

# euro-barometre

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PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



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EURO-BAROMETER No 7

Initial results





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## INTRODUCTION

The results given below were produced by an opinion poll conducted in the nine member countries of the European Community between 23 April and 15 May 1977. A total of 9 044 people representing a cross-section of the population aged 15 and over were questioned by interviewers from eight specialist institutes.

The decision taken by the European Commission early in 1974 to conduct a six-monthly opinion poll in the spring and autumn of each year has provided an interesting addition to the numerous national polls on a wide variety of social and political issues carried out in the Community every day. Euro-Barometer polls are of special interest for a number of reasons:

- (i) Because they are European they allow of an accurate, detailed comparison of replies to identical sets of questions asked simultaneously in all nine countries<sup>2</sup>;
- (ii) Repetition of certain questions - every six months for some, at longer intervals for others - makes it possible to monitor changes in public opinion: the "takes" from successive polls are spliced together, as it were, to produce a "film sequence";
- (iii) Results are analysed in relative detail: they are first broken down by the usual criteria (sex, age, level of education, income bracket and so on)<sup>3</sup>, then subjected to a series of multiple classification analyses in an attempt to pinpoint possible links between all the replies given by an individual or a group of individuals, thus providing insight into the different factors which go to make up "public opinion";
- (iv) Lastly, the main results are published so that they can be perused, ~~used~~ and criticized by all concerned - politicians, journalists and the man-in-the-street<sup>4</sup>.

In accordance with normal practice, the European Commission disclaims all responsibility for this survey (questions, answers, results and commentaries), which was carried out by independent institutes.

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<sup>1</sup> Technical details (list of institutes which conducted the survey, date of interviews in each country, size of national samples, extent to which the findings can be interpreted and so on) are given in the Annex.

<sup>2</sup> Every precaution was taken to ensure that the questions, which were put in the interviewee's mother tongue, were formulated in the same way. Copies of the questionnaire in Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Italian and Letzeburgesch are available on request.

<sup>3</sup> An original feature of Euro-Barometer polls is that results are presented in a way which makes it possible to compare replies in terms of "leadership rating" (leadership = a tendency to discuss politics fairly frequently combined with the ability to persuade others). An explanation of how the leadership index was produced is given on page 10.

<sup>4</sup> All results and documents connected with these surveys are available for research work. Details of how to consult them are given in the Annex.

For Euro-Barometer No 7 the regular questions designed to gauge attitudes in general, and attitudes to the European Community (or the "Common Market") in particular, were supplemented by questions bearing on direct elections to the European Parliament.

I.

THE GENERAL MOOD  
OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC

A number of general questions are asked at intervals in an attempt to gauge what could be termed "the public mood": satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the life we lead, with the kind of society we live in, with the way democracy works in our countries, basic attitudes towards society and priority aims assigned to the social and political order. Obviously, replies to these questions are intrinsically interesting but their main value is revealed in subsequent classification analyses.

1. THE LIFE WE LEAD

"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?"

People who are unfamiliar with public opinion research often challenge questions of this kind: they wonder whether interviewees give "objective" or "honest" answers. Couched in these terms their objection is meaningless. Answers are obviously subjective: they do not necessarily reflect the interviewee's objective situation as male or female, young or old, rich or poor, but rather his general attitudes, his "mood" of the moment, which - as many studies have demonstrated - is much more influenced by his psychological and social make-up, his philosophy of life and his ideology than by the objective facets of his existence. As to "honesty" this is a moral concept which is quite out of place here. In any event, there is no prima facie reason for doubting the "honesty" of the replies, which can differ considerably and consistently from country to country, often over a long period.

For the Community as a whole, reactions to this question have changed very little since 1973 - and remember, a new sample is picked for each poll; approximately 75% of those interviewed claimed to be "very satisfied" or "fairly satisfied", while 25% were "not very satisfied" or "not at all satisfied".

(See Table 1)

Table 1

SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH THE LIFE WE LEAD

(Community as a whole<sup>1</sup>)

	September 1973	May 1975	Oct-Nov 1975	May-June 1976	November 1976	April-May 1977
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very satisfied	21	20	19	20	20	20
Fairly satisfied	58	57	56	55	55	55
Not very satisfied	16	16	17	18	18	18
Not at all satisfied	4	5	6	6	6	6
Don't know	1	2	2	1	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N <sup>2</sup>	13 484	9543	9150	8635	9210	9044

<sup>1</sup>Average weighted by respective populations aged 15 and over.  
<sup>2</sup>Number of people interviewed.

The differences from country to country are very marked, and again very stable. Satisfaction was more common and at a higher level in the smaller countries (Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium) than in the larger countries. But this stability - which can probably be explained by the fact that when someone talks in terms of being "generally satisfied" he means that he has reviewed his aspirations in line with his current situation - is not universal: a temporary fall-off in satisfaction was noted in the United Kingdom in 1975 (between the first and second half of the year to be precise), while the general mood in Italy seems to have been significantly affected by the socio-political and socio-economic changes which have taken place there since 1973.

(See Table 2)

Table 2

SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH THE LIFE WE LEAD  
BY COUNTRY  
(Change between 1973 and 1977<sup>1</sup>)

	September 1973		1975 <sup>2</sup>		1976 <sup>2</sup>		April-May 1977	
	Satis- fied	Not very or not at all	Satis- fied	Not very or not at all	Satis- fied	Not very or not at all	Satis- fied	Not very or not at all
Danmark	95%	5%	90%	4%	93%	6%	95%	4%
Nederland	93	6	86	8	90	9	92	7
Belgique/België	92	8	89	9	90	10	90	10
Luxembourg <sup>3</sup>	(89)	(11)	(72)	(17)	(88)	(10)	(90)	(10)
Ireland	92	8	88	11	88	12	88	12
United Kingdom <sup>4</sup>	85	14	71	13	83	16	82	18
Deutschland	82	17	79	19	81	18	81	17
France	77	21	75	24	71	28	68	31
Italia	65	34	58	40	56	43	59	41
COMMUNITY <sup>5</sup>	79	20	76	22	75	24	75	24

<sup>1</sup> Countries listed by relative frequency of "satisfied" replies in April/May 1977.

<sup>2</sup> Aggregate of results for both six-monthly polls.

<sup>3</sup> Results for Luxembourg are less significant owing to the size of the sample.

<sup>4</sup> Great Britain only in 1973.

<sup>5</sup> Weighted average.

2. THE KIND OF SOCIETY IN WHICH WE LIVE AND THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS

"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with:

- the kind of society in which we live in (country)?
- the way democracy works in (country)?"

The answers given to these questions seem to be much more affected by the general situation in the country concerned and by the implicit or explicit comparisons which contacts can make with other countries. Generally speaking, answers to both questions were fairly positive in Germany and in the smaller countries.

A. The kind of society in which we live

In the autumn of 1973 Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and Denmark were top of the "satisfied" list, ahead of Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain, with France and Italy bringing up the rear. In April/May 1977 Germany came top (+ 25 points), followed by Luxembourg (no significant change), Denmark (+ 15 points), Ireland and Belgium; although the Netherlands had gained 13 points it was still in fifth place, slightly ahead of the United Kingdom; France was again second from the bottom (there was a minimal change of + 5 points); Italy came last (only 17% were "satisfied") having lost 15 points between 1973 and 1977.

(See Table 3)

Table 3

SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH THE KIND OF SOCIETY IN WHICH WE LIVE  
BY COUNTRY  
 (Change between 1973 and 1977<sup>1</sup>)

	September 1973		Oct-Nov 1976		April-May 1977	
	Satis- fied	Not very or not at all	Satis- fied	Not very or not at all	Satis- fied	Not very or not at all
Deutschland	57%	42%	84%	14%	82%	14%
Luxembourg <sup>2</sup>	(67)	(30)	(66)	(26)	(81)	(18)
Danmark	63	37	75	24	78	20
Ireland	68	32	70	28	72	27
Belgique/België	75	24	68	28	70	27
Nederland	54	41	67	32	67	32
United Kingdom <sup>3</sup>	53	47	55	43	63	36
France	44	52	50	48	49	49
Italia	32	67	12	87	17	83
COMMUNITY <sup>4</sup>	49	49	53	45	56	42

<sup>1</sup>Countries listed by relative frequency of "satisfied" replies in April/May 1977.

<sup>2</sup>Results for Luxembourg are less significant owing to the size of the sample.

<sup>3</sup>Great Britain only in 1973.

<sup>4</sup>Weighted average.



B. The way democracy works

In the autumn of 1973 Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were top of the "satisfied" list; Denmark, Germany, Great Britain and France more or less tied for fifth place; and Italy came last. In this spring's survey there was a much greater spread: Germany was first (+ 34 points), followed by Luxembourg (+ 19 points), the Netherlands (+ 15 points), Denmark (+ 18 points) and Ireland (+ 7 points); next came the United Kingdom (+ 14 points) and Belgium (- 6 points); France (no change) and Italy (- 15 points) came bottom of the list again.

(See Table 4)

Table 4

SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS  
BY COUNTRY

(Change between 1973 and 1977<sup>1</sup>)

	September 1973		Oct.-Nov. 1976		April-May 1977	
	Satisfied	Not very or not at all satisfied	Satisfied	Not very or not at all satisfied	Satisfied	Not very or not at all satisfied
Deutschland	44%	55%	79%	19%	78%	18%
Luxembourg <sup>2</sup>	(52)	(37)	(55)	(29)	(71)	(25)
Nederland	52	38	67	32	67	29
Danmark	45	53	55	43	63	29
Ireland	55	43	59	35	62	33
United Kingdom <sup>3</sup>	44	54	51	43	58	37
Belgique/België	62	32	53	32	56	31
France	44	46	42	46	45	45
Italia	27	72	14	83	12	86
COMMUNITY <sup>4</sup>	42	55	51	43	51	44

1)

2) See footnotes to Table 3.

3)

4)

On this basis our second indicator - showing satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the social and political order - would seem more sensitive than the first. It seems as if the effects of the current crisis - interpreted subjectively - are producing disillusionment with the political system (or more probably the government in office) rather than disillusionment with society in general. But on both counts Germans consider that Germany is weathering the storm successfully; the same is true of most of the smaller countries. The French remain more or less evenly divided into "satisfied" and "dissatisfied", while general dissatisfaction in Italy has increased considerably since 1973.

Another important fact to emerge is that satisfaction/dissatisfaction is largely conditioned by nationality<sup>1</sup>. It fluctuates very little according to sex, age (except that older women seem slightly more content than younger women), level of education or indeed income bracket. The most reliable pointer, second only to nationality, appears to be leadership rating: leaders are considerably less satisfied than the general public.

(See Table 5)

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<sup>1</sup>Regional factors may be significant too, but the results have not been analysed systematically enough to demonstrate this conclusively; it might be noted however that the dissatisfaction score for Northern Ireland was twice as high as for Great Britain.

Table 5

SATISFACTION OR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORDER  
RELATED TO EDUCATION, INCOME AND LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole: April/May 1977)

	Education <sup>1</sup>		Income <sup>2</sup>			Leadership rating <sup>3</sup>			
	Elementary	Average	Advanced	Modest	Below average	Above average	Well off	Non-leaders (--)	Leaders (++)
(i) The kind of society in which we live									
Satisfied	55%	61%	50%	48%	53%	61%	59%	57%	43%
Not very or not at all satisfied	42	38	48	49	45	37	40	39	56
Don't know	3	1	2	3	2	2	1	4	1
(ii) The way democracy works									
Satisfied	49%	57%	47%	45%	46%	56%	57%	50%	41%
Not very or not at all satisfied	44	38	50	49	48	40	41	39	57
Don't know	7	5	3	6	6	4	2	11	2
Base <sup>4</sup>	4780	2606	1681	1976	1601	2168	1954	1886	1212

1) See following page.

2) See following page.

3) See following page.

4) See following page.

Table 5 (contd)

<sup>1</sup>Based on age on completion of full-time education: under 16, 16 to 19, 20 and over (or still studying).

<sup>2</sup>Grouped on basis of replies given in national currency; excluding the "don't knows" (15%).

<sup>3</sup>The following table shows how the leadership index was produced:

Discuss political matters	Persuade others				
	often	from time to time	rarely	never	don't know
frequently	++	++	+	+	+
occasionally	+	+	-	-	-
never	-	-	--	--	--
don't know	-	-	--	--	--

Distribution of the population interviewed by leadership rating is as follows:

		Aggregate of polls May and Oct./Nov. 1975		Aggregate of polls May and Nov. 1976		Euro-Barometer No 7 April/May 1977	
		%	Number (N)	%	Number (N)	%	Number (N)
Leaders	++	13	2427	14	2514	13	1212
	+	29	5446	29	5228	31	2804
	-	31	5892	32	5584	35	3166
Non-leaders	--	27	4995	25	4519	21	1886
<u>Total</u>		<u>100</u>	<u>18 760</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>17 845</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>9068</u>

<sup>4</sup>Weighted by the population aged 15 and over in each country.

3. REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, REFORM OR  
DEFENCE AGAINST THE FORCES OF SUBVERSION

"On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-à-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion.

- . The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action.
- . Our society must be gradually improved by reforms.
- . Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces."

This deliberately provocative question has been asked on a number of occasions: in February/March 1970 in the six founder Member States, then in November 1976 and again in April/May 1977<sup>1</sup>.

The first interesting point is that the public is generally willing to answer this question: on average only 6% did not reply<sup>2</sup>.

In 1977, as in 1976, only 8% chose the "revolutionary" option, but there have been interesting developments since 1970:

in France the percentage moved from 5% in 1970 to 13% in 1976 and 14% in 1977;

in Italy the percentage moved from 7% in 1970 to 13% in 1976 and 11% in 1977.

Generally speaking the "reformist" option is the most popular (60% in favour in 1976 and 55% in 1977) but support for reform has declined since 1970, particularly in Germany (-27 points), the Netherlands (-17 points), France (-16 points) and Italy (-15 points).

"Defence against subversion" polled only 26% in 1976 and 31% in 1977, but support has risen significantly since 1970 in Germany (+ 28 points), in Italy (+ 18 points) and in the Netherlands (+ 17 points).

To sum up, the revolutionary approach would seem to be on the up and up in France and Italy, while defence of the established order is gaining in popularity in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.

(See Table 6)

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<sup>1</sup>The wording in the 1970 questionnaire was "by intelligent reforms". The adjective has since been dropped.

<sup>2</sup>17% failed to answer in Luxembourg in 1976 but the size of the sample (N = 301) is such as to preclude comment.

TABLE 6  
BASIC ATTITUDE TO SOCIAL CHANGE

BY COUNTRY

(Change between 1970 and 1977)

	B	D	F	I	L	N	EC (The Six)	DK	IRL	UK	EC (The Nine)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
"The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action" <sup>1</sup>											
February/March 1970	3	2	5	7	1	6	5	4	7	7	8
November 1976	5	2	13	13	2	5	9	3	5	8	8
April/May 1977	6	2	14	11	3	5	8				
"Our society must be gradually improved by reforms" <sup>2</sup>											
February/March 1970	69	70	78	73	65	75	73	51	60	59	60
November 1976	65	52	64	66	49	56	59	52	61	59	55
April/May 1977	66	43	62	58	56	58	55				
"Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces"											
February/March 1970	14	20	12	11	27	15	15	38	23	25	26
November 1976	19	39	18	18	32	32	26	39	26	26	31
April/May 1977	18	48	19	28	32	32	32				
Don't know											
February/March 1970	14	8	5	9	7	4	7	7	10	8	6
November 1976	11	7	5	3	17	7	6	6	8	7	6
April/May 1977	10	7	5	3	9	5	5				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base 1970	1298	2021	2046	1822	335	1230	8752	962	981	1297	9156
Base 1976	1077	1007	1356	1052	301	1123	5916	1010	1008	1414	9041
Base 1977	988	1005	1256	1025	302	1033	5609				

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average.

<sup>2</sup> 1970: "by intelligent reforms".

A breakdown of replies shows little difference between male and female attitudes. Women were slightly less inclined to opt for revolution and slightly more of them refused to reply; this was true for all age brackets. In general, young people (15 to 24) of both sexes, but men in particular, were more inclined to opt for revolution and older people (55 and over), again men in particular, were more inclined to opt for the defence of society. Fewer older women replied.

The area in which contacts lived made little difference: there were slightly more "revolutionaries" in large towns, which were however predominantly "reformist", while slightly more "defenders of society" were to be found in villages.

Level of education proved a more reliable indicator than family income, but once again leadership rating was the factor which most affected overall attitudes to society:

- (i) opinion leaders tended to be more "revolutionary" than the general public, particularly in Italy and France;
- (ii) the desire to protect society against the forces of subversion was particularly widespread among the general public in Denmark and the "middle classes" in Germany.

( See Table 7 )

Table 7

BASIC ATTITUDE TO SOCIAL CHANGE

BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(Aggregate results, by country: November 1976 and April/May 1977<sup>1</sup>)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>2</sup>
<u>Revolutionary action</u>										
Non-leaders ( - - )	3%	1%	3%	6%	6%	7%	2%	10%	5%	5%
( - )	5	2	1	8	5	9	2	4	8	6
( * )	6	4	1	16	6	13	4	4	9	8
Leaders ( ** )	12	8	7	31	7	24	1	6	9	18
<u>Reforms</u>										
Non-leaders ( - - )	54%	42%	42%	64%	57%	62%	42%	48%	54%	55%
( - )	70	54	46	67	58	62	49	57	59	58
( * )	73	57	51	65	66	65	61	60	63	61
Leaders ( ** )	70	53	56	50	66	57	54	57	61	56
<u>Defence against the forces of subversion</u>										
Non-leaders ( - - )	23%	46%	39%	20%	20%	24%	35%	27%	24%	27%
( - )	17	39	47	21	28	27	36	33	26	31
( * )	18	36	44	16	25	21	24	33	26	28
Leaders ( ** )	16	33	36	14	24	19	40	33	27	24

<sup>1</sup> "Don't knows" are not included.

<sup>2</sup> Weighted average.



#### 4. PRIORITIES AND IDEOLOGIES

"There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of (your country) should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals to which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which of these you yourself consider the most important? And the next most important?"

- . Maintenance of law and order
- . Giving people more say in government decisions
- . Fighting rising prices
- . Protecting freedom of expression."

Replies to this question, which has been asked in numerous surveys inside and outside the Community (Switzerland, the United States and so on), have made it possible to construct a priority values index. Analysis has shown that contacts in all countries can be divided into a number of socio-psychological groups. At one end of the scale is a group whose prime concern is to preserve the status quo (standard of living and security), at the other a group which is more concerned with what is generally known as "the quality of life" (expression and participation). The first have been dubbed "materialists", the second "post-materialists"; the labels have no intrinsic meaning but they do indicate sets of values which can be measured by means of an index to produce an explanatory variable. The importance of this variable has been demonstrated elsewhere.

All we need to do for the moment is to present the replies given to this question in April/May 1977, indicate the index values for each country and illustrate the explanatory function of the index.

Table 8 shows the first and second choices for each country. Predictably enough the fight against rising prices was the top priority, especially in France, Belgium and Ireland; Denmark and Italy were the only exceptions to the rule. Maintaining public order generally came second though it was the top priority in Denmark and Italy. Giving people more say in government decisions gained more support in Ireland and the Netherlands than elsewhere, while the Belgians, the Dutch, the Danes and the French were more concerned with freedom of expression than their fellow Europeans.

<sup>1</sup>For more details see La perception de la misère en Europe (Brussels 1977), pp. 111-123, a report prepared by Hélène Riffault and J.R. Rabier at the request of the Commission of the European Communities [to be published shortly]. The index in question was invented by Professor Ronald Inglehart, Universities of Michigan and Geneva; see The Silent Revolution in Europe published in the American Political Science Review 65,4 (December 1971) and The Silent Revolution: Political Change Among Western Publics (Princeton University Press, 1977) [to be published shortly].

Table 9 gives ratings for the index produced by combining both sets of answers .

<sup>1</sup>The index is produced as follows:

Second choice

	Order	Participation	Prices	Expression	
First choice	Maintaining order	0	2	1	2
	Participation	2	0	2	3
	Rising prices	1	2	0	2
	Freedom of expression	2	3	2	0

0 = data excluded (no first or second choice)

1 = "materialists"

2 = a bit of both

3 = " post-materialists".

**Table 8**  
**SOCIAL PRIORITIES**  
**BY COUNTRY**

(Aggregate of first and second choices)<sup>1</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Maintenance of law and order	37	80	57	48	60	71	57	60	64	60
Giving people more say in government decisions	33	21	33	31	41	33	32	41	33	33
Fighting rising prices	75	52	65	78	74	63	69	55	71	68
Protecting freedom of expression	42	38	27	38	22	26	32	39	27	30

<sup>1</sup>"Don't knows" represented approximately 3% on average.

<sup>2</sup>Weighted average.

**Table 9**  
**"MATERIALIST" AND "POST-MATERIALIST" IDEOLOGIES<sup>1</sup>**

(April/May 1977)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. Materialists	29	44	45	38	42	48	40	33	43	42
2. A bit of both	60	49	46	52	52	43	52	52	52	49
3. Post-materialists	11	7	9	10	6	9	8	15	5	9

<sup>1</sup>"Don't knows" (on average approximately %) excluded.

<sup>2</sup>Weighted average.

The explanatory function of this index is revealed in the analysis of numerous attitude/behaviour variables. For example it has been demonstrated elsewhere that "post-materialists" tend to be more aware of the existence of poverty in their country or in their immediate surroundings and to attribute it more frequently to social factors.

A multiple classification analysis of indicators showing basic attitudes to social change<sup>2</sup> shows that the choice made between revolution, reform and defence against the forces of subversion is less important than nationality but more important than political and religious beliefs, age, level of education, sex and profession in determining ideology and vice versa<sup>3</sup>. We will confine ourselves here to illustrating the nature and extent of the relationship between ideology and attitude to social change.

(see Table 10)

Table 10

BASIC ATTITUDE TO SOCIAL CHANGE  
RELATED TO IDEOLOGY

(Community as a whole: November 1976)

	Base	%	Index of attitude to social change <sup>1</sup>
<u>Ideology</u>			
Materialists	3141	38%	2,30
A bit of both	4161	51	2,19
Post-materialists	882	11	<u>1,96</u>

<sup>1</sup> 1.0= revolution

2.0= reform

3.0= defence against the forces of subversion.

<sup>1</sup> See study referred to onp. 15 (not yet published).

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 11 - 14 above.

<sup>3</sup> Details of this Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) are not given here; a working document on the subject will be produced later.

II.

ATTITUDES TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY  
AND EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

Two questions were asked in an attempt to monitor changes in attitudes to the European Community and European unification:

"Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"

"Some people consider the Common Market as being a first step towards a closer union between the Member States. Personally, do you yourself think the movement towards the unification of Europe should be speeded up, slowed down, or continued as it is at present?"

1. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ("COMMON MARKET")

This question has been asked at regular six-monthly intervals since the autumn of 1973. Attitudes in the Community as a whole have changed very little: after a ten-point drop between autumn 1975 and spring 1976 there has been a return to the favourable percentages recorded in September 1973: this time round six in ten (57%) felt that the Community was "a good thing", between one and two in ten (14%) feeling that it was "a bad thing".

(See Table 11)

Table 11

THE COMMON MARKET: A GOOD THING OR A BAD THING

(Community as a whole: Change between 1973 and 1977)

	Good thing	Bad thing	Neither good nor bad	Don't know	Total
1973 September	56%	11%	20%	13%	100%
1974 May	59	14	18	9	100
November	60	14	18	8	100
1975 May	59	9	23	9	100
Oct./Nov.	63	9	21	7	100
1976 May	53	14	24	9	100
November	55	13	25	7	100
1977 April/May	57	14	21	8	100

Attitudes still vary considerably from country to country, but less so than in 1973. At that time the countries most in favour were Italy and Luxembourg, followed by the Netherlands, Germany and France; Belgium and Ireland occupied a mid-way position with Denmark and Great Britain at the bottom of the table. Current ratings put Luxembourg and the Netherlands top of the supporters' league, followed by Italy, Belgium and France; Ireland and Germany are half way down; United Kingdom and Denmark still come last.

If we ignore 5% variations to translate these trends into figures, "pro-marketeers" increased their lead in Luxembourg and the Netherlands (+17 points) and in Belgium (+12 points) between 1973 and 1977. By contrast "pro-marketeers" lost ground in Germany (-9 points) and in Denmark (-8 points).

In Germany an increase in the number of "don't knows" betrayed a reluctance to express an opinion at all. As things now stand Germany has the lowest score of all the founder members of the Community; it even falls behind Ireland, a newcomer.

In the United Kingdom there has been a return to the 1973 situation with "a bad thing" replies outnumbering "a good thing" replies.

In Denmark the nine contacts in ten who answered divided equally into supporters, opponents and the non-committal.

(See Table 12)

Table 12

THE COMMON MARKET: A GOOD THING OR A BAD THING

BY COUNTRY<sup>1</sup>

	Good thing	Bad thing	Neither good nor bad	Don't know	Total
Luxembourg					
Sept. 1973	67%	3%	22%	8%	100%
May 1975	65	7	19	9	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	78	4	12	6	100
May 1976	66	5	21	8	100
Nov. 1976	77	2	17	4	100
April/May 1977	84	2	11	3	100
Nederland					
Sept. 1973	63	4	20	13	100
May 1975	64	3	18	15	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	67	3	12	18	100
May 1976	75	4	15	6	100
Nov. 1976	74	4	14	8	100
April/May 1977	80	3	13	4	100
Italia					
Sept. 1973	69	2	15	14	100
May 1975	71	3	21	5	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	75	4	16	5	100
May 1976	63	6	20	11	100
Nov. 1976	68	5	16	11	100
April/May 1977	71	5	18	6	100
Belgique/België					
Sept. 1973	57	5	19	19	100
May 1975	57	3	21	19	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	59	3	21	17	100
May 1976	62	5	17	16	100
Nov. 1976	66	3	19	12	100
April/May 1977	69	4	17	10	100
France					
Sept. 1973	61	5	22	12	100
May 1975	64	4	25	7	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	67	4	24	5	100
May 1976	57	7	30	6	100
Nov. 1976	52	7	35	6	100
April/May 1977	64	6	24	6	100
Ireland					
Sept. 1973	56	15	21	8	100
May 1975	50	20	25	5	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	67	12	17	4	100
May 1976	50	26	18	6	100
Nov. 1976	50	22	22	6	100
April/May 1977	57	17	22	4	100
					./.

Table 12 (contd)

	Good thing	Bad thing	Neither good nor bad	Don't know	Total
<b>Deutschland</b>					
Sept. 1973 <sup>1</sup>	63%	4%	22%	11%	100%
May 1975	56	8	28	8	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	61	6	27	6	100
May 1976	48	12	30	10	100
Nov 1976	57	5	31	7	100
April/May 1977	54	8	23	15	100
<b>United Kingdom</b>					
Sept. 1973 <sup>2</sup>	31	34	22	13	100
May 1975	47	21	19	13	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	53	24	18	8	100
May 1976	39	35	18	8	100
Nov. 1976	39	34	21	6	100
April/May 1977	35	40	22	3	100
<b>Denmark</b>					
Sept. 1973	42	30	19	9	100
May 1975	36	25	28	11	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	41	27	24	8	100
May 1976	36	29	22	13	100
Nov 1976	29	34	28	9	100
April/May 1977	30	30	30	10	100
<b>COMMUNITY<sup>3</sup></b>					
Sept 1973	56	11	20	13	100
May 1975	59	9	23	9	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	63	9	21	7	100
May 1976	53	14	24	9	100
Nov. 1976	55	13	25	7	100
April/May 1977	57	14	21	8	100

<sup>1</sup> Countries listed by relative frequency of "a good thing" replies in April/May 1977.

<sup>2</sup> Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.

<sup>3</sup> Weighted average.



Support for the European Community was slightly less widespread among women (54%) than among men (61%), particularly among women aged 55 and over (45%). Contacts living in villages tended to be slightly more in favour than those living in small or large towns (61% as compared with 55%), but the determining factors were income, level of education and above all leadership rating. Opinion leaders outnumbered the general public by a ratio of 3:2 in their belief that the Community is "a good thing".

(See Table 13)

Table 13

THE COMMON MARKET: A GOOD THING OR A BAD THING  
RELATED TO SEX, INCOME, EDUCATION AND LEADERSHIP RATING  
 (Community as a whole: April/May 1977)

	Base	Good thing	Bad thing	Neither good nor bad	Don't know	Total
Total	9067	57%	14%	21%	8%	100%
Men	4361	61	14	20	5	100
Women	4706	54	13	23	10	100
<u>Income</u>						
Modest	1976	52	15	23	10	100
Below average	1601	57	14	20	9	100
Above average	2168	56	17	20	7	100
Well off	1954	68	9	20	3	100
<u>Education</u>						
Elementary	4780	51	17	22	10	100
Average	2606	60	12	22	6	100
Advanced	1681	72	7	16	5	100
<u>Leadership rating</u>						
Non-leaders (--)	1886	43	16	24	17	100
(-)	3166	57	13	23	7	100
(+)	2804	64	11	20	5	100
Leaders (++)	1212	66	16	16	2	100

## 2. MOVEMENT TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

Reactions to this question are pretty constant: on average four in ten (42%) feel that the movement should be speeded up, three in ten (34%) would prefer to see it "continued as at present", while only one in ten (11%) would like it to be "slowed down".

An increasingly large majority of Italians and Luxembourgers are in favour of "speeding up".

Opinion was more divided elsewhere:

- . in France the idea of "speeding up" is more popular than that of "continuing as at present" (45% as compared with 37%); the same is true of Germany, but only just (38% as compared with 34%);
- . in Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland there is a majority in favour of "continuing as at present";
- . in the United Kingdom and above all in Denmark the most common reply was "continued as at present", but two or three in ten would still prefer to see the process slowed down.

(See Table 14)

SHOULD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION BE SPEEDED UP,

CONTINUED AS AT PRESENT OR SLOWED DOWN

BY COUNTRY<sup>1</sup>

	Speeded up	Continued as at present	Slowed down	Don't know	Total
Italia					
Sept. 1973	55%	18%	2%	25%	100%
Oct./Nov. 1975	61	17	4	18	100
May 1976	58	16	4	22	100
Nov. 1976	65	14	5	16	100
April/May 1977	66	17	5	12	100
Luxembourg					
Sept. 1973	56	29	1	14	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	52	33	4	11	100
May 1976	55	20	9	16	100
Nov. 1976	55	26	6	13	100
April/May 1977	60	22	7	11	100
France					
Sept. 1973	36	40	3	21	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	45	36	6	13	100
May 1976	43	37	7	13	100
Nov. 1976	42	35	10	13	100
April/May 1977	45	37	7	11	100
Deutschland					
Sept. 1973	49	34	4	13	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	47	36	6	11	100
May 1976	39	34	10	17	100
Nov. 1976	41	37	9	13	100
April/May 1977	38	35	9	18	100
Belgique/België					
Sept. 1973	33	43	3	21	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	39	28	3	30	100
May 1976	40	32	5	23	100
Nov. 1976	40	37	5	18	100
April/May 1977	38	41	5	16	100
Nederland					
Sept. 1973	32	47	6	15	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	33	38	4	25	100
May 1976	43	37	7	13	100
Nov. 1976	41	42	6	11	100
April/May 1977	37	51	4	8	100
					./.

Table 14 (contd)

	Speeded up	Continued as at present	Slowed down	Don't know	Total
Ireland					
Sept. 1973	25	45	12	18	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	35	40	12	13	100
May 1976	31	40	14	15	100
Nov. 1976	33	40	10	17	100
April/May 1977	33	44	14	9	100
United Kingdom <sup>2</sup>					
Sept. 1973	17	40	24	19	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	24	45	17	14	100
May 1976	23	42	24	11	100
Nov. 1976	26	46	17	11	100
April/May 1977	24	43	23	10	100
Danmark					
Sept. 1973	12	44	36	8	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	13	33	37	17	100
May 1976	13	33	32	22	100
Nov. 1976	14	38	30	18	100
April/May 1977	12	39	30	19	100
COMMUNITY <sup>3</sup>					
Sept. 1973	38	34	9	19	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	43	34	8	15	100
May 1976	40	33	11	16	100
Nov. 1976	42	34	11	13	100
April/May 1977	42	34	11	13	100

<sup>1</sup> Countries listed by relative frequency of "speeded up" replies in April/May 1977.

<sup>2</sup> Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.

<sup>3</sup> Weighted average.

In all nine countries (but particularly in Belgium, Germany and France) opinion leaders, viz. those who are better educated, better informed and more politically committed, tended to be more in favour of speeding up the movement towards European unification. In the six original Member States the majority of leaders answered along these lines.

(See Table 15)

Table 15

SPEEDING UP EUROPEAN UNIFICATION  
BY LEADERSHIP RATING  
BY COUNTRY<sup>1</sup>

	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
Italia	50%	66%	72%	75%
Luxembourg	50	60	60	78
France	<del>28</del>	39	51	<del>61</del>
Deutschland	<del>23</del>	36	45	<del>58</del>
Belgique/België	<del>23</del>	38	49	<del>60</del>
Nederland	29	29	39	54
Ireland	28	34	32	48
United Kingdom	17	22	26	34
Danmark	6	11	14	17
COMMUNITY <sup>2</sup>	28%	39%	47%	58%

<sup>1</sup>Countries listed by relative frequency of "speeded up" replies.

<sup>2</sup>Weighted average.

III.

ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

This spring's Euro-Barometer included more questions on direct elections than any previous poll in the series. This was done for the simple reason that once last September's agreements have been ratified by national parliaments and the necessary legislation adopted the election campaign can begin. In this context it is extremely important, for research purposes and for the campaign itself, that the political parties - and through them the people of Europe seen for the first time as an European electorate - should have access to all the information they need.

Surveys will be conducted right up to polling day, which, if all goes well, should be sometime in May or June of next year; findings will be made freely available to all.

\* \*

In addition to the standard questions asked at regular intervals, which provide a valuable means of monitoring changes in public opinion, Euro-Barometer No 7 contained a special set of new questions designed to give a clear picture of the public's views on the role of the European Parliament and the European MP and to show how these compare with their attitudes to national parliaments and national MPs. These were followed by several questions, the first in what might be termed a pre-election series, to gauge the determination of those interviewed to vote, or not as the case may be, in next year's elections.

The results set out below are extremely tentative; further analyse will be needed to reveal the full story.

We propose to examine the following issues in turn, although the questions were asked in a slightly different order<sup>1</sup>:

- . attitude to national parliaments and national MPs;
- . level of information on direct elections and attitudes to the proposal;
- . electoral campaign: priorities and strategy;
- . determination to vote and choice of political group.

---

<sup>1</sup> The question number is given so that the reader can work out the real order for himself.

1. GENERAL ATTITUDE TO NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS  
AND NATIONAL MPS

"How important, would you say, is our own Parliament in the life of  
(country) nowadays?"

- . very important
- . important
- . not very important
- . not at all important?" (Q. 118)

"Would you, personally, prefer that our Parliament played a more or a  
less important part than it does now?" (Q. 119)

"Which of these do you think is the most important job for our  
Parliament to do? And the second most important?"

- . to debate important issues
- . to watch over and support or oppose the government
- . to control the spending of public money
- . to control the Civil Service
- . to propose, discuss and pass laws
- . to investigate scandals and abuses" (Q. 120)

"Which do you think is the most important part of a member of  
Parliament's job?"

- . to help solve problems of individual citizens
- . to support his party in Parliament
- . to take part in parliamentary debates/ask questions on the government's  
actions" (Q. 121)

A. The role of national parliaments

Three countries - Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland - quite clearly attach major importance to their parliaments. They are closely followed by the Netherlands, and then by Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium. Even in France and Italy, which came bottom of the list, there was still a majority (58% in France and 57% in Italy) who considered it either "important" or "very important".

(See Table 16)

Strangely enough, it was the Italians (75%) and the Irish (65%) who were most in favour of the national parliaments playing an even more important role than they do now. This is a phenomenon encountered fairly frequently, in public opinion surveys: the parliamentary enthusiasm displayed by Italian contacts is undoubtedly a reaction to what they regard as parliamentary inadequacy since they were the ones who most

<sup>1</sup> The wording of this question was tailored to the institutional system and political vocabulary of each country. In France, for example, the questions referred to the "Assemblée nationale (ou Chambre des Députés)", in the United Kingdom to "our own Parliament at Westminster" and so on.

<sup>2</sup> This particular item was worded slightly differently in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in view of the different situation prevailing there "Helpen bij het oplossen van de individuele problemen van de burgers" "To help solve problems of individual citizens".



frequently felt that their parliament's present role was not very or not at all important. The reverse was true of the Irish: they are firm believers in the importance of their parliament and would like to see its role extended even further<sup>1</sup>.

Approximately half of those interviewed in the United Kingdom (53%), France (50%) and Belgium (47%) would like to see their parliaments play a more important role. In the Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg and Germany the reply which came most readily was "things are all right as they are".

<sup>1</sup> An analysis of the two sets of replies shows, as might be expected, that those who believe that their parliament's present role is not very or not at all important are more inclined to want this role to become more important; this is the case in Italy. In Ireland, however, irrespective of their opinion on parliament's present role, approximately two-thirds of those interviewed would like to see it extended.

COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE				
	Would like national parliament's role to be			
	more important	less important	the same	don't know
For every 100 who consider national parliament's <u>present</u> role:				
Very important or important	49%	8%	35%	8%
Not very or not at all important	72	11	8	9
ITALIA				
	Would like national parliament's role to be			
	more important	less important	the same	don't know
For every 100 who consider national parliament's <u>present</u> role:				
Very important or important	74%	5%	17%	4%
Not ver or not at all important	93	3	3	1
IRELAND				
	Would like national parliament's role to be			
	more important	less important	the same	don't know
For every 100 who consider national parliament's <u>present</u> role:				
Very important or important	69%	6%	21%	4%
not very or not at all important	60	23	7	10

An interesting point is that 15% of the British sample would like to see their parliament play a less important role<sup>1</sup>; without further analysis it is impossible to say whether this can be attributed to anti-parliamentary feeling or to the current enthusiasm for the devolution of powers to "regional" parliaments.

Nearly one in four (24%) of the Belgian sample and more than one in five (21%) of the French sample failed to reply.

(See Table 17)

<sup>1</sup>There is a positive correlation between the frequency of this reply and level of education.

Table 16

IMPORTANCE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRESENT ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENT

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very important	17	42	22	13	42	16	15	27	45	25
Important	45	44	54	45	35	41	62	55	31	44
Not very important	15	8	15	23	14	26	12	11	17	19
Not at all important	3	.	1	6	5	8	2	2	4	4
Don't know	20	6	8	13	4	9	9	5	3	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2,95	3,35	3,05	2,76	3,20	2,71	2,99	3,13	3,22	2,97

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

<sup>2</sup>"Very important" = 4; "not at all important" = 1.

Table 17

FUTURE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENT

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
More important part	47	35	35	50	65	75	41	36	53	51
Less important part	6	8	10	4	9	4	6	8	15	8
About the same (unprompted)	23	45	37	25	18	11	42	49	25	27
Don't know	24	12	18	21	8	10	11	7	7	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

Thus, although percentages vary, people in all nine countries regard the role of their national parliament as important and would like to see this role extended. This finding is hardly surprising since, despite the ups and downs of history, Community countries share a long tradition of parliamentary democracy.

The next point is whether there are any obvious differences between the views held by various sections of the population in the individual countries. This would not appear to be the case. Neither sex, age, education, income nor size of area lived in appeared to have any significant effect on the results<sup>1</sup>. The only positive correlation was between leadership rating and the desire to see the national parliament play a more important role.

(See Table 18)

<sup>1</sup>Pending further research it can be said that fewer older women (55 and over) and fewer younger men (15 to 24) were in favour of increasing parliament's role. Could this indicate a degree of disillusionment among young men which is not shared by young women, for whom politics represent a challenging new area of responsibility? This might be checked by means of a special survey of young people's ambitions.

Table 18

DESIRE TO SEE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS PLAY A MORE IMPORTANT OR A LESS

IMPORTANT ROLE RELATED TO SEX, AGE, EDUCATION,

INCOME AND LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole)

	Base	More important part	Less important part	About the same	Don't know
Total	9067	51%	8%	27%	14%
<u>Men</u>	4361	56	9	26	9
Between 15 and 24	785	46	12	30	12
25 and 39	1199	55	10	26	9
40 and 54	1111	59	7	27	7
Aged 55 and over	1241	59	7	24	10
<u>Women</u>	4706	48	7	26	19
Between 15 and 24	836	50	11	22	17
25 and 39	1325	48	7	30	15
40 and 54	1163	48	6	26	20
Aged 55 and over	1339	45	6	26	23
<u>Education</u>					
Elementary	4780	53	7	24	16
Average	2606	49	9	30	12
Advanced	1681	50	11	28	11
<u>Income</u>					
Modest	1976	54	6	21	19
Below average	1601	53	8	25	14
Above average	2168	51	8	28	13
Well off	1954	51	11	31	7
<u>Leadership rating</u>					
Non-leaders (--)	1886	44	6	23	27
(-)	3166	51	8	27	14
(+)	2804	52	9	30	9
Leaders (++)	1212	63	9	22	6

# B. Views on the function of national parliaments

Differences in national political traditions were highlighted by the answers to a more complex question listing six generally-accepted parliamentary functions from which contacts had to select two.

Briefly, for the Irish, the British and the Danes - and we have already seen how much importance they all attach to their national parliaments - parliament's primary function is to control the spending of public money. For the French, the Luxembourgers and the Germans it is to propose, discuss and pass laws. The Italians see it as being to debate important issues and - topically enough - to investigate scandals and abuses. The Germans stress the joint importance of one, watching over and supporting or opposing the government and two, passing laws. The Dutch and the Belgians on the other hand seem to make little distinction between the different parliamentary functions.

(See Table 19)

Although more detailed analyses may well disprove this, it seems that the image of parliament as an institution varies very little from one social group to another. This said, it is just about possible to distinguish two images existing side by side: one "popular" (to control the spending of public money, to investigate scandals and abuses), the other more "intellectual" (to pass laws, to keep an eye on the government).

(See Table 20)

Table 19

## MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS<sup>1</sup> (Aggregate of first and second choices)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
To control the spending of public money	33	54	33	28	70	33	39	38	64	40
To propose, discuss and pass laws	30	39	43	48	29	29	43	29	32	37
To debate important issues	36	33	19	35	29	41	30	36	41	34
To watch over and support or oppose the government	29	16	47	38	24	20	31	38	27	33
To investigate scandals and abuses	29	17	23	24	27	40	13	26	11	25
To control the Civil Service	15	23	15	14	14	26	21	25	16	18

<sup>1</sup> Items listed by average relative frequency of replies for the Community as a whole.

<sup>2</sup> Weighted average.

Table 20

MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS RELATED TO EDUCATION  
AND LEADERSHIP RATING<sup>1</sup>

(Community as a whole: Aggregate of first and second choices)

	Education			Leadership rating			
	Elementary	Average	Advanced	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
To control the spending of public money	[43]	40	29	38	[42]	39	36
To propose, discuss and pass laws	30	42	[50]	29	38	[40]	[43]
To debate important issues	34	32	35	32	33	35	32
To watch over and support or oppose the government	28	37	[41]	26	30	[38]	[38]
To investigate scandals and abuses	[30]	20	18	[28]	[27]	20	24
To control the Civil Service	18	18	16	19	18	17	18

<sup>1</sup> See footnote to Table 19

C. Views on the role of national MPs

Helping to solve the problems of individual citizens was the part of an MP's job most frequently quoted as being the most important, particularly in Luxembourg, Ireland and Denmark; in the United Kingdom this came second to taking part in parliamentary debates/asking questions on the government's actions.

(See Table 21)

Here again two views of parliamentary life emerge, this time more clearly: one "popular" (the elected representative at society's service), the other more "intellectual" (the politician in the full sense of the term). The image of MPs as party members was the least common, irrespective of education or leadership rating.

(See Table 22)

Table 21

MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF NATIONAL MPs<sup>1</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>3</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
To help solve problems of individual citizens <sup>2</sup>	48	58	50	48	58	38	60	34	35	43
To take part in parliamentary debates/ask questions on the government's actions	23	20	22	35	26	35	20	36	45	33
To support his party in parliament	17	14	22	13	15	18	17	22	17	18
Don't know	12	8	6	4	1	9	3	8	3	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup> Items listed by average relative frequency of replies for the Community as a whole.

<sup>2</sup> The wording was slightly different for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (see p. 30).

<sup>3</sup> Weighted average.

Table 22

MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF NATIONAL MPs  
RELATED TO EDUCATION AND LEADERSHIP RATING<sup>1</sup>  
 (Community as a whole)

	Education			Leadership rating			
	Ele- mentary	Average	Advanced	Non- leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
To help solve problems of individual citizens <sup>2</sup>	44	43	40	46	45	42	36
To take part in parliamentary debates/ask questions on the government's actions	29	36	38	24	32	36	40
To support his party in parliament	19	17	18	17	17	18	22
Don't know	8	4	4	13	6	4	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

## 2. DIRECT ELECTIONS: WHAT THE GENERAL PUBLIC KNOWS AND THINKS

"Have you recently seen or heard in the papers, or on the radio or TV, anything about the European Parliament? This is the parliamentary assembly of the EEC or Common Market?" (Q.123)

IF YES: "Can you remember what it was that you heard then?" (Q.124)

ASK ALL: "From what you know, or have gathered, would you say that up to now the influence of the present European Parliament on the Common Market's affairs has been very important, important, not very important or not at all important? (Q. 125)

"In 1978 elections for the European Parliament are planned in every country of the Common Market, including (your country). Everybody will be entitled to vote. Are you, yourself, for or against this particular election?" (Q. 126)

"For you, personally, would you say that going to vote in these elections was important or not?" (Q. 127)

"Which one of these opinions comes closest to your own on the future elections to the European Parliament?"

- It is an event with important consequences which is certain to make Europe more politically unified.
- It is an unimportant event because the national governments will not be bound by the votes in the European Parliament." (Q. 136)

### A. Level of information

The facts speak for themselves: whether they are cut off from the main stream of information or alternatively subjected to a barrage of indigestible news, more than half of those interviewed in April/May of this year were unable to say whether they had recently seen or heard any news item about the European Parliament; worse still, only half of those who had seen or heard something, i.e. one quarter of those interviewed, were able to recall without being prompted that the issue under discussion was direct elections.

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<sup>1</sup> A recent (1976) series of surveys showed that on average only 55% of those questioned in the nine Community countries read a daily newspaper "every day" and nearly 30% "occasionally" or "never"; see La lecture des journaux quotidiens dans les pays de la Communauté européenne by J.R. Rabier, working paper, Commission of the European Communities, 6 June 1977.



As can be seen from Table 23, nearly four in ten (37%) of those interviewed in France and Luxembourg were able to mention direct elections without being prompted; this is hardly surprising since these are the two countries in which the European Parliament meets. The score plummeted to one in four in Italy and Denmark (25%), one in six in Ireland (17%) and less than one in seven in the Netherlands (13%).

As is very often the case when it comes to general knowledge on social and political issues the women interviewed were much less well informed than the men, particularly in France; young men (between 15 and 24) were less well informed than older men. Inhabitants of large towns tended to be slightly better informed than those living in small towns or villages. But the most decisive factors turned out to be income, education and above all leadership rating, the influence of which was particularly strong in France, Belgium, Italy, Germany and Denmark.

(See Tables 24 and 25)

Quite obviously a lot remains to be done in the campaign to stimulate public interest and awareness.

Table 23  
PUBLIC AWARENESS  
OF DIRECT ELECTIONS<sup>1</sup>

	Had seen or heard something about the European Parliament			Had not seen or heard anything about the European Parliament	No reply	Total
	Total (A+B)	Mentioned direct elections (A)	Did not mention direct elections (B)			
France	57%	37%	20%	40%	3%	100%
Luxembourg	62	37	25	29	9	100
Italia	52	26	26	44	4	100
Danmark	49	25	24	48	3	100
United Kingdom	58	20	38	39	3	100
Belgique/België	46	19	27	45	9	100
Deutschland	33	18	15	47	20	100
Ireland	47	17	30	49	4	100
Nederland	40	13	27	47	13	100
Community <sup>2</sup>	49	24	25	43	8	100

<sup>1</sup> Countries listed by relative frequency of positive replies to the question on elections to the European Parliament (Column A).

<sup>2</sup> Weighted average.

TABLE 24

## AWARENESS OF DIRECT ELECTIONS

RELATED TO SEX AND AGE<sup>1</sup>

(For every 100 interviewees in each category)

	Total	Men					Women				
		Total	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+	Total	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+
France	37%	52%	42%	46%	55%	60%	24%	17%	26%	23%	27%
Luxembourg	37	46	(28)	(71)	(27)	(49)	27	(27)	(27)	(30)	(24)
Italia	26	34	28	45	30	31	19	25	21	14	16
Denmark	25	32	21	39	33	32	18	19	23	18	14
United Kingdom	20	27	12	26	35	29	13	10	13	10	15
Belgique/België	19	27	23	34	29	21	13	13	16	13	9
Deutschland	18	25	23	25	25	25	12	18	10	15	10
Ireland	17	22	19	26	21	22	11	8	14	13	11
Nederland	13	18	13	20	18	19	7	11	5	7	11
Community <sup>2</sup>	24	33	25	34	34	35	16	17	16	15	15

1) See footnotes to Table 23.

2)

Table 25

**AWARENESS OF DIRECT ELECTIONS<sup>1</sup>**  
**RELATED TO INCOME, EDUCATION AND LEADERSHIP RATING<sup>1</sup>**

(For every 100 interviewees in each category)

	Income				Education			Leadership rating				
	Total	Modest	Below average	Above average	Well off	Elementary	Average	Advanced	Non-leaders (-)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
France	37%	30%	37%	36%	54%	25%	40%	53%	13%	32%	48%	57%
Luxembourg	37	(25)	(32)	(39)	(53)	(19)	(44)	(55)	(20)	(29)	(48)	(47)
Italia	26	19	21	32	36	18	33	43	9	23	31	45
Denmark	25	20	27	26	32	20	30	37	9	22	33	43
United Kingdom	20	11	21	21	28	17	22	26	10	20	24	24
Belgique/België	19	10	18	18	31	10	20	42	9	17	28	47
Deutschland	18	12	21	21	21	14	21	25	6	18	19	42
Ireland	17	11	25	19	18	10	19	27	6	12	26	27
Nederland	13	14	12	13	13	11	11	18	7	8	15	20
Community <sup>2</sup>	24	18	22	26	32	17	27	38	9	22	29	41

<sup>1</sup> See footnotes to Table 23.  
<sup>2</sup>

B. Importance attributed to the role of the European Parliament

Despite the low level of information on direct elections, on average three-quarters of those interviewed expressed some opinion on the importance of the present role of the European Parliament. This is a fairly common phenomenon and one which should be interpreted with care. There is a big difference between answering a general knowledge question without being prompted (especially on a subject that has not yet hit the headlines) and expressing an opinion on a subject (in this case an institution) about which something vague has been heard at some point in the not too distant past. In short, without wishing to deny their intrinsic value, the opinions expressed are not necessarily based on any in-depth knowledge. In the present case, for every ten who were able to mention direct elections without prompting, nine on average held some opinion on Parliament's present role; but, and this is more surprising, for every ten who were unable to mention direct elections, seven held an opinion. And why not? Analysis of the replies makes it clear that the contacts in question did not answer at random but rather that their opinions are based on knowledge, ideals and concepts of a very different kind.

The importance attributed to Parliament's present role was relatively high in Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. But even here only five or six in ten considered it "very important" or "important". The score was considerably lower in Belgium, Denmark and France and lower again in Germany.

(See Table 26)

What is even more interesting is that, although the importance attached to national parliaments increased with leadership rating up to a certain point, the exact opposite applied in the case of the European Parliament. In other words opinion leaders, who have a better grasp of the facts, refrained from passing superficial judgment on Parliament's present role.

(See Table 27)

Table 26

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO PRESENT ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

	B	D	DK	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very important	5	6	3	5	19	16	11	9	20	10
Important	25	17	15	28	34	34	46	40	30	27
Not very important	22	31	41	32	23	19	22	32	23	29
Not at all important	8	5	16	10	6	6	7	6	9	10
Don't know	40	41	25	25	18	25	14	13	18	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2.46	2.40	2.07	2.36	2.80	2.80	2.71	2.60	2.73	2.49

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

<sup>2</sup>"Very important" = 4; "not at all important" = 1.

Table 27

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THE ROLES  
OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
BY LEADERSHIP RATING  
(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
	%	%	%	%
<u>1. Role of national parliament</u>				
Very important or important	61	68	74	68
Not very or not at all important	19	24	22	30
Don't know	20	8	4	2
Total	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>1</sup>	2.95	2.96	3.00	2.94
Net importance <sup>2</sup>	42	44	52	38
<u>2. Role of European Parliament</u>				
Very important or important	31	37	41	38
Not very or not at all important	26	39	43	53
Don't know	43	24	16	9
Total	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>1</sup>	2.56	2.49	2.50	2.40
Net importance <sup>2</sup>	5	-2	-2	-15

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 2 to Table 26.

<sup>2</sup> Difference between total for "important" and total for "not very or not all important".

C. Attitude to direct elections

Neither lack of information nor a somewhat cynical view of the importance of the European Parliament's present role prevented the vast majority of those interviewed from coming out in favour of direct elections: 72% in April/May of this year as compared with 69% in November 1976 and 54% in the autumn of 1973.

(See Table 28)

Table 28

FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE  
(Community as a whole)<sup>1</sup>

	September 1973	May 1975	Oct/Nov 1975	May 1976	November 1976	Apr/May 1977
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Completely favour	24 } 54	27 } 63	25 } 64	28 } 62	31 } 69	34 } 72
Favour on the whole	30 } 54	36 } 63	39 } 64	34 } 62	38 } 69	38 } 72
Disagree to some extent	12 } 23	9 } 18	10 } 18	11 } 21	8 } 14	8 } 13
Disagree completely	11 } 23	9 } 18	8 } 18	10 } 21	6 } 14	5 } 13
Don't know	23	19	18	17	17	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Not surprisingly, those who mentioned direct elections without prompting (i.e., one in four) tended to be more in favour of elections (82%) than those who were unable to do so; but even here 69% thought it was a good idea.

Similarly, 91% of those who considered Parliament's present role "important" supported the idea of direct elections; so did 39% of those who saw this role as being "not very important" or "not at all important".

(See Table 29)

Table 29

ATTITUDE TO DIRECT ELECTIONS

RELATED TO INFORMATION LEVEL

AND IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO PRESENT ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

(Community as a whole: April/May 1977)

	Base	For elections	Against elections	Don't know	Total
For every 100 contacts mentioning direct elections without being prompted	2168	82%	13%	5%	100%
For every 100 contacts unable to do so	6899	69	13	18	100
For every 100 contacts who considered the present role of the European Parliament "very important" or "important"	6053	91%	6%	3%	100%
For every 100 contacts who considered the present role of the European Parliament "not very important" or "not at all important"	1835	39	41	20	100

If these results are compared with those produced in September 1973 in the first poll covering the enlarged Community, it will be seen that there has been an increase in positive attitudes in all countries except Germany.

(See Table 30)

Support has grown most in the United Kingdom (up from 33% to 67%: + 34 points) and Ireland (up from 45% to 76%: + 31 points). These are followed by France (up from 51% to 74%: + 23 points) and the Netherlands (up from 62% to 82%: + 20 points). In the United Kingdom and Ireland, two new members, the change would seem to be largely due to a swing from the anti-elections camp. In France and the Netherlands, on the other hand, the main reason for the change would seem to be a drop in the number of "don't knows".<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> And we mean "would seem to be". Since different people are interviewed each time, a change in the results does not necessarily reflect a change in individual attitudes.



	<u>Increase in number "for"</u>	<u>Drop in number "against"</u>	<u>Drop in number of "don't knows"</u>
United Kingdom <sup>1</sup>	34	27	7
Ireland	31	19	12
France	23	6	17
Netherlands	20	7	13

Germany, which was in second position in the 1973 supporters' league, has dropped back to sixth position although the percentage of "fors" remains unchanged (69%). Some of the "completely fors" have become slightly less committed and some of those who were already less than committed have become non-committal; the overall impression then is one of mild disillusionment.

<sup>1</sup> Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.

Table 30

CHANGE IN ATTITUDES TO DIRECT ELECTIONS<sup>1</sup>

	September 1973				April/May 1977				Increase in rates "for"
	For	Against	Don't know	Total	For	Against	Don't know	Total	
Luxembourg	67%	12%	21%	100%	85%	7%	8%	100%	18
Nederland	62	16	22	100	82	9	9	100	20
Italia	74	12	21	100	80	10	10	100	6
Ireland	45	31	24	100	76	12	12	100	31
France	51	18	31	100	74	12	14	100	23
Deutschland	69	12	19	100	69	8	23	100	0
United Kingdom <sup>2</sup>	33	49	18	100	67	22	11	100	34
Belgique/België	52	14	34	100	64	13	23	100	12
Danmark	36	43	21	100	44	27	29	100	8
<b>COMMUNITY<sup>3</sup></b>	54	23	23	100	72	13	15	100	18

<sup>1</sup> Countries listed by relative frequency of positive replies in April/May 1977.

<sup>2</sup> Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.

<sup>3</sup> Weighted average.

In all nine countries without exception, opinion leaders were much more in favour of direct elections than the general public, and their support for the idea is growing.

The difference between leaders and non-leaders was particularly marked in Germany (91% as compared with 47%).

Support among opinion leaders has grown most in Ireland (up from 57% to 84%: +27 points) and the United Kingdom (up from 51% to 74%: +23 points).

(See Table 31)

Table 31

ATTITUDE TO DIRECT ELECTIONS BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(Change between 1973 and 1977 by country)<sup>1</sup>

	September 1973				April/May 1977			
	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
<u>Belgique/België</u>	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
For	33	53	72	76	47	65	80	88
Against	12	15	14	18	16	15	8	4
Don't know	55	32	14	6	37	20	12	8
<u>Danmark</u>								
For	22	35	39	47	32	46	48	52
Against	43	40	45	47	23	23	32	35
Don't know	35	25	15	6	45	31	20	13
<u>Deutschland</u>								
For	32	65	80	88	47	70	75	91
Against	11	14	12	9	8	10	7	7
Don't know	57	21	8	3	45	20	18	2
<u>France</u>								
For	34	48	55	72	59	73	84	73
Against	14	20	22	19	9	12	9	22
Don't know	52	32	13	9	32	15	7	5
<u>Ireland</u>								
For	32	44	56	57	62	76	85	84
Against	26	33	33	34	15	14	8	8
Don't know	42	23	11	9	23	10	7	8
<u>Italia</u>								
For	44	62	74	80	71	80	86	84
Against	8	10	15	15	10	8	8	14
Don't know	48	28	11	5	19	12	6	2
<u>Nederland</u>								
For	40	65	73	70	56	83	88	86
Against	16	14	16	23	20	8	7	11
Don't know	44	21	11	7	24	9	5	3

Table 31 (contd)

	September 1973				April/May 1977			
	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>United Kingdom</u> <sup>2</sup>								
For	18	33	40	51	54	69	71	74
Against	48	49	51	42	26	20	21	23
Don't know	34	18	9	7	20	11	8	3

<sup>1</sup> Luxembourg is excluded because of the small size of the sample.

<sup>2</sup> Great Britain in 1973.

The results and commentaries presented above are a good illustration of the complexity of public attitudes to direct elections and, more than likely, to the European Community and European unification too: inadequate information and minimal involvement but on the whole a general public which is favourably disposed (except in Denmark) and opinion leaders who are even more favourably disposed, with the important difference that their support is based on a greater degree of awareness and involvement. This is a point which might be borne in mind by the political parties and other organizations in planning their strategy for this, the first European election campaign.

But before we move on to other aspects of the election campaign, the answers to two other questions must be examined:

- the importance attached to turning out to vote;
- the importance attached to the election results, i.e. to the legalized credibility of a European Parliament whose members have been elected by direct universal suffrage.

#### The importance of turning out to vote

On average more than two "Europeans" in three (67%) felt that for them personally voting in the European elections was important.

This view was most widespread among the Dutch, followed closely by the Italians, the Irish, the British and the Luxembourgers, with the French, the Belgians, the Germans and the Danes a little way behind. But everywhere, except in Denmark, the majority of those interviewed felt that turning out to vote was important.

(See Table 32).

As was to be expected, opinion leaders tended to believe more strongly in the importance of voting.

(See Table 33)

Table 32

IMPORTANCE OF VOTING IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Important	55	49	52	69	73	76	72	82	73	67
Not important	30	24	27	16	20	15	20	12	21	20
Don't know	15	27	21	15	7	9	8	6	6	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

Table 33

IMPORTANCE OF VOTING IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
	%	%	%	%
Important	49	66	75	78
Not important	25	21	17	17
Don't know	26	13	8	5
Total	100	100	100	100

### Importance of elections

To a certain extent the importance attached to turning out to vote is a measure of the importance attached to universal suffrage and all it stands for. This may help to explain why a smaller percentage of those interviewed (53%) regarded the elections as "an event with important consequences which is certain to make Europe more politically unified".

Approximately six in ten of those interviewed in Luxembourg, Italy, France and the Netherlands held this view; slightly fewer (between 50 and 55%) in Belgium, the United Kingdom and Ireland and four in ten in Germany and Denmark.

The importance attached to voting is tending to increase as polling day approaches and the political debate gathers momentum in all countries except Germany.

(See Table 34)

The trend is slightly more marked among opinion leaders, with as many as nine in ten replying, more often than not in positive terms. At this stage it is difficult to say whether it is the importance attached to the event which produces a favourable attitude (i.e. contacts were genuinely convinced) or whether the reverse is true (i.e. contacts were rationalizing). The two are not mutually exclusive; a process of psychological and social conditioning could be at work in anticipation of an event which, far from being dreaded, is welcomed, gaining importance and winning support in many quarters.

(See Table 35)

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Table 36 gives details of the replies given by each country to the main question - "for" or "against" direct elections - and shows the change in attitudes between 1973 and 1977.

Table 34  
IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
It is an event with important consequences which is certain to make Europe more politically unified										
Nov. 1976	53	35	47	46	38	56	53	48	41	48
April/May 1977	55	40	41	58	50	62	64	58	51	53
It is an unimportant event because the national governments will not be bound by the votes in the European Parliament <sup>2</sup>										
Nov. 1976	19	33	35	28	27	19	25	29	31	28
April/May 1977	16	25	37	23	28	22	20	28	29	27
Don't know										
Nov. 1976	28	32	18	26	35	25	22	23	28	24
April/May 1977	29	35	22	19	22	16	16	14	20	20

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

<sup>2</sup>The wording of this question in November 1976 was "Heads of State will not be bound ...".

Table 35  
IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

BY LEADERSHIP RATING  
(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
	%	%	%	%
Event with important consequences				
Nov. 1976	36	46	55	56
April/May 1977	36	51	61	62
Unimportant event				
Nov. 1976	22	30	29	34
April/May 1977	26	29	27	29
Don't know				
Nov. 1976	42	24	16	10
April/May 1977	38	20	12	9

Table 36  
FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE  
BY COUNTRY<sup>1</sup>

	Completely for	To some extent for	To some extent against	Completely against	Don't know	Total
Luxembourg						
Sept. 1973	40%	27%	8%	4%	21%	100%
May 1975	36	33	7	3	21	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	31	44	6	1	18	100
May 1976	36	35	5	4	20	100
Nov. 1976	44	33	8	1	14	100
April/May 1977	43	42	5	2	8	100
Nederland						
Sept. 1973	32	30	11	5	22	100
May 1975	28	29	7	7	29	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	27	32	6	5	30	100
May 1976	43	31	8	6	12	100
Nov. 1976	38	36	6	5	15	100
April/May 1977	52	30	6	3	9	100
Italia						
Sept. 1973	34	30	8	4	24	100
May 1975	37	40	6	2	15	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	38	40	5	3	14	100
May 1976	42	32	6	2	18	100
Nov. 1976	40	37	5	3	15	100
April/May 1977	43	37	7	3	10	100
Ireland						
Sept. 1973	15	30	17	14	24	100
May 1975	20	35	13	9	23	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	19	37	15	8	21	100
May 1976	24	33	17	8	18	100
Nov. 1976	29	34	9	5	23	100
April/May 1977	46	30	6	6	12	100
France						
Sept. 1973	22	29	11	7	31	100
May 1975	33	35	9	6	17	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	26	43	9	4	18	100
May 1976	28	38	10	7	17	100
Nov. 1976	27	42	9	4	18	100
April/May 1977	28	46	9	3	14	100
Deutschland						
Sept. 1973	29	40	9	3	19	100
May 1975	28	48	6	2	16	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	23	50	9	2	16	100
May 1976	25	42	10	5	18	100
Nov. 1976	27	49	7	3	14	100
April/May 1977	23	46	6	2	23	./.

Table 36 (contd)

	Completely for	To some extent for	To some extent against	Completely against	Don't know	Total
United Kingdom						
Sept. 1973 <sup>2</sup>	11%	22%	19%	30%	18%	100%
May 1975	16	25	16	27	16	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	13	28	18	24	17	100
May 1976	14	26	19	29	12	100
Nov. 1976	30	27	8	14	21	100
April/May 1977	42	25	10	12	11	100
Belgique/België						
Sept. 1973	23	29	8	6	34	100
May 1975	23	32	6	3	36	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	20	33	5	4	38	100
May 1976	31	28	7	4	30	100
Nov. 1976	37	32	5	4	22	100
April/May 1977	33	31	7	6	23	100
Danmark						
Sept. 1973	20	16	18	25	21	100
May 1975	15	20	12	21	32	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	13	19	18	25	25	100
May 1976	18	22	17	25	18	100
Nov. 1976	22	20	16	21	21	100
April/May 1977	22	22	12	15	29	100

<sup>1</sup> Countries listed by relative frequency of positive replies (i.e. "completely for" and "to some extent for") in April/May 1977.

<sup>2</sup> Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.



3. PUBLIC OPINION:  
THE WHYS AND WHEREFORES

One of the objects of this Euro-Barometer was to investigate the motivations and arguments underlying public attitudes, whether favourable or unfavourable, and the public's views on the role of the European MP in greater detail than earlier polls.

Two questions were asked with this in mind:

"Here are some comments about holding the European Parliamentary elections next year. Please say, for each one, whether you agree with it or not, and how strongly you feel."

- . Elections are necessary to give more democratic control over the Community and the officials in Brussels.
- . Elections are necessary to decide what kind of Europe we want.
- . They would lead to too much power for the European Parliament compared with our own Parliament in (country).
- . We have enough problems without wasting time on European elections."  
(Q. 128-131)

"Which of the following attitudes would you expect a member of the European Parliament to have?"

- . He should support things that are good for Europe as a whole, even if they are not always good for (your country) at the time.
- . He should support the interests of (your country) all the time whether or not they are good for Europe as a whole." (Q. 132)

A. Arguments for and against direct elections

Of the two positive arguments, the one most strongly endorsed by contacts (78% on average) was that elections are necessary to decide what kind of Europe we want. The other, that elections are necessary to give more democratic control over the Community and the officials in Brussels, was supported by 66% of those interviewed.

The more successful of the positive arguments ("What kind of Europe") proved particularly popular in Ireland (86%) and in Luxembourg (81%) but nowhere in the Community did support for it fall below 54% (Denmark). The other positive argument ("Control over officials in Brussels") also appealed in Ireland (82%) and the United Kingdom (77%) and it managed to attract support from 59% of those interviewed in France and Italy, 58% in Belgium and 54% in Denmark.

In the Community as a whole neither of the negative arguments received more than one third of the votes; in no country did either win majority support.

Despite this, 47% of the British and 42% of the Irish were concerned that direct elections might result in too much power for the European Parliament.

A relatively high percentage of the Danes (33% on average) failed to react to any of the arguments.

(See Table 37)

It would appear that leadership rating had little bearing either way on the positive arguments, at least from a certain level of social and political involvement upwards (level -). The opposite was true for the negative arguments; rejection increased significantly with leadership rating.

(See Table 38)

If we disregard the "don't knows" we find that net agreement (i.e. the difference between the percentage who agree and the percentage who disagree) on the second positive argument ("deciding what kind of Europe we want") is higher among "quasi-leaders" (approximately 30% of the population), whereas the first positive argument ("increasing control over officials in Brussels") was more popular among the "general public" (66% of those interviewed).

There is an obvious link between leadership rating and the two negative arguments, particularly the more provocative one ("wasting time on European elections"), which was rejected out of hand by opinion leaders<sup>1</sup>.

(See Table 38)

	NET AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT ON THE DIFFERENT ARGUMENTS			
	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
<u>Positive arguments</u>				
Control over officials in Brussels	39	52	50	42
What kind of Europe	55	69	74	69
<u>Negative arguments</u>				
Too much power	3	-11	-22	-20
Waste of time	5	-20	-39	-45
Base	(1386)	(3166)	(2804)	(1212)

Table 37

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DIRECT ELECTIONS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>A. European elections are necessary to give more democratic control over the Community and the officials in Brussels</u>										
Strongly agree	24	30	25	18	42	19	31	30	36	25
Agree to some extent	34	24	44	41	40	40	38	36	41	41
Disagree somewhat	11	6	10	11	6	15	9	15	6	11
Disagree totally	8	6	5	5	3	12	4	12	6	7
Don't know	23	34	16	25	9	14	18	7	11	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2,96	3,17	3,06	2,98	3,32	2,76	3,17	2,91	3,19	3,00
<u>B. European elections are necessary to decide what kind of Europe we want</u>										
Strongly agree	40	29	36	37	48	35	52	41	41	37
Agree to some extent	32	25	40	43	38	43	29	43	39	41
Disagree somewhat	5	9	8	4	6	7	4	8	5	6
Disagree totally	3	7	4	2	3	5	2	3	7	4
Don't know	20	30	12	14	5	10	13	5	8	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	3,36	3,09	3,23	3,32	3,39	3,20	3,51	3,28	3,24	3,25
<u>C. These elections would lead to too much power for the European Parliament compared with our own Parliament (country)</u>										
Strongly agree	10	18	11	10	13	6	11	11	16	11
Agree to some extent	27	19	21	20	29	19	21	24	31	23
Disagree somewhat	21	17	36	31	29	33	28	34	25	31
Disagree totally	13	9	14	10	11	25	16	24	12	15
Don't know	29	37	18	29	18	17	24	7	16	20

Table 37 (contd)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
Total	% 100	% 100	% 100	% 100	% 100	% 100	% 100	% 100	% 100	% 100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2,47	2,72	2,37	2,43	2,53	2,07	2,36	2,25	2,61	2,37
<u>D. We have enough problems without wasting time on European elections</u>										
Strongly agree	17	18	13	13	18	14	17	15	18	15
Agree to some extent	20	18	14	16	24	17	20	14	25	18
Disagree somewhat	21	17	30	31	28	22	22	25	24	26
Disagree totally	25	15	28	29	24	38	27	41	26	30
Don't know	17	32	15	11	6	9	14	5	7	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2,35	2,58	2,15	2,15	2,39	2,08	2,31	2,03	2,37	2,20

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

<sup>2</sup>"Strongly agree" = 4.

Table 38

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DIRECT ELECTIONS

BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
<u>To give more democratic control over officials in Brussels</u>	%	%	%	%
Agree	53	68	70	68
Don't agree	14	16	20	26
Don't know	33	16	10	6
<u>To decide what kind of Europe we want</u>				
Agree	64	79	84	83
Don't agree	9	10	10	14
Don't know	27	11	6	3
<u>Could lead to too much power for European Parliament</u>				
Agree	33	34	33	36
Don't agree	30	45	55	56
Don't know	37	21	12	8
<u>Waste of time</u>				
Agree	41	35	27	26
Don't agree	36	55	66	71
Don't know	23	10	7	3

What bearing do these arguments for and against direct elections have on the importance attached to turning out to vote?

A combined analysis of both sets of replies shows that:

- (a) 79% of those who support the first positive argument ("increasing control over officials in Brussels") think it is important to vote, as compared with 53% of those who reject it: a difference of 26 points;
- (b) 77% of those who support the second positive argument ("deciding what kind of Europe we want") think it is important to vote; but only 33% of those who reject this argument feel the same way: a difference of 44 points, which implies that this argument is the stronger of the two;
- (c) 26% of those who support the first negative argument ("could lead to too much power for the European Parliament") see no point in voting, as compared with 15% of those who reject it: the difference (11 points) shows that this argument carries little weight;
- (d) finally, 36% of those who support the second negative argument ("enough problems without wasting time on European elections"), see no point in voting, as compared with 11% of those who reject it: a difference of 25 points.

In other words, those who claim to attach a great deal of importance to voting in the European elections would seem to be influenced by the potential impact on the future of the "European venture" rather than the prospect of increased control over "officials in Brussels". Conversely, those who attach little importance to voting would appear to be motivated by the feeling that the whole business (elections and/or the European Parliament) is a waste of time rather than a fear of an elected Parliament becoming "supranational"<sup>1</sup>.

(See Table 39)

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<sup>1</sup> A more detailed analysis will be carried out at a later date on the basis of all the replies given by each person interviewed.

Table 39

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO VOTING  
RELATED TO REACTIONS TO THE ARGUMENTS  
FOR AND AGAINST DIRECT ELECTIONS

(Community as a whole)

	Base	Attach importance to voting	Do not attach importance to voting
Out of every 100 replying as follows:			
<u>To give more democratic control over officials in Brussels</u>			
Agree	5957	79%	14%
Don't agree	1631	53	39
Don't know	1479	34	26
<u>To decide what kind of Europe we want</u>			
Agree	7054	77%	14%
Don't agree	972	33	56
Don't know	1041	26	27
<u>Could lead to too much power for European Parliament</u>			
Agree	3075	65%	26%
Don't agree	4180	78	15
Don't know	1812	44	22
<u>Waste of time</u>			
Agree	2966	51%	36%
Don't agree	5116	83	11
Don't know	985	33	23

## B. Attitude expected of European MPs

With the debate on the dangers of a "supranational" European Parliament raging in a number of countries, it was interesting to see exactly how, if at all, public thinking had been affected. The question put to contacts was worded in such a way as to force them to opt for one of two attitudes which they would like to see in a Euro-MP, himself in a situation where he had to make a choice: either to support Community interests, even when these happen to clash with national interests, or to support national interests exclusively.

Although the question is a tricky one, on average nine in ten of those interviewed replied (22% "don't know" in Denmark, 19% in Germany and 16% in Belgium).

Generally speaking, the contacts who replied divided more or less evenly into the two camps. The Netherlands was the only country where the "supranational" reply won hands down (62% as against 29%). In Ireland (56% as against 39%), Denmark (46% as against 32%), and the United Kingdom (53% as against 41%), the "national" reply came out ahead. In other words there is an appreciable difference in attitudes between the six founder Member States and the three new Member States:

	The Six	United Kingdom	Denmark	Ireland
"Supranational" reply	45	41	32	39%
"National" reply	42	53	46	56
Difference	+3	-12	-14	-17

In general, the "supranational" approach was more popular with young people (male and female), contacts in a fairly high income bracket and opinion leaders, but level of education emerged as the most important factor. A possible explanation for this may be that opinion leaders are by definition influenced by political considerations while the better educated and the better informed (particularly among the young) are less involved and therefore find it easier to think in terms of Community interests<sup>2</sup>.

(See Table 41)

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

<sup>2</sup>A more detailed analysis using the "ideology" variable is the only reliable way of checking out these hypotheses.



Table 40

ATTITUDE EXPECTED FROM EUROPEAN MPs:

PROMOTION OF COMMUNITY INTERESTS OR IMMEDIATE NATIONAL INTERESTS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Support things that are good for Europe as a whole, even if they are not always good for (your country) at the time	39	32	41	48	39	46	49	62	41	44
Support the interests of (your country) all the time whether or not they are good for Europe as a whole	45	46	40	41	56	47	45	29	53	45
Don't know	16	22	19	11	5	7	6	9	6	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

Table 41

ATTITUDE EXPECTED OF EUROPEAN MPs:  
RELATED TO SEX, AGE, INCOME, EDUCATION AND LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole)

	Community interests	National interests	Don't know	Total
Total	44%	45%	11%	100%
<u>Men</u>	48	43	9	100
Aged: 15-24	53	38	9	100
25-39	53	40	7	100
40-54	48	45	7	100
55 and over	39	49	12	100
<u>Women</u>	41	45	14	100
Aged: 15-24	51	38	11	100
25-39	44	44	12	100
40-54	39	47	14	100
55 and over	34	49	17	100
<u>Education</u>				
Elementary	35	52	13	100
Average	49	41	10	100
Advanced	64	28	8	100
<u>Income</u>				
Modest	35	51	14	100
Below average	40	48	12	100
Above average	43	47	10	100
Well off	58	34	8	100
<u>Leadership rating</u>				
Non-leaders (--)	28	52	20	100
(-)	42	47	11	100
(+)	53	39	8	100
Leaders (++)	56	38	6	100

Again it would be interesting to see whether views on attitudes expected of European MPs have any bearing on the importance attached to voting in the European elections.

No less than 80% of those who expect Euro-MPs to adopt a "supranational" approach feel that it is important to vote. But interestingly enough, 61% of those who would prefer Euro-MPs to adopt a "national" approach agree that voting is important. Although there is quite a difference between the two figures, it is still reasonable to argue that the "supranational debate" has little bearing on the decision to vote or not. This makes sense if we remember that almost 80% of those interviewed felt that elections were necessary "to decide what kind of Europe we want"<sup>1</sup>.

(See Table 42)

<sup>1</sup>See pp. 55-61.

Table 42

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO VOTING  
RELATED TO ATTITUDE EXPECTED OF EUROPEAN MPs  
(Community as a whole)

	Base	Consider voting important	Consider voting unimportant
Out of every 100 opting for the "supranational" approach	4002	80	12
Out of every 100 opting for the "national" approach	4035	61	26
Out of every 100 who "don't know"	1030	35	27

#### 4. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN:

##### PRIORITIES AND PARTY STRATEGY

As a follow up to earlier research into the poles of public interest<sup>1</sup>, it seemed sensible to attempt to identify some of the issues which might become significant in the election campaign. This research is, by definition, exploratory.

It also seemed a good idea to find out whether the public expected political parties of the same colour to combine forces or to campaign at national level.

##### A. Priority issues

"Here are some different topics which could become a matter of public debate between candidates for the election to the European Parliament. Which of them interests you most? And the next one?"

- The extent to which countries of the Common Market should be encouraged to act together in the present economic difficulties.
- Ways of increasing the capacity of the Common Market in terms of military defence.
- How to encourage the union of the countries of the Common Market in the face of the superpowers like Russia and America.
- The fight against pollution and the protection of nature and the countryside within the Community.
- The extent to which the European Community will be able to exercise greater control on the activities of the multinational companies."

(Q. 144-145)

"Here are some other possible subjects for public debate between the candidates for the election to the European Parliament. Which one among these interests you the most? And the next one?"

- How to keep the basis of the traditions and the individuality of our own country within a more united Europe.
- How to safeguard the interests of the less powerful countries within a united Europe.
- What kind of relations a more independent Europe would wish to keep with the United States.
- The ways of allowing new countries into the Common Market without endangering its unity.
- How to share out more fairly the costs and benefits for each member country."

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<sup>1</sup>See L'information du public sur les problèmes européens (Brussels, 1977) by J.R. Rabier.

The main point to emerge from an analysis of the replies was the extraordinary uniformity of public opinion throughout the Community. In the first place the order of priority was fairly similar for all nine countries, particularly at both ends of the list; secondly the average spread of national percentages in favour of each item was a mere 7 points for the first list and 11 points for the second list. This confirms previous findings: when it comes to major issues there is such a thing as European public opinion.

Popularity ratings for subjects on the first list were as follows:

- (i) joint action in the face of current economic difficulties (59%), quoted most frequently in the United Kingdom and Italy;
- (ii) fight against pollution and nature conservation (46%), most popular in Denmark and the Netherlands;
- (iii) strengthening the Community in the face of the superpowers (34%), a subject of particular concern to the French;
- (iv) control of multinationals (22%), rated slightly higher in Denmark and Ireland;
- (v) stepping up the Community's defence capacity (last on the list with only 14%), slightly more popular in Germany and Luxembourg.

(See Table 43)

Popularity ratings for subjects on the second list, again listed by relative average frequency, were as follows:

- (i) fairer sharing of costs and benefits among member countries (52%), quoted most frequently in the United Kingdom and Ireland;
- (ii) preservation of national traditions and identity (42%), again much more popular in the United Kingdom and Ireland than elsewhere;
- (iii) protection of the interests of the less powerful countries (36%), understandably enough very popular in the smaller countries (particularly Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands), but also in Italy;
- (iv) accession of new member countries (21%), apparently of slightly greater interest to the Germans and the Dutch;
- (v) establishment of more independent relations between Europe and the United States (21%), a priority issue for 27% of the Germans interviewed<sup>1</sup>.

(See Table 44)

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<sup>1</sup> See following page.

The fact that, from a list of five possible themes, this one has a relatively low score does not mean that Europeans have no strong feelings in the matter. The contrary was demonstrated by answers to a question asked in November 1976: "If we think about the foreign policy of Europe, which of the two following opinions comes closest to your own?"

[illegible]

Table 43

ELECTION CAMPAIGN: PRIORITY ISSUES<sup>1</sup>

(First list: aggregate of first and second choices)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Joint action in the face of current economic difficulties	50	46	50	55	63	66	50	63	67	59
Fight against pollution and nature conservation	46	57	45	48	45	46	46	54	41	46
Strengthening the Community in the face of superpowers	26	11	38	44	28	32	35	28	29	34
Greater control of multinationals	27	31	16	23	34	24	18	25	24	22
Stepping up defence capacity	8	6	24	8	14	8	21	13	17	14

<sup>1</sup> Items listed by relative average frequency of replies for the Community as a whole.

<sup>2</sup> Weighted average.

Table 44

ELECTION CAMPAIGN: PRIORITY ISSUES<sup>1</sup>

(Second list: aggregate of first and second choices)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Fairer sharing of costs and benefits among member countries	36	41	49	49	69	48	43	45	69	52
Preservation of national traditions and identity	31	52	31	49	38	33	24	32	60	42
Protection of interests of less powerful countries	42	38	29	30	54	55	55	49	26	36
Accession of new member countries without endangering the unity of the Community	22	9	30	20	16	20	24	27	13	21
More independent relations between Europe and the United States	19	6	27	24	10	15	22	24	14	21

<sup>1</sup> See footnotes to Table 43.

<sup>2</sup>

All these subjects were rated fairly evenly within the various national samples. There were however a few minor differences.

(a) First list:

- the idea of joint action in the face of current economic difficulties (59% on average) was slightly more popular with men and with contacts in the 25-39 age group in a relatively high income bracket with a fairly high level of education;
- the fight against pollution and nature conservation (46%) was of relatively greater interest to women, particularly young women (between 15 and 39), and to town dwellers;
- strengthening the Community in the face of the superpowers (34%) and control of multinationals (22%) appealed more to opinion leaders.

(b) Neither sex nor age had much bearing on the choice of subject on the second list; by contrast leadership rating was a decisive factor for all topics except the accession of new member countries<sup>1</sup>.

B. Political parties and the election campaign

"For these elections, do you think that parties of the same general outlook in the different countries ought to join together so as to fight a joint campaign, or do you think that each political party should campaign for itself in its own country?" (Q. 138)<sup>2</sup>.

A little more than half of those interviewed were in favour of parties of the same colour fighting a joint campaign; this view predominated in Italy (66%), Belgium (57%), the Netherlands (54%), France (52%) and Germany (47%). The Irish, the British and the Danes were the only nationalities to opt for national campaigning.

(See Table 45)

Being a political question, it was only to be expected that leadership rating would be a decisive factor here:

- in the Community in general, and in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium in particular, opinion leaders were more in favour of joint European campaigns than the general public;
- however, in the United Kingdom, and even more so in Denmark, the majority of opinion leaders were in favour of national campaigns, an attitude which was less common among the general public;

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<sup>1</sup>These initial findings, which have still to be subjected to multiple classification analysis, are not given here.

<sup>2</sup>This question was put to "opinion leaders" only in November 1976. All contacts were asked to reply in April-May 1977.



- in Ireland those with near-average leadership rating, i.e. the "general public", favoured national campaigns, whereas the minority with top leadership rating came out overwhelmingly in support of European campaigns;
- between November 1976 and April/May 1977 there has been a strong swing towards European campaigns among opinion leaders in Ireland, Belgium, Denmark and the United Kingdom: as polling day approaches opinion leaders in these three countries are becoming more aware of the positive advantages of campaigning at European level for the European elections.

(See Table 46)

Table 45  
ELECTION CAMPAIGN: PARTY POLITICAL STRATEGY

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Parties of the same colour should get together	57	23	47	52	44	66	49	54	38	51
Each national party should campaign for itself	21	47	32	30	50	22	39	37	48	33
Don't know	22	30	21	18	6	12	12	9	14	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

Table 46  
ELECTION CAMPAIGN: PARTY POLITICAL STRATEGY  
BY LEADERSHIP RATING

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Parties of the same colour should get together:</u>										
Non-leaders (--)	45	15	30	42	41	55 (33)	32	33	39	
(-)	57	23	46	50	43	66 (53)	51	38	49	
(+)	70	25	55	57	44	73 (50)	60	40	56	
Leaders (++)	73	34	63	60	59	70 (59)	61	43	60	
<u>November 1976<sup>2</sup></u>										
Leaders (++)	55	19	63	59	31	65 (46)	56	31	55	
<u>Each national party should campaign for itself:</u>										
Non-leaders (--)	19	37	28	27	45	20 (41)	42	44	30	
(-)	27	46	36	32	52	22 (35)	42	49	36	
(+)	19	55	31	30	54	21 (42)	33	51	34	
Leaders (++)	16	50	30	30	35	26 (38)	33	48	33	
<u>November 1976</u>										
Leaders (++)	36	51	28	29	59	25 (42)	40	60	35	
<u>Don't know:</u>										
Non-leaders (--)	36	48	42	31	14	25 (26)	26	23	31	
(-)	16	51	18	18	5	12 (12)	7	13	15	
(+)	11	20	14	13	2	6 (8)	7	9	10	
Leaders (++)	11	16	7	10	6	4 (3)	6	9	7	
<u>November 1976</u>										
Leaders (++)	9	30	9	12	10	10 (12)	4	9	10	

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

<sup>2</sup>Question put to opinion leaders only.

5. DETERMINATION TO VOTE -  
PREFERENCE FOR A POLITICAL GROUP -  
LEVEL OF INFORMATION

Three new questions were put to the public with an eye to the pre-election campaign. The first was fairly straightforward and will be repeated as frequently as possible right up to polling day in an attempt to find out whether or not the public intends to vote; it was asked in all nine countries, with slightly different wording in countries like Belgium and Luxembourg where voting is compulsory.

The second question - a slightly more tricky one - was included as an experiment. Each interviewee was asked to express a preference for one of the six political groups currently represented in the European Parliament, to give a second choice, and to state which group he would definitely not choose.

The third question was asked at the end of the interview in an attempt to find out whether contacts felt they were sufficiently well-informed on direct elections.

A. Determination to vote

"There are going to be elections to the European Parliament in the spring of 1978. How likely is it that you will go and vote? Certainly, probably, probably not or certainly not?"<sup>2</sup> (Q. 137)

In the Community as a whole just under half of those interviewed (47%) said that they would "certainly" turn out to vote and just over a quarter claimed they would "probably" do so. The highest percentage of "definites" came from Italy (64%) and the Netherlands (60%), followed by Ireland (52%), France (51%), the United Kingdom (47%), Luxembourg (44%) and Denmark (42%); bottom of the list came Belgium (37%) and Germany (28%).

These figures are difficult to interpret for a number of reasons: firstly, we are still in the realms of hypothesis, talking about intentions rather than decisions; secondly, as the samples represent a cross-section of the population aged 15 and over, they include a small fraction (6.5%) of the population who are not yet old enough to vote; lastly, it would be reasonable to add an as yet unspecified number of "probables" to the "definites".

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<sup>1</sup> Each of the six cards from which the interviewee had to choose showed the name of the political group and the name of the party in each country at present represented in the group.

<sup>2</sup> In Belgium and Luxembourg the phrase " ..... even if voting were not compulsory ....." was added.

Since the significance of replies other than "will certainly go and vote" is uncertain, we must assume that these represent a minimum. This would mean that, as things now stand, something of the order of half the electorate would probably turn up at the polls.

(See Table 47)

Despite the fact that these results are approximate, even allowing for the adjustment suggested above, a pattern does emerge. What is more, the differences which have shown up between the various socio-demographic groups correspond to what we already know about the way voters actually behave in national elections.

For example, more men than women said they would "certainly" turn out to vote. Similarly, young people (between 15 and 24) of both sexes and older women (aged 55 and over) showed least inclination to vote. But once again leadership rating proved the most valuable indicator: determination to vote increased from six in ten for the general public to eight in ten for opinion leaders.

(See Table 48)

Contacts who supported direct elections were also more determined to vote.

(See Table 49)

Table 47

DETERMINATION TO VOTE

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Will certainly go and vote	37	42	28	51	52	64	44	60	47	47
Will probably go and vote	21	18	36	26	26	20	35	22	26	27
Will probably not vote	11	7	11	5	7	5	8	5	11	8
Will certainly not vote	19	12	7	5	8	5	3	5	10	7
Depends	6	9	4	6	3	3	7	5	3	4
Don't know	6	12	14	7	4	3	3	3	3	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

Table 48

DETERMINATION TO VOTE  
RELATED TO SEX, AGE AND LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole)

	Will go and vote		Will not go and vote		Other reply	Total
	Certainly	Probably	Probably	Certainly		
	47%	27%	8%	7%		
Total					11%	100%
<u>Men</u>	52	25	8	7	8	100
Aged: 15-24	38	28	11	13	10	100
25-39	53	27	6	5	9	100
40-54	56	23	7	6	8	100
55 and over	55	22	8	6	9	100
<u>Women</u>	43	28	8	7	14	100
Aged: 15-24	34	27	10	15	14	100
25-39	46	29	7	6	12	100
40-54	49	29	7	4	11	100
55 and over	39	26	10	8	17	100
<u>Leadership rating</u>						
Non-leaders (--)	32	25	11	12	20	100
(-)	44	30	9	6	11	100
(+)	53	27	6	6	8	100
Leaders (++)	66	18	5	5	6	100

Table 49

DETERMINATION TO VOTE  
RELATED TO ATTITUDE TO DIRECT ELECTIONS

(Community as a whole)

	Will go and vote		Will not go and vote		Other reply	Total
	Certainly	Probably	Probably	Certainly		
	47%	27%	8%	7%		
Total					11%	100%
Completely for	77	16	2	3	2	100
To some extent for	40	41	6	4	9	100
To some extent against	21	23	27	14	15	100
Completely against	24	10	14	38	14	100

B. Preference for a political group

"In the European Parliament as it is now, the parliamentarians of different member countries, including our own, have got together into six main groups. Each group consists of Members of Parliament from different countries with similar political ideas. Here are six cards and each one shows one of these groups. You will see that each card gives the name of each party, in each country, that forms that particular group."

Would you please choose the card which corresponds to the political group of the European Parliament that you personally feel closest to.  
(ONE SINGLE ANSWER)

IF CARD IS CHOSEN: If the parties which form the group you choose didn't have any candidates in the election in (your country), which other group would you choose? (ONE SINGLE ANSWER)

ASK ALL: Among these remaining groups, are there any that you would certainly not choose in any case? (ONE SINGLE ANSWER) (Q. 139-141)

These results, even more than the previous set, must be treated with caution. There is no doubt that the public is not totally familiar with the names and membership of the groups at present represented in the European Parliament; it is also possible that contacts were surprised to see that the cards did not include the name of the national (or regional) party for whom they normally vote or for whom they would vote in a national election. Nevertheless the question seems to have been reasonably well received as on average nine in ten answered the first two questions and eight in ten the third.

The breakdown to emerge is as follows; the voting pattern in the most recent national elections is also shown for comparison purposes.

	Breakdown of votes (April/May 1977)	Breakdown of votes at most recent national elections <sup>1</sup>
Communists and Allies <sup>2</sup>	9%	12%
Socialists <sup>3</sup>	33	31
Liberals and Democrats <sup>4</sup>	14	11
Christian Democrats	23	26
European Progressive Democrats <sup>5</sup>	5	5
Conservatives <sup>6</sup>	10	8
Others	6	7
Total (for every 100 votes cast)	100	100

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average of votes received, for every 100 votes cast, in the most recent parliamentary elections.

<sup>2</sup>Including the Socialistisk Folkeparti in Denmark.

<sup>3</sup>Including the Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche in France and the Partito Repubblicana in Italy.

<sup>4</sup>Including the Républicains (Independents) and the Réformateurs (Radicals) in France.

<sup>5</sup>Fremskridtspartiet (Progressives) in Denmark, Fianna Fáil in Ireland and the Rassemblement pour la République (Gaullists) in France.

<sup>6</sup>Including the Centrumsdemokraterne in Denmark.

The April/May 1977 breakdown for the Community as a whole was very similar to the voting pattern in the latest national elections.

Table 50 gives average percentages for each group, in each country, for every 100 people interviewed. Table 51 shows the same results for every 100 who actually expressed an opinion ("no replies" and "don't knows" excluded).

(Table 51 is given for information only. By and large it would seem to correspond fairly closely to the most recent election results available. It is impossible to say at this stage whether such differences as do exist are a direct result of the opinion poll technique or of a change in attitudes since the last elections, or whether in fact the voter's European election choice is different from his national election choice. These hypotheses will be examined in greater detail at a later stage once the question has been asked on a number of occasions.)

Table 50

CHOICE OF A POLITICAL GROUP

FROM GROUPS CURRENTLY REPRESENTED IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

(First choice: for every 100 interviewed)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Communists and Allies	2	8	1	10	1	23	1	2	1	8
Socialists	22	34	27	33	11	21	28	35	27	27
Liberals and Democrats	9	18	12	14	6	4	18	17	14	11
Christian Democrats	33	2	35	7	26	28	26	30	3	20
European Progressive Democrats	3	5	3	10	24	3	1	4	2	5
European Conservatives	1	6	1	3	3	2	2	1	32	8
None of these groups	3	5	3	4	10	6	4	3	5	5
No reply	7	4	2	6	2	6	5	3	2	4
Don't know	20	18	16	13	17	7	15	5	14	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base	988	1010	1005	1256	1008	1025	302	1033	1414	9067

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

Table 51

CHOICE OF A POLITICAL GROUP  
FROM GROUPS CURRENTLY REPRESENTED IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

(First choice: for every 100 who replied)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Communists and Allies	3	10	2	12	1	26	( 1)	2	1	9
Socialists	31	43	33	41	14	24	(34)	38	32	33
Liberals and Democrats	12	23	14	18	7	5	(23)	19	17	14
Christian Democrats	45	2	41	8	32	32	(32)	32	4	23
European Progressive Democrats	5	7	4	12	30	3	( 2)	4	2	5
European Conservatives	1	8	2	3	4	2	( 3)	1	38	10
None of these groups	3	7	4	6	12	8	( 5)	4	6	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base	723	787	830	1024	818	892	243	950	1197	7597

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

The political preferences expressed by the different social groups is more or less what the findings of national sociological surveys of electoral behaviour had led us to expect. As preferences vary so much from country to country, it would be totally misleading to draw any conclusions for the Community as a whole.

It might be noted in passing that there is no obvious link between choice of group and support for direct elections.

(See Table 52)

<sup>1</sup>These results will be analysed country by country for each political group at a later date.



Table 52

ATTITUDE TO DIRECT ELECTIONS  
RELATED TO PREFERENCE FOR A POLITICAL GROUP

(Community as a whole)

	For direct elections	Against direct elections	Don't know	Total	Base
Total	72%	13%	15%	100%	9067
Communists and Allies	71	21	8	100	700
Socialists	76	13	11	100	2471
Liberals and Democrats	80	11	9	100	1043
Christian Democrats	78	7	15	100	1772
European Progressive Democrats	81	10	9	100	414
European Conservatives	78	17	5	100	773

\*

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Replies to the second question give contacts' second choice in the event of the party selected as first choice not contesting the election. The object of the exercise was to establish how close the parties are in the eyes of the electorate.

The first point to emerge is that the voter's ability/inability to make a second choice varies considerably with his basic political allegiance: almost three in ten of those who supported the Socialist, Christian Democrat or Conservative Groups were unable to give a "second choice".

In general, the second choice of most Communist voters went to the Socialists. But support was not reciprocated: Socialists would tend, if necessary, to vote Liberal rather than Communist. The only exceptions to the rule were the French and the Italians; in France 37% of Socialist votes would go to the Communists and 19% to the Liberals, while in Italy 29% of Socialist votes would go to the Communists and 23% to the Christian Democrats.

The Liberals would seem to be closest to the Christian Democrats but a not insubstantial minority would, if necessary, vote for the Socialists or the European Progressive Democrats.

This allegiance was reciprocated by the Christian Democrats: most of their second choices went to the Liberals, with the remaining minority shared out between Progressive Democrats, Socialists and Conservatives.

One third of Progressive Democrat voters felt closer to the Liberals, while a fairly substantial number of second choices went to the Christian Democrats, Socialists and Conservatives.

Finally, Conservatives would, if necessary, prefer to support the Liberals and to a lesser extent the Christian Democrats, Progressive Democrats and Socialists.

These findings must obviously be gone into in more detail at national level. This could reveal affinities which might make it necessary to review this initial analysis.

(See Table 53)

Table 53

SECOND CHOICE OF POLITICAL GROUP  
RELATED TO FIRST CHOICE  
(Community as a whole)

	Second choice							Total	Base
	Communists and Allies	Socialists	Liberals and Democrats	Christian Democrats	European Progressive Democrats	European Conservatives	No reply		
<u>First choice</u>									
Communists and Allies	x	72%	2%	4%	1%	-	21%	100%	700
Socialists	17	x	31	13	7	4	28	100	2471
Liberals and Democrats	1	22	x	30	19	11	17	100	1043
Christian Democrats	1	13	32	x	15	9	30	100	1772
European Progressive Democrats	1	16	34	23	x	13	13	100	414
European Conservatives	1	8	40	12	9	x	30	100	773

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\*

The third question was designed to identify "rejects": "Are there any groups that you would certainly not choose in any case?". The response was clear and unambiguous: the only group rejected out of hand again and again in all nine countries were the Communists. One in two in the Community as a whole, approximately six in ten in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland and Germany, 38% in France and 35% in Italy would not contemplate supporting this group.

(See Table 54)

An analysis of "rejects" in terms of first political choice shows that the Communists were rejected by three-quarters of the Christian Democrats, Conservatives and Liberals, by two-thirds of the European Progressive Democrats and by four in ten Socialists<sup>1</sup>.

(See Table 55)

<sup>1</sup>Only one quarter of French and Italian Socialists would reject the Communist option out of hand.

Table 54

REFUSAL TO VOTE FOR A GIVEN POLITICAL GROUP

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
<u>Would certainly not vote for one of the following groups:</u>	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Communists and Allies	44	33	58	38	61	35	48	61	64	49
Socialists	3	2	2	.	3	2	2	4	3	2
Liberals and Democrats	6	1	1	5	1	7	2	8	1	4
Christian Democrats	4	2	7	7	2	12	7	4	2	6
European Progressive Democrats	1	19	1	7	2	1	2	1	1	3
European Conservatives	3	4	4	10	4	16	2	4	5	8
Don't know or no reply	39	39	27	33	27	27	37	18	24	28
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

Table 55

REFUSAL TO VOTE FOR A GIVEN POLITICAL GROUP  
RELATED TO FIRST CHOICE  
 (Community as a whole)

	Group rejected out of hand								Base
	Communists and Allies	Socialists	Liberals and Democrats	Christian Democrats	European Progressive Democrats	European Conservatives	No reply	Total	
<u>First choice</u>									
Communists and Allies	x	3%	13%	30%	7%	30%	17%	100%	700
Socialists	43	x	7	10	6	14	20	100	2471
Liberals and Democrats	75	3	x	4	2	5	11	100	1043
Christian Democrats	77	3	2	x	1	3	14	100	1772
European Progressive Democrats	66	2	4	8	x	5	15	100	414
European Conservatives	76	6	2	1	1	x	14	100	773

C. Level of information

"Do you think that people like yourself get enough information or not from newspapers, radio and TV about the European Parliament and the forthcoming election of its members?"

(Q. 148)

More than half the general public (55%) in the Community as a whole, and almost two thirds of the Italians and British, felt that they were not being given sufficient information on direct elections.

(See Table 56)

This view was particularly widespread among the better educated and opinion leaders.

(See Table 57)

Table 56

SATISFACTION OR DISSATISFACTION WITH INFORMATION  
AVAILABLE ON DIRECT ELECTIONS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes - enough	44	33	34	37	48	22	54	41	29	32
No - not enough	41	51	47	52	44	65	38	49	64	55
Too much	1	2	1	3	3	2	2	2	2	2
Don't know	14	14	18	8	5	11	6	8	5	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup>Weighted average.

Table 57

SATISFACTION OR DISSATISFACTION WITH INFORMATION  
AVAILABLE ON DIRECT ELECTIONS  
RELATED TO EDUCATION AND LEADERSHIP RATING  
(Community as a whole)

	Education			Leadership rating			
	Elementary	Average	Advanced	Non leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes - enough	32	32	31	30	31	34	31
No - not enough	53	57	61	46	57	57	63
Too much	2	2	1	2	2	2	1
Don't know	13	9	7	22	10	7	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

## CONCLUSIONS

If everything goes according to plan, "Europeans" will go to the polls in less than twelve months' time to choose their own representatives to the European Parliament. This spring's Euro-Barometer was produced with these first-ever European elections in mind. In addition to the standard questions, which date back to 1973 and provide a valuable means of monitoring changes in public opinion throughout the Community, a special set of questions asked for the first time elicited information which gives the authorities, the politicians and the man in the street an insight into public attitudes to a whole range of issues never investigated in such detail before.

The results and analyses are not only of interest within the terms of reference of the current survey. They also make an original contribution to the study of the social and political scene in each of the Nine, because it is impossible to understand "what is happening" and "what people are thinking" in one country without referring to trends in others sharing the same culture and involved in the same political venture.

Points of interest to emerge from the survey are summarized below.

### 1. Satisfied or dissatisfied?

The citizens of the smaller Community countries were more positively satisfied with life in general, a reaction which has remained fairly stable since the first of these surveys was conducted in 1973.

(pp. 1-4)

A higher proportion of interviewees were dissatisfied with their lot in France, and above all in Italy, than in the other seven countries. The gap is widest where questions relate specifically to "the kind of society in which we live" or "the way democracy works". Discontent is more common among opinion leaders (viz, the small minority with a tendency to discuss politics frequently and a capacity to influence others) than among the general public.

(pp. 5-10)

Faced with three deliberately provocative options - revolutionary action, gradual reform, courageous defence against the forces of subversion - a small but growing revolutionary minority is emerging in France and Italy, especially among opinion leaders; defenders of the existing order are gaining ground in Germany, the Netherlands and Italy; and the reformers, caught mid-way between the two camps, are gradually losing their comfortable majority. This "consensus indicator" should be examined in greater detail, not only in relation to opinions expressed but also to underlying motivations and ideologies.

(pp. 11-18)

### 2. Attitudes to the European Community and the movement towards European unification

Despite all that has happened the Community - better known to the general public as the "Common Market" - was regarded as "a good thing" by at least six in every ten interviewed in seven of the nine countries. Slight disillusionment persists in Germany but does not seem to be growing. In the United Kingdom the negative attitude which predominated in the autumn of 1973 to recede in 1975 has regained several points. In Denmark

nine contacts in ten answered the question and divided equally into supporters, opponents and the non-committal. For the Community as a whole opinion leaders (66%) were more in favour of the "Common Market" than the general public (43%).

(pp. 19-24)

The public is also divided on the broader issue of European unification - should it be speeded up, slowed down or continued as at present? - with a majority vote in favour of "speeding up" in Italy and Luxembourg (and in France and Germany too). A majority was in favour of "continuing as at present" in the remaining countries, particularly the United Kingdom and Denmark, where two to three in every ten interviewed would prefer to see the process "slowing down". In all countries opinion leaders were more in favour of "speeding up" than the general public.

(pp. 25-28)

### 3. Attitudes to national parliaments

In all nine countries the public believes that the national parliament plays an important role and would like to see this role expanded. The only difference is one of degree: three countries (Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland) attach major importance to their parliaments. Even in France and Italy, which came bottom of the list, nearly six in ten considered it either "very important" or "important". Strangely enough, it was the Italians and the Irish who were most in favour of their national parliaments playing an even more important role than they do now.

There was a positive correlation between leadership rating and the desire to see the national parliament play a more important part in the life of the country.

Views as to what the national parliament's most important function is varied slightly from country to country:

- . to control the spending of public money (Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark)
- . to propose, discuss and pass laws (France, Luxembourg)
- . to debate important issues (Italy)
- . to watch over and support or oppose the government (Germany)
- . to investigate scandals and abuses (Italy).

It would appear that two images of Parliament as an institution exist side by side in the public mind: one "popular" (to control the spending of public money, to investigate scandals and abuses), the other more "intellectual" (to pass laws, to keep an eye on the government).

Similarly, the general public sees the role of a member of Parliament in terms of solving the problems of individual citizens, while opinion leaders see it in terms of playing an active part on the political scene.

(pp. 27-37)

### 4. Attitudes to European elections

The facts speak for themselves: more than half of those interviewed were unable to say whether they had recently seen or heard any item of news about the European Parliament; worse still, only 50% of those who gave a positive answer were able to recall without being prompted that the issue discussed was direct elections. The general level of information is clearly very low.

On average just under four in every ten interviewed felt that the role played by the European Parliament was "very important" or "important". Strangely enough, although the importance attached to national parliaments increased with leadership rating, the exact opposite applied in the case of the European Parliament, opinion leaders being relatively more cynical than the general public.

Despite the fact that the public is poorly informed and that the institution has had little impact, the idea of an elected European Parliament is becoming increasingly popular as election day approaches and the debate livens up. The countries most in favour are Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy. Denmark comes bottom of the table but even here 44% accept the principle and only 27% are still "against". In a referendum this would give a 62% majority.

Since 1973 support for direct elections has grown most in the United Kingdom, Ireland, France and the Netherlands. The only exception to the trend is Germany, but even here 69% are "for".

In all nine countries opinion leaders were much more in favour of direct elections than the general public

(pp. 38-54)

Two positive arguments and two negative arguments were tried out on interviewees. Replies revealed that those who attach most importance to voting in the European elections are more influenced by the potential impact on the future of the "European venture" than by the prospect of increased control over "officials in Brussels". Conversely, those who attach little importance to voting are motivated by the feeling that the whole business is futile rather than the fear that an elected European Parliament would encroach on the national parliament's powers.

To turn from the European Parliament to elected European MPs, interviewees were more or less evenly divided as to whether members should support Community interests, even when these happen to clash with national interests, or national interests exclusively. Community interests just about made it in the six founder Member States, but national interests came out way ahead in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland. Only the Dutch voted overwhelmingly in favour of Community interests.

(pp. 55-65)

##### 5. Electoral campaign: priorities and strategy

Interviewees were asked to express relative interest in two lists of possible electoral issues. On the first list the current economic situation, nature conservation and strengthening the Community in the face of the superpowers came out ahead of the control of multinationals and the stepping up of Europe's defence capacity. On the second list a fairer sharing of costs and benefits among member countries, preservation of national traditions and identity, and protection of the interests of the less powerful countries triumphed over the accession of new member countries and the establishment of more independent relations with the United States.

The really remarkable thing here was the uniformity of European public opinion; the order of priority given was more or less the same throughout the Community.



As far as election strategy is concerned, interviewees in the six founder Member States were in favour of parties of the same colour fighting a joint campaign, whereas those interviewed in the three new member countries tended to feel that each political party should campaign for itself. Generally speaking opinion leaders were more in favour of joint European campaigns than the general public; however in a number of countries, notably Denmark, leaders tended to be more in favour of national campaigns.

(pp. 66-72)

#### 6. Determination to vote - Information on European Parliament

How will inadequate information and limited involvement on the one hand and support for the principle of direct elections on the other affect the public's determination to vote in next year's European elections?

What follows is not a prediction but rather a pointer, an embryonic indicator: in the Community as a whole in April/May of this year just under 50% of those interviewed said that they would "certainly" turn out to vote.

We can assume that this is a minimum which will increase as the election campaign gathers momentum, especially since a further 25% said that they would probably turn out to vote. Be that as it may, this indicator must be carefully monitored. Of those interviewed young people of both sexes, older women and those with little interest in politics showed least inclination to vote; these groups are the obvious targets for publicity campaigns.

More than half the general public feel that neither newspapers, radio nor television are providing enough information on the European Parliament and the forthcoming elections. There is obviously a demand here that the authorities, the press and political organizations must meet.

(pp. 82-83)

#### 7. Preference for a political group

As an experiment each interviewee was asked to express a preference for one of the political groups currently represented in the European Parliament, to give a second choice and to state which group he would definitely not choose.

It would be unwise to attach too much importance to what was merely an initial sounding out of public opinion. However, for the record, the Socialists came top of the list (33%), followed by the Christian Democrats (23%) and the Liberals (14%). Tying for fourth place were the Conservatives (10%) and the Communists (9%). There was no obvious link between choice of group and support for direct elections.

Interviewees' second choice (i.e. in the event of the party selected as first choice not contesting the election) went mainly to the Liberals, in other words the party of the centre.

The group most frequently rejected out of hand were the Communists.

(pp. 76-82)

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The authors of the survey would like to make it quite clear that they are publishing the results on their own responsibility. They realize that their findings will provoke comment and criticism but hope that they will also be analysed further in the months ahead. They feel that they should be of particular interest to the public relations officers of all political parties and, more generally, to the universities and organizations of all kinds. The first European election is not only a "first" but also a "one-off". It provides a unique opportunity of gaining an insight into the opinions and attitudes of the citizens of the nine countries which form the Community.

ANNEXES



NOMBRE DE PERSONNES INTERROGÉES/ NUMBER OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Belgique/België	(B)	988	19-31 April
Danmark	(DK)	1010	30 April - 8 May
Deutschland	(D)	1005	25 April - 10 May
France	(F)	1256 <sup>1</sup>	25 April - 9 May
Ireland	(IRL)	1008	4-12 May
Italia	(I)	1025	30 April - 9 May
Luxembourg	(L)	302	28 April - 15 May
Nederland	(N)	1033	2-14 May
United Kingdom	(UK)	1417	23 April - 12 May
<u>Total</u>		<u>9044</u>	

INSTITUTS CHARGES DU SONDAGE/ INSTITUTES RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING THE SURVEY

Belgique/België	DIMARSO / INRA
Danmark	GALLUP MARKEDSANALYSE
Deutschland	EMNID-INSTITUT
France	INSTITUT FRANCAIS D'OPINION PUBLIQUE <sup>2</sup>
Ireland	IRISH MARKETING SURVEYS
Italia	ISTITUTO PER LE RICERCHE STATISTICHE ET L'ANALISI DELL'OPINIONE PUBBLICA (DOXA)
Luxembourg	DIMARSO / INRA
Nederland	NEDERLANDS INSTITUUT VOOR DE PUBLIEKE OPINIE (NIPO)
United Kingdom	THE GALLUP POLL <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Y compris surreprésentation d'environ 200 ruraux / Including oversampling of 200 country-dwellers.

<sup>2</sup>Chargé en outre de la coordination internationale et de l'analyse des résultats / Also responsible for international coordination and analysis of the results.

<sup>3</sup>Le sondage en Northern Ireland a été fait en collaboration par le Irish Marketing Surveys et le Gallup Poll / The Northern Ireland poll was conducted jointly by Irish Marketing Surveys and the Gallup Poll.

TECHNICAL NOTESNOTES TECHNIQUES

1. Il est rappelé au lecteur que, dans les enquêtes par sondage, on doit tenir compte d'une certaine marge pour erreur d'échantillonnage. Avec des échantillons de l'ordre de 1000 personnes interrogées, les différences de pourcentages inférieures à 5% ne devraient pas être normalement considérées comme statistiquement significatives.

2. Dans tous les tableaux, la colonne CE/EC donne la moyenne pour l'ensemble des personnes interrogées dans les neuf pays, moyenne pondérée suivant l'effectif de la population âgée de 15 ans et plus dans chacun des pays:

1. Readers are reminded that in survey research allowance must always be made for sampling error. With a sample of 1000 percentage differences of less than 5 points would not normally be regarded as statistically significant.

2. In all tables the EC column gives the average for all interviewees in the nine countries weighted by the population aged 15 and over of each country:

	Milliers / Thousands	%
Belgique/België	7 477	3.84
Danmark	3 858	1.98
Deutschland	48 111	24.48
France	39 789	20.24
Irland	2 098	1.08
Italia	41 975	21.35
Luxembourg	274	0.14
Nederland	10 040	5.11
United Kingdom	42 804	21.78

3. Toutes les données relatives aux Euro-Baromètres sont déposées aux "Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences", (1 Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). Elles sont tenues à la disposition des organismes membres du European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), du Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (Michigan) et des chercheurs justifiant d'un intérêt de recherche.

3. All Euro-Barometer data are stored at the Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences, 1 Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve. They can be consulted by member institutes of the European Consortium for Political Research, by member institutes of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (Michigan), and by anyone interested in social science research.



