, 32% in the United Kingdom and 34% in Denmark.

By comparison with previous polls the general trend would seem to be an increase in public commitment to the Community between late 1973 and late 1975 and consolidation of this commitment from then on.

	Would be very sorry if the Common Market were scrapped:		
	September 1973	November 1975	November 1977
Belgium	39%	42%	44%
Denmark	30	33	30
Germany	57	53	53
France	42	50	45
Ireland	37	51	47
Italy	41	45	48
Luxembourg	51	60	64
Netherlands	46	50	59
United Kingdom ¹	20	40	31
COMMUNITY	41	47	45

¹ Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.

(See Table 31 and Graph 4)

x
x x

¹ For more details see Table 2 in the Annex.

Table 31

COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON MARKET:
REGRET OR RELIEF IF SCRAPPED
(October/November 1977)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
If the Common Market were scrapped, would be:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very sorry	44	30	53	45	47	48	64	59	31	45
Indifferent	34	25	25	39	30	38	25	29	31	32
Relieved	5	34	5	6	18	4	2	4	32	12
Don't know	17	11	17	10	5	10	9	8	6	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹Weighted average.

A more detailed examination of the replies to the three questions relating to views on and commitment to the Community confirmed that differences between the opinions expressed by men and women were slight and attributable on the whole, although not exclusively, to differences in level of education.

Commitment to the Community, involving as it does a relatively high degree of awareness and political insight, is conditioned primarily by leadership rating.

(See Table 32)

Graphique No 4 / Graph 4

"GRANDS REGRETS" EN CAS D'ABANDON DU MARCHÉ COMMUN /
"RELIEVED" IF THE COMMON MARKET WERE SCRAPPED

1973 - 1977




Table 32

VIEWS ON AND COMMITMENT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
RELATED TO SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

	Feel that Community membership is "a good thing"		Would be "very sorry" if the Common Market were scrapped
	At present	In the long term	
<u>Total</u>	56%	59%	45%
<u>Men</u>	59	63	50
Elementary education	52	57	43
Average education	64	69	57
Advanced education	70	70	58
<u>Women</u>	53	56	40
Elementary education	46	50	34
Average education	59	61	47
Advanced education	67	69	52
<u>Leadership rating</u>			
Non-leaders (—)	42	45	25
(-)	54	58	45
(+)	65	69	56
Leaders (++)	64	66	58

3. SOLIDARITY EXPECTED
FROM MEMBER COUNTRIES

"If one of the countries of the Common Market (European Community) finds itself in major economic difficulties, do you feel that the other countries, including (your own), should help it or not?"

As in the previous poll, eight in ten of those interviewed (79%) came out in favour of Community solidarity; the strongest advocate was Italy (92%).

By comparison with September 1973, when the question was asked for the first time, the United Kingdom and Denmark had progressed most in this direction, with figures up from 59% to 75% and from 62% to 75% respectively. This positive trend doubtless demonstrates an ill-defined but none the less deeply felt desire for stronger links between the countries constituting this "community"¹. It can therefore be assumed that the plans for economic and monetary union, as outlined by Mr Jenkins on a number of occasions in recent weeks, might well be given public backing.

(See Table 33)

This backing could be expected to be particularly strong among opinion leaders almost everywhere in the Community, especially Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

(See Table 34)

¹ See Euro-Barometer No 6, January 1977, pp. 31-37.

Table 33

SOLIDARITY AMONG MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

	In the event of one of the member countries being in major economic difficulties, the others:			Total
	Should	Should not help it	Don't know	
<u>Belgium</u>				
September 1973	78%	9%	13%	100%
November 1976	82	8	10	100
Oct/Nov 1977	74	11	15	100
<u>Denmark</u>				
September 1973	62	25	13	100
November 1976	68	18	14	100
Oct/Nov 1977	75	16	9	100
<u>Germany</u>				
September 1973	77	7	16	100
November 1976	74	12	14	100
Oct/Nov 1977	72	10	18	100
<u>France</u>				
September 1973	78	9	13	100
November 1976	75	15	10	100
Oct/Nov 1977	76	12	12	100
<u>Ireland</u>				
September 1973	80	10	10	100
November 1976	83	10	7	100
Oct/Nov 1977	83	10	7	100
<u>Italy</u>				
September 1973	88	2	10	100
November 1976	95	1	4	100
Oct/Nov 1977	92	3	5	100
<u>Luxembourg</u>				
September 1973	87	8	5	100
November 1976	86	4	10	100
Oct/Nov 1977	83	10	7	100
<u>Netherlands</u>				
September 1973	79	9	12	100
November 1976	84	8	8	100
Oct/Nov 1977	85	6	9	100
<u>United Kingdom</u>				
September 1973 ¹	59	28	13	100
November 1976	77	16	7	100
Oct/Nov 1977	75	17	8	100
<u>COMMUNITY</u> ²				
September 1973	76	11	13	100
November 1976	80	11	9	100
Oct/Nov 1977	79	10	11	100

¹Northern Ireland was not included in 1973

²Weighted average.

Table 34

SOLIDARITY AMONG MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(November 1976 and October/November 1977)

		In the event of one of the member countries being in major economic difficulties the others should help it			
		Non-leaders (—)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
BELGIUM	November 1976	70%	85%	93%	87%
	Oct/Nov 1977	56	76	85	86
DENMARK	November 1976	58	71	70	77
	Oct/Nov 1977	63	79	77	78
GERMANY	November 1976	60	73	80	81
	Oct/Nov 1977	50	72	80	80
FRANCE	November 1976	70	72	83	80
	Oct/Nov 1977	65	77	86	73
IRELAND	November 1976	77	83	90	88
	Oct/Nov 1977	77	86	90	81
ITALY	November 1976	91	94	98	95
	Oct/Nov 1977	89	93	93	95
LUXEMBOURG	November 1976	74	90	85	90
	Oct/Nov 1977	73	89	83	86
NETHER- LANDS	November 1976	67	81	91	93
	Oct/Nov 1977	67	82	88	90
UNITED KINGDOM	November 1976	65	79	83	84
	Oct/Nov 1977	65	75	80	85
COMMUNITY	November 1976	71	79	86	86
	Oct/Nov 1977	67	79	85	83

4. APPLICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP:
GREECE, PORTUGAL, SPAIN

"Three European countries: Greece, Portugal and Spain have recently asked to join the European Community (Common Market). In your opinion, would the entry of Greece in the European Community be a good thing, a bad thing or neither a good nor a bad thing, for (your country)? And the entry of Portugal? And the entry of Spain?"

The pattern of opinion on membership was very similar in the case of all three applicants¹. In the Community as a whole on average one in five did not reply, and of the remainder between four and five in ten felt that it would be "a good thing" if the three countries concerned joined the Community. Spain seemed to be the most popular of the applicants (48% of those who replied felt that Spanish membership would be "a good thing") but Portugal and Greece were not far behind (43% and 42% respectively).

An examination of the replies by country in terms of "net support" based on the number of actual replies shows that Germany, Italy and Ireland were most in favour of enlargement, while Denmark had the most reservations.

Table 35

NET SUPPORT FOR MEMBERSHIP: GREECE, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN
(For every 100 actual replies)²

	Greece	Portugal	Spain	Total	Order
Belgium	26	21	28	75	4
Denmark	-8	-7	-4	-19	9
Germany	40	36	48	124	1
France	7	6	16	29	6
Ireland	32	33	36	101	3
Italy	37	38	35	110	2
Luxembourg	19	23	28	70	5
Netherlands	-1	6	7	12	8
United Kingdom	3	8	11	22	7

(See also Tables 36 and 37)

Opinions on enlargement were conditioned most by leadership rating. Not only did a higher percentage actually reply (this was not surprising) but their replies tended to be favourable rather than otherwise.

(See Table 38)

¹This could be due to the fact that the questions were asked one after the other.

²"A good thing" replies minus "a bad thing" replies (percentage).

Table 36

ATTITUDE TOWARDS COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP:
GREECE, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN

(October/November 1977)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>Greece</u>										
A good thing	30	21	41	23	37	42	30	26	23	32
A bad thing	13	26	9	17	14	13	16	27	20	15
Neither good nor bad	20	28	30	34	22	25	27	26	34	30
Don't know	37	25	20	26	27	20	27	21	23	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2. <u>Portugal</u>										
A good thing	29	20	40	25	38	43	31	30	27	33
A bad thing	15	26	11	21	14	12	15	26	21	17
Neither good nor bad	20	28	28	31	22	25	28	24	30	28
Don't know	36	26	21	23	26	20	26	20	22	22
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
3. <u>Spain</u>										
A good thing	33	22	48	33	42	43	35	35	31	39
A bad thing	15	26	8	20	14	14	13	24	22	16
Neither good nor bad	18	28	27	27	20	24	27	22	27	25
Don't know	34	24	17	20	24	19	25	19	20	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹Weighted average.

Table 37

ATTITUDE TOWARDS COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP: GREECE, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN
FOR EVERY 100 REPLIES

(October/November 1977)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>Greece</u>										
A good thing	47	27	51	31	51	53	41	33	30	42
A bad thing	21	35	11	24	19	16	22	34	27	20
Neither good nor bad	32	38	37	45	30	31	37	33	43	38
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2. <u>Portugal</u>										
A good thing	45	28	50	33	52	53	43	38	35	43
A bad thing	24	35	14	27	19	15	20	32	27	21
Neither good nor bad	31	37	36	40	29	32	37	30	38	36
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
3. <u>Spain</u>										
A good thing	50	30	58	41	55	53	46	43	39	48
A bad thing	22	34	10	25	19	18	18	30	28	20
Neither good nor bad	28	36	32	34	26	29	36	27	33	32
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹Weighted average.

Table 38

ATTITUDE TOWARDS COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP: GREECE, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN
BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
<u>Greece</u>				
1. <u>For every 100 interviewed</u>				
A good thing	23	32	36	39
A bad thing	12	15	17	21
Neither good nor bad	30	30	30	27
Don't know	35	23	17	13
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
<u>Portugal</u>				
A good thing	24	33	38	42
A bad thing	13	16	18	22
Neither good nor bad	28	29	27	25
Don't know	35	22	17	11
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
<u>Spain</u>				
A good thing	27	39	44	47
A bad thing	13	15	17	23
Neither good nor bad	27	27	25	21
Don't know	33	19	14	9
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
2. <u>For every 100 replies</u>				
<u>Greece</u>				
A good thing	36	42	43	45
A bad thing	19	19	20	24
Neither good nor bad	45	39	37	31
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net support ¹	17	23	23	21
<u>Portugal</u>				
A good thing	37	42	45	48
A bad thing	20	21	22	24
Neither good nor bad	43	37	33	28
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net support ¹	17	21	23	24
<u>Spain</u>				
A good thing	40	48	51	52
A bad thing	20	19	20	25
Neither good nor bad	40	33	29	23
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net support ¹	20	29	31	27

¹"A good thing" replies minus "a bad thing" replies (percentage).

5. ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Euro-Barometer No 7, published in July 1977, was the first to include a long series of questions on the election of members to the European Parliament. A number of the questions were repeated this time round and will continue to appear in future polls¹.

"In 1978 elections for the European Parliament are planned in every country of the Common Market, including (your country). Everybody will be entitled to vote. Are you, yourself, for or against this particular election?"

"Which one of these opinions comes closest to your own on the future elections to the European Parliament?"

- . It is an event with important consequences which is certain to make Europe more politically unified.
- . It is an unimportant event because the national governments will not be bound by the votes in the European Parliament."

"Which of the following attitudes would you expect a member of the European Parliament representing (your country) to have?"

- . He should support things that are good for Europe as a whole, even if they are not always good for (your country) at the time.
- . He should support the interests of (your country) all the time whether or not they are good for Europe as a whole."

"How likely is it that you will go and vote? Certainly, probably, probably not or certainly not?"

- . Will certainly go and vote
- . Will probably go and vote
- . Will probably not vote
- . Will certainly not vote
- . Depends (DO NOT SUGGEST THIS)."

Attitude to the principle of direct elections

The support of the public, whose interest had been stimulated by the decisions taken in September 1976, remained stable at the previous high level. In the Community as a whole on average 72% of those interviewed came out in favour of direct elections, 13% were against and 15% did not reply. Interestingly enough, consolidation of support was most marked among the ranks of the most committed ("completely in favour").

(See Table 39)

¹ At the time of the survey the vote by the UK Parliament, which means postponing the date of the elections, had not yet been held.

Table 39

FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

(Community as a whole)

	September 1973	May 1975	Oct./Nov. 1975	May 1976	November 1976	April/May 1977	Oct./Nov. 1977
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Completely for	24	27	25	28	31	34	37
To some extent for	30	36	39	34	38	38	35
To some extent against	12	9	10	11	8	8	8
Completely against	11	9	8	10	6	5	5
Don't know	23	19	18	17	17	15	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

It is worth taking this particular example to show how the attitudes of the general public and opinion leaders have changed since 1973.

(See Table 40)

Even as far back as late 1973 the majority of opinion leaders (++) were already much in favour (46%) or in favour (27%), while as many as half of the non-leaders (--) did not reply to a question which seemed of little relevance at the time.

Between September 1973 and May 1976 as election plans took shape and were given increasing press coverage there was a sharp drop in the number of "don't knows" returned by non-leaders (from 48% to 32%, i.e. -16 points). It seemed that previous non-voters were now coming out in support: "favour on the whole" (+10 points) and "completely in favour" (+7 points). The reaction of opinion leaders did not change¹.

Between May 1976 and October/November 1977 under the impact of the decision adopted in September 1976 and despite the relative lack of interest on the political front, the gradual move by non-leaders from their "sitting on the fence" position continued, mainly to the advantage of the pro-elections camp ("completely favour": +8 points). There was little marked change among leaders other than a slow increase in the number of favourable replies offsetting the drop in unfavourable replies; the "don't knows" remained constant.

¹ It goes without saying that the only way to check whether the situation is actually what it seems to be would be to carry out a series of successive interviews on the same sample.

Table 40

FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
<u>Completely for</u>				
September 1973	10%	21%	29%	46%
May 1976	17	25	33	43
November 1976	19	28	37	49
Oct./Nov. 1977	25	35	44	48
Change between 1973 and 1977	+15	+14	+15	+2
<u>To some extent for</u>				
September 1973	22	32	36	27
May 1976	32	36	36	29
November 1976	34	42	42	30
Oct./Nov. 1977	32	38	36	32
Change between 1973 and 1977	+10	+6	0	+5
<u>To some extent against</u>				
September 1973	10	12	14	9
May 1976	9	13	12	10
November 1976	8	8	6	7
Oct./Nov. 1977	9	9	8	6
Change between 1973 and 1977	-1	-3	-6	-3
<u>Completely against</u>				
September 1973	10	10	11	12
May 1976	10	10	10	11
November 1976	6	6	5	9
Oct./Nov. 1977	6	4	4	7
Change between 1973 and 1977	-4	-6	-7	-5
<u>Don't know</u>				
September 1973	48	25	10	6
May 1976	32	16	9	7
November 1976	33	16	10	5
Oct./Nov. 1977	28	14	8	7
Change between 1973 and 1977	-20	-11	-2	+1

The reason that we have dwelt at considerable length on this trend, which has been repeated fairly consistently throughout the Community, is because it gives a clearer insight into the crystallization of attitudes towards Europe. There is among the general public a potential consensus, a latent support, which the right decisions taken at the right time, with adequate information backup, could bring to the surface.

The gap between the different countries is gradually closing. (See Graph 5) The percentage of supporters in Ireland is now on a par with the average recorded in the six founder member countries (74%); the United Kingdom is not far behind (69%) and Denmark too is moving up the scale fairly rapidly (54%) in line with the trend outlined above.

In 1973 the maximum gap recorded in the six original member countries was 23 points (Italy: 74% and France: 51%); this has now narrowed to 16 points (Italy: 79% and Belgium: 63%).

The breakdown of opinions as recorded towards the end of 1977 is given in Table 41¹.

¹For further details, in particular on the change in attitudes, see Table 3 in the Annex.

Table 41

FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE BY COUNTRY

(October/November 1977)


	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Completely for	33	27	28	34	49	45	42	44	42	37
To some extent for	30	27	45	36	25	34	34	33	27	35
(Total "for")	63	54	73	70	74	79	76	77	69	72
To some extent against	8	14	8	8	6	7	11	6	9	8
Completely against	4	15	3	6	5	2	3	4	9	5
(Total "against")	12	29	11	14	11	9	14	10	18	13
Don't know	25	17	16	16	15	12	10	13	13	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

²Weighted average.

Graphique No 5/Graph 5

"POUR" L'ELECTION DU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN/
"FOR" THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

1973-77



Importance of elections

Of those interviewed one in two regarded the elections as "an event with important consequences which is certain to make Europe more politically unified", while 30% felt that it was "an unimportant event because the national governments will not be bound by the votes in the European Parliament"; 20% did not commit themselves.

The first view (i.e. "event with important consequences") was most common in Italy (59%) and least common in Denmark (44%).

But the most interesting point to emerge is the change over the last twelve months: with the exception of Denmark there are no signs of an upward trend in the positive reply. In France, for example, the joint campaign mounted by the spokesmen for both the majority and the opposition in an attempt to dissuade the electorate from attaching too much importance to direct elections has done the trick: the upsurge in election enthusiasm from 46% in November 1976 to 58% in April/May 1977 was followed by a drop back down to 49% in October/November.

(See Table 42)

The falling off in support over the last few months would seem to be more marked among opinion leaders, who are by definition more sensitive to the ups and downs of the political scene.

(See Table 43)

Table 42

IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
It is an event with important consequences which is certain to make Europe more politically unified										
November 1976	53	35	47	46	38	56	53	48	41	48
April/May 1977	55	40	41	58	50	62	64	58	51	53
Oct./Nov. 1977	49	44	46	49	48	59	52	52	47	50
It is an unimportant event because the national governments will not be bound by the votes in the European Parliament ²										
November 1976	19	33	35	28	27	19	25	29	31	28
April/May 1977	16	25	37	23	28	22	20	28	29	27
Oct./Nov. 1977	20	31	35	27	24	25	28	33	32	30
Don't know										
November 1976	28	32	18	26	35	25	22	23	28	24
April/May 1977	29	35	22	19	22	16	16	14	20	20
Oct./Nov. 1977	31	25	19	24	28	16	20	15	21	20

¹Weighted average.

²The wording of this question in November 1976 was "Heads of State will not be bound ...".

Table 43

IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
	%	%	%	%
Event with important consequences				
November 1976	36	46	55	56
April/May 1977	36	51	61	62
Oct./Nov. 1977	36	49	59	56
Unimportant event				
November 1976	22	30	29	34
April/May 1977	26	29	27	29
Oct./Nov. 1977	26	32	29	32
Don't know				
November 1976	42	24	16	10
April/May 1977	38	20	12	9
Oct./Nov. 1977	38	19	12	12

Attitude expected of European MPs

The importance attached to the election of the European Parliament is very probably conditioned by its public image, which in turn is undoubtedly influenced by the current discussion on "supranationalism".

Contacts have now been asked on two occasions, April/May and October/November 1977, to state which attitude they would like to see in a Euro-MP, himself in a situation where he had to make a choice: either to support Community interests, even when these happen to clash with national interests, or to support national interests exclusively.

This question, intentionally worded in such a way as to be totally unbiased, divided contacts more or less evenly into the two camps with, generally speaking, little significant change over the six-month period. The "supranational" approach was quite clearly in the lead in the Netherlands, Italy, Germany and even in France, while the "national" approach came out ahead in Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom.

(See Table 44)

Table 44

ATTITUDE EXPECTED OF EUROPEAN MPs:
PROMOTION OF COMMUNITY INTERESTS OR IMMEDIATE NATIONAL INTERESTS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Support things that are good for Europe as a whole, even if they are not always good for (your country) at the time										
April/May 1977	39	32	41	48	39	46	49	62	41	44
Oct./Nov. 1977	39	36	49	48	35	54	48	65	42	48
Support the interests of (your country) all the time whether or not they are good for Europe as a whole										
April/May 1977	45	46	40	41	56	47	45	29	53	45
Oct./Nov. 1977	41	52	36	40	58	39	43	27	52	41
Don't know										
April/May 1977	16	22	19	11	5	7	6	9	6	11
Oct./Nov. 1977	20	12	15	12	7	7	9	8	6	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹ Weighted average.

Determination to vote

This question was asked for the first time in April/May 1977, when 47% of those interviewed said that they would "certainly" turn out to vote and 27% claimed that they would "probably" do so. The corresponding figures six months later, 50% and 25%, showed little significant change, except perhaps a slightly stronger determination to vote in Denmark (+11 points), in France (+8 points) and in Germany (+6 points)¹.

The highest percentage of "definites" still came from Italy and the Netherlands.

(See Table 45)

From these results it would appear that in Denmark the new voters came either from the ranks of the totally uncommitted ("don't know") or the indecisive ("depends"). In France, where there was already a greater degree of public awareness (and also more support for the principle of elections), the swing seemed mainly one from "probable" to "definite" voters.

There is obviously no foolproof way of measuring the reliability of these predictions: it is quite possible that those who claim today that they will "certainly" turn out to vote will not appear in the polling booths tomorrow. The reverse is also true: it is quite likely that a relatively high proportion of those who claim that they will "probably" vote (or even that they will not vote or do not know) may turn out when the time comes. However, the structure and pattern of replies would seem to provide a reliable pointer.

¹It must be remembered that the samples interviewed represent a cross-section of the population aged 15 and over. There would be a minimal difference if those who were not members of the "electorate" (i.e. those who under national legislation are not old enough to vote) were not included but it would be enough to reduce the percentage of "definite" voters by a further one or two points.

In countries where voting is compulsory (Belgium and Luxembourg) the phrase "... even if voting were not compulsory ..." was added.

Table 45

DETERMINATION TO VOTE
IN DIRECT ELECTIONS

[illegible]

As things stand at present, on average one citizen in every two is a "definite" voter. The proportion is higher for men (55% as compared with 52% in the previous poll) than for women (47% as compared with 43%) - a slight but none the less significant difference. Even more significant, men in all age groups (except between 15 and 24) generally show slightly more inclination to vote than women; the difference is particularly marked among the over-55s, who are no less enthusiastic about voting than those in the age group immediately below. Older women on the other hand show a marked tendency to abstain.

However, much more so than sex, age or level of education, the most reliable indicator of determination to vote is leadership rating. More than two thirds of opinion leaders claimed that they would definitely turn out to vote; the general public were much more non-committal although there are perhaps signs of the beginnings of a thaw among the ranks of the abstentionists.

(See Table 46)

Table 46

DETERMINATION TO VOTE
RELATED TO SEX, AGE AND LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole)

	Will go and vote		Will not go and vote		Other reply	Total
	Certainly	Probably	Probably	Certainly		
1. <u>April/May 1977</u>						
<u>Total</u>	47%	27%	8%	7%	11%	100%
<u>Men</u>	52	25	8	7	8	100
Aged: 15-24	38	28	11	13	10	100
25-39	53	27	6	5	9	100
40-54	56	23	7	6	8	100
55 and over	55	22	8	6	9	100
<u>Women</u>	43	28	8	7	14	100
Aged: 15-24	34	27	10	15	14	100
25-39	46	29	7	6	12	100
40-54	49	29	7	4	11	100
55 and over	39	26	10	8	17	100
<u>Leadership rating</u>						
Non-leaders (--)	32	25	11	12	20	100
(-)	44	30	9	6	11	100
(+)	53	27	6	6	8	100
Leaders (++)	66	18	5	5	6	100

2. <u>October/November 1977</u>						
<u>Total</u>	50%	25%	8%	8%	9%	100%
<u>Men</u>	55	23	8	7	8	100
Aged: 15-24	37	27	9	13	10	100
25-39	57	25	7	5	9	100
40-54	59	22	9	6	8	100
55 and over	60	21	6	6	9	100
<u>Women</u>	47	25	8	8	12	100
Aged: 15-24	39	27	8	12	14	100
25-39	48	28	7	7	10	100
40-54	51	25	8	5	10	100
55 and over	47	22	8	8	15	100
<u>Leadership rating</u>						
Non-leaders (--)	38	24	11	11	16	100
(-)	47	27	8	8	10	100
(+)	57	26	6	6	5	100
Leaders (++)	67	18	4	6	5	100

Attempt to explain attitudes towards the European Parliament and the election of its members

Without being caught up in further research into the poles of public interest with regard to the election campaign¹, it is worth giving a brief rundown of the results to emerge from initial analysis of the information available.

1. Support for the principle of direct elections is widespread - and still on the increase - among members of the general public, the majority of whom are now in favour in all the Community countries without exception.

Support is strongest among opinion leaders, who are better informed and more fully integrated in social and political life, but there are certain signs that an increasing number of non-leaders could swell the ranks of the "fors" or the "completely fors" once the polling date is definitely fixed and the election campaign begins.

Support for the election also goes hand in hand with a positive approach to the Community (Common Market = "a good thing") but is much more widespread. Nine in ten (86%) of those who felt that the Common Market was "a good thing" were also in favour of elections, but their numbers were reinforced by two thirds (65%) of those who were non-committal ("neither good nor bad") and, more significant still, by half (52%) of the anti-marketeers ("a bad thing").

(See Table 47)

Table 47

FOR OR AGAINST DIRECT ELECTIONS
RELATED TO ATTITUDE TO THE COMMON MARKET

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

	For elections		Against elections		Don't know	Total
	++	+	-	--		
For every 100 who consider the Common Market:						
A good thing	49%	37%	4%	2%	8%	100%
Neither good nor bad	22	43	13	4	18	100
A bad thing	27	25	18	19	11	100

¹ See Euro-Barometer No 7, July 1977, pp. 66-72 and L'information du public sur les problèmes européens (X/716/76) December 1976.

2. Despite the fact that half of those interviewed regarded the elections as "an event with important consequences", it is still a fairly vague concept in the minds of the general public.

Not surprisingly, almost all of those who regarded the elections as "an event with important consequences" were also "for" elections. But, and this is more significant, 61% of those who regarded it as "an unimportant event" were also in favour.

(See Table 48)

Table 48

FOR OR AGAINST DIRECT ELECTIONS
RELATED TO IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THE EVENT

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

	For elections		Against elections		Don't know	Total
	++	+	-	--		
For every 100 who regard elections as:						
An event with important consequences	54%	38%	3%	1%	4%	100%
An unimportant event	24	37	18	10	11	100

3. It would seem that even the debate on the dangers of a "supranational" European Parliament has done little to render the image of the institution or the role of its members any less nebulous.

As we saw above, the "supranational" image is slightly more popular in the Community as a whole and much more popular in the Netherlands, Italy, Germany and France. For every 100 contacts who opted for this approach (priority to Community interests) two thirds (65%) felt that elections would "make Europe more politically unified"; this view was also held by 41% of those who felt that national interests should always be uppermost in the mind of the Euro-MP.

(See Table 49)

Table 49

IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS
RELATED TO ATTITUDE EXPECTED OF EURO-MPs

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

	Regard elections as:		Don't know	Total
	An event with important consequences	An unimportant event		
For every 100 who feel that a Euro-MP should:				
Give priority to Community interests	65%	24%	11%	100%
Always defend national interests	41	39	20	100

Admittedly, there is nothing contradictory about all that. But it is a fact that the barriers are now up and in any speeches and procedures in connection with the long-awaited scheme for direct elections caution is so much the order of the day that the public does not know what to think. An earlier survey revealed two functions widely expected of the elected Parliament: "to decide what kind of Europe we want" and "to give more democratic control over officials in Brussels"¹. Anything which debases the public image of the elected Parliament's potential role in these areas - and others - could well seriously reduce the number of voters turning up at the polls.

4. The number of "definite" voters is still low: on average one in two. As we have seen above, leadership rating is an important factor: 67% of opinion leaders are "definites". Further important factors are a positive approach to the Common Market (61% of those who regarded it as "a good thing" said that they would "certainly go and vote" and support for the principle of elections (62% of the "fors" are also "definites").

5. The analysis of the replies to the questions on the European Parliament and the election of its members helps give a clearer picture of the pre-election scene. With the exception of opinion leaders (who account for about 12 or 13% of the population²) the public is fairly well disposed but relatively uncommitted.

¹ For evidence of the positive correlation between agreement on these proposed functions and importance attached to voting see Euro-Barometer No 7, July 1977, p. 61.

² By leaders here we mean those with a ++ rating; if we add those immediately below (i.e. those with a + rating) this percentage can be scaled up to between 40 and 45% of the population.

This low level of commitment is further demonstrated by the fact that the replies to all questions except one were influenced very little by the contacts' political leanings, despite the fact that in most of our countries the division between "left" and "right" is a meaningful one.

Leftist or rightist tendencies, then, had little effect on support, or lack of, for the principle of elections, the importance attributed to the event or the determination to vote. The only question to which answers did vary slightly according to political leanings was the one on the attitude expected of a Euro-MP (in other words the "supranational" debate): in all countries except Denmark and the United Kingdom left-wing voters came out slightly more strongly in favour of the "supranational" option while their compatriots on the right showed more enthusiasm for the "national" option.

(See Tables 50 to 53)

Table 50

FOR OR AGAINST DIRECT ELECTIONS
RELATED TO POSITION ON POLITICAL SPECTRUM
BASED ON PERSONAL ASSESSMENT

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

	Overall	For every 100 interviewees	
		For elections	Against elections
	%	%	%
Left (1 to 3)	16	17	19
Centre (4 to 7)	56	58	51
Right (8 to 10)	17	17	18
Don't know	11	8	12
Total	100	100	100
Index	5.52	5.51	5.43

Table 51

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO DIRECT ELECTIONS
RELATED TO POSITION ON POLITICAL SPECTRUM
BASED ON PERSONAL ASSESSMENT

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

	Overall	For every 100 who regard elections as:	
		An event with important consequences	An unimportant event
	%	%	%
Left (1 to 3)	16	17	17
Centre (4 to 7)	56	57	58
Right (8 to 10)	17	19	17
Don't know	11	7	8
Total	100	100	100
Index	5.52	5.56	5.48

Table 52

DETERMINATION TO VOTE IN DIRECT ELECTIONS
RELATED TO POSITION ON POLITICAL SPECTRUM
BASED ON PERSONAL ASSESSMENT

(Community as a whole: October/November 1977)

	Overall	For every 100 who will go and vote		For every 100 who will not go and vote	
		Certainly	Probably	Probably	Certainly
	%	%	%	%	%
Left (1 to 3)	16	19	13	14	15
Centre (4 to 7)	56	56	59	56	50
Right (8 to 10)	17	17	19	17	16
Don't know	11	8	9	13	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Index	5.52	5.41	5.66	5.77	5.49

Table 53

ATTITUDE EXPECTED OF EURO-MPs

RELATED TO POSITION ON POLITICAL SPECTRUM

BASED ON PERSONAL ASSESSMENT

(October/November 1977)

	Overall	For every 100 who feel that a Euro-MP should:	
		Give priority to Community interests	Always defend national interests
	%	%	%
1. <u>Community as a whole</u>			
Left (1 to 3)	16	19	14
Centre (4 to 7)	56	57	56
Right (8 to 10)	17	16	19
Don't know	11	8	11
Total	100	100	100
Index	5.52	5.40	5.62
2. <u>By country</u> (index only)			
Belgique/België	6.14	6.01	6.23
Danmark	5.40	5.84	5.13
Deutschland	6.08	6.02	6.09
France	5.18	4.94	5.55
Ireland	6.54	6.45	6.57
Italia	4.54	4.40	4.75
Luxembourg	6.09	6.04	6.14
Nederland	5.70	5.56	6.05
United Kingdom	5.93	6.07	5.79

6. VIEWS ON EUROPEAN RADIO BROADCASTS

Previous surveys have shown that members of the European public feel that they are not adequately informed on European affairs in general and direct elections in particular¹.

In an attempt to improve the situation the BBC has made proposals to other Community radio networks for the introduction in the fairly near future, or at least in time for direct elections, of a thirty-minute European news programme to go out on the air daily in several languages.

In an attempt to sound out public opinion on such a move, the following question was asked?

"There is a proposal to have regular broadcasts over radio stations throughout Europe (or throughout the Common Market). These would give news about the campaigns for elections to the European Parliament in the different countries. For example, there may be news of speeches and debates, the views of politicians and parties, etc. Would you be very interested, quite interested, little interested or not at all in such broadcasts?"

The answer speaks for itself: despite the fact that there are as yet no definite plans, on average 50% of those questioned claimed that they would be interested; the percentage was slightly higher in Italy and Luxembourg and slightly lower in Belgium, Ireland and the United Kingdom.

As was to be expected, most interest was shown by opinion leaders and those who attached greatest importance to direct elections. However, nearly one in four non-leaders and contacts who regarded the elections as an event of little importance expressed enthusiasm for the idea. All in all, there would definitely seem to be enough support to justify the experiment.

(See Table 54)

¹ More than half the general public (55%) in the Community as a whole felt that they were not being given enough information either in the newspapers or on the radio or television on the European Parliament and the forthcoming elections. See Euro-Barometer No 7, July 1977, pp. 82 and 83.

Table 54

PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE PLAN FOR EUROPEAN RADIO BROADCASTS

(October/November 1977)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very interested	16	<u>23</u>	11	16	16	<u>19</u>	<u>21</u>	15	11	15
Little interested	28	<u>27</u>	36	39	28	<u>38</u>	<u>33</u>	39	31	35
Not very interested	23	25	32	21	27	<u>23</u>	<u>26</u>	25	27	26
Not at all interested	26	22	17	21	25	18	16	19	30	21
Don't know	7	3	4	3	4	2	4	2	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.37	2.52	2.43	2.52	2.37	<u>2.59</u>	<u>2.61</u>	2.51	2.23	2.44

¹Weighted average.

²"Very interested" = 4; "not at all interested" = 1.

CONCLUSIONS

Each of the six-monthly Euro-Barometer opinion polls makes its own contribution to building up a comprehensive picture of public opinion, attitudes and behaviour in the European Community: the characters - each and every citizen of "the Nine" - (comparison in terms of space) viewed against a constantly changing backcloth (comparison in terms of time).

The issues dealt with here fall under two main headings: firstly, what could be termed "the general mood" of the European public at the end of 1977 and secondly, attitudes to the Community in general and the forthcoming direct elections to the European Parliament in particular.

1. The public mood

The feeling of satisfaction with the life we lead remains at its previous high level; reactions were fairly consistent for all social groups within the different countries although there were signs that the inhabitants of large towns and contacts in low income brackets tended to be less satisfied with their lot than other members of the public. The citizens of the smaller Community countries - Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland - turned out once again to be much more satisfied with life than their fellow Europeans in the larger countries, particularly France and Italy.

It would be worth pursuing this further in a separate study on space conditioning, the way in which it affects the life we lead and our perception of it.

Public opinion on the expected trend in living standards is a valuable indication of whether the prevalent mood is one of optimism or pessimism.

By comparison with the spring of 1976 there has been an increase in optimistic replies; this could be indicative of a lessening of the concern caused by the economic crisis. Top of the optimists' league were Ireland, the United Kingdom and Germany. By contrast unease was expressed by the Dutch, the French and the Belgians in growing proportions.

An interesting exercise consisted of combining and analysing the replies to the question on satisfaction/dissatisfaction with life and the question on the expected trend in living standards, thereby, producing four categories of contacts: the satisfied optimists, the satisfied pessimists, the dissatisfied optimists and the dissatisfied pessimists. Findings showed that the last group - the most "critical" in that the symptom is often the precursor of crisis - accounts for 8% of the population in the Community as a whole and as many as 11% in France and 14% in Italy. (pp. 9-15)

A further valuable indicator worth retaining is the degree of satisfaction with the way democracy works.

Successive polls dating back to September 1973 have shown that once again the smaller countries are among the most satisfied, second however to Germany, which has headed the list since 1976. France and Italy were still in the bottom two positions, although there was a slight improvement between the spring and autumn of 1977. (pp. 16-18)

A question of a more political nature, confronting contacts with three possible courses of action vis-a-vis society - radical change by revolutionary action, gradual improvement by reform, valiant defence against all subversive forces - also emerged this time round as a reliable indicator.

"Revolutionary action" is very much a minority option in most Community countries and would seem to be losing what little support it has in Italy and France. The "defence against subversion" option continues to gain ground almost everywhere but at a slower rate. However, 50% of the German public were in favour of this approach, doubtless by way of reaction to the terrorist activities of recent months. In brief, the pattern to emerge over the past few years is one of a fairly generalized and steady erosion of the "reformist consensus"; but it is impossible at this stage to work out to what extent this development is attributable to the circumstances of the moment and to what extent the causes are more deeply rooted. (pp. 19-27)

Fears of a third world war are not particularly widespread: 32% of those interviewed felt that there was no danger on this front, while only 9% felt the same about an increase in social tension leading to civil disorder.

Fears on the war front were most acute in the Netherlands, while on the civil disorder front it was Italy and the Netherlands again who were the most pessimistic.

The concern of the Italians goes hand in hand with their current dissatisfaction with life in general, while the concern of the Dutch could well explain their gloomy view of the future discussed above.

Also of interest is the fact that fear of an outbreak of war or civil disorder seems slightly more frequent among women than men, especially the better educated. This hypothesis would have to be confirmed but it could well open up an interesting avenue of research into the respective fears and aspirations of both sexes and the resulting differences in socio-political attitudes and behaviour. (pp. 28-35)

Two new questions were asked in an attempt to provide insight into public attitudes towards movements concerned with environmental protection and women's liberation.

Generally speaking, movements for the protection of the environment are much more highly rated by the general public, men and women alike, than women's lib movements: 78% had a high opinion of the former, as compared with only 46% in the case of the latter.

Issues connected with women's lib will be dealt with in a special study to be published in the next few months. However, analysis of the answers relating to ecologists shows that their public image is as popular as it is unclear.

Reactions were conditioned very little by contacts' political leanings. Optimists with high hopes of an improvement in living standards turned out to be warm supporters, as did "post-materialists", i.e. those who

claim that they are more concerned with the "quality of life" than with security and prosperity. However, surprisingly enough, supporters also included those who were satisfied with the way democracy works - we say "surprisingly enough" because "post-materialists" generally have reservations on this particular front.

A longer and more detailed analysis would be necessary to throw more light on the image projected by ecologists and their potential influence as a political force at national and at European level.

(pp. 36-43)

2. The "Common Market" and the European Community

The general climate did not prompt clearcut answers: a general question on the pattern of understanding between member countries over the last twelve months was either answered in neutral terms (38%) or not answered at all (15%) by more than half of those interviewed. In all countries except Denmark and the Netherlands most of those who had noticed a change felt that it was for the better. Not surprisingly, opinion leaders were much more outspoken than the general public, opting for the positive answer in Belgium, the United Kingdom and Germany, and the negative answer in France and the Netherlands.

(pp. 44-46)

None the less, the image of the Community - or the "Common Market" as it is more widely known - is still good, having changed very little over the last six months. Six in ten of those interviewed in the founder member countries regarded it as "a good thing", and the Irish were not far behind. In Denmark and the United Kingdom pro-marketeers and anti-marketeers were more or less neck and neck, although in Denmark the positive opinion does seem to be regaining ground.

On a longer-term basis the Community is more popular: in the United Kingdom, for example, the 35% in favour "as things stand at present" jumped to 48% when the question was rephrased to read ten to fifteen years' time".

Once again opinion leaders were generally more enthusiastic. (pp. 47-57)

An idea of what the public expects of the Community comes across fairly clearly in the answer to the question on solidarity among member countries, i.e. the help which Community countries should give to any member experiencing major economic difficulties. Eight in ten of those interviewed came out in favour of Community solidarity; support **was** particularly strong among opinion leaders. Without denying the element of facile generosity in replies of this type, it can be assumed fairly confidently that plans for economic and monetary union, provided they are well thought out and clearly explained, would receive widespread public backing.

(pp. 58-60)

How does the public feel about Greece, Portugal and Spain becoming members of the Community? Generally speaking approximately 20% of those interviewed did not reply, and of the remainder a good third was non-committal. However, in all the countries except Denmark those in favour outnumbered those against.

The pattern of opinion was very similar for all three applicants: Spain was slightly more popular, possibly on account of its being considered "nearer" than the other two.

(pp. 61-65)

3. Election of the European Parliament

The opinion poll was conducted before postponement of the election date as a result of the difficulties encountered by the United Kingdom.

Reactions to the principle of direct elections remain generally favourable: support in Ireland and the United Kingdom is now more or less on a par with the average recorded in the six founder member countries, and Denmark too is rapidly moving up the scale.

However, neither the broad consensus on the principle of direct elections nor the fact that one in two of those interviewed (and more than six in ten of those who replied) regarded elections as "an event with important consequences" must be allowed to conceal the low level of commitment.

This lack of involvement is demonstrated conclusively by the answers to the question on determination to vote: only one citizen in every two turned out to be a "definite" voter. These answers, given before the election campaign even starts, cannot obviously be taken as a forecast of what will in fact happen, but as an indicator of relative indifference they must be taken seriously.

Admittedly, more than two thirds of opinion leaders claimed that they would definitely turn out to vote, but the task of convincing potential non-voters will not be an easy one.

(pp. 65-82)

The information effort involved will fall primarily to the political parties and other socio-political organizations, but the mass media will also have a part to play. In this connection the answer to a question designed to sound out public opinion on the possible introduction of European radio broadcasts is significant: 50% of those interviewed expressed interest.

(pp. 83-84)

x

x

x

It was not until after the opinion poll was carried out that it became clear that elections would have to be postponed until the autumn of 1978 or the spring of 1979. We must make the most of this extra time in order to become better acquainted with the electorate, and to identify more clearly the poles of interest, aspirations and fears of the public in the different countries.

Once again this survey has demonstrated that the widespread support for the European venture and, in nearly all the countries concerned, the European Community has not yet found a means of political expression.

EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION IN BRIEF

Main results of Euro-Barometer No 8 (October/November) 1977
and comparison with results of previous surveys

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
<u>Satisfaction or dissatisfaction</u>										
<u>The life we lead</u>										
Satisfied	90	94	85	73	89	62	89	92	87	79
(April/May 1977)	89	96	81	69	88	59	90	92	82	75
Dissatisfied	9	6	14	26	11	38	10	7	13	18
(April/May 1977)	10	4	17	31	12	41	10	7	18	24
<u>The way democracy works</u>										
Satisfied	51	67	78	49	69	19	68	64	62	54
(April/May 1977)	56	63	78	45	62	12	71	67	58	51
Dissatisfied	28	30	18	40	22	78	24	32	30	39
(April/May 1977)	31	29	18	45	33	86	25	29	37	44
<u>Optimism or pessimism</u>										
<u>Living standards over the next five years</u>										
Will improve	39	50	57	45	73	54	49	32	65	54
(May/June 1976)	39	34	49	46	66	41	44	25	55	46
Will get worse	30	25	15	31	14	27	33	26	15	22
(May/June 1976)	27	:	18	27	20	25	19	35	24	24
<u>European Community</u>										
<u>Pattern of understanding between member countries over last twelve months</u>										
Progression	21	19	26	24	42	35	28	14	32	28
Regression	18	31	24	16	9	18	19	24	17	19
<u>Views on membership of the European Community</u>										
(a) <u>As things stand at present</u>										
Good thing	60	37	59	57	59	70	73	74	35	56
(April/May 1977)	69	30	54	64	57	71	84	80	35	57

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ²
Bad thing	5	33	7	9	19	5	3	5	37	14
(April/May 1977)	4	30	8	6	17	5	2	3	40	14
(b) <u>In ten to fifteen</u> <u>years' time</u>										
Good thing	59	34	58	58	64	72	73	75	48	59
Bad thing	5	30	7	6	15	5	4	4	26	11
<u>Election of the European</u> <u>Parliament</u>										
<u>Principle of elections</u>										
For	63	54	73	70	74	79	76	77	69	72
(April/May 1977)	64	44	69	74	76	80	85	82	67	72
Against	12	29	11	14	11	9	14	10	18	13
(April/May 1977)	13	27	8	12	12	10	7	9	22	13
<u>Importance attached to</u> <u>elections</u>										
Event with important consequences	49	44	46	49	48	59	52	52	47	50
(April/May 1977)	55	40	41	58	50	62	64	58	51	53
Unimportant event	20	31	35	27	24	25	28	33	32	30
(April/May 1977)	16	25	37	23	28	22	20	28	29	27
<u>Determination to vote</u>										
Certainly	36	53	34	59	54	64	49	63	47	50
(April/May 1977)	37	42	28	51	52	64	44	60	47	47
Probably	22	17	36	17	26	20	26	18	27	25
(April/May 1977)	21	18	36	26	26	20	35	22	26	27

ANNEXES ET TABLEAUX DETAILLES / APPENDIX AND DETAILED TABLES

1. INSTITUTS CHARGES DU SONDAGE ET SPECIALISTES RESPONSABLES /
INSTITUTES WHICH CARRIED OUT THE SURVEY AND EXPERTS IN CHARGE

Belgique/België	(B)	DIMARSO/INRA	Patrick DAVIES
Danmark	(DK)	GALLUP MARKEDSANALYSE	Rolf RANDRUP
Deutschland	(D)	EMNID-INSTITUT	Günther BIERBAUM
France	(F)	INSTITUT FRANCAIS D'OPINION PUBLIQUE (*)	Hélène RIFFAULT
Ireland	(IRL)	IRISH MARKETING SURVEYS	John MEAGHER
Italia	(I)	ISTITUTO PER LE RICERCHE STA- TISTICHE E L'ANALISI DELL'OPI- NIONE PUBBLICA (DOXA)	Ennio SALAMON
Luxembourg	(L)	DIMARSO/INRA	Patrick DAVIES
Nederland	(N)	NEDERLANDS INSTITUUT VOOR DE PUBLIEKE OPINIE (NIPO)	Jan STAPEL
United Kingdom	(UK)	SOCIAL SURVEYS (GALLUP POLL) (xx+)	Norman WEBB

(*) Chargé en outre de la coordination internationale et de l'analyse des résultats / Also responsible for international coordination and analysis of the results.

(xx) Le sondage en Northern Ireland est fait en collaboration par le Irish Marketing Surveys et le Gallup Poll / The Northern Ireland survey is conducted jointly by Irish Marketing Surveys and the Social Surveys (Gallup Poll).

2. ECHANTILLONNAGE / SAMPLING

L'objectif de la méthode d'échantillonnage est de couvrir de façon représentative la totalité de la population des neuf pays de la Communauté âgée de 15 ans et plus.

L'échantillon de chaque pays est constitué à deux niveaux:

1° Régions et localités d'enquête.

Les statistiques de la Communauté européenne divisent l'espace européen en 120 régions (voir liste ci-jointe). L'enquête a lieu dans 117 régions (Corse, Groenland et Val d'Aoste exceptés).

Chaque pays a constitué aléatoirement un échantillon-maître de localités d'enquête de telle sorte que toutes les catégories d'habitat soient représentées proportionnellement à leurs populations respectives.

Au total, les interviews de l'enquête Omnibus Européenne ont lieu dans pas moins de 1 100 points d'enquête couvrant les 117 régions de la Communauté.

2° Choix des personnes interrogées.

Les personnes interrogées sont toujours différentes d'une enquête à l'autre. L'échantillon-maître aléatoire évoqué ci-dessus indique le nombre de personnes à interroger à chaque point d'enquête. Au stade suivant, les personnes à interroger sont désignées:

- soit par un tirage au sort sur liste dans les pays où on peut avoir accès à des listes exhaustives d'individus ou de foyers: Belgique, Pays-Bas, Danemark, Luxembourg.
- soit par échantillonnage stratifié sur la base des statistiques de recensement, l'échantillon étant construit à partir des critères de sexe, âge et profession: France, Italie, Royaume-Uni, Irlande, Allemagne.

The sample has been designed to be representative of the total population aged 15 years and over of the nine countries of the Community.

In each country a two stage sampling method is used:

1° Geographical distribution.

For statistical purposes the European Community divides Europe into 120 regions (see attached list). The survey takes place in 117 of these regions (Corsica, Groenland and Val d'Aoste excluded).

In each country a random selection of sampling points is made in such a way that all types of area (urban, rural, etc.) are represented in proportion to their populations.

The interviews are distributed in more than 1 100 sampling points in the 117 regions of the Community.

2° Choice of respondents.

For each survey different individuals are interviewed in the master sample of sampling points described above. Within these sampling points the individuals to be interviewed are chosen:

- either at random from the population or electoral lists in those countries where access to suitable lists of individuals or households is possible: Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg.
- or by quota sampling. In these cases the quotas are established by sex, age and profession on the basis of census data: this system is used in France, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany.

BELGIQUE/BELGIE

AN : Antwerpen
W.V. : West-Vlaanderen
O.V. : Oost-Vlaanderen
BR : Brabant
LI : Limburg
LIE : Liège
HAI : Hainaut
NA : Namur
LX : Luxembourg

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

S.H. : Schleswig-Holstein
STA : Stade
AUR : Aurich
OLD : Oldenburg
B : Bremen
LUN : Luneburg
BR : Braunschweig
OSN : Osnabrück
HAN : Hannover
MUN : Münster
DET : Detmold
HIL : Hildesheim
DUS : Düsseldorf
ARN : Arnsberg
KAS : Kassel
AA : Aachen
KOL : Köln
TRI : Trier
KOB : Koblenz
DA.WI. : Darmstadt-Wiesbaden
U.F. : Unterfranken
O.F. : Oberfranken
SAA : Saarland
RH.PF. : Rheinhessen-Pfalz
N.B. : Nordbaden
N.W. : Nordwürttemberg
M.F. : Mittelfranken
O.PF. : Oberpfalz
N.BAY. : Niederbayern
S.B. : Südbaden
S.W. : Südwürttemberg
SCH : Schwaben
O.BAY. : Oberbayern
BER : Berlin

DANMARK

JYLL : Jylland
SJAE : Sjælland
FYN : Fyn
GRØ : Grønland

FRANCE

NORD : Nord
PIC : Picardie
H.N. : Haute-Normandie
R.P. : Région Parisienne
CHA : Champagne
LOR : Lorraine

AL : Alsace
B.N. : Basse-Normandie
BRE : Bretagne
P.LOI : Pays de la Loire
CEN : Centre
BOU : Bourgogne
F.C. : Franche-Comté
P.CH : Poitou-Charentes
LIM : Limousin
AUV : Auvergne
R-A : Rhône-Alpes
AQU : Aquitaine
M.P. : Midi-Pyrénées
LAN : Languedoc
P.CDA : Provence-Côte d'Azur
COR : Corse

IRELAND

DON : Donegal
N.W. : North West
N.E. : North East
W. : West
M. : Midlands
E. : East
M.W. : Mid West
S.E. : South East
S.W. : South West

ITALIA

V.D.A. : Valle d'Aosta
PIE : Piemonte
LOM : Lombardia
T.AA : Trentino-Alto Adige
VEN : Veneto
F.V.G. : Friuli-Venezia Giulia
LIG : Liguria
E-R : Emilia-Romagna
TOS : Toscana
UMB : Umbria
MAR : Marche
LAZ : Lazio
ABR : Abruzzi
MOL : Molise
CAM : Campania
PUG : Puglia
BAS : Basilicata
CAL : Calabria
SIC : Sicilia
SAR : Sardegna

LUXEMBOURG

LX : G.D. du Luxembourg

NEDERLAND

GR : Groningen
FR : Friesland
DR : Drenthe
OV : Overijssel
NH : Noord-Holland
GEL : Gelderland

ZH : Zuid-Holland
UT : Utrecht
ZE : Zeeland
N.B. : Noord-Brabant
LI : Limburg

UNITED KINGDOM

SCOTL : Scotland
N. : North
N.I. : Northern Ireland
N.W. : North West
Y.H. : Yorkshire and Humberside
WALES : Wales
W.M. : West Midlands
E.M. : East Midlands
E.A. : East Anglia
S.W. : South West
S.E. : South East

3. POPULATION ETUDIEE, TAILLE DES ECHANTILLONS, DATES DU TRAVAIL /
SURVEYD POPULATION, SIZE OF THE SAMPLES, DATES OF FIELDWORK

	Population (1)		Echantillons / samples (Baro 8)	Dates (Baro 8)
	milliers / thousands	%		
B	7 582	3.84	1006	24/X - 4/XI/1977
DK	3 909	1.98	992	1-8/XI
D	48 507	24.54	999	27/X - 7/XI
F	39 983	20.23	1149 (2)	24/X - 7/XI
IRL	2 148	1.09	997	27/X - 7/XI
I	42 194	21.35	1155	28/X - 15/XI
L	286	0.14	344	24/X - 7/XI
N	10 115	5.12	943	27/X - 7/XI
UK	42 910	21.71	1351	24/X - 7/XI
CE/EC	197 634	100.00	8936	

4. RECOMMANDATION AU LECTEUR / ADVICE TO READERS

Il est rappelé que, dans les enquêtes par sondage, on doit tenir compte d'une certaine marge pour erreur d'échantillonnage. Avec des échantillons de l'ordre de 1000 personnes interrogées, les différences de pourcentages inférieures à 5% ne devraient pas être normalement considérées comme statistiquement significatives.

Readers are reminded that in survey research, one should allow a certain margin for sampling error. With a sample of 1 000 cases, percentage differences of less than 5 points would not normally be regarded as statistically significant.

(1) 15 ans et plus / 15 years and over.

(2) Y compris surreprésentation de 145 ruraux / Including oversampling of 145 country-people.

Tableau 1 / Table 1
JUGEMENT PORTE SUR L'APPARTENANCE A LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE /
ATTITUDE TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)

		BELGIQUE / BELGIE											
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77					
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%					
57	68	60	57	59	62	66	69	60					
5	3	6	3	3	5	3	4	5					
19	15	18	21	21	17	19	17	19					
19	14	16	19	17	16	12	10	16					
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1017	1505	1507	1000	963	1077	988	1006					
		DEUTSCHLAND											
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77					
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%					
63	59	62	56	61	48	57	54	59					
4	8	10	8	6	12	5	8	7					
22	26	20	28	27	30	31	23	24					
11	7	8	8	6	10	7	15	10					
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1060	1042	1039	1002	1004	1007	1005	999					

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /
Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /
Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

(1) "D'une façon générale, pensez-vous que le fait (pour votre pays) de faire partie de la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) est une bonne chose, une mauvaise chose, ou une chose ni bonne ni mauvaise?" / "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"

FRANCE

IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77				
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%				
61	68	63	64	67	57	52	64	57				
5	5	6	4	4	7	7	6	9				
22	20	22	25	24	30	35	24	28				
12	7	9	7	5	6	6	6	6				
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				
2227	1308	1237	1156	1276	1241	1356	1256	1149				

- Bonne chose / Good thing
 - Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
 - Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /
 Neither good nor bad
 - Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

ITALIA

IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77				
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%				
69	77	82	71	75	63	68	71	70				
2	5	3	3	4	6	5	5	5				
15	9	11	21	16	20	16	18	18				
14	9	4	5	5	11	11	6	7				
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				
1909	1030	1021	1043	1110	923	1052	1025	1155				

- Bonne chose / Good thing
 - Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
 - Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /
 Neither good nor bad
 - Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

LUXEMBOURG

IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77				
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%				
67	79	73	65	78	66	77	84	73				
3	4	3	7	4	5	2	2	3				
22	12	13	19	12	21	17	11	17				
8	5	11	9	6	8	4	3	7				
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				
330	308	297	311	297	268	301	302	344				

- Bonne chose / Good thing
 - Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
 - Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /
 Neither good nor bad
 - Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

NEDERLAND										
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77		
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
63	66	70	64	67	75	74	80	74		
4	4	6	3	3	4	4	3	5		
20	14	15	18	12	15	14	13	16		
13	16	9	15	18	6	8	4	5		
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
1464	1000	1012	1093	1006	904	1123	1033	943		

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

DANMARK										
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77		
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
42	35	33	36	41	36	29	30	37		
30	31	35	25	27	29	34	30	33		
19	24	25	28	24	22	28	30	24		
9	10	7	11	8	13	9	10	6		
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
1199	1168	1100	1073	1023	977	962	1010	992		

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

IRELAND										
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77		
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
56	48	50	50	67	50	50	57	59		
15	25	24	20	12	16	22	17	19		
21	19	22	25	17	18	22	22	19		
8	8	4	5	4	6	6	4	3		
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
1199	1000	1000	1000	998	1007	981	1008	997		

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM

X/72 (1)	IX/73 (2)	V/74 (2)	XI/74 (2)	V/75 (2)	XI/75 (2)	I/76 (1)	II/76 (1)	V/76 (2)	VII/76 (1)	IX/76 (1)	XI/76 (2)	I/77 (3)	IV-V 76 (2)
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
40	31	33	36	47	50	50	49	39	39	33	39	35	35
21	34	39	35	21	24	24	26	35	31	37	34	41	40
22	22	19	20	19	18	17	17	18	21	19	21	24	22
17	13	9	9	13	8	9	8	8	9	11	6	24	3
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1028	1933	1031	1039	1328	1438	1077	992	1340	1038	976	1351	1697	1417

Suite / contd.

VI/77 (1)	X/77 (1)	XI/77 (2)											
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
33	37	35											
42	33	37											
18	22	23											
7	8	5											
100	100	100											
945	954	1351											

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

- (1) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more, only Great Britain. / Population de 18 ans et au-delà, seulement Grande-Bretagne.
- (2) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Great Britain from 1973 to 1974; United Kingdom as from 1975 / Population de 15 ans et au-delà. Grande-Bretagne de 1973 à 1974; Royaume-Uni depuis 1975.
- (3) NOP Market Research. Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain. / Population de 18 ans et au-delà, seulement Grande-Bretagne.

Tableau 2 / Table 2

L'ATTITUDE EN CAS D'ABANDON DU MARCHÉ COMMUN /
ATTITUDE IF THE COMMON MARKET HAD BEEN SCRAPPED (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE										DEUTSCHLAND									
	VII/71	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77				VII/71	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%				%	%	%	%	%	%	%			%
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	25	39	48	42	39	42	44				52	57	53	55	55	53	53			53
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	53	44	30	33	33	34	34				29	24	28	27	27	31	25			25
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	4	3	2	4	2	2	5				7	4	5	6	5	4	5			5
- Sans réponse / No reply	18	14	20	21	26	22	17				12	15	14	12	13	12	17			17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				100	100	100	100	100	100	100			100
N	1364	1266	1017	1505	1507	1000	1006				2000	1957	1060	1042	1039	1002	999			999
	FRANCE										ITALIA									
	VII/71	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77				VII/71	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%				%	%	%	%	%	%	%			%
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	31	42	56	50	56	50	45				35	41	60	65	52	45	48			48
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	52	43	30	33	31	37	39				38	44	22	23	35	38	38			38
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	5	2	3	4	4	3	6				3	1	4	2	3	3	4			4
- Sans réponse / No reply	12	13	11	13	9	10	10				24	14	14	10	10	14	10			10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				100	100	100	100	100	100	100			100
N	1806	2227	1308	1237	1156	1276	1149				2000	1909	1030	1021	1043	1110	1155			1155

(1) De 1971 à 1973: "Si l'on vous annonçait demain que le Marché commun est abandonné...". En 1974 et mai 1975: "Si l'on vous annonçait demain que (votre pays) quitte la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) ...". A partir de novembre 1975: "Si l'on vous annonçait demain que la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) est abandonnée...". / From 1971 to 1973: "If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped ...". In 1974 and May 1975: "If you were to be told tomorrow that (your country) was leaving the Common Market ...". As from November 1975: "If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped....".

Eprouveraient / Would be: - De grands regrets / Very sorry - De l'indifférence / Indifferent - Un vif soulagement / Relieved - Sans réponse / No reply Total N	LUXEMBOURG							NEDERLAND						
	VII/71	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77	VII/71	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	36	51	73	70	58	60	64	40	46	54	56	50	50	59
	42	35	17	16	22	24	25	35	37	20	25	27	28	29
	6	3	3	2	7	2	2	10	4	4	5	3	2	4
	16	11	7	12	13	14	9	15	13	22	14	20	20	8
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	302	330	308	297	311	297	344	1198	1464	1000	1012	1093	1006	943
Eprouveraient / Would be: - De grands regrets / Very sorry - De l'indifférence / Indifferent - Un vif soulagement / Relieved - Sans réponse / No reply Total N	DANMARK							IRELAND						
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77		IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	30	27	27	33	33	30		37	38	48	46	51	47	
	29	27	24	22	26	25		40	27	22	32	30	30	
	29	31	35	26	26	34		17	28	24	19	14	18	
	12	15	14	19	15	11		16	7	6	3	5	5	
	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100	100	
	1199	1168	1100	1073	1023	992		1199	1000	1000	1000	998	997	

GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM													
X/72 (1)	I/73 (1)	III-IV 73 (1)	IV-V 73 (1)	VI/73 (1)	VII/73 (1)	IX/73 (1)	IX/73 (2)	X/73 (1)	XI/73 (1)	I-II 74 (1)	III-IV 74 (1)	IV/74 (1)	V/74 (1)
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
26	27	28	21	26	20	21	20	21	23	19	27	24	25
- De grands regrets / Very sorry													
33	28	27	26	24	22	24	33	26	24	26	23	21	33
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent													
35	31	36	41	41	48	46	37	44	42	48	43	43	44
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved													
6	14	9	12	9	10	9	10	9	11	7	7	12	8
- Sans réponse / No reply													
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1028	924	873	885	998	818	1933	902	906	1054	1055	1007	985
VII/74 (1)	VIII/74 (1)	X/74 (1)	XI/74 (2)	I/75 (1)	V/75 (2)	XI/75 (2)	I/76 (1)	II/76 (1)	VII / 76 (1)	IX/76 (1)	VI/77 (1)	X /77 (1)	XI/77 (2)
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
28	24	26	31	24	41	40	37	34	28	25	26	28	31
- De grands regrets / Very sorry													
21	22	24	22	24	27	28	30	30	30	30	24	30	31
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent													
44	47	38	38	40	23	26	24	28	35	34	42	32	32
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved													
7	7	12	9	12	9	6	9	8	7	11	8	10	6
- Sans réponse / No reply													
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	908	817	1039	988	1328	1438	1077	992	1038	976	945	954	1351

(1) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain. Slight difference in the wording of the question: in 1972, "very sorry, indifferent, pleased"; from V/75: "very sorry, indifferent, relieved".

(2) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Only Great Britain from 1973 to 1974; United Kingdom from 1975.

	EURO 6								COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY							
	VIII/71	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77		VII/71	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Eprouveraient / Would be:																
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	40	41	56	56	53	49	50			41	48	49	50	47	45	
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	40	36	26	27	31	35	33			36	27	26	30	33	32	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	5	10	4	4	4	3	5			10	13	13	9	9	12	
- Sans réponse / No reply	15	13	14	14	12	13	12			13	12	12	11	11	11	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	8670	9153	5723	6114	6149	5691	5596			13484	8922	9253	9550	9150	8936	

Tableau 3 / Table 3

POUR OU CONTRE L'ELECTION DU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN AU SUFFRAGE UNIVERSEL DIRECT /
FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE (1)

		BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	IX/73 %	V/75 %	XI/75 %	V/76 %	XI/76 %	V/77 %	XI/77 %				
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	23	23	20	31	37	33	33				
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	29	32	33	28	32	31	30				
Total "pour" / Total "for"	52	55	53	59	69	64	63				
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	8	6	5	7	5	7	8				
- Tout à fait contre / completely against	6	3	4	4	4	6	4				
Total "contre" / Total "against"	14	9	9	11	9	13	12				
Sans réponse / No answer	34	36	38	30	22	23	25				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1266	1507	1000	963	1077	988	1006				

(1) "(...) Il est prévu d'élire les membres du Parlement européen dans chacun des pays de la Communauté européenne, y compris (le vôtre). Tous les citoyens seront appelés à voter. Vous-même, êtes-vous pour ou contre cette élection ?" /

"(...) In 1978 elections for the European Parliament are planned in every country of the Common Market, including (your country) Everybody will be entitled to vote. Are you, yourself, for or against this particular élection ?

(Légères différences de formulation d'un sondage à l'autre / Slight differences of wording from one survey to the other).

DEUTSCHLAND										
	IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	29	28	23	25	27	23	28			
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	40	48	50	42	49	46	45			
Total "pour" / Total "for"	69	76	73	67	76	69	73			
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	9	6	9	10	7	6	8			
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against	3	2	2	5	3	2	3			
Total "contre" / Total "against"	12	8	11	15	10	8	11			
- Sans réponse / No reply	19	16	16	18	14	23	16			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1957	1039	1002	1004	1007	1005	999			

FRANCE										
	IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	22	33	26	28	27	28	34			
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	29	35	43	38	42	46	36			
Total "pour" / Total "for"	51	68	69	66	69	74	70			
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	11	9	9	10	9	9	8			
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against	7	6	4	7	4	3	6			
Total "contre" / Total "against"	18	15	13	17	13	12	14			
- Sans réponse / No reply	31	17	18	17	18	14	16			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	2227	1156	1276	1241	1356	1256	1149			

ITALIA										
	IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	34	37	38	42	40	43	45			
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	30	40	40	32	37	37	34			
Total "pour" / Total "for"	64	77	78	74	77	80	79			
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	8	6	5	6	5	7	7			
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against	4	2	3	2	3	3	2			
Total "contre" / Total "against"	12	8	8	8	8	10	9			
- Sans réponse / No reply	24	15	14	18	15	10	12			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1909	1043	1110	923	1052	1025	1155			

LUXEMBOURG										
	IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77			
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	40	36	31	36	44	43	42			
	27	33	44	35	33	42	34			
Total "pour"/ Total "for"	67	69	75	71	77	85	76			
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	8	7	6	5	8	5	11			
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against	4	3	1	4	1	2	3			
Total "contre"/ Total "against"	12	10	7	9	9	7	14			
- Sans réponse / No reply	21	21	18	20	14	8	10			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	330	311	297	268	301	302	344			

	NEDERLAND									
	IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77			
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	32	28	27	43	38	52	44			
	30	29	32	31	36	30	33			
Total "pour" / Total "for"	62	57	59	74	74	82	77			
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	11	7	6	8	6	6	6			
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against	5	7	5	6	5	3	4			
Total "contre" / Total "against"	16	14	11	14	11	9	10			
Sans réponse / No reply	22	29	30	12	15	9	13			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1464	1093	1006	904	1123	1033	943			

	DANMARK									
	IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77			
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	20	15	13	18	22	22	27			
	16	20	19	22	20	22	27			
Total "pour" / Total "for"	36	35	32	40	42	44	54			
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	18	12	18	17	16	12	14			
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against	25	21	25	25	21	15	15			
Total "contre" / Total "against"	43	33	43	42	37	27	29			
Sans réponse / No reply	21	32	25	18	21	29	17			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1199	1073	1023	977	962	1010	992			

IRELAND										
	IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	15	20	19	24	29	46	49			
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	30	35	37	33	34	30	25			
Total "pour" / Total "for"	45	55	56	57	63	76	74			
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	17	13	15	17	9	6	6			
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against	14	9	8	8	5	6	5			
Total "contre" / Total "against"	31	22	23	25	14	12	11			
Sans réponse / No reply	24	23	21	18	23	12	15			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1199	1000	998	1007	981	1008	997			

UNITED KINGDOM											
IX/73 (2)	V/75	XI/75	I/76 (3)	II/76 (3)	V/76	VII/76	XI/76	V/77	VI/77 (3)	XI/77	
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
11	16	13	15	13	14	13	30	42	16	42	
22	25	28	29	28	26	28	27	25	30	27	
33	41	41	44	41	40	41	57	67	46	69	
19	16	18	15	15	19	17	8	10	16	9	
30	27	24	19	20	29	19	14	12	19	9	
49	43	42	34	35	48	36	22	22	35	18	
18	16	17	22	24	12	23	21	11	19	13	
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
1933	1328	1438	1077	992	1340	1038	1351	1417	945	1351	

- Tout à fait pour / Completely for
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for

Total "pour" / Total "for"

- Plutôt contre / To some extent against
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against

Total "contre" / Total "against"

Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

(2) Great Britain.
(3) Great Britain. 18 years and more.

EURO 6										
	IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	28	31	28	34	32	33	36			
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	33	40	43	36	42	41	38			
Total "pour" / Total "for"	61	71	71	70	74	74	74			
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	9	7	8	8	7	7	8			
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against	5	4	3	4	3	3	3			
Total "contre" / Total "against"	14	11	11	12	10	10	11			
Sans réponse / No reply	25	18	18	18	16	16	15			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	9153	6149	5691	5303	5916	5609	5596			

COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY										
	IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	24	27	25	28	31	34	37			
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	30	36	39	34	38	38	35			
Total "pour" / Total "for"	54	63	64	62	69	72	72			
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	12	9	10	11	8	8	8			
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against	11	9	8	10	6	5	5			
Total "contre" / Total "against"	23	18	18	21	14	13	13			
Sans réponse / No reply	23	19	18	17	17	15	15			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	13 484	9550	9150	8627	9210	9044	8936			

