

euro-barometre

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

EURO-BAROMETER No 6

Initial results

No. 6 JANUARY 1977

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
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INTRODUCTION

Euro-Barometer No 6 was conducted in November 1976, a few weeks after the decision on direct elections to the European Parliament; the results were published in January of this year, shortly after the new Commission took office and a few weeks before the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Rome Treaties. The timing makes this opinion poll a particularly interesting one, providing what might be termed a "State of the Union" report.

As with earlier polls in the series - the first dates back to September 1973 - some 9 200 people representing a cross-section of the population aged 15 and over in all nine countries were questioned¹.

Answers given by the "general public" are presented separately from those given by "opinion leaders", following the practice introduced with Euro-Barometer No. 5. There is one new feature : a special set of questions was put to "opinion leaders" only. (The term is used here to describe interviewees (approximately 15% with (a) a tendency to discuss politics frequently and (b) a capacity to convince others of

¹Technical details (list of institutes which conducted the survey, date of interviews in each country, size of national samples, extent to which the findings can be interpreted and so on) are given in the Annex.

a strongly held opinion).²

Only some of the findings are discussed in this report. Other questions were asked and the replies to these will be published at a future date. All results will be analysed in the weeks ahead : replies will be broken down by sex, age, size of home town or village, level of education, income bracket, and so on; different sets of replies will be combined and subjected to multivariate analysis; aggregates for successive polls will be worked out, and so on. Once the results published, all data will be freely available for use in research work.³

Last but not least, readers' criticisms and/or suggestions are welcomed. It is obvious that the mechanics of opinion polls must be left to the experts. But each and every citizen of the Community can contribute when it comes to discussing the results and preparing the ground for future polls.

²The following table shows how the leadership index was produced.

| Discuss political matters | Persuade others | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------|-------|------------|
| | often | from time to time | rarely | never | don't know |
| frequently | ++ | ++ | + | + | + |
| occasionally | + | + | - | - | - |
| never | - | - | -- | -- | -- |
| don't know | - | - | -- | -- | -- |

Distribution of the population interviewed by leadership rating is as follows :

| | | Aggregate of polls May and Oct. /Nov. 1975 | | Euro-Barometer No 5 May 1976 | | Euro-Barometer No 6 Nov. 1976 | |
|--------------|----|---|---------------|---------------------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|
| | | % | Number (N) | % | Number (N) | % | Number (N) |
| Leaders | ++ | 13 | 2427 | 14 | 1241 | 14 | 1261 |
| | + | 29 | 5446 | 31 | 2637 | 28 | 2566 |
| | - | 31 | 5892 | 31 | 2660 | 31 | 2899 |
| Non-leaders | -- | 27 | 4995 | 24 | 2018 | 27 | 2484 |
| <u>Total</u> | | <u>100</u> | <u>18,760</u> | <u>100</u> | <u>8556</u> | <u>100</u> | <u>9210</u> |

³See Annex.

I

INTEREST IN COMMUNITY PROBLEMS

1. It is not enough to monitor public attitudes towards the European Community; public interest in Community problems is an important indicator too. For this reason a question first asked in September 1973 has re-appeared on a number of occasions and was asked again in November 1976.

"Are you personally very interested, a little interested, or not at all interested in the problems of the European Community (the Common Market)?"

This was asked as a follow-up to another question so that replies to both could be compared :

"Generally speaking, are you interested or not interested in the major political problems of other countries?"

A third question on the frequency of political discussions on subjects connected with the Community followed :

"Do you ever find yourself discussing the Common Market among your family or friends?"

Interest in Community problems has remained remarkably stable from survey to survey : on average slightly more than two in every ten interviewed said that they were "very interested", five in ten were "a little interested", while three in ten were "not at all interested" or gave no reply.

Reactions varied very little from country to country except in the United Kingdom, where interest has been above the Community average ever since the political campaign leading up to the 1975 referendum, and Belgium where it is well below average; almost three times as many Britons as Belgians claimed to be "very interested" in the problems of the "Common Market". (See Table 1).

Generally speaking, considerably more interest was shown by men than by women, and by interviewers in a high income bracket, with a high level of education and a high leadership rating. (See Table 2).

Those "very interested" in Community problems also turned out to be interested in the major political problems of other countries and tended to discuss the "Common Market" with their family and friends. But for every two interviewers who were

"very interested" in Community problems only one discussed them "often", its interest was passive rather than active (See Table 3).

Table 1

PERSONAL INTEREST IN COMMUNITY PROBLEMS

BY COUNTRY¹

| | Interested | | | Don't know | Total |
|----------------|------------|----------|------------|------------|-------|
| | Very | A little | Not at all | | |
| United Kingdom | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 (2) | 23% | 43% | 31% | 3% | 100% |
| May 1975 | 35 | 42 | 19 | 4 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 28 | 45 | 25 | 2 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 28 | 48 | 23 | 1 | 100 |
| Danmark | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 29 | 51 | 19 | 1 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 22 | 50 | 24 | 4 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 19 | 51 | 28 | 2 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 25 | 53 | 20 | 2 | 100 |
| Deutschland | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 31 | 48 | 16 | 5 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 26 | 48 | 22 | 4 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 23 | 51 | 23 | 3 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 23 | 50 | 24 | 3 | 100 |
| Luxembourg | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 26 | 54 | 18 | 2 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 33 | 45 | 16 | 6 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 28 | 55 | 13 | 4 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 22 | 50 | 24 | 4 | 100 |
| Italia | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 21 | 44 | 29 | 6 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 24 | 46 | 27 | 3 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 27 | 46 | 22 | 5 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 21 | 48 | 29 | 2 | 100 |
| Ireland | | | | | |
| Sept. 1975 | 27 | 44 | 29 | . | 100 |
| May 1975 | 24 | 48 | 27 | 1 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 28 | 46 | 25 | 1 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 21 | 48 | 30 | 1 | 100 |

Table 1 (Contd)

| | Interested | | | Don't know | Total |
|-----------------|------------|----------|------------|------------|-------|
| | Very | A little | Not at all | | |
| Nederland | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 23 | 47 | 27 | 3 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 16 | 45 | 31 | 8 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 18 | 47 | 27 | 8 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 20 | 57 | 21 | 2 | 100 |
| France | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 20 | 45 | 33 | 2 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 27 | 53 | 19 | 1 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 23 | 54 | 22 | 1 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 18 | 57 | 24 | 1 | 100 |
| Belgique/België | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 10 | 39 | 46 | 5 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 9 | 39 | 47 | 5 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 10 | 38 | 49 | 3 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 10 | 46 | 41 | 3 | 100 |
| COMMUNITY | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 24 | 45 | 27 | 4 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 26 | 47 | 23 | 4 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 24 | 49 | 24 | 3 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 22 | 51 | 25 | 2 | 100 |

¹Countries listed by relative frequency "very interested" replies in November 1976.

²Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.

³Average for the Nine weighted by the population aged 15 and over in each country.

Table 2
PERSONAL INTEREST IN COMMUNITY PROBLEMS RELATED
TO SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA
(Community as a whole)

| | Base (1) | Overall | Sex | | Age by sex : Men | | | | Age by sex : Women | | | |
|--------------|-------------|---------|------|------|------------------|-------|-------|------|--------------------|-------|-------|------|
| | | | H | F | 15-24 | 25-39 | 40-54 | 55 | 15-24 | 25-39 | 40-54 | 55 |
| | | | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Interested : | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Very | 2027 | 22 | 129 | 15 | 20 | 31 | 32 | 29 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 14 |
| A little | 4693 | 51 | 50 | 51 | 55 | 53 | 48 | 46 | 60 | 58 | 50 | 41 |
| Not at all | 2355 | 25 | 20 | 31 | 22 | 16 | 20 | 23 | 24 | 24 | 31 | 41 |
| Don't know | 188 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | . | . | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Total | 9263 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Base | | 9263 | 4467 | 4728 | 786 | 1336 | 1098 | 1247 | 859 | 1325 | 1136 | 1408 |

¹ Average for the Nine weighted by respective populations. The actual number interviewed was 9 210.

Table 2 (contd)

| | Base | Home | | | Level of education ¹ | | | Family income ² | | | | Leadership rating ³ | | | |
|--------------|------|---------|------------|------------|---------------------------------|---------|----------|----------------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|--------------------------------|-------------|--------------|------|
| | | Village | Small town | Large town | Elementary | Average | Advanced | Modest | Below average | Above average | Well off | Non-leaders (-) | Leaders (+) | Leaders (++) | |
| Interested : | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| | 2027 | 21 | 23 | 22 | 16 | 24 | 34 | 17 | 17 | 22 | 30 | 6 | 17 | 29 | 48 |
| | 4693 | 51 | 50 | 51 | 47 | 55 | 55 | 44 | 52 | 52 | 53 | 38 | 58 | 58 | 41 |
| | 2355 | 26 | 25 | 25 | 34 | 20 | 11 | 35 | 29 | 24 | 16 | 52 | 23 | 12 | 11 |
| | 188 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1 | . |
| Total | 9263 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Base | 9263 | 3169 | 3628 | 2440 | 4919 | 2669 | 1676 | 1540 | 1810 | 2219 | 2275 | 2404 | 2977 | 2527 | 1356 |

¹Based on length of full-time education : under 16, 16 to 19, 20 and over (or still studying).

²Based on interviewees' statements; 15% refused to indicate an income bracket. Valid replies have been roughly distributed in quartiles.

³Based on tendency to discuss politics and ability to convince others of a strongly held opinion.

Table 3

PERSONAL INTEREST IN COMMUNITY PROBLEMS RELATED TO TWO
INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT
(Community as a whole)

| | | Interested in the major political problems of other countries | | | | | Total |
|------------------------------------|--|---|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|-------------|
| | | Very in terested | Rather inter-ested | Not very inter-ested | Not at all in teres- ted | Don't know no reply | |
| Interested in Community problems : | | | | | | | |
| - Very | | <u>32%</u> | <u>47%</u> | 13% | 8% | . | 100% (2027) |
| - A little | | 5 | 39 | 37 | 18 | 1 | 100% (4693) |
| - Not at all | | 1 | 7 | 33 | <u>57</u> | 2 | 100% (2355) |
| - Don't know | | 1 | 9 | 26 | 37 | 27 | 100% (188) |
| Total (Base) | | 10 (927) | 32 (2931) | 31 (2858) | 26 (2404) | 1 (143) | 100% (9263) |

| | | Discuss Community problems with family or friends | | | | Total |
|------------------------------------|--|---|---------------|------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| | | Often | Occasio nally | Rarely of prac tically never | Don't know | |
| Interested in Community problems : | | | | | | |
| - Very | | <u>32%</u> | <u>49%</u> | 18% | 1% | 100% (2027) |
| - A little | | 6 | 43 | 50 | 1 | 100% (4693) |
| - Not at all | | 3 | 10 | <u>85</u> | 2 | 100% (2355) |
| - Don't know | | 2 | 10 | 73 | 15 | 100% (188) |
| Total (Base) | | 11 (1018) | 36 (3300) | 52 (4812) | 1 (133) | 100% (9263) |

2. A further question related specifically to the "future image" of the Community :

"In your opinion, is the way the Common Market (the European Community) is developing very important, quite important, not very important or not important at all for the future of your children or the children of people close to you?"

This question was inspired by surveys which had revealed the importance of the argument "the future for British children" in shaping favourable attitudes towards Community membership during the campaign up to the June 1975 referendum¹.

The findings on that occasion have in fact been borne out in all member countries where three-quarters (74%) of those interviewed felt that the Community was "very important" (40%) or "quite important" (34%) for their children's future. This view was most widely held in the United Kingdom itself (80%)

Table 4
IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMUNITY
FOR CHILDREN'S FUTURE
BY COUNTRY²

| | Very impor- tant | Quite impor- tant | Not very impor- tant | Not at all im- portant | Don't know | Total |
|-----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------|-------|
| United Kingdom | 55% | 25% | 10% | 5% | 5% | 100% |
| Nederland | 43 | 34 | 7 | 5 | 11 | 100 |
| Italia | 41 | 35 | 8 | 4 | 12 | 100 |
| Ireland | 49 | 28 | 13 | 5 | 5 | 100 |
| France | 34 | 37 | 12 | 5 | 12 | 100 |
| Belgique/België | 34 | 36 | 8 | 3 | 19 | 100 |
| Deutschland | 32 | 39 | 15 | 4 | 10 | 100 |
| Luxembourg | 37 | 33 | 12 | 5 | 13 | 100 |
| Danmark | 39 | 30 | 14 | 6 | 11 | 100 |
| COMMUNITY | 40 | 34 | 12 | 4 | 10 | 100 |

¹ See Gallup Poll quoted by David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger in The 1975 Referendum (Macmillan, London, 1976) p. 253.

² Countries listed by relative frequency of favourable replies ("very important" and "quite important").

³ Weighted average.

Opinion leaders in all countries considered that the Community was of much more importance for their children's future than did the general public; this was particularly true of Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Table 5

IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMUNITY FOR CHILDREN'S FUTURE

BY LEADERSHIP RATING

| | B | DK | D | F | IRL | 1 | L | N | UK | CE/EC |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| | | | | | | | 1 | | | 2 |
| <u>Very important</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-leaders (--) | 23% | 13% | 14% | 16% | 31% | 23% | 44% | 25% | 34% | 22% |
| (-) | 33 | 41 | 26 | 34 | 57 | 40 | 28 | 39 | 54 | 38 |
| (+) | 43 | 49 | 41 | 43 | 62 | 51 | 27 | 48 | 64 | 49 |
| Leaders (++) | 49 | 61 | 59 | 50 | 63 | 57 | 52 | 58 | 77 | 53 |
| Difference between leaders and non-leaders | 26 | 48 | 45 | 34 | 32 | 34 | 8 | 23 | 43 | 31 |

¹Results for Luxembourg should be treated with caution given the size of the sample.

²Weighted average.

II

ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Several questions were asked in an attempt to arrive at a reliable assessment of attitudes towards the European Community. It is after all a complex phenomenon, today's "Common Market" foreshadowing tomorrow's "ever closer union among the people of Europe" (see the preamble to the EEC Treaty).

1. IF WE COULD START ALL OVER AGAIN

"If there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of (this country's) membership of the Common Market (the European Community), would you personally vote for or against membership?"

Despite the relative lack of interest in Community problems the answer to this first question was favourable : if they could start all over again, 65% of those interviewed would vote for membership of the European Community; only the Danes would vote against (52%). (See Table 6).

And since the normal practice in a referendum is to calculate the "fors" and the "against" as a percentage of vote cast, it is fact to say that in this opinion poll, those in favour of the Community outnumbered those against by an overwhelming majority - 78% to 22%. A breakdown by country as this basis is given below.

| | <u>For</u> | <u>Against</u> |
|----------------|------------|----------------|
| Belgium | 91% | 9% |
| Italy | 90% | 10 |
| Luxembourg | 89% | 11 |
| Netherlands | 89% | 11 |
| Germany | 89% | 11 |
| France | 85% | 15 |
| Ireland | 63% | 37 |
| United Kingdom | 50.4% | 49.6 |

However, Denmark would give quite a different picture with 61% against.

It is worth noting that the percentage in favour of membership is distingly lower than in the 1972 and 1975 referendums when the figures for Ireland were 83% for and 17% against for Denmark 63.5% for and 36.5% against and for the United Kingdom 67% for and 33% against. Allowances must, however, be made for the fact that an opinion poll, held in a vacuum as it were gives very different results to a referendum. None the less, it would seem that the Community's difficulties have produced a downturn in support from the electorate in all three countries.

This can in fact be checked against replies to a problem question put to interviewers in the three countries in November 1976 : "There was a referendum here (in 1972 or 1975) in which we had to vote for or against the entry of (your country) into the Common Market. Can you tell me if you voted for entry, against entry, don't remember or didn't vote?"

1. In Ireland 73% of those who voted for membership in 1972 would do so again in 1976, 20% would vote against and 7% "didn't know"

86% of those who voted against membership would do so again in 1976, 11% would vote for.

Of those who did not vote in 1972, 43% would vote for and 36% against in 1976.

In Ireland, therefore, the switch from actual "Yes" votes in 1972 to hypothetical "No" votes in 1976 is only slightly offset by the winning-round of a small percentage of those previously opposed to membership.

2. The pattern is more or less the same in the United Kingdom: 79% of those who voted in favour of membership in the 1975 referendum had not changed their views; this was echoed by 90% of those who voted against.

3. The pattern is more alarming in Denmark where only 61% of those who voted "Yes" in 1972 claimed that they would do so again, while 90% of those who voted "No" remained unconverted.

(See Table 7).

Table 6

VOTING PATTERN IF A REFERENDUM
ON COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP WERE HELD TOMORROW
BY COUNTRY¹

| | For | Against | Don't know | Total |
|------------------------|-----|---------|------------|-------|
| Nederland | 77% | 10% | 13% | 100% |
| Italia | 76 | 9 | 15 | 100 |
| Luxembourg | 75 | 9 | 16 | 100 |
| Belgique/België | 71 | 7 | 22 | 100 |
| Deutschland | 70 | 9 | 21 | 100 |
| France | 68 | 12 | 20 | 100 |
| Ireland | 55 | 33 | 12 | 100 |
| United Kingdom | 45 | 44 | 11 | 100 |
| Danmark | 33 | 52 | 15 | 100 |
| COMMUNITY ² | 65 | 18 | 17 | 100 |

¹ Countries listed by relative frequency of "for" votes.

² Weighted average.

Table 7

CHANGE IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE COMMUNITY
IN IRELAND, DENMARK AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
SINCE THE REFERENDUM ON MEMBERSHIP

| | Today's votes | | | Total | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|---------|------------|-------|-------|
| | For | Against | Don't know | | |
| Referendum votes: | | | | | |
| <u>Ireland (1972)</u> | | | | | |
| - for | 73% | 20% | 7% | 100% | (517) |
| - against | 11 | 86 | 3 | 100% | (121) |
| - didn't vote | 43 | 36 | 21 | 100% | (277) |
| - don't remember or don't wish to say | 44 | 26 | 30 | 100% | (66) |
| <u>Danmark (1972)</u> | | | | | |
| - for | 61% | 23% | 16% | 100% | (443) |
| - against | 4 | 90 | 6 | 100% | (345) |
| - didn't vote | 21 | 51 | 28 | 100% | (139) |
| - don't remember or don't wish to say | (14) | (37) | (49) | 100% | (35) |
| <u>United Kingdom (1975)</u> | | | | | |
| - for | 79% | 13% | 8% | 100% | (529) |
| - against | 7 | 90 | 3 | 100% | (364) |
| - didn't vote | 34 | 46 | 20 | 100% | (363) |
| - don't remember or don't wish to say | 31 | 42 | 27 | 100% | (95) |

2. A GOOD THING OR A BAD THING?

"Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the Common Market is a good thing or neither good nor bad?"

In May 1976, for the first time, there was a general drop in approval of the "Common Market"¹ As we thought at the time, the results were influenced by events and reflected what interviewers had heard or read in the weeks preceding opinion poll about "the crisis in Europe" and "the failure of the European Council" in early April. The number of people who think the the Community is a "good thing" has increased slightly since then but is still below the 1975 and 1974 averages.

(See Table 8)

¹See Euro-Barometer No 5, pages 22-25.

Table 8

THE COMMON MARKET: A GOOD THING OR A BAD THING

(Community as a whole: Change between 1973 and 1976)

| | | Good thing | Bad thing | Neither good nor bad | Don't know | Total |
|------|-----------|---------------|--------------|----------------------------|---------------|-------|
| 1973 | September | 56% | 11% | 20% | 13% | 100% |
| 1974 | May | 59 | 14 | 18 | 9 | 100 |
| | November | 60 | 14 | 18 | 8 | 100 |
| 1975 | May | 59 | 9 | 23 | 9 | 100 |
| | Oct./Nov. | 63 | 9 | 21 | 7 | 100 |
| 1976 | May | 53 | 14 | 24 | 9 | 100 |
| | November | 55 | 13 | 25 | 7 | 100 |

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium, in that order, are still the countries where the Community is most frequently considered to be a "good thing". Germany is slightly above the Community average once again, but France is now slightly below. There are no signs of an upward trend in either Ireland or the United Kingdom, both of which are still at the May 1976 level. There has been a further significant drop in approval in Denmark (-7 points).

The general impression is of a public still wavering in the face of a historical phenomenon; it is well-disposed in the whole (except in Denmark) but worried by current difficulties (inflation unemployment etc.,). An improvement in the situation would probably restore confidence. But a further deterioration, or the conviction that nothing concrete was being done to deal with these difficulties, could swell the ranks of the critics, who are still in the minority at present.

(See Table 9).

Table 9

THE COMMON MARKET: A GOOD THING OR A BAD THING

BY COUNTRY¹

| | Good thing | Bad thing | Neither good nor bad | Don't know | Total |
|-----------------|---------------|--------------|----------------------------|---------------|-------|
| Luxembourg | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 67% | 3% | 22% | 8% | 100% |
| May 1975 | 65 | 7 | 19 | 9 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 78 | 4 | 12 | 6 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 66 | 5 | 21 | 8 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 77 | 2 | 17 | 4 | 100 |
| Nederland | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 63 | 4 | 20 | 13 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 64 | 3 | 18 | 15 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 67 | 3 | 12 | 18 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 75 | 4 | 15 | 6 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 74 | 4 | 14 | 8 | 100 |
| Italia | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 69 | 2 | 15 | 14 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 71 | 3 | 21 | 5 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 75 | 4 | 16 | 5 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 63 | 6 | 20 | 11 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 68 | 5 | 16 | 11 | 100 |
| Belgique/België | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 57 | 5 | 19 | 19 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 57 | 3 | 21 | 19 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 59 | 3 | 21 | 17 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 62 | 5 | 17 | 16 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 66 | 3 | 3 | 12 | 100 |
| Deutschland | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 63 | 4 | 22 | 11 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 56 | 8 | 28 | 8 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 61 | 6 | 27 | 6 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 48 | 12 | 30 | 10 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 57 | 5 | 31 | 7 | 100 |
| France | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 61 | 5 | 22 | 12 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 64 | 4 | 25 | 7 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 67 | 4 | 24 | 5 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 57 | 7 | 30 | 6 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 52 | 7 | 35 | 6 | 100 |

Table 9 (contd)

| | Good thing | Bad thing | Neither good nor bad | Don't know | Total |
|-------------------------|------------|-----------|----------------------|------------|-------|
| Ireland | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 56% | 15% | 21% | 8% | 100% |
| May 1975 | 50 | 20 | 25 | 5 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 67 | 12 | 17 | 4 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 50 | 26 | 18 | 6 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 50 | 22 | 22 | 6 | 100 |
| United Kingdom | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 ² | 31 | 34 | 22 | 13 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 47 | 21 | 19 | 13 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 50 | 24 | 18 | 8 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 39 | 35 | 18 | 8 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 39 | 34 | 21 | 6 | 100 |
| Danmark | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 42 | 30 | 19 | 9 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 36 | 25 | 28 | 11 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 41 | 27 | 24 | 8 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 36 | 29 | 22 | 13 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 29 | 34 | 28 | 9 | 100 |
| <u>COMMUNITY 3</u> | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 56 | 11 | 20 | 13 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 59 | 9 | 23 | 9 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 63 | 9 | 21 | 7 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 53 | 14 | 24 | 9 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 55 | 13 | 25 | 7 | 100 |

¹ Countries listed by relative frequency of "a good thing" replies in November 1976.

² Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.

³ Weighted average.

Leaders and non-leaders

On average opinion leaders outnumbered non-leaders by a ratio of 3 : 2 in their belief that the Community is "a good thing". By contrast the frequency of "a bad thing" replies was not affected by leadership rating.

The views of non-leaders tend to be relatively stable, while the views of leaders seem to be more affected by current events; this is not surprising since they represent the section of the population which keeps abreast of current affairs, is interested in politics and hence in the short term at least, more aware of developments of the coverage given them by.

(See Table 10).

Table 10

THE COMMON MARKET: A GOOD THING OR A BAD THING BY LEADERSHIP RATING (Community as a whole)

| | | Good thing | Bad thing | Neither good nor bad | Don't know |
|--------------------------------|------|---------------|--------------|----------------------------|---------------|
| - <u>October-November 1975</u> | | | | | |
| non-leaders | (--) | 43% | 10% | 31% | 16% |
| | (-) | 62 | 9 | 22 | 7 |
| | (+) | 73 | 8 | 16 | 3 |
| leaders | (++) | 74 | 11 | 13 | 2 |
| - <u>May 1976</u> | | | | | |
| non-leaders | (--) | 37 | 15 | 29 | 19 |
| | (-) | 53 | 14 | 25 | 8 |
| | (+) | 59 | 13 | 22 | 6 |
| leaders | (++) | 63 | 17 | 17 | 3 |
| - <u>November 1976</u> | | | | | |
| non-leaders | (--) | 41 | 13 | 31 | 15 |
| | (-) | 53 | 12 | 28 | 7 |
| | (+) | 65 | 12 | 19 | 4 |
| leaders | (++) | 66 | 14 | 18 | 2 |

3. GOOD OR BAD
IN WHAT RESPECT?

"In a little more detail, can you tell me, in each of the following cases, whether the Common Market has had a good effect, a bad effect, or no effect at all on your job or profession (or that of your wife or husband), (your country's) economy, consumer prices (in your country), underdeveloped areas (in your country)?"

Although the public in eight of the nine countries was in favour of the "Common Market", opinion on the actual effects were rather divided:

1. Four in ten (40%) felt that the "Common Market" had had a "good effect" on their country's economy; almost three in ten (29%) thought the opposite and as many again had noticed no effect or "didn't know"

Favourable replies outnumbered unfavourable replies in each of the six original member countries the reverse being true of the three new member countries.

2. Slightly more than two in ten (22%) considered that the "Common Market" had had a "good effect" on the underdeveloped areas in their country; somewhat less (20%) disagreed, but almost six in ten (58%) expressed no opinion.

Favourable replies were clearly in the head in Luxembourg and Ireland, they also outnumbered unfavourable replies, though to a lesser extent, in five other countries. Unfavourable replies had a narrow majority in the United Kingdom and France.

3. Almost two in ten (17%) felt that the "Common Market" had had "good effect" on their job or profession or that of their wife or husband; 7% disagreed, while more than 75% expressed no opinion.

Thus the positive view prevailed but the vast majority had either noticed no effect or failed to reply.

4. On the final issue of consumer prices half of those interviewed (50%) considered that the "Common Market had had a "bad effect"; two in ten (22%) disagreed.

This negative opinion was most prevalent in the

United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, but was also found elsewhere the sole exceptions being Luxembourg and Belgium.

To sum up, the general public in the six original member countries tended to be predisposed (or prejudiced) in favour of the "Common Market", at least as far as the effects on their country's economy were concerned. Hesitation or doubt was the order of the day on the subject of underdeveloped areas. Effects, if any, on job and profession had passed more or less unnoticed. Opinions on prices were generally adverse, particularly in the three new member countries.

(See Table 11).

Table 11

EFFECTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE "COMMON MARKET"

BY COUNTRY

| | B | DK | D | F | IRL | I | L | N | UK | CE/EC ¹ |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|--------------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| <u>1. Your job or profession (or that of your wife or husband):</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| - good effect | 20 | 16 | 23 | 14 | 27 | 14 | 42 | 29 | 12 | 17 |
| - bad effect | 4 | 12 | 7 | 7 | 15 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 11 | 7 |
| - no effect at all | 53 | 56 | 57 | 64 | 52 | 69 | 34 | 53 | 67 | 63 |
| - don't know | 23 | 16 | 13 | 15 | 6 | 13 | 20 | 15 | 10 | 13 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| <u>2. Your country's economy</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| - good effect | 53 | 26 | 53 | 37 | 34 | 47 | 63 | 60 | 18 | 40 |
| - bad effect | 12 | 41 | 20 | 22 | 52 | 20 | 9 | 17 | 60 | 29 |
| - no effect at all | 10 | 10 | 13 | 16 | 5 | 11 | 11 | 6 | 9 | 12 |
| - don't know | 25 | 23 | 14 | 25 | 9 | 22 | 17 | 17 | 13 | 19 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| <u>3. Consumer prices:</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| - good effect | 32 | 12 | 28 | 23 | 10 | 25 | 42 | 31 | 8 | 22 |
| - bad effect | 32 | 56 | 48 | 37 | 80 | 38 | 31 | 48 | 81 | 50 |
| - no effect at all | 11 | 11 | 12 | 18 | 5 | 14 | 10 | 5 | 6 | 12 |
| - don't know | 25 | 21 | 12 | 22 | 5 | 23 | 17 | 16 | 5 | 16 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

¹ Weighted average.

Table 11 (contd)

| | B | DK | D | F | IRL | I | L | N | UK | CE/EC |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| 4. Underdeveloped areas | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| - good effect | 24 | 20 | 28 | 17 | 39 | 22 | 28 | 23 | 21 | 22 |
| - bad effect | 14 | 14 | 18 | 20 | 26 | 20 | 7 | 20 | 25 | 20 |
| - no effect at all | 21 | 19 | 29 | 30 | 16 | 24 | 24 | 25 | 30 | 28 |
| - don't know | 41 | 47 | 25 | 33 | 19 | 34 | 41 | 32 | 24 | 30 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Leaders and non-leaders

Generally speaking opinion leaders tended to attribute positive effects to the Common Market more frequently than non-leaders.

The difference between the two groups is most significant in the question related to the economy: 50% of leaders, as opposed to 27% of non-leaders, felt that the "Common Market" had had a "good effect"1.

(See Table 12)

The difference between leaders and non-leaders was less marked in the United Kingdom than elsewhere except on the question of underdeveloped areas. What this was in fact is that critical or dubious attitudes with regard to the effects of the "Common Market" are pretty widespread in Britain but that regional policy is an issue which preoccupies leaders more than non-leaders.

Table 12

EFFECTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE COMMON MARKET

BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole)

| | | | | |
|--|---|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| | Consider the Common Market has had a good effect: | | | |
| | On job or profession | On country's economy | On consumer prices | On underdeveloped areas |
| Non-leaders (--) | 10% | 27% | 16% | 15% |
| (-) | 16 | 40 | 21 | 20 |
| (+) | 22 | 48 | 26 | 29 |
| Leaders (++) | 23 | 50 | 26 | 30 |
| Difference between leaders and non-leaders | 13 | 23 | 10 | 15 |

Overall attitudes and
effects attributed to the Common Market

An attempt was made to establish a relationship between overall attitudes towards the European Community (Common Market) and the effects attributed to it.

An analysis of the findings shows that there is no strong correlation between attitudes towards the Community and awareness of the effects attributed to the Common Market. In other words overall attitudes - generally positive in most countries - would seem to be based on ideological beliefs rather than personal experience.

1. The positive overall attitude stems primarily from the conviction that the "Common Market" has had a good effect on the economy in general: 61 in every 100 who consider the Community to be a "good thing" also see it as having a good effect on their country's economy; conversely, 81 in every 100 who think that the Community is a "bad thing" see it as having a bad effect on their country's economy.
2. The negative overall attitude stems primarily from the conviction that the "Common Market" has had an adverse effect on consumer prices.
3. The effect on underdeveloped areas also seems to be an important factor in determining overall attitudes.
4. The effect, if any, on job or profession has passed more or less unnoticed, with the same very high percentage of "don't know" among both pro and anti-marketers.

Table 13 gives the results for the Community as a whole;
Table 14 shows, in simplified form, the results of the country
- by - country analysis.

Table 14 shows quite clearly that the link between a positive attitude towards the Community and awareness of a favourable effect on the economy is particularly strong in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Germany. In the United Kingdom and Ireland negative attitudes towards the Community are strongly influenced by the alleged effect of the Common Market on prices. The regional problem is of particular importance in Ireland (where it works for the Community) and in Italy and France (where it works against Community).

Table 13

EFFECTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE COMMON MARKET
RELATED TO OVERALL ATTITUDES
 (Community as a whole)

| | 1. Effect on job or profession | | | | Total |
|--|--------------------------------|--------|--------|------------|-------------|
| | Good | Bad | None | Don't know | |
| Overall attitude towards Common Market | | | | | |
| - good thing | 25% | 3% | 61% | 11% | 100% (5100) |
| - bad thing | 4 | 23 | 62 | 11 | 100% (1163) |
| - neither good nor bad | 8 | 7 | 73 | 12 | 100% (2316) |
| - don't know | 4 | 23 | 62 | 11 | 100% (684) |
| Total | 17 | 7 | 63 | 13 | 100% |
| (Base) | (1559) | (655) | (5815) | (1234) | (9263) |
| | 2. Effect on country's economy | | | | Total |
| | Good | Bad | None | Don't know | |
| Overall attitude towards Common Market | | | | | |
| - good thing | 61% | 15% | 9% | 15% | 100% (5100) |
| - bad thing | 5 | 81 | 8 | 6 | 100% (1163) |
| - neither good nor bad | 20 | 37 | 20 | 23 | 100% (2316) |
| - don't know | 14 | 21 | 10 | 55 | 100% (684) |
| Total | 40 | 29 | 12 | 19 | 100% |
| (Base) | (3732) | (2708) | (1107) | (1716) | (9263) |

Table 13 (contd)

| | 3. Effect on consumer prices | | | | Total |
|--|-----------------------------------|--------|--------|------------|-------------|
| | Good | Bad | None | Don't know | |
| Overall attitude towards Common Market | | | | | |
| - good thing | 34% | 39% | 12% | 15% | 100% (5100) |
| - bad thing | 2 | 90 | 4 | 4 | 100% (1163) |
| - neither good nor bad | 10 | 60 | 16 | 14 | 100% (2316) |
| - don't know | 9 | 32 | 10 | 49 | 100% (684) |
| Total | 22 | 50 | 12 | 16 | 100% (684) |
| (Base) | (2023) | (4667) | (1094) | (1479) | (9263) |
| | 4. Effect on underdeveloped areas | | | | Total |
| | Good | Bad | None | Don't know | |
| Overall attitude towards Common Market | | | | | |
| - good thing | 32% | 15% | 26% | 27% | 100% (5100) |
| - bad thing | 8 | 44 | 25 | 23 | 100% (1163) |
| - neither good nor bad | 13 | 22 | 35 | 30 | 100% (2316) |
| - Don't know | 8 | 11 | 16 | 65 | 100% (684) |
| Total | 22 | 20 | 28 | 30 | 100% |
| (Base) | (2081) | (1883) | (2551) | (2748) | (9263) |

Table 14

EFFECTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE COMMON MARKET

BY THOSE WITH POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE COMMUNITY

BY COUNTRY

| | Effects attribute to the "Common Market by those who saw it as a "good thing" or a "bad thing" | | | | | | | |
|--|--|-----|-----------------|-----|----------------------|-----|-------------------|-----|
| | Country's economy | | Consumer prices | | Underdeveloped areas | | Job or profession | |
| | Good | Bad | Good | Bad | Good | Bad | Good | Bad |
| Overall attitude towards the Community | | | | | | | | |
| LUXEMBOURG | | | | | | | | |
| Good thing (77%) | 73% | 6% | 49% | 26% | 34% | 5% | 49% | 2% |
| Bad thing (2%) | 14 | 29 | 14 | 43 | . | 43 | 14 | 29 |
| NEDERLAND | | | | | | | | |
| Good thing (74%) | 73 | 12 | 38 | 43 | 28 | 20 | 34 | 2 |
| Bad thing (4%) | 18 | 52 | 9 | 77 | 4 | 34 | 14 | 14 |
| ITALIA | | | | | | | | |
| Good thing (68%) | 61 | 13 | 34 | 32 | 30 | 15 | 19 | 3 |
| Bad thing (5%) | 3 | 72 | 2 | 78 | 2 | 59 | 2 | 17 |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIE | | | | | | | | |
| Good thing (66%) | 69 | 7 | 44 | 27 | 33 | 13 | 27 | 4 |
| Bad thing (3%) | 13 | 58 | 10 | 77 | 3 | 48 | . | 13 |

Table 14 (contd)

| | Country's economy | | Consumer prices | | Underdeveloped areas | | Job or profession | |
|---|-------------------|------------|-----------------|------------|----------------------|------------|-------------------|---------|
| | Good | Bad | Good | Bad | Good | Bad | Good | Bad |
| DEUTSCHLAND Good thing (57%) Bad thing (5%) | [72%] 17 | 11 70 | 42 2 | 40 89 | 40 9 | 16 51 | 32 4 | 4 26 |
| FRANCE Good thing (52%) Bad thing (7%) | 59 2 | 10 76 | 33 5 | 28 77 | 24 4 | 16 [57] | 22 1 | 3 34 |
| IRELAND Good thing (50%) Bad thing (22%) | 61 4 | 27 [89] | 18 . | 70 [97] | [57] 16 | 17 46 | 47 5 | 4 40 |
| UNITED KINGDOM Good thing (39%) Bad thing (34%) | 38 3 | 34 [87] | 16 1 | 65 [97] | 34 9 | 13 40 | 20 5 | 5 21 |
| DANMARK Good thing (29%) Bad thing (34%) | 66 4 | 12 75 | 32 3 | 27 84 | 38 11 | 3 28 | 39 4 | 2 24 |

1 Countries listed by relative frequency of "a good thing" replies in November 1976
 Figures in brackets indicate the percentage of all interviewees in each country answering
 "a good thing" or "a bad thing" as the case may be.

4. IF YOUR COUNTRY
WERE NOT A MEMBER?

"All in all, if (your country) were not a member of the Common Market, do you think that for us things would go much better, a bit better, a bit worse, much worse?"

The answers to these questions revealed the emergence of a new trend in public attitudes towards the Community ("Common Market").

Despite the various opinions regarding the effects of the Common Market discussed earlier, the majority opinion is that "all things considered" it is better to be inside than outside, and that without the Common Market things would be worse.

41% of all interviewers felt that things would be "a bit worse" (29%) or "much worse" (12%) if their country were not a member. On the other hand, 26% thought that things would be "a bit better" (19%) or "much better" (7%). Quite a number thought that it would not make any difference (20%) or did not know (13%).

Attitudes obviously varied significantly from country to country :

- (i) in Luxembourg, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium there was a large majority in favour;
- (ii) in Ireland, France and Germany those in favour still had a significant majority;
- (iii) in Denmark, and even more so in the United Kingdom, the unfavourable view prevailed.

(See Table 15).

Table 15

WOULD THINGS GO BETTER OR WORSE IF YOUR COUNTRY WERE
NOT A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY?¹

| | <u>Worse</u> | <u>Better</u> | <u>Difference</u> |
|------------------------|--------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Luxembourg | 63% | 16% | 47 |
| Italia | 60 | 14 | 46 |
| Nederland | 60 | 17 | 43 |
| Belgique/België | 45 | 12 | 33 |
| Ireland | 49 | 34 | 15 |
| France | 34 | 20 | 14 |
| Deutschland | 36 | 26 | 10 |
| Danmark | 29 | 41 | -12 |
| United Kingdom | 32 | 48 | -16 |
| COMMUNITY ² | 41% | 26% | 15% |

Generally speaking, the view that things would be worse without the Community, was more widely held by opinion leaders than by the general public. However, in certain countries (Germany, Denmark and even Italy) the frequency of the opposite view increased with leadership rating.

(See Table 16)

Table 16

WOULD THINGS GO BETTER OR WORSE IF YOUR COUNTRY WERE NOT
A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
BY LEADERSHIP RATING
(Community as a whole)

| | <u>None</u> | <u>Better</u> | <u>Difference</u> |
|------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Non-leaders (--) | 27% | 25% | 2 |
| (-) | 39 | 28 | 11 |
| (+) | 51 | 26 | 25 |
| Leaders (++) | 50 | 25 | 25 |

¹ Interviewees answering "no difference" (volunteered) or "don't know" are excluded. Countries are listed in descending order by the difference between the two sets of replies. (For details see Table 2 of Annex)

² Weighted average.

5. EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY

"If one of the countries of the Common Market found itself in major economic difficulties, do you feel that the other countries, including (your own), should help it or not?"

"Do you think that this idea of Market countries helping one another has already worked to (your country's) benefit? To other member countries' benefit?"

What price solidarity?

The first of these two questions had already been asked in September 1973, a few weeks before the oil crisis. Even then there was a strong majority in favour of Community solidarity: 76% voted for helping any country in difficulty and only 11% against (9% "didn't know").

The response this time was as good, if not better; with the exception of France and Germany, where the situation has remained more or less the same, the number in favour of solidarity is on the increase.

In 1976, as in 1973, the greatest advocate of Community solidarity was Italy, which with the United Kingdom, had progressed most in this direction (+7 and + 18 points respectively).

This is significant from two points of view: firstly, it shows how little attitudes have changed over the last three years and, secondly, it demonstrates the reliability of Euro-Barometer as a measuring instrument: in the present economic situation the British and the Italians had to gain most from Community solidarity. There is, however, a difference: the Italians on the whole are enthusiastic supporters of the Community, while the British are still very divided. This can probably be explained by the time factor: the Italians have been in the Community for almost a quarter of a century - if we go right back to the European Coal and Steel Community - while the British are still tending to think in terms of what they can get out of the Community before committing themselves.

(See Table 17).

Table 17

SOLIDARITY AMONG MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

| | In the event of one of the member countries being in major economic difficulties, the others: | | | Total |
|------------------------------|---|--------------------|------------|-------|
| | Should | Should not help it | Don't know | |
| <u>Belgique/België</u> | | | | |
| September 1973 | 78% | 9% | 13% | 100% |
| November 1976 | 82 | 8 | 10 | 100 |
| <u>Danmark</u> | | | | |
| September 1973 | 62 | 25 | 13 | 100 |
| November 1976 | 68 | 18 | 14 | 100 |
| <u>Deutschland</u> | | | | |
| September 1973 | 77 | 7 | 16 | 100 |
| November 1976 | 74 | 12 | 14 | 100 |
| <u>France</u> | | | | |
| September 1973 | 78 | 9 | 13 | 100 |
| November 1976 | 75 | 15 | 10 | 100 |
| <u>Ireland</u> | | | | |
| September 1973 | 80 | 10 | 10 | 100 |
| November 1976 | 83 | 10 | 7 | 100 |
| <u>Italia</u> | | | | |
| September 1973 | 88 | 2 | 10 | 100 |
| November 1976 | 95 | 1 | 4 | 100 |
| <u>Luxembourg</u> | | | | |
| September 1973 | 87 | 8 | 5 | 100 |
| November 1976 | 86 | 4 | 10 | 100 |
| <u>Nederland</u> | | | | |
| September 1973 | 79 | 9 | 12 | 100 |
| November 1976 | 84 | 8 | 8 | 100 |
| <u>United Kingdom</u> | | | | |
| September 1973 | 59 | 28 | 13 | 100 |
| November 1976 | 77 | 16 | 7 | 100 |
| <u>COMMUNITY²</u> | | | | |
| September 1973 | 76 | 11 | 13 | 100 |
| November 1976 | 80 | 11 | 9 | 100 |

¹ Northern Ireland was not included in 1973

² Weighted average.

Has solidarity worked?

This question had not been asked before. The aim was to find out whether interviewees irrespective of whether they were in favour of Community solidarity or not, felt that it had already worked to the benefit of their own or other countries, in other words, to identify those who felt that the Community was of direct benefit to them as well or considered that the reverse was true and that they were having to pay for the others.

It proved to be a difficult question: 25% of those interviewed did not know whether the idea of Common Market countries helping one another had worked to their country's benefit and 34% were unsure of whether it had benefited other countries. But the replies are particularly interesting.

More than four in ten (44%) felt that European solidarity had benefited their country; this view was held by 50% of the Irish and 73% of the Italians.

Almost six in ten (58%) felt that solidarity had benefited other countries; this view was held by 79% of the Germans.

To sum up, 80% of the Europeans interviewed were in favour of true "Community spirit" and at least 58% felt that the idea of helping one another had already worked.

(See Table 18).

Table 18

HAS COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY WORKED TO THE BENEFIT OF OWN COUNTRY
OR TO THE BENEFIT OF OTHER COUNTRIES ONLY

(November 1976)

[illegible]

The correlation between the different sets of replies and between them and other assessments of the Community (a good or a bad thing, good or bad effects, etc.) has still to be examined. This work will be carried out at a later date and will doubtless show that the Community's credibility and positive attitudes towards it depend to a very large extent on the way in which solidarity has worked in different circumstances over the years.

For the moment we can do little more than analyse the view of the advocates of solidarity on application of the principle in their own or other countries.

Table 19 shows that a little over half (52%) of those in favour of solidarity feel that it has in fact worked to the benefit of their country. But 70% of those against solidarity feel that it has not worked to the benefit of their country.

In Italy and Ireland (Table 20) the link is even closer. Between seven and eight in every ten in favour of solidarity feel that their country has benefited.

The same Table also shows that 63% of all supporters of solidarity feel that it has worked to the benefit of countries other than their own.

The vast majority of German supporters of solidarity feel that other countries have benefited. (see Table 21).

To sum up then, it is clear that the general public sees the European Community as a force for mutual assistance between member countries.

In countries like Italy and Ireland, which have specifically¹ benefited from Community aid, solidarity is highly valued and the public is well aware of the benefits derived from it.

Three-quarters of those interviewed in Germany were in favour of mutual assistance and the vast majority were aware of the benefits other members countries derived from it.

¹ The term "specifically" is used advisely. There is no question of net advantage being confined to mutual assistance mechanisms introduced to help a particular country. It is for the economists to calculate the net advantage accruing to a given country in a given period...

Table 19

COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY:

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE RELATED TO OVERALL ATTITUDES

(Community as a whole)

| | Solidarity has worked to the benefit of own country | | | Total |
|--|---|--------|------------|-------------|
| | yes | no | don't know | |
| In the event of major economic difficulties, the other countries : | | | | |
| - should help | 52% | 26% | 22% | 100% (7402) |
| - should not help | 10 | 70 | 20 | 100% (1018) |
| - Don't know | 13 | 29 | 58 | 100% (843) |
| Total | 44 | 31 | 25 | 100% |
| (Base) | (4060) | (2871) | (2332) | (9263) |
| | Solidarity has worked to the benefit of other countries | | | Total |
| | yes | no | don't know | |
| In the event of major economic difficulties, the other countries | | | | |
| - should help | 63% | 6% | 31% | 100% (7402) |
| - should not help | 45 | 22 | 33 | 100% (1018) |
| - Don't know | 29 | 8 | 63 | 100% (843) |
| Total | 58 | 8 | 34 | 100% |
| (Base) | (5383) | (742) | (3138) | (9263) |

Table 20

ADVOCATES OF SOLIDARITY CLAIMING THAT IT HAS WORKED TO THE
BENEFIT OF THEIR COUNTRY

| <u>Claiming that solidarity has/</u> <u>has not worked to the benefit</u> <u>of their own country</u> | | |
|---|-------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>Has worked</u> | <u>Has not worked</u> |
| <u>Advocates of solidarity:</u> | | |
| Italia (95%) | 75% | 8% |
| Ireland (83%) | 65 | 22 |
| United Kingdom (77%) | 51 | 37 |
| Deutschland (74%) | 49 | 36 |
| Danmark (68%) | 47 | 30 |
| France (75%) | 37 | 27 |
| Nederland (84%) | 34 | 24 |
| Belgique/België | 30 | 24 |
| Luxembourg (86%) | 28 | 28 |
| <u>COMMUNITY²</u> | 52% | 26% |

¹ Countries are listed by relative frequency of advocates of solidarity claiming that it has worked to the benefit of their country. The figures in brackets indicate the percentage in favour of solidarity in each country.

² Weighted average.

Table 21

ADVOCATES OF SOLIDARITY CLAIMING THAT IT HAS WORKED TO THE
BENEFIT OF COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THEIR OWN

| <u>Claiming that solidarity has/ has not worked to the benefit of other countries</u> | | |
|---|-------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>Has worked</u> | <u>Has not worked</u> |
| <u>Advocates of solidarity:</u> | | |
| Deutschland (74%) | 87% | 3% |
| Luxembourg (86%) | 67 | 2 |
| Nederland (84%) | 66 | 3 |
| United Kingdom (77%) | 65 | 9 |
| Ireland (83%) | 62 | 8 |
| France (75%) | 59 | 8 |
| Belgique/België (82%) | 59 | 5 |
| Danmark (68%) | 58 | 10 |
| Italia (95%) | 45 | 6 |
| <u>COMMUNITY</u> ² | 63% | 6% |

¹ Countries listed by relative frequency of advocates of solidarity claiming that it has worked to the benefit of other Community countries.

² Weighted average.

III

MOVEMENT TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

Earlier studies, some conducted by the European Commission, others by independent investigators, have demonstrated that the formation of overall attitudes - positive and negative - towards the existing Community, -generally seen as the "Common Market"- and a "united Europe", - seen as an ideal to be sought often (or alternatively viewed as a prospect which makes the existing Community appear "the lesser of two evils"), - is a highly complex process.

It is difficult to come to grips with the intricate pattern of images, aspirations and ideals. Support (or opposition) is sometimes based on experience, sometimes on ideology. It is only by analysing empirical data, and in particular the results of opinion polls like Euro-Barometer, that a clearer picture will gradually emerge.

In November 1976 a number of new questions¹ were added to the original set to gauge attitudes towards "European unification" and the connotations, rational or emotional, of the European movement.

1. TO SPEED UP OR SLOW DOWN, THAT IS THE QUESTION

"Some people consider the Common Market as being a first step towards a closer union between the member states. Personally, do you yourself think the movement towards the unification of Europe should be speeded up, slowed down or continued as it is at present? And, in your opinion, what is the present attitude of (your country's) government towards the unification of Europe."

The first part of the question has been asked on a number of occasion and the results obtained in November 1976 corresponded exactly to those of earlier polls, indicating great stability despite the difficulties being experienced by the "Common Market", the Member States and their citizens, and the plan for European Union.

In fact, there has been very little change since September 1973: approximately four in ten (42%) think that "the movement towards the unification of Europe should be speeded up", more than three in ten would prefer to see it "continued as at present" and one in ten would like it to be "slowed down" Only 13% of those interviewed did not reply; this very low percentage can probably be explained by the fact that some of those who might have sat on the fence opted for the least committed reply ("continued as at present").

¹ Questions relating to direct elections to the European Parliament are dealt with in Chapter IV.

The most committed reply ("speeded up") was given just as frequently as in September 1973 in all countries except in Germany, where it was down from 49% to 41% (- 8 points). It had gained significant ground in the Netherlands (+ 11 points), Italy (+ 10 points), the United Kingdom (+ 9 points) Ireland (+ 8 points), Belgium (+ 7 points) and France (+ 6 points).

The positive reply ("speed up") was given by 65% of the Italians interviewed, 55% of the Luxembourgers, approximately 40% of the of the French, Dutch, Germans and Belgians, but only 33% of the Irish, 26% of the British and 14% of the Danes.

The negative reply ("slowed down") was given by less than 10% of those interviewed in all countries except the United Kingdom (17%) and Denmark (30%). But even here the position has improved somewhat since the last poll.

(See Table 22).

In all countries opinion leaders are more in favour of "speeding up" than the general public.

(See Table 23).

Table 22

SHOULD THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE BE SPEEDED UP,

CONTINUED AS AT PRESENT OR SLOWED DOWN

BY COUNTRY¹

| | Speeded up | Conti- nued as present | Slowed down | Don't know | Total |
|-----------------|---------------|------------------------------|----------------|---------------|-------|
| Italia | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 55% | 18% | 2% | 25% | 100% |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 61 | 17 | 4 | 18 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 58 | 16 | 4 | 22 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 65 | 14 | 5 | 16 | 100 |
| Luxembourg | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 56 | 29 | 1 | 14 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 52 | 33 | 4 | 11 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 55 | 20 | 9 | 16 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 55 | 26 | 6 | 13 | 100 |
| France | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 36 | 40 | 3 | 21 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 45 | 36 | 6 | 13 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 43 | 37 | 7 | 13 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 42 | 35 | 10 | 13 | 100 |
| Nederland | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 32 | 47 | 6 | 15 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 33 | 38 | 4 | 25 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 43 | 37 | 7 | 13 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 41 | 42 | 6 | 11 | 100 |
| Deutschland | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 49 | 34 | 4 | 13 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 47 | 36 | 6 | 11 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 39 | 34 | 10 | 17 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 41 | 37 | 9 | 13 | 100 |
| Belgique/België | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 33 | 43 | 3 | 21 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 39 | 28 | 3 | 30 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 40 | 32 | 5 | 23 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 40 | 37 | 5 | 18 | 100 |

Table 22 (contd)

| | Speeded up | Continued as present | Slowed down | Don't know | Total |
|-------------------------|------------|----------------------|-------------|------------|-------|
| Ireland | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 25 | 45 | 12 | 18 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 35 | 40 | 12 | 13 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 31 | 40 | 14 | 15 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 33 | 40 | 10 | 17 | 100 |
| United Kingdom | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 ² | 17 | 40 | 24 | 19 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 24 | 45 | 17 | 14 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 23 | 42 | 24 | 11 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 26 | 46 | 17 | 11 | 100 |
| Danmark | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 12 | 44 | 36 | 8 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 13 | 33 | 37 | 17 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 13 | 33 | 32 | 22 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 14 | 38 | 30 | 18 | 100 |
| COMMUNITY ³ | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 38 | 34 | 9 | 19 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 43 | 34 | 8 | 15 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 40 | 33 | 11 | 16 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 42 | 34 | 11 | 13 | 100 |

¹ Countries listed by relative frequency of "speeded up" replies in November 1976

² Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.

³ Weighted average.

There is a strong correlation between the replies to this question and the replies to the one on the "Common Market". The vast majority of those who feel the Common Market is a "good thing" want to see the movement towards European unification speeded up. Conversely, the majority of those who feel the Common Market is "a bad thing" believe that the movement towards unification should be "slowed down" or "continued as at present" (though some actually wanted it "speed up"). This would seem to imply that some people who are hostile to the Common Market, or sceptical about its current policies and achievements, are not altogether opposed to the political unification of Europe⁴.

⁴ The analyses, which are similar to those included in Euro-Barometer No 5, pp 28-32, are not given here.

Table 23

SHOULD THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE BE SPEEDED UP,

CONTINUED AS AT PRESENT OR SLOWED DOWN

BY LEADERSHIP RATING
(Community as a whole)

| | Speeded up | Continued as at present | Slowed down | Don't know |
|------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------------|---------------|
| - <u>October-November 1975</u> | | | | |
| non-leaders (--) | 26% | 35% | 9% | 30% |
| (-) | 39 | 39 | 8 | 14 |
| (+) | 51 | 34 | 7 | 8 |
| leaders (++) | 62 | 22 | 10 | 6 |
| - <u>May 1976</u> | | | | |
| non-leaders (--) | 23% | 35% | 11% | 31% |
| (-) | 38 | 35 | 12 | 15 |
| (+) | 48 | 31 | 11 | 10 |
| leaders (++) | 55 | 26 | 11 | 8 |
| - <u>November 1976</u> | | | | |
| non-leaders (--) | 29% | 35% | 10% | 26% |
| (-) | 39 | 39 | 10 | 12 |
| (+) | 49 | 34 | 11 | 6 |
| leaders (++) | 59 | 22 | 12 | 7 |

A cross-check between the personal opinions of those interviewed and their assessment of their government's attitude shows that only half of those in favour of speeding up unification (to 42% of those interviewed) believe that their government thinks as they do. (See Table 24).

This awareness among supporters of European unification of a gulf between personal and government attitudes is particularly strong in the United Kingdom, Italy and France, but there the similarity ends:

- (i) in the United Kingdom those in favour of speeding up unification are very much in the minority (26%); of that 26% more than a third believe that the British Government also wants to speed things up, while just under a third thinks that it would prefer to continue as at present;
- (ii) in Italy 65% of those interviewed were in favour of speeding up but of that 65% only a little over a third felt that the Italian Government thought likewise; the high proportion of "don't knows" is striking;
- (iii) in France 42% of those interviewed were in favour of speeding up, a figure which, incidentally corresponds exactly to the Community average; of that 42% a third felt that the French Government was in favour of continuing as at present.

In Germany and Luxembourg two-thirds and three-quarters respectively of those in favour of speeding up felt that their opinion was shared by that government (For differences by country see Table 25).

Table 24

SPEEDED UP, CONTINUED AS AT PRESENT OR SLOWED DOWN:

PERSONAL OPINION AND ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTED TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

(Community as a whole)

| | Attitude attributed to national government | | | | Total |
|---------------------------|--|-------------------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| | Speeded up | Continued as at present | Slowed down | Don't know | |
| Personal opinion | | | | | |
| - speeded up | 47% | 26% | 10% | 17% | 100% (3905) |
| - continued as at present | 21 | 57 | 4 | 18 | 100% (3132) |
| - slowed down | 36 | 22 | 23 | 19 | 100% (984) |
| - Don't know | 9 | 8 | 2 | 81 | 100% (1242) |
| Total | 32 | 34 | 8 | 26 | 100% |
| (Base) | (2983) | (3106) | (781) | (2393) | (9263) |

Table 25

ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTED TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT BY SUPPORTERS OF

SPEEDED UNIFICATION

| | Believe government wishes unification to be : | | | Don't know | Total |
|---|---|-------------------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| | Speeded up | Continued as at present | Slowed down | | |
| For every 100 supporters of speeding up unification | | | | | |
| Luxembourg (55%) | 77% | 11% | 2% | 10% | 100% (167) |
| Deutschland (41%) | 68 | 21 | 5 | 6 | 100% (406) |
| Belgique/België (40%) | 59 | 16 | 7 | 18 | 100% (427) |
| Nederland (41%) | 53 | 18 | 8 | 21 | 100% (462) |
| Danmark (14%) | 52 | 23 | 12 | 13 | 100% (136) |
| Ireland (33%) | 45 | 26 | 10 | 19 | 100% (324) |
| France (42%) | 45 | 35 | 9 | 11 | 100% (573) |
| Italia (65%) | 37 | 24 | 13 | 26 | 100% (680) |
| United Kingdom (26%) | 34 | 31 | 16 | 19 | 100% (333) |

1

Countries are listed by relative frequency of supporters of speeded unification believing that their government shares their attitude.

The figures in brackets indicate the percentage of all interviewees in each country who wish to see unification "speeded up"

2. FACTS OR FEELINGS?

"Whether you, yourself are for or against a rapid development towards the unification of Europe, would you say that personally speaking your attitude is mainly a matter of personal feelings or based on actual facts?"

This was an experimental question and the results are difficult to interpret at first sight. For the Community as a whole, 49% on average said that their attitude was mainly "a matter of personal feelings" and 37% that it was "based on actual facts"; 14% did not reply.

The reply "based on actual facts" dominated in France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands, while "a matter of personal feelings" carried the day in Ireland, the United Kingdom and - only first - in Germany.

It would be premature at this stage to theorize about the results or to attempt to explain them in terms of "national temperament". These are after all opinions, i.e. what people say they think, and individuals can, quite uncsciously, attribute their views to the wrong reasons.

This said the replies are interesting when examined firstly in relation to leadership rating and secondly in relation to overall attitude towards European unification.

Leaders and non-leaders

Generally speaking opinion leaders tended to see their attitude as "based on actual facts". In France, strangely enough, the rational or logical answer was given by a large majority irrespective of leadership rating.

In Ireland and the United Kingdom, by contrast, "personal feelings" dominated at all levels.

There is a middle-of-the-road situation in Germany with non-leaders tending to feel that their attitude was "a matter of personal feelings" and leaders that it was "based on actual facts".

Although the results cannot be explained, they do show that, in two Community countries at least, the great European debate was quite different from those in the other seven.

(See Table 26).

Table 26

UNIFICATION OF EUROPE: A MATTER OF PERSONAL FEELINGS

OR BASED ON ACTUAL FACTS

BY LEADERSHIP RATING

| | | Matter of personal feelings | Based on actual facts | Difference |
|------------------------|------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------|
| <u>Belgique/België</u> | | <u>20%</u> | <u>57%</u> | <u>-37</u> |
| non-leaders | (--) | 21 | 38 | -17 |
| | (-) | 24 | 56 | -32 |
| | (+) | 19 | 72 | -53 |
| leaders | (++) | 17 | 77 | -60 |
| <u>Danmark</u> | | <u>29</u> | <u>51</u> | <u>-22</u> |
| non-leaders | (--) | 34 | 38 | -4 |
| | (-) | 29 | 51 | -22 |
| | (+) | 29 | 56 | -27 |
| leaders | (++) | 21 | 64 | -43 |
| <u>Deutschland</u> | | <u>45</u> | <u>41</u> | <u>4</u> |
| non-leaders | (--) | 60 | 16 | 44 |
| | (-) | 48 | 36 | 12 |
| | (+) | 38 | 55 | -17 |
| leaders | (++) | 27 | 68 | -41 |
| <u>France</u> | | <u>13</u> | <u>72</u> | <u>-59</u> |
| non-leaders | (--) | 12 | 63 | -51 |
| | (-) | 12 | 75 | -63 |
| | (+) | 15 | 76 | -61 |
| leaders | (++) | 15 | 75 | -60 |
| <u>Ireland</u> | | <u>61</u> | <u>25</u> | <u>36</u> |
| non-leaders | (--) | 55 | 21 | 24 |
| | (-) | 65 | 22 | 43 |
| | (+) | 62 | 35 | 27 |
| leaders | (++) | 70 | 29 | 41 |
| <u>Italia</u> | | <u>33</u> | <u>54</u> | <u>-21</u> |
| non-leaders | (--) | 40 | 33 | 7 |
| | (-) | 42 | 46 | -4 |
| | (+) | 27 | 68 | -41 |
| leaders | (++) | 17 | 75 | -58 |
| <u>Luxembourg</u> | | <u>20</u> | <u>65</u> | <u>-45</u> |
| non-leaders | (--) | 21 | 64 | -43 |
| | (-) | 17 | 69 | -52 |
| | (+) | 14 | 67 | -43 |
| leaders | (++) | 29 | 61 | -32 |

Table 26 (contd)

| | Matter of personal feelings | Based on actual facts | Difference |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------|
| <u>Nederland</u> | <u>35</u> | <u>50</u> | <u>-15</u> |
| non-leaders (--) | 37 | 30 | 7 |
| (-) | 37 | 42 | -5 |
| (+) | 37 | 55 | -18 |
| leaders (++) | 19 | 73 | -54 |
| <u>United Kingdom</u> | <u>62</u> | <u>28</u> | <u>34</u> |
| non-leaders (--) | 61 | 21 | 40 |
| (-) | 66 | 26 | 40 |
| (+) | 62 | 32 | 30 |
| leaders (++) | 50 | 43 | 7 |

Overall attitude towards European unification
and justification on rational
or emotional grounds

It would appear that of the interviewees who answered these questions in all countries, it was primarily the supporters of speeding unification who claimed that their attitude was based on facts. Those in favour of continuing as at present or slowing down were split more or less evenly between the two camps.

(See Table 27).

However, there is a cultural pattern as well, which would appear to affect "idealists and "realists" alike.

- (i) the vast majority of the French, Belgians, Luxembourgers and Danes, irrespective of their views on the basic issue, claimed to be rational;
- (ii) the British and Irish, wether "pro" of "anti" admitted to being "emotional";
- (iii) the Italians and Germans who favoured "speeding up" tended to appeal to reason, while those who advocated caution appealed to sentiment;
- (iv) the Dutch were totally divided but tended if anything to appeal to reason.

(See Table 28).

Table 27

SPEED UP, CONTINUE AS AT PRESENT OR SLOW DOWN :

A MATTER OF PERSONAL FEELINGS OR BASED ON ACTUAL FACTS?

(Community as a whole)

| | Matter of personal feelings | Based on actual facts | Total (excluding "don't know") |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Personal opinion | | | |
| - speed up | 35% | 65% | 100% (3674) |
| - continue as at present | 50 | 50 | 100% (2809) |
| - slow down | 47 | 53 | 100% (895) |
| All persons answering (Base) | 42% (3100) | 58% (4278) | 100% (7378) |

Table 28

ATTITUDE TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNIFICATION RELATED TO GROUNDS GIVEN
BY COUNTRY

| | <u>Emotional grounds</u> | <u>Rational grounds</u> |
|---|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <u>Belgium</u> | | |
| Speeded up | 22% | 78% |
| Continued as at present or slowed down | 29 | 71 |
| <u>Denmark</u> | | |
| Speeded up | 25 | 75 |
| Continued as at present or slowed down | 37 | 63 |
| <u>Germany</u> | | |
| Speeded up | 43 | 57 |
| Continued as at present or slowed down | 57 | 43 |
| <u>France</u> | | |
| Speeded up | 15 | 85 |
| Continued as at present or slowed down | 16 | 84 |
| <u>Ireland</u> | | |
| Speeded up | 67 | 33 |
| Continued as at present or slowed down | 73 | 27 |
| <u>Italy</u> | | |
| Speeded up | 29 | 71 |
| Continued as at present or slowed down | 56 | 44 |
| <u>Luxembourg</u> | | |
| Speeded up | 25 | 75 |
| Continued as at present or slowed down | 23 | 77 |
| <u>Netherlands</u> | | |
| Speeded up | 35 | 65 |
| Continued as at present or slowed down | 46 | 54 |
| <u>United Kingdom</u> | | |
| Speeded up | 69 | 31 |
| Continued as at present or slowed down | 67 | 33 |

¹ Grounds for attitude towards European unification (emotional or rational) per hundred in favour of speeding unification, or of continuing as at present or slowing down, as the case may be.

IV

ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

On 20 September last year a decision was finally taken to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957 on election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. In its decision the Council urged Member States to adopt the necessary arrangements in accordance with their constitutional procedures. At the same time it solemnly re-affirmed its intention of holding the elections on a single date sometime in May/June 1978.

Subject to ratification by the Nine some two hundred million European voters will be called upon to elect four hundred and ten representatives in eighteen months' time. "A Peoples' Europe" is taking shape and it will be for Euro-Barometer to keep an eye on its development.

Questions have been asked on this subject in previous opinion polls¹ but more detailed surveys will be called for as the idea becomes reality. Surveys will be conducted up to the eve of the ballot and the findings will be widely publicized. (2)

The present Euro-Barometer, conducted a few weeks after the Councils decision but before the ratification debate began in the nine countries, included three questions :

- the first on the principle of direct elections for or against (this had already been asked a number of times);
- a second on the importance attached to the elections;
- a third, which was more complex and put to opinion leaders³ only on the election campaign (should parties with similar views join forces at European level or should each national party campaign for itself).

¹ See Euro-Barometer Nos. 3 to 5 held in 1975 and 1976

² We would remind readers that the data relating to these polls is freely available to all - including the political parties - for research purposes.

³ For definition see p. 1.

1. FOR OR AGAINST
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ELECTION

"The governments of the member countries of the Common Market have reached agreement to hold the first elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage - that is by direct vote of all citizen - in May 1978⁴. Are you, yourself, for or against this particular election?"

The fact that the decision in principle had been taken a little over a month before the opinion poll seems to have had some impact on the results. Nearly seven in ten (69%) were in favour of the elections and only 14% against. This was the best result since September 1973. (The percentage of "don't knows" was more or less the same as in the last three polls).

(See Table 29).

Table 29

OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

(Community as a whole)

| | September 1973 | May 1975 | Oct./Nov. 1975 | May 1976 | November 1976 |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|------------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % |
| Completely favour | 24)54 | 27)63 | 25)64 | 28)62 | 31)69 |
| Favour on the whole | 30)54 | 36)63 | 39)64 | 34)62 | 38)69 |
| Disagree to some extent | 12)23 | 9)18 | 10)18 | 11)21 | 8)14 |
| Disagree completely | 11)23 | 9)18 | 8)18 | 10)21 | 6)14 |
| Don't know | 23 | 19 | 18 | 17 | 17 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Leaders and non-leaders

In all nine countries opinion leaders are much more in favour direct elections than the general publics. A comparison of these results with those of the opinion poll held in late 1975 shows that there has been a more marked increase in positive attitudes among non-leaders than among leaders : the idea of electing the European Parliament is becoming more popular as plans take shape. (See Table 30).

⁴It seemed preferable to say "May 1978" rather than "May/June 1978".

¹Weighted average.

Table 30

FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole)

| | Comple- tely favour | Favour on the whole | Disagree to some extent | Disagree comple- tely | Don't know |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| - <u>October-November 1975</u> | | | | | |
| non-leaders (--) | 11% | 31% | 11% | 10% | 37% |
| (-) | 22 | 42 | 10 | 9 | 17 |
| (+) | 29 | 45 | 10 | 7 | 9 |
| leaders (++) | 40 | 37 | 10 | 8 | 5 |
| - <u>May 1976</u> | | | | | |
| non-leaders (--) | 17% | 32% | 9% | 10% | 32% |
| (-) | 25 | 36 | 13 | 10 | 16 |
| (+) | 33 | 36 | 12 | 10 | 9 |
| leaders (++) | 43 | 29 | 10 | 11 | 7 |
| - <u>November 1976</u> | | | | | |
| non-leaders (--) | 19% | 34% | 8% | 6% | 33% |
| (-) | 28 | 42 | 8 | 6 | 16 |
| (+) | 37 | 42 | 6 | 5 | 10 |
| leaders (++) | 49 | 30 | 7 | 9 | 5 |

Attitudes to direct elections
related to opinion on the Common "Market"

There is a positive correlation between attitudes to the election of the European Parliament and opinions on the Common Market. Virtually all those who considered the Common Market a "good thing" supported the proposal for a directly-elected European Parliament being split fifty/fifty into "completely favour" and "favour on the whole". More than three-quarters of those who gave a neutral reply to the question about the Common Market supported direct election and almost half of those who were most critical favoured direct elections.

(See Table No 31)¹.

¹ The change in attitudes over the six-month period can be gauged by comparing Table 31 with Table 27 of Euro-Barometer No 5, July 1976, p. 49.

Table 31

FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

RELATED TO OPINION ON THE COMMON MARKET

(Community as a whole)

| | Complete- ly favour | Favour on the whole | Disagree to some extent | Disagree comple- tely | Total (not excluding "don't knows") ¹ |
|--|------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Think the Common Market is : | | | | | |
| - a good thing | 49% | 45% | 4% | 2% | 100% (4661) |
| - neither good or bad | 19 | 57 | 16 | 8 | 100% (1797) |
| - a bad thing | 20 | 26 | 20 | 34 | 100% (926) |
| All persons answering both questions (Base) | 38 (2810) | 46 (3382) | 9 (650) | 7 (542) | 100% (7384) |

¹ The figures in brackets indicate the number of people giving the reply that corresponds to each line.

Difference and developments in individual countries

In all Community countries, the United Kingdom and Denmark, included, the advocates of direct elections now outnumber the opponents.

In Luxembourg, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands approximately three-quarters of those interviewed were in favour. Seven in ten were in favour in Belgium and France, approximately six in ten in Ireland and the United Kingdom, and four in ten in Denmark.

Support has grown in all countries since 1973.

Table 32

| | <u>In favour of direct elections to the European Parliament</u> | <u>Increase between 1973 and 1976</u> | |
|-----------------------------|---|---|-------|
| | <u>Sept. 1973</u> | <u>Nov. 1976</u> | |
| United Kingdom ¹ | 33% | 57% | +24 |
| Ireland | 45 | 63 | +18 |
| France | 51 | 69 | +18 |
| Belgium | 52 | 69 | +17 |
| Netherlands | 62 | 74 | +12 |
| Luxembourg | 67 | 77 | +10 |
| Germany | 69 | 76 | + 7 |
| Denmark | 36 | 42 | + 6 |
| Italy | 74 | 77 | + 3 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Community ² | 54 | 69 | +15 |

Table 33 summarizes fluctuations in number "for" and "against" between 1973 and 1976. Table 34 tells us a little more about the varying degrees of enthusiasm (or lack of it) and the change in attitudes between the six-monthly polls.

¹ Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.

² Weighted average.

Table 33

FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

(Change between 1973 and 1976 by country)¹

| | September 1973 | | | | November 1976 | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------|---------|------------|-------|---------------|---------|------------|-------|
| | For | Against | Don't know | Total | For | Against | Don't know | Total |
| Luxembourg | 67% | 12% | 21% | 100% | 77% | 9% | 14% | 100% |
| Italia | 74 | 12 | 24 | 100 | 77 | 8 | 15 | 100 |
| Deutschland | 69 | 12 | 19 | 100 | 76 | 10 | 14 | 100 |
| Nederland | 62 | 16 | 22 | 100 | 74 | 11 | 15 | 100 |
| Belgique/België | 52 | 14 | 34 | 100 | 69 | 9 | 22 | 100 |
| France | 51 | 18 | 31 | 100 | 69 | 13 | 18 | 100 |
| Ireland | 45 | 31 | 24 | 100 | 63 | 14 | 23 | 100 |
| United Kingdom ² | 33 | 49 | 18 | 100 | 57 | 22 | 21 | 100 |
| Danmark | 36 | 43 | 21 | 100 | 42 | 37 | 21 | 100 |
| COMMUNITY ³ | 54 | 23 | 23 | 100 | 69 | 14 | 17 | 100 |

¹ Countries listed by relative frequency of positive replies in 1976.

² Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.

³ Weighted average.

FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

BY COUNTRY¹

| | Comple- tely favour | Favour on the whole | Disagree to some extent | Disagree comple- tely | Don't know | Total |
|-----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------|-------|
| Luxembourg | | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 40% | 27% | 8% | 4% | 21% | 100% |
| May 1975 | 36 | 33 | 7 | 3 | 21 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 31 | 44 | 6 | 1 | 18 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 36 | 35 | 5 | 4 | 20 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 44 | 33 | 8 | 1 | 14 | 100 |
| Italia | | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 34 | 30 | 8 | 4 | 24 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 37 | 40 | 6 | 2 | 15 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 38 | 40 | 5 | 3 | 14 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 42 | 32 | 6 | 2 | 18 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 40 | 37 | 5 | 3 | 15 | 100 |
| Deutschland | | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 29 | 40 | 9 | 3 | 19 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 28 | 48 | 6 | 2 | 16 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 23 | 50 | 9 | 2 | 16 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 25 | 42 | 10 | 5 | 18 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 27 | 49 | 7 | 3 | 14 | 100 |
| Nederland | | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 32 | 30 | 11 | 5 | 22 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 28 | 29 | 7 | 7 | 29 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 27 | 32 | 6 | 5 | 30 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 43 | 31 | 8 | 6 | 12 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 38 | 36 | 6 | 5 | 15 | 100 |
| Belgique/België | | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 23 | 29 | 8 | 6 | 34 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 23 | 32 | 6 | 3 | 36 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 20 | 33 | 5 | 4 | 38 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 31 | 28 | 7 | 4 | 30 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 37 | 32 | 5 | 4 | 22 | 100 |
| France | | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 22 | 29 | 11 | 7 | 31 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 33 | 35 | 9 | 6 | 17 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 26 | 43 | 9 | 4 | 18 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 28 | 38 | 10 | 7 | 17 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 27 | 42 | 9 | 4 | 18 | 100 |

Table 34 (contd)

| | Comple- tely | Favour on the whole | Disagree to some extent | Disagree comple- tely | Don't know | Total |
|----------------|-----------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------|-------|
| Ireland | | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 15 | 30 | 17 | 14 | 24 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 20 | 35 | 13 | 9 | 23 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 19 | 37 | 15 | 8 | 21 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 24 | 33 | 17 | 8 | 18 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 29 | 34 | 9 | 5 | 23 | 100 |
| United Kingdom | | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 11 | 22 | 19 | 30 | 18 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 16 | 25 | 16 | 27 | 16 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 13 | 28 | 18 | 24 | 17 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 14 | 26 | 19 | 29 | 12 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 30 | 27 | 8 | 14 | 21 | 100 |
| Danmark | | | | | | |
| Sept. 1973 | 20 | 16 | 18 | 25 | 21 | 100 |
| May 1975 | 15 | 20 | 12 | 21 | 32 | 100 |
| Oct./Nov. 1975 | 13 | 19 | 18 | 25 | 25 | 100 |
| May 1976 | 18 | 22 | 17 | 25 | 18 | 100 |
| Nov. 1976 | 22 | 20 | 16 | 21 | 21 | 100 |

¹Countries listed by relative frequency of favourable replies
("completely favour" and "favour on the whole" in November 1976.

²Nothern Ireland was not included in 1973.

2. IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO DIRECT ELECTIONS

"Which of these opinions come closest to your own on the future elections to the European Parliament?"

- (1) It is an event with important consequences which is certain to make Europe more politically unified; or
- (2) It is an unimportant event because Heads of State will not be bound by votes in the European Parliament"

Almost half of those interviewed regarded the elections as "an event with important consequences certain to make Europe more unified" (48%); 28% considered it "an unimportant event" and 24% did not reply.

The more positive view dominated in all nine countries, particularly in Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg.

(See Table 35).

Table 35

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY COUNTRY

| | B | DK | D | F | IRL | I | L | N | UK | CE/EC |
|-----------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Event with important consequences | 53 | 35 | 47 | 46 | 38 | 56 | 53 | 48 | 41 | 47 |
| Unimportant event | 19 | 33 | 35 | 28 | 27 | 19 | 25 | 29 | 31 | 28 |
| Don't know | 28 | 32 | 18 | 26 | 35 | 25 | 22 | 23 | 28 | 24 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Leaders and non-leaders

In all nine countries opinion leaders viewed elections as "an event with important consequences" more frequently than the general public.

(See Table 36).

Table 36

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole)

| | Event with important consequences | Unimportant event | Don't know |
|------------------|---|----------------------|---------------|
| Non-leaders (--) | 36% | 22% | 42% |
| (-) | 46 | 30 | 24 |
| (+) | 55 | 29 | 16 |
| Leaders (++) | 56 | 34 | 10 |

Importance attached to direct elections
by those "for" and "against"

The more enthusiastic people are about the elections of the European Parliament, the more likely they are to view it as an event having important consequences. Conversely, those opposed to the election irrespective of whether they disagree "to some extent" or "completely" consider it unimportant.

(See Table 37).

An analysis of the findings for each country confirms that the correlation between attitudes to the election and the importance attached to it is widespread. There are, however, a number of interesting differences :

- (i) in Italy and Belgium advocates of direct elections - namely seven or eight in every ten - are more inclined to view it as an event with important consequences than their counterparts elsewhere;
- (ii) in Germany and Italy, where all the major parties support direct elections, the opponents, though few and far between, are unambiguous in their views : nine in ten consider the importance of the elections to be minimal; in Germany even the supporters of direct elections claim to have no illusions on this score:

(iii) in the other member countries, including France, approximately two-thirds of supporters consider it to be an event with important consequences and two-thirds of opponents consider it unimportant; this indicates that, although opinion is favourable on the whole, feelings do not run high and the debate is not yet sufficiently advanced for clear lines of demarcation to emerge¹.

(See Table 38).

Table 37

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

RELATED TO ATTITUDE TO THE ELECTIONS

(Community as a whole)

| | Event with important consequences | Unimportant event | Total (including don't knows) |
|---------------------------------------|---|----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Completely favour | 80% | 20% | 100% (2532) |
| Favour on the whole | 63 | 37 | 100% (2942) |
| Total "for" | 71 | 29 | 100% (5574) |
| Disagree to some extent | 24 | 76 | 100% (539) |
| Disagree completely | 24 | 76 | 100% (404) |
| Total "against" | 24 | 76 | 100% (943) |
| Total (excluding "don't knows") | 64% | 36% | 100% |
| (Base) | (4194) | (2323) | (6517) |

¹The change in attitudes on the months ahead will provide a useful indicator on the electorate's desire to play a meaningful part in the elections.

Table 39

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN:

ON A NATIONAL OR EUROPEAN BASIS

BY COUNTRY¹

(Question put to "opinion leaders" only)

| | | Parties of the same colour should get together | Each na- tional party should campaign for it- self | Don't know | Total |
|------------------------|---------|--|--|---------------|-------|
| Italia | (N=192) | 65% | 25% | 10% | 100% |
| Deutschland | (N=130) | 63 | 28 | 9 | 100 |
| France | (N=225) | 59 | 29 | 12 | 100 |
| Nederland | (N=143) | 56 | 40 | 4 | 100 |
| Belgique/België | (N=111) | 55 | 36 | 9 | 100 |
| Luxembourg | (N= 69) | 46 | 42 | 12 | 100 |
| Ireland | (N= 91) | 31 | 59 | 10 | 100 |
| United Kingdom | (N=163) | 31 | 60 | 9 | 100 |
| Danmark | (N=145) | 19 | 51 | 30 | 100 |
| COMMUNITY ² | (1356) | 55% | 35% | 10% | 100% |

¹

Countries listed by relative frequency of "parties of the same colour should get together" replies. The figures in brackets indicate the number of leaders interviewed in each country.

²

Weighted average.

CONCLUSIONS

All in all 1976 was a mixed year for the European Community; on the debit side was the continuing economic crisis (with resultant disarray in the member countries) the failure to reach a decision on the Tindemans Report on European Union; on the credit side was the decision on direct elections to the European Parliament. As far as public opinion is concerned the end result is general wavering confounded of hope and disillusionment. x

x x

Generally speaking public interest in ^{leaders} Community problems is at a fairly low ebb except among opinion- / ie the well-educated, well-informed, intellectually aware section of the population of each country. What is more, interest among this group is relatively stable : between 1973 and 1976 there has been very little fluctuation in the numbers of those claiming to be "very interested" a little interested" or "not at all interested" in Community problems. (See Table 1).

On the whole it would seem that the Community has won general acceptance and is seen in a positive light as a herald of better times : four in ten of those interviewed - almost five in ten in the United Kingdom - see its development as being very important for their children's future. (See Table 4).

If they could start all over again, two-thirds of the Community's citizens would vote for membership. This attitude has a clear lead in the six original member countries, but in three new member countries, and in Denmark in particular, support seems to have declined since the 1972 and 1975 referendums. (See Table 6 and 7).

The general drop in approval of the Common Market recorded last May was followed by a slight recovery in November. The fact that 55% of those interviewed felt that the Common Market was a "good thing", even if this was only out of passive loyalty to something which exists, even if this was only out of pasted. especially since two-thirds of opinion leaders share this view.

(See Tables 9 and 10).

The loyalty of the majority stems from the belief that, all things considered, the Common Market has had a good effect on the general economic situation in each of the nine countries.

The critics, on the other hand blame the Common Market for having had a bad effect (or failing to have had a good effect) on consumer prices; this view is particularly prevalent in Ireland and the United Kingdom. (See Tables 11, 13 and 14).

And the opinion of the majority of those interviewed in all countries other than Denmark and the United Kingdom is that without the Common Market, things would probably be worse.

(See Table 15).

To the general public, the European Community or "Common Market" is synonymous with solidarity: in the event of one of the member countries finding itself in major economic difficulties, the others should come to its assistance. This was the view expressed by seven to eight^{of} every ten interviewed irrespective of country. (See Table 17). And this should not be dismissed as a pious wish or a vague moral aspiration: the Italians and the Irish are aware that Community solidarity has already been of benefit to their countries, while the Germans know only too well that it has been of benefit to countries other than their own. (See Tables 18, 20 and 21).

x x

Attitudes towards European unification are obviously linked to attitudes towards the Community and the Common Market but seem less affected by short-term considerations. In fact the reverse would seem to be true, since favourable attitudes are gradually gaining ground. In all countries except Germany more people voted for speeding up unification in 1976 than in 1973 (42% as against 38%), and opinion leaders are again ahead of the general public with 59% on average in favour of speeding unification. (See Tables 22 and 23).

On this issue governments would seem to be lagging behind public opinion: although 42% of those interviewed claimed to be in favour of speeding unification, only 32% felt that their government felt the same way. The gulf between governments and individuals is particularly wide in the United Kingdom, Italy and France. (See Tables 24 and 25).

The decision on elections to the European Parliament is still too recent for the full impact to have been felt, but support for the idea, which seemed rather lukewarm while the plan was still shrouded in uncertainty, is now becoming stronger: on average 69% of all interviewees and 79% of opinion leaders were in favour of direct elections, as compared with 62% and 72% respectively in May 1976. In all countries, the United Kingdom and Denmark included, the majority is now in favour. (See Tables 29 and 30).

Almost 50% of all interviewees (and 56% of opinion leaders) viewed the elections as an "event with important consequences certain to make Europe more unified". As might be expected, this view was most prevalent among supporters of direct elections. (See Tables 35, 37 and 38).

Opinion leaders, who were the only interviewees to be questioned about the election campaign, are quite clear about their preferences. (See Table 39).

- (i) in the six original member countries the majority favour a European campaign with all parties of the same colour joining forces;
- (ii) in the three new member countries by contrast, the majority is in favour of each party campaigning for itself.

The answers to this question highlight the different views - and even more so the different images - current in the enlarged Community. This is true even of the well-informed and actively involved. However, the differences are of degree rather than kind and Euro-Barometer, by drawing attention to their existence, may have made a useful contribution to the democratic discussion which will be part and parcel of the first direct elections to the European Parliament.

ANNEXES / APPENDIX

NOMBRE DE PERSONNES INTERROGÉES / NUMBER OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

| | | | |
|-----------------|-------|-------|-----------------|
| Belgique/België | (B) | 1077 | 5-22 Nov. 1976 |
| Danmark | (DK) | 962 | 9 Nov. - 3 Dec. |
| Deutschland | (D) | 1007 | 4-19 Nov. |
| France | (F) | 1356* | 2-15 Nov. |
| Ireland | (IRL) | 981 | 2-15 Nov. |
| Italia | (I) | 1052 | 3-19 Nov. |
| Luxembourg | (L) | 301 | 3-22 Nov. |
| Nederland | (N) | 1123 | 4-12 Nov. |
| United Kingdom | (UK) | 1351 | 2-21 Nov. |

| | | | |
|--------------|--|-------------|--|
| <u>Total</u> | | <u>9210</u> | |
|--------------|--|-------------|--|

INSTITUTS CHARGES DU SONDAGE / INSTITUTES WHICH CARRIED OUT THE SURVEY

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| Belgique/België | DIMARSO / INRA |
| Danmark | GALLUP MARKEDSANALYSE |
| Deutschland (B.R.) | EMNID-INSTITUT |
| France | INSTITUT FRANCAIS D'OPINION PUBLIQUE** |
| Ireland | IRISH MARKETING SURVEYS |
| Italia | ISTITUTO PER LE RICERCHE STATISTICHE ET L'ANALISI DELL'OPINIONE PUBBLICA (DOXA) |
| Luxembourg | DIMARSO / INRA |
| Nederland | NEDERLANDS INSTITUUT VOOR DE PUBLIEKE OPINIE (NIPO) |
| United Kingdom | THE GALLUP POLL*** |

* Y compris surreprésentation de 188 ruraux / Including oversampling of 188 country-people.

** Chargé en outre de la coordination internationale et de l'analyse des résultats / Also responsible for international coordination and analysis of the results.

*** Le sondage en Northern Ireland a été fait en collaboration par le Irish Marketing Surveys et le Gallup Poll / The Northern Ireland poll was conducted jointly by Irish Marketing Surveys and the Gallup Poll.

NOTES TECHNIQUES

1. Il est rappelé au lecteur que, dans les enquêtes par sondage, on doit tenir compte d'une certaine marge pour erreur d'échantillonnage. Avec des échantillons de l'ordre de 1000 personnes interrogées, les différences de pourcentages inférieures à 5% ne devraient pas être normalement considérées comme statistiquement significatives.

2. Dans tous les tableaux, la colonne CE/EC donne la moyenne pour l'ensemble des personnes interrogées dans les neuf pays, moyenne pondérée suivant l'effectif de la population âgée de 15 ans et plus dans chacun des pays:

TECHNICAL NOTES

1. Readers are reminded that in survey research, one should allow a certain margin for sampling error. With a sample of 1,000 cases, percentage differences of less than 5 points would not normally be regarded as statistically significant.

2. In all tables the column CE/EC gives the mean score for all people interviewed in the nine countries, weighted in terms of population aged 15 and over of each Community country:

| | Milliers / Thousands | % |
|-----------------|-------------------------|-------|
| Belgique/België | 7 477 | 3.84 |
| Danmark | 3 858 | 1.98 |
| Deutschland | 48 111 | 24.48 |
| France | 39 789 | 20.24 |
| Ireland | 2 098 | 1.08 |
| Italia | 41 975 | 21.35 |
| Luxembourg | 274 | 0.14 |
| Nederland | 10 040 | 5.11 |
| United Kingdom | 42 804 | 21.78 |

3. Toutes les données relatives aux Euro-Baromètres sont déposées aux "Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences", (1 Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). Elles sont tenues à la disposition des organismes membres du European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), du Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (Michigan) et des chercheurs justifiant d'un intérêt de recherche.

3. All Euro-Barometre data are stored at the Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences (1, Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research.