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NATIONAL REPORT

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Executive summary

Introduction

- This is the fourth in a series of six-monthly reports on Irish attitudes to European integration. Each report is based on evidence from the most recent Eurobarometer survey of European public opinion. Eurobarometer surveys are conducted bi-annually in each of the member states using nationally representative samples. The present report is based on Eurobarometer 60, which was conducted in autumn 2003. Executive summaries of the three previous Irish reports are reproduced in Appendix 3 of the main report.
- This summary of the current Irish Eurobarometer report begins by placing Irish attitudes in the context of long-term trends in attitudes to integration. It then considers attitudes to the European constitution, to enlargement and to the role of the United States and of the European Union in relation to peace in the world. In this context, it briefly considers the issue of a European defence and concludes with an examination of the evidence relating to the possible emergence of a sense of European identity.

Overall support for integration

- In comparison to the other member-states, Irish support for membership of the European Union shows up very well in the most recent Eurobarometer survey (EB60). This is so in two senses. First of all, Ireland is second only to Luxembourg in overall level of support for the country's membership of the European Union. Secondly, and somewhat dramatically, Ireland is the only country to show an increase in support for membership between spring and autumn 2003, a period in which the majority of member states showed significant falls in support for membership. Irish support for membership went up by six percentage points while average support in the EU went down by six points. Particularly sharp falls were experienced in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium.
- In order to place current Irish attitudes to European integration in context, it is necessary consider how such attitudes have evolved in recent decades. Having lagged behind the European average in the early to mid-1980s, Irish support for membership of the European Community/European Union climbed steadily in the late 1980s, moving ahead of the level of support in the Union as a whole by 1987 and continuing to climb to a peak of close to 80 per cent support in the mid-1990s.
- Irish support for membership of the Union remained at a very high level throughout the 1990s, at a time when support for membership in the Union as a whole had fallen quite dramatically. As of the spring of 2003, however, it looked as if Irish support for membership of the Union might be following the downward path in support for membership in the most of the other member-states. The most recent Eurobarometer (autumn 2003) shows a decisive halt to that downward trend Ireland and, indeed, shows a significant increase in support for membership of the Union in contrast to a further dip in such support in the majority of the other member states.
- On the other hand, Irish enthusiasm for integration did decline in the early 1990s and was at a low of 43 per cent in the period immediately prior to the first referendum on the Nice treaty. However, in autumn 2003, enthusiasm has edged ahead of indifference, albeit by a small margin.

- As the country currently holding the presidency of the European Union, Ireland must bear in mind that it is dealing with a set of countries in which, for the most part, public support for European integration is markedly lower than in Ireland. The contrast with Ireland is particularly strong in the case of the countries that have recently joined the Union and the contrast is substantial also in the case of the two member-states that are the protagonists on one side of the current constitutional impasse, namely Germany and France.

Reactions to the speed of integration

- When it comes to the speed of integration, however, Ireland is located at the less integrationist rather than at the more integrationist end of the spectrum. It is true that one-third of Irish people would like things to speed up, at least a bit. However, 47 per cent believe that the speed of building Europe is about right. This represents the highest level of support for the status quo in any of the 15 countries.
- In regard to the speed of integration, the overall EU 15 numbers are: 49 per cent believing that things are going either a little too slowly or more than a little too slowly, 29 per cent believing that things are about right and 22 per cent believing that it is all going a little too fast or more than a little too fast. France and Germany, the countries that have tended to be most vocal in regard to the idea of a two-speed Europe, are located closer to the EU average position on this scale (50 per cent in favour of faster integration) than to the fast-track end of the scale.

The constitutional issue

- Presumably related to this tendency to prefer the status quo, Irish people also figure among those who are least supportive of the idea that the EU should have a constitution. A majority but only a bare one (53 per cent) believe that the EU should have a constitution; a tiny minority (six per cent) believe it should not. Irish support for a European constitution is the fourth lowest, ranking just above the level of support in Denmark, the UK and Finland. The Irish combination of relatively low support and very low opposition is a reflection of the fact that a very substantial proportion (40 per cent -- the largest of all the 15 countries) simply don't know what to think on the matter (see Figure 6).
- If the potential for the Irish Presidency to broker a deal on the European constitution is realised in the coming months, one of the side effects of the accompanying publicity in Ireland may well be to reduce this level of don't know responses. In any event, whenever the constitution is agreed, there will be an urgent need to help people get off the fence on this issue in advance of the ensuing referendum.
- When asked what you think are the two most important issues facing Ireland at the moment, Irish people show a rather different set of preoccupations compared with people in the EU 15 as a whole. The three most important issues for Irish people in autumn 2003 were crime (41 per cent), the health care system (38 per cent), and, at a slightly lower level, rising prices/inflation (31 per cent). Only one of these issues (crime) was found among the three most important issues as articulated by the citizens of the European Union as a whole.
- The problem this poses for Irish attitudes to the European Union is that highly positive evaluations of the performance of the EU relate to issues that are of

low salience in the eyes of the mass of the citizens while the issues on which evaluations of the EU are less positive or in relation to which the EU plays a minor role tend to be the issues that actually preoccupy Irish respondents.

- The single exception to this generalisation is the issue of crime, which is at the top of the Irish respondents' list of most important issues and in relation to which there is a moderately high perception (37 per cent) that the European Union is playing a positive role.

Knowledge and the media

- Low levels of engagement with European issues are reflected in low subjectively assessed levels of knowledge of the European Union and of its policies and institutions. The prevalence of a low level of subjectively assessed knowledge has been a persistent feature of Irish orientations to the EU over the entire period during which the Eurobarometer has analysed this aspect of attitudes to integration.
- The low level of (subjectively assessed) knowledge is in part at least a product of a distinctly lower level of uptake or usage of the main available channels of information about the European Union. For example, 66 per cent of citizens in the Union as a whole referred to television as a source of information; the corresponding figure in Ireland is 50 per cent.
- In similar vein, most Irish people are either satisfied with how the media present the European Union (in terms of the amount of coverage and the objectivity of that coverage) or they have no opinion on the matter. There is little or no appetite in Ireland for either greater coverage of the EU affairs in the media or for any radical change in the tone and direction of that coverage.

Welcoming new members

- In terms of Irish public opinion, the Taoiseach can confidently and credibly host a welcoming ceremony for the new members of the Union on 1 May 2004 . Irish support for the enlargement of the EU has always been substantial and, in the most recent Eurobarometer, it is significantly ahead of the average level of support across the 15 member states. It stands in particularly strong contrast to the level of support in the three largest member states - France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Public opinion and the trans-Atlantic relationship

- Many have argued that the transatlantic relationship - - in some disrepair as a result of the Iraq war and its aftermath - - might figure as an item on the agenda of the Irish presidency. Part of this argument is that Ireland is seen by some to be in a good position to broker a rapprochement between Europe and the United States.
- Two features of the public opinion background to this suggestion are worth noting. The average EU assessment of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world in autumn 2003 was quite negative. However, this average conceals a very wide spread of opinion on this matter -- from an 11 percentage point positive assessment in the Netherlands to a minus 80 percentage point negative assessment in Greece. In short, European public

opinion is quite divided regarding the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world.

- Evaluation of the role of the US improved by a small but significant margin (nine percentage points) between the spring of 2003 and autumn 2003. The improvement was particularly noticeable in France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Irish net evaluation of the role of the US went from a deficit of five percentage points to zero, in other words, to an exact balance between the proportion assessing the role of positively and the proportion assessing the role negatively. This finely balanced conflict in Irish public opinion might be seen as placing the Irish government in a good position to play the role of an honest broker with a capacity to understand both sides of the issue.
- While, in autumn 2003, all but three member states (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland) showed a negative net assessment of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world, all 15 member states showed a positive net assessment of the role of the European Union in regard to the same issue. There are, admittedly, some gradations, ranging from plus 28 percentage points in the United Kingdom to in excess of 60 percentage points in Germany and the Netherlands.

A European defence?

- Despite the overwhelmingly positive assessments of the role of the European Union in relation to peace in the world (and the predominantly negative assessment of the role of the US), European public opinion fails to produce a majority in favour of European Union decision-making on defence policy. It is on this issue that Irish public opinion appears at its least integrationist. Ireland is located alongside Denmark and the United Kingdom in registering a low level of support for European defence integration.

A European identity?

- In attempting to match the complexity of the layering of European, national and sub-national identities, the Eurobarometer has developed a variety of scales and measures, several of which are deployed in the Eurobarometer 60.
- On average, 51 per cent of people across the EU15 show a strong sense of attachment to their country. In Ireland, 65 per cent show such attachment. The corresponding figure for attachment to Europe in both the EU15 and in Ireland is only 14 per cent.
- Other data in EB60 indicate that, in the Union as a whole, 57 per cent of the citizens have **some degree** of European identity. The corresponding figure in Ireland is 47 per cent. On the other side of the scale, 40 per cent of Europeans identify exclusively with their nationality while 49 per cent of Irish people identify themselves exclusively as Irish. Ireland is fourth from the bottom in terms of the possession of any degree of European identity.
- Ireland behaves somewhat differently on a measure of pride in being European, having the second highest level of pride in this respect. The two countries with the lowest levels of sense of pride in being European are Germany and the United Kingdom.
- Finally, confirming the evidence of the importance of national identity in the Irish case, Ireland is ranked second highest in terms of the overall level of

national pride -- 71 per cent of Irish people feel very proud to be Irish and a further 25 per cent feel fairly proud. Ireland is second only to Greece in prevalence of a sense of national pride.

- At the other end of the scale, Germany stands out as having very low levels of strong national pride (just under 20 per cent), a finding that may reflect the different views of national identity and national pride that are a legacy of German history. Other countries that show relatively low levels of strong national pride include the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Portugal.
- The exceptional strength of Irish people's sense of Irish identity and, in particular, the exceptional strength of their sense of national pride is a significant factor that must be taken into account in any overall interpretation of the Irish attitude to integration. It must be emphasised, however, that this strong sense of national identity and national pride are compatible with high levels of approval of integration. They may also, however, account for relatively low levels of enthusiasm for the project and for a preference for the status quo in relation to the speed of building Europe.

Implications of the Irish presidency of the EU

- The evidence of Irish people's exceptionally high level of national identity and national pride may also have some relevance in the context of the current Irish presidency of the Union. This is because the challenges involved in managing the presidency of the Union tend to put national pride on the line. In this sense the presidency provides an opportunity to hitch the Irish European integration project to the engine of national pride and national identity. Whether this opportunity is realised or not depends on how the presidency performs.
- The performance of the presidency, indeed the very fact of an Irish presidency of the Union, may also have an impact on people's familiarity with EU institutions and policies and with their subjective sense of knowing at least something about the process. This would presumably be especially true if the presidency succeeded in securing agreement on an EU constitution. Accordingly, the next and subsequent reports in this series will closely monitor trends in awareness and knowledge of EU policies and institutions in order to assess the extent and the durability of any gains in understanding that may be achieved in the first half of 2004.

The Report

Introduction

This is the fourth in a series of six-monthly reports on Irish attitudes to European integration. Each report is based on evidence from the most recent Eurobarometer survey of European public opinion. Eurobarometer surveys are conducted bi-annually in each of the member states using nationally representative samples. The present report is based on Eurobarometer 60, which was conducted in autumn 2003. Executive summaries of the three previous Irish reports are reproduced in Appendix 3 of the main report.

Basic trends in attitudes to European integration

In comparison to the other member-states, Irish support for membership of the European Union shows up very well in the most recent Eurobarometer survey (EB60). This is so in two senses. First of all, Ireland is second only to Luxembourg in overall level of support for the country's membership of the European Union. Secondly, and somewhat dramatically, Ireland is the only country to show an increase in support for membership between spring and autumn 2003, a period in which the majority of member states showed significant falls in support for membership. Irish support for membership went up by six percentage points while average support in the EU went down by six points. Particularly sharp falls were experienced in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium (see Figures 1 and 2¹).

In order to place current Irish attitudes to European integration in context, it is necessary consider how such attitudes have evolved in recent decades. Having lagged behind the European average in the early to mid-1980s, Irish support for membership of the European Community/European Union climbed steadily in the late 1980s, moving ahead of the level of support in the Union as a whole by 1987 and continuing to climb to a peak of close to 80 per cent support in the mid-1990s (see Figure 1). Irish support for membership of the Union remained at a very high level throughout the 1990s, at a time when support for membership in the Union as a whole had fallen quite dramatically. As of the spring of 2003, however, it looked as if Irish support for membership of the Union might be following the downward path in support for membership in the most of the other member-states. However, the most

¹ These and succeeding figures can be found immediately after the text of this report.

recent Eurobarometer (EB60, autumn 2003) shows a decisive halt to any incipient downward trend in Ireland and, indeed, shows a significant increase in support for membership of the Union in contrast to a further dip in such support in the majority of the other member states.

The foregoing discussion focuses on what is often referred to as the membership indicator, that is the response to the question "Do you think that Ireland's membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or neither nor?" As indicated in Figure 1, the Eurobarometer also contains other indicators of trends in attitudes to integration over time. One of these (the belief that one's country has benefited from membership of the Union) shows a level of positive evaluation of Ireland's membership in excess of 80 per cent throughout the 1990s. However, the third indicator shown in Figure 1 (the response to the question "If you were told in the morning that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry, indifferent or very relieved?") shows a markedly less positive Irish evaluation of integration. This is because this third indicator (usually referred to as the dissolution indicator) measures enthusiasm for integration rather than just a passive acceptance of it. As such, it shows that enthusiasm for integration in Ireland (being very sorry if EU were scrapped) in fact declined in the early 1990s and was at a low of 43 per cent in the period immediately prior to the first referendum on the Nice treaty. At that time, indeed, indifference towards integration (the sum of the indifferent and don't know responses) was some 10 percentage points higher than the level of enthusiasm for integration. Since early 2001 the situation has, from an integrationist point of view, improved somewhat - particularly in the most recent Eurobarometer where, once again, enthusiasm outstrips indifference, albeit by a small margin (see Figure 1).

The Irish presidency and public opinion in the other member states

As the country holding the presidency of the European Union in the first semester of 2004, Ireland faces a formidable set of challenges that have been extensively documented in the media and in other public fora in recent months. Part of the challenge is rooted in the domestic politics and in the public opinion of the other member-states. This is because, in dealing with its partners, Ireland is dealing with a set of countries in which, for the most part, public support for integration is markedly lower than in Ireland. As Figure 2 shows Irish support for membership of the Union is second only to that in Luxembourg and is some 25 percentage points higher than average support across the EU15. The contrast with Ireland is particularly marked in case of the countries that have recently joined the Union (see the profiles of support

for Sweden, Finland and Austria in Figure 2) and the contrast is substantial also in the case of the two member-states that are the protagonists on one side of the current constitutional debate, namely Germany and France.

Affective responses to the Union and to European integration

As well as measuring overall attitudes to European integration and to membership of the Union as portrayed in Figures 1 and 2, the Eurobarometer also regularly monitors a range of more specific responses to integration and to the European Union and its institutions. One of these is the trust that citizens have in major European institutions. Figure 3 presents a summary measure of trust in such institutions for Ireland and in the EU as a whole over the period autumn 2002, spring 2003 and autumn 2003. In line with the evidence already considered for the EU as a whole, this shows a moderate decline in trust across most of the main institutions between autumn 2002 and spring 2003. However, in the Irish case, trust in EU institutions stabilized and in one or two cases even increased slightly between spring 2003 and autumn 2003. The net result is that trust in EU institutions in the EU as a whole is some 20 to 30 percentage points lower than the level of trust in such institutions in Ireland.

Affective responses to the European Union can also be measured by presenting respondents with a list of seven possible affective responses (enthusiasm, hope, trust, indifference, anxiety, mistrust and rejection) and asking them whether the European Union gives them personally a feeling corresponding to any of the items on the list. The most frequently chosen response is hope. Almost a half of the Irish respondents and, in spring 2002, almost half of respondents in the EU15 said that the European Union gives them a feeling of hope. However, the level of hope expressed in this way by citizens of the Union as a whole declined by nine percentage points, while the frequency of mention of hope in Ireland remained stable at 48 per cent. A drop of similar size occurred across the EU15 in the frequency of reference to a feeling of trust in the European Union, while the Irish level of trust dropped by only 3 percentage points.

Examination of the other responses to this question indicates that there is a substantially larger minority of Irish people who are enthusiastic about the European Union (23 per cent belong to this category in Ireland in autumn 2003 compared to six per cent in the European Union as a whole). It also shows that Irish people are substantially less likely to express anxiety about the European Union or to experience feelings of mistrust vis a vis the Union. On the other hand, and in line with

previous observations, Irish people are somewhat more likely to express some combination of indifference or non-response (see Figure 4).

Reactions to the speed of integration

It must be emphasized again that, though prevailingly positive, Irish attitudes to integration are far from gung-ho. This is evident in the modest levels of enthusiasm for integration (whichever of the two enthusiasm measures discussed above is considered). It is also evident from the data on Irish people's attitude to the speed of integration. Two aspects of the speed of European integration are measured in the Eurobarometer - people's *perception* of the speed of "building Europe" and people's *preference* regarding what that speed should be. The Eurobarometer question presents a card illustrating seven human figures with number 1 standing still and number seven running as fast as possible and the ones in between showing different speeds. The interviewer then says "Choose the one which best corresponds with your opinion of the current speed of building Europe. In the next question the interviewer asks: "And which corresponds to the speed you would like?" By subtracting the number chosen for the current perceived speed from the number for the desired speed, it is possible to obtain an index of people's satisfaction with the speed of European integration. In Figure 5 attitude to the speed of building Europe is reduced to five categories, namely: about right, a little too fast and more than a little too fast and a little too slow and more than a little too slow. Ireland again shows up on one wing of the distribution of attitudes as measured in this way but, on this occasion, it is located at the less integrationist rather than at the more integrationist end of the distribution. Twelve per cent of Irish respondents are ardent integrationists believing that the speed of building Europe is more than a little too slow. A further 20 per cent believe that integration is proceeding a little too slowly. In short, one-third of Irish people would like things to speed up, at least a bit. However, a plurality of respondents, amounting almost to a majority, believes that the speed of building Europe is about right. This 47 per cent figure represents the highest level of support for the status quo in any of the 15 member states. On the other side of the scale, about one in five Irish respondents would like things to slowdown, 13 per cent believing that the speed is a little too fast and nine per cent believing that it is more than a little too fast.

The comparable EU 15 numbers on this index of attitude to the speed of integration are 49 per cent believing that things are going either a little too slowly or more than a little too slowly, 29 per cent believing that things are about right and 22 per cent

believing that it is all going a little too fast or more than a little too fast. Along with Ireland, Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom are located close to the less integrationist end of this spectrum. At the strongly pro-integrationist end of the spectrum one finds Italy, Greece and Portugal. Interestingly, France and Germany, the countries that have been most vocal in regard to the idea of a two-speed Europe, are located closer to the moderate EU average position on this scale (50 per cent in favour of at least somewhat faster integration) than to the fast-track end of the scale.

Presumably related to this tendency to prefer the status quo, Irish people also figure among those who are least supportive of the idea that the EU should have a constitution. A majority but only a bare one (53 per cent) believe that the EU should have a constitution; a tiny minority (six per cent) believe it should not. While Irish opposition to a constitution is among the lowest of any of the 15 member states, Irish support for a European constitution is the fourth lowest, ranking just above the level of support in Denmark, the UK and Finland. The Irish combination of relatively low support and very low opposition is a reflection of the fact that a very substantial proportion (40 per cent -- the largest of all the 15 countries) simply don't know what to think on the matter (see Figure 6). If the potential for the Irish Presidency to broker a deal on the European constitution is realised in the coming months, one of the side effects of the accompanying publicity in Ireland may well be to reduce this level of don't know response. In any event, whenever the constitution is agreed, there will be an urgent need to help people get off the fence on this issue in advance of the ensuing referendum.

In summary, Irish attitudes to European integration and to the European Union are characterised by an overall favourable attitude to the Union (among the most favourable in the EU 15). Irish attitudes are, however, a good deal less positive when it comes to enthusiasm for integration and, in terms of the speed of integration, they show a marked preference for the status quo or for the status quo ante and a relatively low level of commitment to a new European constitution. On this latter issue, as on several other issues, Irish responses are also characterised by exceptionally high levels of don't know.

Issue salience and EU performance

In seeking an explanation of these high levels of don't know response, we shall turn in a moment to evidence on Irish levels of knowledge of European affairs and on the sources of EU information to which Irish people resort. First, however, there is some

evidence relating to the issues that preoccupy Irish people that goes some way towards accounting for the arm's length relationship that is a striking feature of Irish attitudes to European integration.

When asked what you think are the two most important issues facing Ireland at the moment, Irish people show a rather different set of preoccupations compared with people in the EU 15 as a whole. The three most important issues for Irish people in autumn 2003 were crime (41 per cent), the health care system (38 per cent), and, at a slightly lower level, rising prices/inflation (31 per cent). Only one of these issues (crime) was found among the three most important issues as articulated by the citizens of the European Union as a whole, forty-two per cent of whom cited unemployment, 28 per cent crime and 27 per cent the economic situation. In sum, while European citizens are more preoccupied with broad economic issues, Irish citizens are more preoccupied with issues of personal security and healthcare. Other issues reaching double-digit levels of concern were, in the Irish case, housing (14 per cent) and taxation (10 per cent) and, in the EU15 case, immigration (14 per cent), pensions (11 per cent) and terrorism (12 per cent). Irish concern with these three latter issues was negligible, ranging from six per cent (immigration) to two per cent (terrorism).

Irish evaluations of whether the European Union plays a positive role in relation to such issues range from highs of about 50 per cent (in relation to protecting the environment, foreign affairs, the economic situation and fighting terrorism) to lows of about 20 to 25 per cent in the case of housing, rising prices/inflation and the health care system. The problem this poses for Irish attitudes to the European Union is that the highly positive evaluations of the EU relate to issues that are of very low salience in the eyes of the mass of the citizens while the issues on which evaluations of the EU are less positive tend to be the issues that actually preoccupy Irish respondents (compare Figures 7 and 8)

The single exception to this generalisation is the issue of crime, which is at the top of the Irish respondents list of most important issues and in relation to which there is a moderately high perception (37 per cent) that the European Union is playing a positive role. Overall, however, the key point is that the things that the European Union is seen to be good at are of little interest to the people and the things that are of greatest interest to the people are things in relation to which the European Union is seen to play a positive role by relatively small minorities.

Almost across the entire range of issue priorities, Irish evaluations of the role of the European Union are markedly more favourable than evaluations in the European Union as a whole. The greatest discrepancy between the extent of favourable assessments in Ireland and the extent of favourable assessments in the EU15 relates to the economic situation - 50 per cent of Irish respondents regard the Union as playing a positive role while only 31 per cent of citizens of the Union as a whole do so. The main exception to the rule that Irish evaluations of the issue performance of the EU tend to be more positive is that of defence. In this case European evaluations are, by a small but significant margin, more positive than those of Irish people (44 per cent compared to 38 per cent).

Knowledge and sources of information regarding EU affairs

In the Irish case, low levels of engagement with European issues are reflected in low subjectively assessed levels of knowledge of the European Union and of its policies and institutions (see Figure 9). Ireland in fact ranks third (behind the UK and Portugal) in terms of the proportion falling at the lowest three points on a ten-point scale of subjectively assessed knowledge. The Irish proportion is 42 per cent, the UK proportion is 44 per cent and the highest proportion occurs in Portugal (54 per cent). The prevalence of a low level of subjectively assessed knowledge has been a persistent feature of Irish orientations to the EU over the entire period during which the Eurobarometer has analysed this aspect of attitudes to integration.

While the reasons for this lack of knowledge lie partly in the gap between the issue preoccupations of Irish people and the competencies and achievements of the Union, it also seems to be a product of a distinctly lower level of uptake or usage of the main available channels of information about the European Union. Thus, on being asked "When you are looking for information about the European Union, its policies its institutions, which of the following sources do you use?" 66 per cent of citizens in the Union as a whole referred to television; the corresponding figure in Ireland is 50 per cent. There is also a 12 percentage point gap between the level of resort to daily newspapers for such information and a 10 percentage point gap in reliance on discussions with relative friends and colleagues. On the other side of the coin, 28 per cent of Irish people say they never look for such information or are not interested compared to 17 per cent in the Union as a whole. Although the discrepancy in usage between the European average and the Irish level is smaller in the case of the other

channels of communication it remains noticeable in relation to radio, other newspapers or magazines and the internet (see Figure 10).

Underlying these different patterns of usage, there are also quite striking differences in attitude to media coverage of the European Union. A relatively small minority of Irish people (21 per cent) feel that the media *talk too little* about the European Union whereas this view is held by 37 per cent of people in the Union as a whole and by near majorities in Italy and the Netherlands. On the other hand opposition to the prevailing level of coverage of EU affairs in Ireland is low and a majority (53 per cent) are satisfied with the current level of coverage while a significant minority have no opinion on the matter (see Figure 11).

In similar vein, most Irish people are either satisfied with how the media present the European Union (i.e. they think that it presents the European Union objectively) or have no opinion on the matter (see Figure 12). On the basis of these figures and those in the previous paragraph, there is little or no evidence of an appetite in Ireland for either greater coverage of the EU affairs in the media or for any radical change in the tone and direction of that coverage. This gives short shrift to the view that the media are failing to respond to a putative undercurrent of interest in the EU affairs in the population as a whole.

Attitudes to enlargement

Symbolically, the major event of the current Irish presidency of the EU will be the formal welcoming of 10 new members of the Union on 1st May 2004. From the point of view of Irish public opinion, the Taoiseach can confidently and credibly host such a welcoming ceremony. Irish support for the enlargement of the EU has always been substantial, peaking at 67 per cent around the time of the second Nice referendum. In the most recent Eurobarometer, the level of support for enlargement in Ireland at 59 per cent is substantially ahead of the average level of support across the 15 member states. It stands in particularly strong contrast to the level of support in the three largest member states - France Germany and the United Kingdom. On the other side of the coin, Ireland shows a particularly low level of opposition to enlargement (at 20 per cent). This compares to levels of opposition of 55 per cent in France, 42 per cent in Germany and 40 per cent in the United Kingdom. It should also be noted, however, that just over one in five Irish people have no view on the matter (see Figure 13).

Ireland also shows substantial support for making the welcoming of new member countries a high priority. Though the Irish figure of 47 per cent in favour of making enlargement a priority is just under the majority mark, it is the third highest in the EU 15. Again it stands in marked contrast to the attitude in certain member states, notably France, Belgium, Germany, Finland and Luxembourg, where the proportion believing that welcoming new member countries is not a priority is more than 70 per cent (see Figure 14).

Public opinion and the trans-Atlantic relationship

Many have argued that the transatlantic relationship - - in some disrepair as a result of the Iraq war and its aftermath - - might figure as an item on the agenda of the Irish presidency. Part of this argument is that Ireland is seen by some to be in a good position to broker a rapprochement between Europe and the United States.

Two features of the public opinion background to this suggestion are worth noting. The average EU assessment of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world in autumn 2003 was quite negative. If we subtract the proportions making a negative assessment of the role of the United States from the proportion making a positive assessment, we obtain a net evaluation index. Obviously, if this number is negative, negative evaluations outweigh positive evaluations. The net evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world across the European Union in autumn 2003 was minus 26 percentage points. However, this average conceals a very wide spread of opinion on this matter -- from an 11 percentage point positive assessment in the Netherlands to a minus 80 percentage point negative assessment in Greece (see Figure 15). In short, European public opinion is quite divided regarding the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world.

The net evaluation index improved by a small but significant margin (nine percentage points) between the spring of 2003 and autumn 2003. The improvement was particularly noticeable in France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. On the other hand, net evaluation worsened in the UK and Denmark, the only two countries that had had a positive evaluation of the role of the United States in the spring of 2003. Irish net evaluation of the role of the US went from a deficit of five percentage points to zero, in other words, to an exact balance between the proportion assessing the role positively and the proportion assessing the role negatively. This finely balanced conflict in Irish public opinion might be seen as placing the Irish government in a

good position to play the role of an honest broker with a capacity to understand both sides of the issue.

Whereas assessment of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world improved a little between the spring and autumn of 2003, net EU evaluation of the role of the US in relation to the fight against terrorism moved marginally in the opposite direction - from a plus 10 percentage point positive evaluation to a plus six percentage point positive evaluation. The disimprovement in the evaluation of the role of the United States in this respect was particularly noticeable in the United Kingdom and Denmark. As a result of the movements in public opinion that occurred between spring and autumn 2003, by the latter date just about half the EU member states took a positive view on this issue while the other half took a negative view, the negative view being particularly pronounced in Greece and quite substantial in Spain (see Figure 16). The tendency for public opinion to become less positive on this issue over time can perhaps be put down to negative assessments of the impact of the war in Iraq on the problem of dealing with international terrorism.

Eurobarometer 60 provides a further range of evidence regarding public opinion in this area by asking respondents for their assessment of the role that the European Union plays in relation to peace in the world and the fight against terrorism². While in autumn 2003, all but three member states (the Netherlands the United Kingdom and Ireland) showed a negative net assessment of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world, all 15 member states showed a positive net assessment of the role of the European Union in regard to the same issue. There are, admittedly, some gradations, ranging from plus 28 percentage points in the United Kingdom to in excess of 60 percentage points in Germany and the Netherlands. It is perhaps worth noting that it is rare to find Germany at the extreme end of any of these cross-country distributions of opinion. Its extreme position in Figure 17 may well reflect German awareness of the longer-term historical significance of European integration in bringing about lasting peace in the European region.

European public opinion is somewhat less sanguine in regard to the role of the EU in the fight against terrorism. While still being predominantly positive, the net evaluation

² As can be seen from Appendix 1, question 48 in Appendix 1, the full range of issues covered by this particular question (in the case of both the role of the United States and the role of the European Union involved a peace in the world, the fight against terrorism the growth of the world economy, the fight against poverty in the world and the protection of the Environment.

in the 15 member-states is plus 42 percentage points on the issue of terrorism compared to plus 51 percentage points on the issue of peace. Located on the somewhat more sceptical but still basically positive end one finds the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium and France, ranging from plus 24 percentage points in the UK to plus 38 percentage points in France. Irish evaluation of the role of the EU in relation to the fight against terrorism places Ireland right in the middle of the distribution of member states at plus 47 percentage points (see Figure 18).

A European defence?

Given the overwhelmingly positive assessments of the role of the EU in these two areas and the overwhelmingly negative view of the role of the United States, the question must be asked whether these assessments translate into support for a European defence identity. A related question is whether such support has grown between the period leading up to and during the Iraq war on the one hand and the aftermath of the war, on the other.

Despite the overwhelmingly positive assessments of the role of the European Union in relation to peace in the world, European public opinion fails to produce a majority in favour of European Union decision-making on defence policy. The relevant Eurobarometer question asks: "In your opinion, should decisions concerning European defence policy be taken by national government, by NATO or by the European Union?" The distribution of responses endorsing European Union decision-making on defence across the member states and over the period between autumn 2002 and autumn 2003 is shown in Figure 19. Forty-five per cent of European citizens are in favour of decision-making on defence issues by the European Union but this falls short of a majority and the balance of opinion is made up of a combination of those in favour of national government deciding these issues and those in favour of NATO decision-making. Support for decision making by the European Union tended to peak around the time of the Iraq war in spring 2003. Thus, in terms of the European average, support for European defence decision-making went from 44 per cent to 49 per cent and then back to 45 per cent. Most member states show this tendency towards a small but significant decrease in support for a defence role for the European Union, notable exceptions being Denmark, Ireland and Greece. Despite this, on this issue Irish public opinion is at its least integrationist. In Figure 19 Ireland is located alongside Denmark and the United Kingdom in registering a low level of support for European defence integration.

A European identity?

The goal of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe implies the construction, over the long term, of a sense of European identity. What shape and form such an identity might take is the subject of extensive debate. Without entering into that debate at the present moment, one thing is clear and that is that few would suggest that there is a necessary conflict or incompatibility between European and national identity. Rather the vision is of multiple identities each being stimulated by and brought into play in the context of different issues and circumstances. In attempting to match the complexity of this layering of European, national and sub-national identities, the Eurobarometer has developed a variety of scales and measures, several of which are deployed in Eurobarometer 60.

The first measure to be considered here is based on the following question (taking Ireland as an example): "People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, and to their country or to the European Union. Please tell me how attached to you feel to your city/town/village, your region, Ireland, Europe?" The evidence elicited by this question indicates that attachment to Europe is very weak when compared to any of the other attachments touched on in the question. Thus the average European attachment to country is 51 per cent very attached, to town or village 56 per cent very attached and to region 49 per cent very attached. The corresponding figure for Europe is only 14 per cent very attached.

Figure 20 also shows that the proportion showing attachment to all three levels of national/sub-national entities or communities is significantly higher in Ireland than across the EU as a whole. However, in the case of European identity, Irish levels are identical to the European average. Of course, if we extend the notion of attachment to include both very attached and fairly attached, the level of attachment to Europe rises substantially (to 58 per cent in the case of both the EU and Ireland). However this must then be compared to levels of attachment to country that are in excess of 90 per cent. In short, it is clear that, whichever way we look at the data, attachment to Europe is substantially weaker than attachment to any of the other three levels of political identity or community.

This picture of relatively weak European identity is confirmed by the second Eurobarometer measure, which asks the question: "In the near future, do you see yourself as (in the Irish case) Irish only, Irish and European, European and Irish or European only?". One might expect that this question would gather greater numbers

under the umbrella of European identity because of the prospective reference to "in the near future". In fact, in the EU 15 as a whole, the figure for some degree of European identity is almost identical to that suggested by the previous measure. In the Irish case the level of European identity measured in this prospective way is in fact somewhat lower than the sense of attachment considered in the previous table. Thus, in Europe as a whole 57 per cent of the citizens have some degree of European identity. The corresponding figure in Ireland is 47 per cent. On the other side of the scale, 40 per cent of Europeans identify exclusively with their nationality while 49 per cent of Irish people identify exclusively as Irish. In rank order terms, as shown in Figure 21, Ireland is fourth from the bottom in terms of the possession of any degree of European identity. The other countries also located at the less European end of the scale are the United Kingdom (where 62 per cent say British only) and Finland, Portugal and Greece each of which is, like Ireland, clearly located on the periphery of the European Union.

A third measure of European identity invokes the concept of pride, in this case pride in being European. The question asks the respondent whether they would say they are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be European. Again, the overall picture of fairly extensive but weak attachment to Europe is confirmed by the responses to this question. In the European Union as a whole, 13 per cent say that they are very proud to be European while 48 per cent say they are fairly proud. These proportions tend to confirm the picture of the extent of European identity derived from the previously considered measures. Ireland, however, behaves somewhat differently on this measure, moving from the less European end it occupied in Figure 21 to the more European end of the spectrum in Figure 22. Ireland is, in fact, the country with the second highest level of being proud of being European, 24 per cent being very proud to be European and a further 51 per cent being fairly proud. The only country with a higher level of pride in being European is Italy and the adjacent countries in this case are Spain Luxembourg and Finland. The two countries with a distinctly lower sense of pride in being European are Germany and the United Kingdom.

This brings us to final aspect of identity considered in Eurobarometer 60 -- the evidence regarding national pride based on the question, again taking the Irish case "Would you say that you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be Irish ". The evidence derived from this question and presented in Figure 23 places Ireland firmly in the strong national identity camp. Ireland is ranked second

highest in terms of overall level of national pride (96 per cent). Seventy-one per cent of Irish people feel very proud to be Irish and a further 25 per cent feel fairly proud. As Figure 23 shows Ireland is second only to Greece in the overall level of national pride, though the Greek level of very strong national pride is a remarkable 85 per cent. At the other end of the scale, Germany stands out as having very low levels of strong national pride (just under 20 per cent), a finding that may reflect the different views of national identity and national pride that are a legacy of German history. Other countries that show relatively low levels of strong national pride include the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Portugal.


The exceptional strength of Irish people's sense of Irish identity and, in particular, the exceptional strength of their sense of national pride are significant factors that must be taken into account in any overall interpretation of the Irish attitude to integration. It must be emphasised, however, that this strong sense of national identity and national pride are not necessarily antipathetic to European integration. It must be emphasised, however, that this strong sense of national identity and national pride are compatible with high levels of approval of integration though they may also account for relatively low levels of enthusiasm for the project and for a preference for the status quo in relation to the speed of building Europe.

Implications of the Irish Presidency

It is worth emphasising finally that these aspects of Irish people's relationship with their nation and with Europe may be of some relevance in the context of the current Irish presidency of the Union. This is because the challenges involved in managing the presidency of the Union tend to put national pride on the line. In this sense the presidency provides an opportunity to hitch the Irish European integration project to the engine of national pride and national identity. Whether this opportunity is realised or not depends on how the presidency performs.


The performance of the presidency, indeed the very fact of an Irish presidency of the Union, may also have an impact on people's familiarity with EU institutions and policies and with their subjective sense of knowing at least something about the process. This would presumably be especially true if the presidency succeeded in securing agreement on an EU constitution. Accordingly, the next and subsequent reports in this series will closely monitor trends in awareness and knowledge of EU policies and institutions in order to assess the extent and the durability of any gains in understanding that may be achieved in the first half of 2004.

Figure 1 Trends in support for European integration - Ireland and the EU, 1973-2003




Source: EB3 - EB60.1; Dissolution indicator for Ireland for Autumn 2002 from ECR Nice2 Survey (For the wording of all questions from EB60.1, see Appendix A)

Figure 2 Attitude to membership of the European Union by member state, Autumn 2003
(in descending order of a good thing)




Source: EB60.1, Q.7

Figure 3 Net trust (proportion trust minus proportion distrust) in European institutions - Ireland and EU 15, Autumn 2002, Spring 2003 and Autumn 2003 (in descending order of Irish trust, Autumn 2003)




Source: EB58.1, Q.21; EB59.1, Q.17; EB60.1, Q.22

Figure 4 Personal feelings about the EU - Ireland and EU 15, Spring 2002 and Autumn 2003
(in descending order of Irish feelings, Autumn 2003)




Source: EB57.1, Q.30; EB60.1, Q.11

Figure 5 Preferred speed of "building Europe" relative to perceived speed, Autumn 2003
(in descending order of too slow)




Source: EB60.1, Q.12

Figure 6 Opinion on whether the EU should or should not have a Constitution, Autumn 2003
(in descending order of should)




Source: EB60.1, Q.49

Figure 7 Most important issues facing [COUNTRY] at the moment - Ireland and EU 15, Autumn 2003
(in descending order of frequency of issues in Ireland)




Source: EB60.1, Q.26

Figure 8 Issues in [COUNTRY] in which European Union plays positive role - Ireland and EU 15, Autumn 2003
(in descending order of frequency of issues in Ireland)




Source: EB60.1, Q.27

Figure 9 Subjective assessment of own knowledge of the EU, its policies and institutions, Autumn 2003
(in ascending order of very little knowledge (points 1-3 on a 10-point scale))




Source: EB60.1, Q.15

Figure 10 Main sources of information about the EU, its policies and institutions - Ireland and EU 15, Autumn 2003 (in descending order of frequency of sources in Ireland)




Source: EB60.1, Q.16

Figure 11 Evaluation of how much the [NATIONALITY] media talk about the European Union, Autumn 2003
(in ascending order of too little)




Source: EB60.1, Q.18

Figure 12 Evaluation of how the [NATIONALITY] media present the EU, Autumn 2003
(in descending order of too positively)




Source: EB60.1, Q.19

Figure 13 Attitude to the enlargement of the EU to include new countries, Autumn 2003
(in descending order of "for")




Source: EB60.1, Q.29

Figure 14 Priority attached to welcoming new member countries, Autumn 2003
(in descending order of priority)




Source: EB60.1, Q.30

Figure 15 Net evaluation (positive minus negative responses) of the role of the US in relation to peace in the world, Spring 2003 and Autumn 2003 (in descending order of Autumn 2003)




Source: EB59.1, Q.27; EB60.1, Q.47

Figure 16 Net evaluation (positive minus negative responses) of the role of the US in relation to the fight against terrorism, Spring 2003 and Autumn 2003 (in descending order of Autumn 2003)




Source: EB59.1, Q.27; EB60.1, Q.47

Figure 17 Net evaluation (positive minus negative responses) of the role of the EU and US in relation to peace in the world, Autumn 2003 (in descending order of EU)




Source: EB60.1, Q.47 and Q.48

Figure 18 Net evaluation (positive minus negative responses) of the role of the EU and US in relation to the fight against terrorism, Autumn 2003 (in descending order of EU)




Source: EB60.1, Q.47 and Q.48

Figure 19 Support for European Union decision-making on defence policy (in preference to NATO or national decision-making), Autumn 2002, Spring 2003 and Autumn 2003
(in descending order of Autumn 2003)




Source: EB58.1, Q.30; EB59.1, Q.25; EB60.1, Q.33

Figure 20 Degrees of attachment to country, town/village, region and Europe - Ireland and EU 15, Autumn 2003
(in descending order of Irish attachment)




Source: EB60.1, Q.46

Figure 21 Expected national and/or European identity in near future, Autumn 2003
(in descending order of sum of European)




Source: EB60.1, Q.43

Figure 22 Pride in being European, Autumn 2003 (in ascending order of sum of very plus fairly proud)



Source: EB60.1, Q.45

Figure 23 National pride, Autumn 2003 (in ascending order of very proud)



Source: EB60.1, Q.44

Appendix 1

STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 60.1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Between 1st October 2003 and 7th November 2003, the European Opinion Research Group, a consortium of Market and Public Opinion Research agencies, made out of INRA in Belgium – I.C.O. and GfK Worldwide, carried out wave 60.1 of the standard Eurobarometer, on request of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls.

The Standard EUROBAROMETER 60.1 covers the population of the respective nationalities of the European Union Member States, aged 15 years and over, resident in each of the Member States. The basic sample design applied in all Member States is a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In each EU country, a number of sampling points was drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density.

For doing so, the points were drawn systematically from each of the "administrative regional units", after stratification by individual unit and type of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the Member States according to the EUROSTAT NUTS 2 (or equivalent) and according to the distribution of the resident population of the respective EU-nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn, at random. Further addresses were selected as every Nth address by standard random route procedures, from the initial address. In each household, the respondent was drawn, at random. All interviews were face-to-face in people's home and in the appropriate national language.

COUNTRIES	INSTITUTES	N° INTERVIEWS	FIELDWORK DATES	POPULATION 15+ (x 000)
Belgium	INRA/IPSOS BELGIUM	1022	7/10 – 7/11	8,458
Denmark	GfK DENMARK	1000	9/10 – 5/11	4,355
Germany (East)	INRA/IPSOS DEUTSCHLAND	1023	4/10 – 24/10	13,164
Germany (West)	INRA/IPSOS DEUTSCHLAND	1016	4/10 – 24/10	56,319
Greece	MARKET ANALYSIS	1001	6/10 – 2/11	8,899
Spain	INRA/IPSOS ESPAÑA	1000	6/10 – 1/11	34,239
France	CSA-TMO	1015	9/10 – 27/10	47,936
Ireland	LANSDOWNE Market Research	1014	6/10 – 30/10	3,004
Italy	Demoskopea	1008	1/10 – 28/10	49,531
Luxembourg	ILRes	587	3/10 – 7/11	357
The Netherlands	INTOMART	1006	7/10 – 4/11	13,010
Austria	SPECTRA	1010	3/10 – 29/10	6,770
Portugal	METRIS	1000	3/10 – 28/10	8,620
Finland	MDC MARKETING RESEARCH	1018	9/10 – 5/11	4,245
Sweden	GfK SVERIGE	1000	1/10 – 3/11	7,252
Great Britain	MARTIN HAMBLIN LTD	1055	1/10 – 5/11	46,370
Northern Ireland	ULSTER MARKETING SURVEYS	307	7/10 – 28/10	1,314
TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS		16082		

For each country a comparison between the sample and the universe was carried out. The Universe description was derived from Eurostat population data or from national statistics. For all EU member-countries a national weighting procedure, using marginal and intercellular weighting, was carried out based on this Universe description. As such in all countries, minimum gender, age, region NUTS 2 were introduced in the iteration procedure. For international weighting (i.e. EU averages), INRA (EUROPE) applies the official population figures as provided by EUROSTAT or national statistic offices. The total population figures for input in this post-weighting procedure are listed above.

The results of the Eurobarometer studies are reported in the form of tables, datafiles and analyses. Per question a table of results is given with the full question text in English, French and German. The results are expressed as a percentage of the total. The results of the Eurobarometer surveys are analysed and made available through the Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls of the European Commission, rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Brussels. The results are published on the Internet server of the European Commission: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/. All Eurobarometer datafiles are stored at the Zentral Archiv (Universität Köln, Bachemer Strasse, 40, D-50869 Köln-Lindenthal), available through the CESSDA Database <http://www.nsd.uib.no/cessda/europe.html>. They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research.

Readers are reminded that survey results are estimations, the accuracy of which, everything being equal, rests upon the sample size and upon the observed percentage. With samples of about 1,000 interviews, the real percentages vary within the following confidence limits:

Observed percentages	10% or 90%	20% or 80%	30% or 70%	40% or 60%	50%
Confidence limits	± 1.9%	± 2.5%	± 2.7%	± 3.0%	± 3.1%

**STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 60.1
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Appendix 2

A.	YOUR SURVEY NUMBER	<table border="1"><tr><td>4</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>5</td></tr></table>	4	1	1	0	5	(61-65)	
4	1	1	0	5					
B.	COUNTRY CODE	<table border="1"><tr><td>0</td><td>8</td></tr></table>	0	8	(66-67)				
0	8								
C.	OUR SURVEY NUMBER	<table border="1"><tr><td>6</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr></table>	6	0	1	(68-70)			
6	0	1							
D.	INTERVIEW NUMBER	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>							(71-76)

Q.1. What is your nationality? Please tell me the country(ies) that applies(y).
(MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

Belgium	1, (78-94)	—> Q.2
Denmark	2,	
Germany	3,	
Greece	4,	
Spain	5,	
France	6,	
Ireland	7,	
Italy	8,	
Luxembourg	9,	
Netherlands	10,	
Portugal	11,	
United Kingdom (Great Britain, Northern Ireland)	12,	
Austria	13,	
Sweden	14,	
Finland	15,	
Other countries	16,	—> Close interview
DK	17,	

Q.2. When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?

Frequently.....1 (95)
Occasionally2
Never3
DK.....4

Q.3. When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen...? (READ OUT)

often.....1 (96)
from time to time2
rarely.....3
never.....4
DK.....5

Q. 4. On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead? (READ OUT)

Very satisfied1 (97)
Fairly satisfied.....2
Not very satisfied3
Not at all satisfied4
DK.....5

Q. 5. What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2004 be better, worse or the same, when it comes to...?

	READ OUT	BETTER	WORSE	SAME	DK
1	your life in general	1	2	3	4 (98)
2	the economic situation in Ireland	1	2	3	4 (99)
3	the financial situation of your household	1	2	3	4 (100)
4	the employment situation in Ireland	1	2	3	4 (101)
5	your personal job situation	1	2	3	4 (102)

Q.6. I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?

	READ OUT	TEND TO TRUST	TEND NOT TO TRUST	DK
1	The press	1	2	3 (103)
2	Radio	1	2	3 (104)
3	Television	1	2	3 (105)
4	Justice/the Irish legal system	1	2	3 (106)
5	The police	1	2	3 (107)
6	The army	1	2	3 (108)
7	The religious institutions	1	2	3 (109)
8	Trade unions	1	2	3 (110)
9	Political parties	1	2	3 (111)
10	Big companies	1	2	3 (112)
11	The Irish government	1	2	3 (113)
12	The Dail	1	2	3 (114)
13	The European Union	1	2	3 (115)
14	The United Nations	1	2	3 (116)
15	Charitable or voluntary organisations	1	2	3 (117)

Let's continue with some questions on the European Union.

- Q.7. Generally speaking, do you think that Ireland's membership of the European Union is...?
- | | |
|----------------------------|---------|
| a good thing..... | 1 (118) |
| a bad thing..... | 2 |
| neither good nor bad | 3 |
| DK..... | 4 |
- Q.8. Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Ireland has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?
- | | |
|---------------------|---------|
| Benefited | 1 (119) |
| Not benefited | 2 |
| DK..... | 3 |
- Q.9. In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?
- | | |
|-----------------------|---------|
| Very positive..... | 1 (120) |
| Fairly positive..... | 2 |
| Neutral | 3 |
| Fairly negative | 4 |
| Very negative..... | 5 |
| DK..... | 6 |

Q.10. What does the European Union mean to you personally? (SHOW CARD 'Q.10' - READ OUT - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE - ROTATE TOP TO BOTTOM/BOTTOM TO TOP)

Peace.....	1, (121-135)
Economic prosperity.....	2,
Social protection.....	3,
Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the European Union	4,
Cultural diversity.....	5,
Stronger say in the world	6,
Euro	7,
Unemployment	8,
Bureaucracy	9,
Waste of money	10,
Loss of our cultural identity	11,
More crime	12,
Not enough control at external frontiers.....	13,
Other (SPONTANEOUS).....	14,
DK.....	15,

Q.11. Does the European Union give you personally the feeling of...? (SHOW CARD 'Q.11' - READ OUT - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

enthusiasm	1, (136-143)
hope.....	2,
trust.....	3,
indifference.....	4,
anxiety	5,
mistrust	6,
rejecting it	7,
DK.....	8,

- Q.12. a) In your opinion, what is the current speed of building Europe? Please look at these figures **(SHOW CARD 'Q.12' WITH SCALE)**. N°1 is standing still, N°7 is running as fast as possible. Choose the one which best corresponds with your opinion of the current speed of building Europe?

b) And which corresponds best to the speed you would like? **(SHOW CARD 'Q.12 AGAIN)**

READ OUT		Q. 12. a.	Q. 12. b.
		CURRENT SPEED (144)	DESIRED SPEED (145)
1	standstill	1	1
2		2	2
3		3	3
4		4	4
5		5	5
6		6	6
7	runs as fast as possible	7	7
8	DK	8	8

- Q.13. Are you, yourself, for or against the development towards a European political union?

For..... 1 (146)

Against.....2

DK.....3

- Q.14. If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or very relieved?

Very sorry 1 (147)

Indifferent.....2

Very relieved.....3

DK.....4

- Q.15. Using this scale, how much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions? **(SHOW CARD 'Q.15' WITH SCALE)**

(148-149)

KNOW NOTHING AT ALL								KNOW A GREAT DEAL		DK
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11

Q.16. When you are looking for information about the European Union, its policies, its institutions, which of the following sources do you use? Which else? **(SHOW CARD 'Q.16' - READ OUT - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)**

- Meetings 1, (150-167)
- Discussions with relatives, friends, colleagues 2,
- Daily newspapers 3,
- Other newspapers, magazines 4,
- Television 5,
- Radio 6,
- The Internet 7,
- Books, brochures, information leaflets 8,
- CD-Rom 9,
- European Union information on notice boards in libraries, town halls,
railway stations, post offices 10,
- European Union information offices, Euro-info Centers, Euro-info Points,
Euro-libraries, etc 11,
- National or regional government information offices 12,
- Trade unions or professional associations 13,
- Other organisations (consumer organisations, etc.)..... 14,
- A member of European Parliament or a member of The Dail 15,
- Other (**SPONTANEOUS**) 16,
- Never look for such information, not interested (**SPONTANEOUS**) 17, GO TO Q.18.
- DK 18,

DO NOT ASK THOSE WHO ANSWERED "NEVER LOOK FOR SUCH INFORMATION, NOT INTERESTED", CODE 17 IN Q.16.

Q.17. In general, how would you prefer to get information about the European Union? How else?

(SHOW CARD 'Q.17' - READ OUT - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

A short leaflet, that just gives an overview.....	1, (168-182)
A more detailed brochure	2,
A book giving you a complete description	3,
A video tape	4,
On the Internet	5,
A CD-Rom	6,
A computer terminal allowing you to consult databases	7,
From the television	8,
From the radio	9,
From daily newspapers	10,
From other newspapers, magazines.....	11,
From posters	12,
I do not want information about the European Union (SPONTANEOUS)	13,
None of these ways (SPONTANEOUS)	14,
DK.....	15,

ASK ALL

Q.18. Generally speaking, do you think that the Irish media talk too much, about the right amount or too little about the European Union?

Too much.....	1 (183)
About the right amount	2
Too little	3
DK	4

Q.19. And do you think that the Irish media present the European Union too positively, objectively or too negatively?

Too positively.....	1 (184)
Objectively	2
Too negatively	3
DK	4

Q.20. Have you heard of...?

	READ OUT	YES	NO	DK
1	the European Parliament	1	2	3 (185)
2	the European Commission	1	2	3 (186)
3	the Council of Ministers of the European Union	1	2	3 (187)
4	the Court of Justice of the European Union	1	2	3 (188)
5	the European Ombudsman	1	2	3 (189)
6	the European Central Bank	1	2	3 (190)
7	the European Court of Auditors	1	2	3 (191)
8	the Committee of the Regions of the European Union	1	2	3 (192)
9	the Economic and Social Committee of the European Union	1	2	3 (193)

Q.21. And for each of the following European bodies, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?

	READ OUT	IMPORTANT	NOT IMPORTANT	DK
1	The European Parliament	1	2	3 (194)
2	The European Commission	1	2	3 (195)
3	The Council of Ministers of the European Union	1	2	3 (196)
4	The Court of Justice of the European Union	1	2	3 (197)
5	The European Ombudsman	1	2	3 (198)
6	The European Central Bank	1	2	3 (199)
7	The European Court of Auditors	1	2	3 (200)
8	The Committee of the Regions of the European Union	1	2	3 (201)
9	The Economic and Social Committee of the European Union	1	2	3 (202)

Q.22. And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?

	READ OUT	TEND TO TRUST	TEND NOT TO TRUST	DK
1	The European Parliament	1	2	3 (203)
2	The European Commission	1	2	3 (204)
3	The Council of Ministers of the European Union	1	2	3 (205)
4	The Court of Justice of the European Union	1	2	3 (206)
5	The European Ombudsman	1	2	3 (207)
6	The European Central Bank	1	2	3 (208)
7	The European Court of Auditors	1	2	3 (209)
8	The Committee of the Regions of the European Union	1	2	3 (210)
9	The Economic and Social Committee of the European Union	1	2	3 (211)

Q.23. a) On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Ireland? **(SHOW CARD 'Q.23' WITH SCALE)**

b) And how about the way democracy works in the European Union? **(SHOW CARD 'Q.23' AGAIN)**

	READ OUT	VERY SATISFIED	FAIRLY SATISFIED	NOT VERY SATISFIED	NOT AT ALL SATISFIED	DK
Q. 23.a	In Ireland	1	2	3	4	5 (212)
Q. 23.b	In the European Union	1	2	3	4	5 (213)

INTERVIEWER: THERE ARE NO Qs. 24 & 25

PUNCHER NOTE: NO. COLS (214-215)

ASK ALL

Q.26. What do you think are the two most important issues facing Ireland at the moment?
(SHOW CARD 'Q.26' - READ OUT - MAX. 2 ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

Crime	1, (216-231)
Public transport	2,
Economic situation	3,
Rising prices/inflation	4,
Taxation	5,
Unemployment	6,
Terrorism	7,
Defence/Foreign affairs	8,
Housing	9,
Immigration	10,
Health care system.....	11,
The educational system	12,
Pensions	13,
Protecting the environment	14,

Other (SPONTANEOUS)	15,
DK.....	16,

Q.27. And for each of the following issues in Ireland, do you think that the European Union plays a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor negative role?

	READ OUT	POSITIVE ROLE	NEGATIVE ROLE	NEITHER POSITIVE NOR NEGATIVE ROLE	DK
1	Fighting crime	1	2	3	4 (232)
2	Public transport	1	2	3	4 (233)
3	The economic situation	1	2	3	4 (234)
4	Rising prices/inflation	1	2	3	4 (235)
5	Taxation	1	2	3	4 (236)
6	Fighting unemployment	1	2	3	4 (237)
7	Fighting terrorism	1	2	3	4 (238)
8	Defence	1	2	3	4 (239)
9	Foreign affairs	1	2	3	4 (240)
10	Housing	1	2	3	4 (241)
11	Immigration	1	2	3	4 (242)
12	Health care system	1	2	3	4 (243)
13	The educational system	1	2	3	4 (244)
14	Pensions	1	2	3	4 (245)
15	Protecting the environment	1	2	3	4 (246)

- Q.28. a) For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the Irish government, or made jointly within the European Union?

	READ OUT – ROTATE	IRISH GOVERNMENT	JOINTLY WITHIN EUROPEAN UNION	DK
1	Defence	1	2	3 (247)
2	Protection of the environment	1	2	3 (248)
3	Currency	1	2	3 (249)
4	Humanitarian aid	1	2	3 (250)
5	Health and social welfare	1	2	3 (251)
6	Basic rules for broadcasting and press	1	2	3 (252)
7	Fight against poverty/social exclusion	1	2	3 (253)
8	The fight against unemployment	1	2	3 (254)
9	Agriculture and fishing policy	1	2	3 (255)
10	The support to regions which are experiencing economic difficulties	1	2	3 (256)
11	Education	1	2	3 (257)
12	Scientific and technological research	1	2	3 (258)
13	Information about the European Union, its policies and institutions	1	2	3 (259)
14	Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union	1	2	3 (260)
15	Cultural policy	1	2	3 (261)

Q.28. b) And, for each of the following?

	READ OUT – ROTATE	IRISH GOVERNMENT	JOINTLY WITHIN EUROPEAN UNION	DK
1	Immigration policy	1	2	3 (262)
2	Rules for political asylum	1	2	3 (263)
3	The fight against organised crime	1	2	3 (264)
4	Police	1	2	3 (265)
5	Justice	1	2	3 (266)
6	Accepting refugees	1	2	3 (267)
7	Juvenile crime prevention	1	2	3 (268)
8	Urban crime prevention	1	2	3 (269)
9	The fight against drugs	1	2	3 (270)
10	The fight against the trade in, and exploitation of, human beings	1	2	3 (271)
11	The fight against international terrorism	1	2	3 (272)
12	Tackling the challenges of an ageing population	1	2	3 (273)

Q.29. What is your opinion on each of the following statements?
Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

	READ OUT – ROTATE	FOR	AGAINST	DK
1	A European Monetary Union with one single currency, the euro	1	2	3 (274)
2	One common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union, towards other countries	1	2	3 (275)
3	A common defence and security policy among European Union member states	1	2	3 (276)
4	The enlargement of the European Union to include new countries	1	2	3 (277)
5	The European Union being responsible for matters that cannot be effectively handled by national, regional and local governments	1	2	3 (278)
6	The resignation of the President of the European Commission and the European Commissioners if they do not have the support of a majority in the European Parliament	1	2	3 (279)
7	Teaching school children about the way European Union institutions work	1	2	3 (280)

8	The fact that the European Commission is composed of commissioners coming from each of the member states	1	2	3 (281)
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Q.30. I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?

	READ OUT	PRIORITY	NOT A PRIORITY	DK
1	Welcoming new member countries	1	2	3 (282)
2	Getting closer to European citizens, for example by giving them more information about the European Union, its policies and its institutions	1	2	3 (283)
3	Successfully implementing the single European currency, the euro	1	2	3 (284)
4	Fighting poverty and social exclusion	1	2	3 (285)
5	Protecting the environment	1	2	3 (286)
6	Guaranteeing the quality of food products	1	2	3 (287)
7	Protecting consumers and guaranteeing the quality of other products	1	2	3 (288)
8	Fighting unemployment	1	2	3 (289)
9	Reforming the institutions of the European Union and the way they work	1	2	3 (290)
10	Fighting organised crime and drug trafficking	1	2	3 (291)
11	Asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the European Union around the world	1	2	3 (292)
12	Maintaining peace and security in Europe	1	2	3 (293)
13	Guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of democracy in Europe	1	2	3 (294)
14	Fighting terrorism	1	2	3 (295)
15	Fighting illegal immigration	1	2	3 (296)

Q.31. For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?
(SHOW CARD 'Q.31' WITH SCALE)

	READ OUT	VERY EFFECTIVE	FAIRLY EFFECTIVE	NOT VERY EFFECTIVE	NOT AT ALL EFFECTIVE	DK
1	Welcoming new member countries	1	2	3	4	5 (297)
2	Getting closer to European citizens, for example by giving them more information about the European Union, its policies and its institutions	1	2	3	4	5 (298)
3	Successfully implementing the single European currency, the euro	1	2	3	4	5 (299)
4	Fighting poverty and social exclusion	1	2	3	4	5 (300)
5	Protecting the environment	1	2	3	4	5 (301)
6	Guaranteeing the quality of food products	1	2	3	4	5 (302)
7	Protecting consumers and guaranteeing the quality of other products	1	2	3	4	5 (303)
8	Fighting unemployment	1	2	3	4	5 (304)
9	Reforming the institutions of the European Union and the way they work	1	2	3	4	5 (305)
10	Fighting organised crime and drug trafficking	1	2	3	4	5 (306)
11	Asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the European Union around the world	1	2	3	4	5 (307)
12	Maintaining peace and security in Europe	1	2	3	4	5 (308)
13	Guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of democracy in Europe	1	2	3	4	5 (309)
14	Fighting terrorism	1	2	3	4	5 (310)
15	Fighting illegal immigration	1	2	3	4	5 (311)

- Q.32. The European Union already has a Common Security and Foreign Policy and a European Security and Defence Policy. There is now a debate about how much further these should be developed. Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?

	READ OUT - ROTATE	TEND TO AGREE	TEND TO DISAGREE	DK
1	The European Union should have a rapid military reaction force that can be sent quickly to troublespots when an international crisis occurs	1	2	3 (312)
2	When an international crisis occurs, European Union member states should agree a common position	1	2	3 (313)
3	The European Union should have its own Foreign Minister, who can be the spokesperson for a common European Union position	1	2	3 (314)
4	The European Union should have its own seat on the United Nations Security Council	1	2	3 (315)
5	Member states which have opted for neutrality should have a say in European Union foreign policy	1	2	3 (316)
6	Countries which will join the European Union in 2004 as a result of enlargement should already have their say in European Union foreign policy	1	2	3 (317)
7	European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States foreign policy	1	2	3 (318)
8	The European Union should guarantee Human Rights in each member state, even if this is contrary to the wishes of some member states	1	2	3 (319)
9	The European Union should work to guarantee Human Rights around the world, even if this is contrary to the wishes of some other countries	1	2	3 (320)
10	The European Union should have a common immigration policy towards people from outside the European Union	1	2	3 (321)
11	The European Union should have a common asylum policy towards asylum seekers	1	2	3 (322)

- Q.33. In your opinion, should decisions concerning European defence policy be taken by national government, by NATO or by the European Union? **(ONE ANSWER ONLY)**

National governments 1 (323)
 NATO 2
 The European Union 3
 Other (**SPONTANEOUS**) 4
 DK 5

- Q.34. Which of these three options do you prefer for the immediate future of the European Union? **(SHOW CARD 'Q.34' - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)**

The European Union should be enlarged to include all the countries wishing to join..... 1 (324)
 The European Union should be enlarged to include only some of the countries wishing to join 2
 The European Union should not be enlarged to include any additional countries 3
 None of these (**SPONTANEOUS**) 4
 DK..... 5

Q.43. In the near future, do you see yourself as...? (SHOW CARD 'Q.43' - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

Irish only 1 (508)
 Irish and European 2
 European and Irish 3
 European only 4
 DK 5

Q.44. Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be (NATIONALITY AS SPECIFIED IN QUESTION 1 OF QUESTIONNAIRE)? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

Very proud 1 (509)
 Fairly proud 2
 Not very proud 3
 Not at all proud 4
 DK 5

Q.45. And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

Very proud 1 (510)
 Fairly proud 2
 Not very proud 3
 Not at all proud 4
 DK 5

Q.46. People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to European Union. Please tell me how attached you feel to...

a) your city/town/village? (SHOW CARD 'Q.46' WITH SCALE)

b) your region? (SHOW CARD 'Q.46' AGAIN)

c) Ireland? (SHOW CARD 'Q.46' AGAIN)

d) Europe? (SHOW CARD 'Q.46' AGAIN)

	READ OUT	VERY ATTACHED	FAIRLY ATTACHED	NOT VERY ATTACHED	NOT AT ALL ATTACHED	DK
a	your city/town/village	1	2	3	4	5 (511)
b	your region	1	2	3	4	5 (512)
c	Ireland	1	2	3	4	5 (513)
d	Europe	1	2	3	4	5 (514)

Q.47. In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding...?

	READ OUT	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NEITHER POSITIVE NOR NEGATIVE	DK
1	peace in the world	1	2	3	4 (515)
2	the fight against terrorism	1	2	3	4 (516)
3	growth of the world economy	1	2	3	4 (517)
4	the fight against poverty in the world	1	2	3	4 (518)
5	protection of the environment	1	2	3	4 (519)

Q.48. And in your opinion, does the European Union tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor negative role regarding...?

	READ OUT	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NEITHER POSITIVE NOR NEGATIVE	DK
1	peace in the world	1	2	3	4 (520)
2	the fight against terrorism	1	2	3	4 (521)
3	the growth of the world economy	1	2	3	4 (522)
4	the fight against poverty in the world	1	2	3	4 (523)
5	the protection of the environment	1	2	3	4 (524)

Q.49. Do you think that the European Union should or should not have a Constitution?

Should..... 1 (525)
Should not2
DK.....3

Q.50. Which, if any, of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? The President of the European Commission should be...? **(SHOW CARD 'Q.50' - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)**

solely nominated by the Heads of State or Heads of Government of the European Union 1 (526)
solely elected by the European Parliament 2
chosen both by the European Parliament as well as Heads
of State or Heads of Government 3
directly elected by the citizens of the European Union 4
other (**SPONTANEOUS**) 5
DK 6

Q.51. The European Council is composed of Heads of State or Heads of Government of member states and the President of the Commission. The presidency of the European Council is taken by each country in turn, for a period of six months. Do you think that...? **(READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)**

the six-month period should be retained because it gives each member state a chance
to hold the Presidency of the European Union on a regular basis 1 (527)
the period of the Presidency should be extended because six months is too
short to achieve significant results 2
DK 3

Q.52. Currently, each member state has the right of veto in certain areas. In the future, should a right of veto...?

be retained in order to preserve essential national interests 1 (528)
be limited to a very few essential areas 2
be given up for all decisions in order to make the European Union more efficient 3
DK 4

DEMOGRAPHICS

- D.1. In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right".
How would you place your views on this scale? (**SHOW CARD 'D1'**)
(**INT.: DO NOT PROMPT - IF CONTACT HESITATES, TRY AGAIN**)

LEFT									RIGHT
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Refusal 11 (654-655)

DK..... 12

NO QUESTIONS D.2. TO D.6.

- D.7. Could you give me the letter which corresponds best to your own current situation?
(**SHOW CARD 'D.7' - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY**)

Married..... 1 (656-657)

Remarried 2

Unmarried, currently living with partner 3

Unmarried, having never lived with a partner 4

Unmarried, having previously lived with a partner, but now on my own 5

Divorced 6

Separated 7

Widowed 8

Other (**SPONTANEOUS**) 9

Refusal (**SPONTANEOUS**) 10

- D.8. How old were you when you stopped full-time education? (**INT.:IF "STILL STUDYING", CODE '00'**)

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(658-659)

NO QUESTION D.9.

- D.10. Gender.

Male 1 (660)

Female..... 2

- D.11. How old are you?

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(661-662)

NO QUESTION D.12. TO D.14.

D.15. a) What is your current occupation?

IF NOT DOING ANY PAID WORK CURRENTLY – CODES 1 TO 4 IN D. 15. a.

b) Did you do any paid work in the past? What was your last occupation?

	D.15.a. CURRENT OCCUPATION (663-664)	D.15.b. LAST OCCUPATION (665-666)
NON-ACTIVE		
Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any current occupation, not working	1	
Student	2	
Unemployed or temporarily not working	3	
Retired or unable to work through illness	4	
SELF EMPLOYED		
Farmer	5	1
Fisherman	6	2
Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.)	7	3
Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed person	8	4
Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company	9	5
EMPLOYED		
Employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect)	10	6
General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other director)	11	7
Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician)	12	8
Employed position, working mainly at a desk	13	9
Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, etc.)	14	10
Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, fireman, etc.)	15	11
Supervisor	16	12
Skilled manual worker	17	13
Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant	18	14
NEVER DID ANY PAID WORK		15

NO QUESTIONS D.16. TO D.18.

D.19. Are you in your household, the person who contributes most to the household income?
(READ OUT)

Yes 1 (667)
 No 2
 Both equally 3
 DK 4

NO QUESTION D.20.

IF "NO", CODE 2 IN D.19.

- D.21. a) What is the current occupation of the person who contributes most to the household income?

IF "NOT DOING ANY PAID WORK CURRENTLY", CODE 1 TO 4 IN D.21.a.

- b) Did he/she do any paid work in the past? What was his/her last occupation?

	D.21.a. CURRENT OCCUPATION (668-669)	D.21.b. LAST OCCUPATION (670-671)
NON-ACTIVE		
Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any current occupation, not working	1	
Student	2	
Unemployed or temporarily not working	3	
Retired or unable to work through illness	4	
SELF EMPLOYED		
Farmer	5	1
Fisherman	6	2
Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.)	7	3
Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed person	8	4
Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company	9	5
EMPLOYED		
Employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect)	10	6
General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other director)	11	7
Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician)	12	8
Employed position, working mainly at a desk	13	9
Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, etc.)	14	10
Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, fireman, etc.)	15	11
Supervisor	16	12
Skilled manual worker	17	13
Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant	18	14
NEVER DID ANY PAID WORK		15

NO QUESTIONS D.22. TO D.24.

D.25.	Would you say you live in a...? (READ OUT)	
	rural area or village.....	1 (672)
	small or middle sized town	2
	large town	3
	DK.....	4

NO QUESTIONS D.26. TO D.28.

D.29.	We also need some information about the income of this household to be able to analyse the survey results for different types of households. Here is a list of income groups. (SHOW CARD 'D.29') . Please count the total wages and salaries PER MONTH of all members of this household; all pensions and social insurance benefits; child allowances and any other income like rents, etc...Of course, your answer as all other replies in this interview will be treated confidentially and referring back to you or your household will be impossible. Please give me the letter of the income group your household falls into BEFORE tax and other deductions.	
	B	1 (673-674)
	T.....	2
	P	3
	F.....	4
	E	5
	H.....	6
	L.....	7
	N	8
	R	9
	M.....	10
	S	11
	K	12
	Refusal	13
	DK.....	14

INTERVIEW PROTOCOLE

P.1. - DATE OF INTERVIEW	DAY (675-676)		MONTH (677-678)	

P.2. - TIME OF THE BEGINNING OF THE INTERVIEW	HOUR (679-680)		MINUTES (681-682)	
(INT.:USE 24 HOUR CLOCK)				

P.3. - NUMBER OF MINUTES THE INTERVIEW LASTED	MINUTES (683-685)		

- P.4. Number of persons present during the interview, including interviewer.
- Two (interviewer and respondent) 1 (686)
- Three 2
- Four 3
- Five or more 4

- P.5. Respondent cooperation
- Excellent 1 (687)
- Fair 2
- Average 3
- Bad 4

- P. 6. Size of locality
- Less than 2,000 people..... 1 (688)
- 2,001 - 20,000 people..... 2
- 20,001 - 100,000 people..... 3
- 100,001 people and more..... 4

PUNCHER: THERE IS NO COL. (689)

- P.7. - Region
- Donegal 1 (690)
- North West (Sligo, Leitrim)..... 2
- North East (Cavan, Monaghan, Louth) 3
- West (Mayo, Galway) 4
- Midlands (Westmeath, Roscommon, Longford, Laois, Offaly) 5
- East (Dublin, Meath, Kildare, Wicklow) 6
- Mid West (Limerick, Clare, Tipperary North Riding)..... 7
- South East (Waterford, Wexford, Carlow, Kilkenny, Tipperary South Riding) 8
- South West (Kerry, Cork)..... 9

P.8. Postal code

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(692-699)

P.9. Sample point number

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(700-707)

P.10. Interviewer number

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(708-715)

P.11. Weighting factor

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(716-723)

P.12. a) Fixed telephone available in the household?

Yes1 (724)

No2

b) Mobile telephone available in the household?

Yes1 (725)

No2

A.	YOUR SURVEY NUMBER	<table border="1"><tr><td>4</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>5</td></tr></table>	4	1	1	0	5	(61-65)	
4	1	1	0	5					
B.	COUNTRY CODE	<table border="1"><tr><td>0</td><td>8</td></tr></table>	0	8	(66-67)				
0	8								
C.	OUR SURVEY NUMBER	<table border="1"><tr><td>6</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr></table>	6	0	1	(68-70)			
6	0	1							
D.	INTERVIEW NUMBER	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>							(71-76)
E.	SPLIT BALLOT	<table border="1"><tr><td>1</td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td>A</td></tr> </table> <table border="1"><tr><td>2</td><td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td><td>B</td></tr> </table>	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	A	2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	B	(77)
1	<input type="checkbox"/>	A							
2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	B							

Q.1. What is your nationality? Please tell me the country(ies) that applies(y).
(MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

Belgium	1, (78-94)	→ Q.2
Denmark	2,	
Germany	3,	
Greece	4,	
Spain	5,	
France	6,	
Ireland	7,	
Italy	8,	
Luxembourg	9,	
Netherlands	10,	
Portugal	11,	
United Kingdom (Great Britain, Northern Ireland)	12,	
Austria	13,	
Sweden	14,	
Finland	15,	
Other countries	16,	→ Close interview
DK	17,	

Q.37. For each of the following statements, please tell me if you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree? **(SHOW CARD 'Q.37' WITH SCALE)**

	READ OUT	TOTALLY AGREE	TEND TO AGREE	TEND TO DISAGREE	TOTALLY DISAGREE	DK
1	The State intervenes too much in our lives	1	2	3	4	5 (410)
2	We need more equality and justice even if this means less freedom for the individual	1	2	3	4	5 (411)
3	Nowadays there is too much tolerance. Criminals should be punished more severely	1	2	3	4	5 (412)
4	Criminals need help and understanding	1	2	3	4	5 (413)
5	Citizens should participate more actively in politics in Ireland	1	2	3	4	5 (414)
6	Immigrants contribute a lot to Ireland	1	2	3	4	5 (415)
7	Immigrants are a threat to our way of life	1	2	3	4	5 (416)
8	<u>SPLIT BALLOT B</u> Protecting the environment should be a priority for Ireland, even if it affects economic growth	1	2	3	4	5 (418)
9	Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity	1	2	3	4	5 (419)



PUNCHER NOTE NO

Appendix 3

Eurobarometer 57.1 Executive Summary

Irish attitudes to European integration are somewhat puzzling. Favourable attitudes to European integration, as measured across a range of indicators, are extremely widespread in Ireland. Despite this, in a referendum in June 2001, the Irish people, by a majority of 54 to 46 per cent, refused to ratify the Treaty of Nice.

This report examines Irish attitudes to European integration in some depth, drawing on the evidence of Eurobarometer No. 57. Fieldwork for the Irish EB57 survey was conducted by Lansdowne Market Research between 29 March and 25 April, 2002. The questionnaire as implemented in Ireland is presented in Appendix 1. Technical details of how the survey was conducted can be found in Appendix 2.

This executive summary presents the evidence and findings of the report under seven headings:

- **overall attitudes to the European Union and to Ireland's membership of it**
- **reservations about integration in specific areas**
- **levels of knowledge of and engagement with EU affairs**
- **trust in European institutions**
- **trust in national institutions**
- **national and European identity and pride**
- **implications of the evidence considered given the Irish institutional and political context**

Overall Irish attitudes to the European Union and to Ireland's membership of the Union are characterised by:

- widespread approval of Irish membership of the EU
- widespread perception of benefits of EU membership, including personal benefits
- widespread positive image of the EU
- widespread positive attitudes to the euro
- very low levels of opposition to enlargement
- widespread willingness to see a substantial range of issues "Europeanised", in the sense of decisions on such issues being made jointly within the European Union rather than by the national government
- majority support for a common defence and security policy.

This picture of overall positive attitudes must be qualified by noting two areas in which, far from being more supportive of integration than average, Irish people show significantly greater reservations about integration:

- Irish people are more likely than average to express reservations regarding a strongly supranational approach to defence

- as noted in the text of the report, this is quite compatible with majority support for a common defence and security policy
- in parenthesis it is worth adding that there is a lesson to be learned from the different levels of support elicited by the alternative questions on security and defence policy; the lesson is that that complex issues must be very clearly and accurately presented to the public and that due attention must be paid to what might at first sight appear to be subtle nuances and distinctions; this implication applies particularly in countries that choose to involve the mass public in decisions on such matters
- Irish people are also more likely than average to have reservations about a strongly supranational approach to policies dealing with refugees and, to a lesser extent, immigration.

Substantial qualifications to the generally positive picture of Irish attitudes to integration also arise from the low levels of engagement with and knowledge of European affairs found among Irish people:

- enthusiastic support for the European Union lags a long way behind general approval of the EU
- the lack of enthusiastic support for the European Union in Ireland points to a wider problem of lack of engagement with European issues and a lack of knowledge of European institutions and European affairs
- evidence regarding people's feelings about the EU across a number of dimensions (enthusiasm, hope, trust/mistrust, anxiety etc.) confirms the point that the majority of Irish people do not have strong personal feelings (either positive or negative) about the EU
- consistent with the low levels of engagement with EU issues, Irish people lack confidence in their grasp of EU issues
- specifically, Irish people's subjective sense of their knowledge of "the European Union, its policies and its institutions" is lower than that of people in the Union as a whole
- low levels of knowledge are found more frequently among the younger and older age groups in contrast to those in the middle age-cohorts; they are also substantially more likely among women (50 per cent of whom are in the lower knowledge bracket, compared to 37 per cent of men); in occupational terms, low levels of knowledge are quite rare among managers but quite prevalent among manual workers and among the unemployed
- the evidence on knowledge and engagement suggests that improving the level of knowledge of European affairs among Irish people will be an uphill task; whether it be television or radio, newspapers or other magazines, discussion with family and friends or use of the internet, Irish people report less frequent use of all available channels of information or communication compared to the EU average frequency of use; the corollary is that Irish people are significantly above average in reporting that they never look for such information or are not interested in it.

Turning to more general features of Irish political culture, including the political culture of European integration, the evidence shows that Irish levels of trust in the EU and its institutions are considerably higher than the corresponding levels of trust across the Union as a whole:

- subtracting the proportion of Irish people who tend not to trust the EU from the proportion who tend to trust it gives a substantially more positive measure of net trust in Ireland than in the EU as a whole
- net trust in the individual institutions of the EU is even more positive than net trust in the European Union as a whole; the European Parliament receives the highest rating,

followed by the Commission, the Court of Justice, the European Ombudsman and the Council of Ministers

- again, the qualification about levels of knowledge and engagement is essential: the expression of trust in EU institutions just summarised is not necessarily backed up by adequate understanding or knowledge of the institutions in question or of what they do.

Trust in national institutions, particularly trust in national political institutions, tends to be lower than trust in EU institutions:

- much higher levels of net trust are accorded to European institutions as compared with Irish domestic political institutions, including the Dáil, the Government and the political parties (this pattern is not unique to Ireland)
- part of the explanation of this discrepancy in the Irish case lies in the much lower levels of don't know responses in the case of domestic political institutions; people are much more engaged with national politics and much more willing to take a view; the view that they take is also likely to be much more firmly grounded
- the second part of the explanation of the discrepancy is that trust has a very different connotation when applied to mainly apolitical institutions and organisations that are remote from daily experience compared to its meaning when applied to such highly political institutions as the national parliament, the government and the political parties
- in fact, on any realistic view of politics, critical attitudes and a healthy degree of scepticism are necessary parts of the checks and balances that are fundamental to democratic politics; in a national context, mistrustful citizens may be critical citizens as much or more than alienated citizens
- even bearing this qualification in mind, however, the evidence on levels of trust in institutions suggests that a communication or campaign strategy designed to influence people's attitudes to the European Union is likely to be more effective if it is seen to represent the views of the government and the parliament rather than being seen to represent solely the views of political parties.

The picture of Irish attitudes to the European Union as being for the most part positive but as lacking in commitment and active engagement is confirmed by the evidence relating to national and European identity:

- even on the basis of an undemanding and prospective measure of European identity, the proportion of Irish people showing any degree of European identity amounts to a bare majority; the remainder identify themselves as "Irish only"
- this places Ireland firmly in the camp of countries with a less well developed sense of European identity, the only countries with a larger proportion identifying exclusively with their own nationality being Greece, Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom
- the salience of Irish identity in Irish political culture is confirmed by the data on national pride -- well over two-thirds of Irish respondents say that they are very proud to be Irish; a similarly strong sense of national pride is found among only two-fifths of the French and the Dutch and one-fifth of Germans; only in Greece does one find a higher proportion of people in the "very proud" category
- for many Irish people, however, pride in being Irish is quite compatible with pride in being European, albeit that the latter feeling is at a lower level of intensity
- the need to take the nationalist sensibilities underlying these data into account in any assessment of the climate of public opinion towards the EU in Ireland is confirmed by evidence deriving from a question about "the building of Europe, the European Union" and about the fears that this process may give rise to

- in this context fears of adverse economic or welfare consequences are significantly less common in Ireland than in the Union as a whole
- in contrast, Irish people are somewhat more likely to admit to fears about the imposition of decisions by the big countries and about loss of national identity and national culture
- in interpreting these data, one must bear in mind that the potential fears were posed by the question and, in this sense, were prompted by the question; the evidence **does not show** that substantial proportions of people are frantic about these issues; furthermore, the proportions involved (ranging from just under two-fifths to three fifths) must be set along side the fact only one person in twenty indicated, in response to another question, that the EU caused them a feeling of anxiety
- in short, worries about "decisions being imposed by the big member states" or about "Ireland not really existing any more" or about the "loss of our national identity and culture" are, at most, potential or subliminal fears; given the role that nationalist issues have played in Irish history, their incidence is not surprising and, without exaggerating their significance, there is need to take them into consideration in any comprehensive communication strategy.

The implications of any particular configuration of public opinion towards the EU depends on the institutional and political context within which ratification of EU treaties takes place:

- in the Irish case, the defining features of that context are, firstly, the requirement to hold a referendum on any significant treaty changes, secondly, the stipulation that any public funds expended on campaigning be allocated on a fifty-fifty basis between the 'yes' and the 'no' sides and, thirdly, the fact that there is a pro-integration (and pro-Nice) consensus among the political parties and among elected representatives
- the requirement to hold referendums on EU treaty changes puts additional demands on Irish citizens, placing them in the challenging position of making decisions on complex issues and therefore requiring them to have higher rather than average or lower levels of knowledge of and engagement with these issues
- the constitutional requirement that, if any public funds are allocated to referendum campaigning, they must be allocated equally to the 'yes' and the 'no' sides has tended to inhibit efforts to persuade and influence voters
- the fact that there is a pro-integration consensus among the political parties means that, over the years, European issues have not been widely debated and this has had an adverse effect on levels of knowledge and engagement among citizens
- remedying this deficit in party-led debate about Europe is made more difficult by the declining levels of attachment to political parties and by the low level of trust in parties (even though, it should be noted, the level of trust in parties in Ireland in spring 2002 was higher than it was in the Union as a whole)
- the challenges resulting from this combination of constitutional requirements, political circumstances and the current climate of public opinion on European issues were dramatically illustrated by the defeat of the first referendum on the Treaty of Nice (7 June 2001)
- in particular, it is evident that the outcome of that referendum was determined more by abstention than by the growth of the 'no' vote (in fact, in absolute terms and as a proportion of the electorate, the 'no' vote actually declined between the Amsterdam and Nice referendums)
- in turn, the main explanation of the massive (65 per cent) level of abstention in the first Nice referendum was the feeling on the part a substantial majority of the citizens that they did not understand the issues involved

- the feeling of not understanding the issues also contributed to the tendency to vote 'no' but the most important attitudinal factor in determining the 'no' vote was dissatisfaction with the way in which decisions are made in the EU
- in short, close examination of the evidence regarding Irish public opinion on European issues helps to identify the underlying aspects of public opinion that contributed to the defeat of the proposal to ratify the Nice Treaty in the referendum of 7 June 2001; in doing so it points to the problematic aspects of public opinion that need to be dealt with if the extremely high level of abstention in that referendum and the consequences that flowed from it are to be avoided in future referendums on EU treaty changes.

Eurobarometer 58.1 Executive Summary

1. The present report deals with Eurobarometer 58 (autumn 2002) and focuses on (a) current evaluations of aspects of the European Union, (b) further analysis of the degree of engagement with EU issues among Irish people, (c) evidence on Irish people's perception of and attitude to the scope and speed of European integration, (d) attitudes to the impending enlargement of the European Union and (e) evidence on Irish people's evaluation of the role of the United States in the international system and evidence of Irish preferences as to who defence and security policy issues ought to be decided.
2. The timing of the Eurobarometer 58 survey (autumn 2002) also makes it possible to compare attitudes at the time of the second referendum to attitudes some six months previously and, in this way, to gain some additional insight into the impact of the second referendum campaign. In this context, the present report also takes into account the findings of the two studies of attitudes and behaviour in the referendums in Ireland on the Treaty of Nice (see below).
3. The EB 57 report showed that, as of spring 2002, Irish attitudes to the European Union and to Ireland's membership of the Union were characterised by widespread approval of Irish membership, widespread perception of the benefits of membership, including personal benefits, and a widespread positive image of the EU. However, these positive attitudes were accompanied by low levels of engagement with and knowledge of European affairs (see National Report on EB 57)
4. The study of attitudes and behaviour in the second Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty showed a marked improvement in communication and a substantial increase in people's sense that they could understand the issues at stake. The improvements in communication were concentrated in the mass media (television, radio and newspapers) and in interpersonal discussion of the issues. On the other hand, the evidence relating to the second referendum also showed that the communication process had its limits and that there was very little spillover from an understanding of the issues raised by the Treaty of Nice to a more general understanding of the institutions of the Union and how they work.
5. Recent Eurobarometer surveys in Ireland up to and including EB 58 show that, over the last two years, Irish public opinion towards European integration as measured by the standard Eurobarometer indicators, has been somewhat volatile. In autumn 2000 and spring 2001 support for integration experienced two successive falls. These falls were an important aspect of the attitudinal background against which the first referendum on the Nice Treaty took place. Although, in the wake of the first referendum and the defeat of the treaty, there was a substantial recovery in support for integration in autumn 2001, the two most recent surveys (EB 57 and EB 58) again saw two successive falls in the level of support for integration.
6. Despite the decline in overall support for integration between spring and autumn 2002, the evidence in EB 58 shows that certain specific attitudes to European integration changed in a positive direction over this same period. These changes included an increase in Irish people's trust in various European institutions. For example, confidence in the European Parliament rose nine percentage points to 61 per cent, as did confidence in the Commission (to 57 per cent). Confidence in the Council of Ministers showed the biggest increase (up 14 percentage points to 50 per cent). Trust in the Convention on the Future of the European Union also grew substantially - from 24 per cent to 36 per cent.
7. This suggests that the greater degree of engagement with European issues that accompanies a referendum, while it may not lead to changes in overall attitude to European integration or to the European Union, can bring about improvement in more specific evaluations of particular institutions or aspects of integration.

8. Part of the explanation of the changes just mentioned lies in a change in people's engagement with European issues. Such change is indicated by the extent to which people are willing to take a position on a particular issue rather than giving a don't know or non-committal response. The extent of attitude formation in this sense increased substantially in the case of the Convention on the Future of the European Union and in the case of the Council of Ministers between spring and autumn 2002. However, the net effect of these and related increases in attitude formation was simply to bring the Irish level of attitude formation up to the European average.
9. It is also notable that familiarity with some (but only some) of the EU institutions increased in Ireland between spring and autumn 2002. The European Parliament, the European Commission and European Central Bank showed no change in overall exposure/familiarity between these two time periods. On the other hand, familiarity with the Court of Justice rose 12 percentage points, familiarity with the European Court of Auditors rose 10 percentage points, familiarity with the Convention on the Future of the EU rose nine percentage points and familiarity with the Council of Ministers rose seven percentage points.
10. More detailed statistical analysis of the evidence of familiarity with the European institutions indicates that, unlike the people of the Union as a whole, Irish respondents do not experience the Council of Ministers as an integral part of a tripartite policy-making structure involving the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. Given the importance of the role the Council of Ministers plays in the European decision-making process and its relevance to any evaluation of that process, there is clearly room for substantial improvement in Irish people's understanding of this aspect of the European decision-making process. One would expect that, in the run-up to the impending Irish presidency of the Council, there would be an automatic improvement in dissemination of information about the role of the Council. The challenge will be to ensure that any gain in understanding the role of the Council on the part of the public is not lost when things return to normal.
11. Turning to the issue of the level (national or European) at which various policy issues should be decided, there is evidence of some increase in support for the Europeanisation of certain issues between spring and autumn 2002. The changes, which were modest, tended to be concentrated in the area of justice and home affairs, including the fight against drugs; the fight against organised crime, immigration policy, rules for political asylum and urban crime prevention. It is noteworthy that these increases in support for the Europeanisation of issues that lie mainly in the justice and home affairs area occurred during a period in which a wide range of European policy issues were being discussed in the context of the second referendum on the Nice Treaty.
12. Detailed statistical analysis of Irish people's priorities regarding actions that might be undertaken by the European Union points to the existence of two distinct dimensions of concern underlying these priorities. The first dimension relates to major problems on the agenda of every European government, while the second dimension focuses on the European integration process itself. This poses somewhat of a dilemma for the Union. On the one hand, the citizens of Ireland (and of the Union as a whole) would like the European Union to treat all the most difficult problems facing European societies as priorities. On the other hand, actions designed to consolidate or strengthen integration, and which might therefore beef-up the Union's capacity to deal with some of these pressing problems, constitute a separate dimension that is regarded as salient by significantly smaller proportions of the citizens.
13. In regard to the speed of European integration, the results derived from combining data from two questions - one on the perceived speed of building Europe and the other on the preferred speed of building Europe - are quite revealing in regard to Irish attitudes to integration. On this measure Ireland moves from the front rank of supporters of

integration (as per, for example, the membership indicator) to the other end of the scale where it is fourth from the bottom on a descending scale of countries defined by the proportions regarding the pace of integration as too slow. This puts Irish public opinion in quite different company - nestling between Sweden and Austria, though still some way ahead of Finland and Denmark. This suggests that, when it comes to the pace of European integration, Irish people tend to prefer the *status quo* or the *status quo ante*, though there is a significant minority (about one-quarter) that is prepared to forge full-speed ahead.

14. Reservations about the speed of building Europe do not seem to adversely affect Irish people's attitude to enlargement. Support for enlargement increased in Ireland between spring and autumn 2002 and is among the highest in the EU. It should be noted however that more detailed statistical analysis of people's expectations regarding the consequences of enlargement shows that the positive consequences that Irish people see as following from the enlargement process tend to be of an intangible sort, whereas the negative expectations, which are almost equally widespread, relate to much more tangible and material matters (this contrast is also found in public opinion in the Union as a whole).
15. A similar statistical analysis of people's expectations regarding the consequences of enlargement for various social and economic groups and sectors points to a broad distinction between a traditional economic and social sector and a modern economic and social sector. Thus the first dimension of expected winners and losers is defined mainly by expectations in regard to the outcome for fishermen, farmers, people living in the countryside, and small companies. The second dimension is defined by expectations regarding the effect of enlargement on young people, urban dwellers, big business and ethnic minorities.
16. In short, the evidence suggests that Irish people (and people in the European Union as a whole) see the rewards of enlargement as accruing to the more modern social and economic sectors while expectations regarding the traditional economy and society either lean towards anticipation of losses for the groups involved or are unclear or divided.
17. Ireland ranks seventh among the member states in terms of exposure to information about enlargement. When it comes to the subjective sense of being informed about enlargement, Ireland ranks sixth. In the light of Ireland's tendency towards lower engagement with European issues, these rankings are not bad. However, when we look at the sense that people have of participating in political debate about enlargement, Ireland is at the top of a ranking of countries in terms of the proportion feeling either a great deal or somewhat involved in such a debate. Given the tendency noted at several points in this report for Ireland to lag behind in terms of public engagement with European issues, the fact that it is at the top of the ranking in terms of a sense of participation in political debate about enlargement is remarkable and is, no doubt, a direct reflection of having held two referendums in which the enlargement issue played a prominent role. At the same time, the fact that two-thirds of Irish people feel less than somewhat involved in political debate about enlargement underlines the difficulties of securing a sense of mass participation in relation to issues such as enlargement even in a referendum-holding context.
18. As current debates remind us, attitudes to integration are not unconnected with attitudes to the transatlantic relationship. EB 58 included a new set of questions designed to examine attitudes to the role of the United States in the international system in five different areas. Opinion in the member states on the question of the role the United States plays in relation to peace in the world varies widely. The range extends from plus 14 percentage point net rating in Britain to a minus 60 percentage point rating in Greece. Ireland (net rating of plus four percentage points) ranks next to Britain in favourable assessments of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world and just

ahead of Denmark and Italy. Public opinion in all the other member states of the European Union takes a negative view of the role of the United States, the least negative being West German public opinion and the most negative being public opinion in Greece. In contrast to the rating on the question of peace in the world, the United States is positively rated by the majority of member states of the European Union in relation to the fight against terrorism. Ireland's rating of the United States in this regard (plus 37 percentage points) slips from second to fourth position.

19. A majority of the member states show a net favourable evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to growth of the world economy. On the other hand, there is an overwhelmingly negative net evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to the fight against poverty and to the protection of the environment. On all three issues Irish public opinion is the most favourably disposed towards the role of the United States. The Irish public's evaluation of the role the United States on the economic front is a net positive 36 points. On the question of the role of the United States in the fight against poverty, Irish opinion is evenly divided, while, on the question of the United States and the environment, Irish opinion shifts marginally towards the negative side with a net evaluation of minus 4 percentage points. Taking the data on all the dimensions of evaluation of the role of the United States into account, it is clear that Irish public opinion occupies quite a distinctive position among the member states of the European Union.
20. In the conclusion to the previous report (EB 57) in this series, it was emphasised that the implications of any particular configuration of public opinion towards the EU depend on the institutional and political context within which ratification of EU treaties takes place. It was also noted that the requirement to hold referendums on EU treaty changes puts additional demands on Irish citizens, placing them in the position of making decisions on complex issues and requiring them to have higher rather than average levels of knowledge of and engagement with these issues. The evidence considered in this report and the evidence from the special survey of the second referendum on the Nice Treaty both indicate that people's degree of engagement with European issues can be strengthened and improved by an effective process of campaigning and communication. The challenge is to ensure that such engagement is not just specific to the issues in a particular referendum and to the duration of the referendum campaign. The evidence points to a need for a permanent communication campaign to improve the capacity of people to deal with the on-going series of complex issues raised by the on-going process of European integration.

Eurobarometer 59.1 Executive Summary

Introduction

1. The present report deals with Eurobarometer 59 (spring 2003). Its first task is to update the picture of basic trends in Irish people's attitudes to European integration and the European Union. The report then deals with the response of public opinion to four major events and developments in the European Union and in international politics as of the spring of 2003. These developments are, in order of their treatment in this report: the enlargement of the European Union, the Convention on the future of the European Union, the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament and, finally, the war in Iraq and the implications of that war and of events leading up to it for public support for a European common foreign and security policy.
2. Fieldwork for the EB59 survey in Ireland was carried out between 22nd March and 18th April. In the European Union as a whole, fieldwork was completed between 18th March 2003 and 30th April 2003.
3. In order to avoid repetition, this executive summary begins with a reminder of the main findings of the Irish reports on EB57 and EB58 and of two reports on the two Nice referendums that were carried out on behalf of the European Commission Representation in Dublin. Readers who are familiar with the previous reports may wish to fast forward to point 7 in this summary.

Background - Previous Eurobarometers and the Nice referendums

4. The EB 57 report showed that, as of spring 2002, Irish attitudes to the European Union and to Ireland's membership of the Union were characterised by widespread approval of Irish membership, widespread perception of the benefits of membership, including personal benefits, and a widespread positive image of the EU. However, these positive attitudes were accompanied by low levels of engagement with and knowledge of European affairs.
5. When account is taken of evidence in EB58 on both the perceived speed of building Europe and on the preferred speed of building Europe, Ireland moves from the front rank of supporters of integration to the other end of the scale, where it is fourth lowest in terms the proportion regarding the pace of integration as too slow. This suggests that, when it comes to the pace of European integration, Irish people tend to prefer the *status quo* or the *status quo ante*. On the other hand, there is a significant minority (about one-quarter) that is prepared to forge full-speed ahead.
6. The study of the first referendum on the Nice Treaty showed that differential abstention was the main cause of the defeat of the ratification proposal on that occasion. It also showed that the principal source of abstention was a sense of lack of knowledge and understanding of the issues.
7. The study of the second Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty showed a marked improvement in communication and a substantial increase in people's sense that they could understand the issues at stake. The improvements in communication were concentrated in the mass media (television, radio and newspapers) and in interpersonal discussion of the issues. On the other hand, the evidence also showed that the communication process had its limits and that there was very little spillover from an understanding of the issues raised by the Treaty of Nice to a more general understanding of the institutions of the Union and how they work.

Trends in attitudes to European integration and the European Union

8. Eurobarometer 59 shows the third successive fall in Irish support for European integration as measured by the standard EB membership indicator. Approval of Ireland's membership of the European Union has fallen from 83 per cent in autumn

2001 to 67 per cent in spring 2003. The benefits indicator (believe that Ireland has benefited from membership of the EU) has fallen from 90 per cent to 77 per cent over the same period. Cumulatively, these are substantial changes and suggest a significant alteration in the overall orientation of Irish people to European integration.

9. The extent of the alteration in Irish attitudes can be seen by comparing the gap that existed between Irish and average European support for membership of the European Union in autumn 2001 with the gap that now exists. In autumn 2001 the gap was 27 percentage points; in spring 2003 it was 13 percentage points. The change in the basic indicators between autumn 2002 and spring 2003 is confirmed by a variety of other indicators of attitudes to the European Union, including people's image of the European Union (which went from 69 per cent positive in autumn 2002 to 50 per cent positive in spring 2003) and people's trust in a wide range of European institutions.
10. Previous reports in this series have emphasised the importance of the public's knowledge of the European Union. Eurobarometer 59 indicates that the subjective sense of knowing little or nothing about the European Union has increased significantly in all but three member states between autumn 2002 and spring 2003. In the Irish case the increase is of the order of five percentage points; this change places Ireland among the four countries with the most widespread sense of lack of knowledge of the European Union and its policies.

Attitudes to enlargement

11. Irish attitudes to enlargement have been extensively dealt with in previous reports in this series and, accordingly, need not receive detailed treatment in this report. However, it should be noted that EB 59 indicates some slippage in support for enlargement between autumn 2002 and spring 2003 (a decline from 67 per cent in favour to 60 per cent in favour). Opposition to enlargement has grown by four percentage points over the same period and there was a marginal increase in the percentage giving a don't know response. The changes just noted still leave Irish support for enlargement of the European Union significantly ahead of support in the European Union as a whole.

Perceptions of and attitudes to the Convention on the future of the EU

12. As of spring 2003 less than one-third of European citizens had heard of the Convention on the future of the European Union. And only half that number again (one sixth of the citizens) assented to the view that "we are hearing a lot about the Convention at the moment". Irish citizens score a bit above average in terms of basic awareness of the Convention (39 per cent having heard of it). Given the publicity surrounding the finalisation of the Convention's report and its presentation to the EU summit in June 2003, one would expect that people's awareness of the Convention will have substantially improved between spring 2003 and early summer or 2003. Assuming that this is so, the challenge will be to ensure that the improved level of awareness is maintained and that it is accompanied by a full understanding of the Convention's proposals as they make their way through the process of treaty revision and ratification.
13. In any event, as of March-April 2003 only two in every five European and Irish citizens were aware that national governments were represented in the Convention. Slightly under 40 per cent (both in the European Union as a whole and in Ireland) knew that the Convention was working on proposals to reform the EU. On other aspects of the Convention, the Irish level of knowledge tended to be somewhat better than the levels of knowledge among European citizens as a whole. But, while it may have been better, it was not particularly good - only one quarter or thereabouts of Irish citizens say that it is true that citizens will have an opportunity to accept or reject the Convention's proposals, or that it is true that the EU member states will be

allowed to modify the convention's final proposals or that the governments of the accession states are represented in the Convention.

14. EB59 evidence suggests that, again as of spring 2003, the Convention or, more precisely, the member states that back the Convention's proposals had a long way to go to persuade the publics of the existing member states of the merits of some of the Convention's key proposals.

- ***Number of Commissioners***

Obviously, since fieldwork for this survey was carried out in March-April and since the Convention's proposal in relation to be make-up of the Commission only became clear at a much later stage, the question asked in Eurobarometer 59 did not and could not have addressed the precise details of the proposal in the Convention's final report. Nonetheless, it is quite clear from the data in Eurobarometer 59 that there is majority support for the principle of one Commissioner per member state and one can only assume that this support is for a one full Commissioner per member state, i.e. one Commissioner with full voting rights. There is a significant large-state versus small-state polarisation underlying views on this issue. Thus, support for the proposition that the country's interests would suffer if there were no Commissioner from that country is in excess of 80 per cent in Denmark, Greece, Sweden and Ireland and close to 80 per cent in Finland and Luxembourg. By contrast, support for this proposition falls to a range of 66 to 71 per cent in Italy, the UK and Germany and to 58 and 54 per cent in Spain and France respectively.

- ***The President of the Commission***

Public opinion is also somewhat out of sympathy with the design produced by the Convention in regard to the selection of the President of the Commission. One-third of EU citizens believe that the President of the European Commission should be directly elected by the citizens of Europe, while a further 18 per cent say that the President of the European Commission should be "solely elected" by the European Parliament. Thus 51 per cent support the notion the President of the Commission having a broad direct or indirect democratic mandate. Support for one or other of these two democratic alternatives is most widespread in Luxembourg, Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands and least common in Finland, the UK, Portugal and Ireland. Irish public opinion falls into the less democratic/integrationist camp not in virtue of its support for some other alternative but rather in virtue of the large proportion of don't knows on the issue, in this case amounting to almost one in four.

- ***Preservation of the right of veto***

A plurality, amounting almost to a majority, of European citizens is in favour of the retention of the status quo in regard to national vetoes. Fifty per cent of Irish respondents feel that a right of veto should be retained in order to preserve essential national interests and 47 per cent of respondents throughout the EU 15 feel likewise. The attachment of the public to some form of national veto is even more apparent if we add in the proportion of respondents who feel that the right of veto should be maintained but should only apply to "a very few essential areas".

- ***Rotation of the Council Presidency***

The Convention's proposals regarding change in the six-monthly rotation of the presidency of the European Council may well encounter greater public support. In the EU as a whole less than one-third of respondents support retention of the present system, whereas 50 per cent support the idea of extending the period. Ireland is among the country's that are least supportive

of the retention of the present system though, once again, this position is in part a function of the large proportion of don't know responses in Ireland (in this case amounting to 29 per cent).

Attitudes to the European Parliament and to the 2004 elections

15. Inevitably, the European Parliament (and the European Union) rank quite low on a scale of the perceived impact of institutions of governance. Whereas over 50 per cent of people see national governments as having a great effect, only 21 per cent take the same view regarding the impact of the European Parliament. On aggregate, the perceptions of the impact of the Parliament are somewhat more widespread in Ireland than in the Union as a whole. The extent of perception of the Parliament as having a great effect on people's lives is mirrored in the proportion of people who regard European Parliament elections as really important (Irish and European responses in this regard are almost identical).
16. However, Irish views on the proposition that "the members of the European Parliament are good at protecting your interests" are substantially more favourable in their assessment of MEPs than are responses in the Union as a whole - 50 per cent of Irish respondents agree with the proposition compared to 35 per cent of respondents in the Union as a whole.
17. Ireland is, however, only slightly above average when it comes to the visibility of MEPs. Fifty-seven per cent of Irish people report having had some sight of or contact with MEPs (including simply hearing about or seeing MEPs in the media) since the last election. The corresponding figure for the European Union as a whole is 53 per cent whereas it is 76 per cent in Denmark and 67 per cent in Finland.
18. Ireland fares slightly better in terms of a ranking of overall contact between MEPs and the public when account is taken of all varieties of contact and, therefore of the possibility of multiple contacts on the part of some individuals. Looked at in this way, Ireland ranks fifth in terms of contact between MEPs and the citizens but this ranking leaves it significantly below Sweden and Finland and substantially below Denmark and Luxembourg. The proportions of people having multiple contacts with MEPs are particularly low in Portugal, Britain, Italy, East Germany and Greece. One of the factors that differentiates Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden and Finland from the rest of the EU, including Ireland, is the higher rate of exposure to the activities of MEPs through reports in newspapers and magazines.
19. Bearing in mind the fact that, at the time of interviewing the elections were more than a year away, it is not surprising that a strong commitment to voting is quite low. However, what is somewhat more puzzling is that a strong commitment to participation in European Parliament elections declined between autumn 2002 and spring 2003. This decline becomes more understandable when account is taken of the evidence, also from Eurobarometer 59, that propensity to vote in a hypothetical national election declined during the same period by an almost identical margin. In short, the indications of any increased problems with propensity to vote in the European Parliament election of 2004 would seem to be attributable to domestic rather than European factors.
20. In assessing this evidence it must also be borne in mind that the European Parliament election of 2004 in Ireland will coincide with local elections and that the level of turnout in the European Parliament election is likely to be boosted at least to some extent by this concurrence. However, this does not dispense with the importance of encouraging people to vote in European Parliament election as such as, without such interest and such commitment, the value of participation as a factor in developing a relationship between the people and the European institutions would be greatly diminished.

21. Finally in regard to the European Parliament, EB 59 provides some evidence of the kinds of factors that will affect the level of participation in European Parliament elections in 2004. This evidence confirms the value of the distinction between circumstantial and voluntary abstention and the related distinction between facilitating turnout and mobilising turnout. It suggests furthermore that the problem of circumstantial abstention is greater in Ireland than in the European Union as a whole and, hence, that there is a particular need for improvements in the facilitation of voting in the Irish case. In regard to the mobilisation of political participation, the data confirm the obvious point that the concurrence of other elections helps to mobilise participation as does the feeling of participating simultaneously in Europe-wide elections. The evidence suggests that the potential boost to turnout that might be brought about by the inclusion of citizens from other member states as candidates in the election is likely to be marginal.

The Iraq War and attitudes to the United States and to a European CFSP

22. One would anticipate that developments in the Middle East and, in particular, the onset of war in Iraq would have had an effect on European's evaluations of the role of the United States in the international system and that there might have been some carryover into attitudes to the need for a European common foreign and security policy.
23. On the issue of the role of the US in relation to peace in the world, only two European countries show a positive net evaluation (United Kingdom at plus 14 percentage points and Denmark at plus seven percentage points). Irish public opinion on this issue is the next most favourable (or next least unfavourable) - at a net evaluation of minus 5 percentage points. Beyond that one can identify three groups of countries defined by three levels of net negative evaluation of the role of the US in relation to peace in the world ranging from minus 14 percentage points in the Netherlands to minus 87 in Greece.
24. The picture regarding net evaluations of the role of the United States in relation to the fight against terrorism is quite different. Only four countries make a net negative evaluation of the United States in this regard - Austria at minus 14 points, Spain at minus 19, France at minus 18 and Greece at minus 70. In the remainder of the member states the net positive evaluation ranges from 51 per cent in the case of the United Kingdom to 5 per cent in the case of Portugal.
25. Between autumn 2002 and spring 2003, substantial changes in the net evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world occurred in a majority of the member states and the vast bulk of the change that occurred was in a negative direction. In the case of the peace in the world item, Irish public opinion moved from a net positive evaluation of plus 4 percentage points in autumn 2002 to a net negative evaluation of minus 5 percentage points in spring 2003. On the question of the fight against terrorism the size of the movement of Irish public opinion was somewhat greater (down 14 percentage points).
26. Eurobarometers 58 and 59 also allow us to track changes in the mood of Irish and European citizens in relation to a range of fears they might have regarding the international or global situation. The list of potential objects of fear ranged from an accident in a nuclear power station to a world war and included such things as organised crime, international terrorism, epidemics and ethnic conflicts. Irish fears about developments in the international system diminished significantly between autumn 2002 and spring 2003 and, with one notable exceptional area (anything having to do with nuclear issues), tend to be significantly lower in frequency than comparable fears among European citizens as a whole.
27. There is some evidence of increased support in the majority of member states for defence decisions being made by the European Union. Several states show marked

increases, including France (up eight percentage points), Belgium (up seven percentage points) and Finland (up 11 percentage points). Support for European Union decision-making declined significantly in just one state (Austria). Ireland together with Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg showed no change.

28. Detailed analysis of a battery of questions dealing with CFSP issues that were introduced for the first time in EB59 identifies three dimensions underlying such attitudes. The first dimension is that of support for or opposition to a comprehensive common foreign and security policy that would include a rapid military reaction force, an EU foreign minister, an EU common position in international crises, common asylum and immigration policies and a seat for the EU on the UN Security Council. The second dimension involves attitudes to an independent and ethical foreign policy (guaranteeing or working for human-rights in the context of an EU foreign policy independent of US foreign policy). The third and final factor or dimension measures people's attitudes to participation in the formulation of EU foreign policy, i.e. whether the policy-making process should include the neutral states and current accession countries.
29. Member states are divided fairly neatly into three groups in terms of their support for a comprehensive common foreign and security policy. The advanced group, i.e. those most in favour of a comprehensive common foreign and security policy, includes Greece, Italy, France and the Benelux countries. The middle group on this dimension is made up of Germany, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Britain and Ireland, Ireland being smack in the middle of this middle group. The group of member-states opposed to a comprehensive European foreign and security policy comprises the Scandinavian states, with Finland Denmark and Sweden clearly opposed to a comprehensive EU foreign and security policy.
30. The distribution of member states on the independent and ethical foreign policy dimension takes the form of a continuum rather than of discrete groups of countries with clearly different views. However, the ends of the continuum are clearly identifiable - support for an independent and ethical foreign policy is most widespread in the Scandinavian countries, in Greece and in former East Germany whereas strongest opposition to this view is found in Britain and, to a lesser extent, in Portugal. Ireland is in the middle of this dimension, leaning very slightly towards the opposition pole. On the dimension measuring attitudes to participation in the formulation of foreign policy there is a very clear polarisation between, on the one hand, Ireland, followed closely by Austria and Portugal and, on the other hand, Denmark and the Netherlands. The countries in the former group are highly supportive of wide participation while Denmark and the Netherlands are strongly opposed.

Summary and conclusion

31. The main points to emerge from this analysis of the evidence in Eurobarometer 59 can be summarised as follows:
 - Eurobarometer 59 has registered a third successive fall in Irish support for European integration. Despite this, Irish support for integration remains significantly ahead of support in the European Union as a whole.
 - Irish people's confidence in their knowledge and understanding of the EU continues to be problem, Ireland being the country with the fourth largest proportion of people declaring very low levels of knowledge and with exceptionally high levels of don't know responses on specific policy issues.
 - There is a lot of work to be done to inform the public about the process of producing a constitution for the Union and to persuade the public of the merits of some of the European Convention's key proposals.

- With European Parliament elections just around the corner, Irish people are substantially more positive in their assessment of their MEPs than are people in the Union as a whole. Ireland is, however, only somewhat above average when it comes to the visibility of MEPs.
- Indications in EB59 of some decline in the propensity to vote in European Parliament elections would seem to be attributable to domestic rather than European factors. The survey also provides evidence on the potential impact of voter facilitation and voter mobilisation efforts on turnout in EP elections.
- Only two member states show a positive net evaluation of the role of the US in relation to peace in the world (United Kingdom at plus 14 percentage points and Denmark at plus seven percentage points). Ireland, which had been among the minority of member states with a positive evaluation of the US in this regard moved from a net positive evaluation of plus 4 in autumn 2002 to minus 5 in spring 2003. The majority of member states showed much more substantial movement in a negative direction.
- Over this same period, there is some evidence of increased support in the majority of member states for defence decisions being made by the European Union. Ireland, together with Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg, showed no change.
- Member states can be divided into 3 groups in terms of public support for a comprehensive common foreign and security policy. The advanced group includes Greece, Italy, France and the Benelux countries. The middle group is made up of Germany, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Britain and Ireland, Ireland being smack in the middle of this middle group. The group of states opposed to a comprehensive CFSP comprises Finland, Denmark and Sweden.
- Ireland also takes a more or less middle position on the dimension of attitudes to an independent and ethical foreign policy but takes a very strong and distinctive stand on a dimension measuring attitudes to participation by neutral countries and accession countries in the formulation of European foreign policy, with a clear polarisation on this issue between Irish public opinion, which is in favour of such participation and public opinion in Denmark and the Netherlands, which is against.
- In sum, with European elites facing into a year of intensive activity (final negotiations on constitutional issues, EU enlargement, the June 2004 elections, global trade negotiations, the rehabilitation of the trans-Atlantic relationship and, for Irish European elites, the EU presidency in the first half of 2004), Eurobarometer 59 provides a timely reminder of the need to bridge the elite-mass gap in regard to these issues both in Ireland and in other member states and gives a telling indication of the gains in terms of the legitimacy of European integration that would ensue if this were successfully done.