



EUROBAROMETER 58 - NATIONAL STANDARD REPORT

*Irish Public opinion and European integration,
Autumn, 2002*

Survey carried out for the European
Commission's Representation in
[Ireland](#)

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Executive summary

1. The present report deals with Eurobarometer 58 (autumn 2002) and focuses on (a) current evaluations of aspects of the European Union, (b) further analysis of the degree of engagement with EU issues among Irish people, (c) evidence on Irish people's perception of and attitude to the scope and speed of European integration, (d) attitudes to the impending enlargement of the European Union and (e) evidence on Irish people's evaluation of the role of the United States in the international system and evidence of Irish preferences as to who defence and security policy issues ought to be decided.
2. The timing of the Eurobarometer 58 survey (autumn 2002) also makes it possible to compare attitudes at the time of the second referendum to attitudes some six months previously and, in this way, to gain some additional insight into the impact of the second referendum campaign. In this context, the present report also takes into account the findings of the two studies of attitudes and behaviour in the referendums in Ireland on the Treaty of Nice (see below).
3. The EB 57 report showed that, as of spring 2002, Irish attitudes to the European Union and to Ireland's membership of the Union were characterised by widespread approval of Irish membership, widespread perception of the benefits of membership, including personal benefits, and a widespread positive image of the EU. However, these positive attitudes were accompanied by low levels of engagement with and knowledge of European affairs (see National Report on EB 57)
4. The study of attitudes and behaviour in the second Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty showed a marked improvement in communication and a substantial increase in people's sense that they could understand the issues at stake. The improvements in communication were concentrated in the mass media (television, radio and newspapers) and in interpersonal discussion of the issues. On the other hand, the evidence relating to the second referendum also showed that the communication process had its limits and that there was very little spillover from an understanding of the issues raised by the Treaty of Nice to a more general understanding of the institutions of the Union and how they work.
5. Recent Eurobarometer surveys in Ireland up to and including EB 58 show that, over the last two years, Irish public opinion towards European integration as measured by the standard Eurobarometer indicators, has been somewhat volatile. In autumn 2000 and spring 2001 support for integration experienced two successive falls. These falls were an important aspect of the attitudinal background against which the first referendum on the Nice Treaty took place. Although, in the wake of the first referendum and the defeat of the treaty, there was a substantial recovery in support for integration in autumn 2001, the two most recent surveys (EB 57 and EB 58) again saw two successive falls in the level of support for integration.
6. Despite the decline in overall support for integration between spring and autumn 2002, the evidence in EB 58 shows that certain specific attitudes to European integration changed in a positive direction over this same period. These changes included an increase in Irish people's trust in various European institutions. For example, confidence in the European Parliament rose nine percentage points to 61 per

cent, as did confidence in the Commission (to 57 per cent). Confidence in the Council of Ministers showed the biggest increase (up 14 percentage points to 50 per cent). Trust in the Convention on the Future of the European Union also grew substantially - from 24 per cent to 36 per cent.

7. This suggests that the greater degree of engagement with European issues that accompanies a referendum, while it may not lead to changes in overall attitude to European integration or to the European Union, can bring about improvement in more specific evaluations of particular institutions or aspects of integration.
8. Part of the explanation of the changes just mentioned lies in a change in people's engagement with European issues. Such change is indicated by the extent to which people are willing to take a position on a particular issue rather than giving a don't know or non-committal response. The extent of attitude formation in this sense increased substantially in the case of the Convention on the Future of the European Union and in the case of the Council of Ministers between spring and autumn 2002. However, the net effect of these and related increases in attitude formation was simply to bring the Irish level of attitude formation up to the European average.
9. It is also notable that familiarity with some (but only some) of the EU institutions increased in Ireland between spring and autumn 2002. The European Parliament, the European Commission and European Central Bank showed no change in overall exposure/familiarity between these two time periods. On the other hand, familiarity with the Court of Justice rose 12 percentage points, familiarity with the European Court of Auditors rose 10 percentage points, familiarity with the Convention on the Future of the EU rose nine percentage points and familiarity with the Council of Ministers rose seven percentage points.
10. More detailed statistical analysis of the evidence of familiarity with the European institutions indicates that, unlike the people of the Union as a whole, Irish respondents do not experience the Council of Ministers as an integral part of a tripartite policy-making structure involving the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. Given the importance of the role the Council of Ministers plays in the European decision-making process and its relevance to any evaluation of that process, there is clearly room for substantial improvement in Irish people's understanding of this aspect of the European decision-making process. One would expect that, in the run-up to the impending Irish presidency of the Council, there would be an automatic improvement in dissemination of information about the role of the Council. The challenge will be to ensure that any gain in understanding the role of the Council on the part of the public is not lost when things return to normal.
11. Turning to the issue of the level (national or European) at which various policy issues should be decided, there is evidence of some increase in support for the Europeanisation of certain issues between spring and autumn 2002. The changes, which were modest, tended to be concentrated in the area of justice and home affairs, including the fight against drugs; the fight against organised crime, immigration policy, rules for political asylum and urban crime prevention. It is noteworthy that these increases in support for the Europeanisation of issues that lie mainly in the justice and home affairs area occurred during a period in which a wide range of

European policy issues were being discussed in the context of the second referendum on the Nice Treaty.

12. Detailed statistical analysis of Irish people's priorities regarding actions that might be undertaken by the European Union points to the existence of two distinct dimensions of concern underlying these priorities. The first dimension relates to major problems on the agenda of every European government, while the second dimension focuses on the European integration process itself. This poses somewhat of a dilemma for the Union. On the one hand, the citizens of Ireland (and of the Union as a whole) would like the European Union to treat all the most difficult problems facing European societies as priorities. On the other hand, actions designed to consolidate or strengthen integration, and which might therefore beef-up the Union's capacity to deal with some of these pressing problems, constitute a separate dimension that is regarded as salient by significantly smaller proportions of the citizens.
13. In regard to the speed of European integration, the results derived from combining data from two questions - one on the perceived speed of building Europe and the other on the preferred speed of building Europe - are quite revealing in regard to Irish attitudes to integration. On this measure Ireland moves from the front rank of supporters of integration (as per, for example, the membership indicator) to the other end of the scale where it is fourth from the bottom on a descending scale of countries defined by the proportions regarding the pace of integration as too slow. This puts Irish public opinion in quite different company - nestling between Sweden and Austria, though still some way ahead of Finland and Denmark. This suggests that, when it comes to the pace of European integration, Irish people tend to prefer the *status quo* or the *status quo ante*, though there is a significant minority (about one-quarter) that is prepared to forge full-speed ahead.
14. Reservations about the speed of building Europe do not seem to adversely affect Irish people's attitude to enlargement. Support for enlargement increased in Ireland between spring and autumn 2002 and is among the highest in the EU. It should be noted however that more detailed statistical analysis of people's expectations regarding the consequences of enlargement shows that the positive consequences that Irish people see as following from the enlargement process tend to be of an intangible sort, whereas the negative expectations, which are almost equally widespread, relate to much more tangible and material matters (this contrast is also found in public opinion in the Union as a whole).
15. A similar statistical analysis of people's expectations regarding the consequences of enlargement for various social and economic groups and sectors points to a broad distinction between a traditional economic and social sector and a modern economic and social sector. Thus the first dimension of expected winners and losers is defined mainly by expectations in regard to the outcome for fishermen, farmers, people living in the countryside, and small companies. The second dimension is defined by expectations regarding the effect of enlargement on young people, urban dwellers, big business and ethnic minorities.
16. In short, the evidence suggests that Irish people (and people in the European Union as a whole) see the rewards of enlargement as accruing to the more modern social and

economic sectors while expectations regarding the traditional economy and society either lean towards anticipation of losses for the groups involved or are unclear or divided.

17. Ireland ranks seventh among the member states in terms of exposure to information about enlargement. When it comes to the subjective sense of being informed about enlargement, Ireland ranks sixth. In the light of Ireland's tendency towards lower engagement with European issues, these rankings are not bad. However, when we look at the sense that people have of participating in political debate about enlargement, Ireland is at the top of a ranking of countries in terms of the proportion feeling either a great deal or somewhat involved in such a debate. Given the tendency noted at several points in this report for Ireland to lag behind in terms of public engagement with European issues, the fact that it is at the top of the ranking in terms of a sense of participation in political debate about enlargement is remarkable and is, no doubt, a direct reflection of having held two referendums in which the enlargement issue played a prominent role. At the same time, the fact that two-thirds of Irish people feel less than somewhat involved in political debate about enlargement underlines the difficulties of securing a sense of mass participation in relation to issues such as enlargement even in a referendum-holding context.
18. As current debates remind us, attitudes to integration are not unconnected with attitudes to the transatlantic relationship. EB 58 included a new set of questions designed to examine attitudes to the role of the United States in the international system in five different areas. Opinion in the member states on the question of the role the United States plays in relation to peace in the world varies widely. The range extends from plus 14 percentage point net rating in Britain to a minus 60 percentage point rating in Greece. Ireland (net rating of plus four percentage points) ranks next to Britain in favourable assessments of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world and just ahead of Denmark and Italy. Public opinion in all the other member states of the European Union takes a negative view of the role of the United States, the least negative being West German public opinion and the most negative being public opinion in Greece. In contrast to the rating on the question of peace in the world, the United States is positively rated by the majority of member states of the European Union in relation to the fight against terrorism. Ireland's rating of the United States in this regard (plus 37 percentage points) slips from second to fourth position.
19. A majority of the member states show a net favourable evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to growth of the world economy. On the other hand, there is an overwhelmingly negative net evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to the fight against poverty and to the protection of the environment. On all three issues Irish public opinion is the most favourably disposed towards the role of the United States. The Irish public's evaluation of the role the United States on the economic front is a net positive 36 points. On the question of the role of the United States in the fight against poverty, Irish opinion is evenly divided, while, on the question of the United States and the environment, Irish opinion shifts marginally towards the negative side with a net evaluation of minus 4 percentage points. Taking the data on all the dimensions of evaluation of the role of the United States into

account, it is clear that Irish public opinion occupies quite a distinctive position among the member states of the European Union.

20. In the conclusion to the previous report (EB 57) in this series, it was emphasised that the implications of any particular configuration of public opinion towards the EU depend on the institutional and political context within which ratification of EU treaties takes place. It was also noted that the requirement to hold referendums on EU treaty changes puts additional demands on Irish citizens, placing them in the position of making decisions on complex issues and requiring them to have higher rather than average levels of knowledge of and engagement with these issues. The evidence considered in this report and the evidence from the special survey of the second referendum on the Nice Treaty both indicate that people's degree of engagement with European issues can be strengthened and improved by an effective process of campaigning and communication. The challenge is to ensure that such engagement is not just specific to the issues in a particular referendum and to the duration of the referendum campaign. The evidence points to a need for a permanent communication campaign to improve the capacity of people to deal with the on-going series of complex issues raised by the on-going process of European integration.

THE REPORT

Introduction

Building on the evidence of previous reports in this series (see for example the Irish national report on Eurobarometer 57) and on the basis of reports of two special surveys of attitudes and behaviour in the Nice referendums, the present report focuses on the most recent Eurobarometer survey (EB 58). In order to avoid repetition of points already contained in the report on Eurobarometer 57, the following box summarises the main results of that report.

Box 1: Summary the main findings of the EB57 National Report

1. Overall Irish attitudes to the European Union and to Ireland's membership of the Union are characterised by widespread approval of Irish membership of the EU, widespread perception of benefits of EU membership, including personal benefits, and a widespread positive image of the EU. However, these positive attitudes are accompanied by low levels of engagement with and knowledge of European affairs.
2. The evidence relating to engagement and knowledge suggests that improving the level of knowledge of European affairs among Irish people will be an uphill task; whether it be television or radio, newspapers or other magazines, discussion with family and friends or use of the internet, Irish people report less frequent use of all available channels of information or communication compared to the EU average frequency of use.
3. The picture of Irish attitudes to the European Union as being for the most part positive but as lacking in commitment and active engagement is confirmed by the evidence relating to national and European identity, which places Ireland firmly in the camp of member states with a less well developed sense of European identity, the only member states with a larger proportion identifying exclusively with their own nationality being Greece, Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom
4. The implications of any particular configuration of public opinion towards the EU depend on the institutional and political context within which ratification of EU treaties takes place. The requirement to hold referendums on EU treaty changes puts additional demands on Irish citizens, placing them in the position of making decisions on complex issues and requiring them to have higher rather than average or lower levels of knowledge of and engagement with these issues.

Fieldwork for EB58 in Ireland was carried out between the 1st of October and the 29th of October, 2002 with the bulk of the fieldwork having been completed before of the date of the second of referendum on the Nice Treaty (18th October). This makes it possible to compare attitudes at the time of the second referendum to attitudes some six months previously and, in this way, to gain some additional insight into the impact of the second referendum campaign. In order to be able to relate these insights to the wider picture of

attitudes and behaviour in the second Nice referendum, Box 2 below summarises the main findings of the special survey of the second Nice referendum.

Box 2: Summary of the main findings of the study of attitudes and behaviour in the second Nice referendum

1. The second Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty saw a marked improvement in communication and a substantial increase in people's sense that they could understand the issues at stake. The improvements in communication were concentrated in the mass media (television, radio and newspapers) and in interpersonal discussion of the issues.
2. All this was accompanied by a 25 percentage point increase in the proportion of people who felt they understood at least some of the issues involved in the Nice Treaty. On the other hand, the evidence also showed that the communication process had its limits in that specific measures taken by the Government with a view to the second referendum (the insertion of a European defence reservation into the Irish Constitution, the Seville Declaration on neutrality and the new parliamentary procedures for examining EU proposals) generated, at best, only moderate levels of awareness among the public.
3. By comparison with the period immediately after the first referendum, there was a substantial increase in support for EU enlargement. Movement in other attitudes to integration tended to be of very modest proportions. With one exception - attitudes to neutrality - the modest changes that did occur were in a pro-integration direction.
4. The implications of all this for communication and debate about European integration can be summarised as follows. Communication works or can be made to work. The main mechanisms by which it works are the mass media and interpersonal discussion. When it works, it has demonstrable effects on behaviour in terms of both participation and the direction of vote choice. Knowledge and people's sense of assurance about their knowledge also have a significant influence on behaviour. Attitudes also influence behaviour and, while it is more difficult to bring about aggregate change in attitude than to bring about change in knowledge and awareness, attitudes do change in response to unfolding events.
5. Although communication in the area of European affairs can be effective, it is not easy. While knowledge improved substantially in Nice2 by comparison with Nice1, two-in-five citizens were left uninformed (or feeling uninformed) about the issues and there was very little evidence of a spillover from improved knowledge about Nice to improved knowledge about European affairs generally.

Against the background just summarised in Boxes 1 and 2, the first main section of this report focuses the evidence of current evaluations of the European Union and its institutions, noting both long-term and short-term trends in these evaluations. This leads

directly into further analysis of the degree of engagement with EU issues among Irish people (section 2). The report then assesses the evidence on Irish people's perceptions of and attitudes to the scope and speed of European integration (section 3). Since this issue is inseparable from the question of enlargement, the next section deals with attitudes to the impending enlargement of the European Union, including an examination of people's expectations of the consequences of enlargement in general terms and in relation to particular social and economic groups (section 4). Finally, broadening the range of the inquiry beyond attitudes to the European Union and European integration, the report examines new evidence collected in EB 57 on Irish people's evaluation of the role of the United States in the international system, compares Irish attitudes on these issues to attitudes in the other member-states and examines attitudes to defence and security policy in this context (section 5). The report concludes with a brief assessment of current Irish attitudes to European integration with particular reference to the challenges that are likely to arise in the medium term.

1. Trends in evaluation of the EU and of European integration

Figure 1 presents the evidence from three indicators of attitudes to Ireland's membership of the Union and to integration more generally. The indicators are the benefits indicator, the membership indicator and the dissolution indicator¹. In autumn 2000 and spring 2001 support for integration as measured by these indicators experienced two successive falls. These falls were an important aspect of the attitudinal background against which the first referendum on the Nice Treaty took place. In the wake of the first referendum and the defeat of the treaty, there was a substantial recovery in support for integration (i.e. in autumn 2001). The next two surveys (spring 2002 and autumn 2002) again saw two successive falls in the level of support for integration.

A glance at the overall trends in these indicators as shown in Figure 1 underlines the fact that this scale of volatility in Irish people's response to European integration is unusual. It

¹ Readers of previous reports in this series will be familiar with the questions underlying these indicators. For those unfamiliar with these Eurobarometer questions, they deal with whether or not the country in question is seen to have benefited from membership of the Union, with whether the country's membership of the Union is a good thing or a bad thing and with how respondents would react if they were told in the morning tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped. (see full wording of the questions in the questionnaire in Appendix 1.

is also worth noting that these fluctuations brought about a situation in spring 2001 in which the proportion of Irish people who gave either an indifferent or don't know response to the dissolution question exceeded the proportion who gave a "very sorry" response by a significant margin. As the "very sorry" response to the dissolution question can be regarded as a measure of enthusiasm for European integration, it is particularly significant that this indicator fell to 42 per cent in spring 2001, a level not seen since the mid-1980s. The fact that these two indicators came more into balance in Eurobarometer 57 and Eurobarometer 58 does not gainsay the conclusion that, while overall support for Ireland's membership of the European Union is high, enthusiasm is quite low and is matched by an equal level of indifference. This was not and is not an easy attitudinal environment in which to have to hold successive referendums on EU treaty changes.

The other main points that are illustrated in Figure 1 are (a) that these indicators of support for European integration are subject to long term trends and (b) that trends in Ireland have diverged from those in the European Union as a whole since the early 1990s. The main feature of the long-term trends in the Irish case is the sustained growth in support for European integration that started in the early to mid-1980s. This mirrored a contemporaneous rise in the European Union as a whole. However, a divergence set in 1991-92 when support for integration in the Union as a whole went into decline and support in Ireland at first continued to rise and then levelled off in the second half of the 1990s, before undergoing the fluctuation and volatility that, as already noted, have characterised the last two years.

Turning specifically to the changes between spring and autumn 2002, the evidence suggests that, despite the trends in overall attitudes illustrated in Figure 1, certain specific aspects of attitudes to European integration changed in a positive direction. Figure 2 presents a net measure of the degree of trust that Irish and European citizens place in various European institutions. The figure for net trust is arrived at by subtracting the proportion who say they tend not to trust a given institution from the proportion who say they tend to trust it. On the basis of this measure, Irish people's trust in certain European institutions increased significantly over the six-month period between spring and autumn

2002. Thus, for example, confidence in the European Parliament rose nine percentage points to 61 per cent, as did confidence in the Commission (to 57 per cent). Confidence in the Council of Ministers showed the biggest increase (up 14 percentage points to 50 per cent). Trust in the Convention on the Future of the European Union also grew substantially - from 24 per cent to 36 per cent. In summary, the data in Figure 2 suggest that the greater degree of engagement with European issues that accompanies a referendum, while it may not lead to changes in overall attitude to European integration or to the European Union, can bring about improvement in more specific evaluations of particular institutions or of particular aspects of integration.

2. Trends in engagement with European issues

Part of the story underlying the data in Figure 2 lies in changes in people's engagement with European issues. This is indicated by the extent to which they are willing to take a position on a particular issue rather than giving a don't know or non-committal response. Figure 3 indicates the extent of engagement in this sense by adding together the proportions giving trust and mistrust responses to the question on trust in European institutions. The extent of attitude formation in this sense increased substantially in the case of the Convention on the Future of the European Union and in the case of the Council of Ministers between spring and autumn 2002. More modest increases in the extent of attitude formation occurred in the case of the European Ombudsman and the European Court of Justice, while small, but still significant, increases occurred in the case of the European Commission and the European Parliament (see Figure 3).

The other notable feature of the data in Figure 3 is that, in all but one case (the European Ombudsman), the rate or extent of attitude formation in Ireland in spring 2002 was less than the European average. These discrepancies confirm the point made at the outset of this report that, while Irish evaluations of European integration may be highly favourable, Irish levels of engagement with European issues are somewhat lower than average and are certainly low relative to the extent of support for integration. The net effect of the increase in attitude formation that occurred in the Irish case between spring and autumn 2002 was merely to bring the Irish level of attitude formation vis a vis the institutions in question up to the European average.

The changes documented in Figure 3 are confirmed by a more general measure of exposure to or familiarity with European Union institutions. This is the simple question asking respondents whether or not they have heard of each of the various institutions of the European Union. The results from this question bring out significant differences in the degree to which exposure to various institutions changed between spring and autumn 2002. Thus the European Parliament, the European Commission and European Central Bank showed no change in overall exposure/familiarity between these two time periods. On the other hand, and again focusing on the Irish case, familiarity with the Court of Justice rose 12 percentage points, familiarity with the European Court of Auditors rose 10 percentage points, familiarity with the Convention on the Future of the EU rose nine percentage points and familiarity with the Council of Ministers rose seven percentage points. In contrast to the Irish case, changes in familiarity with these various institutions in the European Union as a whole tended to be negligible. The different patterns of exposure evident in Figure 4 are not surprising. The European Parliament in particular, but also the European Commission and the European Central Bank are close to the ceiling of exposure while, in the case of the other institutions, there is substantial room for improvement.

Before leaving these data on attitude formation and on familiarity/exposure to various institutions of the Union, one other aspect of the Irish data deserves closer inspection. This is the tendency for the Council of Ministers to be out of line with the other two main decision-making institutions, namely the European Parliament and the European Commission. In the first place, the Council of Ministers elicits a significantly lower level of trust than either the European Parliament or the European Commission. Secondly, the level of attitude formation in the case of the Council of Ministers is significantly lower than that of the European Commission or the European Parliament. Finally, the level of familiarity with or exposure to the Council of Ministers is significantly lower than familiarity with or exposure to the European Parliament and the European Commission.

That the Council of Ministers falls into a different familiarity/exposure bracket, as it were, is confirmed by the application of an exploratory statistical technique that is widely used to identify the dimensions that may underlie responses to a large number of attitude measures such as the familiarity measures displayed in Figure 4. The technique in

question is known as a factor analysis. The results of two such analyses - one for the member states as a whole and one for the Irish case - are presented in Table 1. The European results present a very clear pattern - the first factor or dimension is defined by familiarity with the five secondary or less important institutions of the European Union while a second and quite distinct factor comprises the primary or more important institutions, namely the Parliament, the Commission, the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank and the Council of Ministers of the European Union. In summary, the evidence suggests that, in the European Union as a whole, people are familiar not just with individual institutions but with blocks of institutions and that familiarity with one block, for example the primary institutions, does not necessarily imply familiarity with the other block. The important point is that, when we focus on public opinion in the Union as a whole, all of the major institutions of the Union are part of the same syndrome of familiarity.

In the case of the Irish familiarity data, however, the second dimension (primary institutions) is defined mainly by reference to familiarity with the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Central Bank (see the high loading items in the fourth column in Table 1). Two things are surprising and anomalous about this result. The first is that the Court of Justice is associated with the secondary rather than with the primary institutions of the Union. The second anomaly in the Irish case is that familiarity with the Council of Ministers is in an ambiguous position as it loads on both the primary and secondary dimensions of familiarity. The implication of this finding is that Irish respondents do not experience the Council of Ministers as an integral part of a tripartite policy-making structure involving the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. Given the importance of the role the Council of Ministers plays in the European decision-making process and its relevance to any evaluation of that process, there is clearly room for substantial improvement in Irish people's understanding of this aspect of European decision-making.

3. The scope and speed of integration

In order to understand attitudes to integration it is essential to go beyond such broad measures as attitude to one's country's membership of the European Union and beyond

even the more specific measure of trust in various European institutions. This is because much of the substance of debate about European integration has to do with specific policy issues and, in particular, with whether those policy issues should be decided at a national level or at a European level. In short, we need to know more about people's attitude to the scope of European policy-making. Such attitudes have been measured by the Eurobarometer across a wide range of issues over a long number of years. The question currently used for this purpose is as follows: "For each of the following, do you think that decisions should be made by the [NATIONALITY] government, or made jointly within the European Union?" The results deriving from this question in EB57 (spring 2002) cover twenty four issues that can be divided into three groups: those with high levels of support for Europeanisation (60 per cent or above), those with moderate levels of Europeanisation (45 to 59 per cent) and those with low levels (less than 45 per cent). Eight of the twenty-four issues considered fall into the category of high support for Europeanisation. There are no surprises in this category -- each of the issues has an inherent European or international dimension and all of them, on any objective assessment, would probably qualify for inclusion in the set of issues that, according to the principle of subsidiarity, should be dealt with at the European level.

At the opposite end of the Europeanisation scale and still focusing on the EB 57 data, one finds a series of policy issues or areas that are central to domestic politics, for example, education, justice, health and social welfare, police and cultural policy. Note, however, that two issues that could be regarded as having a very substantial European dimension are, in the Irish case, also in this category of low support for Europeanisation. The items in question are political asylum (43 per cent support for Europeanisation) and immigration policy (42 per cent). It is also very striking that, in the Irish case, defence issues also fall into this category of low support for Europeanisation. In Ireland 34 per cent of people attribute policy competence for defence to the European Union; this compares to a figure of 51 per cent in the European Union as a whole².

² For a comparison of the Irish and European data on each of the issues in Table 2 see the Irish National Report on EB 57.

In between the items showing high support for Europeanisation and low support for Europeanisation, one finds a series of middle ranking issues ranging from the fight against poverty and social exclusion to agricultural and fishing policy. While the top and the bottom of this range could be as easily allocated to the category of high support or the category of low support respectively, the items in the middle of this moderate support range are genuinely intermediate. It is worth noting therefore that this category includes, right in the middle of the range, two major policy issues - environment and the fight against unemployment.

In addition to arranging these various policy issues in order of the degree of support for their Europeanisation based on the EB 57 figures, Table 2 also shows the changes that occurred between EB 57 and EB 58 (that is between spring 2002 and autumn 2002). For the most part, the changes were in the direction of increased support for Europeanisation and they tended to be concentrated in the area of justice and home affairs, including the fight against drugs, the fight against organised crime, immigration policy, rules for political asylum and urban crime prevention. Given that the main difference between Eurobarometer 57 and Eurobarometer 58 is that the latter survey was conducted more or less during the referendum campaign, it is significant that the tendency was for an increase in support for the Europeanisation of issues and that, for the most part, the issues in relation to which such increases occurred were in the justice and home affairs area.

In order to assess the implications of attitudes to the scope of European integration or European governance as displayed in Table 2, one would need to have data on the salience of each of the policy areas involved. While the Eurobarometer does not systematically examine the salience of each of the policy areas listed in Table 2, it does probe the salience of some of these and of certain other issues by means of the following question "I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not". The responses to this question are presented in Table 3.

Slightly more than half of the 15 items included in this question are regarded as salient by in excess of 80 per cent of Irish respondents. The remaining set of issues are rated as priorities by between 58 and 73 per cent of respondents. Inspection of the ranking in


Table 3 suggests that the issues given priority are those that represent difficult problems facing both national governments and the European Union alike. Examples include terrorism, unemployment, poverty and social exclusion, organised crime and drug trafficking, the environment, the quality of food products, illegal immigration and consumer protection. At the bottom end of the priority scale in Table 3, one finds a set of policy issues that have to do with the European integration process itself. These include getting closer to European citizens, successful implementation of the euro, asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the EU, reforming the institutions of the EU and welcoming new member countries. That the upper and lower ends of this ranking actually constitute different dimensions of salience is confirmed by the factor analysis presented in Table 4. The results suggest a very clear-cut factor structure comprising two dimensions - a set of priorities that focuses on major problems on the agenda of every national government and a set of priorities that focus on the European integration process itself. Only one item (guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of democracy) is ambiguous in the sense of spanning both factors or dimensions.

The combination of the findings displayed in Table 3 and 4 pose somewhat of a dilemma for the Union . On the one hand, the citizens (of Ireland and of the Union as a whole) would like the European Union to treat all the most difficult problems facing European societies as priorities. On the other hand, actions designed to consolidate or strengthen integration, and which might improve the Union's capacity to deal with some of these pressing problems, are accorded a priority or regarded as salient by significantly smaller proportions of the citizens.

European integration, as the phrase "ever closer union" reminds us, is a dynamic process. Accordingly, it is necessary to look not just at attitudes to the scope of integration but also at attitudes to its speed. Figure 5 makes a first stab at this matter by examining both people's expectations in regard to the importance of the role the European Union is likely to play in their daily lives in five years' time and their preferences for how important that role should be. In autumn 2002, a 54 per cent majority of Irish people felt that, by autumn 2007, the European Union would be playing a more important role in their daily lives. This placed Ireland third highest in a ranking of countries according to the proportion

expecting the EU to play a more important role in the future. The two countries with a more widespread expectation in this regard were Greece and Italy. At the other end of the scale, one finds that only about one-third of people in Germany, Finland and Belgium take the same view. A comparison of Figures 5 and 6 shows that significant numbers of Irish people are not happy about such a development. The proportion who say they would like the European Union to play a more important role was 41 per cent, placing Ireland 7th in the ranking of countries based on the proportion preferring a greater role for the EU.

The Eurobarometer allows us to be a bit more precise about this matter of the perceived and preferred speed of European integration. This is achieved via a question that presents the picture shown below to respondents and asks the following question: "Please look at these figures. Number one is standing still, number seven is running as fast as possible. Choose the one which best corresponds with your opinion of the current speed of building Europe". The question then asks: And which corresponds best to the speed you would like? Figure 7 combines these two measures by subtracting each individual's perception score from their preference score. If the result is zero, the respondent in question is satisfied with what he or she sees as the current speed of European integration. If the result is positive, the respondent would like the building of Europe to be proceeding at a faster pace. If the result of the calculation is negative, the respondent feels that integration is going too fast. The range of scores was then recoded so that a 1/-1 or a 2/-2 indicated a little too slow or a little too fast while anything more than that in a positive or negative direction indicated more than a little too slow and more than a little



When attitudes are measured in this way, Ireland moves from the front rank of supporters of integration (as per, for example, the membership indicator) to the other end of the scale where it is fourth from the bottom on a descending scale of countries ranked in terms of the proportions regarding the pace of integration as too slow. This puts Ireland in quite different company - nestling between Sweden and Austria, though still some way ahead of Finland and Denmark. The distribution of attitudes on this scale in the Irish case is as follows: 39 per cent regard the current speed of integration as being about right. Along with Denmark, Ireland thus has the highest proportion wishing the pace of integration to remain as they currently see it. The proportion of Irish people wishing to put the brakes on what they see as a speeding European Union is 19 per cent (13 per cent regarding the speed as more than a little too fast and six per cent regarding it as a little too fast). This leaves 32 per cent on the side of faster European integration (4 per cent regarding the current speed of integration as a little too slow and 28 per cent regarding it as a more than a little too slow). In short, when it comes to the pace of European integration, Irish people tend to prefer the *status quo* or the *status quo ante*, though there is a significant minority (about one-quarter) that is prepared to forge ahead. It should be emphasised that these attitudes relate to the speed of integration (the speed of "building Europe") rather than to its geographical extent. In other words, the evidence just considered does not imply the existence of widespread reservations about enlargement. In fact, as we shall see in the next section, as of autumn 2002, Irish people's attitudes to enlargement were among the most favourable of any of the member states.

4. Attitudes to enlargement

Figure 8 shows that, in common with Greece and Spain, Ireland had the lowest level of opposition to enlargement (about one in six) in autumn 2002 and, that, this time in common with Greece and Denmark, it had in the third highest level of support for enlargement. A notable feature of the distribution of opinion on enlargement as shown in Figure 8 is that, with the exception of Great Britain, the lowest levels of opposition to enlargement tend to be found in the countries that joined the Union in the 1970s and

1980s. Significantly higher levels of opposition are found in the six original member states and in Austria and Finland. The highest level of opposition to enlargement (48 per cent) is found in France.

Expressing an opinion in favour of enlargement is one thing, having an active concern about the issue may be quite another. Some indication of the latter can be gleaned from the questions on the priority actions the European Union ought to undertake. On this measure, Greece and Denmark, followed some way behind by Ireland and Sweden are the four countries whose public opinion shows some degree of commitment to enlargement (see Figure 9). After that, the proportion giving priority to enlargement drops sharply to 40 per cent in Austria and the Netherlands, to one-in-three in Italy Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain and to do one-quarter in Britain, Belgium, West Germany and Finland. French and East German public opinion showed the lowest concern for the enlargement of the Union, in the sense that only one in five regard it as a priority for the Union.

An analysis earlier in this report identified two dimensions underlying the pattern of policy priorities - problem priorities and integration priorities, the latter having a distinctly lower level of salience. Enlargement tends to be accorded the lowest rank in this already low salience category. The point is illustrated in Figure 9 where, for each member state, the priority attached to welcoming new member countries can be compared with the priority attached to getting closer to EU citizens. The discrepancy between these two priorities is least in Denmark (seven percentage points) and next least in Ireland (15 percentage points). The discrepancy is greatest in the case of France (56 percentage points).

A major event or development such as the enlargement of the European Union generates expectations, and hopes and fears, as to its consequences. Irish people's expectations regarding the consequences of enlargement under ten different headings are set out in Table 5. Substantial majorities of Irish people see enlargement as making the European Union more important in the world and as leading to the cultural enrichment of Europe. On the other side of the spectrum, majorities ranging from 55 to 63 per cent see negative consequences for the importance of Ireland in Europe, for the process of making

decisions on a European scale, for financial aid for Ireland from the European Union and, finally, in regard to the need for institutional reform before enlargement can proceed.

Once again, a factor analysis of these data helps us to identify the dimensions underlying the pattern of expectations in Table 5. Summarising the results briefly, it seems clear that the first dimension is a sense of the tangible disadvantages that could follow from enlargement (less financial aid from the EU, more unemployment in Ireland, Ireland becoming less important in Europe, and an increase in the difficulty of making decisions at the European level) (see Table 6). The second dimension relates to what might be described as the intangible advantages that go with enlargement (EU more important in the world, Europe culturally richer, more peace and security in Europe). Two other expectations are (more weakly) associated with this intangible-advantages dimension - the view that the EU should help future member countries before they join and that the EU must reform its institutions before welcoming new members. Finally a single item points to a third aspect of the set of expectations, namely the view that enlargement will not cost more for existing member countries. In summary, while people in Ireland see positive consequences following from the enlargement process, these consequences tend to be of an intangible sort. In contrast to this, the negative expectations, which are almost equally widespread, relate to much more tangible matters.

The Eurobarometer 58 data also make it possible to examine the expected gains and losses affecting various groups and sectors in society as a result of enlargement. The question regarding winners and losers takes account of eleven groups and shows fairly widespread agreement on three groups that are expected to lose out as a result of enlargement - fishermen (39 per cent lose out), small companies (38 per cent), farmers (35 per cent), and the unemployed (35 per cent). At the other end of the scale there is a widespread consensus that big business will benefit from enlargement (66 per cent see it as benefiting) and that young people will also be beneficiaries (58 per cent seeing young people gaining from enlargement). There is also a fairly widespread perception that people living in big cities and ethnic minorities will benefit, though the latter also elicit a high don't know factor as do the unemployed, old people and people living in the countryside .

Again, a factor analysis is useful in identifying the structure underlying these responses. The analysis suggests that there are two dimensions underlying the expectations of gains and losses from enlargement. The two dimensions point to a broad distinction between a traditional economic and social sector and a modern economic and social sector. Thus the first dimension (traditional) is defined mainly by expectations in regard to the outcome for fishermen, farmers, people living in the countryside, and small companies; expectations regarding old people and the unemployed also tend to load on this dimension. The second (modern) dimension is defined by expectations regarding the effect of enlargement on young people, urban dwellers, big businesses, and ethnic minorities. It should be noted that there is a substantial overlap between the two dimensions in regard to the category of "employees in general" (possibly because of the very unspecific definition of this social group). Putting the distinction suggested by the factor analysis together with the distribution of responses as set out in Table 6 points to a set of expectations that the rewards of enlargement will accrue to more modern social and economic sectors while expectations regarding traditional economy and society either lean towards a perception of losses for the groups involved or are unclear or divided.

If the anxieties and apprehensions identified in this analysis of expectations regarding the consequences of enlargement and expectations regarding winners and losers are to be allayed, it would seem essential that the mass public be drawn into a debate about enlargement, that they be exposed to as much information about enlargement as possible, that they feel informed about the process and that, ideally, they have a sense of participating in a public debate about the matter. These three aspects of the Irish public's involvement with enlargement issues are or are set out in Figures 10 to 12.

The ranking of countries in descending order from left to right in Figure 10 is based on taking the average of the three forms of communication shown in the table (television, newspapers and discussions with relative friends and colleagues). Ireland ranks 7th on this basis, 63 per cent having recently seen something about enlargement on television, 43 per cent having read about enlargement in the newspaper and 15 per cent having discussed the issue with family friends or colleagues. Note that only three other countries equal or exceed the level of interpersonal discussion of enlargement issues found in Ireland in autumn 2002 - the three are Denmark Austria and Greece.

When it comes to the subjective sense of being informed about enlargement, Ireland ranks 6th - just behind the Netherlands and Luxembourg but some distance behind the three best informed countries (Finland Austria and Denmark). The distribution of subjective sense of being informed about enlargement in Ireland is 4 per cent very well-informed, 25 per cent well-informed, 41 per cent not very well informed, 28 per cent not at all well informed and one per cent don't know. While the ordering of countries in Figure 11 is likely to be heavily influenced by various aspects of national political culture and political processes, there is some suggestion that exposure to the issue of enlargement is in part a function of geographical or geopolitical proximity to and involvement with the candidate countries.

This brings us to the final aspect of the public's involvement with enlargement issues - the sense of participating in political debate about enlargement. In this case Ireland is at the top of a ranking of countries in terms of the proportion feeling either a great deal involved in such a debate or somewhat involved. In the Irish case one-in-three people see themselves as involved (seven per cent a great deal involved and 26 per cent somewhat involved). Twenty-nine per cent feel themselves not very much involved and 36 per cent not at all involved (see Figure 12). Given the tendency noted at several points in this report for Ireland to lag behind in terms of engagement with European issues, the fact that it is at the top of the ranking in terms of a sense of participation in political debate about enlargement is remarkable and is, no doubt, a direct reflection of having held two referendums on the Nice treaty in which enlargement played a prominent role. At the same time, the fact that two-thirds of Irish people feel less than somewhat involved in political debate about enlargement underlines the difficulties of securing a sense of mass participation in relation to issues such as enlargement even in a referendum-holding context.

5. Transatlantic issues and attitudes to European defence and security policy

As recent developments have indicated, the issue of enlargement of the European Union is inseparable from the wider issue of the transatlantic relationship. The final section of this report examines this relationship by looking at evaluations of the role of the United States in the international system in five areas - peace in the world, the fight against

terrorism, growth of the world economy, the fight against poverty and the protection of the environment. Before examining the data, it is important to emphasise that they refer to evaluations of the role of the United States prior to recent debates in the UN Security Council and prior to the intensification of both transatlantic and intra-European debate on the issue of war with Iraq. As such they have the advantage of establishing a base point against which current evidence of public opinion on specific issues can be assessed.

As Figure 13 shows, opinion in the member states of the European Union on the question of the role the United States plays in relation to peace in the world varies widely. The range extends from a plus 14 percentage point rating in Britain to a minus 60 percentage point rating Greece. Ireland ranks next to Britain in favourable assessments of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world (a four percentage point net positive evaluation), just ahead of Denmark (plus two percentage points) and of Italy (minus two percentage points). Public opinion in all the other member states of the European Union takes a more negative view of the role of the United States, the least negative being West German public opinion (minus nine points) and the most negative being Greek public opinion (minus 60 points).

In contrast to the rating on the question of peace and the world, the United States is positively rated by the vast majority of member states of the European Union in relation to the fight against terrorism. Ireland's rating of the United States in this regard slips from second to fourth position (plus four on peace, plus 37 on the fight against terrorism). The European publics with substantially more positive evaluations of the role the United States in the fight against terrorism are those of Britain, Denmark and West Germany.

Turning to the economic, social and environmental aspects of the role of the United States, there is a net favourable evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to the growth of the world economy in a majority of the member states. On the other hand, there is an overwhelmingly negative net evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to the fight against poverty and in relation to the protection of the environment (see Figure 14).

On all three issues Irish public opinion is the most favourably disposed towards the role of the United States. The Irish public's evaluation of the role the United States on the

economic front is a net positive 36 points. The next closest member state is Finland (26 points positive), followed by Denmark (22 points) and Britain (17 points). On the question the role of the United States in the fight against poverty, Irish opinion is evenly divided, while, on the question of the United States and the environment, Irish opinion shifts marginally towards the negative side with a net evaluation of -4 points. However both these Irish evaluations of the international economic, social and environmental role of the United States are significantly less negative than the next nearest member states - Britain on the fight against poverty (minus 14 points) and Italy and Portugal on the role the United States in relation to the environment (minus 22 and minus 23 points respectively). The severest critic of the United States on all three issues is again Greece, followed this time by France (see Figure 14). Taking the data on all the dimensions of evaluation of the role of the United States together, it is clear that Irish public opinion occupies quite a distinctive position relative to the other member states of the European Union.

As discussed in the Irish National Report on EB 57, attitudes to a common defence both in Ireland and in the European Union as a whole vary substantially depending on what exactly is proposed. Thus, only one-third of Irish respondents are in favour of joint EU decision-making on defence whereas half of Irish respondents say they favour a common defence and security policy among the member states of the European Union. The EB 57 report argued that these discrepancies are not in any way illogical. The fact is that the proposal that there should be joint EU decision-making on defence is a much more radically supranational proposal than the proposal that the European Union should have a common defence and security policy. That this distinction is not just an Irish read on the issue is confirmed by the occurrence of a similar discrepancy in responses to these two questions in the European Union as a whole, albeit that the discrepancy occurs at higher levels of support for both versions of the defence proposal - 50 per cent supporting joint decision-making on defence in the Union as a whole compared to 70 per cent supporting a common defence and security policy (see Figure 15). A final point worth noting from Figure 15 is that there was no change in Irish attitudes to the issue of defence and security policy on either measure between spring 2002 and autumn 2002.

The options spelt out in Figure 15 do not of course exhaust the alternatives in the area of security and defence policy. It is not surprising, therefore, that when a fuller range of alternatives is set out, European public opinion becomes even more complex. Figure 16 shows responses to a question about how decisions concerning defence policy should be made - by the European Union, by Nato, or by national governments. Faced with this set of alternatives, Irish public opinion is ranked third lowest in terms of support for defence decision-making by the European Union, next to Denmark and Britain. It is clear, however, that the reasons for the low level of support for European Union decision-making on defence is very different in Ireland as compared with Denmark and Britain. In the case of the latter two countries support for European decision-making is limited by the quite extensive support for NATO. In the Irish case, despite the favourable assessments of the role of the United States documented above, support for NATO is very low (14 per cent) - though not as low as in some of the member states, for example Finland and Greece. In the Irish case, the limits to support for European Union decision-making on defence or are due to the fact that a plurality of respondents preferred the option of national government decision-making. Irish support for this option (37 per cent) is exceeded only by the proportions holding similar attitudes in Finland (50 per cent) and are matched by a similar percentage in Sweden (37 per cent). In summary, Irish opinion on this issue is divided between a group of slightly less than one-third in favour of a European Union approach and a group of slightly more than one third in favour of national decision-making.

Summary and conclusions

Recent Eurobarometer surveys in Ireland up to and including EB 58 show that, over the last two years, Irish public opinion towards European integration as measured by the standard Eurobarometer indicators, has been somewhat volatile. In autumn 2000 and spring 2001 support for integration experienced two successive falls. These falls were an important aspect of the attitudinal background against which the first referendum on the Nice Treaty took place. Although, in the wake of the first referendum and the defeat of the treaty, there was a substantial recovery in support for integration in autumn 2001, the two most recent surveys (EB 57 and EB 58) again saw two successive falls in the level of support for integration.

Despite the decline in overall support for integration between spring and autumn 2002, the evidence in EB 58 shows that certain specific attitudes to European integration changed in a positive direction over this same period. These changes included an increase in Irish people's trust in various European institutions. For example, confidence in the European Parliament rose nine percentage points to 61 per cent as did confidence in the Commission (to 57 per cent). Confidence in the Council of Ministers showed the biggest increase (up 14 percentage points to 50 per cent). Trust in the Convention on the Future of the European Union also grew substantially - from 24 per cent to 36 per cent.

This suggests that the greater degree of engagement with European issues that accompanies a referendum, while it may not lead to changes in overall attitude to European integration or to the European Union, can bring about improvement in more specific evaluations of particular institutions or aspects of integration.

Part of the explanation of the changes just mentioned lies in a change in people's engagement with European issues. Such change is indicated by the extent to which people are willing to take a position on a particular issue rather than giving a don't know or non-committal response. The extent of attitude formation in this sense increased substantially in the case of the Convention on the Future of the European Union and in the case of the Council of Ministers between spring and autumn 2002. However, the net effect of these and related increases in attitude formation was simply to bring the Irish level of attitude formation up to the European average.

It is also notable that familiarity with some (but only some) of the EU institutions increased in Ireland between spring and autumn 2002. The European Parliament, the European Commission and European Central Bank showed no change in overall exposure/familiarity between these two time periods. On the other hand, familiarity with the Court of Justice rose 12 percentage points, familiarity with the European Court of Auditors rose 10 percentage points, familiarity with the Convention on the Future of the EU rose nine percentage points and familiarity with the Council of Ministers rose seven percentage points.

More detailed statistical analysis of the evidence of familiarity with the European institutions indicates that, unlike the people of the Union as a whole, Irish respondents do

not experience the Council of Ministers as an integral part of a tripartite policy-making structure involving the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. Given the importance of the role the Council of Ministers plays in the European decision-making process and its relevance to any evaluation of that process, there is clearly room for substantial improvement in Irish people's understanding of this aspect of the European decision-making process. One would expect that, in the run-up to the impending Irish presidency of the Council, there would be an automatic improvement in dissemination of information about the role of the Council. The challenge will be to ensure that any gain in understanding the role of the Council on the part of the public is not lost when things return to normal.

Turning to the issue of the level (national or European) at which various policy issues should be decided, there is evidence of some increase in support for the Europeanisation of certain issues between spring and autumn 2002. The changes, which were modest, tended to be concentrated in the area of justice and home affairs, including the fight against drugs, the fight against organised crime, immigration policy, rules for political asylum and urban crime prevention. It is noteworthy that these increases in support for the Europeanisation of issues that lie mainly in the justice and home affairs area occurred during a period in which a wide range of European policy issues were being discussed in the context of the second referendum on the Nice Treaty.

Detailed statistical analysis of Irish people's priorities regarding actions that might be undertaken by the European Union points to the existence of two distinct dimensions of concern underlying these priorities. The first dimension relates to major problems on the agenda of every European government, while the second dimension focuses on the European integration process itself. This poses somewhat of a dilemma for the Union . On the one hand, the citizens of Ireland (and of the Union as a whole) would like the European Union to treat all the most difficult problems facing European societies as priorities. On the other hand, actions designed to consolidate or strengthen integration, and which might therefore beef-up the Union's capacity to deal with some of these pressing problems, constitute a separate dimension that is regarded as salient by significantly smaller proportions of the citizens.

In regard to the speed of European integration, the results derived from combining data from two questions - one on the perceived speed of building Europe and the other on the preferred speed of building Europe - are quite revealing in regard to Irish attitudes to integration. On this measure Ireland moves from the front rank of supporters of integration (as per, for example, the membership indicator) to the other end of the scale where it is fourth from the bottom on a descending scale of countries defined by the proportions regarding the pace of integration as too slow. This puts Irish public opinion in quite different company - nestling between Sweden and Austria, though still some way ahead of Finland and Denmark. This suggests that, when it comes to the pace of European integration, Irish people tend to prefer the *status quo* or the *status quo ante*, though there is a significant minority (about one-quarter) that is prepared to forge full-speed ahead.

Reservations about the speed of building Europe do not seem to adversely affect Irish people's attitude to enlargement. Support for enlargement increased in Ireland between spring and autumn 2002 and is among the highest in the EU. It should be noted however that more detailed statistical analysis of people's expectations regarding the consequences of enlargement shows that the positive consequences that Irish people see as following from the enlargement process tend to be of an intangible sort, whereas the negative expectations, which are almost equally widespread, relate to much more tangible and material matters (this contrast is also found in public opinion in the Union as a whole).

A similar statistical analysis of people's expectations regarding the consequences of enlargement for various social and economic groups and sectors points to a broad distinction between a traditional economic and social sector and a modern economic and social sector. Thus the first dimension of expected winners and losers is defined mainly by expectations in regard to the outcome for fishermen, farmers, people living in the countryside, and small companies. The second dimension is defined by expectations regarding the effect of enlargement on young people, urban dwellers, big business and ethnic minorities.

In short, the evidence suggests that Irish people (and people in the European Union as a whole) see the rewards of enlargement as accruing to the more modern social and

economic sectors while expectations regarding the traditional economy and society either lean towards anticipation of losses for the groups involved or are unclear or divided.

Ireland ranks seventh among the member states in terms of exposure to information about enlargement. When it comes to the subjective sense of being informed about enlargement, Ireland ranks sixth. In the light of Ireland's tendency towards lower engagement with European issues, these rankings are not bad. However, when we look at the sense that people have of participating in political debate about enlargement, Ireland is at the top of a ranking of countries in terms of the proportion feeling either a great deal or somewhat involved in such a debate. Given the tendency noted at several points in this report for Ireland to lag behind in terms of public engagement with European issues, the fact that it is at the top of the ranking in terms of a sense of participation in political debate about enlargement is remarkable and is, no doubt, a direct reflection of having held two referendums in which the enlargement issue played a prominent role. At the same time, the fact that two-thirds of Irish people feel less than somewhat involved in political debate about enlargement underlines the difficulties of securing a sense of mass participation in relation to issues such as enlargement even in a referendum-holding context.

As current debates remind us, attitudes to integration are not unconnected with attitudes to the transatlantic relationship. EB 58 included a new set of questions designed to examine attitudes to the role of the United States in the international system in five different areas. Opinion in the member states on the question of the role the United States plays in relation to peace in the world varies widely. The range extends from plus 14 percentage point net rating in Britain to a minus 60 percentage point rating in Greece. Ireland (net rating of plus four percentage points) ranks next to Britain in favourable assessments of the role of the United States in relation to peace in the world and just ahead of Denmark and Italy. Public opinion in all the other member states of the European Union takes a negative view of the role of the United States, the least negative being West German public opinion and the most negative being public opinion in Greece. In contrast to the rating on the question of peace in the world, the United States is positively rated by the majority of member states of the European Union in relation to the


fight against terrorism. Ireland's rating of the United States in this regard (plus 37 percentage points) slips from second to fourth position.

A majority of the member states show a net favourable evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to growth of the world economy. On the other hand, there is an overwhelmingly negative net evaluation of the role of the United States in relation to the fight against poverty and to the protection of the environment. On all three issues Irish public opinion is the most favourably disposed towards the role of the United States. The Irish public's evaluation of the role the United States on the economic front is a net positive 36 points. On the question of the role of the United States in the fight against poverty, Irish opinion is evenly divided, while, on the question of the United States and the environment, Irish opinion shifts marginally towards the negative side with a net evaluation of minus 4 percentage points. Taking the data on all the dimensions of evaluation of the role of the United States into account, it is clear that Irish public opinion occupies quite a distinctive position among the member states of the European Union.

In the conclusion to the previous report (EB 57) in this series, it was emphasised that the implications of any particular configuration of public opinion towards the EU depend on the institutional and political context within which ratification of EU treaties takes place. It was also noted that the requirement to hold referendums on EU treaty changes puts additional demands on Irish citizens, placing them in the position of making decisions on complex issues and requiring them to have higher rather than average levels of knowledge of and engagement with these issues. The evidence considered in this report and the evidence from the special survey of the second referendum on the Nice Treaty both indicate that people's degree of engagement with European issues can be strengthened and improved by an effective process of campaigning and communication. The challenge is to ensure that such engagement is not just specific to the issues in a particular referendum and to the duration of the referendum campaign. The evidence points to a need for a permanent communication campaign to improve the capacity of people to deal with the on-going series of complex issues raised by the on-going process of European integration.


Figures and Tables
(in order of occurrence in text)

Figure 1 Trends in support for European integration - Ireland and the EU, 1973-2002




Source: EB3 – EB58.1; Dissolution indicator for Ireland for Autumn 2002 from ECR Nice2 Survey

Figure 2 Net trust (trust minus distrust) in European institutions - Ireland and EU15, Spring and Autumn 2002 (in descending order of Irish trust, Spring 2002)




Source: EB57.1, Q.21; EB58.1, Q.21

Figure 3 Extent of attitude formation (total trust plus mistrust responses) on issue of trust in selected European institutions - Ireland and EU15, Spring and Autumn 2002 (in descending order of Irish difference between Spring and Autumn 2002)



Source: EB57.1, Q.21; EB58.1, Q.21

Figure 4 Familiarity with (heard of) European institutions - Ireland and EU15, Spring and Autumn 2002 (in descending order of frequency of heard of institutions in Ireland, Autumn 2002)



Source: EB57.1, Q.19; EB58.1, Q.19

Table 1 Factor analysis of indicators of familiarity with EU institutions - EU and Ireland, Autumn 2002

	Underlying dimensions - EU		Underlying dimensions - Ireland	
	(1) Secondary institutions	(2) Primary institutions	(1) Secondary institutions	(2) Primary institutions
Committee of the Regions of the EU	0.827	0.115	0.856	0.051
Economic and Social Committee of the EU	0.811	0.163	0.834	0.102
Convention on the Future of the EU	0.767	0.140	0.820	0.117
European Ombudsman	0.625	0.240	0.668	0.286
European Court of Auditors	0.588	0.341	0.777	0.189
European Parliament	-0.012	0.788	-0.046	0.763
European Commission	0.125	0.777	0.160	0.774
Court of Justice of the EU	0.331	0.632	0.492	0.339
European Central Bank	0.305	0.624	0.315	0.594
Council of Ministers of the EU	0.368	0.607	0.501	0.495

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Source: EB58.1, Q.19

Table 2 Attribution of policy competence to the European Union - Ireland, Spring and Autumn 2002 (percentage attributing competence to EU)

	Decisions should be made jointly within the EU		
	EB57.1	EB58.1	Difference
	Spring 02 %	Autumn 02 %	(EB58.1 minus EB57.1) %
High support for Europeanization (EB57.1)			
Fight against international terrorism	84	83	-1
Foreign policy towards countries outside EU	72	71	-2
Scientific and technological research	72	72	0
Support to regions experiencing economic difficulties	71	74	3
Currency	71	69	-2
Humanitarian aid	70	72	2
Fight against drugs	63	70	7
Fight against organised crime	60	68	8
Moderate support for Europeanization (EB57.1)			
Fight against poverty and social exclusion	59	66	7
Tackling challenges of ageing population	57	59	2
Environment	53	55	2
Fight against unemployment	48	53	5
Agriculture and fishing policy	47	49	1
Low support for Europeanization (EB57.1)			
Rules for political asylum	43	49	6
Immigration policy	42	44	2
Broadcasting and press	39	47	7
Cultural policy	39	42	3
Justice	35	44	8
Health and social welfare	35	37	3
Urban crime prevention	34	41	6
Education	34	36	2
Defence	34	34	0
Accepting refugees	33	42	9
Police	29	34	5
Average n of cases			
	984	1016	

Source: EB 57.1, Q.24.a and Q.24.b; EB58.1, Q.25.a and Q.25.b

Table 3 Priority attached to actions to be taken by the European Union - Ireland, Autumn 2002

	Priority	Not a priority	DK
Fighting terrorism	92.4	3.6	3.9
Maintaining peace and security in Europe	90.1	4.6	5.3
Fighting unemployment	90.8	4.6	4.5
Fighting poverty and social exclusion	90.8	3.5	5.6
Fighting organised crime and drug trafficking	91.6	4.0	4.3
Protecting the environment	88.3	6.4	5.3
Guaranteeing the quality of food products	87.5	6.1	6.4
Fighting illegal immigration	89.5	5.7	4.8
Protecting consumers and guaranteeing the quality of other products	84.1	8.3	7.7
Guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of democracy in Europe	80.2	9.9	9.8
Getting closer to European citizens	72.9	16.4	10.6
Successfully implementing the single European currency, the euro	77.9	14.7	7.5
Asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the EU around the world	62.8	23.5	13.7
Reforming the institutions of the EU and the way they work	65.0	18.5	16.5
Welcoming new member countries	58.0	29.2	12.8

Source: EB58.1, Q.27


Table 4 Factor analysis of policy priorities - Ireland, Autumn 2002

	Underlying dimensions	
	(1) Problem priorities	(2) Integration priorities
Fighting organised crime and drug trafficking	0.787	0.174
Fighting unemployment	0.768	0.196
Fighting terrorism	0.765	0.150
Fighting poverty and social exclusion	0.738	0.218
Maintaining peace and security in Europe	0.703	0.285
Guaranteeing the quality of food products	0.700	0.296
Fighting illegal immigration	0.690	0.164
Protecting the environment	0.667	0.318
Protecting consumers and guaranteeing the quality of other products	0.657	0.371
Asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the EU around the world	0.249	0.758
Reforming the institutions of the EU and the way they work	0.256	0.737
Getting closer to European citizens	0.279	0.681
Welcoming new member countries	0.022	0.676
Successfully implementing the single European currency, the euro	0.293	0.556
Guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of democracy in Europe	0.503	0.554

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Source: EB58.1, Q.27

Figure 5 Expectations regarding the role the European Union will play in daily life in five years' time (in descending order of more important)



Source: EB58.1, Q.18a

Figure 6 Role would like the European Union to play in daily life in five years' time (in descending order of more important)






Figure 7 Preferred speed of "building Europe" relative to perceived speed (in descending order of too slow), Autumn 2002




Source: EB58.1, Q.17b

Figure 8 For or against enlargement (in descending order of opposition to enlargement), Autumn 2002



Source: EB58.1, Q.26

Figure 9 Priority attached to welcoming new member countries and to getting closer to EU citizens
(in descending order of welcoming new member countries), Autumn 2002



Source: EB58.1, Q.27

Table 5 Expectations/perceptions regarding enlargement - Ireland, Autumn 2002

	Positive Expectation/ Perception	Negative Expectation/ Perception	DK
Importance of EU in the world	66.3	15.1	18.6
Cultural enrichment of Europe	65.6	17.9	16.5
Peace and security in Europe	52.0	28.1	20.0
EU help for future member countries financially, even before they join	41.1	34.4	24.4
Cost of enlargement for existing member countries	37.7	39.9	22.4
Employment in own country	31.9	43.1	25.0
Importance of country in Europe	26.9	55.5	17.6
Making decisions on a European scale	23.9	54.6	21.5
Financial aid for own country from EU	18.0	62.5	19.5
Need for EU institutional reform	10.9	57.2	31.9

Source: EB58.1, Q.43

Table 6 Factor analysis of expectations regarding enlargement - Ireland, Autumn 2002

	Underlying dimensions		
	(1) Tangible disadvantages	(2) Intangible advantages	(3) Perception of costs
Country will receive less financial aid from EU	0.759	0.077	-0.178
There will be more unemployment in country	0.752	-0.192	0.087
Country will become less important in Europe	0.741	-0.088	-0.055
It will be much more difficult to make decisions on a European scale	0.688	-0.061	0.043
The EU will be more important in the world	-0.064	0.787	-0.020
Europe will be culturally richer	-0.128	0.782	-0.039
More peace and security will be guaranteed in Europe	-0.239	0.657	0.219
The EU should help future member countries financially, even before they join	0.034	0.499	0.393
The EU must reform the way its institutions work before welcoming new members	0.378	0.471	-0.062
Enlargement will not cost more for existing member countries	-0.057	0.034	0.932

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Source : EB58.1, Q.43

Table 7 Groups perceived as losing out/benefiting as a result of enlargement - Ireland, Autumn 2002

	Lose out	Benefit	Neither lose out nor benefit/DK
Fishermen	39.2	25.6	35.2
Small companies	38.0	29.0	33.0
Farmers	35.1	34.4	30.5
The unemployed	34.7	17.0	48.2
Old people	25.3	26.4	48.3
People living in the countryside	23.9	27.8	48.3
Employees in general	23.4	37.2	39.4
Ethnic minorities	13.1	48.2	38.7
People living in big cities	13.0	39.8	47.2
Young people	12.5	57.7	29.8
Big businesses	9.1	66.3	24.6

Source: EB58.1, Q.46


Table 8 Factor analysis of anticipated benefits/losses resulting from enlargement - Ireland, Autumn 2002

	Underlying dimensions	
	(1) Traditional economy and society	(2) Modern economy and society
Fishermen	0.866	0.061
Farmers	0.799	0.078
People living in the countryside	0.693	0.349
Small companies	0.688	0.219
Old people	0.578	0.435
Employees in general	0.565	0.556
The unemployed	0.485	0.259
Young people	0.214	0.758
Ethnic minorities	0.138	0.709
People living in big cities	0.283	0.701
Big businesses	0.098	0.661

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Source : EB58.1, Q.46

Figure 10 Recently read/seen/been told something about enlargement - daily newspapers, television and discussions with relatives, friends, colleagues (in descending order of average of three media), Autumn 2002



Source: EB58.1, Q.45

Figure 11 Sense of being informed about enlargement (in descending order of very well plus well informed),
Autumn 2002





Figure 12 Sense of participating in political debate about enlargement (in descending order of a great deal plus somewhat), Autumn 2002



Source: EB58.1, Q.40

Figure 13 Net evaluation of the role of the United States (positive minus negative responses) in relation to peace in the world and the fight against terrorism (in descending order of peace in the world), Autumn 2002






Figure 14 Net evaluation of the role of the United States (positive minus negative responses) in relation to the world economy, poverty in the world and the environment (in descending order of average of world economy), Autumn 2002




Source: EB58.1, Q.48

Figure 15 Support for a common defence and security policy and for joint decision-making on defence - Ireland and EU15, Spring and Autumn 2002



Source: EB57.1, Q.25.3 and Q.24a.1; EB58.1, Q.26.3 and Q.25a.1

Figure 16 Decisions concerning European defence policy



Source: EB58.1, Q.30

EB58 Questionnaire

INTERVIEW NUMBER

+	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	1
+	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	

Q.1. - What is your nationality? Please tell me the country (or countries) that apply(ies). (MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

1. Belgium.....	2	1,
2. Denmark.....		2,
3. Germany.....		3,
4. Greece.....		4,
5. Spain.....		5,
6. France.....		6,
7. Ireland.....		7,
8. Italy.....		8,
9. Luxembourg.....		9,
10. Netherlands.....		10,
11. Portugal.....		11,
12. United Kingdom (Great Britain, Northern Ireland).....		12,
13. Austria.....		13,
14. Sweden.....		14,
15. Finland.....		15,
Other countries.....		16,
DK.....		17,

Q.2. - When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?

Frequently.....	3	1
Occasionally.....		2
Never.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.3. - When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen...? (READ OUT)

often.....	4	1
from time to time.....		2
rarely.....		3
never.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.4. - On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead? (READ OUT)

Very satisfied.....	5	1
Fairly satisfied.....		2
Not very satisfied.....		3
Not at all satisfied.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.5.1. - What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2003 be better, worse or the same, when it comes to YOUR LIFE IN GENERAL?

Better.....	6	1
Worse.....		2
Same.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.5.2. - What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2003 be better, worse or the same, when it comes to THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN (OUR COUNTRY)?

Better.....	7	1
Worse.....	2	
Same.....	3	
DK.....	4	

Q.5.3. - What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2003 be better, worse or the same, when it comes to THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD

Better.....	8	1
Worse.....	2	
Same.....	3	
DK.....	4	

Q.5.4. - What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2003 be better, worse or the same, when it comes to THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION IN (OUR COUNTRY)?

Better.....	9	1
Worse.....	2	
Same.....	3	
DK.....	4	

Q.5.5. - What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2003 be better, worse or the same, when it comes to YOUR PERSONAL JOB SITUATION?

Better.....	10	1
Worse.....	2	
Same.....	3	
DK.....	4	

Q.6.1. - And could you tell me whether in the forthcoming six months you expect to spend more, less or the same amount on HOUSING?

More.....	11	1
Less.....	2	
The same.....	3	
DK.....	4	

Q.6.2. - And could you tell me whether in the forthcoming six months you expect to spend more, less or the same amount on CLOTHING?

More.....	12	1
Less.....	2	
The same.....	3	
DK.....	4	

Q.6.3. - And could you tell me whether in the forthcoming six months you expect to spend more, less or the same amount on FOOD?

More.....	13	1
Less.....	2	
The same.....	3	
DK.....	4	

Q.6.4. - And could you tell me whether in the forthcoming six months you expect to spend more, less or the same amount on HEALTH?

More.....	14	1
Less.....		2
The same.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.6.5. - And could you tell me whether in the forthcoming six months you expect to spend more, less or the same amount on TRANSPORT?

More.....	15	1
Less.....		2
The same.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.6.6. - And could you tell me whether in the forthcoming six months you expect to spend more, less or the same amount on LEISURE?

More.....	16	1
Less.....		2
The same.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.7.a) - Have you ever seen this symbol?

Yes.....	17	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3

IF "YES", CODE 1 IN Q.7.a)

Q.7.b) - Could you tell me what it means?

Yes, Europe, the European Union, the Community, the Common Market, The Council of Europe, etc.....	18	1
Yes, Other.....		2
No.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.8.1. - This symbol is the European flag. I have a list of statements concerning it. I would like to have your opinion on each of these. For each of them, could you please tell me if you tend to agree or tend to disagree?
THIS FLAG IS A GOOD SYMBOL FOR EUROPE

Tend to agree.....	19	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.8.2. - This symbol is the European flag. I have a list of statements concerning it. I would like to have your opinion on each of these. For each of them, could you please tell me if you tend to agree or tend to disagree?
THIS FLAG STANDS FOR SOMETHING GOOD

Tend to agree.....	20	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.8.3. - This symbol is the European flag. I have a list of statements concerning it. I would like to have your opinion on each of these. For each of them, could you please tell me if you tend to agree or tend to disagree?
I IDENTIFY WITH THIS FLAG

Tend to agree.....	21	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.8.4. - This symbol is the European flag. I have a list of statements concerning it. I would like to have your opinion on each of these. For each of them, could you please tell me if you tend to agree or tend to disagree?
THIS FLAG SHOULD BE SEEN ON ALL PUBLIC BUILDINGS IN (OUR COUNTRY) NEXT TO THE NATIONAL FLAG

Tend to agree.....	22	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.9. - Using this scale, how much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions?

1 (Know nothing at all).....	23	1
2.....		2
3.....		3
4.....		4
5.....		5
6.....		6
7.....		7
8.....		8
9.....		9
10 (Know a great deal).....		10
DK.....		11

Q.10. - When you are looking for information about the European Union, its policies, its institutions, which of the following sources do you use? Which else? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

1. Meetings.....	24	1,
2. Discussions with relatives, friends, colleagues.....		2,
3. Daily newspapers.....		3,
4. Other newspapers, magazines.....		4,
5. Television.....		5,
6. Radio.....		6,
7. The Internet.....		7,
8. Books, brochures, information leaflets.....		8,
9. CD-Rom.....		9,
10. EU info. on notice boards in libraries, town halls, railway st., post offices.....		10,
11. European Union information offices, Euro-info Centers, Euro-info Points, Euro-libraries, etc.....		11,
12. National or regional government information offices.....		12,
13. Trade Unions or professional associations.....		13,
14. Other organisations (consumer organisations, etc.).....		14,
15. A member of European Parliament or a member of (NATIONAL PARLIAMENT).....		15,
Other (SPONTANEOUS).....		16,
Never look for such information, not interested (SPONTANEOUS).....		17,
DK.....		18,

DO NOT ASK THOSE WHO ANSWERED "NEVER LOOK FOR SUCH INFORMATION, NOT INTERESTED", CODE 17 IN Q.10.

Q.11. - In general, how would you prefer to get information about the European Union? How else? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

1. A short leaflet, that just gives an overview.....	25	1,
2. A more detailed brochure.....		2,
3. A book giving you a complete description.....		3,
4. A video tape.....		4,
5. On the Internet.....		5,
6. A CD-Rom.....		6,
7. A computer terminal allowing you to consult databases.....		7,
8. From the television.....		8,
9. From the radio.....		9,
10. From daily newspapers.....		10,
11. From other newspapers, magazines.....		11,
12. From posters.....		12,
I do not want information about the European Union (SPONTANEOUS).....		13,
None of these ways (SPONTANEOUS).....		14,
DK.....		15,

ASK ALL

Q.12. - Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is...?

a good thing.....	26	1
a bad thing.....		2
neither good nor bad.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.13. - Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?

Benefited.....	27	1
Not benefited.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.14. - In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?

Very positive.....	28	1
Fairly positive.....		2
Neutral.....		3
Fairly negative.....		4
Very negative.....		5
DK.....		6

Q.15. - Do you think that (OUR COUNTRY) being a member of the European Union has brought you personally...? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

many more advantages.....	29	1
more advantages.....		2
as many advantages as disadvantages.....		3
more disadvantages.....		4
many more disadvantages.....		5
DK.....		6

Q.16. - In the last few months, several European Union Member States have had to face serious floods. Would you say that their membership of the European Union is an advantage, a disadvantage or neither an advantage nor a disadvantage in helping them recover from these disasters?

An advantage.....	30	1
A disadvantage.....		2
Neither an advantage nor a disadvantage.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.17.a) - In your opinion, what is the current speed of building Europe? Please look at these figures. N°1 is standing still, N°7 is running as fast as possible. Choose the one which best corresponds with your opinion of the current speed of building Europe?

1 (Standstill).....	31	1
2.....		2
3.....		3
4.....		4
5.....		5
6.....		6
7 (Runs as fast as possible).....		7
DK.....		8

Q.17.b) - And which corresponds best to the speed you would like?

1 (Standstill).....	32	1
2.....		2
3.....		3
4.....		4
5.....		5
6.....		6
7 (Runs as fast as possible).....		7
DK.....		8

Q.18.a) - In your opinion, in five years' time, will the European Union play a more important, a less important or the same role in your daily life?

More important.....	33	1
Less important.....		2
Same role.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.18.b) - And, in five years' time, would you like the European Union to play a more important, a less important or the same role in your daily life?

More important.....	34	1
Less important.....		2
Same role.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.19.1. - Have you heard of THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT?

Yes.....	35	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.19.2. - Have you heard of THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION?		
Yes.....	36	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3
Q.19.3. - Have you heard of THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION?		
Yes.....	37	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3
Q.19.4. - Have you heard of THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION?		
Yes.....	38	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3
Q.19.5. - Have you heard of THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN?		
Yes.....	39	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3
Q.19.6. - Have you heard of THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK?		
Yes.....	40	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3
Q.19.7. - Have you heard of THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS?		
Yes.....	41	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3
Q.19.8. - Have you heard of THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION?		
Yes.....	42	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3
Q.19.9. - Have you heard of THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION?		
Yes.....	43	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3
Q.19.10. - Have you heard of THE CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION?		
Yes.....	44	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3
Q.20.1. - And for each of the following European institutions, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?		
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT		
Important.....	45	1
Not important.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.20.2. - And for each of the following European institutions, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Important.....	46	1
Not important.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.20.3. - And for each of the following European institutions, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Important.....	47	1
Not important.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.20.4. - And for each of the following European institutions, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?
THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Important.....	48	1
Not important.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.20.5. - And for each of the following European institutions, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?
THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN

Important.....	49	1
Not important.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.20.6. - And for each of the following European institutions, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

Important.....	50	1
Not important.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.20.7. - And for each of the following European institutions, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

Important.....	51	1
Not important.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.20.8. - And for each of the following European institutions, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?
THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Important.....	52	1
Not important.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.20.9. - And for each of the following European institutions, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Important.....	53	1
Not important.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.20.10. - And for each of the following European institutions, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?
THE CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Important.....	54	1
Not important.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.21.1. - And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Tend to trust.....	55	1
Tend not to trust.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.21.2. - And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Tend to trust.....	56	1
Tend not to trust.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.21.3. - And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Tend to trust.....	57	1
Tend not to trust.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.21.4. - And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Tend to trust.....	58	1
Tend not to trust.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.21.5. - And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN

Tend to trust.....	59	1
Tend not to trust.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.21.6. - And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

Tend to trust.....	60	1
Tend not to trust.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.21.7. - And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

Tend to trust.....	61	1
Tend not to trust.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.21.8. - And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Tend to trust.....	62	1
Tend not to trust.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.21.9. - And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Tend to trust.....	63	1
Tend not to trust.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.21.10. - And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
THE CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Tend to trust.....	64	1
Tend not to trust.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.22.a) - On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?

Very satisfied.....	65	1
Fairly satisfied.....		2
Not very satisfied.....		3
Not at all satisfied.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.22.b) - And how about the way democracy works in the European Union?

Very satisfied.....	66	1
Fairly satisfied.....		2
Not very satisfied.....		3
Not at all satisfied.....		4
DK.....		5

ASK ONLY IN DK

Q.23. - In the European Union, each member state, in turn, becomes the President of the Council of Ministers for six months. Right now, it's the turn of Denmark. Have you recently read in the newspapers or heard on the radio or television anything about the Danish presidency?

Yes.....	67	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.24. - Whether you have heard about it or not, do you think it is important or not that Denmark is President of the Council of Ministers of the European Union at this time? Would you say it is...?

very important.....	68	1
important.....		2
not very important.....		3
not at all important.....		4
DK.....		5

ASK ALL

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

1. DEFENCE

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	69	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

1. PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	70	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

3. CURRENCY

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	71	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

4. HUMANITARIAN AID

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	72	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

5. HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	73	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

6. BASIC RULES FOR BROADCASTING AND PRESS

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	74	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

7. FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY/SOCIAL EXCLUSION

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	75	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

8. THE FIGHT AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	76	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

9. AGRICULTURE AND FISHING POLICY

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	77	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

10. THE SUPPORT TO REGIONS THAT ARE EXPERIENCING ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	78	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

11. EDUCATION

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	79	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

12. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	80	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

13. INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN UNION, ITS POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	81	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

14. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	82	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.a) - For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?

15. CULTURAL POLICY

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	83	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.b) - And, for each of the following?

1. IMMIGRATION POLICY

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	84	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.b) - And, for each of the following?

2. RULES FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	85	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.b) - And, for each of the following?

3. THE FIGHT AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	86	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.b) - And, for each of the following?

4. POLICE

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	87	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.b) - And, for each of the following?

5. JUSTICE

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	88	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.b) - And, for each of the following?

6. ACCEPTING REFUGEES

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	89	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.b) - And, for each of the following?

7. JUVENILE CRIME PREVENTION

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	90	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.b) - And, for each of the following?

8. URBAN CRIME PREVENTION

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	91	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.b) - And, for each of the following?

9. THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	92	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.b) - And, for each of the following?

10. THE FIGHT AGAINST THE TRADE IN, AND EXPLOITATION OF, HUMAN BEINGS

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	93	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.b) - And, for each of the following?

11. THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	94	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.25.b) - And, for each of the following?

12. TACKLING THE CHALLENGES OF AN AGEING POPULATION

By the (NATIONALITY) government.....	95	1
Jointly within the European Union.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.26.1. - What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

A EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION WITH ONE SINGLE CURRENCY, THE EURO

For.....	96	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.26.2. - What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

ONE COMMON FOREIGN POLICY AMONG THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, TOWARDS OTHER COUNTRIES

For.....	97	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.26.3. - What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

A COMMON DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY AMONG EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES

For.....	98	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.26.4. - What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

THE ENLARGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO INCLUDE NEW COUNTRIES

For.....	99	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.26.5. - What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

THE EUROPEAN UNION BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR MATTERS THAT CANNOT BE EFFECTIVELY HANDLED BY NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

For.....	100	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.26.6. - What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

THE RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSIONERS IF THEY DO NOT HAVE THE SUPPORT OF A MAJORITY IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For.....	101	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.26.7. - What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

TEACHING SCHOOL CHILDREN ABOUT THE WAY EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS WORK

For.....	102	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.1. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
WELCOMING NEW MEMBER COUNTRIES

Priority.....	103	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.2. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
GETTING CLOSER TO EUROPEAN CITIZENS, FOR EXAMPLE BY GIVING THEM MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN UNION, ITS POLICIES AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

Priority.....	104	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.3. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTING THE SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY, THE EURO

Priority.....	105	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.4. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
FIGHTING POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

Priority.....	106	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.5. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT

Priority.....	107	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.6. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
GUARANTEEING THE QUALITY OF FOOD PRODUCTS

Priority.....	108	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.7. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
PROTECTING CONSUMERS AND GUARANTEEING THE QUALITY OF OTHER PRODUCTS

Priority.....	109	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.8. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
FIGHTING UNEMPLOYMENT

Priority.....	110	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.9. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
 REFORMING THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WAY THEY WORK

Priority.....	111	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.10. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
 FIGHTING ORGANISED CRIME AND DRUG TRAFFICKING

Priority.....	112	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.11. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
 ASSERTING THE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC IMPORTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AROUND THE WORLD

Priority.....	113	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.12. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
 MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE

Priority.....	114	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.13. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
 GUARANTEEING THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE

Priority.....	115	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.14. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
 FIGHTING TERRORISM

Priority.....	116	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.27.15. - I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not?
 FIGHTING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Priority.....	117	1
Not a priority.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.28.1. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?
 WELCOMING NEW MEMBER COUNTRIES

Very effective.....	118	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.2. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?
 GETTING CLOSER TO EUROPEAN CITIZENS, FOR EXAMPLE BY GIVING THEM MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN UNION, ITS POLICIES AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

Very effective.....	119	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.3. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?
 SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTING THE SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY, THE EURO

Very effective.....	120	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.4. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?
 FIGHTING POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

Very effective.....	121	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.5. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?
 PROTECTING ENVIRONMENT

Very effective.....	122	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.6. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?

GUARANTEEING THE QUALITY OF FOOD PRODUCTS

Very effective.....	123	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.7. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?

PROTECTING CONSUMERS AND GUARANTEEING THE QUALITY OF OTHER PRODUCTS

Very effective.....	124	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.8. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?

FIGHTING UNEMPLOYMENT

Very effective.....	125	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.9. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?

REFORMING THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WAY THEY WORK

Very effective.....	126	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.10. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?

FIGHTING ORGANISED CRIME AND DRUG TRAFFICKING

Very effective.....	127	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.11. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?

ASSERTING THE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC IMPORTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AROUND THE WORLD

Very effective.....	128	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.12. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?

MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE

Very effective.....	129	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.13. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?

GUARANTEEING THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE

Very effective.....	130	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.14. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?

FIGHTING TERRORISM

Very effective.....	131	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28.15. - For each of the following areas, do you think action taken by the European Union is, or would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective or not at all effective?

FIGHTING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Very effective.....	132	1
Fairly effective.....		2
Not very effective.....		3
Not at all effective.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.29.1. - Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?

A WORLD WAR

Afraid.....	133	1
Not afraid.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.29.2. - Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?
A NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN EUROPE

Afraid.....	134	1
Not afraid.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.29.3. - Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?
A CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE (NOT NUCLEAR, BACTERIOLOGICAL OR CHEMICAL)

Afraid.....	135	1
Not afraid.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.29.4. - Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?
THE ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH OF A NUCLEAR MISSILE

Afraid.....	136	1
Not afraid.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.29.5. - Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?
AN ACCIDENT IN A NUCLEAR POWER STATION

Afraid.....	137	1
Not afraid.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.29.6. - Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?
SPREAD OF NUCLEAR, BACTERIOLOGICAL OR CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Afraid.....	138	1
Not afraid.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.29.7. - Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?
ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN EUROPE

Afraid.....	139	1
Not afraid.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.29.8. - Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Afraid.....	140	1
Not afraid.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.29.9. - Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?
ORGANISED CRIME

Afraid.....	141	1
Not afraid.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.29.10. - Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?
EPIDEMICS

Afraid.....	142	1
Not afraid.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.30. - In your opinion, should decisions concerning European defence policy be taken by national government, by NATO or by the European Union? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

1. National governments.....	143	1
2. NATO.....		2
3. The European Union.....		3
Other (SPONTANEOUS).....		4
DK.....		5

Q.31.a) - People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to European Union. Please tell me how attached you feel TO YOUR CITY\TOWN\VILLAGE?

Very attached.....	144	1
Fairly attached.....		2
Not very attached.....		3
Not at all attached.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.31.b) - People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to European Union. Please tell me how attached you feel TO YOUR REGION?

Very attached.....	145	1
Fairly attached.....		2
Not very attached.....		3
Not at all attached.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.31.c) - People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to European Union. Please tell me how attached you feel TO (OUR COUNTRY)?

Very attached.....	146	1
Fairly attached.....		2
Not very attached.....		3
Not at all attached.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.31.d) - People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to European Union. Please tell me how attached you feel TO THE EUROPEAN UNION?

Very attached.....	147	1
Fairly attached.....		2
Not very attached.....		3
Not at all attached.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.32. - In the near future, do you see yourself as...? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

1. (NATIONALITY) only.....	148	1
2. (NATIONALITY) and European.....		2
3. European and (NATIONALITY).....		3
4. European only.....		4
DK.....		5

DO NOT ASK IN DK, S AND UK

Q.33. - On 1st January 2002, the euro replaced the (FORMER NATIONAL CURRENCY). Do you think that it is...? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

a very good thing.....	149	1
a fairly good thing.....		2
neither a good nor a bad thing.....		3
a fairly bad thing.....		4
a very bad thing.....		5
DK.....		6

Q.34. - If the euro replaced our (NATIONAL CURRENCY), do you think it would be...? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

a very good thing.....	150	1
a fairly good thing.....		2
neither a good nor a bad thing.....		3
a fairly bad thing.....		4
a very bad thing.....		5
DK.....		6

ASK ALL

Q.35. - How comfortable do you feel about using the euro? Would you say you are...? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

very comfortable.....	151	1
fairly comfortable.....		2
not very comfortable.....		3
not at all comfortable.....		4
DK.....		5
Have not use the euro yet.....		6

Q.36. - Do you personally have the feeling that, in the conversion to the euro, the prices have been generally rounded down, rounded up or not at all rounded? (IF GENERALLY ROUNDED DOWN) Was it in all areas or only in certain areas? (IF GENERALLY ROUNDED UP) Was it in all areas or only in certain areas? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

1. The prices haven't been generally rounded.....	152	1
2. The prices have been generally rounded down in all areas.....		2
3. The prices have been generally rounded up in all areas.....		3
4. The prices have been generally rounded down in certain areas.....		4
5. The prices have been generally rounded up in certain areas.....		5
DK.....		6

Q.37. - Do you personally feel very attached, fairly attached, not very attached or not at all attached to the single European currency, that is the euro? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

Very attached.....	153	1
Fairly attached.....		2
Not very attached.....		3
Not at all attached.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.38. - Do you personally still feel very attached, fairly attached, not very attached or not at all attached to the (PAST NATIONAL CURRENCY)? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

Very attached.....	154	1
Fairly attached.....		2
Not very attached.....		3
Not at all attached.....		4
DK.....		5

NOW LET'S TALK ABOUT ANOTHER TOPIC: ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
ASK ALL

Q.39. - Which of these 3 options do you prefer for the immediate future of the European Union? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

1. The European Union should be enlarged to include all the countries wishing to join...	155	1
2. The European Union should be enlarged to include only some of the countries wishing to join.....		2
3. The European Union should not be enlarged to any additional countries.....		3
None of these (SPONTANEOUS).....		4
DK.....		5

Q.40. - How much do you feel you are participating in the political debate about enlargement? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

A great deal.....	156	1
Somewhat.....		2
Not very much.....		3
Not at all.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.41.1. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
CZECH REPUBLIC

In favour.....	157	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41.2. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
SLOVAKIA

In favour.....	158	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41.3. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
POLAND

In favour.....	159	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41.4. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
HUNGARY

In favour.....	160	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41.5. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
ROMANIA

In favour.....	161	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41.6. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
SLOVENIA

In favour.....	162	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41.7. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
ESTONIA

In favour.....	163	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41.8. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
LATVIA

In favour.....	164	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41.9. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
LITHUANIA

In favour.....	165	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41.10. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
BULGARIA

In favour.....	166	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41.11. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
CYPRUS

In favour.....	167	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41.12. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
MALTA

In favour.....	168	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41.13. - For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
TURKEY

In favour.....	169	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.42.1. - And for each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
SWITZERLAND

In favour.....	170	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.42.2. - And for each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
NORWAY

In favour.....	171	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.42.3. - And for each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In favour.....	172	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.42.4. - And for each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
CROATIA

In favour.....	173	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.42.5. - And for each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (FYROM)

In favour.....	174	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.42.6. - And for each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
YUGOSLAVIA (FEDERAL REPUBLIC)

In favour.....	175	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.42.7. - And for each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
ICELAND

In favour.....	176	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.42.8. - And for each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?
ALBANIA

In favour.....	177	1
Against.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.43.1. - Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?
THE MORE COUNTRIES THERE ARE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE MORE PEACE AND SECURITY WILL BE GUARANTEED IN EUROPE

Tend to agree.....	178	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.43.2. - Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?
ENLARGMENT WILL NOT COST MORE FOR EXISTING MEMBER COUNTRIES LIKE (OUR COUNTRY)

Tend to agree.....	179	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.43.3. - Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?
AFTER ENLARGMENT TO INCLUDE NEW COUNTRIES, (OUR COUNTRY) WILL BECOME LESS IMPORTANT IN EUROPE

Tend to agree.....	180	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.43.4. - Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?
THE MORE COUNTRIES THERE ARE, THE MORE UNEMPLOYMENT THERE WILL BE IN (OUR COUNTRY)

Tend to agree.....	181	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.43.5. - Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?
THE EUROPEAN UNION SHOULD HELP FUTURE MEMBER COUNTRIES FINANCIALLY, EVEN BEFORE THEY JOIN

Tend to agree.....	182	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.43.6. - Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?
ONCE NEW COUNTRIES HAVE JOINED THE EUROPEAN UNION, (OUR COUNTRY) WILL RECEIVE LESS FINANCIAL AID FROM IT

Tend to agree.....	183	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.43.7. - Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?
WITH MORE COUNTRIES, IT WILL BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO MAKE DECISIONS ON A EUROPEAN SCALE

Tend to agree.....	184	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.43.8. - Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?
THE MORE MEMBER COUNTRIES WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE MORE IMPORTANT IT WILL BE IN THE WORLD

Tend to agree.....	185	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.43.9. - Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?
WITH MORE MEMBER COUNTRIES, EUROPE WILL BE CULTURALLY RICHER

Tend to agree.....	186	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.43.10. - Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?
THE EUROPEAN UNION MUST REFORM THE WAY ITS INSTITUTIONS WORK BEFORE WELCOMING NEW MEMBERS

Tend to agree.....	187	1
Tend to disagree.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.44. - How well informed do you feel about the enlargement, that is new countries joining the European Union? Do you feel ...?
(ONE ANSWER ONLY)

very well informed.....	188	1
well informed.....		2
not very well informed.....		3
not at all well informed.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.45. - Have you recently read, seen, or been told anything about enlargement?
(IF YES) From which sources? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

1. Meetings.....	189	1,
2. Discussions with relatives, friends, colleagues.....		2,
3. Daily newspapers.....		3,
4. Other newspapers, magazines.....		4,
5. Television.....		5,
6. Radio.....		6,
7. The Internet.....		7,
8. Books, brochures, information leaflets.....		8,
9. CD-ROM.....		9,
10. European info. on notice boards in libr., town halls, railway st., post offices.....		10
11. European Union information offices, Euro-info Centers, Euro-info Points, Euro-libraries, etc.....		11
12. National or regional government information offices.....		12
13. Trade Unions or professional associations.....		13
14. Other organisations (consumer organisations, etc.).....		14
15. A member of European Parliament or a member of (NATIONAL PARLIAMENT).....		15
Other (SPONTANEOUS).....		16
Never look for such information, not interested (SPONTANEOUS).....		17
DK.....		18

Q.46.1. - For each of the following groups in our country, could you tell me if you think it will benefit, it will lose out or neither benefit nor lose out as a result of enlargement?

SMALL COMPANIES

Benefit.....	190	1
Lose out.....		2
Neither benefit nor lose out.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.46.2. - For each of the following groups in our country, could you tell me if you think it will benefit, it will lose out or neither benefit nor lose out as a result of enlargement?

BIG BUSINESSES

Benefit.....	191	1
Lose out.....		2
Neither benefit nor lose out.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.46.3. - For each of the following groups in (OUR COUNTRY), could you tell me if you think it will benefit, it will lose out or neither benefit nor lose out as a result of enlargement?

FARMERS

Benefit.....	192	1
Lose out.....		2
Neither benefit nor lose out.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.46.4. - For each of the following groups in (OUR COUNTRY), could you tell me if you think it will benefit, it will lose out or neither benefit nor lose out as a result of enlargement?

FISHERMEN

Benefit.....	193	1
Lose out.....		2
Neither benefit nor lose out.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.46.5. - For each of the following groups in (OUR COUNTRY), could you tell me if you think it will benefit, it will lose out or neither benefit nor lose out as a result of enlargement?

EMPLOYEES IN GENERAL

Benefit.....	194	1
Lose out.....		2
Neither benefit nor lose out.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.46.6. - For each of the following groups in our country, could you tell me if you think it will benefit, it will lose out or neither benefit nor lose out as a result of enlargement?

THE UNEMPLOYED

Benefit.....	195	1
Lose out.....		2
Neither benefit nor lose out.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.46.7. - For each of the following groups in our country, could you tell me if you think it will benefit, it will lose out or neither benefit nor lose out as a result of enlargement?
YOUNG PEOPLE

Benefit.....	196	1
Lose out.....		2
Neither benefit nor lose out.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.46.8. - For each of the following groups in our country, could you tell me if you think it will benefit, it will lose out or neither benefit nor lose out as a result of enlargement?
OLD PEOPLE

Benefit.....	197	1
Lose out.....		2
Neither benefit nor lose out.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.46.9. - For each of the following groups in our country, could you tell me if you think it will benefit, it will lose out or neither benefit nor lose out as a result of enlargement?
ETHNIC MINORITIES

Benefit.....	198	1
Lose out.....		2
Neither benefit nor lose out.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.46.10. - For each of the following groups in our country, could you tell me if you think it will benefit, it will lose out or neither benefit nor lose out as a result of enlargement?
PEOPLE LIVING IN BIG CITIES

Benefit.....	199	1
Lose out.....		2
Neither benefit nor lose out.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.46.11. - For each of the following groups in our country, could you tell me if you think it will benefit, it will lose out or neither benefit nor lose out as a result of enlargement?
PEOPLE LIVING IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Benefit.....	200	1
Lose out.....		2
Neither benefit nor lose out.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.47.1. - Since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, do you think that the countries from Central and Eastern Europe have BECOME MORE DEMOCRATIC?

Yes.....	201	1
No.....		2
It depends (SPONTANEOUS).....		3
DK.....		4

Q.47.2. - Since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, do you think that the countries from Central and Eastern Europe have WORKED HARD TO PREVENT CORRUPTION?

Yes.....	202	1
No.....		2
It depends (SPONTANEOUS).....		3
DK.....		4

Q.47.3. - Since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, do you think that the countries from Central and Eastern Europe have BECOME RICHER?

Yes.....	203	1
No.....		2
It depends (SPONTANEOUS).....		3
DK.....		4

Q.47.4. - Since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, do you think that the countries from Central and Eastern Europe have IMPROVED THEIR ENVIRONMENT?

Yes.....	204	1
No.....		2
It depends (SPONTANEOUS).....		3
DK.....		4

Q.48.1. - In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding PEACE IN THE WORLD?

Positive.....	205	1
Negative.....		2
Neither positive nor negative.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.48.2. - In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM?

Positive.....	206	1
Negative.....		2
Neither positive nor negative.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.48.3. - In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding GROWTH OF THE WORLD ECONOMY?

Positive.....	207	1
Negative.....		2
Neither positive nor negative.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.48.4. - In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY IN THE WORLD?

Positive.....	208	1
Negative.....		2
Neither positive nor negative.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.48.5. - In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT?

Positive.....	209	1
Negative.....		2
Neither positive nor negative.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.49. - Do you think that the European Union should or should not have a Constitution?

Should.....	210	1
Should not.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.50. - Which if any, of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? The President of the European Commission should be... (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

1. nominated by the Heads of State for governments of the European Union.....	211	1
2. elected by the majority of the European Parliament.....		2
3. directly elected by the citizens of the European Union.....		3
Other (SPONTANEOUS).....		4
DK.....		5

Q.51. - In the European Union, each Member State has a right of veto for the most important or sensitive decisions. In other words, each country can block such a decision even if the others support it. Should this right of veto...? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

be retained in order to preserve essential national interests.....	212	1
be given up in order to make the European Union more efficient.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.52.1. - We will end this part with a little quiz. For each of the following statements, could you please tell me if you think it is true or false?

THE EUROPEAN UNION CONSISTS OF 12 MEMBER STATES

True.....	213	1
False.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.52.2. - We will end this part with a little quiz. For each of the following statements, could you please tell me if you think it is true or false?

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WAS CREATED JUST AFTER WORLD WAR I

True.....	214	1
False.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.52.3. - We will end this part with a little quiz. For each of the following statements, could you please tell me if you think it is true or false?

THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS ITS OWN ANTHEM

True.....	215	1
False.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.52.4. - We will end this part with a little quiz. For each of the following statements, could you please tell me if you think it is true or false?

EACH YEAR, EUROPE DAY IS OBSERVED IN COMMON BY ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

True.....	216	1
False.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.52.5. - We will end this part with a little quiz. For each of the following statements, could you please tell me if you think it is true or false?

MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ARE ELECTED BY CITIZENS LIKE YOU AND ME

True.....	217	1
False.....		2
DK.....		3

DEMOGRAPHICS

D.1.1. - In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale ?

1 = LEFT.....	218	1
2.....		2
3.....		3
4.....		4
5.....		5
6.....		6
7.....		7
8.....		8
9.....		9
10 = RIGHT.....		10
Refusal.....		11
DK.....		12

D.1.2. - LEFT-RIGHT SCALE (REC. 3 cat.)

(1 - 4) Left.....	219	1
(5 - 6) Centre.....		2
(7 -10) Right.....		3
NA/DK/Refusal.....		4

D.1.3. - LEFT-RIGHT SCALE (REC. 5 cat.)

(1 - 2) Left.....	220	1
(3 - 4).....		2
(5 - 6) Centre.....		3
(7 - 8).....		4
(9 -10) Right.....		5
NA/DK/Refusal.....		6

NO QUESTIONS D.2 TO D.6 D.7.

D.7. - Could you give me the letter which corresponds best to your own current situation? (SHOW CARD - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

Married.....	221	1
Remarried.....		2
Unmarried. Currently living with partner.....		3
Unmarried. Having never lived with a partner.....		4
Unmarried. Having previously lived with a partner, but now on my own.....		5
Divorced.....		6
Separated.....		7
Widowed.....		8
Other (SPONTANEOUS).....		9
Refusal (SPONTANEOUS).....		10

D.8. - How old were you when you finished your full-time education ?

Up to 15 years.....	222	1
16 - 19 years.....		2
20 + years.....		3
Still studying.....		4

D.8. - How old were you when you stopped full-time education?

+	-	+	-	+	+	223
+	-	+	-	+	+	

NO QUESTION D.9

D.10. - Sex of the interviewee

Male.....	224	1
Female.....		2

D.11.1. How old are you ? (av.)

15 - 24 years.....	225	1
25 - 39 years.....		2
40 - 54 years.....		3
55 + years.....		4

D.11.2. How old are you ? (av.)

15 - 24 years.....	226	1
25 - 34 years.....		2
35 - 44 years.....		3
45 - 54 years.....		4
55 - 64 years.....		5
65 + years.....		6

D.11.3. How old are you ? (av.)		
15 - 25 years.....	227	1
26 - 44 years.....		2
45 - 64 years.....		3
65 + years.....		4

D.11. - How old are you?

+--+--+	228
+--+--+	

NO QUESTIONS D.12 TO D.14

D.15.a) - What is your current occupation?

D.15.a) - Quelle est votre profession actuelle ?

1. Farmer.....	229	1
2. Fisherman.....		2
3. Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.).....		3
4. Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self employed person.....		4
5. Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company.....		5
6. Employed professional.....		6
7. General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other, etc.).....		7
8. Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician).....		8
9. Employed position, working mainly at a desk.....		9
10. Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, etc.).....		10
11. Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, police, restaurant, etc.).....		11
12. Supervisor.....		12
13. Skilled manual worker.....		13
14. Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant.....		14
15. Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home or without any current occup.....		15
16. Student.....		16
17. Unemployed or temporarily not working.....		17
18. Retired or unable to work through illness.....		18

D.15.a) (RECODED) - What is your current occupation?

D.15.a) (RECODEE) - Quelle est votre profession actuelle ?

Self-employed.....	230	1
Employed.....		2
Not working.....		3

IF NOT DOING ANY PAID WORK CURRENTLY, CODES 1 TO 4 IN D.15.a)

D.15.b) - Did you do any paid work in the past ? What was your last occupation?

D.15.b) - Exerciez-vous une activité professionnelle auparavant ? Laquelle en dernier lieu ?

1. Farmer.....	231	1
2. Fisherman.....		2
3. Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.).....		3
4. Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self employed person.....		4
5. Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company.....		5
6. Employed professional.....		6
7. General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other, etc.).....		7
8. Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician).....		8
9. Employed position, working mainly at a desk.....		9
10. Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, etc.).....		10
11. Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, police, restaurant, etc.).....		11
12. Supervisor.....		12
13. Skilled manual worker.....		13
14. Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant.....		14
15. Never did any paid work.....		15

D.15.b) (RECODED) - Did you do any paid work in the past ? What was your last occupation?

D.15.b) (RECODEE) - Exerciez-vous une activité professionnelle auparavant ? Laquelle en dernier lieu ?

Self-employed.....	232	1
Employed.....		2
Not working.....		3

NO QUESTIONS D.16 TO D.18

D.19. - Are you, in the household, the person who contributes most to the household income? (READ OUT)

Yes.....	233	1
No.....		2
Both equally.....		3
DK.....		4

NO QUESTION D.20
 IF "NO", CODE 2 IN D.19

D.21.a) - What is the current occupation of the person who contributes most to the household income?
 D.21.a) - Quelle est la profession actuelle de la personne qui apporte le revenu principal du foyer ?

1. Farmer.....	234	1
2. Fisherman.....		2
3. Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.).....		3
4. Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self employed person.....		4
5. Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company.....		5
6. Employed professional.....		6
7. General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other ...)		7
8. Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician).....		8
9. Employed position, working mainly at a desk.....		9
10. Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, etc.).....		10
11. Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, police, restaurant, etc.).....		11
12. Supervisor.....		12
13. Skilled manual worker.....		13
14. Other unskilled manual worker, servant.....		14
15. Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home or without any current occup.....		15
16. Student.....		16
17. Unemployed or temporarily not working.....		17
18. Retired or unable to work through illness.....		18

D.21.a) (RECODED) - What is the current occupation of the person who contributes most to the household income?

D.21.a) (RECODEE) - Quelle est la profession actuelle de la personne qui apporte le revenu principal du foyer ?

Self-employed.....	235	1
Employed.....		2
Not working.....		3

IF "NO", CODE 2 IN D.19

IF "NOT DOING ANY PAID WORK CURRENTLY", CODES 1 TO 4 IN D.21.a

D.21.b) - Did he/she do any paid work in the past ? What was his/her last occupation?

D.21.b) - Exercit-il/elle une activité professionnelle rémunérée auparavant ? Laquelle en dernier lieu ?

1. Farmer.....	236	1
2. Fisherman.....		2
3. Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.).....		3
4. Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self employed person.....		4
5. Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company.....		5
6. Employed professional.....		6
7. General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other, etc.).....		7
8. Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician).....		8
9. Employed position, working mainly at a desk.....		9
10. Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, etc.).....		10
11. Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, police, restaurant, etc.).....		11
12. Supervisor.....		12
13. Skilled manual worker.....		13
14. Other unskilled manual worker, servant.....		14
15. Never did any paid work.....		15

D.21.b) (RECODED) - Did he/she do any paid work in the past ? What was his/her last occupation?

D.21.b) (RECODEE) - Exercit-il/elle une activité professionnelle rémunérée auparavant ? Laquelle en dernier lieu ?

Self-employed.....	237	1
Employed.....		2
Not working.....		3

NO QUESTION D.22 TO D.24

D.25. - Would you say you live in a...? (READ OUT)

rural area or village.....	238	1
small or middle sized town.....		2
large town.....		3
DK.....		4

NO QUESTIONS D.26 TO D.28

D.29. - HARMONISED - We also need some information about the income of this household to be able to analyse the survey results for different types of households. Here is a list of income groups. (SHOW INCOME CARD) Please count the total wages and salaries PER MONTH of all members of this household; all pensions and social insurance benefits; child allowances and any other income like rents, etc. Of course, your answer as all other replies in this interview will be treated confidentially and referring back to you or your household will be impossible. Please give me the letter of the income group your household falls into BEFORE tax and other deductions

-	239	1
-		2
+		3
+ +		4
DK/Refusal.....		5

PROTOCOLE VARIABLES

P.1. - Date of the interview

Tuesday 1 October.....	240	1
Wednesday 2 October.....		2
Thursday 3 October.....		3
Friday 4 October.....		4
Saturday 5 October.....		5
Sunday 6 October.....		6
Monday 7 October.....		7
Tuesday 8 October.....		8
Wednesday 9 October.....		9
Thursday 10 October.....		10
Friday 11 October.....		11
Friday 12 October.....		12
Saturday 13 October.....		13
Sunday 14 October.....		14
Tuesday 15 October.....		15
Wednesday 16 October.....		16
Thursday 17 October.....		17
Friday 18 October.....		18
Saturday 19 October.....		19
Sunday 20 October.....		20
Monday 21 October.....		21
Tuesday 22 October.....		22
Wednesday 23 October.....		23
Thursday 24 October.....		24
Friday 25 October.....		25
Saturday 26 October.....		26
Sunday 27 October.....		27
Monday 28 October.....		28
Tuesday 29 October.....		29
Wednesday 30 October.....		30
Thursday 31 October.....		31
Friday 1 November.....		32
Saturday 2 November.....		33
Sunday 3 November.....		34
Monday 4 November.....		35
Tuesday 5 November.....		36
Wednesday 6 November.....		37
Thursday 7 November.....		38
Friday 8 November.....		39
Friday 9 November.....		40
Saturday 10 November.....		41
Sunday 11 November.....		42
Tuesday 12 November.....		43
Wednesday 13 November.....		44
Thursday 14 November.....		45
Friday 15 November.....		46
Saturday 16 November.....		47
Sunday 17 November.....		48
Monday 18 November.....		49
Tuesday 19 November.....		50
Wednesday 20 November.....		51
Thursday 21 November.....		52
Friday 22 November.....		53
Saturday 23 November.....		54
Sunday 24 November.....		55
Monday 25 November.....		56
Tuesday 26 November.....		57
Wednesday 27 November.....		58
Thursday 28 November.....		59
Friday 29 November.....		60
Saturday 30 November.....		61

P.2. - Time of the beginning of the interview

< 8 h.....	241	1
8 - 12 h.....		2
13 - 16 h.....		3
17 - 19 h.....		4
20 - 22 h.....		5
23 h +.....		6

P.3. - Number of minutes the interview lasted

1 - 14 min.....	242	1
15 - 29 min.....		2
30 - 44 min.....		3
45 - 59 min.....		4
60 - 74 min.....		5
75 - 89 min.....		6
> 90 min.....		7

P.3. - Number of minutes the interview lasted		
1-30.....	243	1
31-35.....		2
36-40.....		3
41-45.....		4
46-50.....		5
51-55.....		6
56-60.....		7
61-65.....		8
66-70.....		9
71-75.....		10
76-80.....		11
81-120.....		12

P.3. - Number of minutes the interview lasted MINUTES

+--+--+--+	244
+--+--+--+	

P.4. - Number of persons present during the interview, including interviewer		
Two (interviewer and respondent).....	245	1
Three.....		2
Four.....		3
Five or more.....		4

P.5. - Respondant cooperation		
Excellent.....	246	1
Fair.....		2
Average.....		3
Bad.....		4

P.6. - Size of locality (LOCAL CODES)

+--+--+	247
+--+--+	

P.7. - Region (LOCAL CODES)

+--+--+	248
+--+--+	

P.8. - Postal Code

+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+	249
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+	

P.9. - Sample Point Number

+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+	250
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+	

P.10. - Interviewer Number

+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+	251
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+	

P.12.a) - Fixed telephone available in the household?		
Yes.....	252	1
No.....		2

P.12.b) - Mobile telephone available in the household?		
Yes.....	253	1
No.....		2

ASK ONLY IN LU, BE AND FI

+--+ 254
| |
+--+

RECODED VARIABLES

C.1. - OPINION LEADERSHIP INDEX		
+ + high.....	255	1
.....		2
.....		3
- - low.....		4
C.14. (RECODED) - RESPONDENT OCCUPATION SCALE		
Selfemployed.....	256	1
Managers.....		2
Other white collars.....		3
Manual workers.....		4
House person.....		5
Unemployed.....		6
Retired.....		7
Students.....		8

NATIONAL VARIABLES

COUNTRIES		
	BELGIQUE.....	257 1
	DANMARK.....	2
	DEUTSCHLAND WEST.....	3
	ELLAS.....	4
	ITALIA.....	5
	ESPAÑA.....	6
	FRANCE.....	7
	IRELAND.....	8
	NORTHERN IRELAND.....	9
	LUXEMBOURG.....	10
	NEDERLAND.....	11
	PORTUGAL.....	12
	GREAT BRITAIN.....	13
	DEUTSCHLAND OST.....	14
	NORGE.....	15
	SUOMEN.....	16
	SVERIGE.....	17
	ÖSTERREICH.....	18
	EU 6.....	258 1,
	EU 9.....	259 1,
	EU 10.....	260 1,
	EU 12 -.....	261 1,
	EU 12.....	262 1,
	EU 15.....	263 1,
	EU new 3.....	264 1,
	EURO 11.....	265 1,
	PRE-IN 4.....	2,
	EURO ZONE.....	266 1,
	PRE-IN 3.....	2,
	TOTAL.....	267 1,
BELGIUM		
	TOTAL.....	268 1,
DANMARK		
	TOTAL.....	269 1,
WEST DEUTSCHLAND		
	TOTAL.....	270 1,
ELLAS		
	TOTAL.....	271 1,
ITALIA		
	TOTAL.....	272 1,
ESPAÑA		
	TOTAL.....	273 1,
FRANCE		
	TOTAL.....	274 1,
IRELAND		
	TOTAL.....	275 1,
NORTHERN IRELAND		
	TOTAL.....	276 1,
G.-D. LUXEMBOURG		
	TOTAL.....	277 1,
NEDERLAND		
	TOTAL.....	278 1,
PORTUGAL		
	TOTAL.....	279 1,
GREAT BRITAIN		
	TOTAL.....	280 1,

OST DEUTSCHLAND	
TOTAL.....	281 1,
SUOMEN	
TOTAL.....	282 1,
SVERIGE	
TOTAL.....	283 1,
OSTER-REICH	
TOTAL.....	284 1,
DEUTSCHLAND GESAMT	
TOTAL.....	285 1,
UNITED KINGDOM	
TOTAL.....	286 1,

BELGIUM

D.29. - BEL - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 500 E.....	287	1
From 500 to 749 E.....		2
From 750 to 999 E.....		3
From 1.000 to 1.249 E.....		4
From 1.250 to 1.499 E.....		5
From 1.500 to 1.749 E.....		6
From 1.750 to 1.999 E.....		7
From 2.000 to 2.249 E.....		8
From 2.250 to 2.499 E.....		9
From 2.500 to 2.749 E.....		10
From 2.750 to 2.999 E.....		11
3.000 E OR MORE.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - BEL - Size of locality		
5 Grands centres.....	288	1
Localités urbaines.....		2
Localités secondaires.....		3
Autres localités.....		4
P.7. - BEL - Basic regions		
Hainaut.....	289	1
Limburg.....		2
Namur.....		3
Oost-Vlaanderen.....		4
West-Vlaanderen.....		5
Liège.....		6
Luxembourg.....		7
Vlaams Brabant.....		8
Antwerpen.....		9
Bruxelles.....		10
Brabant wallon.....		11
P.7. - BEL - Combined regions		
Wallonie.....	290	1
Brussels.....		2
Vlaanderen.....		3
P.13. - BEL - Language		
Francophone.....	291	1
Nederlandstalig.....		2
P.7. - BEL - Regions		
Hainaut.....	292	1
Namur.....		2
Liège.....		3
Luxembourg.....		4
Brabant.....		5
Bruxelles/Brussel.....		6
Limburg.....		7
Oost-Vlaanderen.....		8
West-Vlaanderen.....		9
Antwerpen.....		10

DENMARK

D.29. - DEN - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 100.000 DKK.....	293	1
From 100.000 - 129.999 DKK.....		2
From 130.000 - 169.999 DKK.....		3
From 170.000 - 199.999 DKK.....		4
From 200.000 - 239.999 DKK.....		5
From 240.000 - 299.999 DKK.....		6
From 300.000 - 349.999 DKK.....		7
From 350.000 - 399.999 DKK.....		8
From 400.000 - 449.999 DKK.....		9
From 450.000 - 499.999 DKK.....		10
From 500.000 - 549.999 DKK.....		11
550.000 DKK or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - DEN - Size of locality		
Less than 2.000 inhabitants.....	294	1
From 2.000 to 4.999 inhabitants.....		2
From 5.000 to 9.999 inhabitants.....		3
From 10.000 to 19.999 inhabitants.....		4
From 20.000 to 49.999 inhabitants.....		5
From 50000 to 99999 inhabitants.....		6
100000 inhabitants and more.....		7
P.7. - DEN - Basic regions		
Hovedstadsområdet (Copenhagen area).....	295	1
Sjælland, Lolland-Falster Bornholm (excl hovedstadsområdet).....		2
Fyn.....		3
Jylland.....		4

WEST GERMANY

D.29. - WGE - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 751 E.....	296	1
From 751 to 875 E.....		2
From 876 to 1.000 E.....		3
From 1.001 to 1.125 E.....		4
From 1.126 to 1.150 E.....		5
From 1.151 to 1.375 E.....		6
From 1.376 to 1.500 E.....		7
From 1.501 to 1.750 E.....		8
From 1.751 to 2.000 E.....		9
From 2.001 to 2.250 E.....		10
From 2.251 to 2.500 E.....		11
2.501 E or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - WGE - Size of locality		
Less than 2.000 inhabitants.....	297	1
From 2.000 to 4.999 inhabitants.....		2
From 5.000 to 19.999 inhabitants.....		3
From 20.000 to 49.999 inhabitants.....		4
From 50.000 to 99.999 inhabitants.....		5
From 100.000 to 499.999 inhabitants.....		6
500.000 inhabitants or more.....		7
P.7. - WGE - Basic regions		
Schleswig-Holstein.....	298	1
Hamburg.....		2
Braunschweig.....		3
Hannover.....		4
Lüneburg.....		5
Weser-EMS.....		6
Bremen.....		7
Düsseldorf.....		8
Köln.....		9
Münster.....		10
Detmold.....		11
Arnsberg.....		12
Darmstadt.....		13
Giessen.....		14
Kassel.....		15
Koblenz.....		16
Trier.....		17
Rheinhessen-Pfalz.....		18
Saarland.....		19
Nord Württemberg=Stuttgart.....		20
Nordbaden=Karlsruhe.....		21
Südbaden=Freiburg.....		22
Süd Württemberg=Tübingen.....		23
Oberbayern.....		24
Niederbayern.....		25
Oberpfalz.....		26
Oberfranken.....		27
Mittelfranken.....		28
Unterfranken.....		29
Schwaben.....		30
West Berlin.....		31
P.7. - WGE - Combined regions		
Schlesw.Holstein Hamburg Niedersa. Bremen.....	299	1
Nord Westfalen.....		2
Hessen.....		3
Rheinland Pfalz+Saarland.....		4
Baden Württemberg.....		5
Bayern.....		6
Berlin West.....		7

GREECE

D.29. - GRE - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 451 E.....	300	1
From 451 to 600 E.....		2
From 601 to 750 E.....		3
From 751 to 900 E.....		4
From 901 to 1.050 E.....		5
From 1.051 to 1.200 E.....		6
From 1.201 to 1.350 E.....		7
From 1.351 to 1.500 E.....		8
From 1.501 to 1.650 E.....		9
From 1.651 to 2.000 E.....		10
From 2.001 to 2.200 E.....		11
2.201 E or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - GRE - Size of locality		
Less than 2.001 inhabitants.....	301	1
From 2.001 to 10.000 inhabitants.....		2
From 10.001 to 50.000 inhabitants.....		3
From 50.001 to 1.000.000 inhabitants.....		4
More than 1.000.001 inhabitants.....		5
P.7. - GRE - Basic regions		
Macedonia.....	302	1
Thessalia.....		2
Anatoliki makedonia.....		3
Thraki.....		4
Anatoliki Sterea kai Nissia.....		5
Peloponnisos kai Dytiki Sterea.....		6
Ipeiros.....		7
Kriti.....		8
Nisia Anatolikou Aigaiou.....		9
P.7. - GRE - Combined regions		
Voreia Ellada (Northern Greece).....	303	1
Kentriki Ellada (Central Greece).....		2
Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti (East and south Islands).....		3

ITALIE

D.29. - ITA - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 388 E.....	304	1
From 388 to 516 E.....		2
From 517 to 774 E.....		3
From 775 to 903 E.....		4
From 904 to 1.032 E.....		5
From 1.033 to 1.291 E.....		6
From 1.292 to 1.549 E.....		7
From 1.550 to 1.807 E.....		8
From 1.808 to 2.065 E.....		9
From 2.066 to 2.324 E.....		10
From 2.325 to 2.582 E.....		11
2.583 E or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - ITA - Size of locality		
Less than 10.001 inhabitants.....	305	1
From 10.001 to 100.000 inhabitants.....		2
From 100.001 to 250.000 inhabitants.....		3
250.001 inhabitants or more.....		4
P.7. - ITA - Basic regions		
Valle d'Aostae Piemonte.....	306	1
Liguria.....		2
Lombardia.....		3
Milano.....		4
Trentino.....		5
Veneto.....		6
Friuli, Venezia, Giulia.....		7
Emilia Romagna.....		8
Toscana.....		9
Marche.....		10
Umbria.....		11
Lazio.....		12
Molisee Abruzzi.....		13
Campania.....		14
Puglie.....		15
Basilicata.....		16
Calabria.....		17
Sicilia.....		18
Sardegna.....		19
P.7. - ITA - Combined regions		
North West.....	307	1
Lombardia.....		2
North East.....		3
Emilia Romagna.....		4
Centro.....		5
Lazio.....		6
Molise Abruzzi.....		7
Campania.....		8
South.....		9
Sicilia.....		10
Sardegna.....		11
P.7. - ITA - Combined regions		
North West.....	308	1
Lombardia.....		2
North East.....		3
Emilia Romagna.....		4
Centro.....		5
Lazio.....		6
Molise Abruzzi + Campania.....		7
South.....		8
Sicilia + Sardegna.....		9

SPAIN

D.29. - SPA - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 300 E.....	309	1
From 301 to 360 E.....		2
From 361 to 420 E.....		3
From 421 to 480 E.....		4
From 481 to 540 E.....		5
From 541 to 600 E.....		6
From 601 to 750 E.....		7
From 751 to 900 E.....		8
From 901 to 1.000 E.....		9
From 1.001 to 1.200 E.....		10
From 1.201 to 1.350 E.....		11
1.351 E or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - SPA - Size of locality		
Less than 2.001 inhabitants.....	310	1
From 2.001 to 10.000 inhabitants.....		2
From 10.001 to 50.000 inhabitants.....		3
From 50.001 to 100.000 inhabitants.....		4
From 100.001 to 300.000 inhabitants.....		5
From 300.001 to 500.000 inhabitants.....		6
From 500.001 to 1.000.000 inhabitants.....		7
1.000.001 inhabitants or more.....		8
P.7. - SPA - Basic regions		
Andalucia.....	311	1
Aragon.....		2
Asturias.....		3
Baleares.....		4
Canarias.....		5
Cantabria.....		6
Castilla-Leon.....		7
Castilla-La Mancha.....		8
Cataluña.....		9
Extremadura.....		10
Galicia.....		11
Madrid.....		12
Murcia.....		13
Navarra.....		14
La Rioja.....		15
Pais Valenciano.....		16
Pais Vasco.....		17
P.7. - SPA - Combined regions		
Galicia.....	312	1
Norte.....		2
Noreste.....		3
Aragon-Rioja.....		4
Madrid.....		5
Centro.....		6
Cataluna.....		7
Este.....		8
Sur.....		9
Canaria.....		10
P.7. - SPA - Combined regions		
Noroeste.....	313	1
Noreste.....		2
Madrid.....		3
Centro.....		4
Este.....		5
Sur.....		6
Canaria.....		7

FRANCE

D.29. - FRA - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 500 E.....	314	1
From 500 to 799 E.....		2
From 800 to 999 E.....		3
From 1.000 to 1.199 E.....		4
From 1.200 to 1.399 E.....		5
From 1.400 to 1.599 E.....		6
From 1.600 to 1.799 E.....		7
From 1.800 to 1.999 E.....		8
From 2.000 to 2.199 E.....		9
From 2.200 to 2.399 E.....		10
From 2.400 to 2.599 E.....		11
2.600 E or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - FRA - Size of locality		
Less than 2.000.....	315	1
From 2.000 to 20.000 inhabitants.....		2
From 20.001 to 100.000 inhabitants.....		3
100.001 inhabitants or more.....		4
Agglomération parisienne.....		5
P.7. - FRA - Basic regions		
Ile-de-France.....	316	1
Champagne-Ardenne.....		2
Picardie.....		3
Haute-Normandie.....		4
Centre.....		5
Basse-Normandie.....		6
Bourgogne.....		7
Nord Pas de Calais.....		8
Lorraine.....		9
Alsace.....		10
Franche-Comté.....		11
Pays de la Loire.....		12
Bretagne.....		13
Poitou-Charentes.....		14
Aquitaine.....		15
Midi-Pyrénées.....		16
Limousin.....		17
Rhône-Alpes.....		18
Auvergne.....		19
Languedoc-Roussillon.....		20
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur.....		21
Corse.....		22
P.7. - FRA - Combined regions		
Ile de France.....	317	1
Bassin Parisien.....		2
Nord/Pas-de-Calais.....		3
Est.....		4
Ouest.....		5
Sud Ouest.....		6
Centre Est.....		7
Méditerranée.....		8

IRLANDE

D.29. - IRL - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 240 IEP.....	318	1
240 - 399 IEP.....		2
400 - 499 IEP.....		3
500 - 599 IEP.....		4
600 - 699 IEP.....		5
700 - 799 IEP.....		6
800 - 899 IEP.....		7
900 - 999 IEP.....		8
1.000 - 1.199 IEP.....		9
1.200 - 1.499 IEP.....		10
1.500 - 1.999 IEP.....		11
2000 IEP and over.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - IRL - Size of locality		
Less than 2.001 inhabitants.....	319	1
From 2.001 to 20.000 inhabitants.....		2
From 20.001 to 100.000 inhabitants.....		3
100.001 inhabitants or more.....		4
P.7. - IRL - Basic regions		
Donegal.....	320	1
North west.....		2
North east.....		3
West.....		4
Midlands.....		5
East.....		6
Mid west.....		7
South east.....		8
South west.....		9
P.7. - IRL - Combined regions		
Dublin.....	321	1
Rest of Leinster.....		2
Munster.....		3
Connaught/Ulster.....		4

NORTHERN IRELAND

D.29. - keke NIR - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 240 GBP.....	322	1
From 240 to 399 GBP.....		2
From 400 to 499 GBP.....		3
From 500 to 599 GBP.....		4
From 600 to 699 GBP.....		5
From 700 to 799 GBP.....		6
From 800 to 899 GBP.....		7
From 900 to 999 GBP.....		8
From 1.000 to 1.199 GBP.....		9
From 1.200 to 1.499 GBP.....		10
From 1.500 to 1.999 GBP.....		11
2.000 GBP and more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - NIR - Size of locality		
Less than 2.000 inhabitants.....	323	1
From 2.001 to 20.000 inhabitants.....		2
From 20.001 to 100.000 inhabitants.....		3
100.001 inhabitants and more.....		4

LUXEMBOURG

D.29. - LUX - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 1.250 E.....	324	1
From 1.250 to 1.750 E.....		2
From 1.751 to 2.250 E.....		3
From 2.251 to 2.500 E.....		4
From 2.501 to 2.750 E.....		5
From 2.751 to 3.000 E.....		6
From 3.001 to 3.250 E.....		7
From 3.251 to 3.500 E.....		8
From 3.501 to 3.750 E.....		9
From 3.751 to 4.000 E.....		10
From 4.001 to 4.250 E.....		11
4.251 E or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - LUX - Size of locality		
Less than 2.500 inhabitants.....	325	1
From 2.501 to 5.000 inhabitants.....		2
From 5.001 to 10.000 inhabitants.....		3
From 10.001 to 20.000 inhabitants.....		4
From 20.001 to 50.000 inhabitants.....		5
50.000 inhabitants or more (Luxembourg ville).....		6
P.7. - LUX - Basic regions		
Centrum.....	326	1
Süden.....		2
Norden.....		3
Osten.....		4
P.13. - LUX - LANGUAGE		
P.13. - LUX - LANGUAGE		
Luxemburges.....	327	1
Francophone.....		2

NETHERLANDS

D.29. - NET - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 681 E.....	328	1
From 681 to 907 E.....		2
From 908 to 1.134 E.....		3
From 1.135 to 1.247 E.....		4
From 1.248 to 1.474 E.....		5
From 1.475 to 1.701 E.....		6
From 1.702 to 1.928 E.....		7
From 1.929 to 2.155 E.....		8
From 2.156 to 2.381 E.....		9
From 2.382 to 2.835 E.....		10
From 2.836 to 3.289 E.....		11
3.290 E or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - NET - Size of locality		
Less than 5.000 inhabitants.....	329	1
From 5.000 to 10.000 inhabitants.....		2
From 10.001 to 20.000 inhabitants.....		3
From 20.001 to 50.000 inhabitants.....		4
From 50.001 to 100.000 inhabitants.....		5
From 100.000 to 400.000 inhabitants.....		6
400.000 inhabitants or more.....		7
P.7. - NET - Basic regions		
Groningen.....	330	1
Friesland.....		2
Drente.....		3
Overijssel.....		4
Gelderland.....		5
Flevoland.....		6
Utrecht.....		7
Noord Holland.....		8
Zuid Holland.....		9
Zeeland.....		10
Noord Brabant.....		11
Limburg.....		12
P.7. - NET - Combined regions		
Noord.....	331	1
Oost.....		2
West.....		3
Zuid.....		4

PORTUGAL

D.29. - POR - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 300 E.....	332	1
From 301 to 450 E.....		2
From 451 to 600 E.....		3
From 601 to 750 E.....		4
From 751 to 1.000 E.....		5
From 1.001 to 1.250 E.....		6
From 1.251 to 1.500 E.....		7
From 1.501 to 1.750 E.....		8
From 1.751 to 2.000 E.....		9
From 2.001 to 2.250 E.....		10
From 2.251 to 2.500 E.....		11
2.501 E or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - POR - Size of locality		
Less than 100 inhabitants.....	333	1
From 101 to 200 inhabitants.....		2
From 201 to 500 inhabitants.....		3
From 501 to 1.000 inhabitants.....		4
From 1.001 to 2.000 inhabitants.....		5
From 2.001 to 5.000 inhabitants.....		6
From 5.001 to 10.000 inhabitants.....		7
From 10.001 to 20.000 inhabitants.....		8
From 20.001 to 100.000 inhabitants.....		9
From 100.001 to 500.000 inhabitants.....		10
500.001 inhabitants or more.....		11
P.7. - POR - Basic regions		
Norte.....	334	1
Centro.....		2
Lisboa et Vale do Tejo.....		3
Alentejo.....		4
Algarve.....		5
Açores.....		6
Madeira.....		7
P.7. - POR - Combined regions		
Norte.....	335	1
Centro.....		2
Lisboa et Vale do Tejo.....		3
Alentejo + Algarve + Açores + Madeira.....		4

GREAT BRITAIN

D.29. - GB - MONTH INCOMES

Less than 240 GBP.....	336	1
From 240 to 399 GBP.....		2
From 400 to 499 GBP.....		3
From 500 to 599 GBP.....		4
From 600 to 699 GBP.....		5
From 700 to 799 GBP.....		6
From 800 to 899 GBP.....		7
From 900 to 999 GBP.....		8
From 1.000 to 1.199 GBP.....		9
From 1.200 to 1.499 GBP.....		10
From 1.500 to 1.999 GBP.....		11
2.000 GBP and more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14

P.6. - GB - Size of locality

Metropolitan.....	337	1
Urban.....		2
Suburban.....		3
Rural.....		4

P.7. - GB - Basic regions

Cleveland,Durham.....	338	1
Cumbria.....		2
Northumberland,Tyne and Wear.....		3
Humberside.....		4
North Yorkshire.....		5
South Yorkshire.....		6
West Yorkshire.....		7
Derbyshire,Nottinghamshire.....		8
Leicestershire,Northamptonshire.....		9
Lincolnshire.....		10
East Anglia.....		11
Bedfordshire,Hertfordshire.....		12
Berkshire,Buckinghamshire,Oxfordshire.....		13
Surrey,East/west Sussex.....		14
Essex.....		15
Greater London.....		16
Hampshire,Isle of wight.....		17
Kent.....		18
Avon,Gloucestershire,Wiltshire.....		19
Cornwall,Devon.....		20
Dorset,Somerset.....		21
Hereford and Worcester,Warwickshire.....		22
Schropshire,Staffordshire.....		23
West Midlands (County).....		24
Cheshire.....		25
Greater Manchester.....		26
Lancashire.....		27
Merseyside.....		28
Clwyd,Dyfed,Gwynedd,Powys.....		29
Gwent,Mid-S-W Glamorgan.....		30
Borders,Central,Fife,Lothian,Tayside.....		31
Dumfries-Galloway,Strathclyde.....		32
Highlands,Islands.....		33
Grampian.....		34

P.7. - GB - Combined regions

North.....	339	1
Yorkshire & Humberside.....		2
East Midlands + East Anglia.....		3
South East.....		4
South West.....		5
West Midlands.....		6
North West.....		7
Wales.....		8
Scotland.....		9

EAST GERMANY

D.29. - EGE - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 751 E.....	340	1
From 751 to 875 E.....		2
From 876 to 1.000 E.....		3
From 1.001 to 1.125 E.....		4
From 1.126 to 1.150 E.....		5
From 1.151 to 1.375 E.....		6
From 1.376 to 1.500 E.....		7
From 1.501 to 1.750 E.....		8
From 1.751 to 2.000 E.....		9
From 2.001 to 2.250 E.....		10
From 2.251 to 2.500 E.....		11
2.501 E or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - EGE - Size of locality		
Less than 2.000 inhabitants.....	341	1
From 2.000 to 5.000 inhabitants.....		2
From 5.000 to 20.000 inhabitants.....		3
From 20.000 to 50.000 inhabitants.....		4
From 50.000 to 100.000 inhabitants.....		5
From 100.000 to 500.000 inhabitants.....		6
500.000 inhabitants or more.....		7
P.7. - EGE - Combined regions		
Mecklenburg.....	342	1
Brandenburg.....		2
Sachsen-Anhalt.....		3
Thuringen.....		4
Sachsen.....		5
Ost Berlin.....		6
P.7 - EGE - Basic regions		
Ost Berlin.....	343	1
Brandenburg.....		2
Mecklenburg Vorpommern.....		3
Chemnitz.....		4
Dresden.....		5
Leipzig.....		6
Dessau.....		7
Halle.....		8
Magdeburg.....		9
Thuringen.....		10

FINLAND

D.29. - FIN - MONTH INCOMES

Less than 801 E.....	344	1
From 801 to 1.200 E.....		2
From 1.201 to 1.600 E.....		3
From 1.601 to 2.100 E.....		4
From 2.101 to 2.500 E.....		5
From 2.501 to 2.900 E.....		6
From 2.901 to 3.300 E.....		7
From 3.301 to 3.700 E.....		8
From 3.701 to 4.200 E.....		9
From 4.201 to 4.500 E.....		10
From 4.501 to 5.000 E.....		11
5.001 E or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14

P.6. - FIN - Size of locality

Helsinki area.....	345	1
Turku, Tampere.....		2
Other town.....		3
Rural center.....		4

P.7. - FIN - Basic regions

Uusimaa.....	346	1
Varsinais Suomi.....		2
Satakunta.....		3
Hame.....		4
Pirkanmaa.....		5
Paijat Hame.....		6
Kymenlaakso.....		7
Etelä Karjala.....		8
Etelä Savo.....		9
Pohjois Savo.....		10
Pohjois Karjala.....		11
Keski Suomi.....		12
Etelä Pohjanmaa.....		13
Vaasanrannikkoseutu.....		14
Keski Pohjanmaa.....		15
Pohjois Pohjanmaa.....		16
Kainuu.....		17
Lappi.....		18

P.7. - FIN - Combined regions

Uusimaa.....	347	1
Etelä- Suomi.....		2
Itä- Suomi.....		3
Väli- Suomi.....		4
Pohjois- Suomi.....		5

P.13. - LANGUAGE - FINLAND

Finnish.....	348	1
Swedish.....		2

SWEDEN

D.29. - SWE - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 5.000 SEK.....	349	1
From 5.000 to 10.000 SEK.....		2
From 10.001 to 15.000 SEK.....		3
From 15.001 to 20.000 SEK.....		4
From 20.001 to 25.000 SEK.....		5
From 25.001 to 30.000 SEK.....		6
From 30.001 to 35.000 SEK.....		7
From 35.001 to 40.000 SEK.....		8
From 40.001 to 45.000 SEK.....		9
From 45.001 to 50.000 SEK.....		10
From 50.001 to 55.000 SEK.....		11
55.001 SEK or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - SWE - Size of locality		
Less than 5.000 inhabitants.....	350	1
From 5.000 to 10.000 inhabitants.....		2
From 10.000 to 30.000 inhabitants.....		3
From 30.000 to 50.000 inhabitants.....		4
From 50.000 to 100.000 inhabitants.....		5
From 100.000 to 150.000 inhabitants.....		6
150.001 inhabitants or more.....		7
P.7. - SWE - Basic regions		
Göteborg.....	351	1
Svealand.....		2
Norrland.....		3
Stockholm area.....		4
Göteborg.....		5
Malmö area.....		6
P.7. - SWE - Combined regions		
Stockholm.....	352	1
Östra Mellansverige.....		2
Småland Med Öarna.....		3
Sydsverige.....		4
Västsverige.....		5
Norra Mellansverige.....		6
Mellersta Norrland + Övre Norrland.....		7

AUSTRIA

D.29. - AUS - MONTH INCOMES		
Less than 546 E.....	353	1
From 546 to 690 E.....		2
From 691 to 945 E.....		3
From 946 to 1.165 E.....		4
From 1.166 to 1.420 E.....		5
From 1.421 to 1.670 E.....		6
From 1.671 to 2.180 E.....		7
From 2.181 to 2.690 E.....		8
From 2.691 to 3.270 E.....		9
From 3.271 to 3.850 E.....		10
From 3.851 to 4.360 E.....		11
4.361 E or more.....		12
Refusal.....		13
DK.....		14
P.6. - AUS - Size of locality		
Rural.....	354	1
Mixed urban/rural.....		2
Urban.....		3
Metropolitan.....		4
P.7. - AUS - Basic regions		
Vorarlberg.....	355	1
Tirol.....		2
Salzburg.....		3
Upper Austria.....		4
Styria.....		5
Carynthia.....		6
Lower Austria.....		7
Burgenland.....		8
Vienna.....		9
P.7. - AUS - Combined regions		
Vorarlberg + Tirol.....	356	1
Salzburg + Carynthia.....		2
Upper Austria.....		3
Styria.....		4
Lower Austria + Burgenland.....		5
Vienna.....		6

GERMANY


P.6. - GER - Size of locality		
Less than 2.000 inhabitants.....	357	1
From 2.000 to 5.000 inhabitants.....		2
From 5.000 to 20.000 inhabitants.....		3
From 20.000 to 50.000 inhabitants.....		4
From 50.000 to 100.000 inhabitants.....		5
From 100.000 to 500.000 inhabitants.....		6
500.000 inhabitants or more.....		7
P.7. - GER - Combined regions		
Schlesw. Holstein Hamburg Nieders. Bremen.....	358	1
Nord Westfalen.....		2
Hessen.....		3
Rheinland Pfalz+Saarland.....		4
Baden Württemberg.....		5
Bayern.....		6
Berlin West.....		7
Ost Berlin.....		8
Mecklenburg.....		9
Brandenburg.....		10
Sachsen Anhalt.....		11
Thuringen.....		12
Sachsen.....		13
P.7. - GER - Basic regions		
Schleswig-Holstein.....	359	1
Hamburg.....		2
Braunschweig.....		3
Hannover.....		4
Lüneburg.....		5
Weser-EMS.....		6
Bremen.....		7
Düsseldorf.....		8
Köln.....		9
Münster.....		10
Detmold.....		11
Arnsberg.....		12
Darmstadt.....		13
Giessen.....		14
Kassel.....		15
Koblenz.....		16
Trier.....		17
Rheinhessen-Pfalz.....		18
Saarland.....		19
Nord Württemberg=Stuttgart.....		20
Nordbaden=Karlsruhe.....		21
Südbaden=Freiburg.....		22
Süd Württemberg=Tübingen.....		23
Oberbayern.....		24
Niederbayern.....		25
Oberpfalz.....		26
Oberfranken.....		27
Mittelfranken.....		28
Unterfranken.....		29
Schwaben.....		30
West Berlin.....		31
Ost Berlin.....		32
Brandenburg.....		33
Mecklenburg Vorpommern.....		34
Chemnitz.....		35
Dresden.....		36
Leipzig.....		37
Dessau.....		38
Halle.....		39
Magdeburg.....		40
Thuringen.....		41

UNITED KINGDOM


P.7. - UK - Combined regions		
Scotland.....	360	1
North+Yorks&Humberside+North West.....		2
East/West Midlands+East Anglia.....		3
Wales.....		4
GLC.....		5
South East+South West.....		6
Northern Ireland.....		7
P.7. - UK - Combined regions		
North.....	361	1
Yorkshire & Humberside.....		2
East Midlands + East Anglia.....		3
South East.....		4
South West.....		5
West Midlands.....		6
North West.....		7
Wales.....		8
Scotland.....		9
Northern Ireland.....		10

WEIGHTING VARIABLES


W.1. - WEIGHT RESULT FROM TARGET




W.3. - WEIGHT SPECIAL GERMANY




W.4. - WEIGHT SPECIAL UNITED KINGDOM




W.5. - WEIGHT EURO 6




W.6. - WEIGHT EURO 9




W.7. - WEIGHT EURO 10




W.8. - WEIGHT EURO 12 - EAST GERMANY




W.9. - WEIGHT EUROPE 12




W.10. - WEIGHT EURO +3




W.11. - WEIGHT EUROPE 15




W.12. - WEIGHT NORWAY




W.13. - WEIGHT TOTAL




W.14. - WEIGHT STANDARD SIZE - GERMANY AND UNITED KINGDOM EXTRAPOLATED



W.15. - WEIGHT SPECIAL EURO OR NOT EURO



W.16. - WEIGHT SPECIAL EURO OR NOT EURO (AVEC GR)



STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 58.1

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Between 1 October 2002 and 5 November 2002, the European Opinion Research Group, a consortium of Market and Public Opinion Research agencies, made out of INRA in Belgium – I.C.O. and GfK Worldwide, carried out wave 58.1 of the standard Eurobarometer, on request of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls.

The Standard EUROBAROMETER 58.1 covers the population of the respective nationalities of the European Union Member States, aged 15 years and over, resident in each of the Member States. The basic sample design applied in all Member States is a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In each EU country, a number of sampling points was drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density.

For doing so, the points were drawn systematically from each of the "administrative regional units", after stratification by individual unit and type of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the Member States according to the EUROSTAT NUTS 2 (or equivalent) and according to the distribution of the resident population of the respective EU-nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn, at random. Further addresses were selected as every Nth address by standard random route procedures, from the initial address. In each household, the respondent was drawn, at random. All interviews were face-to-face in people's home and in the appropriate national language.

<u>COUNTRIES</u>	<u>INSTITUTES</u>	<u>N° INTERVIEWS</u>	<u>FIELDWORK DATES</u>	<u>POPULATION 15+ (x 000)</u>
Belgium	INRA BELGIUM	1,037	4/10 – 31/10	8,326
Denmark	GfK DENMARK	1,000	3/10 – 5/11	4,338
Germany (East)	INRA DEUTSCHLAND	1,016	1/10 – 20/10	13,028
Germany (West)	INRA DEUTSCHLAND	1,018	1/10 – 19/10	55,782
Greece	MARKET ANALYSIS	1,003	4/10 – 1/11	8,793
Spain	INRA ESPAÑA	1,000	1/10 – 4/11	33,024
France	CSA-TMO	1,004	1/10 – 5/11	46,945
Ireland	LANSDOWNE Market Research	1,016	1/10 – 29/10	2,980
Italy	INRA Demoskopoea	1,043	1/10 – 31/10	49,017
Luxembourg	ILRes	600	1/10 – 31/10	364
The Netherlands	INTOMART	1,000	1/10 – 28/10	12,705
Austria	SPECTRA	1,010	1/10 – 23/10	6,668
Portugal	METRIS	1,000	3/10 – 24/10	8,217
Finland	MDC MARKETING RESEARCH	1,013	3/10 – 5/11	4,165
Sweden	GfK SVERIGE	1,000	1/10 – 5/11	7,183
Great Britain	MARTIN HAMBLIN LTD	1,014	1/10 – 3/11	46,077
Northern Ireland	ULSTER MARKETING SURVEYS	300	3/10 – 5/11	1,273
	TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS	16,074		

For each country a comparison between the sample and the universe was carried out. The Universe description was derived from Eurostat population data or from national statistics. For all EU member-countries a national weighting procedure, using marginal and intercellular weighting, was carried out based on this Universe description. As such in all countries, minimum gender, age, region NUTS 2 were introduced in the iteration procedure. For international weighting (i.e. EU averages), INRA (EUROPE) applies the official population figures as provided by EUROSTAT in the Regional Statistics Yearbook (data for 1997). The total population figures for input in this postweighting procedure are listed above.

The results of the Eurobarometer studies are reported in the form of tables, datafiles and analyses. Per question a table of results is given with the full question text in English, French and German. The results are expressed as a percentage of the total. The results of the Eurobarometer surveys are analysed and made available through the Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls of the European Commission, rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Brussels. The results are published on the Internet server of the European Commission: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo>. All Eurobarometer datafiles are stored at the Zentral Archiv (Universität Köln, Bachemer Strasse, 40, D-50869 Köln-Lindenthal), available through the CESSDA Database <http://www.nsd.uib.no/cessda/europe.html>. They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research.

Readers are reminded that survey results are estimations, the accuracy of which, everything being equal, rests upon the sample size and upon the observed percentage. With samples of about 1,000 interviews, the real percentages vary within the following confidence limits:

Observed percentages	10% or 90%	20% or 80%	30% or 70%	40% or 60%	50%
Confidence limits	± 1.9%	± 2.5%	± 2.7%	± 3.0%	± 3.1%

**STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 58.0
CO-OPERATING AGENCIES AND RESEARCH EXECUTIVES**

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