



STANDARD EUROBAROMETER



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# EUROBAROMETER 59

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

## SPRING 2003

NATIONAL REPORT

IRELAND

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The interpretations and opinions contained in it are solely those of the authors.

## Introduction

This report analyses the Irish data from Eurobarometer 59, making comparisons between Irish public opinion and public opinion in the European Union as a whole and in individual member states as appropriate. The first task is to bring the picture of basic trends in Irish people's attitudes to European integration and to the European Union up to date, that is up to spring 2003<sup>1</sup>. The report then deals with the response of Irish and European public opinion to four major events and developments in the European Union and in international politics as of spring 2003. These developments are, in order of their treatment in this report: the enlargement of the European Union, the Convention on the Future of the European Union, the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament and, finally, the war in Iraq and the implications of that war and of events leading up to it for public support for a European common foreign and security policy.

In order to avoid repetition of points from previous reports in this series, the following box summarises the main findings of the Irish reports on EB57 and EB58 and of two reports on the Nice referendums that were carried out on behalf of the European Commission Representation in Dublin<sup>2</sup>.

### **Background - previous national reports (EB57, EB58 and Nice referendums)**

- The EB57 national report showed that, as of spring 2002, Irish attitudes to the European Union and to Ireland's membership of the Union were characterised by widespread approval of Irish membership, widespread perception of the benefits of membership, including personal benefits, and a widespread positive image of the EU. However, these positive attitudes were accompanied by low levels of engagement with and knowledge of European affairs.
- When account is taken of the evidence in EB58 on both the perceived speed of building Europe and on the preferred speed of building Europe, Ireland moves from the front rank of supporters of integration to the other end of the scale where it is fourth lowest in terms the proportion regarding the pace of integration as too slow. This suggests that, when it comes to the pace of European integration, Irish people tend to prefer the *status quo*. On the other hand, a significant minority (about one-quarter) is prepared to forge full-speed ahead.
- The study of the first referendum on the Nice Treaty showed that differential abstention was the main cause of the defeat of the ratification proposal on that occasion. It also showed that the principal source of abstention was a sense of lack of knowledge and understanding of the issues.
- The study of the second Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty showed a marked improvement in communication and a substantial increase in people's sense that they could understand the issues at stake. The improvements in communication were concentrated in the mass media (television, radio and newspapers) and in interpersonal discussion of the issues. On the other hand, the evidence also showed that the communication process had its limits and that there was very little spillover from an understanding of the issues raised by the Treaty of Nice to a more general understanding of the institutions of the Union and how they work.

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<sup>1</sup> Fieldwork for the EB59 survey in Ireland was carried out between 22nd March and 18th April. In the European Union as a whole, fieldwork was completed between 18th March 2003 and 30th April 2003

<sup>2</sup> The full texts of the reports referred to are available on the following websites:  
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb57/eb57\\_ireland.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb57/eb57_ireland.pdf)  
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb58/eb58\\_ireland.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb58/eb58_ireland.pdf)  
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/public\\_opinion/flash/fl108\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fl108_en.pdf)  
[http://www.euireland.ie/TreatyofNice\(2\)report.pdf](http://www.euireland.ie/TreatyofNice(2)report.pdf)

## **Trends in attitudes to European integration and the European Union**

In spring 2003, the Irish graph of support for European integration, as this is measured by the standard Eurobarometer "membership" indicator (think that country's membership of the European Union is a good thing<sup>3</sup>), registered a third successive fall, going from 83 per cent in autumn 2001 to 67 per cent in spring 2003 (see Figure 1). In parallel with this decline the benefits indicator (believe that Ireland has benefited from membership of the EU) has fallen from 90 per cent to 77 per cent. Cumulatively, these are substantial changes and suggest a significant alteration in the overall orientation of Irish people to European integration. The extent of the alteration can be seen by comparing the gap that existed between Irish and average European support for membership of the European Union in autumn 2001 with the gap that now exists. In autumn 2001 the gap was 27 percentage points; in spring 2003 it was 13 percentage points. In short, while Ireland still has a much more positive attitude to integration than the vast majority of member states, the gap has closed significantly<sup>4</sup> (see Figure 2).

The change in attitude that occurred between autumn 2002 and spring 2003 is confirmed by a variety of other indicators of attitudes to the European Union. Thus, as Figure 3 shows, the image conjured up by the European Union in people's minds was significantly less positive in the spring of this year by comparison with the autumn of the previous year, going from 69 per cent positive in autumn 2002 to 50 per cent positive in spring 2003.

Likewise, Irish people's trust in a wide range of European institutions shows a significant decline between these two time periods. In Figure 4, trust in European institutions is calculated as a net figure (the percentage trusting the institution minus the percentage distrusting the institution). The institutions in question include the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Court of Justice, the Council of Ministers, the European Central Bank, the European Ombudsman and the Convention on the Future of Europe. In the Irish case, all of these institutions have suffered a decline in net trust of nine percentage points or more since autumn 2003. As Figure 4 shows, net trust also tended to decline in the European Union as a whole, but the European-level decline was half or less than half that occurring in Ireland.

Again it must be emphasised that trust in these institutions is substantially more widespread in each and every case in Ireland than in the European Union as a whole. Nonetheless, the

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<sup>3</sup> For the wording of Eurobarometer questions used in this report see Appendix 1 (question numbers are given in the figures and tables. Figures and tables follow the text.

<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately we cannot measure recent change in the third indicator of support for integration displayed in Figure 1 because the question concerned ("If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped would you be very sorry, indifferent or very relieved") has not been asked in the two most recent Eurobarometers.

tendency for Irish public opinion to move towards the European average (and, therefore, downwards) is a striking feature of the most recent Eurobarometer data. In the light of the challenges in relation to further development of European integration that are likely to confront Irish political leaders and policymakers in the near future, the decline in net trust in the Convention on the Future of the European Union (down 11 percentage points) may be of particular concern<sup>5</sup>.

Previous reports in this series have emphasised the importance of the public's knowledge of the European Union. Knowledge of the European Union can be measured subjectively (that is by looking at the respondent's own assessment of his or her knowledge of the EU, its policies and institutions) or objectively, that is by means of a battery of factual questions that seek to measure how much respondents actually know about the European Union. Focusing on the subjective measure and looking at the evidence of the last three Eurobarometers, one can see from Figure 5 that the subjective sense of knowing little or nothing about the European Union has increased significantly in all but three member states between autumn 2002 and spring 2003. In the Irish case the increase is five percentage points. This change places Ireland among the four countries with the most widespread sense of lack of knowledge of the European Union and its policies. The other three countries in this category are the United Kingdom, Portugal and Spain. As emphasised in previous reports in this series, a low level of knowledge of the European Union, whether this be a subjective sense of incomprehension or an objectively measured assessment of the actual level of knowledge, poses particular problems in societies and political systems committed to holding referendums on complex changes in the EU treaties.

### **Attitudes to enlargement**

Irish attitudes to enlargement have been extensively dealt with in previous reports in this series and, accordingly, need not receive detailed treatment in this report. However, it should be noted that EB 59 indicates some slippage in support for enlargement between autumn 2002 and spring 2003 (a decline from 67 per cent in favour to 60 per cent in favour - see Figure 6). Opposition to enlargement has grown by four percentage points over the same period and there was a marginal increase in the percentage giving a don't know response. The changes just noted still leave Irish support for enlargement of the European Union significantly ahead of support in the European Union as a whole.

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<sup>5</sup> Note however, that whereas net trust in the Convention in Ireland has declined from plus 36 percentage points to plus 25 percentage points, in Europe as a whole it was only eight percentage points in autumn 2002 and fell to four percentage points in spring 2003.

## **Perceptions of and attitudes to the Convention on the Future of Europe**

Constitutions and constitutional government are the foundation stones of modern liberal democracies. Overall, it is not surprising therefore that two-thirds of the citizens of the European Union believe that the European Union should have a constitution. On the other hand, despite the fact that constitutions tend to be regarded as a good thing as a matter of principle, there is quite substantial variation around that European average (see Figure 7). Thus support for the principle of a European constitution falls as low as 43 and 44 per cent in Denmark and Finland and goes as high as 77 per cent in Italy. Ireland tends towards the negative end of this spectrum, in the company of the United Kingdom, Finland and Denmark -- in spring 2003, 54 per cent of Irish respondents felt that the European Union should have a constitution. Figure 7 also reveals significant variation over time in regard to the principle of having a constitution for the European Union. The change in the average European view (down two percentage points) masks quite significant falls in support for a European constitution in Finland, Denmark, France, Luxembourg and Ireland. Irish support was down seven percentage points between autumn 2002 and spring 2003.

- **Public awareness and understanding of the role of the Convention**

Endorsement of the general principle of having a European Union constitution can be a very different thing from having any sense of involvement in a process leading to such a constitution or from endorsing any specific proposals emerging from that process. Thus, while almost two-thirds of European citizens support the idea of a European constitution, less than one-third, as of spring 2003, had heard of the Convention on the Future of the European Union (see Figure 8). And only half of that number again (one sixth of the citizens) assented to the view that "we are hearing a lot about the Convention at the moment". Irish citizens score a bit above average in terms of basic awareness of the Convention (39 per cent have heard of it). Given the publicity surrounding the finalisation of the Convention's report and its presentation to the EU summit in June 2003, one would expect that people's awareness of the Convention will have substantially improved between spring 2003 and early summer of 2003. The spring 2003 figures are, however, important as a benchmark against which to judge current and future levels of awareness and knowledge of these issues.

Eurobarometer 59 introduced a series of new questions designed to probe people's understanding of the Convention and its procedures. These items consisted of a series of statements requiring a true/false response. It is inevitable that some respondents engage in a guessing game when faced with a series of items like this and evidence of some successful guessing can be seen from the fact that just over 40 per cent say that it

is true that the national government is represented on the Convention while, as we have just seen, only 30 per cent claimed (in an earlier part of the interview) to have heard about the Convention. Accordingly the reported levels of understanding or awareness of various features of the Convention and its processes displayed in Figure 9 must be regarded as including some element of exaggeration.

In the light of this probable inflation of the figures, the fact that knowledge that governments are represented on the Convention exists among only 2 in every five European and Irish citizens is decidedly worrying. Slightly fewer than 40 per cent (both in the European Union as a whole and in Ireland) know that the Convention is working on proposals to reform the Union. After that, Irish levels of knowledge of specific aspects of the Convention tend to be somewhat better than the levels of knowledge among European citizens as a whole. But, while it may be better, it is not particularly good - only one quarter or thereabouts of Irish citizens say that it is true that citizens will have an opportunity to accept or reject the Convention's proposals, that it is true that EU member states are allowed to modify the Convention's proposals and that the governments of the accession states are represented on the Convention. And, with only two or three months to go to the completion of the work of the Convention, only one in five Irish citizens and less than one in six citizens in the European Union were aware of the impending completion of the Convention's work

While some might regard these items of knowledge as trivial in so far as they relate to specific aspects of the Convention's composition and procedures, the counter argument that an understanding of the Convention and its workings is highly desirable as a basis from which citizens can develop a mature response to the proposals contained in the Convention's report is more plausible. After all, a major purpose behind the establishment of the Convention was to stimulate public involvement and interest in these matters.

- **The issue of one Commissioner per member state**

The evidence also indicates that public opinion is not entirely in sympathy with key aspects of what the Convention proposes. The clearest example of the European public not being in sympathy with the thrust of the Convention's thinking relates to the issue of one Commissioner per member state. Obviously, since fieldwork for this survey was done in March-April 2003 and since the Convention's proposal in relation to be make-up of the European Commission only became clear in mid-June, the question asked in Eurobarometer 59 did not and could not have addressed the precise details of the proposal set out in the Convention's report. It is, however, quite clear from the data in

Eurobarometer 59 that there is strong majority support for the principle of one Commissioner per member state and one can only assume that this support is for one full Commissioner per member state, i.e. one Commissioner with full voting rights. Average support across the European Union as a whole for the principle of one Commissioner per member states ranges from 65 per cent agreement with the statement that "our country's interests would suffer a if there were no [NATIONALITY] Commissioner" to 72 per cent endorsing the statements that "after enlargement there should continue to be at least one Commissioner from each member state" and also endorsing the statement that "every member state should have the right to appoint a Commissioner". As Figure 10 shows, there is a significant large state versus small state polarisation underlying these average EU figures. Thus, support for the proposition that the country's interests would suffer if there were no Commissioner from that country is in excess of 80 per cent in Denmark, Greece, Sweden and Ireland and close to 80 per cent in Finland and Luxembourg. By contrast, support for this proposition falls to a range of 66 to 71 per cent in Italy, the UK and Germany and to 58 and 54 per cent in Spain and France respectively.

- **Selecting the President of the European Commission**

Public opinion is also somewhat out of sympathy with the Convention's design for the process of selecting the President of the Commission. One-third of EU citizens believe that the President of the European Commission should be directly elected by the citizens of Europe, while a further 18 per cent say that the President of the European Commission should be "solely elected" by the European Parliament. Thus 51 per cent support the notion of the President of the Commission having a broad direct or indirect democratic mandate. Support for one or other of these two democratic alternatives is most widespread in Luxembourg, Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands and least common in Finland, the UK, Portugal and Ireland (see Figure 11). Irish public opinion falls into the less democratic/integrationist camp not in virtue of its support for some other alternative but rather in virtue of the large proportion of don't knows on the issue, in this case amounting to almost one in four.

- **The issue of national vetoes**

What amounts in effect to a majority of European citizens is in favour of the retention of the status quo regarding national vetoes. Irish public opinion on this issue is very close to the European average - 50 per cent of Irish respondents felt that a right of veto should be retained in order to preserve essential national interests and 47 per cent of respondents throughout the EU 15 felt likewise (see Figure 12). Public commitment to retention of

national vetoes in some form is substantially greater if we add in the proportion of respondents who feel that the right of veto should be limited to a very few essential areas. Within the European Union as a whole, 68 per cent support the retention of some areas to which a national veto would apply; the corresponding figure in Ireland of 63 per cent. Much stronger support for the retention of either the current set of existing national vetoes or at least some limited set of vetoes is much more widespread in some of the other smaller member states, notably in Greece, Denmark, Austria, Luxembourg and Finland. The fact that Ireland is not placed among this group of countries does not indicate that Irish public opinion is in favour of "giving up the right of veto for all decisions in order to make the European Union more efficient". In fact Irish support for this proposition is among the lowest in the Union. The reason that Irish public opinion is not more closely aligned with opinion in other small member states showing widespread support for retention of national vetoes is that a very large proportion of Irish people gave a don't know response on this particular question (28 per cent don't know).

- **The rotation of the Presidency of the Council**

The move to change the six-month monthly rotation of the presidency of the European Council does, however, appear to have significant public support, at least in so far as the principle of extension of the period of the presidency is concerned. In the EU as a whole less than one-third of respondents support the proposition that "the six-month period of the presidency of the European Council should be retained because it gives each member state a chance to hold the presidency of the European Union on a regular basis" whereas 50 per cent support the proposition that the period of the presidency "should be extended because six months is too short to achieve significant results". Ireland is among the countries that are least supportive of the retention of the present system though, once again, this position is in part a function of the large proportion of don't know responses in Ireland (in this case amounting to 29 per cent).

### **Attitudes to the European Parliament and to the 2004 elections**

Inevitably, the European Parliament ranks quite low on a scale of the perceived impact of institutions of governance (as indeed does the European Union). Whereas over 50 per cent of people see national governments as having a great effect on people like themselves, only 21 per cent take the same view regarding the impact of the European Parliament. On aggregate, perceptions of the impact of the Parliament are somewhat more widespread in Ireland than in the Union as a whole (see Figure 14 and 15). The extent of perception of the Parliament as having a great effect on people's lives is mirrored in the proportion of people who regard European Parliament elections as really important. Irish and European



responses in this regard are almost identical, with 20 and 18 per cent in *total agreement* that EP elections are really important and 45 and 47 per cent respectively *tending to agree* that they are important (see Figure 16).

- **Assessment of and contact with MEPs**

On the other hand, Irish assessments of MEPs are substantially more favourable than assessment among people in the Union as a whole - overall, 50 per cent of Irish respondents agree with the proposition that "the members of the European Parliament are good at protecting your interests" compared to 35 per cent of respondents in the Union as a whole (see Figure 16). Ireland is, however, only slightly above average when it comes to the visibility of MEPs. Fifty-seven per cent of Irish people report having had some sight of or contact with MEPs (including simply hearing about or seeing MEPs in the media) since the last election. The corresponding figure for the European Union as a whole is 53 per cent whereas it is 76 per cent in Denmark and 67 per cent in Finland. Particularly low levels of contact are found in Britain, former East Germany and Portugal (see Figure 17). The proportion of respondents in Ireland reporting some degree of contact with an MEP/MEPs increased between spring 2002 and spring 2003; but this is only as it should be given the longer time span implied by the use of the phrase "since the last election". On the other hand, there are some states that show no evidence of an increase in contact with MEPs and one region (former East Germany) actually shows a significant decline (see Figure 17).

The contrasts in the patterns of contact between MEPs and citizens across the member states are even more striking when account is taken of the different types of contact and of the extent to which citizens may experience more than one form of contact (see Figure 18). The possibility of multiple contacts and hence of multiple responses to the question underlying the data in Figure 18 mean that the percentages in the figure can and do in some cases add up to a lot more than 100 (essentially because some individuals are counted more than once). The proportions of people having multiple contacts with MEPs are particularly low in Portugal, Britain, Italy, East Germany and Greece. At the top end of the scale of (multiple) contact, one finds Luxembourg and Denmark, followed at some distance by Sweden and Finland, followed, again at some distance, by Ireland. The evidence in Figure 18 brings out more clearly the fact that Ireland is above the European average in terms of the level of contact between MEPs and the citizens but also clearly shows that the overall level of such contact in Ireland is well below that found in the three Scandinavian countries and in Luxembourg. Figure 18 also shows that one of the factors that differentiates Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden and Finland from the rest of the EU,

including Ireland, is the higher rate of exposure to the activities of MEPs through reports in newspapers and magazines.

- **Commitment to participation in European Parliament elections**

In assessing evidence on commitment to voting in European Parliament elections in the Irish case, it must be borne in mind that the 2004 election in Ireland will coincide with local elections and that the level of turnout in the European Parliament election is likely to be boosted at least to some extent by this concurrence<sup>6</sup>. However, this does not dispense with the importance of encouraging people to vote in the European Parliament election as such as, without such interest and such commitment, the value of participation as a factor in developing a relationship between the people and the European institutions would be greatly diminished.

One must also bear in mind the fact that, at the time of interviewing, the European Parliament elections were more than a year away. Given this, it may not seem particularly surprising that a strong commitment to voting is found among relatively few respondents - in spring 2003, only 28 per cent of Irish respondent placed themselves at point 10 on a scale on which "10" indicated that they "would definitely vote". What is somewhat more puzzling, however, is that this sense of strong commitment to participation in European Parliament elections declined between autumn 2002 and spring 2003 (from 37 to 28 percent). This decline becomes more understandable when account is taken of the evidence, also from Eurobarometer 59, that definite commitment to voting *in a hypothetical national election* declined during the same period by an almost identical margin (from 45 per cent to 37 per cent). In short, the indications of any increased problems with propensity to vote in the European Parliament election of 2004 would seem to be attributable to domestic rather than specifically European factors (see Figure 19).

- **Factors affecting participation in EP elections**

Finally in regard to the European Parliament, EB 59 provides some evidence of the kinds of factors that will affect the level of participation in European Parliament elections in 2004. This evidence confirms the value of the distinction between circumstantial and voluntary abstention and the related distinction between facilitating turnout and mobilising turnout. The evidence arises from a series of questions each of which poses a mini-scenario relating to voting in European Parliament elections and asks the respondent whether each scenario or hypothetical factor would affect his or her

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<sup>6</sup> However, since turnout in local elections in Ireland has been declining, the boost to EP turnout deriving from the concurrence of the two elections may not be as great as it would have been twenty years ago.

likelihood of voting. It is important to emphasise that most of the hypothetical factors are not on anyone's immediate policy agenda and are certainly not going to be implemented between now and June 2004. The crucial interpretative point is that the proportion who say that a particular hypothetical factor would increase their likelihood of voting provides a broad indication of *the extent to which the current absence of that particular factor inhibits voting*. Accordingly, bearing in mind that these are subjective and hypothetical estimates, the data are nonetheless useful in drawing attention to factors that potentially affect the level of turnout in an EP election.

As suggested above, such factors can be thought of in terms of the distinction between facilitating and mobilising turnout (see Figure 20). Facilitating factors are those that make voting easier; mobilising factors are those that provide incentives to vote<sup>7</sup>. In terms of facilitating factors, the evidence indicating that the availability of polling stations at workplaces and in shopping locations would make more of a difference to the level of turnout in Ireland than in other countries suggests that lack of time and the general inconvenience of voting have more of a negative effect on turnout in Ireland than elsewhere in the European Union. The evidence also indicates that the difficulty involved in registering to vote (in those countries where voting is not automatic) is also an inhibiting factor and that this has a somewhat greater effect in Ireland than in the other countries involved. In short, the evidence suggests that the problem of circumstantial abstention is greater in Ireland than in the European Union as a whole and, hence, that there is a particular need for improvements in the facilitation of voting in the Irish case.

In regard to the mobilisation of political participation, the data confirm the obvious point that the concurrence of other elections helps to mobilise participation, as does the feeling of participating simultaneously in Europe-wide elections. However, the evidence suggests that the potential boost to turnout that might be brought about by the inclusion of citizens from other member states as candidates in the election is likely to be marginal.

### **The Iraq War and attitudes to the United States and to a European CFSP**

The beginning of fieldwork for EB59 coincided with the commencement of the war in Iraq. Accordingly, the survey was conducted during a period of heightened attention to and anxiety about international relations and issues of war and peace. One would anticipate that these events would have had an effect on European's evaluations of the role of the United

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<sup>7</sup> For discussion of this distinction see Jean Blondel, Richard Sinnott and Pelle Svensson, *People and Parliament in the European Union*, Oxford University Press, 1998 and Richard Sinnott 'Electoral participation/abstention: a framework for research and policy-development', PART-COM Working Paper, 2003, <http://www.ucd.ie/~dempart/workingpapers/framework.pdf>.

States in the international system and that there might have been some carry over from this into attitudes to a European common foreign and security policy. The autumn 2002 and spring 2003 Eurobarometers both carried a series of questions on evaluations of the US role in relation to peace in the world, the fight against terrorism, growth in the world economy, the fight against poverty in the world and protection of the environment. All five items were discussed at some length in the Irish national report on Eurobarometer 58. In the present report we focus on the first two items - peace in the world and the fight against terrorism.

- **Evaluation of the US in relation to peace in the world**

Figure 21 shows the net evaluation of the role of the US in relation to peace in the world. Net evaluation is arrived at by subtracting the percentage of negative responses from the percentage of positive response. In the case of the peace in the world item, only 2 European countries show a positive net evaluation (United Kingdom at plus 14 percentage points and Denmark at plus seven percentage points). Leaving Ireland aside for the moment, the data in Figure 21 suggest that, apart from these positive evaluations, there are 3 groups of countries defined by three levels of net negative evaluation of the role of the US. The first group might be described as a somewhat negative ranging from -14 percentage points in the Netherlands to minus 24 percentage points in Portugal. As well as these two countries this group includes Luxembourg Sweden and Italy. The second group shows net negative evaluations running from minus 45 percentage points to minus fifty three percentage points in Austria and Finland respectively and including Germany Belgium and Spain in between. The final set of countries comprises just two - France at minus 61 percentage points and Greece at minus 87 percentage points. Given these indications of the extensive negative assessments of the role of the US in relation to peace in the world, Irish public opinion is clearly located more towards the pro U.S. end of this scale at minus 5 percentage points.

- **Evaluation of the role of the US in relation to the fight against terrorism**

The picture regarding net evaluations of the role of the United States in relation to the fight against terrorism is quite different (see Figure 21). Only four countries make a net negative evaluation of the United States in this regard - Austria at minus 14 points, Spain at minus 19 points, France at minus 18 points and Greece at minus 70. In the remainder of the member states, however, the positive net evaluation ranges from 51 per cent in the case of the United Kingdom to 5 per cent in the case of Portugal. Ireland lies about halfway between these two proportions with a net positive evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to the fight against terrorism of plus 23 percentage points.

- **Change in evaluations of the role of the US, autumn 2002 - spring 2003**

Obviously, a major source of interest lies in the change, if any, which occurred in relation to both these indicators between autumn 2002 and spring 2003. As Figure 22 shows, changes in the net evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world occurred in a majority of the member states and the vast bulk of the change that occurred was in a negative direction. Denmark is the only country to show what might be regarded as a statistically significant net improvement in the evaluation of the role of the United States in this regard. The other countries on that side of Figure 21 (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg) can be regarded as not registering any statistically significant change, with the exception of the improvement of eight percentage points in the net evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to the fight against terrorism in the Netherlands.

Moving from left to right, Figure 21 then shows a group of states with statistically significant but still fairly minor disimprovements in net evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world. These countries are: Ireland, Sweden and Portugal. The remaining member states show disimprovement in evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to peace ranging from minus 18 percentage points in Austria to minus 35 percentage points in Belgium. Note that, in contrast to Figure 21, Greece and France are not in this case at the extreme end of the scale, if only for the obvious reason that, as of autumn 2002, the views of their populations regarding the role of the United States were already very substantially negative.

One can summarise Ireland's position on these two issues as follows. In the case of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world, Irish public opinion moved from a net positive evaluation of four percentage points in autumn 2002 to a net negative evaluation of minus 5 percentage points in spring 2003. On the question of the fight against terrorism, the size of the movement of Irish public opinion was somewhat greater (a downward movement of 14 percentage points as compared with a downward movement of 9 percentage points in the case of the peace in the world item).

- **Fear of potential international and global problems**

Eurobarometers 58 and 59 also make it possible to track changes in the mood of Irish and European citizens in relation to a range of fears concerning the international and global situation. The list of potential objects of fear ranged from an accident in a nuclear power station to a world war and included such things as organised crime, international terrorism, epidemics and ethnic conflict (for the full list of 10 potential objects of fear see Figure 23). One might have expected that, in a period of heightened international

tension, fearfulness in general on the part of the public might grow and certainly that fears in relation to the direct or indirect effects of war might increase. In fact, in the case of Irish public opinion, the level of fear declined significantly between autumn 2002 and spring 2003 across nine of the 10 objects listed. The exception was fear of epidemics, which went from 57 to 55 per cent - a statistically insignificant difference. Taking these changes into account shows that the greatest source of fear on the part of Irish public opinion is fear of an accident in a nuclear power station. This, no doubt, reflects both the proximity of Sellafield to the densely inhabited east coast of Ireland and to the publicity that the issue of an extensive nuclear facility in such close proximity to Ireland gives rise.

With three exceptions, the levels of fear expressed by the Irish people in relation to the 10 potential sources of danger considered in Eurobarometer 59 are either lower than or the same as the level of fear expressed by the citizens of the European Union as a whole. Thus, for example, while 80 per cent of citizens of the European Union say that they are afraid of international terrorism, only 67 per cent of Irish people express a similar fear. The three exceptional items all focus on one particular area - the issue of a nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities. While one-third (65 per cent) of Europeans say that they are afraid of an accident in a nuclear power station, three-quarters (76 per cent) of Irish people acknowledge such fears. In the case of fear of an accidental launch of a nuclear missile, 65 per cent of Irish people harbour this fear, compared to 57 per cent of the citizens of the EU as a whole. The third nuclear item is nuclear conflict in Europe. Here the difference between Ireland and the EU as a whole is marginal but is in the same direction, i.e., a tendency for Irish fears in regard to nuclear issues to outstrip those of their fellow European citizens.

In summary, Irish fears about developments in the international system tend to have diminished significantly between autumn 2002 and spring 2003 and, with one notable exceptional areas (nuclear issues) tend to be at a significantly lower level than among European citizens as a whole.

- **Changes in attitudes to EU decision-making on defence issues**

Turning to the issue of whether the onset of the Iraq war had the effect of encouraging Europeans to think more seriously about a European security and defence policy, there is some evidence of increased support in the majority of member states for defence decisions being made by the European Union (see Figure 25 -- the question related to whether decisions concerning European defence policy should be taken by national governments, by NATO or by the European Union). The average increase in support for EU decision-making is a modest but significant five percentage points. Several states

show increases in support for European decision-making in excess of this average, including France (up eight percentage points), Belgium (up seven percentage points) and Finland (up 11 percentage points). Support for European Union decision-making declined significantly in just one state (Austria). Ireland together with Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg showed what amounts effectively to be no change (up from 31 per cent to 33 per cent in the Irish case).

- **Attitudes to the development of a European foreign, security and defence policy**

A new set of Eurobarometer items dealing with the issues of a common foreign, security and defence policy allows us to examine these issues in greater depth. The individual questions were prefaced with the following statement "The European Union already has a common security and foreign policy and a European security and defence policy. There is now a debate about how much further these should be developed. Do you tend to agree or disagree with each of the following statements". The results of this question for Ireland and the EU as a whole are shown in Figure 26. With the exception of two items, the European public as a whole shows widespread support for the various aspects of the development of a common security and foreign policy and of the European security and defence policy listed in the question. The two items that fail to produce substantial majority support at the European level are the proposition that member states that have opted for neutrality should have a say in European Union foreign policy and the proposition that countries that will join the European Union in 2004 as a result of enlargement should already have a say in European Union foreign policy.

Not surprisingly, at least in relation to the first of these two items, there is a substantial divergence between Irish public opinion and public opinion in the Union as a whole - sixty per cent of Irish respondents agree with the inclusion of neutral states whereas such inclusion is supported by only 51 per cent in the Union as a whole. Irish support for wide participation in the formulation of EU foreign policy extends beyond support for participation by states that have a tradition of neutrality. Thus, Irish support for participation in EU foreign policy making by the accession countries is 48 per cent, compared to 33 per cent in the European Union as a whole.

On most other issues listed in Figure 12, Ireland is in fact remarkably close to the average European view. However, there are also two exceptions to this statement. Irish public opinion is significantly less supportive of the proposition that when an international crisis occurs, European Union member states should agree a common position (Ireland, 74 per cent in agreement; EU 15, 83 per cent in agreement). The second exception

relates to the proposition that the European Union should have a rapid military reaction force that can be sent quickly to trouble spots when an international crisis occurs; Irish agreement with this proposition is 61 per cent compared to 69 per cent in the European Union as a whole. Overall, however, and taking account of the exceptions noted, what is remarkable about these figures is the clear majority Irish support for the development of a common foreign and security policy.

- **Dimensions of attitudes to a European CFSP**

Attitudes to a common foreign and security policy can be further clarified by means of a factor analysis of the eleven items in Figure 26<sup>8</sup>. This analysis suggests that there are three dimensions underlying responses to the 11 items (see Table 1). The first dimension is that of support for a comprehensive common foreign and security policy that would include a rapid military reaction force, an EU foreign minister, an EU common position in international crises, common asylum and immigration policies and a seat for the EU on the UN Security Council. The second dimension can best be described as attitudes to an independent and ethical foreign policy, as it is based on the two items referring to guaranteeing or working for human-rights and the item supporting the notion of an EU foreign policy independent of US foreign policy. The third and final factor or dimension measures people's attitudes to participation in the formulation of EU foreign policy, i.e., whether or not the policy-making process should include neutral states and accession countries.

- **Public opinion in the member states on three aspects of the CFSP**

The factor analysis just summarised enables us to calculate the average score of each member state on each of the three dimensions. Figures 27a and 27b plot these average scores, beginning with a plot of the location of member states in a two-dimensional space defined by attitude to a comprehensive common foreign and security policy and attitude to an independent and ethical foreign policy. This graph indicates that the member states are fairly neatly divided into three groups in terms of their support for a comprehensive common foreign and security policy. The advanced group, i.e. those most in favour of a comprehensive common foreign and security policy include Greece, Italy, France and the Benelux countries. The middle group on this dimension is made up of Germany, Austria Spain, Portugal and Britain. Ireland lies firmly in the middle of this

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<sup>8</sup> Factor analysis is a widely used statistical technique that examines the relationships or associations between a given set of variables (in this case the responses to the questionnaire items) in order to discover the common 'factors' or dimensions underlying the pattern of responses. The interpretation of the factors or dimensions is based on the contribution of each variable (questionnaire item) to the factor as indicated by the magnitude of the factor "loading" for that item (loadings are shown in the factor analysis table in the text).



middle group. The group of member-states opposed to a comprehensive European foreign and security policy comprises Finland, Denmark and Sweden.

The distribution of member states on the independent and ethical foreign policy dimension takes the form of a continuum rather than of discrete groups of countries with clearly different views. However, the ends of the continuum are clearly identifiable - support for an independent and ethical foreign policy is most widespread in the Scandinavian countries, in Greece and in former East Germany, whereas strongest opposition to this view is found in Britain and, to a lesser extent in Portugal. Ireland is in the middle of this dimension, leaning very slightly towards the opposition pole. On the dimension measuring attitudes to participation in the formulation of foreign policy there is a very clear polarisation between, on the one hand, Ireland, followed closely by Austria and Portugal and, on the other hand, Denmark and the Netherlands. The countries in the former group are highly supportive of wide participation while Denmark and the Netherlands are strongly opposed.

## **Summary and conclusion**


A detailed summary of the findings of this analysis of EB59 is provided in the executive summary that accompanies this report. The highlights of the analysis can be briefly summarized as follows:

- Eurobarometer 59 points to a third successive fall in Irish support for European integration. Despite this, Irish support for integration remains significantly ahead of support in the European Union as a whole.
- Irish people's confidence in their knowledge and understanding of the EU continues to be problem, Ireland being the country with the fourth largest proportion of people declaring very low levels of knowledge and with exceptionally high levels of don't know responses on specific policy issues.
- There is a lot of work to be done, both in Ireland and throughout the Union to inform the public about the process of producing a constitution for the Union and to persuade the public of the merits of some of the European Convention's key proposals.
- With European Parliament elections just around the corner, Irish people are substantially more positive in their assessment of their MEPs than are people in the Union as a whole. Ireland is, however, only somewhat above average when it comes to the visibility of MEPs.
- Indications in EB59 of some decline in the propensity to vote in European Parliament elections would seem to be attributable to domestic rather than European factors. EB59 also provides evidence on the potential impact of voter facilitation and voter mobilisation efforts on turnout in EP elections.
- Only two member states show a positive net evaluation of the role of the US in relation to peace in the world (United Kingdom at plus 14 percentage points and Denmark at plus seven percentage points). Ireland, which had been among the minority of member states with a positive evaluation of the US in this regard moved

from a net positive evaluation of plus 4 in autumn 2002 to minus 5 in spring 2003. The majority of member states showed much more substantial movement in a negative direction.


- Over this same period, there is some evidence of increased support in the majority of member states for defence decisions being made by the European Union. Ireland, together with Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg, showed no change.
- Member states can be divided into 3 groups in terms of public support for a comprehensive common foreign and security policy. The advanced group includes Greece, Italy, France and the Benelux countries. The middle group is made up of Germany, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Britain and Ireland, Ireland being smack in the middle of this middle group. The group of states opposed to a comprehensive CFSP comprises Finland, Denmark and Sweden.
- Ireland also takes a more or less middle position on the dimension of attitudes to an independent and ethical foreign policy but takes a very strong and distinctive stand on a dimension measuring attitudes to participation by neutral countries and accession countries in the formulation of European foreign policy, with a clear polarisation on this issue between Irish public opinion, which is in favour of such participation, and public opinion in Denmark and the Netherlands, which is against.
- European elites face into a year of intensive activity (inter-governmental negotiations on constitutional issues, EU enlargement, the June 2004 elections, global trade negotiations, the rehabilitation of the trans-Atlantic relationship and, for Irish European elites, the EU presidency in the first half of 2004). In this context, Eurobarometer 59 provides a timely reminder of the need to bridge the elite-mass gap in regard to the issues involved. This holds for both Ireland and for the vast majority of the other member states. Eurobarometer 59 also gives a telling indication of the gains in terms of the legitimacy of European integration that would ensue if this were successfully achieved.

Figure 1 Trends in support for European integration - Ireland and the EU, 1973-2003




Source: EB3 – EB59.1; Dissolution indicator for Ireland for Autumn 2002 from ECR Nice2 Survey (For the wording of all questions from EB59.1, see Appendix A)

Figure 2 Attitude to membership of the European Union by member state, Spring 2003  
(in descending order of a good thing)




Source: EB59.1, Q.9

Figure 3 Positive and negative image of the EU - Ireland and EU15, Spring 2002, Autumn 2002 and Spring 2003




Source: EB57.1, Q.15; EB58.1, Q.14; EB59.1, Q.11

Figure 4 Net trust (proportion trust minus proportion distrust) in European institutions - Ireland and EU15, Autumn 2002 and Spring 2003 (in descending order of Irish trust, Spring 2003)




Source: EB58.1, Q.21; EB59.1, Q.17

Figure 5 Assessment of own knowledge of the EU, its policies and institutions (percentage scoring 1-3 on 10 point scale), Autumn 2002 and Spring 2003 (in descending order of Spring 2003)



Source: EB58.1, Q.9; EB59.1, Q7


Figure 6 Attitude to the enlargement of the European Union to include new countries - Ireland and EU15, Spring 2002, Autumn 2002 and Spring 2003



Source: EB57.1, Q.25; EB58.1, Q.26; EB59.1, Q.23




Figure 7 Opinion that the European Union should have a Constitution, Autumn 2002 and Spring 2003  
(in descending order of Spring 2003)




Source: EB58.1, Q.49; EB59.1, Q.30

Figure 8 Awareness of the Convention on the future of the European Union (heard of and hearing a lot about), Spring 2003  
(in descending order of heard of)




Source: EB59.1, Q.15.10 and Q.32.1

Figure 9 Perceptions of the work and role of the Convention on the future of Europe - Ireland and EU15, Spring 2003  
(in descending order of Irish perceptions)




Source: EB59.1, Q.31

Figure 10 Attitude to issue of one Commissioner per member state, Spring 2003  
(in descending order of interests would suffer)




Source: EB59.1, Q.33 EB59.1

Figure 11 Attitudes to the selection of the President of the European Commission, Spring 2003  
(in descending order of sum of elected by citizens and elected by EP)




Source: EB59.1, Q.34

Figure 12 Attitude to each member state's right of veto in certain areas, Spring 2003  
(in descending order of sum of should be retained and should be limited to certain areas)




Source: EB59.1, Q.36

Figure 13 Attitude to six-month period of the Presidency of the European Council, Spring 2003  
(in descending order of should be retained)



Source: EB59.1, Q.35


Figure 14 Perceived effect of activities and decisions on people like self - Ireland, Spring 2003  
(in descending order of great effect)



Source: EB59.1, Q.42




Figure 15 Perceived effect of activities and decisions on people like self - EU15, Spring 2003  
(in descending order of great effect)




Source: EB59.1, Q.42

Figure 16 Attitudes to EP elections and to MEPs - Ireland and EU15, Spring 2003




Source: EB59.1, Q.43

Figure 17 Proportions of respondents 18 years and over having some contact with members of the European Parliament, Spring 2002 and Spring 2003 (in descending order of Spring 2003)




Source: EB57.1, Q.51; EB59.1, Q.40

Figure 18 Contact with members of the European Parliament, Spring 2003 (respondents aged 18 and over in descending order of cumulative percentage of respondents indicating any contact (includes multiple mentions))




Source: EB59.1, Q.40

Figure 19 Likelihood of voting in general and in European Parliament elections - Ireland, Autumn 2002 and Spring 2003 (respondents aged 18 and over)




Source: EB57.1, Q.44 and Q.46; EB59.1, Q.38 and Q.39

Figure 20 Hypothetical facilitating and mobilising factors affecting likelihood of voting in European Parliament elections - Ireland and EU15, Spring 2003 (respondents aged 18 and over)




Source: EB59.1, Q.45

Figure 21 Net evaluation (positive minus negative responses) of the role of the US in relation to peace in the world and the fight against terrorism, Spring 2003 (in descending order of evaluation of peace in the world)



Source: EB59.1, Q.27


Figure 22 Change in net evaluation of the role of the US (positive minus negative responses) between Autumn 2002 and Spring 2003 in relation to peace in the world and fight against terrorism (in descending order of change)



Source: EB58.1, Q.48; EB59.1, Q.27




Figure 23 Fear of potential international/global problems - Ireland and EU15, Spring 2003  
(in descending order of Irish fear)




Source: EB59.1, Q.6

Figure 24 Fear of potential international/global problems - Ireland, Autumn 2002 and Spring 2003  
(in descending order of fear, Spring 2003)




Source: EB59.1, Q.6

Figure 25 Preference for European Union decision-making on defence policy, Autumn 2002 and Spring 2003  
(in descending order of Spring 2003)



Source: EB58.1, Q.30; EB59.1, Q.25

Figure 26 Agreement with aspects of the development of EU foreign, security and defence policy - Ireland and EU15, Spring 2003  
(in descending order of EU agreement)




Source: EB59.1, Q.24

is of items relating to aspects of the development of EU foreign, security and defence policy - EU15, Spring 2003


	Component		
	(1) Comprehensive CFSP	(2) Independent ethical foreign policy	(3) Wide participation in EU foreign policy making
military reaction force in international crisis	<b>0.692</b>	-0.021	0.101
Foreign Minister	<b>0.675</b>	0.109	0.260
ould agree common position in international crisis	<b>0.639</b>	0.287	0.038
on asylum policy towards asylum seekers	<b>0.620</b>	0.418	-0.026
on immigration policy towards people from outside EU	<b>0.617</b>	0.449	-0.021
eat on UN Security Council	<b>0.587</b>	0.205	0.301
Human Rights in each member state	0.170	<b>0.803</b>	0.103
Human Rights around the world	0.175	<b>0.756</b>	0.147
ld be independent of US foreign policy	0.172	<b>0.641</b>	0.130
n 2004 should already have say in EU foreign policy	0.163	0.022	<b>0.782</b>
s should have say in EU foreign policy	0.091	0.260	<b>0.745</b>
ed	36.448	9.992	9.667

ncipal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

*Figure 27a* Location of member states on two dimensions of attitude to the CFSP - support for a comprehensive CFSP and support for an independent and ethical foreign policy, Spring 2003



*Figure 27b* Location of member states on two dimensions of attitude to the CFSP - support for a comprehensive CFSP and support for wide participation in EU foreign policy making, Spring 2003



Source: EB59.1, Q.24

## Appendix A

### European Opinion Research Group – 59.1 – Spring 2003

A. YOUR SURVEY NUMBER

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B. COUNTRY CODE

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C. OUR SURVEY NUMBER

5	9	1
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D. INTERVIEW NUMBER

--	--	--	--	--	--

Q.1. What is your nationality? Please tell me the country(ies) that applies(y).  
(MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

Belgium	1,	—> Q.2
Denmark	2,	
Germany	3,	
Greece	4,	
Spain	5,	
France	6,	
Ireland	7,	
Italy	8,	
Luxembourg	9,	
Netherlands	10,	
Portugal	11,	
United Kingdom (Great Britain, Northern Ireland)	12,	
Austria	13,	
Sweden	14,	
Finland	15,	
Other countries	16,	—> Close interview
DK	17,	

EB59.0 - Q.1. - TREND

Q.2. When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?

Frequently ..... 1  
Occasionally ..... 2  
Never ..... 3  
DK ..... 4

EB58.1 - Q.2. - TREND

Q.3. When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen...? (READ OUT)

often ..... 1  
from time to time ..... 2  
rarely ..... 3  
never ..... 4  
DK ..... 5

EB58.1 - Q.3. - TREND



Q.4. I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?

	READ OUT	TEND TO TRUST	TEND NOT TO TRUST	DK
1	The press	1	2	3
2	Radio	1	2	3
3	Television	1	2	3
4	Justice/the (NATIONALITY) legal system	1	2	3
5	The police	1	2	3
6	The army	1	2	3
7	The religious institutions	1	2	3
8	Trade unions	1	2	3
9	Political parties	1	2	3
10	Big companies	1	2	3
11	The (NATIONALITY) government	1	2	3
12	The (NATIONALITY) Parliament (USE PROPER NAME FOR LOWER HOUSE - FR: "ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE", GE: "BUNDESTAG", UK: "HOUSE OF COMMONS")	1	2	3
13	The European Union	1	2	3
14	The United Nations	1	2	3
15	Charitable or voluntary organisations	1	2	3

EB57.1 - Q.8. - TREND MODIFIED

Q.5. What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?  
(SHOW CARD - READ OUT - MAX. 2 ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

Crime.....1,  
Public transports .....2,  
Economic Situation.....3,  
Rising prices/inflation .....4,  
Taxation .....5,  
Unemployment .....6,  
Terrorism .....7,  
Defence/Foreign affairs .....8,  
Housing .....9,  
Immigration .....10,  
Health care system.....11,  
The educational system .....12,  
Pensions .....13,  
Protecting the environment .....14,  
Other (SPONTANEOUS) .....15,  
DK .....16,

EB57.2 - Q.2. - TREND

Q.6. Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?

	READ OUT	AFRAID	NOT AFRAID	DK
1	A world war	1	2	3
2	A nuclear conflict in Europe	1	2	3
3	A conventional war in Europe (not nuclear, bacteriological or chemical)	1	2	3
4	The accidental launch of a nuclear missile	1	2	3
5	An accident in a nuclear power station	1	2	3
6	Spread of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction	1	2	3
7	Ethnic conflicts in Europe	1	2	3
8	International terrorism	1	2	3
9	Organised crime	1	2	3
10	Epidemics	1	2	3

EB58.1 - Q.29. - TREND

- Q.7. Using this scale, how much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions? (SHOW CARD WITH SCALE)

KNOW NOTHING AT ALL								KNOW A GREAT DEAL		DK
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11

EB58.1 - Q.9. - TREND

- Q.8. In general, how would you prefer to get information about the European Union? How else? (SHOW CARD - READ OUT - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

- A short leaflet, that just gives an overview ..... 1,  
A more detailed brochure ..... 2,  
A book giving you a complete description ..... 3,  
A video tape ..... 4,  
On the Internet ..... 5,  
A CD-Rom ..... 6,  
A computer terminal allowing you to consult databases ..... 7,  
From the television ..... 8,  
From the radio ..... 9,  
From daily newspapers ..... 10,  
From other newspapers, magazines ..... 11,  
From posters ..... 12,  
I do not want information about the European Union (SPONTANEOUS) ..... 13,  
None of these ways (SPONTANEOUS) ..... 14,  
DK ..... 15,

EB58.1 - Q.11. - TREND

- Q.9. Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is...?

- a good thing ..... 1  
a bad thing ..... 2  
neither good nor bad ..... 3  
DK ..... 4

EB58.1 - Q.12. - TREND

Q.10. Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?

Benefited ..... 1  
 Not benefited ..... 2  
 DK ..... 3

EB58.1 - Q.13. - TREND

Q.11. In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?

Very positive ..... 1  
 Fairly positive ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Fairly negative ..... 4  
 Very negative ..... 5  
 DK ..... 6

EB58.1 - Q.14. - TREND

Q.12. In the near future, do you see yourself as...? (SHOW CARD - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

(NATIONALITY) only ..... 1  
 (NATIONALITY) and European ..... 2  
 European and (NATIONALITY) ..... 3  
 European only ..... 4  
 DK ..... 5

EB58.1 - Q.32. - TREND

Q.13. What does the European Union mean to you personally? (SHOW CARD - READ OUT - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE - ROTATE TOP TO BOTTOM/BOTTOM TO TOP)

Peace .....	1,
Economic prosperity .....	2,
Social protection .....	3,
Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the European Union .....	4,
Cultural diversity .....	5,
Stronger say in the world .....	6,
Euro .....	7,
Unemployment .....	8,
Bureaucracy .....	9,
Waste of money .....	10,
Loss of our cultural identity .....	11,
More crime .....	12,
Not enough control at external frontiers .....	13,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) .....	14,
DK .....	15,

EB57.1 - Q.18. - TREND

Q.14. It has been suggested that the name of the European Union be changed. Of the following options, which do you prefer? (SHOW CARD - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

The European Community .....	1
United Europe .....	2
The United States of Europe .....	3
The United Nations of Europe .....	4
No change, it should remain the European Union .....	5
Some other name .....	6
DK .....	7

EB59.1 - NEW

Q.15. Have you heard of...?

	READ OUT	YES	NO	DK
1	the European Parliament	1	2	3
2	the European Commission	1	2	3
3	the Council of Ministers of the European Union	1	2	3
4	the Court of Justice of the European Union	1	2	3
5	the European Ombudsman	1	2	3
6	the European Central Bank	1	2	3
7	the European Court of Auditors	1	2	3
8	the Committee of the Regions of the European Union	1	2	3
9	the Economic and Social Committee of the European Union	1	2	3
10	the Convention on the future of the European Union	1	2	3

EB58.1 - Q.19. - TREND

Q.16. And for each of the following European bodies, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?

	READ OUT	IMPORTANT	NOT IMPORTANT	DK
1	The European Parliament	1	2	3
2	The European Commission	1	2	3
3	The Council of Ministers of the European Union	1	2	3
4	The Court of Justice of the European Union	1	2	3
5	The European Ombudsman	1	2	3
6	The European Central Bank	1	2	3
7	The European Court of Auditors	1	2	3
8	The Committee of the Regions of the European Union	1	2	3
9	The Economic and Social Committee of the European Union	1	2	3
10	The Convention on the future of the European Union	1	2	3

EB58.1 - Q.20. - TREND MODIFIED

Q.17. And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?

	READ OUT	TEND TO TRUST	TEND NOT TO TRUST	DK
1	The European Parliament	1	2	3
2	The European Commission	1	2	3
3	The Council of Ministers of the European Union	1	2	3
4	The Court of Justice of the European Union	1	2	3
5	The European Ombudsman	1	2	3
6	The European Central Bank	1	2	3
7	The European Court of Auditors	1	2	3
8	The Committee of the Regions of the European Union	1	2	3
9	The Economic and Social Committee of the European Union	1	2	3
10	The Convention on the future of the European Union	1	2	3

EB58.1 - Q.21. - TREND

**ASK Q.18. AND Q.19. ONLY IN GREECE**

Q.18. In the European Union, each member state, in turn, becomes the President of the Council of Ministers for six months. Right now, it's the turn of Greece. Have you recently read in the newspapers or heard on the radio or television anything about the Greek presidency?

Yes ..... 1  
 No.....2  
 DK .....3

EB58.1 - Q.23. - TREND

Q.19. Whether you have heard about it or not, do you think it is important or not that Greece is President of the Council of Ministers of the European Union at this time? Would you say it is...? (READ OUT)

very important ..... 1  
 important .....2  
 not very important.....3  
 not at all important.....4  
 DK .....5

EB58.1 - Q.24. - TREND

# **ASK ALL**

- Q.20. a) On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)? (SHOW CARD WITH SCALE)
- b) And how about the way democracy works in the European Union? (SHOW SAME CARD)

READ OUT		VERY SATISFIED	FAIRLY SATISFIED	NOT VERY SATISFIED	NOT AT ALL SATISFIED	DK
a)	In (OUR COUNTRY)	1	2	3	4	5
b)	In the European Union	1	2	3	4	5

EB58.1 - Q.22. a. & b. - TREND

- Q.21. Now, I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me if, in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?

	READ OUT	PRIORITY	NOT A PRIORITY	DK
1	Successful enlargement of the European Union to include new member countries (N)	1	2	3
2	Getting closer to European citizens, for example by giving them more information about the European Union, its policies and its institutions	1	2	3
3	Successfully implementing the single European currency, the euro	1	2	3
4	Fighting poverty and social exclusion	1	2	3
5	Protecting the environment	1	2	3
6	Guaranteeing the quality of food products	1	2	3
7	Protecting consumers and guaranteeing the quality of other products	1	2	3
8	Fighting unemployment	1	2	3
9	Reforming the institutions of the European Union and the way they work	1	2	3
10	Fighting organised crime and drug trafficking	1	2	3
11	Asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the European Union around the world	1	2	3
12	Maintaining peace and security in Europe	1	2	3
13	Guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of democracy in Europe	1	2	3
14	Fighting terrorism	1	2	3
15	Fighting illegal immigration	1	2	3

EB58.1 - Q.27. - TREND MODIFIED



- Q.22. a) For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

	READ OUT - ROTATE	(NATIONALITY) GOVERNMENT	JOINTLY WITHIN EUROPEAN UNION	DK
1	Defence	1	2	3
2	Protection of the environment	1	2	3
3	Currency	1	2	3
4	Humanitarian aid	1	2	3
5	Health and social welfare	1	2	3
6	Basic rules for broadcasting and press	1	2	3
7	Fight against poverty/social exclusion	1	2	3
8	The fight against unemployment	1	2	3
9	Agriculture and fishing policy	1	2	3
10	The support to regions which are experiencing economic difficulties	1	2	3
11	Education	1	2	3
12	Scientific and technological research	1	2	3
13	Information about the European Union, its policies and institutions	1	2	3
14	Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union	1	2	3
15	Cultural policy	1	2	3

EB58.1 - Q.25.a. - TREND

Q.22. b) And, for each of the following?

	READ OUT - ROTATE	(NATIONALITY) GOVERNMENT	JOINTLY WITHIN EUROPEAN UNION	DK
1	Immigration policy	1	2	3
2	Rules for political asylum	1	2	3
3	The fight against organised crime	1	2	3
4	Police	1	2	3
5	Justice	1	2	3
6	Accepting refugees	1	2	3
7	Juvenile crime prevention	1	2	3
8	Urban crime prevention	1	2	3
9	The fight against drugs	1	2	3
10	The fight against the trade in, and exploitation of, human beings	1	2	3
11	The fight against international terrorism	1	2	3
12	Tackling the challenges of an ageing population	1	2	3

EB58.1 - Q.25. b. - TREND

Q.23. What is your opinion on each of the following statements?  
Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

	READ OUT – ROTATE	FOR	AGAINST	DK
1	A European Monetary Union with one single currency, the euro	1	2	3
2	One common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union, towards other countries	1	2	3
3	A common defence and security policy among European Union member states	1	2	3
4	The enlargement of the European Union to include new countries	1	2	3
5	The European Union being responsible for matters that cannot be effectively handled by national, regional and local governments	1	2	3
6	The resignation of the President of the European Commission and the European Commissioners if they do not have the support of a majority in the European Parliament	1	2	3
7	Teaching school children about the way European Union institutions work	1	2	3

EB59.0 - Q.2. - TREND

- Q.24. The European Union already has a Common Security and Foreign Policy and a European Security and Defence Policy. There is now a debate about how much further these should be developed. Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?

	READ OUT - ROTATE	TEND TO AGREE	TEND TO DISAGREE	DK
1	The European Union should have a rapid military reaction force that can be sent quickly to trouble spots when an international crisis occurs	1	2	3
2	When an international crisis occurs, European Union member states should agree a common position	1	2	3
3	The European Union should have its own Foreign Minister, who can be the spokesperson for a common European Union position	1	2	3
4	The European Union should have its own seat on the United Nations Security Council	1	2	3
5	Member states which have opted for neutrality should have a say in European Union foreign policy	1	2	3
6	Countries which will join the European Union in 2004 as a result of enlargement should already have a say in European Union foreign policy	1	2	3
7	European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States foreign policy	1	2	3
8	The European Union should guarantee Human Rights in each member state, even if this is contrary to the wishes of some member states	1	2	3
9	The European Union should work to guarantee Human Rights around the world, even if this is contrary to the wishes of some other countries	1	2	3
10	The European Union should have a common immigration policy towards people from outside the European Union	1	2	3
11	The European Union should have a common asylum policy towards asylum seekers	1	2	3

EB59.1 - NEW

- Q.25. In your opinion, should decisions concerning European defence policy be taken by national governments, by NATO or by the European Union? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

National governments .....1  
 NATO .....2  
 The European Union .....3  
 Other (SPONTANEOUS) .....4  
 DK .....5

EB58.1 - Q.30 - TREND

Q.26. From the following list, which are the sources that you use the most to inform yourself about the current international situation? (READ OUT - SEVERAL ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

- Newspapers and magazines in (OUR COUNTRY).....1,  
 Newspapers and magazines from other countries.....2,  
 Radio stations in (OUR COUNTRY) .....3,  
 Radio stations from other countries .....4,  
 News on (NATIONALITY) TV .....5,  
 News on TV from other countries .....6,  
 Television debates with politicians.....7,  
 Television debates with experts.....8,  
 Continuous TV News channels.....9,  
 The Internet .....10,  
 Discussions with colleagues, friends and relatives .....11,  
 Other (SPONTANEOUS).....12,  
 None (SPONTANEOUS) .....13,  
 DK.....14,

EB59.1 - NEW

Q.27. In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding...?

	READ OUT	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NEITHER POSITIVE NOR NEGATIVE	DK
1	peace in the world	1	2	3	4
2	the fight against terrorism	1	2	3	4
3	growth of the world economy	1	2	3	4
4	the fight against poverty in the world	1	2	3	4
5	protection of the environment	1	2	3	4

EB58.1 - Q.48. - TREND

- Q.28. a) Which one of the following do you think has most influence on decision-making within the European Union? (SHOW CARD - ONE ANSWER ONLY)
- b) And which one of the following do you think should have the most influence? (SHOW SAME CARD - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

	READ OUT	a) MOST INFLUENCE	b) SHOULD HAVE THE MOST INFLUENCE
1	Citizens	1	1
2	National governments	2	2
3	The European Commission	3	3
4	The European Parliament	4	4
5	National parliaments (N)	5	5
6	Businesses	6	6
7	Trade unions	7	7
8	Pressure groups, lobbies	8	8
9	Other (SPONTANEOUS)	9	9
10	DK	10	10

EB56.3 - Q.58. - TREND MODIFIED

Q.29. Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?

	READ OUT	TEND TO AGREE	TEND TO DISAGREE	DK
1	Decisions taken by the European Union have an impact on my daily life	1	2	3
2	Decisions taken by the European Union are generally sound	1	2	3
3	All in all, I understand how the European Union works	1	2	3
4	(OUR COUNTRY)'s influence is important within the European Union	1	2	3
5	The European Union listens to the opinions of people like me	1	2	3
6	Big countries have the most power in the European Union	1	2	3
7	Small countries can protect their interests effectively in the European Union	1	2	3
8	The way that the European Union works is too complex	1	2	3
9	More responsibilities should be transferred from the member states to the European Union	1	2	3
10	The European Union will work well after enlargement	1	2	3
11	After enlargement, there will be more bureaucracy in the European Union	1	2	3
12	There should be closer co-operation between member states in economic matters	1	2	3
13	There should be closer co-operation between member states in social matters	1	2	3

EB56.3 - Q.57. - TREND MODIFIED

Q.30. Do you think that the European Union should or should not have a Constitution?

Should .....1

Should not .....2

DK .....3

EB58.1 - Q.49. - TREND

Q.31. For each of the following statements about the European Convention, could you please tell me if you think it is true or false?

	READ OUT	TRUE	FALSE	DK
1	The Convention is working on proposals to reform the European Union	1	2	3
2	Our government is represented on the Convention	1	2	3
3	Our Parliament is represented on the Convention	1	2	3
4	The governments of future member states are already represented on the Convention	1	2	3
5	The Convention will complete its work this year	1	2	3
6	The European Union member states will be allowed to modify the Convention's final proposals	1	2	3
7	Citizens will have the opportunity to accept or to reject the Convention's final proposals	1	2	3

EB59.1 - NEW

Q.32. The European Convention is responsible for thinking about how the European Union will function following enlargement to include new countries. Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?

	READ OUT	TEND TO AGREE	TEND TO DISAGREE	DK
1	We are hearing a lot about the Convention at the moment	1	2	3
2	The media should tell us more about what the Convention is doing	1	2	3
3	Politicians should tell us more about what the Convention is doing	1	2	3

EB59.1 - NEW

Q.33. At the moment, the European Commission is composed of 20 independent Commissioners, including at least one from each member state. Following the enlargement of the European Union, the number of Commissioners may have to increase. Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?

	READ OUT	TEND TO AGREE	TEND TO DISAGREE	DK
1	After enlargement, there should continue to be at least one Commissioner from each member state	1	2	3
2	If there were to be a Commissioner from each member state, the European Union would become inefficient	1	2	3
3	Every member state should have the right to appoint a Commissioner	1	2	3
4	Small member states should have the right to appoint the same number of Commissioners as big member states	1	2	3
5	(OUR COUNTRY)'s interests would suffer if there were no (NATIONALITY) Commissioner	1	2	3

EB59.1 - NEW

- Q.34. Which, if any of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? The President of the European Commission should be... ? (SHOW CARD - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)
- solely nominated by the Heads of State or Heads of Government of the European Union (M) ..... 1
- solely elected by the European Parliament (M) ..... 2
- chosen both by the European Parliament as well as Heads of State or Heads of Government (N) ..... 3
- directly elected by the citizens of the European Union ..... 4
- other (SPONTANEOUS) ..... 5
- DK ..... 6

EB58.1 - Q.50. - TREND MODIFIED

- Q.35. The European Council is composed of Heads of State or Heads of Government of member states and the President of the Commission. The presidency of the European Council is taken by each country in turn, for a period of six months. Do you think that...? (READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)
- the six-month period should be retained because it gives each member state a chance to hold the Presidency of the European Union on a regular basis ..... 1
- the period of the Presidency should be extended because six months is too short to achieve significant results ..... 2
- DK ..... 3

EB59.1 - NEW

- Q.36. Currently, each member state has the right of veto in certain areas. In the future, should a right of veto...?
- be retained in order to preserve essential national interests ..... 1
- be limited to a very few essential areas ..... 2
- be given up for all decisions in order to make the European Union more efficient ..... 3
- DK ..... 4

EB59.1 - NEW

- Q.37. At present, each member state passes on to the European Union a part of its tax revenue. Would you prefer to pay this contribution directly to the European Union, or not?
- Yes ..... 1
- No ..... 2
- DK ..... 3

EB57.1 - Q.43. - TREND



- Q.38. Supposing a (APPROPRIATE REFERENCE TO NATIONAL ELECTIONS/GENERAL ELECTIONS - FR: "PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS") were being held tomorrow, can you tell me on a scale of 1 to 10 how likely it is that you would vote in that election? Please place yourself at a point on this scale where "1" indicates that you would definitely not vote, "10" indicates that you would definitely vote and the remaining numbers indicates something in between these two positions. (READ OUT - SHOW CARD WITH SCALE)

1 (WOULD DEFINITELY NOT VOTE)									10 (WOULD DEFINITELY VOTE)	DK
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11

EB57.1 - Q.44. - TREND

- Q.39. And, supposing there was a European Parliament election being held tomorrow, can you tell me on a scale of 1 to 10 how likely it is that you would vote in that election? Please place yourself at a point on this scale where "1" indicates that you would definitely not vote, "10" indicates that you would definitely vote and the remaining numbers indicates something in between these two positions. (READ OUT - SHOW SAME CARD WITH SCALE AS IN Q.38.)

1 (WOULD DEFINITELY NOT VOTE)									10 (WOULD DEFINITELY VOTE)	DK
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11

EB57.1 - Q.46. - TREND SLIGHTLY MODIFIED

- Q.40. Since the last European Parliament elections, have you seen or heard anything about or had any contacts with a member of the European Parliament in any of the following ways? (SHOW CARD - READ OUT - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

Yes, I have read about members of the European Parliament in newspapers or magazines .....1,  
Yes, I have seen members of the European Parliament on television .....2,  
Yes, I have heard members of the European Parliament on the radio.....3,  
Yes, I have read about members of the European parliament on the Internet .....4,  
Yes, I have received leaflet(s), newsletter(s) or letter(s) from (a) member(s) of the European Parliament.....5,  
Yes, I have seen members of the European parliament at (a) pubic meeting(s).....6,  
No, I have not seen or heard anything about or had any contacts with a member of the European Parliament.....7,  
Other (SPONTANEOUS) .....8,  
DK.....9,

EB57.1 - Q.51. - TREND SLIGHTLY MODIFIED

Q.41. Would you personally be interested in seeing or hearing more about members of the European Parliament in any of the ways we have just talked about?  
(SHOW CARD - READ OUT - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

Yes, I would be interested in reading about members of the European Parliament  
in newspapers or magazines..... 1,  
Yes, I would be interested in seeing members of the European Parliament on television .....2,  
Yes, I would be interested in hearing members of the European Parliament on the radio.....3,  
Yes, I would be interested in reading, seeing or hearing about members of the European  
Parliament on the Internet (M).....4,  
Yes, I would be interested in receiving leaflet(s), newsletter(s) or letter(s) from  
(a) member(s) of the European Parliament .....5,  
Yes, I would be interested in seeing members of the European Parliament  
at (a) public meeting(s).....6,  
No, I would not be interested .....7,  
Other (SPONTANEOUS) .....8,  
DK.....9,

EB57.1 - Q.52. - TREND SLIGHTLY MODIFIED

Q.42. Please consider each of the following and tell me how much its activities, decisions and so on  
affect people like yourself? In each case, do they have a great effect, some effect or no effect?  
(SHOW CARD WITH SCALE)

	READ OUT	GREAT EFFECT	SOME EFFECT	NO EFFECT	DK
1	The (NATIONAL) government	1	2	3	4
2	The (LOWER HOUSE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENT - UK: "HOUSE OF COMMONS")	1	2	3	4
3	The European Union as a whole	1	2	3	4
4	The European Parliament in particular	1	2	3	4
5	Regional (or local) government in (OUR COUNTRY) (THE MOST IMPORTANT LEVEL OF SUB- NATIONAL GOVERNMENT)	1	2	3	4

EB57.1 - Q.47. - TREND

Q.43. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree?

	READ OUT	TOTALLY AGREE	TEND TO AGREE	TEND TO DISAGREE	TOTALLY DISAGREE	DK
1	The members of the European Parliament are good at protecting your interests	1	2	3	4	5
2	The European Parliament has more power than the (LOWER HOUSE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENT - UK: "HOUSE OF COMMONS")	1	2	3	4	5
3	European Parliament elections are really important	1	2	3	4	5

EB59.1 - NEW

Q.44. Do you think the next European Parliament election campaign should mainly focus on...? (SHOW CARD - READ OUT - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

issues specific to (OUR COUNTRY) ..... 1,  
 agriculture ..... 2,  
 environment ..... 3,  
 crime ..... 4,  
 employment..... 5,  
 immigration..... 6,  
 education..... 7,  
 common defence policy..... 8,  
 foreign policy ..... 9,  
 enlargement of the European Union..... 10,  
 the reform of European Union institutions ..... 11,  
 the activities of the European Parliament..... 12,  
 rights as a European Union citizen..... 13,  
 DK ..... 14,

EB59.1 - NEW

Q.45. Would you be more likely to vote in the European (Parliament) elections if...?

	READ OUT	YES	NO	DK
1	public transport was free on election day	1	2	3
2	polling stations were set up in supermarkets	1	2	3
3	it were possible to vote on the Internet	1	2	3
4	it were possible to vote at your workplace	1	2	3
5	local, regional or national elections were organised on the same day as the European elections	1	2	3
6	European elections took place on the same day throughout the European Union	1	2	3
7	(DO NOT ASK IN B, I, IRL AND UK) there were regional lists of candidates	1	2	3
8	citizens from other member states were candidates on the ballot paper	1	2	3
9	(DO NOT ASK IN COUNTRIES WHERE IT DOES NOT APPLY) you had more time to put your name on the Electoral Register	1	2	3

EB59.1 - NEW

**Now let's talk about another topic: enlargement of the European union.**

Q.46. Which of these 3 options do you prefer for the immediate future of the European Union?  
(SHOW CARD - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

- The European Union should be enlarged to include all the countries wishing to join ..... 1
- The European Union should be enlarged to include only some of the countries  
wishing to join.....2
- The European Union should not be enlarged to any additional countries .....3
- None of these (SPONTANEOUS) .....4
- DK .....5

EB58.1 - Q.39. - TREND

Q.47. Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?

	READ OUT - ROTATE	TEND TO AGREE	TEND TO DISAGREE	DK
1	The more countries there are in the European Union, the more peace and security will be guaranteed in Europe	1	2	3
2	Enlargement will not cost more for existing member countries like (OUR COUNTRY)	1	2	3
3	After enlargement to include new countries, (OUR COUNTRY) will become less important in Europe	1	2	3
4	The more countries there are, the more unemployment there will be in (OUR COUNTRY)	1	2	3
5	The European Union should help future member countries financially, even before they join	1	2	3
6	Once new countries have joined the European Union, (OUR COUNTRY) will receive less financial aid from it	1	2	3
7	With more countries, it will be much more difficult to make decisions on a European scale	1	2	3
8	The more member countries within the European Union, the more important it will be in the world	1	2	3
9	With more member countries, Europe will be culturally richer	1	2	3
10	The European Union must reform the way its institutions work before welcoming new members	1	2	3

EB58.1 - Q.43. - TREND

Q.48. How well informed do you feel about the enlargement, that is new countries joining the European Union? Do you feel...? (SHOW CARD - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

very well informed .....1  
 well informed .....2  
 not very well informed .....3  
 not at all well informed.....4  
 DK .....5

EB58.1 - Q.44. - TREND

Q.49. Which of the following countries, if any, have you ever heard of?  
 (DO NOT SHOW CARD - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

EB56.3 - Q.28. - TREND

Q.50. And which of them have you visited or do have links of any kind with?  
 (SHOW CARD - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

	READ OUT	<u>Q.49</u> HEARD OF	<u>Q.50</u> VISITED OR LINKS
1	Bulgaria	1,	1,
2	Cyprus	2,	2,
3	Czech Republic	3,	3,
4	Estonia	4,	4,
5	Hungary	5,	5,
6	Latvia	6,	6,
7	Lithuania	7,	7,
8	Malta	8,	8,
9	Poland	9,	9,
10	Romania	10,	10,
11	Slovakia	11,	11,
12	Slovenia	12,	12,
13	Turkey	13,	13,
14	None of these (SPONTANEOUS)	14,	14,

EB56.3 - Q.29. - TREND MODIFIED

## STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 59.1

### TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Between 18<sup>th</sup> March 2003 and 30<sup>th</sup> April 2003, the European Opinion Research Group, a consortium of Market and Public Opinion Research agencies, made out of INRA in Belgium – I.C.O. and GfK Worldwide, carried out wave 59.1 of the standard Eurobarometer, on request of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls.

The Standard EUROBAROMETER 59.1 covers the population of the respective nationalities of the European Union Member States, aged 15 years and over, resident in each of the Member States. The basic sample design applied in all Member States is a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In each EU country, a number of sampling points was drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density.

For doing so, the points were drawn systematically from each of the "administrative regional units", after stratification by individual unit and type of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the Member States according to the EUROSTAT NUTS 2 (or equivalent) and according to the distribution of the resident population of the respective EU-nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn, at random. Further addresses were selected as every N<sup>th</sup> address by standard random route procedures, from the initial address. In each household, the respondent was drawn, at random. All interviews were face-to-face in people's home and in the appropriate national language.

<u>COUNTRIES</u>	<u>INSTITUTES</u>	<u>N° INTERVIEWS</u>	<u>FIELDWORK DATES</u>	<u>POPULATION 15+ (x 000)</u>
Belgium	INRA BELGIUM	1,112	18/03 – 28/04	8,458
Denmark	GfK DENMARK	1,000	18/03 – 29/04	4,355
Germany (East)	INRA DEUTSCHLAND	1,021	22/03 – 9/04	13,164
Germany (West)	INRA DEUTSCHLAND	1,050	21/03 – 9/04	56,319
Greece	MARKET ANALYSIS	1,003	21/03 – 20/04	8,899
Spain	INRA ESPAÑA	1,000	20/03 – 26/04	34,239
France	CSA-TMO	1,075	18/03 – 24/04	47,936
Ireland	LANSDOWNE Market Research	1,024	22/03 – 18/04	3,004
Italy	INRA Demoskopoea	1,027	20/03 – 15/04	49,531
Luxembourg	ILRes	600	21/03 – 27/04	357
The Netherlands	INTOMART	1,008	22/03 – 22/04	13,010
Austria	SPECTRA	1,021	20/03 – 7/04	6,770
Portugal	METRIS	1,001	29/03 – 22/04	8,620
Finland	MDC MARKETING RESEARCH	1,046	23/03 – 20/04	4,245
Sweden	GfK SVERIGE	1,000	18/03 – 30/04	7,252
Great Britain	MARTIN HAMBLIN LTD	1,011	18/03 – 29/04	46,370
Northern Ireland	ULSTER MARKETING SURVEYS	308	23/03 – 17/04	1,314
TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS		16,307		

For each country a comparison between the sample and the universe was carried out. The Universe description was derived from Eurostat population data or from national statistics. For all EU member-countries a national weighting procedure, using marginal and intercellular weighting, was carried out based on this Universe description. As such in all countries, minimum gender, age, region NUTS 2 were introduced in the iteration procedure. For international weighting (i.e. EU averages), INRA (EUROPE) applies the official population figures as provided by EUROSTAT or national statistic offices. The total population figures for input in this post-weighting procedure are listed above.

The results of the Eurobarometer studies are reported in the form of tables, datafiles and analyses. Per question a table of results is given with the full question text in English, French and German. The results are expressed as a percentage of the total. The results of the Eurobarometer surveys are analysed and made available through the Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls of the European Commission, rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Brussels. The results are published on the Internet server of the European Commission: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo>. All Eurobarometer datafiles are stored at the Zentral Archiv (Universität Köln, Bachemer Strasse, 40, D-50869 Köln-Lindenthal), available through the CESSDA Database <http://www.nsd.uib.no/cessda/europe.html>. They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research.

Readers are reminded that survey results are estimations, the accuracy of which, everything being equal, rests upon the sample size and upon the observed percentage. With samples of about 1,000 interviews, the real percentages vary within the following confidence limits:

Observed percentages	10% or 90%	20% or 80%	30% or 70%	40% or 60%	50%
Confidence limits	± 1.9%	± 2.5%	± 2.7%	± 3.0%	± 3.1%

**STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 59.1  
CO-OPERATING AGENCIES AND RESEARCH EXECUTIVES**

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