

## EUROBAROMETER 57 - NATIONAL STANDARD REPORT

### ***FINAL DRAFT OF IRISH REPORT***

Survey carried out for the European  
Commission's Representation in  
IRELAND

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Irish attitudes to European integration are somewhat puzzling. Favourable attitudes to European integration, as measured across a range of indicators, are extremely widespread in Ireland. Despite this, in a referendum in June 2001, the Irish people, by a majority of 54 to 46 per cent, refused to ratify the Treaty of Nice.

This report examines Irish attitudes to European integration in some depth, drawing on the evidence of Eurobarometer No. 57. Fieldwork for the Irish EB57 survey was conducted by Lansdowne Market Research between 29 March and 25 April, 2002. The questionnaire as implemented in Ireland is presented in Appendix 1. Technical details of how the survey was conducted can be found in Appendix 2.

**This executive summary presents the evidence and findings of the report under seven headings:**

- **overall attitudes to the European Union and to Ireland's membership of it**
- **reservations about integration in specific areas**
- **levels of knowledge of and engagement with EU affairs**
- **trust in European institutions**
- **trust in national institutions**
- **national and European identity and pride**
- **implications of the evidence considered given the Irish institutional and political context**

**Overall Irish attitudes to the European Union and to Ireland's membership of the Union are characterised by:**

- widespread approval of Irish membership of the EU
- widespread perception of benefits of EU membership, including personal benefits
- widespread positive image of the EU
- widespread positive attitudes to the euro
- very low levels of opposition to enlargement
- widespread willingness to see a substantial range of issues "Europeanised", in the sense of decisions on such issues being made jointly within the European Union rather than by the national government

- majority support for a common defence and security policy.

**This picture of overall positive attitudes must be qualified by noting two areas in which, far from being more supportive of integration than average, Irish people show significantly greater reservations about integration:**

- Irish people are more likely than average to express reservations regarding a strongly supranational approach to defence
- as noted in the text of the report, this is quite compatible with majority support for a common defence and security policy
- in parenthesis it is worth adding that there is a lesson to be learned from the different levels of support elicited by the alternative questions on security and defence policy; the lesson is that that complex issues must be very clearly and accurately presented to the public and that due attention must be paid to what might at first sight appear to be subtle nuances and distinctions; this implication applies particularly in countries that choose to involve the mass public in decisions on such matters
- Irish people are also more likely than average to have reservations about a strongly supranational approach to policy dealing with refugees and, to a lesser extent, immigration.

**Substantial qualifications to the generally positive picture of Irish attitudes to integration also arise from the low levels of engagement with and knowledge of European affairs found among Irish people:**

- enthusiastic support for the European Union lags a long way behind general approval of the EU
- the lack of enthusiastic support for the European Union in Ireland points to a wider problem of lack of engagement with European issues and a lack of knowledge of European institutions and European affairs
- evidence regarding people's feelings about the EU across a number of dimensions (enthusiasm, hope, trust/mistrust, anxiety etc.) confirms the point that the majority of Irish people do not have strong personal feelings (either positive or negative) about the EU
- consistent with the low levels of engagement with EU issues, Irish people lack confidence in their grasp of EU issues
- specifically, Irish people's subjective sense of their knowledge of "the European Union, its policies and its institutions" is lower than that of people in the Union as a whole
- low levels of knowledge are found more frequently among the younger and older age groups in contrast to those in the middle age-cohorts; they are also substantially more likely among women (50 per cent of whom are in the lower knowledge bracket, compared to 37 per cent of men); in occupational terms, low levels of knowledge are quite rare among managers but quite prevalent among manual workers and among the unemployed

- the evidence on knowledge and engagement suggests that improving the level of knowledge of European affairs among Irish people will be an uphill task; whether it be television or radio, newspapers or other magazines, discussion with family and friends or use of the internet, Irish people report less frequent use of all available channels of information or communication compared to the EU average frequency of use; the corollary is that Irish people are significantly above average in reporting that they never look for such information or are not interested in it.

**Turning to more general features of Irish political culture, including the political culture of European integration, the evidence shows that Irish levels of trust in the EU and its institutions are considerably higher than the corresponding levels of trust across the Union as a whole:**

- subtracting the proportion of Irish people who tend not to trust the EU from the proportion who tend to trust it gives a substantially more positive measure of net trust in Ireland than in the EU as a whole
- net trust in the individual institutions of the EU is even more positive than net trust in the European Union as a whole; the European Parliament receives the highest rating, followed by the Commission, the Court of Justice, the European Ombudsman and the Council of Ministers
- again, the qualification about levels of knowledge and engagement is essential: the expression of trust in EU institutions just summarised is not necessarily backed up by adequate understanding or knowledge of the institutions in question or of what they do.

**Trust in national institutions, particularly trust in national political institutions, tends to be lower than trust in EU institutions:**

- much higher levels of net trust are accorded to European institutions as compared with Irish domestic political institutions, including the Dáil, the Government and the political parties (this pattern is not unique to Ireland)
- part of the explanation of this discrepancy in the Irish case lies in the much lower levels of don't know responses in the case of domestic political institutions; people are much more engaged with national politics and much more willing to take a view; the view that they take is also likely to be much more firmly grounded
- the second part of the explanation of the discrepancy is that trust has a very different connotation when applied to mainly apolitical institutions and organisations that are remote from daily experience compared to its meaning when applied to such highly political institutions as the national parliament, the government and the political parties
- in fact, on any realistic view of politics, critical attitudes and a healthy degree of scepticism are necessary parts of the checks and balances that are fundamental to democratic politics; in a national context, mistrustful citizens may be critical citizens as much or more than alienated citizens

- even bearing this qualification in mind, however, the evidence on levels of trust in institutions suggests that a communication or campaign strategy designed to influence people's attitudes to the European Union is likely to be more effective if it is seen to represent the views of the government and the parliament rather than being seen to represent solely the views of the political parties.

**The picture of Irish attitudes to the European Union as being for the most part positive but as lacking in commitment and active engagement is confirmed by the evidence relating to national and European identity:**

- even on the basis of an undemanding and prospective measure of European identity, the proportion of Irish people showing any degree of European identity amounts to a bare majority; the remainder identify themselves as "Irish only"
- this places Ireland firmly in the camp of countries with a less well developed sense of European identity, the only countries with a larger proportion identifying exclusively with their own nationality being Greece, Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom
- the salience of Irish identity in Irish political culture is confirmed by the data on national pride -- well over two-thirds of Irish respondents say that they are very proud to be Irish; a similarly strong sense of national pride is found among only two-fifths of the French and the Dutch and one-fifth of Germans; only in Greece does one find a higher proportion of people in the "very proud" category
- for many Irish people, however, pride in being Irish is quite compatible with pride in being European, albeit that the latter feeling is at a lower level of intensity
- the need to take the nationalist sensibilities underlying these data into account in any assessment of the climate of public opinion towards the EU in Ireland is confirmed by evidence deriving from a question about "the building of Europe, the European Union" and about the fears that this process may give rise to
- in this context fears of adverse economic or welfare consequences are significantly less common in Ireland than in the Union as a whole
- in contrast, Irish people are somewhat more likely to admit to fears about the imposition of decisions by the big countries and about loss of national identity and national culture
- in interpreting these data, one must bear in mind that the fears were posed by the question and, in this sense, were prompted by the question; the evidence *does not show* that substantial proportions of people are frantic about these issues and the proportions involved (ranging from just under two-fifths to three fifths) must be set along side the fact only one person in twenty indicated in response to another question that the EU caused them a feeling of anxiety
- in short, worries about "decisions being imposed by the big member states" or about "Ireland not really existing any more" or about the "loss of our national identity and culture" are, at most, potential or subliminal fears; given the role that nationalist issues have played in Irish history, their incidence is not surprising and, without exaggerating their significance, there is need to take them into consideration in any comprehensive communication strategy.



**The implications of any particular configuration of public opinion towards the EU depends on the institutional and political context within which ratification of EU treaties takes place:**

- in the Irish case, the defining features of that context are, firstly, the requirement to hold a referendum on any significant treaty changes, secondly, the stipulation that any public funds expended on campaigning be allocated on a fifty-fifty basis between the 'yes' and the 'no' sides and, thirdly, the fact that there is a pro-integration (and pro-Nice) consensus among the political parties and among elected representatives
- the requirement to hold referendums on EU treaty changes puts additional demands on Irish citizens, placing them in the challenging position of making decisions on complex issues and therefore requiring them to have higher rather than average or lower levels of knowledge of and engagement with these issues
- the constitutional requirement that, if any public funds are allocated to referendum campaigning, they must be allocated equally to the 'yes' and the 'no' sides has tended to inhibit efforts to persuade and influence voters
- the fact that there is a pro-integration consensus among the political parties means that, over the years, European issues have not been widely debated and this has had an adverse effect on levels of knowledge and engagement among citizens
- remedying this deficit in party-led debate about Europe is made more difficult by the declining levels of attachment to political parties and by the low level of trust in parties (even though, it should be noted, the level of trust in parties in Ireland is higher than it is in the Union as a whole)
- the challenges resulting from this combination of constitutional requirements, political circumstances and the current climate of public opinion on European issues were dramatically illustrated by the defeat of the first referendum on the Treaty of Nice (7 June 2001)
- in particular, it is evident that the outcome of that referendum was determined more by abstention than by the growth of the 'no' vote (in fact, in absolute terms and as a proportion of the electorate, the 'no' vote actually declined between the Amsterdam and Nice referendums)
- in turn, the main explanation of the massive (65 per cent) level of abstention in the first Nice referendum was the feeling on the part a substantial majority of the citizens that they did not understand the issues involved
- the feeling of not understanding the issues also contributed to the tendency to vote 'no' but the most important attitudinal factor in determining the 'no' vote was dissatisfaction with the way in which decisions are made in the EU
- in short, close examination of the evidence regarding Irish public opinion on European issues helps to identify the underlying aspects of public opinion that contributed to the defeat of the proposal to ratify the Nice Treaty in the referendum of 7 June 2001; in doing so it points to the problematic aspects of public opinion that need to be dealt with if the extremely high level of abstention in that referendum and the consequences that flowed from it are to be



avoided in future referendums on EU treaty changes, including in the forthcoming second referendum on the Treaty of Nice.

## **The report**

## **Introduction**

There is a substantial puzzle at the heart of Irish attitudes to European integration. On the one hand, the level of support for European integration in Ireland, as measured across a range of indicators, is among the highest in the Union. On the other hand, in a referendum in June 2001, the Irish people, by a majority of 54 to 46 per cent, refused to ratify the Treaty of Nice. It could be argued that there is a simple answer to this puzzle, the answer being that it is possible to be pro-EU and to vote against the Nice Treaty (or to fail to vote for it, which as we shall see below was the crucial factor in the defeat of the proposal to ratify the treaty). While, strictly speaking, all of that is true, such an "answer" only pushes the puzzle one step further back -- to the issue of why, in a country with predominantly and, in some respects, overwhelmingly favourable attitudes to European integration, the majority were not sufficiently pro-Nice to go and vote for it in the referendum. The puzzle is more than a purely academic one. The Irish people are due to vote on the Nice Treaty again on October 19, 2002. The nature and implications of Irish attitudes to European integration are, accordingly, pressing issues and ones that are the main focus of the present report.

The report draws on the evidence of Eurobarometer No. 57 (EB57), using both the Irish data and, for purposes of comparison, the data relating to the other member states and to the EU as a whole. Fieldwork for the Irish EB57 survey was conducted by Lansdowne Market Research between 29 March and 25 April, 2002. The EB57 questionnaire as implemented in Ireland is presented in Appendix 1. Technical details of how the survey was conducted can be found in Appendix 2.

## **Attitudes to membership and to the EU in general**

Eurobarometer surveys have monitored support for European integration over almost three decades using a number of basic indicators. The following discussion of trends over time will consider three of these indicators, which can be summarily referred to as the "membership" indicator, the "benefits" indicator and the "dissolution" indicator (see questions 13, 14 and 17 in Appendix 1).

The indicator with the highest positive response in Ireland is the benefits indicator, reflecting widespread popular recognition of the benefits accruing to Ireland from membership of the Union. The question asked is as follows: "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Ireland has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?". In spring 2002, 86 percent of respondents in EB57 said Ireland had benefited from membership of the Union. As the top line in Figure 1 shows, the level of perception of benefit from membership has been hovering fairly steadily at or around this figure since the mid-1990s, having risen almost continuously in survey after survey since this aspect of attitudes to integration was first measured in the mid 1980s.

The membership indicator measures people's evaluation a country's membership of the EU by means of the question "Generally speaking, do you think that [COUNTRY's) membership of the EU is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?" In the case of Ireland, the membership indicator shows a steady rise more or less in parallel with that of the benefits indicator over most of the period from 1984 to 1997. Since then the membership indicator has fallen slightly, though some pick-up is just about observable in 2001 and 2002.

Figure 1 about here

The membership indicator shows an enormous contrast between Irish attitudes and attitudes in the Union as a whole, in terms of both current levels and change over time. In EB57, 78 per cent of Irish people said that they felt that Ireland's membership of the Union is "a good thing"; the corresponding figure for the Union as a whole was a full 25 percentage points lower.

This very substantial gap between Irish and EU-wide attitudes to membership is relatively new. In fact, in the early 1980s Ireland lagged somewhat behind the EC as a whole on the membership indicator. However, the European and the Irish indicators both then began what turned out to be a remarkably steady climb, the Irish indicator starting its rise a little bit later but then rising more sharply and passing out the level of support in the EC as a whole in 1987. The big contrast between Irish and European attitudes to EU membership started to open up in the

early 1990s and the gap simply got wider and wider. From 1991 on, support for EU membership in the Union as a whole went into decline, losing all the gains that had been made in the mid to late 1980s, while Irish support for membership, after some initial hesitation, continued to rise, thus producing the 25 percentage point gap already noted.

The high overall level of approval of Ireland's EU membership shown by the EB57 data is not equally spread across all social and demographic sectors of Irish society. In some cases the differences are relatively minor, as in the tendency for people aged 65 or over to be somewhat less supportive of EU membership and correspondingly more agnostic ("neither good nor bad") and in the tendency for women to be less supportive (75 per cent of women regard membership as a good thing compared to 81 per cent of men and 23 per cent of women opt for the neither good nor bad category, compared to 14 per cent of men. In the case of occupation and education, the differences are more substantial. Thus 89 per cent of managers and 85 per cent of the self-employed approve of EU membership compared to 71 per cent of other white-collar workers. Similarly 85 per cent of those who completed their education at age 20 or more give a positive response, compared to 69 per cent of those who completed education at the age of 15 or 16.

Tables 1 about here

The exceptionally high level of overall positive attitudes to integration among the Irish public is confirmed by the results of additional questions recently introduced in the Eurobarometer. Thus 71 per cent say that the EU "conjures up" for them a very positive or fairly positive image. This compares to an average of 49 per cent for the Union as a whole and, as Figure 2 shows, confirms Ireland's placement at the top of the country-by-country league of positive attitudes to the EU . At the other end of this positive-negative image scale, a mere five per cent of Irish people have a negative image of the EU - compared to proportions in excess of 20 per cent (in some cases well in excess of 20 per cent) in Denmark, Austria, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Figure 2 also shows that Ireland has the lowest level of neutral responses to this question of any of the member states (16 per cent)

Figure 2 about here

The discussion of the evidence deriving from the benefits indicator in Figure 1 noted the overwhelming (85 per cent) recognition by Irish people that their country has benefited from membership of the Union. It is clear, however, that more people see benefit for the country than see benefit for themselves. Thus, when the question focuses directly on *personal* advantages and disadvantages arising from Ireland's membership of the EU, in Ireland the positive response slips back significantly (to 62 per cent). On the other hand, as Figure 3 illustrates, this still leaves Irish people with by far the most positive perception of the personal advantages of their country's membership of the Union. The next closest country is Spain, where 47 per cent believe that they have derived more personal advantages than disadvantages from Spain's membership of the Union. In the Union as a whole positive responses on this question amount to only 28 per cent (a gap of 34 percentage points relative to Ireland).

Figure 3 about here

It is important to note at this stage that the dissolution indicator (see Figure 1) gives rise to a significant qualification to what has been said up to this point about Irish attitudes to European integration. The indicator is based on the following question: "If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent, or very relieved?" The value of this indicator is that it measures enthusiasm for the Union (very sorry) and indifference to it (indifferent plus don't know) in a way that is not achieved by any of the other questions we have considered so far.

The qualification arising from this indicator in the Irish case is that the very high levels of approval of Ireland's membership of the Union must be read in the light of the much lower levels of enthusiastic support. Thus, while in the spring of 2002 in EB57, 78 per cent of Irish people

thought that Irish membership was a good thing only 48 per cent would have been very sorry to hear that the Union had been scrapped<sup>1</sup>.

- In short, while the vast majority of Irish people approve of Irish membership of the Union, far fewer (30 percentage points fewer to be precise) feel any real enthusiasm for the EU.

The level of indifference elicited by this question provides equally telling evidence. Indifference plus don't know is illustrated in Figure 1 by the vertical bars rising from the base of the graph. In spring 2002 (EB57), the level of indifference stood at 49 per cent, which meant that it was equal to the level of enthusiasm. In spring 2001 (just prior to the first Nice referendum), however, Irish indifference to the EU outstripped enthusiasm by a margin on 10 percentage points. A glance back over the time span covered in Figure 1 shows that such a deficit of enthusiasm relative to indifference had not occurred since the early to mid 1980s, at which time it was a striking and regular feature of Irish attitudes.

- The extent of indifference to the EU revealed by the dissolution indicator is an important feature of the attitudinal context in which EU referendums in Ireland take place. In the period immediately prior to the Nice referendum of June 2001, indifference exceeded enthusiasm by a significant margin.

### **Attitude to enlargement**

The evidence discussed so far relates to the European Union as it currently exists - a union of fifteen Western European states. The immediate prospect is of a substantial enlargement of the Union and of significant consequential changes not just in the composition of the Union but also in the way in which it conducts its business. The main changes in regard to the latter are incorporated into the Treaty of Nice. This makes it imperative to include evidence on attitudes to enlargement in any assessment of Irish attitudes to European integration. Could it indeed be that enlargement is the issue that has given rise to the problems with the ratification of the Nice

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<sup>1</sup> Some discrepancy between approval and enthusiasm is found in all member states. However, the average gap between the two across the Union as a whole is only 19 percentage points and only in Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain is the gap as high or (slightly) higher than in Ireland

Treaty in Ireland, with Irish people being very satisfied with the status quo but opposed to enlargement?

In fact, as Figure 4 shows, Ireland is one of the countries with the lowest level of outright opposition to enlargement and one of the highest levels of support for comprehensive enlargement (i.e. enlargement to "include all the countries wishing to join"). Only 10 per cent of Irish people are opposed to enlargement as such (compared to 21 per cent of people in the Union as a whole). At the other end of the scale, 29 per cent of Irish people are in favour of comprehensive enlargement (all countries wishing to join), compared to 21 per cent in the Union as whole.

When it comes to the issue of the admission of specific countries and a question is put to respondents asking for a specific 'yes' or 'no', in the case of all applicant countries the level of Irish opposition to admission is substantially less than the level in the Union as a whole. However, the level of don't know responses also tends to be higher in Ireland than in the Union as a whole, both on the general question on enlargement and especially on the questions dealing with the admission of specific countries. Even taking this qualification into account, however, it is clear that Irish attitudes to enlargement are generally positive and there is no evidence that would support the view that opposition to enlargement was a major factor in explaining the 'no' to Nice.

Figure 4 about here

### **Preferences regarding the Europeanisation of policy issues**

The evidence considered so far has dealt with overall support or opposition (or, as we have seen in many instances, indifference) vis a vis EU membership or European integration as a whole. One of the outstanding features of European integration, however, is that the degree of integration varies from policy sector to policy sector and it would be amazing if support for integration did not also vary by policy sector. Technically, what we are dealing with here is public support for the attribution of policy competence to the European level of governance.

More simply, we can think of this as support for the Europeanisation of issues and of decision-making.

Such support has been measured by the Eurobarometer across a wide range of issues over a long number of years. The question currently used to measure Europeanisation is as follows: "For each of the following, do you think that decision should be made by the [NATIONALITY] government, or made jointly within the European Union. The results deriving from this question in EB57 (spring 2002) are presented in Table 2, which shows support for the Europeanisation of various issues arranged in descending order of the Irish level of support. The twenty four issues are divided into three groups: those with high levels of support for Europeanisation (60 per cent or above), those with moderate levels of Europeanisation (45 to 59 per cent) and those with low levels (less than 45 per cent). A final and, in the present context, vital piece of information is contained in the third column of Table 1. This is the difference between the Irish level of support for Europeanisation and the level of such support in the Union as a whole. Positive numbers in this column mean that Irish support for the Europeanisation of the issue in question is higher than support in the Union as a whole; negative numbers mean that it is lower.

Table 2 about here

Eight of the twenty-four issues considered fall into the category of high support for Europeanisation<sup>2</sup>. There are no surprises in this category -- each of the issues has an inherent European or international dimension and all of them, on any objective assessment, would probably qualify for inclusion in the set of issues that, according to the principle of subsidiarity, should be dealt with at the European level.

Although there is a general consensus regarding the Europeanisation of these issues, there are two issues in the set on which some disagreement between Irish and European respondents emerges. The first of these relates to "support to regions experiencing economic difficulties".

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<sup>2</sup> It should be emphasised that the arrangement of the issues in these groups in Table 1 is based on the Irish distribution of responses



Support for the Europeanisation of this policy area is 11 percentage points higher in Ireland. Given Ireland's position in relation to EU regional policy, this divergence is not surprising.

The second difference of emphasis in relation to issues that generally elicit a high degree of support for Europeanisation arises on the issue of "the fight against organised crime". The level of support for the Europeanisation of this issue is 9 percentage points lower among Irish respondents than it is among respondents in the EU as a whole. This presumably reflects in part a greater awareness of the international dimension of organised crime among continental Europeans.

Table 1 about here

This brings us to the issues on which support for Europeanisation is substantially lower in Ireland than in the Union as a whole. The areas involved are the Europeanisation of decision-making on defence and on policy towards the acceptance of refugees plus, to a lesser extent, issues of asylum policy and immigration policy more generally. As the issue of decision-making on defence matters is extremely complex and as EB57 provides some additional data that throws light on the issue, we will deal with it separately in a moment. In the meantime, we can complete this review of attitudes to the Europeanisation of issues by noting that, whereas in the Union as a whole there is moderate support for the Europeanisation of the issue of "accepting refugees", support in Ireland (at 33 per cent) is 18 percentage points lower (see Table 1). Smaller deficits in Irish support for Europeanisation (of 7 percentage points) occur in the relation to rules for political asylum and immigration policy. These are significant contrasts in themselves but they become quite striking when we bear in the very high level of Irish support for EU membership and for European integration in general that has been documented above.

- While Irish attitudes to Ireland's membership of the Union and to the Union as such are much more positive than attitudes in most other member states, Ireland lags significantly behind the European average in terms of support for the Europeanisation of certain specific issues, including issues relating to refugees, to asylum and to immigration

### **Attitudes to European defence and security policy**

In public opinion research on complex issues, responses can vary substantially depending on the wording of the question. This tendency is illustrated by the responses in EB57 to defence and security issues. In Ireland, as Table 1 shows, the notion of decisions on defence being made "jointly within the European Union" as opposed to being made "by the Irish government" is supported by only 34 per cent of respondents. On the other hand, when respondents are asked if they are for or against "a common defence and security policy among the European Union member states", support for a joint approach rises to 50 per cent. It is important to emphasise that this contrast is not confined to Ireland -- as Figure 7 shows, the publics of all member states show significantly more support for "a common defence and security policy" than for decisions in relation to defence being "made jointly within the European Union".

The reason these contrasting responses to the two formulations of the defence question is that two different attitudes are being measured. The first question measures attitudes to the principle of supranational versus national decision-making on defence by posing a stark choice between "jointly decided within the European Union" as against "decided by the [NATIONAL] government". Support for a supranational approach in this sense is only 51 per cent in the Union as a whole and, as we have seen, a mere 34 per cent in Ireland.

The second question (for or against "a common defence and security policy among the European Union member states") measures an attitude to the existing common defence and security policy with all its qualifications and limitations that, in effect, preserve a substantial degree of national decision-making.

- The lesson to be learned from the different levels of support elicited by the alternative questions on security and defence policy is that public opinion in Ireland, as in the other member states, is quite sensitive to subtle variations in the way in which issues are formulated and communicated. The strong implication is that complex issues must be very clearly and accurately presented to the public and that due attention must be paid to what might at first sight

appear to be subtle nuances and distinctions. This implication applies particularly in countries that choose to involve the mass public in decisions on such matters.

As a final addendum to this discussion of defence and security policy, it is worth noting that a majority (58 per cent) of Irish people are in favour of "a common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union towards other countries", a proportion that puts it only a little behind support for a common foreign policy in the Union as a whole. Opposition to a common foreign policy is quite low (20 per cent) but there is a substantial don't know factor (22 per cent)<sup>3</sup>.

### **Attitude to the Euro**

As well as being more willing than average to attribute policy competence to the European Union over a wide range of policy domains (with the exceptions noted), Irish people are much more supportive than average of one of the most significant policy innovations in the history of European integration, namely the introduction of the Euro on the on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2002. Asked for their evaluation of this development, 66 per cent of respondents said it was a good thing (33 per cent very good and 33 per cent fairly good) while only 19 per cent thought it was a bad thing (10 per cent very bad and 9 per cent fairly bad). The two-thirds positive response makes Ireland the country with the third most positive reaction to the introduction of the euro and puts it well ahead of opinion in the euro zone as a whole (54 per cent positive).

Figures 6 about here

Irish people also declare themselves to be much more comfortable about using the Euro than do people in any other member state except Luxembourg and Italy. Eighty-three per cent of Irish

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<sup>3</sup> Note that the foreign policy issue was also tackled using the two different types of questions as already examined in the case of defence. It turns out that support for policy integration in the case of foreign policy is actually somewhat *higher* (both in Ireland and in the Union as a whole) in response to the joint decision-making question than in response to the question asking for preferences for and against a common policy. This is the reverse of the situation that obtains in the case of the defence issue and can be interpreted as indicating that people are more open to a supranational approach to decision-making in the case of foreign policy.

people say they are comfortable using the Euro (42 per cent very comfortable and 41 per cent fairly comfortable), compared to 69 per cent in the Netherlands and 55 per cent in Germany.

In summary, Irish attitudes to the European Union are characterised by

- widespread approval of Irish membership of the EU
- widespread perception of benefits of EU membership, including personal benefits
- widespread positive image of the EU
- widespread support for the euro
- low levels of opposition to enlargement
- majority support for a common defence and security policy
- widespread willingness to see a substantial range of issues "Europeanised", in the sense of decisions on such issues being made jointly within the European Union rather than by the national government

All of this underlines the question posed at the outset: If Irish attitudes to European integration are so positive, how is it that the proposal to ratify the Nice Treaty was defeated by a comfortable margin in June 2001?

Part to the answer to this question may lie in three qualifications arising from the evidence considered so far:

- Irish people are more likely to express reservations regarding any *strongly* supranational approach to defence (though at the same time a majority does favour a common defence and security policy)
- Irish people are more likely to have reservations about a strongly supranational approach to policy relating to refugees and, to a lesser extent, immigration
- In Ireland enthusiastic support for the European Union lags a long way behind general approval of the EU

Figure 7 about here

### **Engagement, knowledge and approaches to information**

Evidence in EB57 regarding people's feelings about the EU across a number of dimensions (enthusiasm, hope, trust/mistrust, anxiety etc.) confirms the indications already noted that the majority of Irish people do not have strong personal feelings (either positive or negative) about

the EU. The most widespread positive feeling endorsed by Irish people in response to this question was the rather vague feeling of "hope". This was endorsed by equal proportions in Ireland and in the Union as a whole (47 per cent). As Figure 8 shows, other positive feelings about the EU were held by relatively small minorities of Irish people (22 per cent had a feeling of enthusiasm for the EU and 18 per cent a feeling of trust) and these positive feelings were matched by the 20 per cent who reported feeling indifferent and by the further 15 per cent who reported having no feelings about the EU one way or the other.

Figure 8 about here

The view that the problem with Irish attitudes to integration lies in lack of engagement and commitment is supported by the evidence elicited by a question on "What does the European Union mean to you personally?" With one single exception, Irish levels of endorsement of a range of possible characteristics presented to respondents were either at or below the European average. This was the case both for positive responses and for negative responses. The exception was "economic prosperity" which was endorsed as one of the meanings of the EU by 41 per cent of Irish respondents, compared to 24 per cent of EU respondents as a whole. In short, while a positive image of the EU is widespread, it is a relatively undifferentiated image that is not backed up by any commensurate degree of enthusiasm, detailed appraisal or engagement.

Figure 9 about here

Consistent with the low levels of engagement with EU issues, Irish people lack confidence in their grasp of EU issues. Asked "How well informed do you feel about enlargement?", only 21 per cent of Irish respondents gave a positive assessment of their level of information, saying that they either felt very well informed (5 per cent) or well informed (16 per cent). This overall low level of positive assessment is in fact identical to the level in the Union as a whole. Given that only a little over a year ago Ireland held a referendum on the Nice Treaty and is about to face into another one, the low level of (subjectively assessed) knowledge of this aspect of European affairs is particularly problematic.

EB57 also assessed people's subjective sense of their knowledge of the EU more generally, the question making reference to knowledge about "the European Union, its policies and its institutions" and measuring knowledge on a ten-point scale running from one ("know nothing at all" to ten ("know a great deal"). In this case, Irish people's assessment of their competence in this area is slightly lower than that of people in the Union as a whole. Forty-three per cent of Irish people put themselves on the lower end of the scale (points 1 to 3) compared to 36 per cent of people in the Union as a whole.

Figure 10 about here

One could argue that, since the proportion of Irish people who feel that they are badly informed is not far removed from the European average, it is not that much of a problem. The difficulty with this view is twofold. Firstly, by generating public debate, the practice of holding referendums ought to increase people's level of knowledge and their sense of confidence in their level of knowledge. On this basis Irish people ought to feel far better informed than the peoples of most other member states.

Secondly, and looking at the matter prospectively, the continuing commitment to hold referendums in this area, including one in the autumn of this year, puts additional demands on Irish citizens, placing them in the position of making decisions on complex issues and therefore requiring them to have higher rather than average or lower levels of knowledge.

The problem of Irish people's low level of confidence in their grasp of European affairs is underlined if we compare Irish levels of subjective knowledge not with the EU average but with the other member states that have held referendums in recent years. Low levels of subjectively assessed knowledge (point 1 to 3 on the scale), which are found among 43 per cent of Irish people, are found among only 19 per cent of Austrians, 24 per cent of Danes, 31 per cent of Swedes and 35 per cent of Finns. In short, most of the other countries on the shoulders of whose citizens the duty of ratifying EU treaties falls have more widespread levels of (subjectively

assessed) knowledge of EU affairs<sup>4</sup>. But does knowledge matter? In particular does people's subjective assessment of their state of knowledge of EU affairs have any implications for their attitudes to the Union or for their behaviour?

- The evidence suggests that knowledge matters and that the important difference is between having "very little to no knowledge" and having "some knowledge". The difference in approval of Ireland's membership of the EU between these two groups is 19 percentage points (68 per cent approval among those with little or no knowledge compared to 87 per cent among those with some knowledge.

Table 3 about here

If the problem of low levels of knowledge of EU affairs is to be rectified, it is important to be able to identify the sectors of society where it is most likely to occur. Table 4 shows that low levels of knowledge are found more frequently among younger and older age groups in contrast to those in the middle age-cohorts. They are also substantially more likely among women (50 per cent of whom are in the lower knowledge bracket, compared to 37 per cent of men). In occupational terms, low levels of knowledge are quite rare among managers but quite prevalent among manual workers and among the unemployed. Finally, and not surprisingly, knowledge is closely related to level of education, being lowest among those who completed their education at age 15 or 16 (54 per cent of whom report a low level of knowledge) and highest among those who completed education at age 20 or over.

Table 4 about here

It is clear from the above that variations in levels of knowledge of EU affairs are embedded in the social and economic structure of society. Consequently, dealing with the problem of low levels of knowledge will require substantial effort. The analysis here points to at least some of the areas on which such effort should be targeted and also suggests that, given the relationship

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<sup>4</sup> The problems that could be faced by any British government that decided to hold a referendum on joining European Monetary Union can be guessed from the fact that the people of the UK have the largest proportion (52 per cent) in the low knowledge category.

between knowledge and attitudes, the effort could lead to increased levels of support for European integration.

Irish people's low ranking on the subjective knowledge scale is consistent with their lower than average attention to news about the EU. The contrast between Ireland on the one hand and the Scandinavian countries plus Austria on the other in this regard is particularly striking. As Figure 11 shows, Ireland is located at the low end of the country-spectrum of attention to EU matters (along with Germany and the Netherlands). At the other end of the spectrum one finds Denmark and Finland and, a little towards the middle but still on the more attentive side, Austria and Sweden. Only 11 per cent of Danes pay no attention at all to news about the EU. The corresponding figure for Ireland is 38 per cent.

Figure 11 about here

Lower levels of attention to European affairs in Ireland are confirmed by the evidence of lower levels of information-seeking across a wide range of potential sources of EU information. Figure 12 compares Irish people's propensity to seek EU information from various sources to the propensity to engage in this kind of activity in the EU as a whole. While television is the most used medium for this purpose both in Ireland and in the EU, only 39 per cent of Irish people use it compared to 65 per cent in the EU as a whole (and compared to 82 per cent in Denmark). The gap between Irish usage and EU-wide usage of a range of other media is smaller but in the same direction.

It is clear that improving the level of knowledge of European affairs among Irish people will be an uphill task. Whether it be television or radio, newspapers or other magazines, discussion with family and friends or use of the internet, Irish people report less frequent use of each channel of information or communication compared to the EU average frequency of use. The corollary is that Irish people are significantly above average in reporting that they never look for such information



or are not interested in it (32 per cent in Ireland compared to 21 per cent in the Union as a whole).

Figure 12 about here

### **Trust in national and EU institutions**

Communication strategies do not take place in a vacuum and are fundamentally affected by the political context and the political culture in the state in which they are undertaken. An important aspect of that culture is the degree of trust that people have in both national and European institutions.

Asked explicitly whether they tend to trust or tend not to trust the European Union, 52 per cent of Irish people say they tend to trust the EU, 24 per cent say they tend not to trust it and 24 say they do not know<sup>5</sup>. Subtracting the proportion of Irish people who tend not to trust from the proportion who tend to trust gives a measure of net trust of +28 points. This compares to net trust of + 9 percentage points in the EU as a whole.

When net trust in the EU in Ireland is compared to net trust in a wide range of (Irish) national institutions and organisations, the EU emerges as the fourth most trusted institution, coming in behind two media institutions, namely radio and television, and the Civil Service. In contrast to the high positive trust ratings of radio and television, the net trust rating of the press in Ireland is actually negative. Although overall levels of confidence in media organisations across the EU are lower than corresponding levels in Ireland, the same contrast between positive trust ratings for

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<sup>5</sup> The level of trust and the level of distrust elicited by this explicit question are substantially higher than those elicited by the question about feelings related to the EU, the results of which were reported in Figure 8 above. The reason for the difference is that the explicit trust question forces all respondents to pick one or other option (tend to trust or tend not to trust) or to respond don't know, whereas the question underlying Figure 8 measures the presence or absence of a feeling, explicitly allowing for the possibility that the feeling in question may not exist for the respondent. The result of the different ways of asking the question is that what one might call the presence/absence

radio and television and a negative trust rating for the press is observable in the Union as a whole. Finally, in terms of general differences between Ireland and the EU, the very positive net trust rating of the civil service in Ireland is in sharp contrast to the (marginally) negative rating of national civil services across the Union as a whole.

Figure 13 about here

Not only is the net trust rating of the EU in Ireland in strong surplus (+28), net trust in the main the main EU institutions is even more positive (see Figure 14). The European Parliament receives the highest rating, followed by the Commission, the Court of Justice, the European Ombudsman and the Council of Ministers. The institution with the lowest level of net trust in Ireland is the Convention on the Future of the European Union but even its rating is substantially positive (+24). Comparing Ireland with the EU as a whole, the size of the margin by which the Irish level of trust in EU institutions outstrips the European level is striking.

Figure 14 about here

This brings us to the issue of the significance of these trust ratings, in general and in particular in relation to efforts to overcome the knowledge deficit identified in an earlier section of this report. The first point to be made in this regard is that these high trust ratings relating to the EU and its institutions co-exist with quite high and in some instances very high levels of don't know responses. The don't know rate on these items among Irish respondents varies from a quarter in the case of the European Parliament and the EU as a whole, to roughly two-in-five in the case of the Court of Justice and the European Ombudsman and to almost 60 per cent in the case of the Convention (see Figure 15). The second point to note is that, given the lack of engagement with EU issues and politics noted above, the expression of trust EU institutions portrayed in Figure 14 is not necessarily backed up by adequate understanding or knowledge of the institution in question or of what it does. The high levels of trust expressed may simply reflect the overall

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question produces a much larger proportion of people who do not respond to the EU in terms of either trust or distrust.

positive orientation of Irish people to the European Union. As such, while they provide fertile ground for information and communication initiatives that might be undertaken by the EU, they also underline the need for such initiatives if existing levels of trust are to be consolidated.

Figure 15 about here

At first sight, a striking aspect of the Irish data on trust in institutions is the much higher levels of net trust accorded to European institutions as compared with Irish domestic political institutions (the Dáil, the Government and the political parties). Part of the explanation of this discrepancy is the very much lower levels of don't know responses in the case of domestic political institutions. People are much more engaged with national politics and much more willing to take a view. The view that they take is also likely to be much more firmly grounded.

The second part of the explanation of the discrepancy is that trust has a very different connotation when applied to mainly apolitical institutions and organisations that are remote from daily experience compared to its meaning when applied to such highly political institutions as the national parliament, the government and the political parties. In fact, on any realistic view of politics, critical attitudes and a healthy degree of scepticism are necessary parts of the checks and balances that are a fundamental part of democratic politics. In a national context, mistrustful citizens may be critical citizens as much or more than alienated citizens. This cautions us against jumping to far-reaching conclusions based on an initial assessment of the contrasts in Figure 13. With this qualification in mind and looking at the matter from the point of view of communication and information strategy, the evidence on levels of trust in institutions suggests that:

a communication or campaign strategy designed to influence people's attitudes to the European Union is likely to be more effective if it is seen to represent the views of the government and the parliament rather than being seen to represent solely the views of the political parties.
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### **European identity and national and European pride**

The picture of Irish attitudes to the European Union as being for the most part positive but as lacking in commitment and active engagement is confirmed by the evidence relating to national and European identity contained in EB57. The current EB question on national and European identity is based on the recognition of the possibility of a duality of identities and gives every opportunity for the expression of European identity, having three response categories allowing for some degree of European identity (European only, European and national, and national and European) and one category for the expression of an exclusively national identity ([NATIONALITY] only). The Eurobarometer identity measure also increases the likelihood of eliciting some expression of European identity by posing the question in the context of "the near future" rather than the immediate present. Even on the basis of this generous measure of European identity, only a bare 50 per cent of Irish people express any degree of European identity and 47 per cent opt for the "Irish only" response. This places Ireland firmly in the camp of countries with a less well developed sense of European identity, the only countries with a larger proportion identifying as "[NATIONALITY] only" being Greece, Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom. Although geo-political location undoubtedly contributes to the higher level of exclusively national identity in Ireland and in the other countries concerned, the Irish level is also likely to be a product of Ireland's history and the role that nationalism played in that history.

The salience of Irish identity in Irish political culture is further illustrated by the data on national pride in EB57. Just over 70 per cent of Irish respondents say that they are very proud to be Irish. This level of national pride is expressed by just over 40 per cent of the French and the Dutch and by only 22 per cent of Germans. The only country with a more widespread expression of this strong degree of national pride is Greece and the Irish close the gap with the Greeks if we take the sum of the proportions saying very and fairly proud of being Greek/Irish (see Figure 17).

Figure 17 about here

However, it is vital to note that, for many, pride in being Irish is quite compatible with pride in being European. Note also that, in all member states, the level of strong expression of pride in

being European is much lower than the level of strong expression of national pride. Accordingly, in order to find anything more than small minorities who are proud to be European, one must include both very and fairly proud as indicators of European pride. On the basis of this measure, pride in being European is quite widespread in Ireland (72 per cent, comprising 21 per cent very proud and 51 per cent fairly proud). This puts Ireland back on the pro-European end of the spectrum of countries, in the company of Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and, interestingly given the well known Danish reservations about aspect of European integration and its history of EU-related referendums, Denmark (see Figure 18).

Figure 18 about here

While it is clear from the above that Irish attitudes to national and European identity are distinctive (a relatively high level of Irish-only identity and a very high level of national pride), it is also clear that Irish attitudes to European integration are not driven by any kind of exclusivist nationalism. This is evident from all that has been said above about the widespread favourable attitudes to the European Union. It is also evident in the fact that many people have no difficulty in being both proud to be Irish and proud to the European, albeit that the latter feeling is at a lower level of intensity. At the same time, the evidence indicates that nationalist sensibilities need to be taken into account in any assessment of the climate of public opinion towards the EU in Ireland. Given both Ireland's history and its contemporary political culture (which of course is to a substantial extent a product of that history), it would be surprising if issues of sovereignty and national independence were not stirred to at least some degree by a succession of new EU treaties and by discussions of the constitutional future of Europe.

The final figure in this report (Figure 18) both confirms and qualifies this expectation. The data in Figure 18 derive from a question about "the building of Europe, the European Union" and about the fears that this process may give rise to. The results show that fears of adverse economic or welfare consequences from the building of Europe are significantly less common in Ireland than in the Union as a whole. This fits in with Ireland's overall favourable disposition towards the Union and with its recent economic experience. However, when potential fears about loss of

sovereignty or national identity are put to respondents, Irish people are *slightly* more likely to admit to such fears, 59 per cent fearing the imposition of decisions by the big countries, 48 per cent fearing some loss of national identity and culture and 38 per cent saying 'yes' to the fear of "Ireland not existing not really existing any more". In interpreting these data, one must bear in mind that the fears were posed by and, in this sense, prompted by the question. Thus, the evidence *does not show* that 38 per cent of people are frantic about Ireland disappearing down the tube. Indeed, the reader will recall from Figure 8 that only 6 per cent of Irish people said that the EU caused them a feeling of anxiety. On the other hand, when the possibility of "Ireland not really existing any more" or the possibility of "the loss of our national identity and culture" is put to respondents, substantial numbers do not dismiss these notions out of hand. This suggests that the fears are potential or perhaps subliminal and, as such, need to be anticipated in any considered strategy of public discussion and persuasion.

## **Conclusion**

The implications of any particular configuration of public opinion towards the EU depends on the institutional and political context within which ratification of EU treaties takes place. In the Irish case, the defining features of that context are, firstly, the requirement to hold a referendum on any significant treaty changes, secondly, the stipulation that any public funds expended on campaigning be allocated on a fifty-fifty basis between the 'yes' and the 'no' sides and, thirdly, the fact that there is a pro-integration (and pro-Nice) consensus among the political parties and among the members of the Dáil.

The requirement to hold referendums on EU treaty changes puts additional demands on Irish citizens, placing them in the challenging position of making decisions on complex issues and therefore requiring them to have higher rather than average or lower levels of knowledge of and engagement with the issues involved.

The constitutional requirement that, if any public funds are allocated to referendum campaigning, they must be allocated equally to the 'yes' and the 'no' sides has tended to inhibit efforts to persuade and influence voters. The pro-integration consensus among the political parties and the vast majority of public representatives means that, over the years, European issues have not been widely debated and this has had an adverse effect on levels of knowledge and engagement among citizens. Remedying this deficit in party-led debate about Europe is made more difficult by the declining levels of attachment to political parties and by the low level of trust in parties (even though, it should be noted, the level of trust in parties in Ireland is higher than it is in the Union as a whole).

The challenges resulting from this combination of constitutional requirements, political circumstances and the current climate of public opinion on European issues were dramatically illustrated by the defeat of the first referendum on the Treaty of Nice (7 June 2001). In particular, it is evident that the outcome of that referendum was determined more by abstention than by the growth of the 'no' vote (in fact, in absolute terms and as a proportion of the electorate, the 'no' vote actually declined between the Amsterdam and Nice referendums). In turn, the main explanation of the massive (65 per cent) level of abstention in the first Nice referendum was the feeling on the part a substantial majority of the citizens that they did not understand the issues involved; the feeling of not understanding the issues also contributed to the tendency to vote 'no' but the most important attitudinal factor in determining the 'no' vote was dissatisfaction with the way in which decisions are made in the EU (on the determinants of abstention and of the 'no' vote in the first referendum on the Nice Treaty see the report of the study carried out on behalf of the European Commission Representation in Ireland which is available at:

<http://www.euireland.ie/news/Institutions/1001/fullopinionpollresults.pdf>

or at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/flash/fl108\\_v2\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/flash/fl108_v2_en.pdf))

In short, close examination of the evidence regarding Irish public opinion on European issues helps to identify the underlying aspects of Irish public opinion that contributed to the defeat of the proposal to ratify the Nice Treaty in the referendum of 7 June 2001. In doing so it points to the problematic aspects of public opinion that need to be dealt with if the extremely high level of

abstention in that referendum and the consequences that flowed from it are to be avoided in future referendums on EU treaty changes, including in the forthcoming second referendum on the Treaty of Nice.



# **Appendix 1** **Irish Questionnaire for EB57.1**

Q.1. Not applicable

Q.2. When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?

Frequently.....	34	1
Occasionally.....		2
Never.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.3. When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen ? **(READ OUT)**

Often.....	35	1
From time to time .....		2
Rarely.....		3
Never.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.4. On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?  
**(READ OUT)**

Very satisfied.....	36	1
Fairly satisfied.....		2
Not very satisfied.....		3
Not at all satisfied.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.5. If you compare your present situation with five years ago, would you say it has improved, stayed about the same or got worse ?

Improved.....	37	1
Stayed about the same.....		2
Got worse.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.6. In the course of the next five years, do you expect your personal situation to improve, to stay about the same or to get worse ?

Improve.....	38	1
Stay about the same.....		2
Get worse.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.7. Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of.  
For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid  
of it, or not?

<b>READ OUT</b> ▼	<b>AFRAID</b>	<b>NOT AFRAID</b>	<b>DK</b>
A world war	39 1	2	3
A nuclear conflict in Europe	40 1	2	3
A conventional war in Europe (not nuclear, bacteriological or chemical)	41 1	2	3
The accidental launch of a nuclear missile	42 1	2	3
An accident in a nuclear power station	43 1	2	3
The spread of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction	44 1	2	3
Ethnic conflicts in Europe	45 1	2	3
Terrorism	46 1	2	3
Organised crime	47 1	2	3
Epidemics	48 1	2	3

Q.8. I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have  
in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions,  
please  
tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it ?

<b>READ OUT</b> ▼	<b>TEND TO TRUST</b>	<b>TEND NOT TO TRUST</b>	<b>DK</b>
1. The press	49 1	2	3
2. Radio	50 1	2	3
3. Television	51 1	2	3
4. Justice/the legal system	52 1	2	3
5. The police	53 1	2	3
6. The army	54 1	2	3
7. The Church	55 1	2	3
8. Trade unions	56 1	2	3
9. Political parties	57 1	2	3
10. The Civil service	58 1	2	3
11. Big companies	59 1	2	3
12. The Irish government	60 1	2	3

13. The Dail	61	1	2	3
14. The European Union	62	1	2	3
15. The United Nations	63	1	2	3
16. Non-Governmental Organisations	64	1	2	3
17. Charitable or voluntary organisations	65	1	2	3

Q.9. In general, do you pay attention to news about each of the following ?  
(SHOW CARD 'Q.9' WITH SCALE)

READ OUT ↓	A LOT OF ATTENTION	A LITTLE ATTENTION	NO ATTENTION AT ALL	DK
1. Politics	66 1	2	3	4
2. Social issues such as education, health care, poverty, etc.	67 1	2	3	4
3. The European Union	68 1	2	3	4
4. The economy	69 1	2	3	4
5. Sport	70 1	2	3	4
6. The environment	71 1	2	3	4
7. Foreign policy/ international affairs	72 1	2	3	4
8. Culture	73 1	2	3	4

Q.10. Using this scale, how much do you feel you know about the European Union,  
its policies, its institutions? (SHOW CARD 'Q.10' WITH SCALE)

READ OUT	KNOW NOTHING AT ALL										KNOW A GREAT DEAL	DK
74-75	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	

Q.11. When you are looking for information about the European Union, its policies, its institutions, which of the following sources do you use?

What others?

(SHOW CARD 'Q.11'- READ OUT - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

Meetings.....	76	1,
Discussions with relatives, friends, colleagues.....		2,
Daily newspapers.....		3,
Other newspapers, magazines.....		4,
Television.....		5,
Radio.....		6,
The Internet.....		7,
Books, brochures, information leaflets.....		8,
CD-Rom .....		9,
European Union information on notice boards in libraries, town halls, railway stations, post offices .....		10,
European Union information offices, Euro-info Centres, Euro-info Points, Euro-libraries, etc.....		11,
National or regional government information offices.....		12,
Trade Unions or professional associations.....		13,
Other organisations (consumer organisations, etc.).....		14,
A member of the European Parliament or a member of The Dail.....		15,
Other (SPONTANEOUS).....		16,
Never look for such information, not interested (SPONTANEOUS).....		17,GO
TO Q.13		
DK.....		18,

DO NOT ASK THOSE WHO ANSWERED "NEVER LOOK FOR SUCH INFORMATION, NOT  
INTERESTED  
CODE 17 AT Q.11

Q.12. In general, how would you prefer to get information about the  
European Union? How else? (SHOW CARD 'Q.12' - READ OUT - MULTIPLE  
ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

A short leaflet, that just gives an overview.....94

1,  
A more detailed brochure.....

2,  
A book giving you a complete description.....

3,  
A video tape.....

4,  
On the Internet.....

5,  
A CD-rom.....

6,  
A computer terminal allowing you to consult databases.....

7,  
From the television.....

8,  
From the radio.....

9,  
From daily newspapers.....

10,  
From other newspapers, magazines.....

11,  
From posters.....

12,  
I do not want information about the European  
Union (SPONTANEOUS) .....

13,  
None of these ways (SPONTANEOUS).....

14,  
DK.....

15,

**ASK ALL**

Q.13. Generally speaking, do you think that Ireland's membership of the European Union is ...? **(READ OUT)**

A good thing.....	109	1
A bad thing.....		2
Neither good nor bad.....		3
DK.....		4

Q.14. Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Ireland has on balance benefitted or not from being a member of the European Union?

Benefitted.....	110	1
Not benefitted.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.15. In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?

Very positive.....	111	1
Fairly positive.....		2
Neutral.....		3
Fairly negative.....		4
Very negative.....		5
DK.....		6

Q.16. Do you think that Ireland being a member of the European Union has brought you personally.....?  
**(SHOW CARD 'Q.16' - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)**

Many more advantages.....	112	1
More advantages.....		2
As many advantages as disadvantages.....		3
More disadvantages.....		4
Many more disadvantages.....		5
DK.....		6

Q.17. If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or very relieved?

Very sorry..... 113 1  
Indifferent..... 2  
Very relieved..... 3  
DK..... 4

Q.18. What does the European Union mean to you personally?  
(SHOW CARD Q.18' READ OUT - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE - ROTATE TOP TO BOTTOM/BOTTOM TO TOP)

Peace.....114 1,  
Economic prosperity..... 2,  
Social welfare/benefit system..... 3,  
Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the European Union..... 4,  
Cultural diversity..... 5,  
Stronger say in the world..... 6,  
The euro..... 7,  
Unemployment..... 8,  
Bureaucracy..... 9,  
Waste of money..... 10,  
Loss of our cultural identity..... 11,  
More crime..... 12,  
Not enough control at borders with non EU member countries.. 13,  
Other (SPONTANEOUS)..... 14,  
DK..... 15,

Q.19. Have you ever heard of... ?

READ OUT ↓		YES	NO	DK
1.	the European Parliament	129 1	2	3
2.	the European Commission	130 1	2	3
3.	the Council of Ministers of the European Union	131 1	2	3
4.	the Court of Justice of the European Communities	132 1	2	3
5.	the European Ombudsman	133 1	2	3
6.	the European Central Bank	134 1	2	3



7. the European Court of Auditors	135	1	2	3
8. the Committee of the Regions of the European Union	136	1	2	3
9. the Economic and Social Committee of the European Union	137	1	2	3
10. the convention on the future of the European Union	138	1	2	3

Q.20 And for each of the following European institutions, do you think it plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?

<b>READ OUT</b>		<b>IMPORTANT</b>		<b>NOT IMPORTANT</b>	<b>DK</b>
1.	The European Parliament	139	1	2	3
2.	The European Commission	140	1	2	3
3.	The Council of Ministers of the European Union	141	1	2	3
4.	The Court of Justice of the European Communities	142	1	2	3
5.	The European Ombudsman	143	1	2	3
6.	The European Central Bank	144	1	2	3
7.	The European Court of Auditors	145	1	2	3
8.	The Committee of the Regions of the European Union	146	1	2	3
9.	The Economic and Social Committee of the European Union	147	1	2	3
10.	The convention on the future of the European Union	148	1	2	3

Q.21 And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?

<b>READ OUT</b>		<b>TEND TO TRUST</b>		<b>TEND NOT TO TRUST</b>	<b>DK</b>
1.	The European Parliament	149	1	2	3
2.	The European Commission	150	1	2	3
3.	The Council of Ministers of the European Union	151	1	2	3
4.	The Court of Justice of the European Communities	152	1	2	3
5.	The European Ombudsman	153	1	2	3
6.	The European Central Bank	154	1	2	3
7.	The European Court of Auditors	155	1	2	3

8.	The Committee of the Regions of the European Union	156	1	2	3
9.	The Economic and Social Committee of the European Union	157	1	2	3
10.	The convention on the future of the European Union	158	1	2	3


NO QUESTIONS Q.22 & Q.23

PUNCHER NOTE: NO COLS.

159-160

ASK ALL

Q.24a) For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the Irish government, or made jointly within the European Union?

<b>READ OUT - ROTATE</b> 		<b>BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT</b>		<b>JOINTLY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION</b>	<b>DK</b>
1.	Defence	161	1	2	3
2.	Protection of the environment	162	1	2	3
3.	Currency	163	1	2	3
4.	Humanitarian aid	164	1	2	3
5.	Health and social welfare	165	1	2	3
6.	Basic rules for broadcasting and press	166	1	2	3
7.	Fight against poverty/social exclusion	167	1	2	3
8.	The fight against unemployment	168	1	2	3
9.	Agriculture and fishing policy	169	1	2	3
10.	Support to regions which are experiencing economic difficulties	170	1	2	3
11.	Education	171	1	2	3

12.	Scientific and technological research	172	1	2	3
13.	Information about the European Union, its policies and institutions	173	1	2	3
14.	Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union	174	1	2	3
15.	Cultural policy	175	1	2	3

Q.24b) And, for each of the following?

<b>READ OUT - ROTATE</b>	<b>THE IRISH GOVERNMENT</b>	<b>JOINTLY WITH EUROPEAN UNION</b>	<b>DK</b>
1. Immigration policy	176 1	2	3
2. Rules for political asylum	177 1	2	3
3. The fight against organised crime	178 1	2	3
4. Police	179 1	2	3
5. Justice	180 1	2	3
6. Accepting refugees	181 1	2	3
7. Juvenile crime prevention	182 1	2	3
8. Urban crime prevention	183 1	2	3
9. The fight against drugs	184 1	2	3
10. The fight against the trade in, and exploitation of, human beings	185 1	2	3
11. The fight against international terrorism	186 1	2	3
12. Tackling the challenges of an ageing population	187 1	2	3

Q.25. What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

<b>READ OUT - ROTATE</b>	<b>FOR</b>	<b>AGAINST</b>	<b>DK</b>
1. A European Monetary Union with one single currency, the euro	188 1	2	3
2. One common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union, towards other countries	189 1	2	3
3. A common defence and security policy among the European Union member states	190 1	2	3
4. The enlargement of the European Union to include new countries	191 1	2	3
5. The European Union being responsible for matters that cannot be effectively handled by national, regional and local governments	192 1	2	3

6.	The resignation of the President of the European Commission and the European Commissioners if they do not have the support of a majority in the European Parliament	193	1	2	3
7.	Teaching school children about the way European Union institutions work	194	1	2	3

Q.26 I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion it should be a priority, or not?

READ OUT ▼		PRIORITY		NOT A PRIORITY	DK
1.	Welcoming new member countries	195	1	2	3
2.	Getting closer to European citizens, for example by giving them more information about the European union, its policies and its institutions	196	1	2	3
3.	Successfully implementing the single European currency, the euro	197	1	2	3
4.	Fighting poverty and social exclusion	198	1	2	3
5.	Protecting the environment	199	1	2	3
6.	Guaranteeing the quality of food products	200	1	2	3
7.	Protecting consumers and guaranteeing the quality of other products	201	1	2	3
8.	Fighting unemployment	202	1	2	3
9.	Reforming the institutions of the European Union and the way they work	203	1	2	3
10.	Fighting organised crime and drug trafficking	204	1	2	3
11.	Asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the European Union around the world	205	1	2	3
12.	Maintaining peace and security in Europe	206	1	2	3
13.	Guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of democracy in Europe	207	1	2	3

14. Fighting terrorism	208	1	2	3
15. Tackling the challenges of an ageing population	209	1	2	3

Q.27. In the near future, do you see yourself as ... ?  
**(SHOWCARD 'Q.27' - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)**

From Ireland only.....	210	1
From Ireland and European .....		2
European and from Ireland.....		3
European only.....		4
DK.....		5

Q.28. Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be (NATIONALITY AS SPECIFIED IN QUESTION 1 OF QUESTIONNAIRE)? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

Very proud.....211 1  
 Fairly proud..... 2  
 Not very proud..... 3  
 Not at all proud..... 4  
 DK..... 5

Q.29. And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

Very proud.....212 1  
 Fairly proud..... 2  
 Not very proud..... 3  
 Not at all proud..... 4  
 DK..... 5

Q.30. Does the European Union give you personally the feeling of....? (SHOW CARD 'Q.30' - READ OUT - MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)

enthusiam..... 213 1,  
 hope..... 2,  
 trust..... 3,  
 indifference..... 4,  
 anxiety..... 5,  
 mistrust..... 6,  
 rejecting it..... 7,  
 DK..... 8,

Q.31. Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you, personally, are currently afraid of it, or not?

READ OUT ↓		CURRENTLY AFRAID OF IT	NOT CURRENTLY AFRAID OF IT	DK
1.	An economic crisis	221 1	2	3
2.	An increase in drug trafficking and international organised crime	222 1	2	3
3.	An increase in unemployment	223 1	2	3
4.	The loss of social benefits	224 1	2	3
5.	The loss of our national identity and culture	225 1	2	3



6. Decisions imposed by the big member countries	226 1	2	3
7. Ireland not really existing anymore	227 1	2	3

Q.32 On 1st January 2002, the euro replaced the Irish Punt. Do you think that this is...? (SHOW CARD 'Q.32' - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

a very good thing.....	228	1
a fairly good thing.....		2
neither a good nor a bad thing.....		3
a fairly bad thing.....		4
a very bad thing.....		5
DK.....		6

NO QUESTION 33

PUNCHER NOTE: NO COL. 229

ASK ALL

Q.34. How comfortable do you feel about using the euro? Would you say you are...? (SHOW CARD 'Q.34' - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

very comfortable.....	230	1
fairly comfortable.....		2
not very comfortable.....		3
not at all comfortable.....		4
DK.....		5
I have not used it yet (SPONTANEOUS).....		6

NOW, LET'S TALK ABOUT ANOTHER TOPIC: ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Q.35. Which of these 3 options do you prefer for the immediate future of the European Union? (SHOW CARD 'Q.35'- READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

The European Union should be enlarged to include all the countries wishing to join.....	231	1
The European Union should be enlarged to include only some of the countries wishing to join.....		2
The European Union should not be enlarged to include any additional countries.....		3
None of these (SPONTANEOUS).....		4
DK.....		5

Q.36a) For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of, or against it, becoming part of the European Union in the future?

READ OUT - ROTATE ▼	IN FAVOUR	AGAINST	DK
1. Czech Republic	232 1	2	3
2. Slovakia	233 1	2	3
3. Poland	234 1	2	3
4. Hungary	235 1	2	3
5. Romania	236 1	2	3
6. Slovenia	237 1	2	3
7. Estonia	238 1	2	3
8. Latvia	239 1	2	3
9. Lithuania	240 1	2	3
10. Bulgaria	241 1	2	3
11. Cyprus	242 1	2	3
12. Malta	243 1	2	3
13. Turkey	244 1	2	3

Q.36b) And for each of the following countries, would you be in favour of, or against it, becoming part of the European Union in the future?

READ OUT ▼	IN FAVOUR	AGAINST	DK
1. Switzerland	245 1	2	3
2. Norway	246 1	2	3
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina	247 1	2	3
4. Croatia	248 1	2	3
5. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)	249 1	2	3
6. Yugoslavia (Federal Republic)	250 1	2	3
7. Iceland	251 1	2	3
8. Albania	252 1	2	3

Q.37. After the planned enlargement of the European Union, the number of member states will increase from 15 to more than 25. In your opinion, should European Union decisions then be made...?  
**(SHOW CARD 'Q.37' - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)**

Unanimously by all member states.....	253	1
By a majority of the member states.....		2
It depends ( <b>SPONTANEOUS</b> ).....		3
DK.....		4

Q.38. Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?

READ OUT - ROTATE ▼	TEND TO AGREE	TEND TO DISAGREE	DK
1. The more countries there are in the European Union, the more peace and security will be guaranteed in Europe	254 1	2	3
2. Enlargement will not cost more for existing member countries like Ireland	255 1	2	3
3. After enlargement to include new countries, Ireland will become less important in Europe	256 1	2	3
4. The more countries there are, the more unemployment there will be in Ireland	257 1	2	3
5. The European Union should help future member countries financially, even before they join	258 1	2	3
6. Once new countries have joined the European Union, Ireland will receive less financial aid from it	259 1	2	3
7. With more countries, it will be much more difficult to make decisions on a European scale	260 1	2	3
8. The more member countries within the European Union, the more important it will be in the world	261 1	2	3
9. With more member countries, Europe will be culturally richer	262 1	2	3
10. The European Union must reform the way its institutions work before welcoming new members	263 1	2	3

Q.39. How well informed do you feel about enlargement, that is new countries joining the European Union? Do you feel ...? (READ OUT)

Very well informed.....264  
1  
Well informed.....  
2  
Not very well informed.....  
3  
Not at all well informed.....  
4  
DK.....  
5

Q.40. Do you think that the European Union should or should not have a Constitution?

Should.....	265	1
Should not.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.41. Which, if any of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? The President of the European Commission should be ...  
(READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

nominated by the Heads of governments of the European Union.	266	1
elected by the majority of the European Parliament.....		2
directly elected by the citizens of the European Union.....		3
Other (SPONTANEOUS).....		4
DK.....		5

Q.42. In the European Union, each Member State has a right of veto on the most important or sensitive decisions. In other words, each country can block such a decision even if the others support it. Should this right of veto.....

(SHOW CARD - 'Q.42' - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

be retained in order to protect essential national interests.....	267	1
be given up in order to make the European Union more effective.....		2
DK.....		3

Q.43. At present, each member state passes on to the European Union a part of its tax revenue. Would you prefer to pay your contribution directly to the European Union, or not?

Yes.....	268	1
No.....		2
DK.....		3

# DEMOGRAPHICS

## ASK ALL

D.1. In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right".  
How would you place your views on this scale?  
(SHOW CARD 'D.1' - DO NOT PROMPT. IF CONTACT HESITATES, ASK TO TRY AGAIN)

	LEFT									RIGHT
369-370	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Refusal..... 371 1  
DK..... 2

## NO QUESTIONS D2 TO D6

D.7. Could you give me the letter which corresponds best to your own  
current situation? (SHOW CARD 'D.7 - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)

372-373

Married.....

.

01

Remarried.....

..

02

Unmarried. Currently living with  
partner.....

03

Unmarried. Having never lived with a  
partner.....

04

Unmarried. Having previously lived with a partner, but now on my  
own..

05

Divorced.....

..

06

Separated.....

..

07

Widowed.....

..

08



Other  
( **SPONTANEOUS** ) . . . . .

09  
Refusal  
( **SPONTANEOUS** ) . . . . .

10

D.8.        How old were you when you stopped full-time education ?  
             (IF STILL STUDYING : CODE 00 - GO TO D.10)

		374-375
--	--	---------

NO QUESTION D.9

D.10.       **GENDER**  
             Male..... 376    1  
             Female.....       2

D.11        How old are you?

		377-378
--	--	---------

NO QUESTIONS D12 TO D14

- D.15. a) What is your current occupation ?  
b) (IF NOT DOING ANY PAID WORK CURRENTLY - CODES 01 TO 04 IN D.15a)  
Did you do any paid work in the past ?  
What was your last occupation ?

	a) CURRENT OCCUPATION	b) LAST OCCUPATION
<b>NOT WORKING</b>	379-380	-----
Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any current occupation, not working	01	-----
Student	02	-----
Unemployed or temporarily not working	03	-----
Retired or unable to work through illness	04	-----
<b>SELF EMPLOYED</b>		381-382
Farmer	05	01
Fisherman	06	02
Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, ...)	07	03
Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self employed person	08	04
Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company	09	05
<b>EMPLOYED</b>		
Employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect)	10	06
General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other director)	11	07
Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician)	12	08
Employed position, working mainly at a desk	13	09
Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, ...)	14	10
Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, fireman, ...)	15	11
Supervisor	16	12

Skilled manual worker	17	13
Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant	18	14
<b>NEVER DID ANY PAID WORK</b>	-----	15

NO QUESTIONS D.16 TO D.18

ASK ALL

D.19      Are you, in your household, the person who contributes most to the household income? **READ OUT**

Yes.....	383	1
No.....		2
Both equally.....		3
DK.....		4

**NO QUESTION D20**

**IF CODE 2 AT D.19, ASK**

D.21.a) What is the current occupation of the person who contributes most to the household income ?

D.21.b) **(IF NOT DOING ANY PAID WORK CURRENTLY - CODE 01 TO 04 AT D.21a)**

Did he/she do any paid work in the past ?

What was his/her last occupation ?

	CURRENT OCCUPATION	LAST OCCUPATION
<b>NOT WORKING</b>	384-385	-----
Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any current occupation, not working	01	-----
Student	02	-----
Unemployed or temporarily not working	03	-----
Retired or unable to work through illness	04	-----
<b>SELF EMPLOYED</b>		386-387
Farmer	05	01
Fisherman	06	02
Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, ...)	07	03
Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self employed person	08	04
Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company	09	05
<b>EMPLOYED</b>		
Employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect)	10	06
General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other director)	11	07
Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician)	12	08
Employed position, working mainly at a desk	13	09
Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, ...)	14	10
Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, fireman, ...)	15	11
Supervisor	16	12

Skilled manual worker	17	13
Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant	18	14
<b>NEVER DID ANY PAID WORK</b>	-----	15

**NO QUESTIONS D.22 TO D.24**

D.25. Would you say you live in a ... ? **(READ OUT)**

Rural area or village.....	388	1
Small or middle sized town.....		2
Large town.....		3
DK.....		4

**THERE ARE NO QUESTIONS D.26 - D.28**

D.29. We also need some information about the income of this household to be able to analyse the survey results for different types of households. Here is a list of income groups. **(SHOW INCOME CARD 'D.29')** Please count the total wages and salaries PER MONTH of all members of this household; all pensions and social insurance benefits; child allowances and any other income like rents, etc. ... Of course, your answer as all other replies in this interview will be treated confidentially and referring back to you or your household will be impossible. Please give me the letter of the income group your household falls into **BEFORE** tax and other deductions.

	389-390	
B.....	01	T.....
P.....	03	
F.....	04	
E.....	05	
H.....	06	
R.....	07	
M.....	08	
S.....	09	
D.....	10	
A.....	11	
Q.....	12	
U.....	13	
B.....	14	
C.....	15	
Refusal.....	16	
DK.....	17	

**THERE ARE NO QUESTIONS D30-D32**

## **Appendix 2**

### **STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 57.1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS**

Between March 29 and May 1 2002, the European Opinion Research Group, a consortium of Market and Public Opinion Research agencies, made out of INRA in Belgium – I.C.O. and GfK Worldwide, carried out wave 57.1 of the standard Eurobarometer, on request of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls.

The Standard EUROBAROMETER 57.1 covers the population of the respective nationalities of the European Union Member States, aged 15 years and over, resident in each of the Member States. The basic sample design applied in all Member States is a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In each EU country, a number of sampling points was drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density.

For doing so, the points were drawn systematically from each of the "administrative regional units", after stratification by individual unit and type of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the Member States according to the EUROSTAT NUTS 2 (or equivalent) and according to the distribution of the resident population of the respective EU-nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn, at random. Further addresses were selected as every N<sup>th</sup> address by standard random route procedures, from the initial address. In each household, the respondent was drawn, at random. All interviews were face-to-face in people's home and in the appropriate national language.

<u>COUNTRIES</u>	<u>INSTITUTES</u>	<u>N° INTERVIEWS</u>	<u>FIELDWORK DATES</u>	<u>POPULATION 15+ (x 000)</u>
Belgium	INRA BELGIUM	1045	29/03 – 30/04	8,326
Denmark	GfK DANMARK	1000	29/03 – 30/04	4,338
Germany(East)	INRA DEUTSCHLAND	1051	29/03 – 28/04	13,028
Germany(West)	INRA DEUTSCHLAND	1000	29/03 – 28/04	55,782
Greece	MARKET ANALYSIS	1002	29/03 – 28/04	8,793
Spain	INRA ESPAÑA	1000	29/03 – 28/04	33,024
France	CSA-TMO	1010	02/04 – 29/04	46,945
Ireland	LANSDOWNE Market Research	984	29/03 – 25/04	2,980
Italy	INRA Demoskopea	1000	29/03 – 28/04	49,017
Luxembourg	ILRes	602	29/03 – 30/04	364
The Netherlands	INTOMART	997	29/03 – 28/04	12,705
Austria	SPECTRA	1000	29/03 – 28/04	6,668
Portugal	METRIS	1000	29/03 – 28/04	8,217
Finland	MDC MARKETING RESEARCH	1010	29/03 – 28/04	4,165
Sweden	GfK SVERIGE	1000	01/04 – 01/05	7,183
Great Britain	MARTIN HAMBLIN LTD	1004	30/03 – 24/04	46,077
Northern Ireland	ULSTER MARKETING SURVEYS	307	03/04 – 22/04	1,273
	TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS	15987		

For each country a comparison between the sample and the universe was carried out. The Universe description was derived from Eurostat population data or from national statistics. For all EU member-countries a national weighting procedure, using marginal and intercellular weighting, was carried out based on this Universe description. As such in all countries, minimum gender, age, region NUTS 2 were introduced in the iteration procedure. For international weighting (i.e. EU averages), INRA (EUROPE) applies the official population figures as provided by EUROSTAT in the Regional Statistics Yearbook (data for 1997). The total population figures for input in this post-weighting procedure are listed above.

The results of the Eurobarometer studies are reported in the form of tables, datafiles and analyses. Per question a table of results is given with the full question text in English, French and German. The results are expressed as a percentage of the total. The results of



the Eurobarometer surveys are analysed and made available through the Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls of the European Commission, rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Brussels. The results are published on the Internet server of the European Commission: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo>. All Eurobarometer datafiles are stored at the Zentral Archiv (Universität Köln, Bachemer Strasse, 40, D-50869 Köln-Lindenthal), available through the CESSDA Database <http://www.nsd.uib.no/cessda/europe.html>. They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research.

Readers are reminded that survey results are estimations, the accuracy of which, everything being equal, rests upon the sample size and upon the observed percentage. With samples of about 1,000 interviews, the real percentages vary within the following confidence limits:

Observed percentages	10% or 90%	20% or 80%	30% or 70%	40% or 60%	50%
Confidence limits	± 1.9%	± 2.5%	± 2.7%	± 3.0%	± 3.1%

**STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 57.1  
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