


# No. 38

DECEMBER 1992

COMMISSION  
OF THE EUROPEAN  
COMMUNITIES



# EUROBAROMETER

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



EUROBAROMETER survey no.38 was ~~carried~~ out between 21st September and 15th October 1992, i.e. after the French referendum and before the Birmingham and Edinburgh "summits".

## HIGHLIGHTS

- \* EC support decreases in eight member **states**, dropping sharply in Britain and East Germany compared to Spring 1992. Support remains largely stable in **France**, West Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
- \* In Autumn 1992, before the Edinburgh summit, there are impressive increases in support for the Community in Denmark, but continuing disapproval of "Maastricht".
- \* There is very high awareness of "Maastricht" among EC citizens. But many citizens say they know little about it.
- \* The Treaty was opposed, before "Edinburgh", by majorities in Britain and Denmark. Otherwise, absolute majorities are in favour in six member states with strong relative majorities supporting everywhere else. In a "Flash EUROBAROMETER" survey conducted after Edinburgh, an absolute majority of Danes and a relative majority of British are for the treaty.
- \* One in two EC citizens **sees** "Maastricht" as having a positive effect on their country; one in four a negative effect; one in twenty no effect at all.
- \* A quarter of EC citizens who say "No" to Maastricht say **"Yes"** to European unity. And more citizens support important elements of Maastricht, when explicitly reminded of member state governments' role in European Union decision making.
- \* There is greater awareness of the European Commission and European Parliament in the media compared to six months ago, but a decrease of favourable perceptions.
- \* Over the past two years, support for common foreign and defence policies has grown. The opposite is true for Monetary Union. Majorities of British, Danes, and Germans oppose a single currency.
- \* One in two relate the Single Market to hope, more than a third relate it to fear. In France, for the first time in any country, more people relate it to fear than to hope. **"Less jobs"** is the top fear concerning the Single Market. Next is "too much immigration". The number three concern is "loss of national identity".
- \* For the first time since EUROBAROMETER asked the question, more people interviewed are dissatisfied than satisfied with the way their country's democracy works. Majorities everywhere voice a concern about the EC's democratic deficit.
- \* Absolute majorities of EC citizens would like the EC in the year 2000 to consist of 21 countries: the current Twelve, six EFTA countries, Poland, Hungary and Malta.

## NOTE

EURÖBAROMETER public opinion surveys ("standard EUROBAROMETER surveys") have been conducted on behalf of the Directorate-General Audio-Visual, Information, Communication, Culture of the European Commission each Spring and Autumn since Autumn 1973 (EBN°0). They have included Greece since Autumn 1980, Portugal and Spain since Autumn 1985 and the former German Democratic Republic from Autumn 1990 onwards.

An identical set of questions was put to representative samples of the population aged fifteen and over in each member state. The regular sample in standard EUROBAROMETER surveys is 1000 people per country except Luxembourg (500) and the United Kingdom (1000 in Great Britain and 300 in Northern Ireland). In order to monitor the integration of the five new Lander into Germany and the European Community, 2000 persons have been sampled there since EUROBAROMETER 34: 1000 in East Germany and 1000 in West Germany.

Until EUROBAROMETER No 31, surveys were carried out by national institutes belonging to "European Omnibus Surveys" (EOS-Gallup Europe.) "Faits et Opinions", Paris, working with the Commission's "Surveys, Research, Analyses" Unit was responsible for finalization of questionnaires, international coordination and the initial statistical analyses of the data. The surveys from No 32 onwards have been carried out by national institutes associated with the "INRA (EUROPE) European Coordination Office", Brussels.

All institutes involved were selected by tender. They are all members of the "European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research" (ESOMAR) and comply with its standards.

The figures given for the Community as a whole, which are shown in this document, are weighted on the basis of the adult population in each country. Unless otherwise specified, tables show percentages. In certain cases, percentages do not always add up exactly to 100%, but a number very close to it (e.g. 99 or 101), because of rounding. When questions allow for several responses, percentages also often add up to more than 100%.

In accordance with normal practice for this type of survey, the Commission disclaims all responsibility for questions, results and commentaries. This report, which was drawn up by the "Surveys, Research, Analyses" Unit of the Directorate-General, Audio-visual, Information, Communication, Culture, is an internal working document of the Commission of the European Communities.

Some of the results published here have already been distributed by the publication of an Early Release (13th November 1992). The sections and paragraphs of this report which have already been published are annotated in the margin by the sign ⊗.

Detailed tables on series of trend variables, some of which go back to 1962, formerly published as Appendix B or Volume II of the EUROBAROMETER report twice a year, have been published annually since March 1991 as "EUROBAROMETER TRENDS".

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## MAIN REPORT

### PAGE

## EDITORIAL

<b>1. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TODAY</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Expectations for <b>1993</b>	1
1.2 Awareness and Information	5
1.3 Public support	7
1.4 The image of the Commission	23
1.5 The United Kingdom Presidency	25
<b>2. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY</b>	<b>27</b>
2.1 Awareness and informedness	27
2.2 Support and Opposition	29
2.3 "For" or "Against" specific elements	33
2.4 Anticipated effects	43
2.5 United Europe and national identity	45
<b>3. THE SINGLE MARKET</b>	<b>47</b>
3.1 Awareness and support/evaluation	47
3.2 Hopes and fears	51
3.3 The social dimension	60
<b>4. THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AND PARLIAMENT</b>	<b>61</b>
4.1 Awareness and image of the European Parliament	61
4.2 Current and desired role	65
4.3 The democratic deficit at national and EC levels	69
<b>5. ISSUES FACING EUROPEAN SOCIETY</b>	<b>77</b>
5.1 European Community in the <del>Year</del> 2000	77
5.2 Getting justice at the European Court	83
5.3 Consumer protection	85
5.4 Stereotypes challenged: roles at home and at work	85

# TABLE OF CONTENTS ANNEXES

	PAGE
<b>DETAILS ON FIELDWORK AND SAMPLING</b> . . . . .	A2
Standard EUROBAROMETER survey N° 38.0, September-October 1992, by INRA (EUROPE) . . . . .	A2
Standard EUROBAROMETER survey N° 38.1, November 1992, by INRA (EUROPE) . . . . .	A5
Flash EUROBAROMETER survey N° 14, August 1992, by EOS Gallup Europe . . . . .	A7
Flash EUROBAROMETER survey N° 15, December 1992, by EOS Gallup Europe . . . . .	A9
 <b>LIST OF TABLES</b> . . . . .	 A11
 <b>TABLES</b> . . . . .	 A15
 <b>LIST OF GRAPHICS</b> . . . . .	 A51
 <b>SURVEYS ON ATTITUDES OF EUROPEANS</b> . . . . .	 A54
 <b>TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR SOCIO- DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-POLITICAL VARIABLES</b> . . . . .	 A64

## EDITORIAL

The climate of public opinion towards "Europe", towards West European unification and the European Community has changed. **Part of the public looks at "Brussels" in a different way, now.**

Many politicians and journalists thought (and still think) that it was the Maastricht Treaty that brought about this change. Readers of EUROBAROMETER reports know better: the "change of the tide" took place **before** the Maastricht meeting of the European Council in December 1991. On average throughout the Community, this change took place in Summer 1991 for "general support", and in 1989 already for perceived "benefit from EC membership". And in some important big Member States, especially Italy and France, this change happened even earlier, in 1988 or 1987.

So it was not the Maastricht Treaty that "turned public opinion around". Instead the change can be attributed to the dynamics of completing the Internal Market by the end of 1992<sup>1</sup>. The new dynamics first contributed to the significant overall increase in public support. But with the "magic date" of 1992/1993 coming much closer and discussions about concrete details more controversial, perceptions of risks and concerns gained ground. The overall support curves began to drop. By consequence, Maastricht <sup>2</sup> - presented as **"still much more Europe to come"** - was then, indeed, a powerful accelerator of this change in the climate of public opinion.

---

<sup>1</sup> In addition to the current report, special dossiers with detailed documentation of major aspects of EC public opinion change are available upon request from the EUROBAROMETER, (T120 - 1/108), EC Commission, B-1049 Brussels, Fax: +32-2-299.92.05

For the particular importance of the Single Market, see: The Concerns of Europeans. Attitudes towards the Single Market as first order indicators for the climate of public opinion change in the Community (EB-dossier 38/1, Nov. 1992)

<sup>2</sup> See The Maastricht Treaty in EC Public Opinion. Core elements and issues of the debate. (EB Dossier 38/2, January 1993).

## EUROBAROMETER 38

---

Finally, we must not forget : the climate of public opinion regarding the EC is not only affected by the development and the events in Community politics proper. Other factors also play a role : **the economy definitely turning sour** <sup>3</sup> in 1991 coupled with **the end of the cold war** with breathtakingly good news from Central and Eastern Europe (including German unification within the EC) rapidly transforming into very bad news of coups d'Etat, economic hardship, war in former Yugoslavia plus hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees with no European **Community answer capable of convincing TV news-watching citizens** <sup>4</sup>, contributed their share...

The (surprisingly small) Danish "NEJ" on 2 June 1992 to "Maastricht One" and the (unsurprisingly small) French "**OUT**" together with the "Black Wednesday" drop out of pound sterling from **ERM** (where it had entered at perhaps a far to high parity level against the DM) could not fail to increase the temperature of the political debate. For **months**, **"Europe" was taken as seriously by the public as it is**. And many indicators now suggest that, **as** far as citizens are concerned, things will never again be as comfortable for political leaders **as** they had been before: **public opinion matters**. Politicians are reminded that they better look back over their shoulders and make sure that the people, a majority of the people at least, are still with them. A "democratic deficit" of the European Community, which had seemed for many years a mere phantom existing only in newspaper columns and books, became at first slowly and secretly, then all of a sudden very visibly and audibly, real and evident. Only one in seven people interviewed in Autumn 1992 think that there is sufficient democratic influence of citizens in **EC** decision-making.

---

<sup>3</sup> See the dossiers on The State of the Economy and Public Support for European Unification and the EC. (EB dossier 38/3, 1993, in preparation), containing several sub-dossiers:

- Concern about inflation and public support of the EC and the Single European Market. (EB dossier 38/3a, December 1992)
- Consumer confidence and public support of the EC, (EB dossier 38/3b, January 1993)
- Economic growth, inflation, unemployment and public support of the EC and the Single Market. (EB dossier 38/3c, 1993, in preparation)
- The State of the Economy and Public Support for "Europe", ZEUS Report, University of Mannheim 1993, in preparation

<sup>4</sup> In the second Autumn 1992 Standard EUROBAROMETER 38.1 survey, 53% of EC citizens were in favour of a military intervention in former Yugoslavia in order to stop the bloodshed (29% were against). For November 1992 public opinion in 18 Central and Eastern European countries about the EC, political and economic reforms in their countries and attitudes toward efforts to end the war in the Balkans, see Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER no. 3, 1993.

At the same time, confidence of EC citizens in their national "political class" has significantly dropped over recent **years** in several Member **States**. For the first time since EUROBAROMETER asked the question more people are dissatisfied, now, than satisfied with the way their country's democracy works <sup>5</sup>. Loss of confidence in the future - irrespective of its different possible causes - may effect support for "Europe".

Public opinion about European integration and the EC **has** been accurately described as a "permissive consensus", for many **years** <sup>6</sup>. As we wrote in 1987 (EUROBAROMETER 27, p.42) : "Consensus about 'Europe' and about 'more of it' is more permissive, acceptive, benevolent than demanding, challenging, pressing, or pushing". Approval and support were high, but not deeply felt by many. Political leaders, governments had a remarkable margin of manoeuvre. "Europe" was peace, friendship and mostly beneficial economic cooperation. Up to 81% were "for" the unification **of** Western Europe. But "Europe" was not extremely salient for many: the percentage of those "very much in favour" of European unification never was higher, on EC average, than 38% (EB27, Spring). There were never more than 24% (EB26, 1986; EB4, 1975) or 26% (EB3, 1975) who said they were "a great deal" interested in EC affairs.

But this permissive consensus **has** eroded. Although one should not present the situation more dramatic than it really is - some standard indicators of support for "Europe", though dropping notably in a relatively short period of time, are little lower now than the maxima they had reached in the 1970s - there are many signals pointing at **a** change in the nature of public attitudes towards the EC. The consensus that remains has become less and less permissive.

We do not have evidence of the EC being likely to fall apart **b u s e** of lack of public support. (Though some observers are no longer convinced of the EC's ability to withstand any kind of pressure, they would rather **see** political leaders or economic forces bringing this about than the general public.)

We have evidence, however, as to a significant proportion of the public in several member countries - although still being "for Europe" - wanting an explicit say in the debate about "which Europe" and as to "how much of it".

---

<sup>5</sup> See Democratic Deficits? Satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the way democracy works at member state and EC levels (EB Dossier 38/4, 1993, in preparation).

<sup>6</sup> For the origin of this conceptualisation cf. Leon N. LINDBERG and Stuart A. SCHEINGOLD (1970), *Europe's Would-be Policy. Patterns of Change in the European Community*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.



Ironically, our **data** reveal, that many who say they do not agree with the EC as they **see** it currently **working** - and often agree even less with what they **read** into "Maastricht" - want or prefer in **turn** an EC that is more or less the one we currently have, and often prefer an EC **as** "Maastricht" foresees it actually becoming. **But they are simply not aware of the reality.**

In our Autumn 1992 EUROBAROMETER survey no. 38.0, we have asked several questions **related** to the Maastricht Treaty or to the debate around it in two different ways.

One **type** of question addressed the respective issue (a European Government, a common foreign policy, a common defence policy) in such a way as to not remind the respondents of **the essential role Member States' governments play in the EC and EC decision-making.** Another **type** of questions addressed the same issues **with** an explicit reminder of the Member **States'** role. In most **cases** in most member countries, majorities in favour of the respective proposal were significantly stronger - and in any **case**, opposition very significantly weaker - when the Member **State** governments' role was explicitly referred to.

When we asked the question (which is not in the Maastricht Treaty, but rather more far-reaching) whether citizens were "for or against the formation of a European Union with a **European Government responsible to the European Parliament**", 51% on average were for this, 28% against. When the question was whether people are "for or against the European Community having a European Government responsible to the European Parliament **and to the European Council of Heads of National Government**" 56% were for it and only 16% against.

Most impressive are the Danish and British examples. A 24%:67% Danish opposition (-43 points "net") was reduced to 35%:47% (-12 points "net"). In the UK a 24%:56% rejection (-32 points "net" opposition) was transformed into a 43%:24% approval (+19 points "net" support).

Similarly, support for a **common** foreign policy went up in Denmark from 56:36% (+20 points net) to 64:30% (+35 points net) and in the UK from 47:34% (+13 points net) to 55:30% (+25 points net). At EC 12-average level, support increased from 62:21% to 69:17% (from net +42 to +52 points). And support for a common defence policy increased from 73:15% **to** 77:13% for the EC as a whole and from 58:27% to 70:20% in the UK?

---

<sup>7</sup> In the case of Common Defence, the Danes - exceptionally - show more support (52:46%) when national governments are not mentioned in the question than when governments are mentioned (48:46%).

A different question showed, that the number of citizens who feel somewhat or very fearful about the Single Market varies considerably across Member States. The EC average of fearful is 37%. When these citizens were asked **why** they feel fearful, political reasons often played a much more decisive role in several Northern countries than economic reasons : "loss of national identity", "too much immigration", "our country will have no say anymore", "more drugs and crime because of open borders".

The different insights provided by **EUROBAROMETER** 38 (and its predecessors) suggest the following tentative general conclusion :

There is a notable part of the public in favour of European unification but against a certain **type** of Europe which they believe is represented by the Maastricht Treaty and even by the current EC as they perceive it.

They are against a Europe

- which threatens national identity and cultural diversity;
- which gives citizens insufficient democratic influence;
- which gives their country **and** its government **no** say in European decision-making;
- which centralises "everything" in "Brussels"; and
- which is run by an enormous Brussels bureaucracy that is out of touch with the real world of citizens.

They are, however, in favour of a united Europe

- where national (and regional) identities and cultural diversity are respected, protected and defended;
- where democratic channels of citizen influence exist and visibly function;
- including their democratically established national government having an important role in common decision-making
- where sovereignty is pooled and exercised through common institutions **only** in such policy areas, where national (or regional) governments *can* no longer solve problems effectively;

- where such policies are prepared and executed by an administration of adequate, limited, **size** which is directed by a body (the Commission, or a later European Government) responsible to **a** powerful democratically elected European Parliament **and to** the European Council consisting of the democratically established national **Heads** of State and Government.

The **type** of Europe rejected clearly is neither foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty nor is it represented by the current EC in spite of many **a** shortcoming.

The **type** of Europe favoured, acceptable and supportable, on the other hand, is the very Europe designed by "Maastricht" and in many respects already existing and functioning as the European Community. But the public, and the Euro-sceptical part of the public in particular, **does not** know.

**The crucial problem, thus, is a serious information gap.**

Ways and means of closing this information gap are currently being discussed. The debate is controversial **as** is normal in pluralist democratic societies.

From **a** survey research supported point of view, closing this information gap is not **an** easy **task**. In complex modern societies **citizen information as** regards political matters of direct relevance for "the person in the **street**" already is precarious within the nation state. But within the democratic nation **state, mechanisms exist that help citizens to orient themselves** and to define their own interests and positions **as** regards political issues. Family, schools, mass media provide some basic knowledge. Political parties, political leaders, interest organisations and the public debate among them, reported and commented in the mass media, provide not only information but also orientation.

**Such orientation-giving mechanisms largely lack at the European Community level.** Hence the European Community public is confronted with not only a serious information gap but also with an equally **serious orientation gap**.

At times when the traditional "permissive consensus" is eroding, the building up and consolidation of an "active positive consensus" depends on efforts to close the information gap as well as the orientation gap.

# 1. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TODAY'

## 1.1 Expectations for 1993


The world economic slowdown has lasted for much longer than had originally been anticipated. The "greedy eighties" had ended with unemployment and high interest rates, coupled with the increased indebtedness of governments, businesses and ordinary people in many of the Group of **24** most industrialised countries. The world powerhouse economies of the United States, Germany and Japan spent 1992 in the dog-house, none growing more than an estimated +2%. Business and consumer confidence recorded dramatic falls in many countries. **So** did many people's trust in their own governments' ability to deal with the situation.

The European Community found itself increasingly **in** economic turmoil. Problems with the ratification of the Treaty on Maastricht caused people to question the likelihood of a European Political, Economic and Monetary Union coming about. **As** markets bought German Deutschmarks because of the attractiveness of the Bundesbank's high interest rate coupled with the weakness of the UK and Italian economies, the subsequent strain on the Exchange Rate Mechanism caused the weakened British pound and Italian lira to leave. The Spanish peseta devalued. Many EC Governments undertook economic austerity programmes, oftentimes citing the need for EC economies to converge in preparation for Economic Union. The negotiations to reach a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (**GATT**) also ran into stormy waters, as the United States threatened trade sanctions against the European Community to try and get its way on a deal concerning oilseeds. .


---

'Except when specifically mentioned, the data contained in the report came from standard EUROBAROMETER38.0, conducted September/October 1992 by INRA (EUROPE). For more technical details, see the Annexes.

THE ECONOMY 1992  
1991 EXPECTATIONS, 1992 REPORTS  
% "ECONOMY BETTER"  
MINUS "ECONOMY WORSE"



P UK E DK IRL B EC 12 D L I F Q R N L  
EB36  
ANTICIPATED END OF 1991



P UK E DK IRL B EC 12 D L I F Q R N L  
EB38  
REPORTED END OF 1992

EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.1

Expectations for 1993<sup>9</sup>, asked in the second wave of standard EUROBAROMETER 38 (fieldwork: November 1992) could only have been affected in a major way by all these momentous events. Despite it having been a bad year, people in the Community think that 1993 will be worse (35%) rather than better (28%) or even the same (29%).

Relative majorities of Greeks (50%), Spaniards (46%) and Italians (41%) think 1993 will be worse. Germans are as a whole divided as to whether 1993 will be the same (37%) or worse (35%), just as the Irish (32:32) and the British (34:36) are split as to whether it will be better or worse. On balance, most Belgians (36%), Danes (46%), French (36%), Luxembourgers (48%) and Dutch (49%) think things will not change compared to 1992. Only many Portuguese (36%) think on balance things may improve (Table 1).

1992 turned out to be economically much worse than had been anticipated by EC citizens (Figure 1.1). In Standard Eurobarometer 36, EC citizens in eight countries had on balance predicted that their country's economy would have got better, while only a preponderance of French, Greeks and Dutch thought their country's economy would get worse (Table 2).

Reflecting on what people perceived had actually happened in 1992, only a small proportion of Portuguese (+6) still felt their country's economy had improved on balance. Elsewhere hopes were badly dashed. Two-thirds (67%) of EC citizens say their country's economy declined while only one in twelve (8%) say it had improved. Biggest disappointments are felt in the United Kingdom, where a +32 preponderance saying the economy would improve in Autumn 1991 turned into a -81 by the time 1992 was nearly over. Apart from Portugal (27% "worse"), Luxembourg (42%) and Denmark (47%), all other countries had absolute majorities saying their economy had got worse.

In actual fact, EUROSTAT, the European Community's statistical office, estimates that Luxembourg had the best economic performance in 1992 (+ 2.9 GDP annual growth rate), followed by Spain (+2.5), Denmark (+2.4) and Portugal (+2.3). Lowest growth rates were experienced in the United Kingdom (+0.6) and the Netherlands (+1.2).


In the next twelve months, EC citizens are still pessimistic - still almost half (48%) say their country's economy will get worse while a fifth (19%) expect matters to improve. The Dutch (68%) "worse", Spaniards (60%), Germans (56%) and Greeks (50%) are the most pessimistic. Everywhere pessimists outnumber optimists. Only in Italy do those that say their country's economy will get better (34%) almost balance those who say it will get worse (37%) (Table 3).

---

<sup>9</sup>Standard EUROBAROMETER survey 38.1, the second wave of the regular Autumn 1992 survey.

## EUROBAROMETER 38


### "RECENT" AWARENESS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS/INITIATIVES IN THE MEDIA, AND CHANGE COMPARED TO 6 MONTH AGO



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 12

• COMPARED TO FLASH 14, IN AUGUST.

### FEELING INFORMED ABOUT THE EC:



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 13

By contrast, EUROSTAT is predicting a more normal but still a little weak +2.3 GDP growth for 1993 within the Community, with Luxembourg continuing to show the best performance (+3.6) and the Netherlands the weakest (+1.7).

Concerning "money in the pocket", EC citizens felt things had not changed (49%) rather than got better (17%) or worse (33%) in 1992. Only an absolute majority of Greeks (61%) say their household income had become worse (Table 4).

In 1993, EC citizens think their household finances will stay much unchanged (47%), with more of a balance between those who say their households will have more money (22%) and those who say they will have less (26%). Greeks (43% "worse") are largely pessimistic while citizens of all countries say their household incomes will be largely unchanged (45% - 64%). Denmark (31%) and Portugal (29%) have the largest numbers of people who feel their household income will improve (Table 5).

Overall, EC citizens are more cautious about the future after having been too optimistic about the economic recovery in 1992.

## 1.2 Awareness and Information

Four out of five people (81%) say they have heard or read something recently about the European Community (EC) or the European Economic Community (the EEC), its policies and institutions (Table 6).

News about the European Community is most prominent in Denmark (88%), the Netherlands (87%) and Luxembourg (85%). Even the lowest results - Ireland (74%) and Spain (75%) - are still high.

Awareness has increased significantly in all EC countries, especially in the United Kingdom (+21), the Netherlands (+19), Greece, France (both +18) and Spain (+16).

Overall it went up by 15 points compared to six months ago (66%). The major reason for this rise is likely to have been the prominence of the three referenda (Denmark - 2nd June, Ireland - 18th June, France - 20th September) on the Treaty of Maastricht held in the past six months.

In standard EUROBAROMETER report 37, we noted that some people do not readily associate the EC with its institutions and policies. The wording of this question was slightly altered this time around by the addition of the words: "its institutions, its policies".



## EUROBAROMETER 38

---

Nevertheless, if the levels of awareness of the European Community are compared with those of the Maastricht Treaty, more people in all countries say they have recently heard of Maastricht (**85%**) than the European Community (**81%**) except in Germany, where the percentages are almost **equal**, and in Italy and Portugal, where the EC is more prominent (see Chapter 2.1 for further details of the Maastricht results). Less people EC-wide, however, say they have heard recently of the Single Market (69%), the European Parliament (55%) and the Commission (**51%**) than the European Community (**81%**) (Figure 1.2).

Overall, less than a third of EC citizens **say they** are very (**3%**) or quite well (**29%**) informed about the European Community, its policies and its institutions. Almost everyone else says they are not very well (**47%**) or not at all well (**19%**) informed (Table 7, Figure 1.3).

EC-wide levels of feeling informed have not changed since six months ago (**-1** well informed; **+1** not well informed). Nevertheless, subjective informedness increased substantially in Denmark (**+15**), while losing a lot of ground in Portugal (**-14**), Luxembourg (**-11**) and Belgium (**-9**). The decline in Portugal in the last six months may be connected with the fact that their Presidency of the Community seemed widely reported in the media just before that time (see EUROBAROMETER 37 report, Chapter 1.4).

Danes and Dutch (both **46%**), as well as Luxembourgers (**44%**) are the most likely to feel informed; Spaniards (**22%**) and Portuguese (**24%**) currently the least. A similar, but differently worded question was **also** asked about people's feeling informed about Maastricht (see Chapter 2.1 for full results). There too, the Danes are best informed, followed by post-referendum Irish as well as the Dutch. Again, those who feel least informed are Spaniards and Portuguese.

When it comes to actual knowledge about the Community, people were asked to give the date when the Single Market is due to come into being. Danes are the best informed in this real test of their knowledge, while the Netherlands in fact came second from last in terms of knowing the correct answer. A quarter of the Dutch say "**1999**", the expected date of the advent of the single currency; they also have the least percentage of people having recently heard of "**1992**" in the media (see Chapter 3.1 for full results).

### ⊗ 1.3 Public support

The EUROBAROMETER's four standard indicators of support for European unification and the Community show (Table 8-11, Figure 1.4 a-1, with latest/highest ever percentages marked):


- \* **73%** versus 19% are in favour of efforts being made to unify Western Europe;
- \* 60% say their country's membership of the Community is a "good thing", 23% "neither good nor bad" and 12% a "bad thing";
- \* 49% versus 34% see their country benefiting from Community membership;
- \* 44% say they would be very **sorry** if they were told that the Community would be scrapped, 34% indifferent and 12% very relieved.

While many more EC citizens support rather than oppose "Europe" in each question, the trend since the last survey of Spring 1992 shows an EC-wide decline in positive responses of between three and five points.


Most significant falls in support for European unification and the European Community during this period are registered in both the United Kingdom (between -9 and **-14** points for each measure) and East Germany (-10 to -12). The survey took place shortly after "Black Wednesday" and sterling's withdrawal from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, while the East German result appears to signal the definite end of post-revolutionary euphoria.

Major reductions were also experienced in Italy (**-4** to -7 points), where support for the Community on many measures has been traditionally the strongest; in other southern EC member states - Spain (0 to -8), Portugal (-2 to -6), Greece (-1 to -6); and in Ireland (-1 to -7). In several cases this may reflect the effects of austerity measures perceived to be in preparation for Monetary Union as well as the exchange rate crises experienced in both Italy and Spain just prior to the survey.

Remarkably, Denmark bucked the trend, with increased support for European Unification (+4), Community membership (+11), perceived benefits of membership (+6) and feeling **sorry** if the Community were to be scrapped (+11). Since the 1986 referendum on the Single European Act (if not since their 1972 referendum on whether to join the European (Economic!) Community), more and more Danes have systematically supported the principle of the EEC while remaining deeply sceptical about a Political European Union. In fact, despite their recent narrow but significant rejection of "Maastricht", Danish support has peaked on three out of four indicators, and is above the EC membership-support average.




# SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY (B) 1981 - 1992




EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.4 a

## SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY (DK) 1981 - 1992




EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.4 b

## SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY (D) 1981 - 1992




EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.4 c

## SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY (GR) 1981 - 1992



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.4 d

## SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY (E) 1981 - 1992




EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.4 e




EUROBAROMETER 38

# **SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY (F) 1981 - 1992**



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.4 f


## SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY (IRL) 1981 - 1992



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.4 g


EUROBAROMETER 38

## SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY (I) 1981 - 1992




EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.4 h

## SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY (L) 1981 - 1992




EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.4 i

EUROBAROMETER 38




## SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND COMMUNITY (P) 1981 - 1992



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.4 k

EUROBAROMETER 38

# **SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY (UK) 1981 - 1992**



DOTTED LINE DISPLAYS "MEMBERSHIP" (EC12)

EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.4 I

Results show little change in France compared to six months ago (the poll was conducted just after its Maastricht referendum).

As recent EUROBAROMETERs have shown, support for European unification and the European Community had reached an all-time high in Autumn 1990/Spring 1991 on all standard indicator measures, but had started to fall before agreement had been reached on the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991.

For some countries, the decline in positive support had started earlier, even much earlier. In Italy, the decline started after peaks in Autumn 1988, while in France, the decline began after peaks in 1988/89 (unification), Autumn 1987 (membership), or even as early as Spring 1987 (benefit/regret dissolution).

If one assesses the results "net" (ie. positive answers minus negative answers), the peak for approval of membership in Italy occurred in Autumn 1988, and for France in Autumn 1987. "Net" benefit perceived from membership started to decline after a peak in Autumn 1989 for the Community as a whole. Net benefit in France declines since Spring 1987.

As we shall see, declines took place on most trend measures concerning the European Community and its work in this survey compared to six months ago or longer.

Using our simple Typology of European Attitudes<sup>10</sup>, over half of EC citizens in this survey have positive European attitudes (55%), around a third are ambivalent (36%) while just a twelfth are negative (8%) on that measure (Table 12 & 13). Overall the Dutch (71%), Greeks (68%) and Italians (66%) are the most positive, while the highest percentages of "negatives" are found in Denmark (12%) and the United Kingdom (18%). However, as we shall see, this does not prevent many of those positive about Europe saying "no" to Maastricht (see Chapter 2.2).

EC citizens were asked whether European Community matters are important or not for the future of their country and its people, irrespective of whether or not they had the time to take a personal interest in these affairs (Table 14, Figure 1.5).


---

<sup>10</sup>See Annexes "Technical specifications for socio-demographic and socio-political variations used in crosstabulations" for full explanations of these definitions and scales.




## EUROBAROMETER 38

### IMPORTANCE OF EC MATTERS FOR THE FUTURE OF OUR COUNTRY AND ITS CITIZENS 1974 - 1992 (EC12)



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 15

### IMAGE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN THE MEDIA \* 1987 - 1992 (EC12)



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 16

More than four out of five (81%)<sup>11</sup> say that EC matters are very important (28%) or important (52%). Only a sixth said they are not very (12%) or not at all important (3%). This is a very high percentage and reflects the fact that - like the European Community or not - the overwhelming majority of EC citizens feel it important.

The result shows a slight decline in those saying it is very/important (-1) with a corresponding increase in those saying it is not very/at all important (+1). However, comparing this result to the trend since 1975 (not asked every year), the result is average for the whole period (77%-85%), although a fall has been occurring since the high (85%) reached in Autumn 1991. The largest percentages of people saying the EC is very/important are to be found in Luxembourg, host to many of its institutions (89%), Denmark, where a second referendum on a renegotiated Maastricht is planned (88%), and **Italy**, traditionally where public support for European Union is very high (88%). Results for all countries without exception are high. Even economically-dominant but unification-problems ridden Germany (73%) and Euro-sceptical United Kingdom (76%) show very high proportions of people saying it is important. No country increased or decreased more than **+/-4** points in that view over the past six months, but East Germany dropped -10 points in saying the European Community is very/important.

## 1.4 The image of the Commission


There has been a major increase in peoples' recent awareness of the European Commission in their media, mirrored by a corresponding drop among them in their favourable impression of the Commission as a consequence of what they saw or heard reported. Just over half of all EC citizens (51%) say they have "recently seen or heard in the papers, on the radio or on television something about the European Commission in Brussels, that is the Commission of the European Communities" (Table 15).

Most numerous in this respect are the Danes (68%), Luxembourgers (62%) and Portuguese (61%). The least numerous are Italians (43%), Greeks and British (both 50%). Compared to last time, biggest increases occurred in Spain (+22), the Netherlands (+20), United Kingdom (+13) and France (+10). Statistically-significant increases **occurred** in all the Twelve. Perceived reporting is the highest since Autumn 1989.

---

<sup>11</sup> Occasionally, due to rounding, combined totals of positive and negative, as well as trends/shifts, may differ by one percent from non-aggregated figures.

## AWARENESS AND IMPORTANCE OF EC PRESIDENCY



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 1.7

Those who had heard something recently were **asked** whether what they had read or heard gives them a favourable or unfavourable impression of the European Commission. Two out of five say their impression is favourable (39%), while a quarter (25%) say it is unfavourable. Almost a third (30%) say it is neither (Table 16, Figure 1.6).

Absolute majorities in many southern EC member countries say they feel reporting is favourable - Portugal (59%), Greece (55%) and Italy (51%) - as well as Ireland (58%). In Germany, more say it is positive (38%) than negative (28%) or neutral (29%). In Belgium, Spain and France it is as neutral (40%, 41% and 39%) as positive (39%, 39%, 37%). In Luxembourg it is mainly neutral (41%) while it is more negative than anything else in the Netherlands (37%), the United Kingdom and Denmark (both 46%).

The last six months have really shown how the European Commission has become more controversial. Since the last EUROBAROMETER, favourable impressions of its reporting in the media fell 9 points, while unfavourable impressions gained 8 points. Positive impressions fell everywhere except in Greece (+2) and France (-2), where the situation remains largely unchanged.

Biggest falls in the Commission's image **occurred** in Spain, Portugal (both -18), East Germany (-16), the United Kingdom (-14), Denmark and the Netherlands (both -10). Since the question was first asked in Autumn 1987, the Commission's image reached all-time lows in Spain, France and Italy; while in many other countries, it fell back to the lows experienced in Autumn 1987/Spring 1988 - Belgium, Ireland and the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, the fall has been particularly spectacular since the high of Spring 1990 (-26). Overall, the European Commission's image now stands as it did in Spring 1988.

## 1.5 The United Kingdom Presidency

Since Autumn 1986, in every EUROBAROMETER a question has been asked about the awareness and image of the Council Presidency in the country holding the Presidency at the time. In Autumn 1992, over half of all British (52%) say they have recently read in the newspapers or heard on the radio or television something about the British Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Table 17, Figure 1.7).

Awareness levels are low compared to other countries. Only France achieved significantly less awareness during its Presidency in the second half of 1989 (43%). It is however more **than** twice the awareness level achieved the last time the United Kingdom held the Presidency in the second half of 1986 (22%). Traditionally, awareness of the Presidency in the media has been lower among the biggest four countries of the Community (22%-55%) than for most of the rest (51%-82%).

## EUROBAROMETER 38

---

A factor in the low result for the United Kingdom could be that EUROBAROMETER 38 was conducted a few ~~weeks~~ earlier this year than is normal. Some presidencies have held summits half-way through, as well ~~as~~ near the end of their six month ~~terms~~. Normally these "interim" summits receive considerable domestic media coverage. This time, the Birmingham summit occurred on 16th October, just after the completion of this EUROBAROMETER survey. Much of the normal pre-summit coverage was overtaken by problems concerning British miners. ~~Thus~~ the British did not have the benefit of this extra media coverage to boost awareness of their Presidency.

Irrespective of whether they had heard anything or not, people were asked if they feel it is important or not that the United Kingdom is President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community at this time. Almost two-thirds (**64%**) saw it to be very/important while just over a quarter (26%) did not.

The United Kingdom result reveals a 5 point increase in people's view that their Presidency is important compared to the last time the British held the Presidency. More British thought their Presidency important compared to many Belgians, Danes, Germans and the Dutch at the time of their own Presidency. Nevertheless, the British result is at the lower end of the range of results during the past six and a half years (56%-78%).

\*

Historians will look back on this tumultuous ~~period~~ and will ~~try to analyze~~ why support for the Community began to erode even before Maastricht was signed in December 1991. In standard EUROBAROMETER N0.36 (Autumn 1991), when the first signs of an overall decline in positive answers to questions of general support became evident, we wrote: "what remains to be seen is whether the apparent reverses are merely a fluctuation or something more significant as European integration becomes more complex and demanding an issue than anyone would have foreseen even a few years ago".

## 2. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY

### ⊗2.1 Awareness and informedness

Maastricht has turned out to be a controversial issue in several member countries ever since a slender majority of 23 000 Danes rejected the **treaty** in a referendum on 2nd June 1992. While the Irish voted by a large majority to accept the Treaty (69%) soon afterwards, in **France**, voters only narrowly (51%)<sup>12</sup> passed it on 20th September, despite their previously perceived strong Euro-credentials. These problems caused the postponement of its ratification in the United Kingdom until the result of the second referendum in Denmark, due in May 1993, is known. The Treaty passed parliamentary hurdles in the other ten member **states** by the end of 1992 as originally envisaged.

The intensity of the public debate on Maastricht is shown by the fact that **85%** of EC citizens say that they have recently heard of it (Table 18, Figure 2.1).


The French, just after their referendum on Maastricht, are unsurprisingly almost unanimous (96%) in saying they have heard something about it - closely followed by the Danes (95%), where the "no" vote has kept the issue at the top of the political agenda. Very high results are also achieved in Luxembourg (94%), the Netherlands (91%) and the United Kingdom (89%). Italy has the lowest awareness level - a still considerable 74%. It is clear that the repercussions of the Danish vote, coupled with the resultant French referendum, helped make "Maastricht" known across the entire community.

---

<sup>12</sup>50.08 % in Metropolitan France.


# EUROBAROMETER 38

## AWARENESS OF MAASTRICHT



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 2.1

## MAASTRICHT: HOW MUCH DO YOU KNOW?



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 2.2

The ~~same~~ question had been asked within the framework of Flash EUROBAROMETER 14<sup>13</sup> of August 1992, a month before the French vote. The results at an EC12 level shows 69% aware of Maastricht at that time. France's awareness levels were very high (at the time of the debate on the referendum) (94%), but much lower in countries such as Spain (53%), West Germany (60%) and Portugal (61%). The publicity generated by the French referendum, which took place between the two surveys, stimulated awareness everywhere, especially in previously less aware countries - Spain (+28), the United Kingdom (+25), West Germany (+23) and Portugal (+19).

However the lack of information still remains great. Only 19% in the Standard EUROBAROMETER survey say they know a great deal or a fair amount about the Maastricht Treaty, while those - an overwhelming 81% - saying either they know just a little (47%) or have no more than heard of it (28%) or have never heard of it before today (6%). Both the Danes (41%) and the Irish (31%) were the most likely to say that they knew a great deal or a fair amount - the French less so (21%): the recent debate before their referendum addressed several other European Community issues at the same time (Table 19, Figure 2.2).

Compared to the previous month, when Flash EUROBAROMETER 14 occurred, a slight increase in the perceived level of information has been achieved - the percentage who say they know a great deal or a fair amount stays roughly the same (+1), while those who claim to know just a little increases (+5) relative to those that know nothing (-6). The last phase of the campaign in France has not increased subjective informedness about the Treaty among many French. Main gainers over the month have been West Germans (+8) and Irish (+7). The Danes (41%) and French (21%) who say they know a great deal or fair amount stay roughly the same. Belgium, Spain and Portugal, both then (in August) and now (September/October), are bottom of the list.

## ⊗ 2.2 Support and opposition

In ten out of twelve countries, absolute or relative majorities of people at the time of the poll (21st September - 15th October) said they are "for" the Maastricht Treaty: of those who took a stand, majorities of Italians (85:15), Belgians (82:18), Portuguese (80:20), Greeks (80:20), Dutch (78:22), Luxembourgers (72:28), Irish (70:30), Spaniards (69:32), Germans (59:41) and French (54:46) were in favour of the Treaty (Table 20). However, around half of all Spaniards (50%) and Portuguese (47%) interviewed were undecided (Table 21, Figure 2.3).


---

<sup>13</sup>The technical specifications regarding this Flash can be found in the Annexes. East Germany was not included in this survey. Only main cities were surveyed in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland: results in these countries are not directly comparable.




## EUROBAROMETER 38

### MAASTRICHT: FOR OR AGAINST?



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 2.3

### "YES TO EUROPE: NO TO MAASTRICHT" - EC12 ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE OF THOSE:



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 2.4

The situation in the United Kingdom is different, where 63% of those expressing an opinion say they are against the Treaty, while only 38% are for it. In Denmark, the gap between **those** in favour (47%) and those against (53%) remains relatively narrow.

During the French referendum, many of those against the Treaty campaigned with the slogan: "Yes to Europe; no to Maastricht". . An analysis of people's positive, ambivalent and negative attitudes towards European Unification and the EC (~~see~~ Chapter 1.3) vis à vis their attitudes towards Maastricht shows that almost a quarter of those who are against the Treaty (24%) have positive attitudes towards European Unification and the EC; half (50%) have ambivalent attitudes while another quarter (25%) are **negative**<sup>14</sup>. Unsurprisingly, those who would vote for Maastricht have overwhelmingly positive European attitudes (82%) (Table 22 & Table 23, Figure 2.4).

Those who have positive European attitudes **are** a great deal "softer" about supporting Maastricht, while those negative are overwhelmingly mobilised against the Treaty. While two-thirds (64%) of those with positive attitudes are prepared to back Maastricht, more than four out of five with negative attitudes **are** prepared to oppose it (82%). Ambivalents by definition tend to be much more undecided (42%) and against (37%) the Treaty than for it (21%).

Again, looking at the situation one month prior to the standard EUROBAROMETER no.38.0 survey, the debate on Maastricht has undoubtedly substantially increased the number of people making up their minds on the issue (EC: +19). It has however, not fundamentally altered **the** proportion of people who are "for" or "against". Both in August and September, three out of five EC citizens with an opinion support the Treaty, while two out of five oppose (61:39, then 62:38).


Between August and September", support for Maastricht amongst those who can decide increased in Greece (+17), West Germany (+14), the Netherlands (+5), Belgium (+5), Denmark (+3), Portugal (+3) and Spain (+3) while it decreased in Italy (-5), Ireland (-6), Luxembourg (-7); in France, there was no major change (+1) during the last month of debate, as was the case in the United Kingdom (0). The change in West Germany was sufficiently significant to overturn a majority opposing Maastricht - from 45:55 in August to 59:41 in September.

---

<sup>14</sup>Details about the "Typology of European Attitudes" can be found in the Annexes under "Technical specifications for socio-demographic and socio-political variables used in crosstabulations".

<sup>15</sup>The technical specifications regarding this Flash can be found in the Annexes. East Germany was not included in this survey. Only main cities were surveyed in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland: results in these countries are not directly comparable.

## MAASTRICHT 14 ISSUES (EC12)



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 2.5

The proportion of "Undecided" declined over that period primarily in Greece (-25), France (-24), West Germany (-23), Portugal (-18) and the Netherlands (-17). Throughout the Community, more people in each country were ready to make a choice by September.

## 2.3 "For" or "Against" specific elements

THE EUROBAROMETER asked whether EC citizens support **14** key elements of the Maastricht Treaty debate (Table 24, Figure 2.5). The results show EC-wide that:

\* The governments of EC member states should work towards close cooperation in fighting drug traffic and organised crime, by **89%** to **5%**. Nowhere is support less than **78%** (Portugal) for this measure, going to as high as **94%** in Denmark. Given the topic, this is unsurprisingly the most popular Maastricht measure in all countries without exception;

\* EC Member States should work towards a common defence policy, by **77%** to **13%**. Most people in **11** countries support it, especially in Luxembourg (**84%**), France (**81%**), Italy (**81%**) and Germany (**81%**, including **88%** of East Germans). A relative majority of neutrality-minded Irish are in favour (**50:32**), while Danes are split on the subject (**48:46**);

\* The EC member states should have some basic common principles on social policy, but details should be left to national governments, by **74%** to **12%**. Absolute majorities everywhere support this, especially in France (**81%**), the Netherlands and Luxembourg (both **79%**)- along with **83%** of East Germans;

\* The governments of EC member states should work towards common rules in matters of political asylum, refugees and immigration, by **72%** to **17%**. Absolute majorities everywhere are in favour, especially Germany (**81%**), the Netherlands (**80%**) and Italy (**74%**);

\* The President and the members of the European Commission should have the support of a majority in the European Parliament - otherwise, they should resign, by **69%** to **9%**. Absolute majorities are in favour everywhere, especially the Netherlands (**82%**), except in Portugal, where almost as many do not answer (**43%**) as support the measure (**47%**);

\* The member states of the European Community should have one common foreign policy towards countries outside the European Community, by **69%** to **17%**. Absolute majorities in all countries support this issue, especially Luxembourg (**79%**), the Netherlands (**77%**) and Germany (**75%**, with **81%** in East Germany). Relatively-speaking, least support is found in the United Kingdom (**55:30**). In Denmark, there is almost two-to-one support (**64:30**);

## EUROBAROMETER 38

---

\* There should be a Monetary Union with a European Central Bank pursuing a policy of monetary stability that is fighting inflation, by **64% to 23%**. Majorities in all countries support: especially in Italy (**83%**), the Netherlands (**74%**) and Greece (**71%**). Only in the **United** Kingdom are those "for" in only a narrow majority (**45:42**);

\* The directly-elected European Parliament should have a greater say in European Community legislation, by **62% to 14%**. Absolute majorities are in favour everywhere, from a high of **72%** in the Netherlands to a low of **52%** in Denmark;

\* The European Community should have a European Government responsible to the European Parliament and to the European Council of Heads of National Government, by **56% to 16%**. Majorities support this measure in 11 countries, especially the Netherlands (**68%**) and Luxembourg (**65%**). Danes are "against" (**47%**) rather than "for" (**35%**);

\* The European Community should be responsible only for matters that cannot be handled effectively by national governments, by 56% to **23%**. This principle of "subsidiarity" receives backing from majorities in all 12 countries, most fervently Denmark (**70%**), Greece (**63%**) and the United Kingdom (**62%**). **66%** of East Germans like the idea;

\* There should be a European Monetary Union with one single currency replacing by **1999** the (NATIONAL CURRENCY) and all other national currencies of the member states of the European Community, by **53% to 36%**. Majorities in **9** countries support this: especially Italy (**79%**), Greece (**71%**) and Ireland (**66%**); while majorities in **3** countries oppose - Denmark (**35:60**), United Kingdom (**30:58**) and Germany (**36:53**);

\* In matters of EC legislation, taxation and expenditure, the European Parliament should have equal rights with the Council of Ministers, which represents national governments, by 50% to **20%**, especially in Ireland (**58%**), Greece (**57%**) and the Netherlands (**54%**). Most people in **11** countries expressing an opinion support this measure. There is a narrow majority against it (**36:39**) in Denmark;

\* Any citizen of another EC country who resides in (OUR COUNTRY) should have the right to vote in local elections, narrowly by **45% to 42%**. Majorities in **6** countries support the measure: Ireland (**67:18**), the Netherlands (**60:33**), Spain (**57:29**), Portugal (**48:24**), Italy (**46:36**) and Belgium. People in a further 2 countries are divided: Germany (**42:43**), Greece (**45:44**). The public in **4** voice their opposition: the United Kingdom (**41:50**), **France** (**41:50**), Luxembourg (**36:54**) and Denmark (**35:61**);

In only one instance is a clear majority against a measure:

\* Any citizen of another EC country who resides in (our country) should have the right to be a candidate in local elections, by 36% "for" to 50% "against". Only 3 countries have majorities in favour: Ireland (51:28), Spain (49:36) and, narrowly, Italy (42:39). 2 countries are divided: the Netherlands (46:45) and Portugal (37:35). 7 are against: Luxembourg (25:66), Denmark (31:66), France (26:64), United Kingdom (32:58), Greece (31:57), Germany (34:51) and Belgium (35:50).



\* On each of the fourteen measures or issues debated regarding the Treaty, between a fifth (18%) and nearly half (44%) of all Portuguese did not give an opinion. Other southern countries are next in line - Greece (10%-33%), Spain (9%-33%) and Italy (6%-33%). The two questions on power-sharing between the Council of Ministers and Parliament, the first concerning equal rights and the second concerning their relationship with a European Government, had the highest EC-wide rate of "don't know" (31% and 28% respectively).

The above presented 14 proposals were introduced in the August 1992 Flash EUROBAROMETER 14 and in the September/October 1992 Standard EUROBAROMETER 38, i.e. after Maastricht meeting of the European Council of December 1991 and the Danish referendum of 2 June 1992. As far as they address elements of the Maastricht Treaty, they are based on the final agreement which distinguishes "three pillars" of the European Union : the European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy and Intergovernmental cooperation in matters like fighting drug trafficking and organized crime or immigration. All such items **explicitly mention the crucial role of member states or their governments in the respective decision-making procedures.**

At the same time we once more asked questions addressing core elements of European Political Union and European Monetary Union in the wording which had been unchanged since 1990 when they had been introduced, in order to ensure strict comparability over time. Their wording reflected positions of the Commission (or of the European Parliament) at the time, i.e. before the beginning of the Intergovernmental Conferences. They typically begin "as an Economic and Monetary Union, the European Community having.." or "**As a Political Union, the European Community being responsible for a common..**" **The decisive role of Member State governments having the final say in Community legislation when their representatives meet as the Council of Ministers was not explicitly mentioned.** The answers to those trend questions (Table 25, Figure 2.6) show people supporting:

\* **By 73% to 15%, as a Political Union, the European Community being responsible for a common policy in matters of security and defence** - an increase since 6 months ago of 3 points in favour. Absolute majorities in favour everywhere except relative majority support in neutrality-minded Ireland (46:33);

## EUROBAROMETER 38



\* By **62%** to **21%**, **as** a Political Union, the European Community being responsible for foreign policy towards countries outside the EC - an increase of **3** points in favour since Spring. All countries have absolute majorities in favour, except the United Kingdom where there is a relative majority (**47:34**).

\* By **57%** to **25%**, as an Economic and Monetary Union, the European Community having a common European central bank with heads of national central banks on its board of directors - an increase of 2 points in favour. Only most British are not in favour (**37:44**), while the Danes reversed the position last time and are narrowly supporting the idea (**48:45**);

\* By **52%** to **35%**, within the Economic and Monetary Union, a single common currency replacing the different currencies of the member states in five or ~~six~~ years' time, an increase of 4 points not in favour. Most Danes (**35:60**), Germans (**38:48**) and British (**30:59**) are against.

Trends since Autumn **1990** concerning the above four measures show support has increased by 11 points for having a foreign policy towards countries outside the EC and 7 points for a common security and defence policy; support for the European central bank remains largely unchanged (+1), although opposition to it has increased (+7); the same is true for the single currency (support -3; opposition +12).

Thus the trend shows gathering support for aspects of Political Union but increasing doubts about Economic and Monetary Union, especially the single currency (Figure 2.7). Above all, it shows that anti-EC feelings are only partially related to concrete details contained in the Maastricht Treaty.

Answers to those questions which address the same issue but in two different wordings show highly interesting patterns of support and opposition, when compared.


## Which type of Europe?

When it comes to "**Single Currency**", differences are minimal everywhere except Germany, where explicitly using the name of the national currency in the new question (Table 24) attained stronger opposition (Table 25) than when only speaking of a "national currency".

As far **as** a "**European Central Bank**" is concerned, the new question emphasizes its "pursuing a policy of monetary stability that is fighting inflation". This version finds significantly more support almost everywhere (**64:23%** **as** compared to **57:25%** for EC12) than the old question, which had nevertheless mentioned "the heads of national banks on its Board of Directors".



## WHO HAS THE FINAL SAY ON EC LAW-MAKING (EUROBAROMETER 37 -SPRING/1992- RESULTS)



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 2.8

Looking at "**Common Defence**", the new question, according to "Maastricht", **speaks** of "The Member States of the European Community should work towards a Common Defence Policy." On average throughout the EC, support is significantly higher (77:13%) compared to the old question (73:15%) In the **UK**, where scepticism **as** regards Maastricht is widespread, the difference is even more pronounced (70:20% as compared to 58:27%) In Denmark, however, the old question - speaking of **a** "common policy in matters of defence and **security**" - finds 7 points more support (48:46% **as** compared to 52:42%).

Most impressive are the differences in support concerning "**Foreign Policy**". Both the old and the new wording of the question find more support than opposition everywhere. But **the new question, emphasizing the role of the Member States as the Maastricht Treaty does, finds more support everywhere**, except in Greece, Italy and Portugal where there are practically no differences. The EC average support for the new question is 69:17% as compared to 62:21% for the "old". But the increase in support is particularly significant in countries where there was a more intense public debate about the EC in general and the Maastricht Treaty in particular: "Net Support", i.e. percentage points "for" minus percentage points "against", increased by 12 points in Ireland **and** the UK and by 15 points in Denmark, Germany, France and the Netherlands.


Many citizens are not aware of the fact that it is the governments of the member **states** which play the crucial decisive role in "European" legislation and decision-making: as EUROBAROMETER 37 showed, only one in four EC citizens **know** this (Table 27, Figure 2.8)

It appears that citizens are clearly more numerous to support the Community in general, **and** "Maastricht" in particular, as soon as they are reminded of the important role national governments play in decisions taken at the European level.

If this is **so**, opposition to the Maastricht Treaty (and also to the EC in general) could be based on the fact that people are opposed to **a "type of Europe"** which they **see** to be **aimed** at in the Maastricht Treaty (or in the current EC) which is not at all foreseen (or currently existing). On the other hand, the "type of Europe" they would be very well prepared to support - and in any case to accept - is the very one existing and even being reinforced through the Maastricht Treaty. But **they do not know**.

We shall come back to this issue, when discussing the Democratic Deficit of the Community in chapter 4.3. But the respective roles of the national member state and its government on the one hand and of the EC on the other are **also** the subject of another question asked in EUROBAROMETER 38, to which we now **turn**.

## NATIONAL OR JOINT EC DECISION MAKING? 18 POLICY AREAS - EC 12



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 2.9

## What is to be decided where?

An important principle of the European Community, strongly emphasized in the Maastricht Treaty, is "subsidiarity": the member nation states of the Community or Union continue to **deal** with most aspects of political life. Only in matters where national (or regional or local) governments *can* no longer effectively handle a policy **area** or an important part of it should this be dealt with at the European Community (or Union) level.

For several years, **and without any references to the Maastricht Treaty**, EUROBAROMETER has been asking whether each of a number of policy areas should be decided by the respective national government or jointly within the European Community. No institutional details were specified. A direct comparison with results of the questions just dealt with above **is**, therefore, less justified. It is rather **the principal of some policy domains being transferred** at the common EC decision-making level while others remaining to be taken care of nationally, which interests here. And it is **the type of policy domains, majorities want to be handled at one or at the other level of government**, which is of interest.

EC citizens feel that the following policy areas should be primarily decided at the EC level (**first percentage figure, joint decision within EC; second, national government decision**) (Table 27, Figure 2.9):

- \* Cooperation with developing countries, the Third World, by 78% to 15% . 2/3 and higher majorities (62%-82%) almost everywhere.
- \* Scientific and technological research by 75% to 19% . 2/3 and higher majorities (68%-85%) everywhere;
- \* Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Community by 71% to 20%. Absolute majorities (58%-82%) everywhere;
- \* Protection of the environment by 70% to 26% . At least absolute majorities (50%-79%) everywhere;
- \* Rules for political asylum by 59% to 33%. Most people support the EC's role in 10 countries with only most Danes (40:58) and British opposing (43:49);
- \* Immigration policy by 59% to 36% . 8 countries have majorities in favour; Ireland is split (47:47); while Denmark (39:59), Luxembourg (44:51) and the United Kingdom (33:63) are more in favour of national government action;

## EUROBAROMETER 38

---

\* Industrial policy by **57%** to **36%**. Majorities in 11 countries back the EC - the United Kingdom **(40:55)** is the only exception;

\* Rates of VAT (Value Added Tax) by **54%** to **37%**. 7 countries have majorities in favour. The Portuguese are divided **(42:42)**, while 4 largely back national government - Denmark **(45:51)**, Greece **(43:46)**, Luxembourg **(40:55)** and the United Kingdom **(35:59)**;

\* Currency by **54%** to **40%**. Majorities from 10 countries back the EC. The Germans are divided **(47:48)**, while the British largely oppose **(28:68)**;

\* Security and defence by 53% to **43%**. Majorities from 8 countries support. Most in 4 oppose: Denmark **(40:58)**, Greece **(44:51)**, the United Kingdom **(37:61)** and especially in neutrality-minded Ireland **(24:73)**;

\* Dealing with unemployment by **51%** to **44%**. The EC is evenly divided, with majorities in 6 countries support EC joint action (Belgium, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy and Portugal) while the other 6 back the role of national government (Denmark, Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom).

**The respective national government should primarily take responsibility for (first percentage figure, national government decision; second, joint decision within EC):**

\* Data Protection by **47%** to **40%**. Majorities in 8 countries back national government; the opposite is true in 4 - Germany **(44:52)**, Greece **(38:42)**, Spain **(37:40)** and Italy **(31:42)**;

\* Basic rules for broadcasting and press by **48%** to **44%**. Citizens are very divided on this issue. In 5 countries, most support national government (Denmark, France, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom), the public in 4 are split on the issue (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy) while in 3 they support an EC role (Germany, Spain and Luxembourg);

\* Health and safety of workers by **49%** to **46%**. Most people in 8 countries support national government's decision; while majorities in the other 4 - Greece **(44:51)**, Ireland **(45:51)**, Italy **(30:65)** and Portugal **(36:56)** prefer joint EC action;

\* Participation of workers' representatives on company boards of Directors by **51%** to **37%**. Most people in 10 countries back national government's decisions. Ireland is divided **(43:43)** while most in Italy say it should be the EC **(38:43)**;

\* Cultural policy by **52%** to **41%**. Most people in 9 countries back national government's decisions; Germany **(48:47)** and Portugal **(43:45)** are divided; while support for joint EC decision-making has only the support of most Italians **(34:58)**;

\* ~~Health~~ and social welfare by **58%** to **37%**. Absolute majorities in 9 countries, while the public in 3 countries mostly back the EC's role: Greece (**51:44**), Italy (**52:43**) and Portugal (**54:39**);

\* Education by 59% to 37%. Most people in **10** countries back national government, Greece is divided (**48:48**), while people in Italy largely support ~~an~~ EC role (40:55).

Trends since six months ago (when this extended list ~~was~~ first introduced) show that:

\* The number of policy areas having absolute or relative majorities in favour of EC decision-taking has fallen by one from **12** to **11**.

\* Gains have been made by 'national government' of +2 or more if we look at the EC average on 9 out of the **18** policy areas, while joint EC action gained by +2 for only 3 policy domains - political asylum and unemployment, both major news issues at the present time where the media portrays national governments in many EC countries as not coping well, and VAT.


\* By far the biggest swing this time is ~~an~~ impressive **+10** at the EC level, preserving member states' sole discretion over cultural policy. Statistically-significant swings (3 points or more) are achieved in all countries, especially France (**+16**), the Netherlands (**+14**), Ireland (**+13**) and the United Kingdom (**+12**). The swing almost exactly reverses the overall majority support enjoyed by the EC for this issue last time (**51:42**).

## 2.4 Anticipated effects

Majorities in all countries feel Maastricht would have **a** positive effect on the **European**, Community (EC wide: 59% "positive"; **6%** "no effect"; **13%** "negative") while much fewer believe the Treaty would influence **their** own **life** (EC wide: **27%** "positive"; **31%** "no effect"; **17%** "negative"). Irrespective of whether they are for or against the Treaty itself, relative or absolute majorities of people in all countries believe **Maastricht will have a positive (46%) rather than a negative (27%) effect on their country**, including the British (**36%** versus **31%**). The only exceptions are the Danes, who are divided on the subject (**40%** versus **42%**). Less than a sixteenth (6%) of EC citizens say there would be "no effect" (Table 28, Figure 2.10). People may, **of** course, be **personally** against the Treaty but ~~see~~ positive effects for their country as a whole. Absolute majorities in all countries - and a relative majority (**43:20**) in the United Kingdom - believe that Maastricht will have a positive effect on the life of the European Community. Biggest percentages saying negative effect in this case come from Denmark (27%) and the United Kingdom (**20%**).


## EUROBAROMETER 38

### ANTICIPATED EFFECT OF MAASTRICHT ON ... (EC12)



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 2.10

### LOSS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY OR NAT. IDENT./EUROP-IDENT. COMPATIBLE?



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 2.11

On balance, people in most countries are uncertain to what degree, if any, Maastricht will ultimately affect their own lives. The Portuguese (48%), Greeks (45%) and Irish (40%) are the most likely to think there will be positive results - they are the people whose countries are, indeed, meant to benefit primarily from the Delors II package. Italians (34% positive, 32% no effect) Dutch (31:29) and Luxembourgers (29:28) tend towards the positive and neutral, while those who mainly say "no effect" are Belgians (35%), Germans (31%) Spaniards (38% - despite the "promise" of Delors II) and French (38%). The British are almost evenly split between the three options, while Danes are more negative (33%) than positive (29%) or neutral (24%).

## 2.5 United Europe and national identity

The increasingly-discussed topic of possible tensions between a new "European Identity" and traditional "national identity" was addressed in two different questions in this EUROBAROMETER survey.

People were asked whether they thought the sense of national identity would end up disappearing and being replaced by a sense of European identity if all the countries of the European Community came together in a European Union, or whether they thought one could have a sense of national identity as well as a sense of European identity at the same time (Table 29, Figure 2.1 1).

By a proportion of almost three-to-one (62:23), EC citizens believe that a national and European identity are compatible. Absolute majorities everywhere see compatibility possible, from a high of 71% for Italy and 69% for the Netherlands to a low of 52% for the United Kingdom and 50% for Ireland. Both the United Kingdom (38%) and Ireland (32%) had the highest percentages of people expecting that national identity would, indeed, be replaced by a European sense of identity. In Denmark, more than twice as many people (65:29) say national and European identity can co-exist than not.

Taking a set of greater extremes, EC citizens were given two possible options as to how this issue might evolve within the Community: whether a real European Union would mean the end of national cultural identities and their diversity; or whether the only way to protect national cultural identity and their diversity is through the countries of Europe becoming a real European Union (Table 30).

A seven point scale was used. Respondents were asked to choose a number on the scale corresponding to their point of view relative to 1 ("European Union will end national cultural identities") or 7 ("European Union is the only way to protect national cultural identities in the future"). 4 is, thus, the middle point between the two views.



## EUROBAROMETER 38

---

Absolute or relative majorities in nine countries indicate confidence in a European Union protecting national cultural identities and their diversity. Ireland (36:35) and the United Kingdom (39:42) are borderline, while only in Denmark (32:45) substantially more people are found fearful of losing their national cultural identities regarding this question.

**As** oftentimes, those with negative opinions who fear change are the more vociferous. Thus the tone of the media on this issue in the ~~United~~ Kingdom in particular reflects this. But even ~~the~~ British are almost three-to-two of the opinion that national identity *can* co-exist with **a** European identity; they are divided as **to** whether a European Union **can** help keep the diversities of national cultures.

## 3. THE SINGLE MARKET


### 3.1 Awareness and Support/Evaluation

Interviews for standard EUROBAROMETER No.38.0 occurred just three months before the Single Market officially comes into being. With around 340 million consumers, the EC's domestic market will be as big as that of the United States and Japan combined. Yet even though 260 of the programme's 282 directives have by now been adopted by the Council, many are still awaiting approval by national parliaments before they **can** become law and their success will depend very much upon effective enforcement of those rules in member states. The SingleMarket's arrival may therefore not be heralded by a "big bang", but more likely the gradual dawn of a new era. Irrespective of how long it takes to be fully in place, its initial advent will, nevertheless, be a major historical event.

Almost seven EC citizens out of ten (69%) **say** they have read in the papers, seen on television or heard something about the Single European Market. **Those** most likely to have read, seen or heard something are Danes (80%), Germans (76%), Portuguese (75%) and Luxembourgers (**74%**). Those relatively least numerous are the French (65%), British (62%) and Dutch (57%). More than half in all countries say they have heard something (Table 31, Figure 3.1).


## EUROBAROMETER 38

### AWARENESS OF SINGLE MARKET IN THE MEDIA



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 3.1

### INFORMEDNESS: WHEN IS THE SINGLE MARKET TO START?



\*) 28% in NL say 1999 (or later)

EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 3.2

At an EC12 level, there is no change since last time in the percentage of people saying they recently heard something. Yet on a national level, we ~~see~~ a very significant increase in Spain (+10) and lesser ones in France (+5) and the Netherlands (+4). A large fall in awareness is registered in East Germany (-15), followed by Belgium (-7) and Greece (-5).

Since this question was first asked in Autumn 1988, EC-wide awareness levels have hovered consistently around the 66%-76% level. Current results are therefore rather average for the **period** since around the time the Single Market project was announced. Perceived reporting of the issue seems to have held up quite well everywhere over the years, except in France where a strong start (Autumn 1988 - Spring 1989: 85%-84%) tailed off somewhat (Spring 1991 - Autumn 1992: 60%-71%); in Belgium where the result is the lowest so far (all-time **high**: 93%; **now** 70%); and in Greece where it has fallen 17 points over the past year (85% to 68%).



While the vast majority of people continue to be aware of the Single Market in the media, the proportion who know the date it is due to come into being is **also** high. When asked the date it is likely to happen, **around half (46%) can say, without prompting, that the Single Market is due to come into force in 1992/1993.** A third (30%) can give the date even more accurately (December 1992/January 1993).

Danes (70%) are easily the most knowledgeable about the deadline, followed by the French (60%). Both held referenda on Maastricht. Last come the Dutch (29%) and ~~Greeks~~ (19%). In Greece and the United Kingdom, more than half ("don't know": both 54%) could not even hazard a guess. In the Netherlands, the question seems to have led to some confusion, perhaps with Monetary Union (advent of the Single Currency) - more than half saying the Single Market would happen in 1999 or later (28%), or that they do not know (25%) (''able 32, Figure 3.2).

EC citizens are more than three-to-one (**40%** versus 12%) convinced that the Single Market will be - for people like them - a good rather than bad thing. Over a third (37%) say it will be neither good nor bad (Table 33, Figure 3.3).

At the beginning of the "long march" towards the Single Market, more than half of EC citizens believed it would be a good thing (Autumn 1987 - Spring 1989: 53%-57%). Then the percentage dropped, hovering at the 45%-50% level before dropping eight points over the past year (48% to 40%) - a drop of 17 points over the past five years. Negatives doubled over the same period (6% to 12%) while those saying "neither/nor" went up 12 points.

## EUROBAROMETER 38



All-time lows in positive support are reached this time in Italy (**53%**), Spain (**38%**), the United Kingdom (**32%**) and France (**31%**). The only significant increases since the last standard EUROBAROMETER occur in Denmark (+4) and West Germany (+5).

Falls of over **20** points from all-time highs in the percentage of people saying the Single Market is a "good thing" occur in:

- \* Spain, down **31** points (**69%** to **38%**) since Spring **1989**;
- \* Belgium, down **26** points (**65%** to **39%**) since Autumn **1987**;
- \* Luxembourg, down **26** points (**61%** to **36%**) during Autumn **1987** to Autumn **1988**, then a fairly consistent **34%-43%**; currently **35%**;
- \* Italy, down **25** points (**78%** to **53%**) since Autumn **1988**;
- \* France, down **24** points (**55%** to **31%**) since Autumn **1987**;
- \* East Germany, down **24** points (**56%** to **32%**) since the EUROBAROMETER started asking the question there in Autumn **1990**.

By contrast Denmark increased its support by **15** points (**29%** to **44%** now) since Autumn **1987**. It was the least supportive country at the beginning. Now it is the fifth-ranking country in support, while at the same time having the second highest percentage of those saying "bad thing" (**16%**) after the United Kingdom (**18%**).

Absolute majorities of Irish (**55%**), Italians (**53%**) and Portuguese (**51%**) say the Single Market will be - for people like them - a good thing. The British (**32%**) and French (**31%**) are the least supportive. Half of the French (**48%**) say it will be neither good nor bad.

### 3.2 Hopes and fears

There is a **9** point increase since six months ago in the percentage of people expressing fears about the Single Market (Table **34**, Figure 3.4). Barely half of all EC citizens (**51%**) now say they are hopeful, while over a third (**37%**) express some or much fear.

## EUROBAROMETER 38

---

Absolute majorities remain hopeful everywhere except the United Kingdom (47:37) and Spain (44:37), where majorities are relative. France is the only country where there are now more fearful (49%) than hopeful (44%), the first time any country feels decisively negative about the subject (people in Luxembourg have often been divided on the issue in the past).

It Seems ironic that many countries in the Community with large economies are currently the most perturbed by the advent of the Single Market. As we shall see later, the reasons for the fears expressed in France, Germany and the United Kingdom in particular not only have to do with economics but **also** with immigration **and** the perceived loss of national identity that many in those countries expect the Single Market to bring.

In view of the fact that major elements contained in the Maastricht Treaty were supported by absolute majorities of the French, causes for the very narrow victory of "yes" on 20th September (**50.8%** in metropolitan France) are much more likely to be found in lack of general self-confidence (in view of the Single Market to come), anger (among certain key sectors) against Common Agricultural Policy Reform and dissatisfaction with "Brussels" rather than opposition to Monetary Union or hostility towards a future common foreign and security policy.

Double-digit increases in fear about the Single Market since the last standard EUROBAROMETER occur in Spain (**+17**), the United Kingdom and Italy (both **+11**) and East Germany (**+10**). In the former three countries, currency devaluations may have increased fear; in East Germany - the economic recession. Only in Greece (fear **-5**), Luxembourg (**-5**) and Denmark (**-4**) are less people worried than last time.

Since the time the question was first asked in Autumn 1988, those fearful have consistently remained around a fifth to a quarter (21% to 26%) of the EC adult population. Then in Spring 1992, people expressing fear increased to 28% and have now jumped to 37%, as the Single Market approaches and the debate about Maastricht becomes more intense a few weeks before the Danish referendum. Since Autumn 1988, those feeling hope about the Single Market have fallen 15 points from two-thirds (66%) to half (51%) the EC population, while those fearful have increased by around the same amount - 14 points - during that period. "Net" hope (positive minus negative answers) has fallen from **+45%** in Autumn 1989 to **+14%** in Autumn 1992, a drop of 31 points.

For Autumn 1991, when hope **started** dropping significantly until Autumn 1992, those fearful almost doubled in Spain (**17%** to **36%**) and Italy (**18%** to **33%**), increasing in all countries except in Denmark (**33%-34%**), Ireland (**17%-18%**) and the Netherlands (**21%-22%**) which experienced little change; and in Luxembourg (**42%** to **35%**) and especially in Greece (**37%** to **23%**) where fear fell exceptionally.

If one compares the country rankings of those who **say** the Single Market will be a good thing and those who express hope, one finds that there is not much difference in their positions. In both **cases**, the Irish showed themselves the most optimistic and the French the most pessimistic.

In the last EUROBAROMETER, an open-ended question was asked to let people express their views on why they were hopeful or fearful about the advent of the Single Market. Their answers to this question were used this time to formulate one set of pre-defined answers in a "closed" question offered throughout the EC, from which people could choose a maximum of three reasons why they had said either "hope" or "fear". The percentages given below refer only to those expressing "hope" or "fear" respectively.

Those saying "hope" are most likely to give **as** a reason that there will be opportunities to work anywhere in the European Community (**45%**)<sup>16</sup>, that the Single Market will make trade and commerce between the Twelve easier (**35%**) and that it should encourage more jobs and less unemployment (32%). 29% say they feel hopeful **because** the Single Market will improve the possibilities of solving problems together, while **25%** hope for lower prices and improved chances of standing up to the United States and Japan. (Table 35, Figure 3.5).


Patterns of reasons for "hope" do not vary much across member states. The opportunity to work anywhere in the European Community is the most popular choice of those "hopeful" everywhere except in Denmark (more opportunities for companies: **39%**), Ireland (more jobs and less unemployment: **53%**), the Netherlands (easier trade and commerce: **43%**) and the United Kingdom (easier trade and commerce: **39%**). In East Germany, almost half (**47%**) hope for more jobs and less unemployment.

---

<sup>16</sup>This reason was presented first on the list to choose from. It cannot be discounted that this was a determining factor in it being chosen particularly often. An interviewer instruction to change order of items offered in each interview will be used next time.



## WHY HOPE FOR SINGLE MARKET? EC12




Total % exceeds 100

as up to 3 answers possible

EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 3.5


# WHY AFRAID OF SINGLE MARKET? EC12



Total % exceeds 100  
as up to 3 answers possible  
EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 3.6


## EUROBAROMETER 38

### WHY AFRAID OF SINGLE MARKET? SPAIN



Total % exceeds 100  
as up to 3 answers possible  
EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 3.7

### WHY AFRAID OF SINGLE MARKET? DENMARK



Total % exceeds 100  
as up to 3 answers possible  
EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 3.8


"Standing up to USA and Japan" is a far above-average reason for "hope" among the French (**44%**: second **rank** there). It was **France** alone among EC member states which pressed for counter-sanctions rather than continued negotiations when the United States threatened trade war against the Community over the GATT oilseeds dispute in November **1992**.

The worries of Europeans concerning the Single Market cover a wider, less economy-related field. Those fearful are most likely to cite the spectre of more unemployment and less jobs (**33%**), worries about too much immigration into their countries (30%) and the loss of national identity (**29%**). General uncertainty about the future (**28%**) is also an important factor (Table **36**, Figure **3.6**).

Worries **vary** much more than hopes from country to country, as indeed do the percentages of people expressing fear in the first place. Chief concerns are:

- \* Belgium (30% fearful): immigration (**37%**), less jobs (**36%**) and lower prices (**31%**);
- \* Denmark (**34%** fearful): loss of national identity (**46%**), their country having no say anymore (**46%**) and drugs/crime (to come in more easily because border controls are thought to disappear) (**38%**);
- \* Germany (**38%** fearful): too much immigration (**44%**), opening borders to drugs/crime (**43%**) and having to pay for others **42%**);
- \* Greece (**23%** fearful): less jobs (**42%**), too much competition (**40%**) and higher prices (**39%**);
- \* Spain (**36%** fearful): less jobs (**41%**), higher prices (**40%**) and "an uncertain future" (**39%**);
- \* France (**49%** fearful): less jobs (**46%**), loss of national identity (**34%**) and immigration (**32%**);
- \* Ireland (18% fearful): "our uncertain future" (**43%**), less jobs (**38%**) and loss of national identity (**35%**);
- \* Italy (**33%** fearful): "our country is not ready yet" (**45%**), too much competition (**29%**) and "an uncertain future" (28%);
- \* Luxembourg (**35%** fearful): higher prices (**41%**), less jobs (**40%**) and opening of borders leading to increased drugs/crime (**33%**);

# WHY AFRAID OF SINGLE MARKET? - TOO MUCH COMPETITION



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 3.9

\* Netherlands (21% fearful): loss of national identity (**36%**), opening borders to drugs/crime (**33%**) and immigration (29%);

\* Portugal (**25%** fearful): uncertain future (**43%**), ~~too~~ much competition (**42%**) and country not yet ready (**33%**);

\* United Kingdom (**37%** fearful): loss of national identity (**49%**); their country having no say anymore (**31%**) and immigration (**30%**).

Those fearful divide themselves into three broad categories:

\* People who mainly worry about the economic consequences of a Single Market, especially during a time of economic slowdown - mainly found in smaller states or those located in the south of the Community like Greece, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal (e.g. Spain, Figure 3.7);

\* **Those** whose primary worry is more xenophobic, preserving national identity, especially if open borders allow the freer movement of immigrants - mainly found in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (e.g. Denmark, Figure 3.8);

\* Countries where ~~both~~ types of fear ~~seem~~ almost equally expressed - mainly found in Belgium, Ireland and **France**.

Poor competitiveness of their country's economy is particularly a fear for many people living in southern Community countries - Portugal (**42%**), Greece (**40%**), Spain (38%) and Italy (29%) (Figure **3.9**).

Thus, in the eyes of a significant amount of people, the Single Market may have a more profound impact on the social, political and cultural rather than economic fabric of the European Community. The economic slowdown, coupled with unemployment, has raised people's hopes of finding jobs in other countries through a Single Market. It has also generated fears of people from other countries taking jobs away from them in their own country.

## EUROBAROMETER 38

---

### 3.3 The social dimension.

On the social dimension of the Single Market question there has not been much change in the strong level of support that has always existed since the question was first asked in Spring 1989. **This** is not surprising as people regularly tend to ~~see~~ social policy issues favourably.

Currently, almost two-thirds (**64%**) of EC citizens say the social dimension of the Single Market is a good thing; a seventh (**14%**) neither good nor bad; and only a tenth (10%) that it is a bad (Table 37).

Although the latest results show a Community-wide fall of 3 points in positive responses since six months ago, the level of support has stayed rather steady (**64%-70%**) on a EC-wide basis for the past three and a half years.

Seven out of ten or more Italians and Dutch (both **75%**), Greeks (**72%**), Portuguese (**71%**) and Irish (**70%**) **say** the social dimension is a good thing. Absolute majorities are in favour in all countries. The Danes are the least supportive - even ~~so~~, more than two-to-one are still in favour (**53%** versus 25%).

Since the last **EUROBAROMETER**, drops in support for the social dimension have been greatest in Portugal (-10), East Germany (-8), Spain (-7) and France (-5). It is at an all-time low in East Germany - and Germany as a whole as a consequence - but not in any other country, including Portugal.

The popularity of the social dimension is substantially greater than support for the Single Market **as** such, in all countries. This underpins the fact that social issues are to the fore when it comes to people's current hopes and fears of how the Single Market may affect their lives. Despite this, not much progress has been made in bringing many of the **47** measures that constitute the EC's "social action programme" into reality, especially when it comes to labour laws. **As** is well-known, the United Kingdom has gone even ~~so~~ far **as** to opt out of the social chapter of Maastricht altogether.

## 4. THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AND PARLIAMENT

### 4.1 Awareness and image of the European Parliament<sup>17</sup>

On 15th September 1992, the European Parliament celebrated its 40th Anniversary. The EC-wide debate about the effects of the Maastricht referenda in Denmark, Ireland and France has brought to the fore the frustrations of the EC electorate in not having a clear enough voice in decisions perceived to be taken centrally in Brussels. In the short term, this has heightened the debate on "subsidiarity" and focused attention on the role played by national parliaments in the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, the main long-term beneficiary of this debate should be the European Parliament, having more say vis-&vis the European Commission and the European Council, along with national parliaments paying more attention to their governments' activities in the Council. The European Parliament will become a more effective representative of EC citizens' views and concerns with the somewhat enhanced powers it is due to receive thanks to the Maastricht Treaty.

Over the past six months, the European Parliament's visibility has evidently benefited from all this public debate (Table 38). There has been a substantial rise in the percentage of people saying they have recently seen or heard, in the papers, on the radio or on TV, something about the European Parliament. Over half of EC citizens (55%) now say they have heard about it recently, a rise of 11 points since the last standard EUROBAROMETER.


---

<sup>17</sup>The questions reported in Section 4.1 and 4.2 have been asked on behalf of the European Parliament.



EUROBAROMETER 38

# IMAGE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN THE MEDIA \* 1982 - 1992 (EC12)



\* AMONG THOSE RECENTLY HEARD ABOUT IT  
EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 4.1

It is notable that there was a 9 point rise in the Commission's awareness reported earlier. The levels of awareness of the Commission (51%) and Parliament (55%) continue to be close but, only to a certain degree, linked (*see* EUROBAROMETER 37 report page 56).

In all countries, more than half the population say they have seen reporting about the European Parliament in the media. Luxembourg (65%), one of the host countries to the peripatetic Parliament, has the highest awareness, followed by Portugal (62%), Denmark (59%) and **France** (58%), another host country. Lowest awareness is in Ireland (51%) and the Netherlands (51%).

Double digit increases in perceived reporting on the Parliament happens in **France** (+19), the United Kingdom (+16), the Netherlands (+11) and Spain (+10). **Rises** occur everywhere except Portugal (61%-62%) and Luxembourg (67%-65%), where already high levels of awareness stay largely stable.

People, however, have a less favourable impression of the Parliament from what they say they have seen in the media. Almost half say they have a favourable impression (46%), a drop of 7 points since six months ago. Around a **fifth** (21%) say their impression is unfavourable, while over a quarter (27%) say spontaneously that it is neither (Table 39, Figure 4.1).

These results have overturned the absolute majority of favourable impressions recorded by the EUROBAROMETER for the past three years. Parliament's image in the media is now where it was in Autumn 1987. It **needs** to be seen whether this is more than just a temporary setback.


People who are the most likely to have a favourable image of the Parliament through the media come, as usual, from Ireland (67%) and "Southern" countries - Italy (63%), Portugal (62%), Greece (60%) and Spain (51%). Nevertheless some of these traditional supporters have seen big drops in their results - in **Spain** (-13) and Portugal (-12) especially.

There is now perceived to be more unfavourable than favourable reporting taking place in both Denmark (30% favourable versus 35% unfavourable) and the United Kingdom (33:41).

Perceived favourable reporting in the United Kingdom has dropped 10 points since last time, while unfavourable reporting has gained by 11 points. The current result for the United Kingdom is still not as bad as during the period Autumn 1982- Spring 1988 (worst result at the beginning: 18% favourable versus 59% unfavourable).

EUROBAROMETER 38

## IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT - CURRENT AND DESIRED



EUROBAROMETER - FIGURE 4.2

In the Netherlands, people are divided as to the tendency of media reporting (34:35). In East Germany, impressions of favourable reporting also fell by 10 points, while those saying it was neither favourable nor unfavourable increased by the same.

Overall, favourable reporting fell in **8** countries and remained roughly the same in the 4 other - Belgium (+2), Ireland (+1), Luxembourg (0) and the Netherlands (+2).

## 4.2 Current and desired role

People feel on balance that the European Parliament plays an important part in the life of the European Community (Table 40). They are almost two-to-one of the opinion that its role is important (54%) rather than not (29%).

This measure has remained virtually stable over the past six months. The percentage saying it is important decreased by one point, while those saying it is unimportant increased by two points.

Again, the Irish (66%) as well as southern members of the Community - Greeks (68%), Portuguese (63%), Spaniards (59%) and Italians (55%) - are most likely to feel the Parliament makes an important contribution. Nevertheless, once again, Portugal registers a big drop in positive responses (-12), while those saying "don't know" increase (+8).

All countries have absolute majorities of people who consider the Parliament's role as important except for the United Kingdom, where 49% of people say it is important and 30% not important, and in the Netherlands, where the population is divided (44:45). Even Denmark has an absolute majority with a positive attitude (52:37). The result in these countries do not change to a major degree compared to last time.

Practically always since 1984, an absolute majority of EC citizens have felt the European Parliament plays an important role in the life of the Community (49%-60%). The result this time around is very much average for the whole period, although there has been a 6 point decline taking place since Spring 1990 (Figure 4.2).

Looking at specific aspects of policy (Table 41, Figure 4.3), most EC citizens believe the European Parliament plays an important rather than unimportant part in:

## EUROBAROMETER 38

---

\* Environmental protection policy by **61% to 19%**, especially in East Germany (**71%** - and 66% in Germany **as a whole** partially **as a consequence**), Greece (**68%**), Ireland (**64%**) and the Netherlands (**62%**). Absolute majorities in every country think its role important. "Don't knows" range from **13%** in Denmark to **28%** in Portugal.

\* European social policy by **51% to 26%**, especially in Greece (**72%**), Ireland (**63%**), Italy (**59%**), Portugal and Spain (both 58%). Absolute or relative majorities say the Parliament is important in this domain everywhere except the Netherlands, where people are divided (**39%** "important" versus **41%** "unimportant"), and Denmark, where more say it is unimportant (**44%**) than important (**34%**). From **19%** in Germany up to **30%** in the United Kingdom in each country say they do not know.

\* Consumer protection policy by **48% to 28%**, especially in Greece (**64%**), Ireland (**59%**), Germany (**52%**) and Italy (**51%**). Absolute or relative majorities everywhere say it is important in this policy area. "Don't knows" range from **19%** in Denmark to **32%** in Portugal.

\* Student exchange policy by **46% to 26%**, especially in Luxembourg (**56%**), Ireland (**55%**), Greece (**54%**) and Germany (**51%**). Everywhere absolute or relative majorities say the Parliament's role is important here. There are high levels of "don't knows", from **19%** in Germany and Luxembourg to **41%** in Portugal.

\* The mutual recognition of qualifications by **42% to 30%**, especially in Luxembourg, Ireland (both **55%**), Greece (**51%**) and Germany (**50%**). All other countries has relative majorities saying it is important in that role, except France, where opinion is divided (**36%** "important" versus **37%** "unimportant"). From **18%** in Germany to **45%** in Portugal could not say. There was a large drop in Spain (-15) on this dimension over the past six months.

\* Policies in favour of families, women and elderly people by **39% to 35%**, especially in Greece (**57%**), Ireland (**55%**) and Luxembourg (**46%**). The European Parliament's role in this policy area is judged largely unimportant by relative majorities of Danes (**25%** "important" versus **49%** "unimportant"), French (**28:49**) and Dutch (**28:44**), while Belgians (**37:37**), East Germans (**38:38**) and Italians (**37:35**) are divided on the issue.

The ranking of the European Parliament's importance of these policy domains has remained virtually consistent since the time the question was first asked a year ago. The percentage of people who feel the role of the Parliament is important has eroded **2-4** points while those thinking it unimportant have gained by **2-3** points at the EC level on all measures during this period.

Since six months ago, the European Parliament has increased substantially in importance among many Greeks on all measures (between **+10** and **+16**), mainly because of very large reductions in those not wanting to give an opinion (between -14 and -19).

For the same reason **as** Greece, the opposite is true for Portugal. There, Parliament's perceived importance decreases substantially (between -9 and -14) while both negatives and "don't know" gained roughly equally on all measures except on environmental protection, where **those** saying the Parliament is unimportant gain primarily (**+11**).

Looking at the issue of whether people think Parliament should play a more or less important role **than** it does now, just over half of EC citizens (55%) believe it should be more important, while one in ten (11%) think it should be less. Around a sixth (17%) say spontaneously it should stay about the same (Table 42).

The result is virtually identical compared to last time. The percentage of people saying it should be more important has decreased by one point, while those saying it should be less important has risen accordingly. Increases and declines are not very major from country to country - the biggest increase comes from West Germany (+4) and the greatest decline in Ireland (-6).



Nevertheless, the percentage of people that say it should be more important has been declining slowly but steadily since the all-time high of 61% reached in Spring 1991. Now the percentage of people saying the European Parliament is important (54%) and the percentage saying it should be more important (55%) is virtually the same at the EC level. Nevertheless, the composition of these two groups are by no means identical.

Almost two-thirds (**64%**) of those who say the Parliament is already important say it should gain in power; nearly the same percentage (58%) of those saying it is not currently important hope it will become more important.

Those that say it should be less important are made up of almost as many who say it is currently important (41%) as those who say it is not (50%) (Table 43).

In all countries more people say on balance that the powers of the European Parliament should increase except in Denmark, where virtually as many say they should increase (32%) **as** say they should remain the same (31%). Biggest support for increasing the powers of Parliament comes from Portugal (70%), Italy (64%), the Netherlands (63%) and Greece (61%).

## EUROBAROMETER 38



When it comes to whether important decisions should be approved or not by the European Parliament before being applied (Table 44, Figure 4.4):

\* **53%** say that important decisions concerning reform of the Common Agricultural Policy should need the approval of the European Parliament, especially in the Netherlands (**69%**), France (**63%**) and Ireland (**61%**). Least support for the European Parliament's say in this domain is found in Spain (**41%**), Belgium (**42%**) and Greece (**49%**);

\* **51%** believe important decisions concerning European social policy should be approved by the European Parliament, especially in the Netherlands (**62%**), Ireland (**61%**) and France (**60%**). Least support for the European Parliament's say in this domain is found in Spain (**40%**), Denmark (**42%**), Belgium and Portugal (both **45%**);

\* **47%** think important decisions concerning European citizenship should be approved by the Parliament, especially in Ireland (**61%**), France (**56%**) and the United Kingdom (**55%**). Least support for the European Parliament's say in this domain is found in Spain (**36%**), Germany (**41%**), Greece and Luxembourg (both **42%**).

\* **45%** say important decisions concerning the policy of development towards non-EC countries should be approved, especially Ireland and Luxembourg (both **58%**). Least support for the European Parliament's say in this domain is in Spain (**34%**) and Belgium (**37%**).

The phrasing of the question asked by the European Parliament leaves us uncertain as to whether **those** that did not say "yes" are opposed or that they just have no opinion ("no" was not an option). Nevertheless, it is clear from the results that the Irish and French are the most numerous in supporting the European Parliament's powers in these areas, while Spaniards and Belgians seem the least.


### **4.3 The democratic deficit at national and EC levels**

The democratic deficit is something that is at the heart of the problems facing the European Community at the present time. In part, this frustration may be symptomatic of the crisis in democracy that people are increasingly facing at home.

Since Autumn **1976**, the EUROBAROMETER has regularly asked a question about the level of satisfaction that people have with the way democracy works in their country. Since the beginning, those satisfied have always been in a majority (**57%-47%**), while those dissatisfied an - albeit large - minority (**48%-38%**). On only very few occasions did the percentage of satisfied and dissatisfied meet for the EC as a whole.



## SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY AT HOME? 1976 -1992 (EC12)



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 4.5

Now for the ~~first~~ time at the EC12 level, a clear majority of people are more dissatisfied (52%) than satisfied (45%) with the way democracy works in their country (Table 45, Figure 4.5).

Majorities are unhappy in Italy (12% "satisfied" : **84%** "dissatisfied"), Greece (36:62), Spain (41:55) and France (47:50) as well as in East Germany (39:59). Greatest falls in satisfaction since last time are in Spain (-15); the United Kingdom's large fall (-11) also means people are now split on the issue (48:47). "Satisfaction" still wins the day in the seven remaining countries - Denmark 80%; Netherlands 71%; Luxembourg 70%; Portugal 65%; Ireland 62%; Germany 56%; (West Germany 60%) and Belgium 53%.

Bearing in mind this striking trend, one ~~can see~~ better the context within which EC citizens **also** express their dissatisfaction with the democratic deficit within the Community, whose institutions are seen to be even more difficult for the ordinary EC citizen to influence.

An overwhelming 71% of respondents say that citizens do not have sufficient democratic influence in EC decision-making (Table 46, Figure 4.6). Only 14% say they do, while another 14% say they do not know.


**Those** who are dissatisfied with democracy in their own country are marginally more likely to complain about lack of democratic influence in EC decision-making (78%) than those who are satisfied (66%) (Table 47).

The British are the most numerous to say that citizens do not have sufficient influence (84%), followed by Spaniards (73%), Germans (71%) and Irish (67%). Everywhere, absolute majorities complain about the deficit except in Portugal, where, nevertheless, a strong relative majority (44:33) has a grievance about the situation.

Even if we take into account that, in complex modern democratic systems, many citizens tend to express dissatisfaction when asked this kind of question, the proportions complaining here about insufficient citizen influence in the EC is impressively very high.

The problem of democratic deficit has many different aspects: do the necessary institutions exist? Is the public aware of their work? Are citizens happy/unhappy with the political forces they voted for in terms of expressing their interests? In terms of translating them into **good** policies? And so on.

# SUFFICIENT DEMOCRATIC INFLUENCE OF CITIZENS IN EC-DECISION MAKING?



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 4.6

In a political system like the Community, **composed** of a number of democratic national system which want to solve certain problems together in common institutions, **democratic influence of citizens usually takes place via two different channels** : a direct one, e.g. consisting of a directly elected common Parliament at the Community level, in our case the **European Parliament**. And an indirect channel, consisting of national governments (formed by directly elected national parliaments) and taking EC decisions when meeting as the **Council of Ministers**. (This indirect channel is further re-enforced by the **European Council** of national Heads of State and government.) **Both** channels are based on democratic elections (European or national). But neither their relative powers nor the way they work appears to satisfy citizens.

**The powers of the European Parliament**, although somewhat strengthened over the last decades, are still considerably less than what is seen to be normal for national parliaments. And what appears to be equally important when it comes to citizens' opinion about it: the work of **the EP is scarcely visible** for ordinary citizens.

When asked, majorities of citizens support the European **Parliament to become more important** (see above, section 4.2) even if the EP was also affected by the change of the climate of public opinion about the EC. And 62% (against 14%) want the EP to have a greater say in EC legislation (section 2.3). By 69% to 9% citizens say, the President and the members of the Commission should have the support of a majority in the EP - otherwise they should resign.

Greater EP say in legislation concerns the balance of powers between Parliament and Council. 60% (against 15%) support **Parliament having equal rights with the Council** in matters of legislation (clear relative majorities in Denmark and the UK, absolute majorities everywhere else). If, however, taxation (and expenditure) is also mentioned in an otherwise identically worded question, support falters to 50% against 20%.

As far as the indirect channel of democratic influence on EC decision is concerned, **national parliaments** (which have lost exclusive rights to decide in policy matters handled at the Community level) pay relatively little **attention** to what the governments they support do in the Council, at least in many countries. Where they do intensely deal with EC matters, as in Denmark or the UK, EC matters are at least publicly debated and controversy gains media attention. **Citizens become aware** of the issues at **stake** and of the options preferred by different sides : a fundamental prerequisite for overcoming the democratic deficit.

## EUROBAROMETER 38

---

As our surveys have shown over the years, many citizens have little knowledge and no clear understanding of the EC institutions. In their country they may not all know details about institutions either, but they have a rough idea about their parliament **and government**. And controversial public debates, political parties and political leaders give them **orientation** about major political issues ~~so~~ they can define their **own** views and opinion.

**At the EC level they neither see a government nor are there orientation structures which help them understand what is going on.**

A question has been asked in the EUROBAROMETER for several years which **asks** citizens' opinion about a proposal that goes beyond the current European Community and **also** beyond the Maastricht Treaty: "Are you for or against the formation of a European Union **with a** European Government responsible to the European Parliament?"

**51% of** EC citizens are "for" this, **28%** against. As compared to last Spring, support dropped by **4** points, opposition rose by **8** points, an impact of the more intense debate about "Europe". "Net support" dropped in every country, though to different degrees (Table **48**). In Denmark, there has always been **a** majority against (now **67:24**). In the United Kingdom an even split of **35:35%** was transformed into a majority against (**56:24%**).

This time, another additional question with partially identical wording asked people whether they are "for or against (that) the European Community should have a European Government responsible to the European Parliament **and to the European Council of Heads of National Government**."

The distribution of answers as compared to the first question is strikingly different! Net support for the second question was **16** points higher than for the first one, for **EC12** average (from **51:28%** to **56:16%**).

Net support dropped in Portugal (**-13**) due to increase in "don't knows" (**+15**), and in Italy (**-7**) where "don't knows" rose **+12** points. Belgium shows no difference. Everywhere else net support for a European Government was significantly higher for the second wording: GR+8, D+9, E+14, F+19, L+22, IRL+23.



In Denmark, net opposition dropped from **-43** to **-12** (**35%** for, **47%** against). In the Netherlands net support climbed **+37** points and in the United Kingdom even **+51** points (from **-32** to **+19**, i.e. from **24:56%** in the first question, a more than two-to-one rejection to **43:24%** in the second question, a majority in favour).

As in matters of foreign and defence policies where difference in response distribution suggested this specific conclusion, responsibility of a (hypothetical) European government not only to ~~the~~ direct channel of democratic citizen influence (European Parliament) but also to the indirect one, National **Heads** of State and Government, receive much stronger support.

The Commission of today is seen to be the forerunner of a full-grown European Government by many. Citizens would feel better ~~Órientated~~ even about its current role, had it had such **a** familiar name for many years. But ~~equally~~, if not much more important Seems to be an equilibrium between the institutions ~~representing~~ the two different channels of democratic citizen influence.

## EUROBAROMETER 38

---



## 5. ISSUES FACING EUROPEAN SOCIETY

Within the framework of the 38th wave of the standard EUROBAROMETER (Autumn 1992), several special studies were *carried out* on behalf of the European Parliament (see Chapter 4 sections 1 and 2) and of various specialised services of the European Commission, as well as of external partners. The main studies this time are about opinions and attitudes concerning consumer protection, the European Court of Justice, passive smoking and how people would like the membership of the European Community to look in the ~~Year~~ 2000.

Detailed analyses of these surveys requested by the specialised services of the Commission will be presented in their own reports at a later stage (see Annexes for the current and expected list of these reports). By way of illustration, some questions of general interest *can*, however, already be subject to a preliminary analysis and presented here.

### 5.1 European Community in the Year 2000


Seven countries have now applied to join the European Community - Turkey (1988), Austria (1989), Cyprus (1990), Malta (1990), Sweden (1991), Finland (1992), Norway (1992) and Switzerland (1992) - although, on 6th December, the latter rejected by referendum joining the European Economic Area. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have all signalled their desire to apply at some future date by signing "Europe Agreements" for EC association.



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 5.1



# **EC IN THE YEAR 2000: WHICH COUNTRIES SHOULD BE MEMBERS?**



■ YES    ▨ NO

## EUROBAROMETER 38

---

Making progress on the enlargement issue is one of the priorities of the UK Presidency - especially at the Edinburgh summit - and is expected to be high on the agenda of the current Danish Presidency as well.

In standard EUROBAROMETER 37, absolute majorities of EC citizens were in favour of Sweden (80%), Switzerland (79%), Norway (78%), Finland (77%), Austria (77%) and Iceland (58%) - the entire membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) excluding Liechtenstein (which was not asked) - joining; and absolute majorities also said that all these countries would have a beneficial impact on the Community. Malta and Cyprus also received absolute majority backing for their membership bid but only relative majorities felt their accession would have a positive effect on the EC. On this occasion, the question encompassed 8 countries only.

In the context of a question asked in cooperation with "World Media", a cooperative venture of 24 leading European newspapers, respondents this time were shown a map of Europe containing 43 countries and asked - if given the choice - which of them they think should be part of the European Community by the Year 2000 (Figure 5.1).

At the EC level, answers given by absolute majorities of EC citizens show that they would like the European Community to consist of 21 member states by the Year 2000. It would be composed of the current Twelve, the EFTA six (again Liechtenstein not asked), some of the Eastern European "Visegrad" group of countries which are EC associate members (Poland and Hungary) and Malta. Absolute majorities from all EC countries have a range of 19-23 members in mind: a high of 26 members is reached only among an absolute majority of Dutch (Table 49, Figure 5.2).

Absolute majorities in all countries say that the current Twelve should still be members, joined by the EFTA six. Concerning the "Visegrad" group, only Luxembourg did not quite have an absolute majority supporting Hungary to be a member (46%), while similarly 49% of Germans endorse Polish entry by the Year 2000.

If relative majorities are taken into account, another 5 members would be added: the new Czech Republic (47:34), Cyprus (44:36), Romania (43:39), Estonia (42:36) and Lithuania (41:38).

EC citizens are divided about Turkey (41:42), which has already applied to accede. People are also split about Bulgaria (41:40) and Latvia (40:38).

Absolute majorities of Danes and Dutch would like to see all three Baltic states be members by the Year 2000.

Nevertheless, for the other 14 countries on the map, there is much less support. These include all members of the Commonwealth of Independent **States** asked in the survey (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, **Ukraine**, as well as ex-USSR Georgia); the former Republics of Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia); Albania and Slovakia.

The same question was **asked** in **5** Central and East European countries (Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia West of the Urals, **Ukraine**) **as well as** 3 EFTA countries (Austria, Norway, Switzerland). The results **show**:

\* Absolute majorities in all countries (except Norway's relative majority 43:32) include their own country in their list of future members of the Community. **This is also true even of Switzerland by the Year 2000 (59:33), where, two months after this survey, the referendum campaign about joining the European Economic Area resulted in a "No".**

\* 31 countries received absolute majorities for EC membership in Hungary and the Ukraine, 23 in Poland, 20 in Switzerland and 19 in the Czech and Slovak Republic;

\* Extremely high numbers of "don't knows" in Austria (37%-54% for each country), Norway (25%-39%) and European Russia (39%-59%) mean that only 11 countries received absolute majority support in European Russia, 10 in Norway and 7 in Austria;


\* Taking relative and absolute majorities together, people want the current Twelve to remain in the Community by the **Year 2000** everywhere except in the Czech and Slovak Republic, where a narrow majority (51:46) say Ireland should not be in;

\* Absolute majorities in all 8 countries say they would like to ~~see~~ Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland as EC members.

**France** is the firm favourite in almost all EC and non-EC countries surveyed.


## EUROBAROMETER 38

### SHOULD ONE OBEY DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT?



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 5.3

### CONCERNED ABOUT SAFETY OF PRODUCTS AND SERVICES?



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 5.4

## 5.2 Getting justice at the European Court''

A quarter of EC citizens say they are very aware (**4%**) or somewhat aware (20%) of the European Court of Justice (Table 50). Around half (**48%**) are not very aware while the rest have not heard about the European Court before the questions were asked (22%) or simply did not know (**6%**).

**Three** out of five people are very or somewhat aware of the European Court in Ireland (**61%**), where it has recently been involved in rulings related to the controversial issue of abortion. Over half of the British (**53%**) are very or somewhat aware of it as well. Half of all EC citizens (50%) say that everyone should obey the decisions of the European Court of Justice whether they agree with its decisions or not (Table 51, Figure 5.3). More than a fifth (22%) disagree, while a sixth (18%) are undecided.

There are more people supporting than opposing compliance in all countries. Absolute majorities are for it in Denmark (**75%**), the United Kingdom (**60%**), Italy (**58%**) and the Netherlands (**54%**). However if one adds the undecideds to **those** who say they would not comply, a fair amount of resistance or uncertainty to the idea *can* be found in Spain (**48%**), France (**46%**), Germany (**46%**), Portugal (**43%**) and Luxembourg (**42%**).

It is instructive to compare this result with the number of European Court rulings that countries currently fail to obey (figures according to the **25th** General Report on the Activities of the European Communities, 1991):

\* Italy has the highest rate of non-compliance (**35** rulings) while an absolute majority of its citizens are for compliance in principle (**58%**). Belgium (17 rulings) and France (**14** rulings) are next in line - most Belgians say they should comply (**47%**) rather than not or being undecided (**40%**), while there is more resistance and uncertainty in France (**46%**) as has already been noted;

\* Portugal has the best record for compliance in the European Community (0 rulings), followed by Denmark (1 ruling), Luxembourg (2 rulings), the United Kingdom and Ireland (both **3** rulings).


Therefore, there **seems** oftentimes little apparent relationship between the level of non-compliance of European Court rulings by member governments and its citizens' wishes on this issue.

---

<sup>18</sup> A series of questions related to the European Court of Justice was asked on behalf of Professors James GIBSON and Greg CALDEIRA from the Universities of Houston and Ohio respectively.


## EUROBAROMETER 38

### ARE YOU THE MAIN HOUSEHOLD INCOME EARNER (OPINION BY RESPONDENT'S GENDER)



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 5.5

### ARE YOU THE MAIN HOUSEPERSON? (OPINION BY RESPONDENT'S GENDER)



EUROBAROMETER 38 - FIGURE 5.6

### 5.3 Consumer protection

On behalf of the Commission's Consumer Policy Service, the EUROBAROMETER included questions on product safety. Among other matters, it **asked** to what degree people feel concerned about the safety of products **and** services of consumers. (Table 52, Figure 5.4)

Unsurprisingly, 71% of people EC-wide are "very" or "somewhat" concerned about the safety of products and services of consumers. 28% are "not very" or "not at all" concerned. Just over a quarter (28%) of EC citizens say they are "very" concerned. Most concern is expressed by southern members of the Community - Greece (**57%**), Portugal (**42%**) and Spain (35%) as well as the two non-continental EC members - the United Kingdom (**46%**) and Ireland (**33%**).

Most Danes did not seem concerned, the only people in this respect. Only a twentieth (5%) are very concerned, while the percentages of those not very or not at all concerned (61%) outnumber those who are very much or somewhat concerned (**37%**). Most people in northern continental Europe feel less concern than those elsewhere. It is hardly surprising that this question creates such a major affirmative response (71% "very" and "somewhat" concerned). Few are the people whose countries' products are of such high standard as to treat lightly a potential threat to their health.

### 5.4 Stereotypes challenged : roles at home and at work

As part of its standard socio-demographics, the EUROBAROMETER asks a question about the chief role of the interviewee at home and at work - whether he or she is the person in the household mainly responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, and whether he or she is the person who contributes most to the household income.

Unsurprisingly, the chief person bringing in the income is still most frequently male (75%) while the main role at home, including doing the shopping (82%) is most often female. Nevertheless almost a third of women say they are the main income provider (31%) while almost a quarter of men (**24%**) say they are primarily in charge of domestic work (Tables 53 & 54, Figures 5.5 & 5.6).

There is some overlap in roles, with a number saying they are both the main income earners and do most of the work at home. This is the typical response coming from a single person household. This result is particularly prevalent in northern continental Europe, including **France** (Table 55).



## EUROBAROMETER 38

---

Hence Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and France have the greatest number of men AND women ~~saying~~ that they are the main income earners in the Community (except Danish ~~male~~ income earners). Denmark has the highest number of women (**47%**) chief income earners in the Community. Women are least likely to be the main household income earner ~~in~~ Spain (**18%**), Italy, Greece (both **23%**), Ireland, Luxembourg (both **24%**) and Portugal (**26%**) .

Women say they are mainly responsible for the shopping at home in Germany (90%), ~~France~~ (87%) and the Netherlands (86%), while men ~~are~~ most likely to be responsible for household duties in Denmark (**34%**), the Netherlands (**33%**) and Greece (**32%**). Men are least likely ~~to be~~ the houseperson in Portugal (11%), Spain (**13%**), Ireland (**16%**), Italy (**21%**) and Luxembourg (**22%**). Lack of sufficient employment opportunities, larger households and specific differences ~~in~~ culture and the structure of ~~the~~ economy may be some reasons why most southern EC members, plus Ireland, have more traditional divisions of labour than many northern Community continental ~~states~~.

## **ANNEXES**

## STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 38.0/.1 - EUROBAROMETER STANDARD 38.0/.1

CO-OPERATING AGENCIES AND RESEARCH EXECUTIVES /  
INSTITUTS ET CHARGES D'ETUDES

**INRA (EUROPE) - European Coordination Office SA/NV**  
**JONATHAN QUATRESOIX - Dominique VANCRAEYNEST - Eric MARLIER**  
**Avenue R. Vandendriessche, 18**  
**B-1150 BRUSSELS**  
**BELGIUM**  
**Tel. ++/32/2/772 44 44 - Fax ++/32/2/772 40 79**

BELGIQUE	MARKETING UNIT 430, Avenue Louise B-1050 BRUXELLES	Mr Dan CUKIER	tel. ++/32 2 648 80 10 fax. ++/32 2 648 34 08
DANMARK	GFK DANMARK Toldbodgade, 10B DK-1253 COPENHAGEN K.	Mr Enk CHRISTIANSEN	tel. ++/45 33 93 17 40 fax. ++/45 33 13 07 40
DEUTSCHLAND	SAMPLE INSTITUT Papenkamp, 2-6 D-2410 MÖLLN	Ms Dons SIEBER	tel. ++/49 4542 801 0 fax. ++/49 4542 801 201
ELLAS	KEME Ippodamou Street, 24 GR-11635 ATHENA	Mr Helene CHARI	tel. ++/30 1 701 80 82 fax. ++/30 1 701 78 37
ITALIA	PRAGMA Via Salaria, 298a I-00199 ROMA	Ms Maria-Adelaide SANTILLI	tel. ++/39 6 884 80 57 fax. ++/39 6 854 00 38
ESPAÑA	CIMEI Alberto Aguilera, 7-5º E-28015 MADRID	Ms Carmen MOZO	tel. ++/34 2 594 47 93 fax. ++/34 2 594 52 23
FRANCE	TMO Consultants 22, rue du 4 Septembre F-75002 PARIS	Ms Isabelle CREBASSA	tel. ++/33 1 47 42 34 81 fax. ++/33 1 47 42 44 74
IRELAND	LANSDOWNE Market Research 12, Hatch Street IRL-DUBLIN 2	Mr Roger JUPP	tel. ++/353 1 61 34 83 fax. ++/353 1 61 34 79
LUXEMBOURG	ILRES 6, rue du Marché aux Herbes GD-1728 LUXEMBOURG	Mr Louis MEVIS	tel. ++/352 47 50 21 fax. ++/352 46 26 20
NEDERLAND	NIPO "Westerdokhuis" Barentszplein, 7 NL-1013 NJ AMSTERDAM	Mr Martin JONKER	tel. ++/31 20 523 84 44 fax. ++/31 20 626 43 75
PORTUGAL	NORMA Av. 5 de Outubro, 122 P-1000 LISBOA	Mr Lopes DA SILVA	tel. ++/351 1 796 76 0418 fax. ++/351 1 797 39 48
GREAT BRITAIN	NOP Corporate and Financial Evelyn House 62, Oxford Street UK-LONDON W1N 9LD	Mr Chris KAY	tel. ++/44 71 631 00 40 fax. ++/44 71 631 01 17

## STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 38.0 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Between September **21** and October **15 1992**, INRA (EUROPE), a **European** Network of Market- and Public Opinion Research agencies, carried out wave **38.0** of the STANDARD EUROBAROMETER, on request of the COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES.

The EUROBAROMETER **38.0** covers the population of the **respective nationalities, aged 15** years and over, in each of the Member States of the **European** Community. The basic sample design applied in all **Member** States is a multi-stage, random (**probability**) one. In each EC country, a number of sampling **points** **was** drawn with probability **proportional** to population size (for a total coverage of the country) **and** to population **density**.

For doing so, the points were drawn systematically from all "**administrative** regional units", after stratification by individual unit and type of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the **Member** States according to the EUROSTAT-NUTS **II** and according to the distribution of the national, resident population in terms of **metropolitan**, urban and rural areas. In each of the **selected** sampling points, a starting address was drawn, at random. Further addresses were selected as every **Nth** address by standard random route procedures. from the initial address. In each household, the respondent was drawn, at random. All interviews were face-to-face in people's home and in the appropriate national language.

<u>COUNTRIES</u>	<u>INSTITUTES</u>	<u>N° INTERVIEWS</u>	<u>FIELDWORK DATES</u>	<u>POPULATION 15 + (x 000)</u>
Belgium	MARKETING UNIT	1040	23/09 - 09/10	7 994.4
Denmark	QFK DANMARK	1000	23/09 - 09/10	4 160.4
Germany(East)	SAMPLE INSTITUT	1015	23/09 - 02/10	13 607.0
Germany(West)	SAMPLE INSTITUT	1913	23/09 - 09/10	51 708.0
Greece	KEME	1006	25/09 - 08/10	7 825.6
Spain	CIMEI	1004	21/09 - 10/10	29 427.2
France	TMO Consultants	1006	23/09 - 07/10	43 318.5
Ireland	LANSOWNE Market Research	1008	24/09 - 14/10	2 583.0
Italy	PRAGMA	1052	28/09 - 10/10	45 902.8
Luxemburg	ILRES	500	21/09 - 15/10	302.6
The Netherlands	NIPO	1003	23/09 - 13/10	11 603.6
Portugal	NORMA	1000	24/09 - 09/10	7 718.7
Great Britain	NOP Corporate and Financial	1058	23/09 - 09/10	44 562.0
Northern Ireland	ULSTER MARKETING SERVICES	304	24/09 - 13/10	1159.1

For each country a comparison between the sample and the **universe** was **carried** out. The Universe description was derived from EUROSTAT population data. For all EC member-countries national weighting procedure, using marginal and intercellular weighting, was carried out based on this Universe description. As such in all countries, minimum sex, age, region NUTS **II** and size of locality were introduced in the iteration procedure. For international weighting (i.e. EC averages), INRA (EUROPE) applies the official population figures as published by EUROSTAT in the Regional Statistics Yearbook of **1989**. The total population figures for input in this post-weighting procedure are listed above.

The results of the EUROBAROMETER studies are reported in the form of tables, **datafiles** and analyses. Per question a table of results is given with **the full question** text (English and French) on top; the **results** are expressed **1)** as a percentage on total base and **2)** as a percentage on **the** number of "**valid**" responses (i.e. "Don't Know" and "No Answer" excluded). All EUROBAROMETER datafiles are stored at the Zentral Archiv (Universität Köln, **Bachemer** Strasse, **40**, D-5000 Köln **41**). They are at the disposal of **all** institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and **Social** Research (Michigan) and of **all** those interested in social science research. The results of the EUROBAROMETER surveys **are** analysed and made **available** through the Unit "Surveys, Research, Analyses" of **DG X** of the Commission of the EC, "EUROBAROMETER", Rue de la Loi **200**, **81049** Brussels.

Readers are reminded that survey results are estimations, the accuracy of which, everything being equal, rests upon the sample size and upon the observed percentage. With samples of about **1.000** interviews, the real percentages vary within the following confidence limits :

Observed percentages	10% or 90%	20% or 80%	30% or 70%	40% or 60%	50%
Confidence limits	± 1.9%	± 2.5%	± 2.7%	± 3.0%	± 3.1%

EUROBAROMETRE STANDARD 38.0 - SPECIFICATIONS TECHNIQUES

Entre le 21 septembre et le 15 octobre 1992, INRA (EUROPE), un réseau européen d'agences d'études de marché et d'opinion publique, a réalisé la vague 38.0 de l'EUROBAROMETRE STANDARD, à la demande de la COMMISSION DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE.

L'EUROBAROMETRE 38.0 couvre la population nationale, de 15 ans et plus, dans chaque Etat membre de la Communauté Européenne. Le principe d'échantillonnage appliqué dans tous les Etats membres est une sélection aléatoire (probabiliste) à multiples phases. Dans chaque pays CE, divers points de chute ont été tirés avec une probabilité proportionnelle à la taille de la population (afin de couvrir la totalité du pays) et à la densité de la population.

Pour ce, ces points de chute ont été tirés systématiquement dans chacune des "unités régionales administratives", après avoir été stratifiés par unité individuelle et par type de région. Ils représentent ainsi l'ensemble du territoire des Etats membres, selon les EUROSTAT-NUTS II et selon la distribution de la population résidente nationale en termes de régions métropolitaines, urbaines et rurales. Dans chacun des points de chute sélectionnés, une adresse de départ a été sélectionnée aléatoirement. D'autres adresses ont ensuite été sélectionnées, comme chaque dresse N, par des procédures de "random route" à partir de l'adresse initiale. Dans chaque minage, le répondant a été tiré aléatoirement. Toutes les interviews ont été réalisées en face à face chez les répondants et dans la langue nationale appropriée.

PAYS	INSTITUTS	N° INTERVIEWS	DATES DE TERRAIN	POPULATION 15+ (x000)
Belgium	MARKETING UNIT	1040	23/09 - 09/10	7 994.4
Denmark	GFK DANMARK	1000	23/09 - 09/10	4 160.4
Germany(East)	SAMPLE INSTITUT	1015	23/09 - 02/10	13 607.0
Germany(West)	SAMPLE INSTITUT	1013	23/09 - 09/10	51 708.0
Greece	KEME	1006	25/09 - 08/10	7 825.6
Spain	CIMEI	1004	21/09 - 10/10	29 427.2
France	TMO Consultants	1006	23/09 - 07/10	43 318.5
Ireland	LANSDOWNE Market Research	1008	24/09 - 14/10	2 583.0
Italy	PRAGMA	1052	28/09 - 10/10	46 902.8
Luxembourg	ILRES	500	21/09 - 15/10	302.6
The Netherlands	NIPO	1003	23/09 - 13/10	11 603.6
Portugal	NORMA	1000	24/09 - 09/10	7 718.7
Great Britain	NOP Corporate and Financial	1058	23/09 - 09/10	562.0
Northern Ireland	ULSTER MARKETING SERVICES	304	24/09 - 13/10	1159.1

Dans chaque pays, l'échantillon a été comparé à l'univers. La description de l'univers se base sur les données de population EUROSTAT. Pour tous les Etats membres CE, une procédure de pondération nationale a été réalisée (utilisant des pondérations marginales et croisées), sur base de cette description de l'univers. Dans tous les pays, au moins le sexe, l'âge, les régions NUTS II et la taille de l'agglomération ont été introduits dans la procédure d'itération. Pour la pondération internationale (i.e. les moyennes CE), INRA (EUROPE) recourt aux chiffres officiels de population, publiés par EUROSTAT dans l'Annuaire 1989 des Statistiques Régionales. Les chiffres complets de la population, introduits dans cette procédure de post-pondération, sont indiqués ci-dessus.

Les résultats des études EUROBAROMETRE sont analysés et sont présentés sous forme de tableaux, de fichiers de données et d'analyses. Pour chaque question, un tableau de résultats est fourni, accompagné de la question complète (en anglais et en français) en tête de page; ces résultats sont exprimés 1) en pourcentage calculé sur la base totale et 2) en pourcentage calculé sur le nombre de réponses "valables" (i.e. "Ne sait pas" et "Sans réponses" exclus). Tous les fichiers de données de l'EUROBAROMETRE sont déposés au Zentralarchiv (Universität Köln, Bachemer Strasse 40, D-5000 Köln 41). Ils sont à la disposition de tous les instituts membres du "European Consortium for Political Research" (Essex), du "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research" (Michigan) et de toute personne intéressée par la recherche en sciences sociales. Les résultats des enquêtes EUROBAROMETRE sont analysés par l'unité "Sondages, Recherches, Analyses" de la DG X de la Commission de la CE, "EUROBAROMETRE", Rue de la Loi 200, E1049 Bruxelles; ils peuvent être obtenus à cette adresse.

Il importe de rappeler aux lecteurs que les résultats d'un sondage sont des estimations dont l'exactitude, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, dépend de la taille de l'échantillon et du pourcentage observé. Pour des échantillons d'environ 1.000 interviews, le pourcentage réel oscille dans les intervalles de confiance suivants :

Pourcentage observé	10% or 90%	20% or 80%	30% or 70%	40% or 60%	50%
Intervalle de confiance	± 1.9%	± 2.5%	± 2.7%	± 3.0%	± 3.1%

## STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 38.1 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

### EUROBAROMETRE STANDARD 38.1 - SPECIFICATIONS TECHNIQUES

Between November 2 and November 27 1992, INRA (EUROPE), ● European Network of Market- and Public Opinion Research agencies, carried out wave 38.1 of the STANDARD EUROBAROMETER, on request of the COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES.

Entre le 2 novembre et le 27 novembre 1992, INRA (EUROPE), un réseau européen d'agences d'études de marché et d'opinion publique, a réalisé la vague 38.1 de l'EUROBAROMETRE STANDARD, à la demande de la COMMISSION DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE.

<u>COUNTRIES</u>	<u>INSTITUTES</u>	<u>N° INTERVIEWS</u>	<u>FIELDWORK DATES</u>	<u>POPULATION 16+ (x 000)</u>
Belgium	MARKETING UNIT	1043	09/11 - 20/11	7 994.4
Denmark	GFK DANMARK	1000	05/11 - 24/11	4 160.4
Germany (East)	SAMPLE INSTITUT	1014	10/11 - 22/11	13 607.0
Germany (West)	SAMPLE INSTITUT	1018	10/11 - 24/11	51 708.0
Greece	KEME	1003	09/11 - 23/11	7 826.6
Spain	CIMEI	1021	06/11 - 22/11	29 427.2
France	TMO Consultants	1008	09/11 - 23/11	43 318.5
Ireland	LANSDOWNE Market Research	1000	10/11 - 23/11	2 583.0
Italy	PRAGMA	1021	10/11 - 23/11	45 902.8
Luxembourg	ILRES	500	02/11 - 27/11	302.6
The Netherlands	NIPO	1022	09/11 - 27/11	11 603.6
Portugal	NORMA	1000	09/11 - 23/11	7 718.7
Great Britain	NOP Corporate and Financial	1066	04/11 - 23/11	44 562.0
Northern Ireland	ULSTER MARKETING SERVICES	308	09/11 - 22/11	1159.1

Observed percentages	10% or 90%	20% or 80%	30% or 70%	40% or 60%	50%
Confidence limits	± 1.9%	± 2.5%	± 2.7%	± 3.0%	± 3.1%

The remaining technical specifications are the same as for EB 38.0.

Les autres spécifications techniques sont les mêmes que pour l'EB 38.0.

## ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONAL UNITS / UNITES ADMINISTRATIVES REGIONALES

**BELGIQUE**

Hainaut  
Limburg  
Namur  
Flandre Orientale  
Flandre Occidentale  
**Liège**  
Luxembourg  
Brabant Flamand  
Antwerpen  
**Bruxelles**  
Brabant Wallon

**DANMARK**

Hovadstadsområdet  
**Sjælland**, Lolland-Falster  
Bornholm  
**Fyn**  
Jylland

**DEUTSCHLAND**

**Schleswig Holstein**  
Hamburg  
**RB Braunschweig**  
**RB Hannover**  
**RB Lüneburg**  
**RB Weser-EMS**  
Bremen  
Düsseldorf  
Köln  
Münster  
Detmold  
Arnsberg  
Darmstadt  
**Giessen**  
Kassel  
Koblenz  
Trier  
Rheinhausen-Pfalz  
Saarland  
**Nordwürttemberg-Stuttgart**  
Nordbaden-Karlsruhe  
**Südbaden-Freiburg**  
Südwestfalen-Tübingen  
**Oberbayern**  
**Niederbayern**  
**Oberpfalz**  
Oberfranken  
**Mittelfranken**  
Unterfranken  
Schwaben  
Berlin-west  
Berlin-Ost  
Rostock  
Schwerin  
Neubrandenburg  
Potsdam  
Frankfurt-Oder  
**Cottbus**  
Magdeburg  
**Halle, Erfurt**  
Gera, Suhl  
**Dresden, Leipzig**  
Chemnitz

**ELLAS**

Kentriki kai Dytiki  
Makedonia  
Thessalia  
Anatoliki Makedonia  
**Thraki**  
Anatoliki Sterea kai  
**Nisia**  
Peloponnisos & Dytiki  
**Sterea**  
**Ipeiros**  
**Kriti**  
**Nisia Anatolikou Aigaiou**

**ESPAGNE**

Andalucia  
Aragon  
Asturias  
Balearas  
Canarias  
Cantabria  
**Castilla-La Mancha**  
**Castilla-Leon**  
**Cataluna**  
**Extremadura**  
**Galicia**  
Madrid  
Murcia  
Navarra  
Peis Valenciano  
Pais Vasco  
La Rioja

**FRANCE**

Ile de France  
**Champagne-Ardenne**  
Picardie  
Hauts de Normandie  
Centre  
**Basse Normandie**  
Bourgogne  
**Nord/Pas-de-Calais**  
Lorraine  
Alsace  
Franche-Comte  
Pays de la Loire  
Bretagne  
Poitou-Charentes  
Aquitaine  
**Midi-Pyrénées**  
Limousin  
**Rhône-Alpes**  
Auvergne  
Languedoc-Roussillon  
Provence-Alpes  
**Côte d'Azur**  
Corse

**ITALIA**

**Valle d'Aosta/Piemonte**  
Liguria  
Lombardie  
**Milano**  
**Trentino**  
**Veneto**  
**Friuli, Venezia, Giulia**  
Emilia  
**Toscana**  
**Marche**  
**Umbria**  
Lazio  
**Molise e Abruzzi**  
**Campania**  
**Puglie**  
**Basilicata**  
Calabria  
Sicilia  
Sardegna

**IRELAND**

Dublin  
Rest of Leinster  
Munster  
**Connaught/Ulster**

**LUXEMBOURG**

Centre  
**Sud**  
Nord  
**Est**

**NEDERLAND**

Gröningen  
**Friesland**  
Drente  
**Overijssel**  
**Gelderland**  
Utrecht  
Noord-Holland  
**Zuid-Holland**  
Zealand  
Noord-Brabant  
Limburg  
flavoland

**PORTUGAL**

Norte  
Centro  
Lisboa e **Vale do Tejo**  
Alentejo  
**Algarve**  
Azores  
Madeira

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Cleveland, Durham  
Cumbria  
Northumberland  
Tyne & Wear  
Humberside  
North Yorkshire  
South Yorkshire  
**West Yorkshire**  
**Derbyshire**,  
Nottinghamshire  
Leicestershire,  
Northamptonshire  
Lincolnshire  
East Anglia  
Bedfordshire  
Hertfordshire  
Berkshire  
Buckinghamshire  
Oxfordshire  
Surrey  
**East/West Sussex**  
Essex  
Greater London  
**Hampshire, Isle of Wight**  
Kent  
Avon, Gloucestershire  
Wiltshire  
**Cornwall, Devon**  
**Dorset, Somerset**  
Hereford, & Worcester  
**Warwickshire**  
Shropshire, Staffordshire  
West Midlands (county)  
Cheshire  
Greater Manchester  
Lancashire  
**Merseyside**  
Clwyd, Dyfed  
Gwynedd, Powys  
Gwent  
MS-W Glamorgan  
Borders, **Central**, fife,  
Lothian, Tayside  
Dumfries, Galloway  
Strathclyde  
**Highlands, Islands**  
Grampians  
NORTHERN IRELAND

## FLASH 14/15 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS/SPECIFICATIONS TECHNIQUES

CO-OPERATING AGENCIES AND RESEARCH EXECUTIVES  
INSTITUTS ET CHARGES D'ETUDESNicole JAMAR - EOS ~~GALLUP~~ EUROPE

Pré Delcourt, 34

B - 1325 CHAUMONT-GISTOUX

BELGIUM

Tel: ++/32/10/68 96 14 - Fax: ++/32/10/68 96 16

BELGIQUE	DIMARSO N.V. 78, Boulevard Lambertmont B-1030 BRUXELLES	Luc SCHULPEN	tel. fax.	+ +/32 2 215 19 30 + +/32 2 216 13 96
DANMARK	GALLUP MARKEDANALYSE Marina Park-Sundkrosgade 10 DK-2100 COPENHAGEN	Rolf RANDRUP	tel. fax.	+ +14539 27 27 27 + +/4521 18 24 66
DEUTSCHLAND	EMNID-INSTITUT GmbH Bodelschwingstrasse 23-25 D-4800 BIELEFELD 1	Gunter BIERBAUM	tel. fax.	+ +/49 5212 600 10 + +/49 5212 600 155
ELLAS	ICAP HELLAS 64, Queen Sophia Avenue GR-11528 ATHENS	Tilemachos DIB	tel. fax.	+ +/30 1724 96 57 + +/30 1723 11 62
ESPANA	INTERGALLUP P-Hermosilla 23 E-28001 MADRID	Jaime MIQUEL ADRADA Victoria MIQUEL	tel. fax.	+ +/34 1431 93 36 + +/34 1576 40 05
FRANCE	C.S.A. 8, rue d'Uzès F-75002 PARIS	Roland CAYROL Stéphane ROZES	tel. fax.	+ +/33 1401 30 290 + +/33 1402 89 034
IRELAND	IRISH MARKETING SURVEYS 19-20 Upper Pembroke Street IRL-DUBLIN 2	Charles COYLE	tel. fax.	+ +/35 3176 11 96 + +/35 3176 08 777
ITALIA	PRAGMA Via Salaria, 298/a I-00199 ROMA	Clara MARIOTTI	tel. fax.	+ +/39 6841 35 57 + +139 685400 38
LUXEMBOURG	ILRES S.A. 6, Rue du Marché-aux-Herbes GD-1728 LUXEMBOURG	Louis MEVIS Charles MARGUE	tel. fax.	+ +/35 2475 02 1 + +/35 2462 62 0
NEDERLAND	NIPO B.V. Westerdokhuis, Barentzplein 7 NL-1013 AMSTERDAM	Arnold WEIJTLAND	tel. fax.	+ +/31 2052 38 444 + +/31 2062 64 375
PORTUGAL	NORMA - S.A. Av. 5 de Outubro, 122 P-1000 LISBOA	Armando HENRIQUES Susan CATITA	tel. fax.	+ +35 1179 67 604 + +/35 1179 73 948
UNITED KINGDOM	SOCIAL SURVEYS (GALLUP POLL) 307 Finchley Road, LONDON NW3 6BJ-UK	Bob WYBROW	tel. fax.	+ +/44 7179 40 461 + +/44 7143 10 252



FLASH 14 - SPECIFICATIONS TECHNIQUES

Entre le 30 juillet et le 11 septembre 1992, EOS Gallup Europe, un réseau européen d'agences d'études de marché et d'opinion publique, a réalisé FLASH 14 sur le Traité de Maastricht à la demande de la COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNES par les douze Instituts dont la liste suit:

PAYS	INSTITUTS	N° INTERVIEWS	PATES DE TERRAIN	POPULATION 15+ (x000)
Belgium	DIMARSO N.V.	1002	07/08 - 14/08	7 994.4
Denmark	GALLUP MARKEDANALYSE	1002	08/08 - 24/08	4 160.4
Germany	EMNID-INSTITUT GmbH	1009	05/08 - 20/08	13 607.0
Greece	ICAP HELLAS S	1000	04/09 - 11/09	7 825.6
Spain	INTERGALLUP	1002	03/08 - 27/08	29 427.2
France	C.S.A.	999	05/08 - 10/08	43 318.5
Ireland	IRISH MARKETING SERVICE	1400	06/08 - 14/08	2 583.0
Italy	PRAGMA	1026	30/07 - 07/08	45 902.8
Luxemburg	ILRES S.A.	302	04/08 - 07/08	302.6
The Netherlands	NIPO B.V.	862	07/08 - 11/08	11 603.6
Portugal	NORMA S.A.	998	03/08 - 14/08	7 718.7
Great Britain	SOCIAL SURVEYS (GALLUP POLL)	916	06/08 - 11/08	44 562.0

Chaque échantillon est **nationalement représentatif de la population continentale agée de 15 ans et plus, avec les restrictions suivantes** :

- ALLEMAGNE : limitation territoriale aux "anciens Linder"
- GREECE : limitation territoriale au Grand Athènes et Thessalonique
- GRAND-BRETAGNE : Irlande du Nord exclue
- FRANCE : Population agée de 18 ans et plus

A l'égard de la question 2, "S'il y avait un référendum sur la ratification ou le rejet du Traité de Maastricht, voteriez-vous pour ou contre la ratification du Traité de Maastricht?", deux pays de la Communauté avaient déjà connu un référendum en réalité à l'époque des interviews: le DANMARK et l'IRLANDE. La formulation de la question était adaptée en conséquence et porte donc dans ces deux pays sur un "autre" référendum. A l'époque des interviews, la FRANCE était en pré-campagne référendaire, et tous les instituts incorporaient une question d'intention de vote dans leurs sondages. Nous avons accepté la formulation proposée par l'institut C.S.A., qui élimine les "non-inscrits" par une question-filtre, comme la formulation de notre FLASH était autrement impraticable dans ce contexte.

FLASH 14 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Between 30th June and 11th September 1992, EOS Gallup Europe, a coordinating agency of European Marketing and Public Opinion instituter, carried out FLASH 14 on the Treaty of Maastricht at the request of the COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, with the assistance of the following institutes:

COUNTRY	INSTITUTES	N° INTERVIEWS	FIELDWORK DATES	POPULATION 16+(x000)
Belgium	DIMARSO N.V.	1002	07/08 - 14/08	7 994.4
Denmark	GALLUP MARKEDANALYSE	1002	08/08 - 24/08	4 160.4
Germany	EMNID-INSTITUT GmbH	1009	05/08 - 20/08	13 607.0
Greece	ICAP HELLAS S	1000	04/09 - 11/09	7 825.6
Spain	INTERGALLUP	1002	03/08 - 27/08	29 427.2
France	C.S.A.	999	05/08 - 10/08	43 318.5
Ireland	IRISH MARKETING SERVICE	1400	06/08 - 14/08	2 583.0
Italy	PRAGMA	1026	30/07 - 07/08	45 902.8
Luxemburg	ILRES S.A.	302	04/08 - 07/08	302.6
The Netherlands	NIPO B.V.	862	07/08 - 11/08	11 603.6
Portugal	NORMA S.A.	998	03/08 - 14/08	7 718.7
Great Britain	SOCIAL SURVEYS (GALLUP POLL)	916	06/08 - 11/08	44 562.0

Each survey is nationally representative of the population in each country aged 15 and over, with the following exceptions:

- GERMANY : "old Linder" only
- GREECE : Greater Athens and Thessalonika only
- GREAT BRITAIN : Northern Ireland not included.
- FRANCE : Population aged 18 and over.

In regard of question 2, "If there were a referendum on the ratification or rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht, would you vote for or against the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht?", two countries at the time of the interviews had already held referenda: DENMARK and IRELAND. The question formulation was consequently adapted and thus referred in these two countries to "another" referendum. At the time of the interviews, FRANCE was in pre-referendum campaign phase, and all the institutes incorporated a question addressing intention to vote in their surveys. The C.S.A. Institute proposal of eliminating "non-registered" by a filter-question was used, as otherwise the formulation of the Flash would have been impracticable in this context.

## FLASH 15 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Between 12th and 15th December 1992, EOS GALLUP EUROPE, a coordination office of European Market- and Public Opinion Research Institutes, carried out flash EUROBAROMETER 15 on attitudes towards the re-examined Maastricht Treaty at the request of the COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, with the assistance of the following Institutes:-

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>INSTITUTES</u>	<u>No. INTERVIEWS</u>	<u>FIELDWORK DATES</u>	<u>POPULATION 15+ (x000)</u>
DENMARK	GALLUP A/S	483	13/12 1992-14/12/92	4,160.4
GREAT BRITAIN	GALLUP POLL	508	12/12/92-14/12/92	44,562.0

Each sample is nationally representative of the population in each country aged 18 or over (In Great Britain: Northern Ireland not included.) The interviews were carried out by telephone.

## FLASH 15 - SPECIFICATIONS TECHNIQUES

Entre le 12 et le 15 décembre 1992, EOS Gallup Europe, un bureau de coordination d'instituts européens d'études de marché et d'opinion publique, a organisé l'EUROBAROMETRE FLASH 15. Ce flash, portant sur les attitudes à l'égard de la version révisée du Traité de Maastricht, a été effectué à la demande de la COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES par les instituts de sondage suivants:

<u>PAYS</u>	<u>INSTITUTS</u>	<u>No. INTERVIEWS</u>	<u>DATES DE TERRAIN</u>	<u>POPULATION 15+ (x000)</u>
DANMARK	GALLUP AIS	483	13/12/92-14/12/92	4,160.4
GRANDE-BRETAGNE	GALLUP POLL	508	12/12/92-14/12/92	44,562.0

Dans l'ensemble des pays, chaque échantillon est représentatif de la population âgée de 18 ans et plus (en Grande-Bretagne: l'Irlande du nord n'était pas incluse). Les interviews ont été effectuées par téléphone.

## ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONAL UNITS / UNITES ADMINISTRATIVES REGIONALES

**BELGIQUE**

Hainaut  
Limburg  
Namur  
flandre Orientale  
flandre Occidentale  
**Liège**  
Brabant flamand  
Antwerpen  
**Bruxelles**  
Brabant Wallon

**DANMARK**

Hovedstadsområdet  
Sjælland, Lolland-Falster  
Fyn  
Jylland

**DEUTSCHLAND**

Schleswig-Holstein  
Hamburg  
RB Braunschweig  
RB Hannover  
RB Lüneburg  
RB Weser-EMS  
Bremen  
Düsseldorf  
Köln  
Münster  
Detmold  
Arnsberg  
Darmstadt  
Giessen  
Kassel  
Koblenz  
Trier  
Rheinhausen-Pfalz  
Saarland  
Nordwürttemberg-Stuttgart  
Nordbaden-Karlsruhe  
Südbaden-Freiburg  
Südwestfalen-Tübingen  
Oberbayern  
Niederbayern  
Oberpfalz  
Oberfranken  
Mittelfranken  
Unterfranken  
Schwaben  
Berlin-west

**ELLAS**

Kentriki & Dykiti Ma  
Anatoliki Sterea & N

**ESPANA**

Andalucia  
Aragon  
Balears  
Canarias  
Castilla-La Mancha  
Castilla-Leon  
Cataluna  
Galicia  
Murcia  
Comunidad Valenciana  
Pais Vasco  
La Rioja

**FRANCE**

Ile de France  
Champagne-Ardenne  
Picardie  
Centre  
Basse Normandie  
Nord/Pas-de-Calais  
Lorraine  
Bretagne  
Aquitaine  
Midi-Pyrénées  
Rhône-Alpes  
Provence-Alpes

**ITALIA**

Piemonte e Val d'Aosta  
Lombardia  
Liguria  
**Milano**  
Trentino  
Veneto  
Friuli, Venezia, Giulia  
Emilia  
Toscana  
Mucho  
**Umbria**  
**Lazio**  
**Molise e Abruzzi**  
**Campania**  
**Puglia**  
**Basilicata**  
**Calabria**  
Sicilia  
Sardegna

**IRELAND**

Dublin  
Rest of Leinster  
Munster  
Connaught/Ulster

**LUXEMBOURG**

Centre  
**Sud**  
Nord  
Est

**NEDERLAND**

Groningen  
Friesland  
Drente  
Overijssel  
Gelderland  
Utrecht  
**Noord-Holland**  
Zuid-Holland  
**Zeeland**  
Noord-Brabant  
Limburg  
Flevoland

**PORTUGAL**

Great Lisbon  
Great Oporto  
North Littoral  
Center Littoral  
North Lisbon  
**Setubal**  
**Viseu**  
North Interior  
Coimbra Interior  
Ribatejo Interior  
Alentejo  
**Algarve**

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Cleveland, Durham  
Cumbria  
Northumberland  
**Tyne**  
Humberside  
North Yorkshire  
South Yorkshire  
West Yorkshire  
Derbyshire,  
Nottinghamshire  
Leicestershire,  
Northamptonshire  
Lincolnshire  
East Anglia  
Bedfordshire  
Hertfordshire  
Berkshire  
Buckinghamshire  
Surrey  
East/West Sussex  
Essex  
Greater London  
Hampshire, Isle of Wight  
Kent  
Avon, Gloucestershire  
Cornwall, Devon  
Dorset, Somerset  
Hereford, & Worcester  
Shropshire, Staffordshire  
West Midlands (county)  
Greater Manchester  
Merseyside  
Gwent  
Glamorgan  
Borders, Central, Fife  
Dumfries, Galloway  
Highlands, Islands

## LIST OF TABLES / LISTE DES TABLEAUX

Table/Tableau 1 : THE NEXT YEAR : BETTER OR WORSE ? / L'année prochaine : meilleure ou moins bonne ? (% , by country/par pays) . . . . .	A15
Table/Tableau 2 : PERCEIVED CHANGES IN COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION - PAST 12 MONTHS / Evaluation des changements de la situation économique du pays au cours des 12 derniers mois (% , by country/par pays) . . . . .	A15
Table/Tableau 3 : ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION - NEXT 12 MONTHS / Evaluation des changements de la situation économique du pays dans les 12 prochains mois (% , by country/par pays) . . . . .	A16
Table/Tableau 4 : PERCEIVED CHANGES IN FINANCIAL SITUATION OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS - PAST 12 MONTHS / Changements perçus dans la situation financière de son ménage - 12 derniers mois (% , by country/par pays) . . . . .	A16
Table/Tableau 5 : ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN FINANCIAL SITUATION OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS - NEXT 12 MONTHS / Evaluation des changements de la situation financière des ménages dans les 12 prochains mois (% , by country/par pays) . . . .	A16
Table/Tableau 6 : AWARENESS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY / La notoriété de la Communauté Européenne (% , by country/par pays) . . . . .	A17
Table/Tableau 7 : FEELING INFORMED ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY / Sentiment d'être informé sur la Communauté Européenne (% , by country / par pays) . . . . .	A17
Table/Tableau 8 : SUPPORT FOR UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE / Appui à l'unification de l'Europe occidentale (% , by country/par pays) . . . . .	A18
Table/Tableau 9 : EC MEMBERSHIP: "A GOOD THING" / Appartenance à la CE: "une bonne chose" (% , by country/par pays) . . . . .	A18
Table/Tableau 10 : HAS ONE'S COUNTRY BENEFITED FROM EC MEMBERSHIP/ Son pays a-t-il bénéficié de son appartenance à la CE (% , by country/par pays) . .	A19
Table/Tableau 11 : ATTITUDE IF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAD BEEN SCRAPPED / L'attitude en cas d'abandon de la Communauté Européenne (% , by country/ par pays) . . . . .	A19
Table/Tableau 12 : TYPOLOGY OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES / Typologie d'attitudes européennes (% , EC12+ / CE12+ , by socio-demographic and socio-political variables / par variables socio-démographiques et socio-politiques) . . . . .	A20
Table/Tableau 13 : TYPOLOGY OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES / Typologie d'attitudes européennes (% , by country/par pays) . . . . .	A21
Table/Tableau 14 : IMPORTANCE OF EC MATTERS / Importance des affaires communautaires (% , by country/par pays) . . . . .	A21
Table/Tableau 15 : AWARENESS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION / La notoriété de la Commission Européenne (% , by country/par pays) . . . . .	A22

Table/Tableau 16 : IMPRESSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION / L'impression sur la Commission Européenne (% of those who have heard of the European Commission, by country / % de ceux qui ont entendu quelque chose au sujet de la Commission Européenne, par pays) ..... A22

Table/Tableau 17 : AWARENESS AND IMPORTANCE OF COUNCIL PRESIDENCY / Notoriété et importance de la présidence du Conseil (% , 1986-1992) ..... A23

Table/Tableau 18 : MAASTRICHT: HEARD OF?/ Entendu parler de Maastricht? (% , by country/par pays) ..... A24

Table/Tableau 19 : MAASTRICHT: HOW MUCH DO YOU KNOW?/Maastricht: qu'en connaissez-vous? (% , by country/par pays) ..... A24

Table/Tableau 20 : MAASTRICHT: FOR OR AGAINST?/ Maastricht: pour ou contre? (% , by country/par pays, only those who express an opinion/uniquement ceux qui expriment une opinion) ..... A25

Table/Tableau 21 : MAASTRICHT: FOR OR AGAINST?/ Maastricht: pour ou contre? (% , by country/par pays) ..... A25

Table/Tableau 22 : RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAASTRICHT AND GENERAL EURO-ATTITUDES / Relation entre Maastricht et les attitudes générales envers l'Europe (Crosstabulation between Tables 13 and 20 / Croisement des tableaux 13 et 20) ..... A26

Table/Tableau 23 : VOTE INTENTION IN REFERENDUM/ Intentions de vote lors d'un referendum(% , EC12 +/CE12 + ,by socio-demographic and socio-political variables/par variables socio-démographiques et socio-politiques) ..... A27

Table/Tableau 24 : OPINION ON MAASTRICHT ISSUES/ Opinion à l'égard des thèmes de débat autour de Maastricht (% , by country/par pays) ..... A28

Table/Tableau 25 : OPINION ON EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION AND ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION/ Opinion à l'égard de l'Union Economique et Monétaire Européenne et de l'Union politique (% , by country/par pays) ..... A30

Table/Tableau 26 : THE MOST POWERFUL INSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REGARDING EC LEGISLATION / L'institution de la Communauté Européenne ayant le plus de pouvoir en matière de législation CE (% , by country/par pays) ..... A31

Table/Tableau 27 : NATIONAL OR JOINT COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKING ? / Decisions nationales ou en commun au sein de la Communauté ? (% , by country/ par pays) ..... A32

Table/Tableau 28 : POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECT OF MAASTRICHT TREATY ? / Effets positifs et négatifs du Traité de Maastricht (% , by country/par pays) .. A34

Table/Tableau 29 : NATIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN UNION/L'identité nationale et l'Union Européenne (% , by country/par pays) ..... A34

Table/Tableau 30 : EUROPEAN IDENTITY / L'identité européenne (% , by country/par pays) ..... A35

Table/Tableau 31 : AWARENESS OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET OF 1992 / La notoriété du Grand Marche Europeen de 1992 (% , by country/par pays) . . . . A35

Table/Tableau 32 : DATE OF START OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET / Date d'entrée en vigueur du Grand Marche Europeen (% , by country/par pays) . . . A36

Table/Tableau 33 : THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET IN 1992 - A GOOD THING ? | Le Grand Marche Europeen de 1992 - Une bonne chose ? (% , by country / par pays) . . . . . A36

Table/Tableau 34 : THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET OF 1992: HOPE OR FEAR ? | Le Grand Marche Europeen de 1992 : espoir ou crainte ? (% , by country / par pays) . . . . . A37

Table/Tableau 35 : REASONS FOR HOPE ABOUT THE SINGLE MARKET ? / Les raisons de l'espoir à l'égard du Grand Marché? (% , by country / par pays, only those who answered very or rather hopeful about Single European Market/ Uniquement ceux à qui le Marche Unique donne beaucoup ou un peu d'espoir ) . . . . . A38

Table/Tableau 36 : REASONS FOR FEARING SINGLE MARKET ? / Les principales raisons des craintes à l'égard du Grand Marche? (% , by country/par pays, only those who answer very or rather fearful about the Single Market/Uniquement ceux à qui le Marche Unique donne beaucoup ou un peu de crainte) . . . . . A39

Table/Tableau 37 : THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE SINGLE MARKET - A GOOD THING ? / La dimension sociale du Marche Unique - Une bonne chose ? (% , by country/par pays) . . . . . A40

Table/Tableau 38 : AWARENESS OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT / Notoriété du Parlement Europeen (% , by country/par pays) . . . . . A40

Table/Tableau 39 : IMPRESSION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT / L'impression sur le Parlement Europeen (% of those who said they heard of the European Parliament / % de ceux déclarant avoir entendu parler du Parlement Europeen, by country/par pays) . . . . . A41

Table/Tableau 40 : THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN EC LIFE / Le Parlement Europeen dans la vie de la CE (% , by country / par pays) . . . . . A41

Table/Tableau 41 : OPINION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT / Opinion à l'égard des activités du Parlement Europeen (% , by country / par pays) . . . . . A42

Table/Tableau 42 : THE ROLE DESIRED FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT / Le rôle souhaite pour le Parlement Europeen (% , by country/par pays) . . . . . A43

Table/Tableau 43 : RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CURRENT AND DESIRED ROLES FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT/ Relation entre le rôle actuel et le rôle souhaite du Parlement Europeen (Crosstabulation between Tables 40 and 42 /Croisement des tableaux 40 et 42). . . . . A43

Table/Tableau 44 : POLICY AREAS FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S APPROVAL/ Domaines politiques dans lesquels les decisions devraient être approuvées par le Parlement Europeen (% , by country/par pays) . . . . . A44

Table/Tableau 45 : SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN ONE'S COUNTRY / Satisfaction à l'égard de la démocratie dans son pays (% , by country / par pays) .	A44
Table/Tableau 46 : DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT / Déficit démocratique (% , by country/par pays) .	A45
Table/Tableau 47 : RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION WITH OWN DEMOCRACY AND THE EC DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT / Relation entre la satisfaction à l'égard de sa propre démocratie et le déficit démocratique de la CE (Crosstabulation between Tables 45 and 46 / Croisement des tableaux 45 et 46) .	A45
Table/Tableau 48 : SUPPORT FOR A EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT / Pour un gouvernement européen responsable devant le Parlement Européen (% , by country/par pays) .	A45
Table/Tableau 49 : EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE YEAR 2000 / La Communauté Européenne en l'an 2000 (% , by country/par pays) .	A46
Table/Tableau 50 : AWARENESS OF EUROPEAN COURT / Notoriété de la Cour de Justice Européenne (% , by country/par pays) .	A49
Table/Tableau 51 : OBEYING EUROPEAN COURT DECISIONS / Obeir aux décisions de la Cour de Justice Européenne (% , by country/par pays) .	A49
Table/Tableau 52 : CONCERN ABOUT CONSUMER PROTECTION / Concerne par le problème de sécurité des produits (% , by country/par pays) .	A50
Table/Tableau 53 : MAIN INCOME EARNER / La personne qui apporte le revenu principal du foyer (% , by country/par pays) .	A50
Table/Tableau 54 : MAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR SHOPPING AND HOUSEHOLD / La personne principale responsable des tâches ménagères (% , by country / par pays) .	A50
Table/Tableau 55 : SAME MAIN PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR INCOME AND DOMESTIC WORK / La même personne qui apporte le revenu principal du foyer et qui est principalement responsable des tâches ménagères (% , by country /par pays? crosstabulation tables 53 and 54/Croisement des tableaux 53 et 54) .	A50

Table/Tableau 1 : T Y NEXT YEAR : BETTER OR WORSE ? / L'année prochaine : meilleure ou moins bonne ? (%  
by country/par pays)

QUESTION : As far as you are concerned, do you think that next year - 1993 - will be better or worse than 1992? / En ce qui vous concerne, pensez-vous que l'année prochaine - 1993 - sera meilleure ou moins bonne que 1992?

1st column: EB38 result 2nd colmn: Change from EB36	B		DK		D						GR		E		F	
					WEST		EAST									
Better	26	+8	39	+2	20	-6	23	-9	33	-19	26	-3	21	-28	29	+5
Yorse	28	+11	12	+1	35	+7	33	+7	24	+6	50	+4	46	+29	28	+3
Same (SPONT)	36	-5	45	+1	37	0	36	+3	34	+15	17	+3	25	+2	36	-4
Don't know	9	-14	4	-4	8	-1	8	-1	9	-2	7	-3	8	-3	7	-4
TOTAL	99		100		100		100		100		100		100		100	

1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col:Variation depuis EB36	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC 12 +	
Meilleure	32	-15	33	-7	20	-6	28	+3	36	-17	34	-22	28	-9	28	-10
Moins bonne	32	+11	41	+20	26	+4	19	-4	28	+15	36	+20	35	+13	35	+13
Sans changement (SPONT)	29	+4	15	-9	48	+6	49	+6	25	+5	23	+4	29	0	29	0
Ne sait pas	6	0	11	-4	7	-3	5	-4	11	-2	8	-2	8	-3	8	-3
TOTAL	99		100		101		101		100		101		100		100	

Table/Tableau 2 : PERCEIVED CHANGES IN COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION - PAST 12 MONTHS / Evaluation des changements de la situation économique du pays au cours des 12 derniers mois (% by country/par pays)

QUESTION : Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in this country is ...? / Par rapport à ce qu'elle était il y a 12 mois, pensez-vous que la situation économique générale de ce pays est actuellement ...?

	B	DK	D			GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12 +
			WEST		EAST										
A lot better	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	2	0	1
A little better	7	18	5	9	24	9	7	7	11	6	13	5	31	3	8
Stayed the same	30	31	31	31	31	18	15	29	23	13	35	32	38	9	22
A little worse	40	36	50	46	31	40	43	37	33	42	36	46	24	32	40
A lot worse	17	11	12	11	10	30	31	25	29	36	6	11	3	53	27
Don't know	5	3	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	9	5	3	2	3
TOTAL	100	101	101	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	99	101



Table/Tableau 3 : ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION - NEXT 12 MONTHS / Evaluation des changements de la situation économique du pays dans les 12 prochains mois (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : And over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation in this country will get ...? Would you say it will ...? / Et dans les 12 prochains mois, pensez-vous que la situation économique générale de ce pays va devenir ...?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+
			WEST	EAST										
Bien meilleure	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	0	2	2	1
Un peu meilleure	12	19	8	12	19	10	18	21	32	11	7	28	21	18
Inchangée	34	38	26	27	19	23	35	30	23	33	21	34	27	27
Un peu moins bonne	33	34	46	42	30	37	23	28	24	34	57	24	27	32
Bien moins bonne	14	4	16	14	20	23	16	12	13	6	11	3	19	16
Ne sait pas	6	4	3	3	10	5	8	7	6	15	3	9	4	5
TOTAL	100	100	100	99	100	99	101	100	100	101	99	100	100	99

Table/Tableau 4 : PERCEIVED CHANGES IN FINANCIAL SITUATION OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS - PAST 12 MONTHS / Changements perçus dans la situation financière de son ménage ~ 12 derniers mois (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the financial situation of your household, now is ....? / Par rapport à ce qu'elle était il y a 12 mois, pensez-vous que la situation financière de votre ménage est actuellement ?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+
			WEST	EAST										
A lot better	3	4	1	3	2	2	4	2	2	3	4	2	4	3
A little better	15	19	11	16	8	13	11	14	12	19	16	28	13	14
Stayed the same	54	57	58	54	29	51	46	47	54	64	56	51	37	49
A little worse	21	15	25	23	38	27	26	22	25	10	19	17	28	25
A lot worse	4	4	3	4	23	6	12	1	2	5	1	4	1	7
Don't know	3	1	2	2	1	1	2	3	2	4	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	100	100	100	102	101	100	101	100	100	101	100	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 5 : ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN FINANCIAL SITUATION OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS - NEXT 12 MONTHS / Evaluation des changements de la situation financière des ménages dans les 12 prochains mois (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : And over the next 12 months, do you expect the financial situation of your household will ...? / Et dans les 12 prochains mois, pensez-vous que la situation financière de votre ménage va devenir ...?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+
			WEST	EAST										
Bien meilleure	4	4	2	2	2	2	5	3	2	3	4	1	4	3
Un peu meilleure	21	27	13	17	20	15	19	18	21	17	18	28	21	19
Inchangée	48	55	50	48	28	47	46	50	49	64	55	45	48	47
Un peu moins bonne	17	11	28	27	27	24	18	14	19	9	20	18	17	21
bien moins bonne	4	1	4	4	16	6	7	6	3	2	2	1	6	5
Ne sait pas	7	2	3	3	8	7	5	9	6	6	2	8	4	5
TOTAL	101	100	100	101	101	101	100	100	100	101	101	101	100	100

# A 17

Table/Tableau 6 : **AWARENESS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/La notoriété de la Communauté Européenne** (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : Have you recently heard or read something about the European Community (the EC) or the European Economic Community (the EEC), its policies, its institutions ? / Avez-vous récemment entendu ou lu quelque chose au sujet de la Communauté Européenne (La CE) ou de la Communauté Economique Europeenne (CEE), ses politiques, ses institutions ?

1st column: EB38 result 2nd column: Change from EB37	B	DK	D				GR	E	EC 12+
			WEST			EAST			
Yes	79 +16	88 +9	84 +14	84 +12	06 +5	82 +18	75 +16	81 +15	
Nb	20 -16	10 -11	12 -12	11 -11	10 -5	15 -20	24 -16	16 -16	
Don't know	1 0	2 +2	5 0	5 0	4 +1	2 +1	1 -1	3 0	
TOTAL	100	100	101	100	100	99	100	100	

1ère colonne: Résultat E638 2e col: Variation depuis EB37	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12 +
Oui	83 +14	74 +14	80 +13	85 +12	87 +19	84 +6	79 +21	81 +15
Non	15 -19	24 -13	18 -15	12 -9	12 -18	14 -5	19 -22	16 -16
Ne sait pas	2 0				1 -1	2 0	2 +1	3 0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 7 : **FEELING INFORMED ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY / Sentiment d'être informé sur la Communauté Européenne** (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : All things considered, how well informed do you feel you are about the European Community, its policies, its institutions ? / Tout compte fait, comment vous sentez-vous informé sur la Communauté Europeenne, ses politiques, ses institutions ?

	B	DK	D				GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+
			West			East										
Very well/Très bien	2	7	5	5	2	2	4	2	3	7	2	6	4	2	2	3
Quite well/Assez bien	32	38	35	33	27	26	26	20	27	30	29	38	42	23	26	29
Not very well/ Assez mal	42	48	47	49	56	47	47	47	45	37	49	40	41	45	48	47
Not at all well/ Très mal	20	6	11	11	13	22	28	28	22	24	19	13	12	28	23	19
Don't know/Ne sait pas	4	0	2	2	2	1	3	3	2	2	1	3	1	3	0	2
TOTAL	100	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	99	100	100	100	100	101	99	100

# A 18

Table/Tableau 8 : **SUPPORT FOR UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE / Appui à l'unification de l'Europe occidentale** (% , by country, par pays)

**QUESTION :** In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? Are you...? / D'une façon générale, êtes-vous pour ou contre les efforts qui sont faits pour unifier l'Europe occidentale? Etes-vous ....?

1st column: EB38 result 2nd column: Change from EB37	B	DK		D				GR		E		F	
				WEST		EAST							
Very much for	21 -2	28 +5	28 -1	26 -3	19 -9	43 -4	31 -8	24 +5					
To some extent for	53 -4	37 -1	46 +3	45 +1	45 -3	39 +3	47 +8	49 -7					
To some extent against	13 +3	17 -4	14 -1	15 0	20 +5	6 0	9 +4	14 +4					
Very much against	3 +1	15 +1	6 0	7 +1	11 +7	5 + 3	3 0	6 0					
Don't know	9 +1	3 0	6 -1	6 0	5 0	8 -1	11 -3	7 -2					
TOTAL	99	100	100	99	100	101	101	100					

1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col:Variation depuis EB37	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Très pour	33 -3	31 -11	30 +6	24 +2	51 -8	17 -7	27	27 -3
Plutôt pour	41 -4	52 +6	50 +1	52 -3	29 +4	40 -6	46	46 0
Plutôt contre	9 +4	8 +2	11 -4	13 0	6 +2	19 +6	13	13 +2
Très contre	4 +2	2 0	5 + 2	6 +2	2 0	13 +7	6	6 +1
Ne sait pas	13 +1	7 +2	5 -4	5 -1	13 +2	11 +1	8	8 0
TOTAL	100	100	101	100	101	100	100 *	100

Table/Tableau 9 : **EC MEMBERSHIP: "A GOOD THING" / Appartenance à la CE: "une bonne chose"** (% , by country, par pays)

**WESTION :** Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRYS) membership of the European Community is ....? / D'une façon générale, pensez-vous que le fait pour (NOTRE PAYS) de faire partie de la Communauté Européenne est ....?

1st column: EB38 result 2nd col: Change from EB37	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			EST	1	EAST			
A good thing	63 -6	68 +11	60 0	60 -3	60 -4	78 +2	58 -8	58 -1
A bad thing	7 0	14 -7	11 -2	10 -1	7 +4	8 +2	9 -3	12 0
Neither good nor bad	25 +3	16 -3	24 +3	24 +3				
Don't know	5 +2	2 -1	5 -1	5 0				
TOTAL	100	100	100	99				
1ère colonne: Resultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis EB37	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Une bonne chose	71 -4	71 -5	78 0	85 0	70 -2	43 -11	60	60 -5
Une mauvaise chose	9 +3	7 + 2	5 0	3 - 1	5 +2	25 +12	12	12 +2
Une chose ni bonne ni mauvaise	16 +2	16 +3	14 -1	10 +2	20 +1	25 0	22	23 +4
Ne sait pas	5 0	6 + 1	3 + 2	3 0			5	5 -1
TOTAL	101	100	100	101	6 0	108 +1	99	100

101

Table/Tableau 10 : **HAS ONE'S COUNTRY BENEFITED FROM EC MEMBERSHIP /** son pays a-t-il bénéficié de son appartenance à la CE (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community ? / Tout bien considere, estimez-vous que (NOTRE PAYS) a bénéficié ou non de son appartenance à la Communauté Européenne ?

1st colum: EB38 result 2nd colum: Change EB37	B	DK	D						GR	E	F
			EST		EAST						
Benefited	58 -3	73 +6	47 0	47 -1	45 -10	70 -3	42 -2	49 -1			
Not benefited	19 +3	16 -5	36 -2	37 +2	38 +11	17 +4	43 +5	31 -1			
Don't knou	24 +1	11 -1	16 0	16 0	16 -3	13 -1	14 -5	21 +2			
TOTAL	101	100	99	100	99	100	99	101			
1are colonne: Resultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis EB37	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +			
Bénéficié	77 -4	54 -7	67 -5	72 -1	78 -4	31 -14	49	49 -4			
Pas bénéficié	15 +3	24 +8	18 +4	11 -3	10 -4		33	34 +5			
Ne sait pas	8 0	22 -1	15 +1	17 +3	12 +3	52 +15	18	18 0			
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100 +3	100 -1	100	101			

Table/Tableau 11 : **ATTITUDE IF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAD BEEN SCRAPPED /** L'attitude en cas d'abandon de la Communauté Européenne (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : If you were told tomorrow that the European Community had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or very relieved? / Si l'on annonçait demain que la Communauté Européenne est abandonnée, @prouveriez-vous de grands regrets, de l'indifférence (cela vous serait égal) ou un vif soulagement?

1st colum: EB38 result 2nd colum: Change from EB37	B		DK		D				GR		E		F			
					WEST		EAST									
Very sorry	41	0	48	+11	45	-3	44	-4	40	-10	53	-6	45	-7	47	+2
Indifferent	43	0	29	-1	30	+2	32	+3	39	+5	33	+6	41	+10	32	-7
Very relieved	6	+1	16	-6	12	0	12	+2	11	+5	5	+1	8	+3	14	+5
Don't know	9	-2	8	-4	13	0	12	0	9	-2	10	-1	6	-6	8	0
TOTAL	99		101		100		100		99		101		100		101	
1ère colonne: Resultat EB38 2e col:Variation depuis EB37	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC 12 +	
De grands regrets	53	-1	58	-4	60	-1	55	+4	44	-6	25	-9	45		44	-4
De l'indifférence	34	-2	29	+4	28	0	31	-4	43	+6	41	-2	34		34	+1
Un vif soulagement	7	+2	4	+1	5	+2	6	+2	3	+1	28	+12	12		12	+3
Ne sait pas	6	0	10	0	7	-2	9	-1	10	-1	7	0	9		9	-1
TOTAL	100		101		100		101		100		101		100		99	

Table/Tableau 12 : **TPOLOGY OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES/** Typologie d'attitudes européennes (% , EC12+/CE12+, by socio-demographic and socio-political variables/par variables socio-démographiques et socio-politiques)

QUESTIONS : See appendices/Voir annexes

	SEX(E)		AGE				AGE AT END OF STUDIES/ AGE DE FIN D'ETUDES				POLITICAL SCALE/ ECHELLE POLITIQUE			TOTAL EC12+
	M	F	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+	-16	16-19	20+	STUDENT/ ETUDIANT	L/G	(*) C	R/D	
Positive	61	50	56	57	57	52	47	53	71	64	63	57	52	55
Ambivalent	31	41	38	35	35	38	43	38	24	32	30	36	37	36
Negative	8	8	5	8	9	10	10	9	6	4	7	7	12	8
TOTAL	100	99	99	100	101	100	100	100	101	100	100	100	101	99

	OPINION LEADERSHIP (*)				RESPONDENT OCCUPATION SCALE						EUROPEAN SOCIAL GRADE							TOTAL CE12+
	++ high/ élevé	+	-	-- low/ faible	Self employed	Managers	Other white collars	Manual workers	House person	Unemp loyed	A	B	C	D	E1	E2	E3	
Positives	65	62	52	39	58	68	58	50	50	49	68	64	57	51	44	47	53	55
Ambivalentes	26	32	39	50	32	26	36	40	41	41	26	28	35	39	44	45	42	36
Négatives	8	7	9	10	10	6	7	10	9	10	6	7	8	10	12	8	5	8
TOTAL	99	101	100	99	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	99	100	100	100	101	99	W

(\*) See annex/Voir annexes "technical specifications for socio-demographic and socio-political variables used in cross-tabulations".

Table/Tableau 13 : **TYPOLGY OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES** / Typologie d'attitudes européennes (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTIONS : See appendices/Voir annexes

1st column: EB38 result 2nd column: Change from EB37	B		DK		D		GR		E		EC12+					
					WEST		EAST									
Positive	58	-6	56	+6	56	-1	55	-3	51	-13	68	-1	54	-6	55	-5
Ambivalent	37	+4	32	-1	35	+2	37	+4	43	+9	26	-1	41	-6	36	+2
Negative	5	+1	12	-6	9	-1	8	-1	6	+3	6	+2	4	0	8	+2
TOTAL	100		100		100		100		100		100		99		99	
1ère colonne: Resultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis EB37	F		IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC12+	
Positives	55	0	62	+5	66	-8	68	+6	71	+1	62	-3	38	-10	55	-5
Ambivalentes	37	0	34	+3	30	+7	29	-7	26	-1	36	+3	44	0	36	+2
Negatives	9	+1	4	+2	4	+1	3	+1	3	+1	2	+1	18	+10	8	+2
TOTAL	101		100		100		100		100		100		100		99	

Table/Tableau 14 : **IMPORTANCE OF EC MATTERS** / Importance des affaires communautaires (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : Whether or not you have the time to take a personal interest in European Community matters, do you feel that these are very important, important, not very important or not at all important for the future of (OUR COUNTRY) and the (PEOPLE OF OUR COUNTRY) ? / Que vous ayez ou non le temps de vous intéresser personnellement aux affaires de la Communauté Européenne, est-ce que cela vous paraît, pour l'avenir de (NOTRE PAYS) et de (NOS CONCITOYENS), être des affaires...?

1st column: EB38 result 2nd colum: Change from EB37	B	DK	D				GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST				
Very important	23 +5	45 +1	21 -4	20 -4	17 -5	42 +6	28 -2	32 +4	
Irrportant	56 -3	44 -3	52 +1	53 0	53 -5	45 -4	55 +6	52 -2	
Not very important	13 +1	8 +3	18 +4	18 +4	21 +6	5 0	9 +1	9 -1	
Not at all important	2 0	2 +1	3 -2	3 -1	4 +3	2 +1	3 +1	3 -1	
Don't know	6 -3	2 0	6 0	6 +1	4 0	6 -3	5 -6	4 0	
TOTAL	100	101	100	100	99	100	100	100	

1ère colonne: Resultat EB38 2e col:Variation depuis EB37	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Très importantes	42 +3	33 +2	37 -3	22 -5	26 +4	30 -8	29 0	28 -1
Importantes	41 -7	56 +2	51 -3	61 -5	59 +4	47 -3	52 -1	52 -1
Peu importantes	8 0	6 0	6 -2	10 -1	7 +3	16 +3	11 +1	12 +2
Pas du tout irrportantes	3 +2	1 0	1 0	2 0	2 +1	4 0	3 0	3 0
Ne sait pas	7 +3	5 -1	4 -2	5 0	7 +2	4 +1	5 -1	5 0
TOTAL	101	101	99	100	101	101	100	100

Table/Tableau 15 : **AWARENESS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION** /La notoriété de la Commission Européenne (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : Have you recently seen or heard, in the papers, on the radio, or on television, anything about the European Commission in Brussels, that is the Commission of the European Communities ? / Avez-vous récemment lu dans les journaux ou entendu à la radio ou vu à la télévision quelque chose au sujet de la Commission Européenne à Bruxelles, c'est-à-dire de la Commission de la Communauté Européenne ?

1st column: E638 result 2nd column: Change from E637	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST			
Yes.	55 +8	68 +9	52 +4	52 +5	51 +6	50 +5	53 +22	56 +10
No	39 -4	31 -8	35 -6	35 -6	35 -6	47 -2	43 -21	41 -10
Don't know	6 -4	1 -2	14 +2	14 +2	13 -1	3 -3	4 -1	4 0
TOTAL	100	100	101	101	99	100	100	101
1ère colonne: Résultat E638 2e col: Variation depuis E637	IRL	I	L	YL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Oui	55 +7	43 +3	62 +8	52 +20	61 +3	50 +13	51 +9	51 +9
Non	40 -8	51 -2	35 -8	45 -19	34 0	48 -11	43 -9	42 -9
Né sait pas	6 +1	7 -1	3 0	3 -1	5 -3	3 -1	6 -1	7 0
TOTAL	101	101	100	100	100	101	100	100

Table/Tableau 16 : **IMPRESSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION** / L'impression sur la Commission Européenne (% of those who have heard of the European Commission, by country / % de ceux qui ont entendu quelque chose au sujet de la Commission Européenne, par pays)

QUESTION : Has what you read or heard given you a generally favourable or unfavourable impression of the European Commission ? / Est-ce que cela vous a donné plutôt une bonne impression ou plutôt une mauvaise impression de la Commission Européenne ?

1st column: E638 result 2nd column: Change from E637	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST			
Generally favourable	39 -8	24 -10	38 -3	38 -5	37 -16	55 +2	39 -18	37 -2
Generally unfavourable	15 +6	46 +13	30 +4	28 +6	19 +11	12 +1	14 +6	22 +3
Neither favourable nor unfavourable (SPONT)	40 +5	25 -3	27 +1	29 +2	38 +7	31 -1	41 +12	39 +6
Don't know	5 -4	5 +5	5 -3	5 -3	6 -3	3 -1	7 -1	3 -5
TOTAL	99	100	100	100	100	101	101	101
1ère colonne: Résultat E638 2e col: Variation depuis E637	IRL	I	L	YL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Plutôt bonne	58 -7	51 -5	31 -7	31 -10	59 -18	28 -14	39 -8	39 -8
Plutôt mauvaise	15 +3	14 +7	23 +2	37 +7	7 +3	46 +14	25 +6	25 +7
Ni bonne, ni mauvaise (SPONT)	20 +3	27 +1	41 +7	23 +3	27 +11	20 0	30 +3	30 +1
Né sait pas	7 0	7 -4	5 -2	9 0	7 +4	7 0	6 -2	6 -2
TOTAL	100	99	100	100	100	101	100	100

Table/Tableau 17 : **AWARENESS AND IMPORTANCE OF COUNCIL PRESIDENCY / Notoriété et importance de la présidence du Conseil (% , 1986-1992)(\*)**

QUESTION : In the European Community, each Member State, in turn, becomes the President of the Council of Ministers for six months. Just now, it's the turn of the UNITED KINGDOM. Have you recently read in the newspapers or heard on radio or television anything about the BRITISH Presidency ? / Dans la Communauté Européenne, chaque Etat " breest, à son tour, Le Président du Conseil des Ministres pendant six mois. A l'heure actuelle, c'est le tour du ROYAUME-UNI. Avez-vous récemment lu dans les journaux ou entendu à la radio ou à la télévision quelque chose au sujet de la Présidence du ROYAUME-UNI ? (AWARENESS OF PRESIDENCY)

QUESTION : Whether you have heard about it or not, do you think it is important or not that the UNITED KINGDOM is President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community at this time ? Would you say it is...? / Que vous ayez ou non entendu parler de quelque chose à ce sujet, pensez-vous que c'est ou non important que le ROYAUME-UNI soit en ce moment Président du Conseil des Ministres de la Communauté Européenne ? Diriez-vous que c'est...? (IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENCY)

	UK 7-12 1986	B 1-6 1987	DK 7-12 1987	D 1-6 1988	GR 7-12 1988	E 1-6 1989	F 7-12 1989	IRL 1-6 1990	I 7-12 1990	L 1-6 1991	NL 7-12 1991	P 1-6 1992	UK 7-12 1992
<b>AWARENESS OF PRESIDENCY</b>													
Yes/Oui	22	51	79	55	74	72	43	70	54	82	ai	ai	52
No/Non	72	37	ia	32	19	20	49	24	39	16	ia	14	45
Don't know/ Ne sait pas	6	13	3	14	7	7	a	7	7	2	2	6	3
TOTAL	100	101	100	101	100	99	100	101	100	100	101	101	100
<b>IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENCY</b>													
Very important/ Très important	22	15	25	14	44	21	15	35	25	36	13	39	29
Important/ Important	37	41	36	43	29	57	49	40	48	39	44	46	35
Not very important/ Pas très important	25	24	24	23	15	6	21	11	14	14	30	5	19
Not at all important/ Pas important du tout	a	6	8	8	4	2	4	5	3	3	6	2	7
Don't know/ Ne sait pas	9	14	7	13	a	14	11	9	11	a	7	9	11
TOTAL	100	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	101	100	100	101	101

(\*) This question is asked only to the citizens of the country holding the Presidency at the time of the EUROBAROMETER survey/Cette question est posée exclusivement aux citoyens du pays qui assure la présidence au moment du sondage EUROBAROMETRE.



Table/Tableau 18 : **MAASTRICHT: HEARD OF?** / Entendu parler de Maastricht? (% , by country/par pays) (\*)

QUESTION : Have you recently heard anything about the Treaty of Maastricht? This Treaty foresees, within the European Community, the development of a European Union with a single currency and a common foreign and security policy. /Avez-vous récemment entendu parler du Traité de Maastricht? Ce Traité prévoit de développer, à l'intérieur de la Communauté Européenne, un Union Européenne avec une monnaie unique ainsi qu'une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune.

1st colum: EB38 result 2nd colum: Change Flash 14	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST			
Yes	83 +15	95 +14	83 +23	83	83	87 +4	81 +28	96 +2
No	13 -8	5 -13	12 -3	13	13	10 0	13 -23	3 -2
Don't know	4 -6	0 -1	5 -20	5	4	3 -4	5 -5	1 0
TOTAL	100	100	100	101	100	100	99	100
1ère colonne: Resultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis Flash 14	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Oui	87 +18	74 +10	94 +9	91 +11	78 +17	89 +26	85 +16	85
Non	7 -19	20 -12	5 -10	6 -10	16 -13	9 -23	11 -12	11
Ne sait pas	6 0	6 +3	2 +2	3 -1	6 -4	2 -2	4 -5	4
TOTAL	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 19 : **MAASTRICHT: HOW MUCH DO YOU KNOW?** / Maastricht: qu'en connaissez-vous ? (% , by country/par pays) (\*)

QUESTION : How much do you feel you know about the Maastricht Treaty? /En ce qui concerne le Traité de Maastricht, diriez-vous que vous connaissez...?

1st colum: EB38 result 2nd colum: Change Flash 14	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			EST		EAST			
A great deal	3 +2	5 -1	3 +2	2	1	4 0	1 0	4 +1
A fair amount	9 -2	36 +2	17 +6	16	11	23 -1	7 -1	17 -2
Know just a little	56 +17	49 +2	53 +10	54	57	46 +7	40 +12	56 0
Heard of, know nothing else	27 -1	9 -2	24 +2	24	24	21 +4	44 +9	23 +4
Never heard of it before today	6 -15	1 0	3 -20	4	7	7 -8	9 -19	0 -3
TOTAL	101	100	100	100	100	101	101	100
1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis Flash 14	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Beaucoup	3 -1	2 0	4 +2	3 0	2 +1	1 -1	2 0	2
Pas mal	28 +7	23 +1	19 +2	27 +5	7 +2	16 -1	17 +1	17
Un peu	52 -1	35 -1	43 -14	49 +10	36 +7	47 +1	47 +5	47
Seulement de nom et rien d'autre	16 -4	25 +7	32 +11	18 -5	42 +6	33 +9	28 +5	28
Jamais entendu parler avant aujourd'hui	1 -2	15 -6	2 -1	3 -10	13 -15	4 -8	6 -11	6
TOTAL	100	99	100	100	100	101	100	100

(\*) Limited comparability is possible between Flash and Standard EUROBAROMETER surveys in Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. There is no Flash survey in East Germany / La possibilité de comparer les sondages du Flash et de l'Eurobaromètre standard est limitée en Grèce, en Espagne, en Irlande et au Portugal. Il n'y a pas de sondage Flash en Allemagne de l'Est.

## A 25

Table/Tableau 20 : **MAASTRICHT: FOR OR AGAINST?/** Maastricht: pour ou contre? (% , by country, par pays, only those who express an opinion/uniquement ceux qui expriment une opinion)

QUESTION : If there were a referendum (Denmark, Ireland, France: "another referendum") on whether to agree to the Maastricht Treaty or not, would you vote for or against? /S'il y avait un référendum (au Danemark, en Irlande et en France: "un autre référendum") sur l'acceptation ou non du Traité de Maastricht, voteriez-vous pour ou contre?

1st colum: EB38 result 2nd colum: Change Flash 14	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST			
For	82 +4	47 +3	59 +13	59	60	80 +18	69 +4	54 -3
Against	18 -5	53 -3	41 -13	41	40	20 -18	32 -3	46 +3
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	100
1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis Flash 14	IRL	I	L	YL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Pour	70 -6	85 -5	72 -7	78 +5	80 +3	38 0	62	62 +1
Contre	30 +6	15 +5	28 +7	22 -5	20 -3	63 +1	38	38 -1
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	101	100	100

(\*) Limited comparability is possible between Flash and Standard EUROBAROMETER surveys in Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. There is no Flash survey in East Germany / La possibilité de comparer les sondages du Flash et de l'Eurobaromètre standard est limitée en Grèce, en Espagne, en Irlande et au Portugal. Il n'y a pas de sondage Flash en Allemagne de l'Est.

Table/Tableau 21 : **MAASTRICHT: FOR OR AGAINST?/** Maastricht: pour ou contre? (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : If there were a referendum (Denmark, Ireland, France: "another referendum") on whether to agree to the Maastricht Treaty or not, would you vote for or against? /S'il y avait un référendum (au Danemark, en Irlande et en France: "un autre référendum") sur l'acceptation ou non du Traité de Maastricht, voteriez-vous pour ou contre?

1st column: EB38 result 2nd column: Change Flash 14	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST			
For	53 +22	43 +8	45 +26	44	41	58 +29	34 +8	45 +13
Against	11 +2	48 +3	31 +9	30	28	15 -3	16 +2	38 +14
Undecided	36 -24	10 -11	25 -33	26	31	28 -26	50 -10	17 -27
TOTAL	99	100	101	100	100	101	100	100
1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis Flash 14	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Pour	55 +2	55 +3	56 0	62 +16	43 +16	26 +5	44 +13	43
Contre	24 +7	10 +4	22 +7	18 +1	11 +3	43 +9	27 +7	27
Indécis	22 -8	35 -6	23 -6	20 -17	47 -18	31 -13	30 -19	30
TOTAL	101	100	101	100	101	100	101	100

(\*) Limited comparability is possible between Flash and Standard EUROBAROMETER surveys in Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. There is no Flash survey in East Germany / La possibilité de comparer les sondages du Flash et de l'Eurobaromètre standard est limitée en Grèce, en Espagne, en Irlande et au Portugal. Il n'y a pas de sondage Flash en Allemagne de l'Est.

Table/Tableau 22 : **RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAASTRICHT AND GENERAL EURO-ATTITUDES/** Relation entre Maastricht et Les attitudes générales envers L'Europe (Crosstabulation between Tables 13 and 20/Croisement des tableaux 13 et 20).

EURO-ATTITUDES	MAASTRICHT			TOTAL
	For/Pour	Against/Contre	DK/NSP	
	43	27	30	100
Positive/Positive	82	24	45	55
	64	12	24	100
Ambivalent/Ambivalente	18	50	51	36
	21	37	42	100
Negative/Négative	1	25	4	8
	5	82	13	100
TOTAL	101	99	100	99

**Table/Tableau 23 : VOTE INTENTION IN REFERENDUM/ Intentions de vote lors d'un référendum (% EC12+/CE12+, by socio-demographic and socio-political variables/par variables socio-démographiques et socio-politiques)**

**QUESTION :** If ther were a referendun on whether to agree to the Maastricht Treaty or not, would you vote for or against ? / S'il y avait un référendum sur l'acceptation ou non du Trait6 de Maastricht, voteriez-vous pour ou contre ?

	SEX(E)		AGE				AGE AT END OF STUDIES/ AGE DE FIN D'ETUDES				POLITICAL SCALE/ ECHELLE POLITIQUE			TOTAL EC12+
	M	F	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+	-16	16-19	20+	STUDENT/ ETUDIANT	L/G	(*) C	R/D	
For/Pour	64	60	64	62	63	60	57	59	71	70	67	63	55	62
Against/Contre	36	40	36	38	37	40	43	41	29	30	33	37	45	38
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

	OPINION LEADERSHIP (*)				RESPONDENT OCCUPATION SCALE						EUROPEAN SOCIAL GRADE							TOTAL CE12+
	++ high/ élevé	+	-	-- low/ faible	Self employed	Manager s	Other white collars	Manual workers	House person	Unemp loyed	A	B	C	D	E1	E2	E3	
For/Pour	65	66	59	53	61	72	65	52	62	60	72	66	63	57	51	54	74	62
Against/Contre	35	34	41	47	39	28	35	48	38	40	28	34	37	43	49	46	26	38
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

(\*) See annex/Voir annexes "technical specifications for socio-demographic and socio-political variables used in cross-tabulations".

Table/Tableau 24 : **OPINION ON MAASTRICHT ISSUES** / Opinion à l'égard des thèmes de débat autour de Maastricht (% , by country/par pays) (\*)

QUESTION : Irrespective of other details of the Maastricht Treaty, what is your opinion on each of the following proposals? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it. / Sans tenir compte des autres détails du Traité de Maastricht, quelle est votre opinion sur chacune des propositions suivantes? Veuillez me dire, pour chaque proposition, si vous êtes pour ou si vous êtes contre.

- a) There should be a European Monetary Union with one single currency replacing by 1999 the (NATIONAL CURRENCY) and all other national currencies of the Member States of the European Community (SINGLE CURRENCY) / Il devrait y avoir une Union Monétaire Européenne, avec une monnaie unique remplaçant d'ici 1999 (NOTRE MONNAIE NATIONALE) et toutes les autres monnaies de la Communauté Européenne.
- b) There should be a European Monetary Union with a European Central Bank pursuing a policy of monetary stability that is fighting inflation (CENTRAL BANK) / Il devrait y avoir une Union Monétaire Européenne, avec une Banque Centrale Européenne poursuivant une politique de stabilité monétaire, c'est-à-dire de lutte contre l'inflation.
- c) The Member States of the European Community should have one common foreign policy towards countries outside the European Community (FOREIGN POLICY) / Les Pays Membres de la Communauté Européenne devraient avoir une politique étrangère commune vis-à-vis des pays hors de la Communauté Européenne.
- d) The EC member states should work towards a common defence policy (COMMON DEFENCE) / Les Pays Membres de la Communauté Européenne devraient travailler à l'élaboration d'une politique de défense commune.
- e) The EC Member States should have some basic common principles on social policy, but details should be left to national governments (SOCIAL POLICY) / Les Pays membres de la Communauté Européenne devraient avoir quelques principes de base communs en ce qui concerne la politique sociale, mais les détails devraient être laissés aux gouvernements nationaux.
- f) The governments of EC Member States should work towards common rules in matters of political asylum, refugees and immigration (IMMIGRATION) / Les gouvernements des Pays Membres de la Communauté Européenne devraient travailler à l'élaboration de règles communes en matière d'asile politique, de réfugiés et d'immigration.
- g) The governments of EC Member States should work towards close cooperation in fighting drug traffic and organized crime (CRIME) / Les gouvernements des Pays membres de la Communauté Européenne devraient travailler pour une coopération étroite dans la lutte contre le trafic de drogue et le crime organisé.
- h) The directly elected European Parliament should have a greater say in European Community legislation (LEGISLATION) / Le Parlement Européen, élu au suffrage direct, devrait avoir plus à dire sur la législation de la Communauté Européenne.
- i) The President and the members of the European Commission should have the support of a majority in the European Parliament. Otherwise they should resign (EP SUPPORT COMMISSION MEMBERS) / Le Président et les membres de la Commission Européenne devraient avoir la confiance d'une majorité du Parlement Européen. Autrement, ils devraient démissionner.
- j) In matters of EC legislation, taxation and expenditure, the European Parliament should have equal rights with the Council of Ministers, which represents the national governments (EURO-PARLIAMENT EQUAL RIGHTS). / En ce qui concerne la législation, la taxation et les dépenses de la Communauté Européenne, le Parlement Européen devrait avoir les mêmes droits que ceux du Conseil des Ministres qui représente les gouvernements nationaux.
- k) Any citizen of another EC country who resides in (OUR COUNTRY) should have the right to vote in local elections (VOTE LOCAL EC ELECTIONS) / Tout citoyen d'un pays de la Communauté Européenne qui réside en (NOTRE PAYS) devrait avoir le droit de voter aux élections municipales.
- l) Any citizen of another EC country who resides in (OUR COUNTRY) should have the right to be a candidate in local elections (EC CANDIDATE LOCAL ELECTIONS) / Tout citoyen d'un pays de la Communauté Européenne qui réside en (NOTRE PAYS) devrait avoir le droit d'être candidat aux élections municipales.
- m) The European Community should have a European Government responsible to the European Parliament and to the European Council of Heads of National Government (EURO-GOVERNMENT) / La Communauté Européenne devrait avoir un Gouvernement Européen responsable devant le Parlement Européen et devant le Conseil Européen des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement.
- n) The European Community should be responsible only for matters that cannot be effectively handled by national governments (SUBSIDIARITY) / La Communauté Européenne devrait être responsable que des affaires qui ne peuvent pas être efficacement réglées par les gouvernements nationaux.

Table 24 - see previous page for details/voir page précédente pour plus de détails

1st colum: % in favour 2nd colum: % not in favour	B		DK		D						GR		E		F	
					WEST				EAST							
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
a) SINGLE CURRENCY	65	23	35	60	36	54	36	53	39	50	71	14	63	22	59	30
b) CENTRAL BANK	69	16	52	41	58	31	59	30	62	26	71	13	68	16	67	23
c) FOREIGN POLICY	68	15	64	30	74	14	75	13	81	1	70	11	68	13	70	11
d) COMMON DEFENCE	77	11	48	44	80	13	81	12	88	6	75	11	76	13	81	10
e) SOCIAL POLICY	68	13	74	22	76	12	77	11	83	1	74	8	70	12	81	1
f) IMMIGRATION	66	20	62	33	80	13	81	13	83	11	70	15	71	14	69	23
g) CRIME	85	6	94	5	87	7	89	6	95	1	85	6	88	5	91	1
h) LEGISLATION	64	5	52	30	62	18	62	17	62	13	65	10	60	10	63	10
i) EP SUPPORT COMMISSION MEMBERS	60	11	75	11	70	10	72	8	82	4	65	8	69	8	73	8
j) EURO-PARLIAMENT EQUAL RIGHTS	51	16	36	39	50	21	48	22	45	24	57	10	50	17	50	20
k) EC VOTE LOCAL ELECTIONS	46	38	35	61	41	44	42	43	47	35	45	44	57	29	41	50
l) EC CANDIDATE LOCAL ELECTIONS	35	50	31	66	34	51	34	51	34	51	31	57	49	36	26	64
m) EURO-GOVERNMENT	59	12	35	47	57	20	57	20	57	17	63	10	63	9	57	18
n) SUBSIDIARITY	45	26	70	15	60	21	61	20	66	16	63	16	49	29	56	24
1ère colonne: % "favorable" 2e colonne: % non favorable	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC12+	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
a) MONNAIE UNIQUE	66	20	79	11	67	24	61	30	59	17	30	58	54	35	53	30
b) BANQUE CENTRALE	68	16	63	7	70	14	74	14	65	10	45	42	64	23	64	23
c) POLITIQUE ETRANGERE	63	18	73	11	79	10	77	13	56	10	55	30	68	17	69	17
d) DEFENCE COMMUNE	50	32	81	9	84	6	80	12	67	8	70	20	77	14	77	13
e) POLITIQUE SOCIALE	74	8	68	15	79	9	79	10	60	9	75	12	74	12	74	12
f) IMMIGRATION	65	17	74	12	71	20	80	13	62	8	63	27	71	17	72	17
g) CRIME	85	5	89	5	89	4	93	3	78	4	91	3	89	5	89	5
h) LEGISLATION	61	10	70	6	60	15	72	13	57	6	53	24	62	14	62	14
i) SOUTIEN PE AUX MEMBRES DE LA COMMISSION	65	7	63	9	71	8	82	5	47	10	68	9	68	9	69	9
j) EURO PARLEMENT MEME DROITS	58	12	52	14	49	28	54	24	46	10	47	24	50	19	50	20
k) VOTER DANS LES ELECTIONS LOCALES CE	67	18	46	36	36	54	60	33	48	24	41	50	45	42	45	42
l) ETRE CANDIDAT AUX ELECTIONS LOCALES CE	51	28	42	39	25	66	46	45	37	35	32	58	36	50	36	50
m) GOUVERNEMENT EUROPEEN	54	12	63	8	65	14	68	14	46	12	43	24	56	16	56	16
n) SUBSIDIARITE	60	15	48	29	60	19	58	27	45	18	62	21	56	24	56	23

(\*) The difference between "+" and "-", and 100, is the percentage of "don't know" (not shown) / La différence entre la somme des "+" et "-", et 100, représente le pourcentage des "ne sait pas" (pas indiqué).

Table/Tableau 25 : **OPINION ON EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION AND ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION** / Opinion à l'égard de L'Union Economique et Monétaire Européenne et de l'Union politique (% by country/par pays) (\*)

QUESTION : At the moment, the debate on European Union continuous. Could you tell please tell whether you are in favour or not, of ...?/En ce moment, le débat sur l'Union Européenne continue. Pourriez-vous me dire si vous êtes favorable ou non à ce que...?

- As an Economic and Monetary Union, the European Community having a common European Central Bank, with the heads of national central banks on its board of Directors / En tant qu'Union Economique et Monétaire, la Communauté Européenne ait une Banque Centrale commune Européenne, avec les directeurs des banques centrales nationales faisant partie de sa direction (EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK)
- Within this European Economic and Monetary Union, a single common currency replacing the different currencies of the member states in five or six years' time / Dans une Union Economique et Monétaire Européenne, une seule " " a commune remplace dans cinq ou six ans les différentes monnaies des Etats Membres (SINGLE CURRENCY)
- As a Political Union, the European Community being responsible for foreign policy towards countries outside the EC / En tant qu'Union Politique, la Communauté Européenne soit responsable de la politique étrangère vis-à-vis des pays hors de la CEE (EC RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY)
- As a Political Union, the European Community being responsible for a common policy in matters of security and defence / En tant qu'Union Politique, la Communauté Européenne soit responsable d'une politique commune en matière de sécurité et de défense (EC RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY & DEFENCE)
- The European Parliament having the right to decide together with the Council of Ministers representing the national governments, on the legislation of the European Community / Le Parlement Européen ait le droit de décider avec le Conseil des Ministres représentant les gouvernements nationaux, de la législation de la Communauté Européenne (CO-LEGISLATION)

1st column: % in favour 2nd column: % not in favour	B		DK		D						GR		E		F	
					WEST				EAST							
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK	62	16	48	45	51	34	51	33	54	29	70	11	62	17	59	25
SINGLE CURRENCY	63	22	35	60	37	49	38	48	41	45	69	15	60	21	57	32
EC RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY	62	15	56	36	65	20	66	19	69	17	68	16	61	15	62	23
EC RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY & DEFENCE	73	10	52	42	74	15	76	13	84	6	75	11	74	11	76	14
CO-LEGISLATION	59	12	47	35	56	19	57	18	61	14	67	8	60	10	64	15
1ère col m : % "favorable" 2e col m : % non favorable	IRL		1		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC12+	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
BANQUE CENTRALE EUROPEENNE	63	16	74	9	61	22	73	14	58	11	37	44	57	25	57	25
MONNAIE UNIQUE	61	20	76	12	62	25	62	29	56	16	30	59	52	34	52	35
CE RESPONSABLE DE LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE	55	21	74	11	69	14	68	20	56	12	47	34	62	21	62	21
CE RESPONSABLE DE LA SÉCURITÉ ET DEFENSE	46	33	81	8	79	9	82	11	66	8	58	27	72	15	73	15
CO-LEGISLATION	54	13	72	6	60	12	68	16	58	6	48	24	60	15	60	15

(\*) The difference between "+" and "-" and 100 is the percentage of "don't know" (not shown) / La différence entre la somme des "+" et "-" et 100 représente le pourcentage des "ne sait pas" (pas indiqué).

## A 31

Table/Tableau 26 : THE MOST POWERFUL INSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REGARDING EC LEGISLATION / L'institution de la Communauté Européenne ayant le plus de pouvoir en matière de législation CE (% by country/par pays)

QUESTION : Which one of the following institutions of the European Community is, in your opinion, the most powerful, in terms of having the final say on European Community legislation? / D'après vous, laquelle des institutions suivantes de la Communauté Européenne a le plus de pouvoir, le droit de décision finale en matière de législation de la Communauté Européenne?

- The European Commission in Brussels/La Commission Européenne de Bruxelles (COMMISSION)
- The European Parliament/Le Parlement Européen (PARLIAMENT)
- The Council of Ministers representing the governments of the Member States/Le Conseil des Ministres représentant les gouvernements des Etats Membres (COUNCIL)

Results EB37 Résultats EB37	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12 +	
			West	East											
COMMISSION	14	27	14	14	15	13	7	24	23	16	19	15	14	25	17
PARLIAMENT	35	22	31	34	45	28	28	27	21	31	26	34	29	23	29
COUNCIL	25	38	26	25	21	19	17	27	26	19	37	34	22	23	24
Don't know/Ne sait pas	26	14	28	27	19	40	49	23	31	34	18	17	36	29	30
											100	100	101	100	100



Table/Tableau 27 : **NATIONAL OR JOINT COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKING ? / Décisions nationales ou en commun au sein de la Communauté ?** (% , by country/ par pays) (\*)

QUESTION : Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Community. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Community ? / Il y a des personnes qui pensent que certains domaines d'action politique devraient être décidés par le gouvernement (NATIONAL) pendant que d'autres domaines devraient être décidés en commun au sein de la Communauté Européenne. Parmi les domaines d'action politique suivants, quels sont ceux, selon vous, qui devraient être décidés par le gouvernement (NATIONAL) et ceux où les décisions devraient être prises en commun au sein de la Communauté Européenne ?

1st colum: % National 2nd colum: % EC	B		DK		D								GR		E		F	
					WEST				EAST									
	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC		
Security and defence	36	51	58	40	42	55	40	57	34	63	51	44	41	48	44	53		
Protection of the environment	28	61	38	61	28	70	26	72	21	77	36	60	21	60	28	70		
Currency	24	65	36	58	49	47	48	47	47	50	33	59	33	52	33	61		
Cooperation with Third Uorld	16	77	24	73	18	77	17	78	13	81	29	62	11	74	13	81		
Health and social welfare	59	35	85	14	58	39	60	37	67	38	44	51	50	38	72	25		
Education	61	32	74	25	58	39	60	37	70	20	48	48	53	36	63	34		
Basic rules for broadcasting	45	47	76	22	41	55	43	52	51	44	46	47	40	43	50	43		
Scientific & tech. research	19	74	22	75	28	69	26	70	19	76	21	71	13	73	14	82		
Rates of Value Added Tax	26	65	51	45	39	56	40	54	45	40	46	43	32	48	23	68		
Foreign policy towards non-EC countries	16	74	35	58	21	75	21	75	19	75	35	57	16	66	22	70		
Participation of workers' reps. on company boards	47	30	78	14	51	42	53	40	59	33	46	42	46	31	58	34		
Protection of computer-based information on individuals	46	43	78	19	43	53	44	52	46	48	38	42	37	40	56	34		
Industrial policy	30	63	45	49	43	53	42	54	38	56	31	61	35	49	28	66		
Cultural policy	53	39	78	19	47	49	49	47	56	40	58	36	52	35	57	38		
Immigration policy	34	59	59	39	30	67	31	66	35	61	44	49	30	57	37	58		
Rules for political asylum	32	60	59	40	32	66	33	65	38	59	44	47	25	58	38	55		
Health and safety of workers	52	42	75	24	52	46	55	43	68	29	44	51	47	41	60	37		
Dealing with unemployment	40	53	72	25	47	50	50	47	63	35	36	58	46	42	38	58		

Table 27 (continued)/Tableau 27 (suite)

1ère colonne: % National 2e colonne: % EC	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC12+	
	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC
Sécurité et défense	73	24	28	68	3 6 6 2		32	64	44	48	61	37	43	53	43	53
Protection de l'environnement	47	50	23	73	31	66	19	61	28	64	29	69	27	70	26	70
Monnaie	39	54	16	76	30	66	36	60	35	54	68	28	39	54	40	54
Coopération avec les P.V.D.	20	75	9	82	17	79	20	77	18	70	16	79	15	78	15	78
Santé et sécurité sociale	62	36	43	52	65	33	64	33	39	54	65	33	58	38	58	37
Enseignement	66	31	40	55	59	38	66	31	49	42	75	23	58	37	59	37
Règles de base radio/TV/presse	47	46	44	46	44	48	49	46	47	38	64	33	48	44	48	44
Recherche scientifique et technologique	16	77	9	85	10	85	18	78	17	70	26	68	19	75	19	75
Taux de TVA	37	56	27	59	55	40	23	72	42	42	59	35	36	54	37	54
politique étrangère à l'égard des pays non-CE	25	67	9	82	20	73	21	75	19	64	29	63	20	71	20	71
Particip.représ.travailleurs à direction entreprises	43	43	38	43	60	31	59	31	45	41	54	35	50	37	51	37
Protection des informations personnelles sur fichier informatique	55	36	31	42	54	40	56	40	46	35	61	31	47	40	47	40
Politique industrielle	38	55	20	73	36	59	30	64	29	58	55	40	36	57	36	57
Politique culturelle	70	25	34	58	52	44	66	29	43	45	64	31	52	42	52	41
Politique d'immigration	47	47	13	80	51	44	40	56	26	62	63	33	36	59	36	59
Règles en matière d'asile politique	42	47	14	76	44	51	40	57	25	59	49	43	33	59	33	59
Santé et la sécurité des travailleurs	45	51	30	65	62	35	51	47	36	56	52	46	48	47	49	46
Lutte contre le chômage	39	57	24	72	54	44	50	47	31	61	59	38	43	52	44	51

(+) The difference between "+" and "-" is the percentage of "don't know" (not shown) / La différence entre la somme des "+" et des "-" et 100 représente le pourcentage des "ne sait pas" (pas indiqué).

**Table/Tableau 28 : POSITIVE (Aj) NEGATIVE EFFECT OF MAASTRICHT TREATY ? Effets positifs et négatifs du Traité de Maastricht (% by country/par pays)**

**QUESTION :** In your opinion, will the Treaty of Maastricht have a positive effect, a negative effect or no effect at all ~~all~~ ? / D'après vous, le ~~Traité de Maastricht~~ aura-t-il des effets positifs, des effets négatifs ou aucun effet du tout pour...?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+	
			West	East											
... the European Community/la Communauté Européenne															
positive effect	69	53	62	61	57	64	64	57	60	70	67	62	65	43	59
negative effect	8	27	15	14	11	11	10	17	12	6	5	13	10	20	13
no effect	6	6	4	5	6	3	5	10	8	4	5	4	5	8	6
don't know	17	14	20	21	26	23	21	16	20	21	23	21	19	30	21
TOTAL	100	100	100	101	100	101	100	100	100	101	100	100	99	101	99
... our country/notre pays															
effets positifs	58	40	39	39	38	56				57	47	59	61	36	46
effets négatifs	15	42	35	34	28	18				17	20	17	12	31	27
aucun effet	9	6	4	4	6	2				5	7	4	7	6	6
ne sait pas	19	12	22	23	28	24	23	15	17	21	26	20	20	27	22
TOTAL	101	100	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101
... your life/votre vie															
positive effect	27	29	20	20	21	48	25	23	40	34	29	31	48	25	27
negative effect	13	33	22	21	16	18	14	22	14	7	17	12	10	22	17
no effect	35	24	32	31	27	9	38	38	30	32	28	29	21	22	31
don't know	25	14	27	28	35	26	24	18	16	28	26	28	21	30	26
TOTAL	100	100	101	100	99	101	101	101	100	101	99	100	100	99	101

Table/Tableau 29 : **NATIONAL IDENTITY** <sup>Air</sup> **EUROPEAN UNION/** L'identité nationale et l'Union Européenne (% by country/par pays)

**QUESTION :** If all countries of the European Community come together in a European Union, do you think that the sense of national identity will end up disappearing and being replaced by a sense of European identity or can one have a national sense of identity and a European sense of identity at the same time ? / Si tous les pays de la Communauté Européenne s'assemblent dans une Union Européenne, pensez-vous que le sentiment d'identité nationale finira par disparaître au profit d'un sentiment d'identité Européenne ou que l'on pourra tout à la fois avoir un sentiment d'identité nationale et un sentiment d'identité Européenne ?

[illegible]

Table/Tableau 30 : EUROPEAN IDENTITY / L'identité européenne (% by country/par pays)

**QUESTION** : There is a lot of talk about national identity and European identity in the countries of the European Community. Some say (A) If a real European Union ever came about, it would mean the end of our national cultural identities and their diversity (UNION ENDS IDENTITIES). Others say (B) The only way to protect our national cultural identities and their diversity, is through the countries of Europe caning to a real European Union (UNION PROTECTS IDENTITIES). Do you feel closer to the first (A) or to the second (B) of these two statements? \* / On parle beaucoup d'identité nationale et d'identité Européenne dans les pays de la Communauté Européenne. Certains disent (A): Si un jour l'on arrivait à une véritable Union Européenne, ce serait la fin de nos identités culturelles nationales et de leur diversité (L'UNION EST LA FIN DES IDENTITES). D'autres disent (B): La seule façon de défendre nos identités culturelles nationales et leur diversité, c'est que les pays d'Europe arrivent à une véritable Union Européenne (L'UNION PROTEGE LES IDENTITES). \* Est-ce-que vous vous sentez plus proche de la première (A) ou de la deuxième (B) de ces opinions?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+	
			West	East											
1-3 Union ends identities/L'Union est le fin des identités	24	45	30	32	38	29	25	34	35	18	28	33	19	42	30
4 In between/Entre les deux	15	19	16	15	12	15	15	14	12	11	19	21	11	14	14
5-7 Union protects identities/ L'Union protege les identites	52	32	43	42	40	43	47	48	36	60	39	40	50	39	46
Don't know/Ne sait pas	9	6	12	12	10	13	14	5	17	11	14	6	20	6	10

\* 1= closest to statement A, 7= closest to statement B / 1= le plus proche de la proposition A, 7= le plus proche de la proposition B.

Table/Tableau 31 : AWARENESS OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET OF 1992 / La notoriété du Grand Marché Européen de 1992 (% by country/par pays)

**QUESTION** : Have you read in the papers, seen on television or heard anything about the Single European Market of 1992? / Avez-vous lu dans les journaux, vu à la télévision ou entendu parler de quelque chose au sujet du Grand Marché Européen de 1992?

1st column: EB38 result 2nd column: Change from EB37	B	DK	D		GR	E	F
			WEST	EAST			
Yes	70 -7	80 -1	78 -3	76 -5	65 -15	68 -5	65 +5
No	25 +8	18 0	18 +4	19 +5	26 +12	26 +2	31 -4
Don't know	5 0	2 +1	4 -2	5 -1	9 +3	6 +3	4 -1
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1ère colonne: Resultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis EB37	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12 +
Qui	69 0	70 +1	74 0	57 +4	75 -3	62 -2	69 0
Non	27 -1	25 -2	25 +3	40 -5	21 +4	35 +1	27 0
Ne sait pas	3 0	5 +1	2 -2	2 -1	4 -1	3 +1	4 0
TOTAL	99	100	101	99	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 32 : DATE OF START OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET / Date d'entrée en vigueur du Grand Marché Européen (% by country/par pays) (\*)

QUESTION : In recent years, the European Community has been very active in working to complete the Single European Market. On which date is the Single European Market to be completed and come into force ? / La Communauté Européenne a été très active ces dernières années à achever le Grand Marché Européen. A quelle date le Grand Marché doit-il être achevé et entrer en vigueur ?

	B	DK	D			GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+
			West		East										
Correct/Correcte	24	61	30	27	16	7	21	39	22	29	41	14	27	12	25
Incorrect/Incorrecte	43	14	37	37	39	39	31	41	39	34	33	61	26	34	37
Don't know/Ne sait pas	33	25	33	36	45	54	49	20	40	37	26	25	47	54	38
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	100	101	100	100	100	100	100	100

\* Correct responses were "December 1992" and "January 1993" / Les réponses correctes étaient "Décembre 1992" et "Janvier 1993".

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+	
			West	East											
December 1992 or January 1993/Décembre 1992 ou Janvier 1993	26	62	36	33	20	11	22	43	30	34	42	17	28	18	30
Other 1992/	2	2	4	3	1	2	5	3	11	1	2	7	1	10	4
Other 1993/	11	6	13	13	12	6	7	14	12	17	8	5	9	10	12
Wrong/Incorrecte	28	6	14	16	23	28	18	21	8	11	22	46	15	8	16
Don't know/Ne sait pas	33	25	33	36	45	54	49	20	40	37	26	25	47	54	38
TOTAL	100	101	100	101	101	101	101	101	101	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 33 : THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET IN 1992 - A GOOD THING ? / Le Grand Marché Européen de 1992 - Une bonne chose ? (% by country/par pays)

QUESTION : Overall, do you think that the completion of the Single European Market by the end of 1992, the beginning of 1993, will be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither a good nor a bad thing ? / Dans l'ensemble, pensez-vous que la réalisation du Grand Marché Européen pour la fin 1992, le début 1993 sera, pour des gens comme vous, une bonne chose, une mauvaise chose, ou une chose ni bonne, ni mauvaise ?

1st colum: EB38 result 2nd colum: Change from EB37	B		DK		D				GR		E		F			
					WEST		EAST									
A good thing	39	-3	44	+4	41	+5	39	+2	32	-8	48	-8	38	-9	31	-3
A bad thing	11	-1	16	-1	12	-2	12	0	11	+5	11	+4	11	0	12	0
Neither good, nor bad thing	40	+5	32	-4	36	+6	37	+6	40	+5	25	+4	37	+18	48	+4
Don't know	10	-1	9	+2	12	-8	13	-7	16	-3	16	-1	14	-9	10	0
TOTAL	100		101		101		101		99		100		100		101	
1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col:Variation depuis EB37	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC 12 +	
Bonne chose	55	-1	53	-10	35	-2	43	+2	51	-8	32	-8	40		40	-4
Mauvaise chose	6	+2	8	+4	13	+4	9	+1	4	+1	18	+6	12		12	+2
Jne chose ni bonne, ni mauva ise	25	0	29	+5	41	-1	36	-3	30	+7	37	+5	37		37	+6
Ne sait pas	14	-3	11	+1	11	-2	11	-1	15	0	13	-3	12		12	-2
TOTAL	100		101		100		99		100		100		101		101	

# A 37

Table/Tableau 34 : THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET OF 1992: HOPE OR FEAR ? / Le Grand Marché Européen de 1992: espoir ou crainte ? (% by country/par pays)

QUESTION : Personally, would you say that the Single European Market which will come about by the end of 1992, the beginning of 1993, makes you feel very hopeful, rather hopeful, rather fearful or very fearful?/ Personnellement, diriez-vous que la réalisation du Grand Marché Européen pour la fin 1992, le début 1993, vous donne beaucoup d'espoir, un peu d'espoir, un peu de crainte ou beaucoup de crainte ?

1st column: EB38 result 2nd column: Change from EB37	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST	EAST				
Very hopeful	15 -6	12 +3	12 +1	11 0	7 -4	20 -1	7 -5	10 -5
Rather hopeful	43 +5	49 +2	39 +4	39 +2	35 -9	41 +4	37 -1	34 -3
Rather fearful	22 +1	29 -1	27 +1	28 +2	32 +5	14 -5	30 +15	32 +6
Very fearful	8 0	5 -3	9 0	9 +1	11 +5	9 0	7 +2	17 +4
Don't know	12 -1	5 -1	12 -8	13 -5	15 +3	16 +2	19 -12	7 -3
TOTAL	100	100	99	100	100	100	100	100
1re colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis EB37	IRL	I	L	YL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Beaucoup d'espoir	23 0	12 -5	14 +5	10 +3	21 -6	8 -3	11	11 -3
Un peu d'espoir	44 +2	48 -2	39 +4	53 -5	38 +1	39 -3	41	40 -1
Un peu de crainte	11 -1	24 +8	31 -2	17 +2	20 +6	27 +7	26	27 +6
Beaucoup de crainte	7 +3	9 +3	4 -3	4 +1	4 +1	10 +4	10	10 +3
Ne sait pas	16 -3	7 -4	11 -6	16 -2	17 -2	16 -6	12	12 -5
TOTAL	101	100	99	100	100	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 35 : **REASONS FOR HOPE ABOUT THE SINGLE MARKET ? / Les raisons de l'espoir à l'égard du Grand Marché? (%) by country/par pays, only those who answered very or rather hopeful about Single European Market/Uniquement ceux à qui le Marché Unique donne beaucoup ou un peu d'espoir )**

**QUESTION :** You said that you feel hopeful about the Single European Market. Among the following statements, could you tell me the main reasons for your hopes about the Single Market? (3 answers maximum)/Vous m'avez dit que le Grand Marché Européen vous donne de l'espoir. Parmi les propositions suivantes, pourriez-vous citer les principales raisons de votre espoir à l'égard du Grand Marché? (3 réponses maximum)

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	YL	P	UK	EC12+	
			West	East											
The opportunity to work anywhere in the EC/La possibilité de travailler partout dans la CE	39	37	45	43	35	37	41	50	44	57	42	32	55	36	45
Easier trade and commerce/Des échanges commerciaux plus faciles	39	30	38	37	34	22	18	32	25	41	34	43	26	39	35
More jobs and less unemployment/Plus d'emplois et moins de chômage	27	28	22	26	47	31	29	34	53	39	24	19	40	37	32
Solve major problems better together/Mieux résoudre les grands problèmes ensemble	21	32	38	37	33	30	21	28	18	28	33	38	18	27	29
Lower prices and cost of living/La baisse des prix et du coût de la vie	21	19	29	31	38	26	27	18	34	22	23	15	42	26	25
Stand up better to competition from the USA & Japan/Mieux faire face à la concurrence des EU et du Japon	28	34	27	27	23	22	20	44	13	17	37	30	12	21	25
Reviving and improving the economy/La relance et l'amélioration de l'économie	16	19	21	22	27	24	22	24	17	23	24	18	17	20	22
More opportunities for companies/Plus de possibilités pour les entreprises	19	39	21	21	18	9	15	25	17	15	12	20	15	28	20
The same prices and taxes in all member states/Les mêmes prix et taxes dans tous les Etats Membres	29	12	23	22	18	23	12	14	22	20	16	19	15	16	18
Less social inequality/Moins d'inégalités sociales	11	8	13	15	22	12	20	15	8	10	14	17	28	13	14
A wider choice of goods and products/Un plus grand choix de produits à l'achat	9	7	15	15	14	15	14	6	12	5	12	4	8	12	10
Other/Autres	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1
Don't know/Ne sait pas	2	6	5	5	4	5	9	2	6	3	1	10	3	3	4

Table/Tableau 36 : **REASONS FOR FEARING SINGLE MARKET ?** / Les principales raisons des craintes à l'égard du Grand Marché? (% by country/par pays, only those who answer very or rather fearful about the Single Market/Uniquement ceux à qui le Marché Unique donne beaucoup ou un peu de crainte).

**QUESTION :** You said that you feel fearful about the Single European Market. Among the following statements, could you tell me the main reasons for your fears about the Single Market? (3 answers maximum)/Vous m'avez dit que le Grand Marché Européen vous donne de la crainte. Parmi les propositions suivantes, pourriez-vous me citer les principales raisons de votre crainte à l'égard du Grand Marché? (3 réponses maximum)

	B	DK	D			GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+
			West	East											
More unemployment and less jobs/Plus de chômage et moins d'emploi	36	27	26	30	44	42	41	46	38	23	40	17	30	27	33
Too much immigration into (OUR COUNTRY)/Une trop grande immigration en (NOTRE PAYS)	37	32	45	44	43	12	16	32	10	19	31	29	7	30	30
The loss of our national identity/ La perte de notre identité nationale	18	46	30	29	25	16	14	34	35	13	25	36	26	49	29
An uncertain future/ Un avenir incertain	26	21	23	24	27	27	39	30	43	28	31	20	43	23	28
No more border control to stop criminals and drugs/Absence de contrôles aux frontières pour arrêter les criminels et la drogue	20	38	42	43	45	8	8	26	23	13	33	33	27	28	26
Higher prices and cost of living/La hausse des prix et du coût de la vie	31	5	21	22	22	39	40	19	28	26	41	15	26	28	25
Too much competition/ Une trop grande concurrence	24	13	18	16	11	40	38	27	24	29	26	13	42	9	23
We are not ready yet/ Nous ne sommes pas encore prêts	18	13	11	14	25	31	33	18	8	45	9	22	33	13	22
We will have to pay for the others/Nous devons payer pour les autres	15	10	44	42	34	11	8	18	5	13	11	20	9	11	20
Our country won't have any say anymore/ Notre pays n'aura plus rien à dire	15	46	15	14	10	15	7	13	28	21	22	17	7	31	18
Too many changes, too much upheaval/Trop de changements, trop de bouleversements	10	9	7	8	11	11	8	9	8	18	9	11	12	13	11
Other/Autres	4	3	2	2	2	1	4	3	3	2	0	6	2	3	3
Don't know/Ne sait pas	3	6	7	6	3	5	2	2	10	5	1	10	5	5	5



Table/Tableau 37 : T E **SOCIAL DIMENSION OF T Y SINGLE MARKET - A GOOD THING ? /** La dimension sociale du Marché Unique - Une bonne chose ? (% , by country/par pays)

**QUESTION** - The European Community is committed to complementing the Single European Market with a social dimension. This consists of a basic set of rules, for example, concerning the rights and duties of workers and employers in all the member countries. In your opinion, is such a European social dimension a good thing or a bad thing ? / La Communauté Européenne s'est engagée à accompagner le Grand Marché Européen d'une dimension sociale. Celle-ci consiste en une base commune de règles, par exemple, sur les droits et devoirs des travailleurs et des employeurs de tous les pays membres. A votre avis, est-ce qu'une telle dimension sociale européenne est une bonne chose ou une mauvaise chose ?

1st colum: EB38 result 2nd colum: Change from EB37	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST			
Good thing	54 -3	53 +1	60 -1	62 -2	68 -8	72 -4	61 -7	60 -5
Bad thing	6 +1	25 -4	10 +1	9 +1	5 +1	3 +1	4 +1	14 +4
Neither good, nor bad (SPONT)	26 0	11 +1	15 +2	14 +2	12 +4	10 +1	18 +9	16 0
Don't know	13 +2	12 +2	15 -2	15 -1	15 +2	15 +1	17 -4	10 +1
TOTAL	99	101	100	100	100	100	100	100
1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis EB37	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Bonne chose	70 -2	75 -3	58 -4	75 0	71 -10	58 0	64 -3	64 -3
Mauvaise chose	6 +2	3 +1	10 +3	8 +2	3 +2	21 +4	10 +2	10 +2
Une chose ni bonne, ni mauvaise (SPONT)	9 +1	12 +4	19 +2	10 +2	17 +5	11 0	14 +2	14 +2
Ne sait pas	15 -2	10 -2	14 0	7 -4	10 +4	11 -3	12 -2	12 -2
TOTAL	100	100	101	100	101	101	100	100

Table/Tableau 38 : **AWARENESS OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT /** Notoriété du Parlement Européen (% , by country/par pays)

**QUESTION** : Have you recently seen or heard, in the papers, on the radio or on TV, anything about the European Parliament, that is the parliamentary assembly of the European Community ? / Avez-vous récemment lu dans les journaux ou entendu à la radio ou à la télévision quelque chose au sujet du Parlement Européen, c'est-à-dire de l'Assemblée parlementaire de la Communauté Européenne ?

1st colum: EB38 result 2nd colum: Change from EB37	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST			
Yes	53 +6	59 +4	57 +10	56 +9	53 +6	57 +8	56 +10	58 +19
No	39 -5	38 -3	34 -8	34 -8	36 -3	39 -4	38 -5	37 -16
Don't know	8 -1	3 0	9 -3	10 -2	11 -3	4 -4	6 -1	6 -2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101
1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis EB37	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Oui	51 +7	54 +9	65 -2	51 +11	62 +1	53 +16	55 +11	55 +11
Non	44 -4	39 -8	32 +4	45 -10	32 0	43 -18	38 -11	38 -10
Ne sait pas	6 -2	7 +1	3 -3	5 0	6 -1	4 +1	6 -2	7 -1
TOTAL	101	100	100	101	100	100	99	100

# A 41

Table/Tableau 39 : **IMPRESSION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT** / l'impression sur le Parlement Européen (% of those who said they heard of the European Parliament / % de ceux déclarant avoir entendu parler du Parlement Européen, by country/par pays)

**QUESTION** : Has what you read or heard given you a generally favourable or unfavourable impression of the European Parliament ? / Est-ce que cela vous a donné plutôt une bonne impression ou plutôt une mauvaise impression du Parlement Européen ?

1st column: EB38 result 2nd column: Change from EB37	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST	EAST				
Generally favourable	43 +2	30 -4	46 -2	44 -5	37 -13	60 -7	51 -13	41 -5
Generally unfavourable	12 -7	35 -1	25 -2	24 0	17 +4	9 +2	12 +7	17 +3
Neither favourable, nor unfavourable (SPONT)	38 +7	31 -3	23 +4	26 +5	41 +10	28 +5	31 +5	37 +5
Don't know	7 -2	5 +3	6 -1	6 -1	5 -2	4 0	6 +1	5 -3
TOTAL	100	101	100	100	100	101	100	100
1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis EB37	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Plutôt bonne	67 +1	63 -3	37 0	34 +2	62 -12	33 -10	47 -6	46 -7
Plutôt mauvaise	13 +2	9 +1	23 -2	35 +2	6 +2	41 +11	21 +3	21 +4
Ni bonne, ni mauvaise (SPONT)	14 -3	23 +1	37 +5	22 -3	27 +6	21 +1	27 +4	27 +3
Ne sait pas	6 0	6 +2	4 -1	9 -1	5 +3	5 -2	6 0	6 0
TOTAL	100	101	101	100	100	100	101	100

Table/Tableau 40 : **THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN EC LIFE** / le Parlement Européen dans la vie de la CE (% by country / par pays)

**QUESTION** : How important a part would you say the European Parliament plays in the life of the European Community nowadays...? / A votre avis, actuellement, le Parlement Européen joue-t-il dans la vie de la Communauté Européenne un rôle...?

1st column: EB38 result 2nd column: Change from EB37	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST	EAST				
Very important	10 0	10 0	9 -2	9 -2	9 -2	24 +4	15 -4	8 +1
Important	40 -9	42 -2	48 +7	47 +5	41 -4	44 0	44 -1	46 0
Not very important	28 +4	30 +1	25 0	25 -1	26 -1	8 0	17 +7	28 0
Not at all important	4 0	7 +3	5 -3	5 -2	6 +2	2 +1	4 +1	5 +1
Don't know	18 +3	11 -2	13 -1	14 0	19 +5	23 -4	21 -3	13 -2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	101	101	101	100
1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis EB37	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Très important	24 -1	13 -4	12 +1	4 0	19 -7	11 +2	11 -1	11 -1
Important	42 -1	42 -1	47 -8	40 +2	44 -5	38 -3	43 0	43 0
Peu important	10 0	20 +1	21 +3	39 -4	10 +3	25 0	23 +1	24 +1
Pas important du tout	3 0	3 0	6 +1	6 +3	1 0	5 +1	5 +1	5 +1
Ne sait pas	21 +1	22 +3	14 +2	10 -2	25 +8	21 +1	18 0	18 0
TOTAL	100	100	100	99	99	100	100	101

Table/Tableau 41 : **OPINION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT** / Opinion à l'égard des activités du Parlement Européen (% by country/par pays) (\*)

**QUESTION** : For each of the following, could you tell me if you think the European Parliament plays an important or unimportant part in ...? / Selon vous, le Parlement Européen joue-t-il un rôle important ou pas important dans les domaines suivants ...?

1st column: important 2nd column: not important	B		DK		D				GR		E		F	
					WEST		EAST							
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
European social policy	52	27	34	44	52	30	52	29	52	26	72	8	58	16
The common recognition of qualifications	43	30	44	36	51	33	50	32	46	31	51	17	32	27
Student exchange policy	43	29	46	32	51	31	51	30	51	26	54	14	45	21
Policies in favour of families, women and old people	37	37	25	49	43	38	42	38	38	38	57	16	44	24
Consumer protection policy	48	29	43	38	53	29	52	29	48	27	64	13	47	24
Environmental protection policy	56	25	60	27	64	21	66	20	71	13	68	12	59	14
1ère col.: important 2e col.: pas important	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
La politique sociale de L'Europe	63	10	59	18	55	25	39	41	58	13	45	25	51	26
La reconnaissance mutuelle des diplômes	55	15	49	26	55	26	42	30	32	23	36	30	42	30
La politique d'échange d'étudiants	55	19	45	25	56	25	47	26	37	22	44	22	46	26
Les politiques en faveur des familles, des femmes et des personnes âgées	55	14	37	35	46	36	28	44	42	26	44	26	39	35
La politique de protection des consommateurs	59	14	51	26	50	30	49	31	48	20	46	25	48	28
La politique de protection de l'environnement	64	12	60	18	60	23	62	24	56	16	60	16	61	19

(\*) The difference between "+" plus "-" and 100 is the percentage of "don't know" (not shown)/La différence entre la somme des "+" et des "-" et 100 représente le pourcentage des "ne sait pas" (pas indiqué).

# A 43

Table/Tableau 42 : **THE ROLE DESIRED FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT** / Le rôle souhaité pour le Parlement Européen (% by country/par pays)

QUESTION : Would you personally prefer the European Parliament played a more important or a less important part than it does now ? / Vous-même souhaiteriez-vous que le Parlement Européen joue un rôle plus important ou moins important qu'à l'heure actuelle ?

1st column: EB38 result 2nd column: Change from EB38	B	DK	D				GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST				
More important	56 -1	32 0	53 +4	53 +2	55 -4	61 -2	58 +1	58 -5	
Less important	7 +3	25 -2	14 +1	14 +2	12 +4	4 +1	4 +1	9 +2	
About the same (SPONT)	27 -1	31 +5	13 -4	13 -3	13 -1	16 +3	18 +3	15 +1	
Don't know	10 -1	12 -4	19 -2	20 0	20 +1	19 -2	20 -4	18 +3	
TOTAL	100	100	99	100	100	100	100	100	
1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis EB38	IRL			NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +	
Plus important	42 -6			63 -3	70 -3	40 -3	55 -1	55 -1	
Moins important	8 +4			9 +1	2 0	22 +4	10 +1	11 +2	
Le même (SPONT)	26 +2	17 +4	34 -3	15 0	12 +1	18 -4	17 +1	17 +1	
Ne sait pas	25 +1	16 -2	14 +5	14 +1	16 +3	20 +1	18 -1	18 0	
TOTAL	101	101	101	101	100	100	100	101	

Table/Tableau 43 : **RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CURRENT AND DESIRED ROLES FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT** / Relation entre le rôle actuel et Le rôle souhaité du Parlement Européen (Crosstabulation between Tables 40 and 42/Croisement des tableaux 40 et 42).

EURO-PARLIAMENT DESIRED/ PARLEMENT EUROPEEN SOUHAITE	EURO-PARLIAMENT CURRENTLY/ PARLEMENT EUROPEEN ACTUELLEMENT			TOTAL
	Important/ Important	Not important/ Pas important	DK/NSP	
	34	29	18	101
More/Plus	64	58	23	55
	63	30	7	100
Less/Moins	8	19	6	11
	41	50	10	101
Same/Le même	19	13	16	17
	61	22	17	100
Don't know/Ne sait pas	10	10	55	18
	30	16	54	100
TOTAL	101	100	100	101

**Table/Tableau 44 : POLICY AREAS FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S APPROVAL/ Domaines politiques dans lesquels les décisions devraient être approuvées par le Parlement Européen (% , by country/par pays)**

**QUESTION :** For each of the following areas, do you think that important decisions should be approved or not by the European Parliament before being applied ? / A wtrc avis, pour chacun des domaines suivants, les décisions essentielles devraient-elles ou non être approuvées par le Parlement Européen avant leur mise en application ? \*

	B	DK	D			GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+
			EST		EAST										
Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy/La réforme de la Politique Agricole Commune	42	50	53	52	50	49	41	63	61	50	60	69	53	54	53
European Citizenship/La citoyenneté Européenne	45	44	41	41	41	42	36	56	61	59	42	52	43	55	47
The policy of development towards non EC countries/ La politique de développement envers des pays non membres de la CE	37	50	44	44	46	42	34	52	58	43	58	50	43	51	45
European Social policy/ La politique sociale Européenne	45	42	49	49	53	52	40	60	61	50	55	62	45	51	51

• Multiple "Yes" answers possible / Plusieurs réponses "Oui" possible

**Table/Tableau 45 : SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN ONE'S COUNTRY / Satisfaction à l'égard de la démocratie dans son pays (% , by country/par pays)**

**QUESTION :** On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, or not very satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country) Would you say you are ...? / Dans l'ensemble, êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas du tout satisfait du fonctionnement de la démocratie dans (votre pays) ? Diriez-vous que vous êtes... ?

1st column: EB38 result 2nd column: Change from EB37	B		DK		D						GR		E		F	
					EST				EAST							
Very satisfied	6	-1	22	0	8	-3	7	-2	3	0	6	0	9	-6	4	+2
Fairly satisfied	47	-3	58	+2	52	-3	49	-3	36	-5	30	0	32	-9	43	+5
Not very satisfied	28	+2	16	-1	32	+5	35	+4	47	+3	41	+1	38	+11	33	-1
Not at all satisfied	14	+3	3	-2	7	+2	8	+2	12	+2	21	0	17	+4	17	-4
Don't know	5	-1	1	+1	2	-1	2	-1	2	0	3	-1	4	-1	4	-1
TOTAL	100		100		101		101		100		101		100		101	
1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col: Variation depuis EB37	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC 12 +	
Très satisfait	13	+1	1	0	18	+4	7	-3	2	-3	5	-3	6	-2	6	-1
Plutôt satisfait	49	0	11	-8	52	-8	64	+4	83	-4	42	-8	39	-4	39	-4
Plutôt pas satisfait	19	-2	40	-5	20	+2	23	-1	24	+5	32	+5	33	+2	34	+2
Pas du tout satisfait	12	0	44	+13	6	+3	5	+1	7	+1	15	+5	18	+3	18	+3
Ne sait pas	7	+1	4	0	4	-1	2	-1	5	+2	5	0	4	0	3	-1
TOTAL	100		100		100		101		101		100		100		100	

Table/Tableau 46 : **DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT / Déficit démocratique (%)**, by country/par pays)

WESTION : Do you think citizens have sufficient democratic influence in EC-decision making or not? / Selon vous, les citoyens ont-ils suffisamment ou non d'influence démocratique dans les décisions de la Communauté Européenne?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+	
			West	East											
Yes/oui	17	16	15	14	10	28	11	16	14	15	19	21	33	7	14
No/Non	68	77	69	71	77	52	73	74	67	66	70	63	44	84	71
Don't know/Ne sait pas	16	7	16	15	13	21	16	9	19	19	11	16	23	9	14
TOTAL	101	100	100	100	100	101	100	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	99

Table/Tableau 47 : **RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION WITH OUR DEMOCRACY AND THE EC DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT / Relation entre la satisfaction à l'égard de sa propre démocratie et le déficit démocratique de la CE** (Crosstabulation between Tables 45 and 46/croisement des tableaux 45 et 46).

	SATISFACTION NATIONAL DEMOCRACY/ SATISFACTION DEMOCRATIE NATIONALE			
EC CITIZEN INFLUENCE/ INFLUENCE CITOYEN CE	Satisfied/ Satisfait	Not satisfied/ Pas satisfait	DK/NSP	TOTAL
	45	52	3	100
Sufficient influence/ Assez d'influence	19 60	11 38	9 2	14 100
Insufficient influence/ Pas assez d'influence	66 41	78 57	46 2	71 100
Don't know/Ne sait pas	15 47	12 42	45 11	14 100
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>99</b>

Table/Tableau 48 : **SUPPORT FOR A EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT / Pour un gouvernement européen responsable devant le Parlement Européen (%)**, by country/par pays)

WESTION : Are you for or against the formation of a European Union with a European government responsible to the European Parliament? / Etes-vous pour ou contre la formation d'une Union Européenne avec un Gouvernement Européen responsable devant le Parlement Européen?

1st colum: EB38 result 2nd colum: Change from EB37	B		DK		D		GR		E		F					
					EST		EAST									
For	61	0	24	-1	51	-1	50	-3	46	-8	62	+1	59	0	49	-7
Against	15	+7	67	+3	22	+2	23	+4	26	+8	17	-2	21	+7	31	-11
Don't know	25	-7	9	-2	27	+1	27	-1	28	0	21	0	20	-7	20	-4
TOTAL	101		100		100		100		100		100		100		100	

1ère colonne: Résultat EB38 2e col:Variation depuis EB37	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC 12 +	
Pour	44	-7	73	0	56	-1	50	-9	60	-9	24	-11	51	-4	51	-4
Contre	25	+9	11	+4	27	+4	32	+8	13	+4	56	+21	28	+8	28	+8
Ne sait pas	31	-2	16	-4	18	-3	18	+1	27	-5	20	-11	21	-4	21	-4
TOTAL	100		100		101		100		100		100		100		100	

Table/Tableau 49 : EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN T Y YEAR 2000 / La Communauté Européenne en l'an 2000 (% by country/par pays).

QUESTION : If you had the choice, which countries do you think should be part of the European Community in the year 2000? For each of the countries on this map, please tell me if it should be a member of the European Community in the year 2000 or not ? / Si vous aviez le choix, quels seraient les pays qui, selon vous, devraient faire partie de la Communauté Européenne en l'an 2000 ? Pour chacun des pays de cette carte, voulez-vous me dire si, oui ou non, il devrait en faire partie en l'an 2000 ?

+ = in favour - = not in favour	B		DK		EST		EAST		GR		E		EC12+	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Albania	28	50	20	68	15	65	17	62	26	51	27	60	39	31
Germany	90	5	90	6	94	2	94	2	93	3	87	7	81	4
United Kingdom	8	6	8	90	6	84	10	85	8	91	4	8	6	7
Armenia	26	53	11	77	12	67	13	66	20	55	28	53	30	38
Austria	8	4	7	8	4	5	89	5	89	5	91	4	79	10
Azerbaijan	24	56	10	77	12	68	13	67	18	61	19	57	30	37
Belgium	92	3	90	6	87	5	88	5	90	4	86	6	8	0
Belarus	35	43	23	65	30	48	33	45	43	35	33	45	37	31
Bosnia-Herzegovina	29	51	20	67	21	60	21	59	23	57	28	54	37	33
Bulgaria	44	37	30	59	29	50	34	46	53	25	48	39	50	24
Cyprus	49	32	32	56	35	43	38	39	50	26	82	9	45	28
Croatia	33	48	24	63	26	52	26	53	24	56	33	49	42	30
Denmark	8	6	8	91	6	90	5	90	4	93	3	8	4	7
Spain	89	5	85	11	84	10	84	9	86	6	89	4	80	4
Estonia	42	36	62	27	48	31	49	31	55	28	33	44	43	27
Finland	75	13	8	6	9	73	12	75	11	83	7	77	12	66
France	92	3	91	5	92	3	92	3	93	3	89	4	82	2
Georgia	31	47	15	73	22	55	23	54	25	52	38	43	41	28
Greece	81	9	74	20	76	15	76	14	78	14	90	5	78	4
Hungary	58	26	50	40	56	28	60	25	73	15	63	25	57	18
Ireland	77	12	84	11	80	10	79	10	78	10	76	12	76	5
Iceland	67	17	81	13	68	17	69	16	70	13	69	18	63	13
Italy	87	6	87	9	85	9	85	9	85	7	89	5	81	2
Latvia	38	40	62	20	45	34	46	33	50	31	31	46	41	28
Lithuania	37	42	62	28	46	34	47	33	51	31	33	44	42	28
Luxembourg	89	4	89	6	89	5	89	4	91	4	8	2	9	77
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	32	47	21	65	18	60	19	59	22	58	20	71	38	30
Malta	51	30	49	38	52	28	53	27	56	22	67	20	44	28
Moldova	31	45	16	70	17	58	19	57	26	51	36	44	34	33
Norway	81	9	9	0	6	88	4	89	4	91	3	79	10	73
Netherlands	91	4	92	4	91	4	92	4	93	2	85	7	78	4
Poland	60	26	58	32	46	40	49	37	58	27	53	33	59	18
Portugal	81	10	79	16	73	16	74	15	76	11	8	4	8	80
Romania	4	4	3	8	32	56	30	52	32	51	39	44	51	37
Czech Republic	40	38	41	48	42	37	48	33	69	16	43	39	49	23
Russia	38	42	19	70	32	48	35	45	46	34	48	38	48	27
Serbia and Montenegro	28	51	19	69	14	66	15	65	19	60	33	52	3	6
Slovakia	34	43	32	56	28	50	33	45	54	26	30	50	43	26
Slovenia	3	4	4	4	24	64	26	52	27	50	32	43	30	51
Sweden	8	6	6	9	0	6	88	5	88	5	90	4	85	7
Switzerland	87	6	83	11	88	6	88	5	91	4	8	4	8	79
Turkey	43	40	26	61	43	41	44	40	47	36	19	71	44	31
Ukraine	33	46	19	69	28	51	32	47	45	34	35	47	41	30

# A 47

see Table 49 for details / voir Tableau 49 pour plus de détails

+ : favorable - : défavorable	F		IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		CE 12 +						
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-					
Albanie	22	57	27	35	34	49	20	67	28	54	35	33	32	44	27	51					
Allemagne	89	7	8	3	8	87	8	91	4	92	3	79	6	79	10	87	6				
Angleterre	84	11	8	8	5	89	6	87	7	8	6	7	79	5	78	10	8	4	8		
Arménie	24	59	23	40	25	53	18	68	23	59	35	33	24	53	22	55					
Autriche	77	14	65	12	81	10	80	14	a5	7	63	14	75	11	8	0	9				
Azerbaïdjan	17	62	20	40	21	54	15	71	21	61	29	36	19	57	19	57					
Belgique	91	4	a1	5	89	5	93	2	94	1	78	5	82	6	87	5					
Bielorussie	29	53	18	40	30	44	25	61	39	44	33	32	29	46	32	45					
Bosnie-Herzégovine	25	57	25	39	32	48	25	63	31	49	33	36	32	47	28	51					
Bulgar ie	40	46	41	30	45	37	37	53	43	42	50	22	41	39	41	40					
Chypre	32	52	51	25	45	34	41	47	47	37	42	29	54	28	44	36					
Croatie	30	55	27	39	39	42	25	61	35	46	34	34	34	47	33	47					
Danemark	84	11	82	8	8	3	7	89	5	91	4	77	5	82	6	85	6				
Espagne	89	7	8	6	5	91	4	87	7	8	8	6	8	3	3	79	9	85	7		
Eston ie	35	48	30	35	40	38	40	48	58	27	37	32	39	39	42	36					
Finlande	73	17	69	13	75	13	72	21	83	10	63	13	69	16	73	13					
France	94	3	8	8	4	9	4	3	92	3	91	3	8	4	2	81	a	89	4		
Géorg ie	27	56	31	36	38	41	26	61	28	53	43	28	28	49	30	47					
Grèce	76	17	77	9	83	10	79	14	72	17	75	7	39	17	77	13					
Hongr ie	54	34	59	18	59	27	4	6	4	4	6	4	2	3	56	19	57	25	58	26	
Irlande	79	14	89	4	80	10	84	9	8	3	1	0	71	8	75	13	78	11			
Islande	64	25	56	20	72	16	67	25	74	15	54	21	57	26	66	19					
Italie	8	8	7	85	5	92	4	90	4	8	4	8	8	2	2	79	9	85	7		
Letton ie	34	50	32	33	38	39	39	48	54	31	34	33	38	41	40	38					
Lituanie	34	49	34	33	39	39	36	52	51	33	34	34	38	40	41	38					
Luxembourg	89	7	79	8	8	2	9	93	2	92	3	76	8	73	11	8	3	7			
Ex-république yougoslave de Macédoine	28	54	28	35	31	46	22	63	33	47	30	36	33	43	28	49					
Malte	40	43	53	20	62	21	49	40	61	24	41	28	63	22	53	28					
Moldavie	25	56	22	39	33	40	23	60	29	50	31	33	30	46	27	48					
Norvège	79	14	79	8	80	10	77	16	89	4	69	10	76	11	81	9					
Pays-Bas	89	6	82	6	8	4	8	93	2	93	2	67	12	80	7	8	6	6			
Pologne	59	32	60	20	66	22	51	39	65	24	58	19	60	22	58	27					
Portugal	80	14	81	7	81	9	82	11	85	8	8	4	2	74	12	78	11				
Roumanie	44	43	44	31	51	34	35	54	45	40	51	24	44	36	43	39					
République Tchèque	42	45	37	32	49	33	40	47	51	31	41	30	51	31	47	34					
Russie	34	53	31	44	44	37	33	55	41	44	48	29	36	45	39	43					
Serbie et Montenegro	26	57	21	45	28	51	19	66	30	52	31	38	30	48	26	53					
Slovaquie	31	53	23	41	39	40	31	57	45	37	34	33	38	40	36	42					
Slovénie	29	53	24	41	41	38	28	57	40	42	32	34	34	42	33	44					
Sulde	83	10	82	6	8	8	5	8	0	1	3	9	0	4	72	9	78	9	8	4	7
Suisse	8	8	7	8	3	5	85	8	79	15	89	4	76	7	79	8	8	4	7		
Turquie	34	54	51	26	40	44	34	54	51	35	53	22	45	36	41	42					
Ukraine	34	51	27	38	35	43	27	58	36	47	42	29	35	43	35	44					



Table/Tableau 49 bis  
see previous table for details / voir Tableau 49 pour les détails

+ : in favour - : not in favour	AUSTRIA		CZECHOSLOVAKIA		HUNGARY		NORWAY		POLAND		RUSSIA		SWITZERLAND		UKRAINE			
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-		
Albania	15	36	19	72	33	41	20	43	21	53	27	22	21	57	40	25		
Germany	58	4	82	11	89	3	55	19	8	2	5	57	3	78	16	79	2	
United Kingdom	48	8	73	26	84	7	54	19	81	5	55	4	77	16	75	7		
Armenia	12	39	17	72	31	51	16	47	19	54	19	33	20	58	28	42		
Austria	51	12	79	20	89	3	50	21	77	8	51	6	75	17	67	4		
Azerbaijan	12	38	16	72	21	55	15	48	16	57	18	34	17	55	22	45		
Belgium	45	9	71	22	80	5	53	18	78	7	47	1	75	17	72	5		
Belarus	17	32	29	64	38	41	25	39	39	36	45	11	30	47	64	11		
Bosnia-Herzegovina	18	33	23	65	36	47	24	41	24	51	26	20	22	57	34	22		
Bulgaria	22	26	39	54	55	31	30	36	41	36	47	10	34	46	67	a		
Cyprus	23	26	28	65	54	21	30	36	33	40	32	14	42	38	37	ia		
Croatia	21	30	2	9	6	4	50	34	24	39	29	46	28	15	24	55	39	20
Denmark	4	8	8	69	25	81	8	53	22	77	7	49	6	75	16	65	7	
Spain	48	7	66	32	8	3	7	52	20	78	8	50	7	76	17	6	8	5
Estonia	27	20	32	61	54	28	38	29	41	34	36	18	42	37	56	14		
Finland	43	11	65	33	8	0	5	48	25	71	12	56	4	70	19	75	3	
France	54	5	82	17	8	8	4	55	18	84	3	58	3	79	14	a	3	1
Georgia	18	28	19	70	30	50	19	45	25	49	21	32	24	51	27	40		
Greece	45	8	55	41	78	11	44	25	78	15	49	7	37	23	65	8		
Hungary	35	17	70	28	8	8	3	36	30	73	12	44	10	50	33	65	8	
Ireland	40	10	46	51	64	21	49	22	60	19	40	11	69	20	54	10		
Iceland	36	13	38	55	59	24	44	29	56	22	39	10	95	25	52	12		
Italy	50	6	77	21	86	5	53	20	8	2	4	54	5	77	16	75	4	
Latvia	24	22	31	62	52	31	33	32	45	31	37	17	39	39	58	14		
Lithuania	23	24	34	60	52	31	36	31	47	29	35	18	38	40	56	15		
Luxembourg	47	7	55	42	79	9	50	21	64	16	40	9	75	17	53	13		
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	16	41	19	69	33	43	23	41	23	45	26	16	22	57	53	13		
Malta	27	21	30	64	61	21	33	31	37	37	30	13	50	33	33	20		
Moldova	15	31	19	69	34	45	20	41	24	48	32	20	22	50	39	29		
Norway	47	8	63	35	a	0	9	43	32	75	9	50	5	75	17	6	4	5
Netherlands	50	7	71	27	a	6	5	52	19	81	5	4	4	7	76	16	63	7
Poland	28	21	6	4	3	4	70	17	41	28	82	4	44	12	49	32	63	10
Portugal	38	12	54	42	70	15	49	21	66	15	45	7	70	21	63	7		
Romania	19	29	30	63	40	46	27	37	31	44	41	13	36	45	49	19		
Czech Republic	26	23	82	17	66	20	36	29	70	12	41	11	40	39	60	9		
Russia	21	29	38	56	51	34	23	41	43	34	57	3	30	50	66	10		
Serbia and Montenegro	14	43	24	68	31	49	22	42	24	50	26	19	19	61	34	22		
Slovakia	20	31	67	31	56	29	28	36	57	22	36	13	28	47	50	13		
Slovenia	23	28	31	62	50	32	27	37	34	39	31	15	25	50	43	16		
Sweden	50	7	71	27	87	4	47	27	8	0	5	57	3	75	17	76	2	
Switzerland	54	6	75	23	8	8	4	51	21	79	6	55	4	59	33	76	3	
Turkey	24	25	35	59	58	26	28	37	52	28	41	13	39	45	50	20		
Ukraine	17	31	38	56	51	32	22	40	43	34	46	10	28	48	73	5		

- The difference between "+" and "-", and 100, is the percentage of "don't know" (not shown) / La différence entre la somme des "+" et "-", et 100%, représente le pourcentage des "ne sait pas" (pas indiqué)

# A 49

Table/Tableau 50 : **AWARENESS OF EUROPEAN COURT / Notoriété de la Cour de Justice Européenne (%)**, by country, par pays)

**QUESTION** : Would you say you are very aware, somewhat aware, not very aware or have you never heard of the European Court of Justice before today ? / Diriez-vous que vous connaissez très bien, assez bien, pas très bien la Cour de Justice Européenne ou que vous n'en aviez jamais entendu parler avant aujourd'hui?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+	
			WEST	EAST											
Very aware/ Connait très bien	2	3	6	5	2	3	0	1	18	1	3	2	2	14	4
Somewhat aware/ Connait assez bien	11	40	33	30	18	2	3	4	8	43	8	14	15	39	20
Not very aware/ Ne connait pas très bien	60	54	52	54	60	45	50	55	22	47	61	62	35	29	48
Never heard of before today/ N'a jamais entendu parler avant aujourd'hui	18	2	7	9	16	26	32	33	11	35	14	15	35	14	22
Don't know/Ne sait pas	9	1	2	3	5	3	14	4	7	10	8	8	13	5	6
TOTAL	100	100	100	101	101	100	100	101	101	101	100	101	100	101	100

Table/Tableau 51 : **OBEYING EUROPEAN COURT DECISIONS / Obeir aux décisions de la Cour de Justice Européenne (%)**, by country/par pays)

**QUESTION** : The European Court of Justice is in charge of hearing cases about the laws of the European Community. It decides on the proper interpretation of Community law and whether European law or national law prevails. For each of the following statements, could you please indicate whether you agree strongly, you agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or you disagree strongly with it? If you are undecided, please tell me / La Cour de Justice Européenne traite de cas concernant la législation de la Communauté Européenne. Elle décide de l'interprétation correcte du droit communautaire et sur la question de savoir si le droit communautaire ou le droit national l'emporte. Pour chacune des propositions suivantes, veuillez indiquer si vous êtes d'accord, plutôt d'accord, plutôt pas d'accord ou pas du tout d'accord. Si vous êtes indécis, veuillez l'indiquer.

Whether we agree with the decisions of the European Court of Justice or not, everyone should obey them / Que nous soyons ou non d'accord avec les décisions de la Cour de Justice Européenne, chacun devrait s'y conformer.

	B	DK	D			GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+
			WEST		EAST										
Agree strongly/ Tout à fait d'accord	12	45	15	15	15	20	18	12	15	18	15	19	13	20	17
Agree somewhat/ Plutôt d'accord	35	30	32	31	28	29	23	34	33	40	30	35	25	40	34
Undecided/Indécis	23	7	26	26	25	14	18	16	18	18	13	9	14	11	18
Disagree somewhat/ Plutôt pas d'accord	13	10	13	14	17	14	17	19	14	9	21	17	14	14	14
Disagree strongly/ Pas du tout d'accord	5	6	6	6	7	9	13	11	7	4	9	12	15	6	8
Don't know/Ne sait pas	13	2	8	8	9	14	11	8	13	12	14	8	20	9	10
TOTAL	101	100	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	101	102	100	101	100	101

Table/Tableau 52 : **CONCERN ABOUT CONSUMER PROTECTION** / Concerné par le problème de sécurité des produits (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : In general, do you feel very concerned, somewhat concerned, or not at all concerned about the safety of products and services of consumers? / En général, vous sentez-vous très concerné, plutôt concerné, plutôt pas concerné par les problèmes de sécurité des produits et des services pour les consommateurs ?

	B	DK	D			GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	YL	P	UK	EC12+
			WEST		EAST										
Very concerned/ Très concerné	15	5	12	13	13	57	35	32	33	20	28	21	42	46	28
Somewhat concerned/ Un peu concerné	39	32	40	39	35	30	43	50	42	50	46	41	40	40	43
Not very concerned/ Pas très concerné	26	42	34	35	38	9	16	12	13	22	16	26	12	12	21
Not at all concerned/ Pas du tout concerné	17	19	11	11	10	3	4	5	6	5	7	10	5	2	7
Don't know/Ne sait pas	4	2	3	3	4	2	1	1	6	3	5	2	1	1	2
TOTAL	101	100	100	101	100	101	99	100	100	100	102	100	100	101	101

Table/Tableau 53 : **MAIN INCOME EARNER** / La personne qui apporte Le revenu principal du foyer (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : Are you in your household the person who contributes most to the household income? / Etes-vous la personne qui apporte le revenu principal au foyer?

	B	DK	D			GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	YL	P	UK	EC12+
			West		East										
Male/Masculin	76	77	84	82	74	74	70	81	70	62	76	87	78	72	75
Female/Feminin	31	47	40	40	38	23	18	35	24	23	24	35	26	32	31

Table/Tableau 54 : **MAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR SHOPPING** (Ay) **HOUSEHOLD** / La personne principalement responsable des tâches ménagères (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : Are you in your household the person mainly responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home? / Etes-vous dans votre foyer la personne principalement responsable des achats courants et des tâches ménagères?

	B	DK	D			GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+
			West		East										
Male/Masculin	25	34	30	28	20	32	13	23	16	21	22	33	11	27	24
Female/Feminin	81	84	91	90	86	81	77	87	73	64	80	86	80	85	82

Table/Tableau 55 : **SAME MAIN PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR INCOME** (Ay) **DOMESTIC WORK** / La même personne qui apporte le revenu principal du foyer, et qui est la principale responsable des tâches ménagères (% , by country/par pays) (Crosstabulation tables 53 and 54/Croisement des tableaux 53 et 54)

	B	DK	D			GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12+
			West		East										
% same main person responsible for income and domestic work/ % même personne responsable du revenu et des tâches ménagères	24	35	34	32	26	25	13	28	18	20	21	32	17	27	25

## LIST OF GRAPHICS/LISTE DES GRAPHIQUES

Figure	Title/Titre	Page
1.1	The economy 1992. 1991 expectations, 1992 reports (% "economy better" minus "economy worse") / L'economie en 1992, imaginée fin 1991, ressentie 1992 (% "Economie meilleure" moins "Economie moins bonne") .....	2
1.2	"Recent" awareness of European Community institutions/initiatives in the media and change compared to 6 months ago / Visibilité 'recente' dans les medias des institutions/initiatives de la Communauté Européene, et changement depuis 6 mois .....	4
1.3	Feeling informed about the EC/ Sentiment d'etre informe sur la CE ...	4
1.4 a-l	Support for European Unification and the Community 1981-1992 / Soutien à l'unification et à la Communauté 1981-1992 .....	8-20
1.5	Importance of EC matters for the future of our country and its citizens 1974-1992 (EC12) / Importances des affaires CE pour l'avenir de notre pays et nos citoyens 1974-1992 (CE12) .....	22
1.6	Image of the European Commission in the media 1987-1992 (EC12) / Image de la Commission européenne dans les medias 1987-1992 (CE12) .....	22
1.7	Awareness and importance of EC Presidency / Notoriété et importance de la Présidence CE .....	24
2.1	Awareness of Maastricht / Notoriété de Maastricht .....	28
2.2	Maastricht: how much do you know? / Maastricht: qu'en connaissez-vous? .....	28
2.3	Maastricht: for or against? / Maastricht: pour ou contre? .....	30
2.4	"Yes to Europe: No to Maastricht" - EC12 attitudes towards Europe of those "for" and "against" Maastricht / "Oui à Europe: Non à Maastricht" -- Attitudes de CE12 envers l'Europe de ceux qui sont "pour" ou "contre" Maastricht .....	30
2.5	Maastricht 14 issues (EC12) / Maastricht: 14 aspects (CE12) .....	32
2.6	Core "Maastricht" elements (EC12)/ Principaux elements de "Maastricht" - (CE12) .....	36
2.7	Support for "core" Maastricht elements 1990-1992 (EC12)/ Soutien aux principaux elements de "Maastricht" (CE12) .....	36

2.8	Who has the final say on EC law-making? (EUROBAROMETER 37 - Spring 1992 results) / Legislation CE: à qui appartient la decision finale? (EUROBAROMETRE 37 - résultats du Printemps 1992) . . . . .	38
2.9	National or joint EC decision-making? 18 policy areas - EC12 / Legislation nationale ou communautaire? -CE12 . . . . .	40
2.10	Anticipated effect of Maastricht on... (EC12) / Effets anticipés de Maastricht sur - CE12 . . . . .	U
2.11	Loss of national identity or national identity / european identity compatible? / Perte de l'identité nationale ou compatibilité de l'identité nationale? . . . . .	. U
3.1	Awareness of Single Market in the media / Notoriété du marche unique au travers des medias . . . . .	48
3.2	Informedness: when is the Single Market to start? / Niveau d'information: quand le Marche Unique doit-il debuter? . . . . .	48
3.3	Single Market "Good thing" or "bad thing" 1987-1992 (EC12) / Marche Unique: "Bonne chose" ou "mauvaise chose" (CE12) . . . . .	50
3.4	Single Market "Hope" or "Fear" 1988-1992 (EC12) / Marche Unique - "Espoir" ou "Crainte" 1988-1992 (CE12) . . . . .	50
3.5	Why "Hope" for Single Market? EC12 / Marche unique: pourquoi de l'espoir? (CE12) . . . . .	54
3.6	Why "Afraid" of Single Market? EC12 / Marche unique: pourquoi de la crainte? . . . . .	.55
3.7	Why "Afraid" of Single Market? Spain / Marche unique: pourquoi de la crainte? -Espagne . . . . .	56
3.8	Why "Afraid" of Single Market? Denmark / Marche unique: pourquoi de la crainte? -Danemark . . . . .	56
3.9	Why "Afraid" of Single Market - too much competition / Marche unique: pourquoi de la crainte? -trop de concurrence . . . . .	58
4.1	Image of the European Parliament in the media 1982-1992 (EC12)/ Image du Parlement européenne au travers des medias 1982-1992 (CE12) . . . . .	62
4.2	Importance of European Parliament - current and desired / Importance du Parlement européen - actuelle et souhaitée . . . . .	64
4.3	Importance of European Parliament's role in.. / Importance du role du Parlement européen dans.. . . . .	68



RECHERCHES SUR LES ATTITUDES DES EUROPEENS /  
SURVEYS ON ATTITUDES OF THE EUROPEANS

- (1) "LES EUROPEENS ET L'UNIFICATION DE L'EUROPE" / "EUROPEANS AND EUROPEAN UNIFICATION" (FR/EN)  
Sondage de février-mars 1970 / Survey carried out in February-March 1970  
Rapport juin 1972 / Report June 1972 - 240 p.
  
- (2) "L'OPINION DES EUROPEENS SUR LES ASPECTS REGIONAUX ET AGRICOLES DU MARCHE COMMUN. L'UNIFICATION POLITIQUE DE L'EUROPE ET L'INFORMATION DU PUBLIC" (FR)  
Sondage de juillet 1971 / Survey carried out in July 1971.  
Rapport décembre 1971 / Report December 1971 - 64 p.
  
- (3) "SATISFACTION ET INSATISFACTION QUANT AUX CONDITIONS DE VIE DANS LES PAYS DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE" (FR)  
Sondage de septembre 1973 / Survey carried out in September 1973.  
Rapport juin 1974 / Report June 1974 - 120 p.
  
- (4) "L'EUROPE VUE PAR LES EUROPEENS" (FR)  
Sondage de septembre 1973 / Survey carried out in September 1973.  
Rapport août 1974 / Report August 1974 - 48 p.
  
- (5) "EUROBAROMETRE" / "EUROBAROMETER" (Disponible dans toutes les langues communautaires / Available in all Community languages).  
Sondage semestriel dont les resultats sont publies depuis juin 1974. / Half-yearly survey published as from June 1974.
  
- (6) "FEMMES ET HOMMES D'EUROPE" / "EUROPEAN MEN AND WOMEN" (FR/EN/DE)  
Sondage de mai 1975 / Survey carried out in May 1975  
Rapport décembre 1975 / Report December 1975 - 215 p.
  
- (7) "LE CONSOMMATEUR EUROPEEN" / "EUROPEAN CONSUMER" (FR/EN)  
Sondage d'octobre 1975 / Survey carried out in October 1975  
Rapport mai 1976 / Report May 1976 - 175 p.
  
- (8) "LA PERCEPTION DE LA MISERE EN EUROPE" / "THE PERCEPTION OF POVERTY IN EUROPE" (FR/EN/DE/NL/DA)  
Sondage de mai-juin 1976 / Survey carried out in May-June 1976.  
Rapport mars 1977 / Report March 1977 - 144 p. - 2<sup>o</sup> édition (FR) septembre 1981.
  
- (9) "LA SCIENCE ET L'OPINION PUBLIQUE EUROPEENNE" / "SCIENCE AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION" (EN/DE/IT/NL) (FR épuisé)  
Sondage d'avril-mai 1977 / Survey carried out in April-May 1977.  
Rapport octobre 1977 / Report October 1977 - 98 p.

- (10) "LES **ATTITUDES** DE LA POPULATION ACTIVE A L'EGARD DES PERSPECTIVES DE LA RETRAITE" / "THE **ATTITUDES** OF THE WORKING POPULATION TO RETIREMENT" (FR/EN/DE/IT/NL)  
Sondage d'octobre-novembre 1977 / Survey carried out in October-November 1977.  
Rapport mai 1978 / Report May 1978 - 52 p.
- (11) "LES **ATTITUDES** DU PUBLIC **EUROPEEN** FACE AU DEVELOPPEMENT SCIENTIFIQUE ET TECHNIQUE" / "THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC'S **ATTITUDES** TO SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT" (FR/DE) (EN épuisé)  
Sondage d'octobre 1978 / Survey carried out in October 1978.  
Rapport février 1979 / Report February 1979 - 67 p.
- (12) "FEMMES ET HOMMES D'EUROPE EN 1978" / "EUROPEAN MEN AND WOMEN IN 1978" (FR/EN/DE/IT/NL)  
Sondage d'octobre-novembre 1977 / Survey carried out in October-November 1977.  
Rapport février 1979 / Report February 1979 - 248 p.
- (13) "**CHOMAGE** ET RECHERCHE D'UN EMPLOI: attitudes et opinions des publics **européens**" (FR)  
Sondage de mai-juin 1978 / Survey carried out in May-June 1978.  
Rapport septembre 1979 / Report September 1979 - 74 p.
- (14) "LES EUROPEENS ET LEURS ENFANTS" / "THE EUROPEANS AND THEIR CHILDREN" (FR/EN/DE/NL/DA/IT)  
Sondage d'avril 1979 / Survey carried out in April 1979.  
Rapport octobre 1979 / Report October 1979 - 102 p.
- (15) "LES FEMMES **SALARIEES** EN EUROPE: comment elles perçoivent les discriminations dans le travail" / "EUROPEAN WOMEN IN PAID EMPLOYMENT: their perception of discrimination at work" (FR/EN/DE/NL/IT/DA/GR)  
Sondage de juin-juillet 1980 / Survey carried out in June-July 1980.  
Rapport décembre 1980 / Report December 1980 - 72 p.
- (16) "LES EUROPEENS ET LEUR REGION: **étude** exploratoire sur la perception des **disparités socio-économiques**" / EUROPEANS AND THEIR REGION: public perception of the socio-economic disparities: an exploratory study" (FR/EN/DE/NL/IT/DA)  
Sondage d'avril-mai 1980 / Survey carried out in April-May 1980.  
Rapport décembre 1980 / Report December 1980 - 62 p.
- (17) "L'**OPINION** EUROPEENNE ET LES QUESTIONS **ENERGETIQUES**" / "THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE ENERGY PROBLEM" (FR/EN)  
Sondage de mars-avril 1982 / Survey carried out in March-April 1982.  
Rapport octobre 1982 / Report October 1982 - 79 p.



- (18) "LES JEUNES EUROPEENS : étude exploratoire des jeunes **âgés** de **15 à 24** ans dans **les** pays de la **Communauté Européenne**" / "THE YOUNG EUROPEANS: Exploratory study on young people aged between **15** and **24 years** in the countries of the European Community" - (FR/EN/DE/NL/IT/DA/GR)  
Sondage de mars-avril 1982 / Survey carried out in March-April 1982.  
Rapport **décembre** 1982 / Report December 1982 - 139 p.
- (19) "LE PARLEMENT EUROPEEN ET L'ELECTION DE **1984**" (FR)  
Sondage de mars-avril 1983 / Survey carried out in March-April 1983.  
Rapport **août** 1983 / Report August 1983 - 105 p.
- (20) "LES EUROPEENS ET LEUR ENVIRONNEMENT" / "EUROPEANS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT" (FR/EN/NL/IT/DA/DE)  
Sondage d'octobre 1982 / Survey carried out in October 1982.  
Rapport **novembre** 1983 / Report November 1983 - 64 p.
- (21) "LES EUROPEENS ET L'AIDE AU DEVELOPPEMENT" / "EUROPEANS AND AID TO DEVELOPMENT" (FR/EN)  
Sondage de septembre-octobre 1983 / Survey carried out in September-October 1983.  
Rapport **mai** 1984 / Report May 1984 - 134 p.
- (22) "FEMMES ET HOMMES D'EUROPE EN **1983**" / "EUROPEAN WOMEN AND MEN IN **1983**" (FRIEN + **résumés** disponibles dans les autres langues communautaires/ FR/EN + summaries available in other languages of the Community).  
Sondage de mars-avril 1983 / Survey carried out in March-April 1983.  
Rapport **juin** 1984 / Report June 1984 - 186 p.
- (23) "LES FEMMES **SALARIEES** EN EUROPE - **1984**" / "EUROPEAN WOMEN IN PAID EMPLOYMENT" (EN)  
Sondage de janvier-fevrier 1984 / Survey carried out in January-February 1984.  
Rapport **décembre** 1984 / Report December 1984 - 118 p.
- (24) "LE PUBLIC EUROPEEN ET L'INFORMATION DES CONSOMMATEURS : COMPARAISONS **1975-1985**" (FR)  
Mars 1985 / March 1985 - 18 p.  
Rapport **mars** 1985 / Report March 1985
- (25) "L'OPINION EUROPEENNE ET LES QUESTIONS **ENERGETIQUES** EN **1984**" / "THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE ENERGY PROBLEM IN **1984**" (FR/EN/DE)  
Sondage d'octobre 1984 / Survey carried out in October 1984.  
Rapport **juillet** 1985 / Report July 1985 - 99 p.

- (26) "L'OPINION DES SALAIRES EUROPEENS SUR LA FLEXIBILITE DANS LES CONDITIONS DE TRAVAIL" (FR)  
Sondage de mars-avril 1985 / Survey carried out in March-April 1985.  
Rapport juillet 1985 / Report July 1985 - 47 p.
- (26a) "ENQUETE AUPRES DES TRAVAILLEURS SALAIRES SUR LA FLEXIBILITE DANS LES CONDITIONS DE TRAVAIL" / "EMPLOYEE SURVEY ON LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY" (FR)  
(Economie européenne / European Economy nr. 27)  
Rapport octobre 1985 / Report October 1985 - 12 p.
- (27) "LE PUBLIC EUROPEEN ET L'ECU" / "EUROPEANS AND ECU" (FR/EN/DE/NL)  
Enquête faite dans sept pays de la Communauté Européenne à l'initiative d'un groupe de banques. / Survey carried out in seven EC countries on behalf of a group of banks.  
Sondage de mars-avril 1985 / Survey carried out in March-April 1985.  
Rapport novembre 1985 / Report November 1985 - 43 p.
- (28) "LES EUROPEENS ET LES VACANCES" / "EUROPEANS AND THEIR HOLIDAYS" (FR/EN/DE/IT/DA/ES/GR)  
Sondage de mars-avril 1986 / Survey carried out in March-April 1986.  
Rapport mars 1987 / Report March 1987 - 104 p.
- (29) "EUROPE 2000" (Disponible dans toutes les langues communautaires / Available in all Community languages).  
Sondage de **déc.** 1986-janv. 1987 / Survey carried out in Dec. 1986-Jan. 1987  
Edition speciale de l'Eurobaromètre pour le 30ème anniversaire du Traité de Rome, mars 1987 / Special Edition of the Eurobarometer for the 30th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, March 1987 - 58 p.
- (30) "LES EUROPEENS ET LEUR ENVIRONNEMENT EN 1986" / "EUROPEANS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT IN 1986" (Disponible dans toutes les langues communautaires / Available in all Community languages).  
Sondage de mars-avril 1986 / Survey carried out in March-April 1986  
Rapport mars 1987 / Report March 1987 - 107 p.
- (31) "LES EUROPEENS ET LA SECURITE ROUTIERE" / "EUROPEANS AND ROAD SAFETY" (FR/EN)  
Sondage d'octobre-novembre 1986 / Survey carried out in October-November 1986.  
Rapport mars 1988 / Report March 1988 - 98 p.

- (32) "L'OPINION EUROPEENNE ET LES QUESTIONS ENERGETIQUES EN **1986**" / "EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE ENERGY PROBLEM IN **1986**" (EN/FR + resumes disponibles en DE/ES/NL/DA/PO / FR/EN + summaries available in DE/ES/NL/DA/PO/IT)  
Sondage d'octobre-novembre 1986 / Survey carried out in October-November 1986.  
Rapport janvier 1988 / Report January 1988 - 163 p.
- (33) "LES EUROPEENS ET LA PREVENTION DU CANCER : **une étude sur les attitudes et comportements du public.**" / "EUROPEANS AND CANCER PREVENTION : **a study of attitudes and behaviour of the public**" (FR/EN)  
Sondage de mars-avril 1987 / Survey carried out in March-April 1987.  
Rapport juin 1988 / Report June 1988 - 88 p.
- (34) "LES EUROPEENS, LEUR AGRICULTURE ET LA POLITIQUE AGRICOLE COMMUNE" / "EUROPEANS, AGRICULTURE AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY". (Disponible dans toutes les langues communautaires / Available in all Community languages).  
Sondage de mars-avril 1987 / Survey carried out in March-April 1987.  
Edition spéciale de l'Eurobaromètre - Février 1988 / Special edition of the Eurobarometer - February 1988 - 60 p.
- (35) "HOMMES ET FEMMES D'EUROPE **1987. Evolution des opinions et des attitudes.**" / "MEN AND WOMEN IN EUROPE **1987. The evolution of opinions and attitudes.**" (FR/EN)  
Sondage de mars-avril 1987 / Survey carried out in March-April 1987.  
Supplément n°26 de "Femmes d'Europe" / Supplement nr. 26 of "Women of Europe". - 64 p.
- (36) "L'OPINION EUROPEENNE ET LES QUESTIONS ENERGETIQUES EN **1987**" / "EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE ENERGY PROBLEM IN **1987**". (FR/EN)  
Sondage d'octobre-novembre 1987 / Survey carried out in October-November 1987.  
Rapport mai 1988 / Report May 1988 - 174 p.
- (37) "LES EUROPEENS ET L'AIDE AU DEVELOPPEMENT EN **1987**" / "EUROPEANS AND DEVELOPMENT AID IN **1987**". (FR/EN)  
Sondage d'octobre-novembre 1987 / Survey carried out in October-November 1987.  
Rapport mars 1988 / Report March 1988 - 70 p.
- (38) "LES JEUNES EUROPEENS EN **1987**" / "THE YOUNG EUROPEANS IN **1987**". (FR/EN)  
Sondage d'octobre-novembre 1987 / Survey carried out in October-November 1987.  
Rapport mars 1989 / Report March 1989 - 208 p.

- (39) "LES EUROPEENS ET LEUR ENVIRONNEMENT EN 1988" / "EUROPEANS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT IN 1988." (FR)  
Sondage de mars-avril 1988 / Survey carried out in March-April 1988.  
Rapport octobre 1988 / Report October 1988 - 71 p.
- (40) "LES EUROPEENS ET LA PREVENTION DU CANCER : consommation alimentaire, tabagisme, **dépistage** des cancers féminins". / "EUROPEANS AND THE PREVENTION OF CANCER : food consumption, smoking, screening for women's cancers". (FR/EN)  
Sondage de mars-avril 1988 / Survey carried out in March-April 1988.  
Rapport décembre 1988 / Report December 1988 - 71 p.
- (41) "RACISME ET XENOPHOBIE. Droits de l'homme et immigration dans la Communauté européenne" / "RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA. Human rights and immigration in the European Community" (Disponible dans toutes les langues communautaires / Available in all Community languages)  
Sondage d'octobre-novembre 1988 / Survey carried out in October-November 1988.  
Rapport novembre 1989 / Report November 1989 - 120 p.
- (42) "LES EUROPEENS ET LA PREVENTION DU CANCER : la notoriété du Programme et du Code européen" / "EUROPEANS AND THE PREVENTION OF CANCER : awareness of the Programme and the European Code" (FR/EN).  
Sondage d'octobre-novembre 1988 / Survey carried out in October-November 1988.  
Rapport juin 1989 / Report June 1989 - 85 p.
- (43) "LES EUROPEENS, LA SCIENCE ET LA TECHNOLOGIE" / "EUROPEANS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY"  
Sondage mars-avril 1989 / Survey carried out in March-April 1989.  
Rapport non disponible / Report not available.  
Article disponible en EN / Article available in EN ("Europeans, Science and Technology" by J.R. Durant, J.D. Miller, J.F. Tchernia, W. van Deelen. A paper presented to the 1991 annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington, D.C. 15 February 1991, 22 p.).
- (44) "LES EUROPEENS ET LA PREVENTION DU CANCER : comportements liés au risque de cancer" / "EUROPEANS AND CANCER PREVENTION : behaviour linked with cancer" (FR)  
Sondage mars-avril 1989 / Survey carried out in March-April 1989  
Rapport décembre 1989 / Report December 1989 - 79 p.
- (45) "LES EUROPEENS ET LA PAUVRETE" / "EUROPEANS AND POVERTY" (FR/EN)  
Sondage juin-juillet 1989 / Survey carried out in June-July 1989  
Rapport mars 1990 / Report March 1990 - 110 p.

- (46) "LES EUROPEENS ET LES QUESTIONS **ENERGETIQUES EN 1989**" / "EUROPEANS AND THE ENERGY PROBLEM IN **1989**" (FR/EN/DE)  
Sondage juin-juillet 1989 / Survey carried out in June-July 1989  
Rapport novembre 1989 / Report November 1989 - 111 p.
- (47) "LES EUROPEENS ET LES ELECTIONS EUROPEENNES **1989**" / "EUROPEANS AND THE **1989** EUROPEAN ELECTIONS"  
Sondages oct.-nov. 1988, mars-avril 1989 et juin-juillet **1989**/Surveys carried out in Oct.-Nov. 1988, in March-April 1989 and in June-July 1989  
Diverses publications 1989 ff. du Groupe Transnational d'Etudes sur les Elections Européennes/Various publications 1989 ff. of the Transnational European Election Study Group/Coordination: Hermann SCHMITT, Zentrum für Europäische Umfrageanalysen und Studien (ZEUS), Universität Mannheim, Fed. Rep. of Germany.
- (48) "LA FAMILLE ET LE DESIR D'ENFANTS" / "THE FAMILY AND THE DESIRE FOR CHILDREN" (EN/DE) (FR épuisé)  
Sondage octobre-novembre 1989 / Survey carried out in October-November 1989  
Rapport août 1990 / Report August 1990 - 119 p.
- (49) "L'OPINION PUBLIQUE DANS LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE A PROPOS DES NATIONS-UNIES" / "PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS" (EN)  
Sondage octobre-novembre 1989/Survey carried out in October-November 1989  
Publié au printemps 1990 par l'ONU / Published in Spring 1990 by the UN
- (50) "LES JEUNES EUROPEENS EN **1990**" / "THE YOUNG EUROPEANS IN **1990**" (FR/EN) Sondage octobre-novembre 1990 / Survey carried out in October-November 1990  
Rapport mai 1991 / Report May 1991 - 191 p.
- (51) "FAMILLE ET EMPLOI DANS L'EUROPE DES DOUZE" / "FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT WITHIN THE TWELVE" (FR/EN)  
Sondage octobre-novembre 1990/Survey carried out in October-November 1990  
Rapport décembre 1991/Report December 1991 - 174 p.
- (52) "FIRST EUROPEAN SURVEY ON THE WORK ENVIRONMENT **1991-1992**" (EN)  
Sondage mars-avril 1991/Survey carried out in March-April 1991  
Published in 1992 by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions - 229 p.

- (53) "LA REPRESENTATION DES INTERETS DANS QUATRE PAYS DE LA CE"/"INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN FOUR EC COUNTRIES"  
Sondage octobre-novembre 1990/Survey carried out October-November 1990  
Publie en 1991 par le Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialwissenschaften/Published in 1991 by the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialwissenschaften (WZB)
- (54) "ESOMAR HARMONISED DEMOGRAPHICS FOR EUROPEAN SURVEY RESEARCH" (EN)  
Survey carried out October-November 1990. Published 1991 by the European Society for Opinion and Market Research (ESOMAR).
- (55) "LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ET L'ALLEMAGNE UNIE EN AUTOMNE 1990" / "THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNITED GERMANY IN AUTUMN 1990" (DE)  
Rapport special sur les resultats du sondage Eurobaromètre No.34, octobre 1990 / Special report on the results of the October 1990 Eurobarometer survey No.34.  
Rapport en février 1991 / Report February 1991 - 41 p.
- (56) "L'OPINION EUROPEENNE ET LES QUESTIONS ENERGETIQUES EN 1991" / "THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE ENERGY PROBLEM IN 1991" (FR/EN)  
Sondage mars 1991 / Survey carried out in March 1991.  
Rapport novembre 1991 / Report November 1991 - 85 p.
- (57) "LES EUROPEENS ET LA SANTE ET LA SECURITE AU TRAVAIL" / "EUROPEANS AND HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK" (EN/FR).  
Sondage avril-mai 1991 / Survey carried out in April-May 1991  
Rapport publié en 1992 / Report published in 1992 - 140 p.
- (58) "CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR IN THE INTERNAL MARKET" (EN)  
Survey carried out in April 1991  
Report July 1991 - 16 p.
- (59) "EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS URBAN TRAFFIC PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORT" (EN)  
Sondage avril 1991 / Survey carried out in April 1991  
Rapport juillet 1991 / Report July 1991 - 72 p.
- (60) "L'OPINION DES EUROPEENS CONCERNANT LA BIOTECHNOLOGIE EN 1991" / "OPINIONS OF EUROPEANS ON BIOTECHNOLOGY IN 1991" (EN/FR)  
Sondage mars-avril 1991 / Survey carried out in March-April 1991  
Rapport juillet 1991 / Report July 1991 - 76 p.  
A book on this topic is also available: Durant, John ed., "Biotechnology in Public: A review of recent research". Science Museum for the European Federation of Biotechnology. London 1992.

- (61) "LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ET L'ALLEMAGNE UNIE AU PRINTEMPS **1991**" / "THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNITED GERMANY IN SPRING **1991**" (DE/FR/EN)  
Rapport special sur les resultats du sondage Eurobarometre N° 35, mars 1991 / Special report on the results of the March 1991 Eurobarometer survey N° 35  
Rapport avril 1991 / Report April 1991 - 17 p.
- (62) "LES POLITIQUES REGIONALES DANS L'OPINION PUBLIC" / "REGIONAL POLICY IN THE PUBLIC OPINION" (FR) (EN épuisé)  
Sondage octobre-novembre 1991 / Survey carried out in October-November 1991  
Rapport 1992 / Report 1992  
(Brochures disponibles en FR/EN/DE/ES / Brochures available in FR/EN/DE/ES)
- (63) "LA FACON DONT LES EUROPEENS PERÇOIVENT LE TIERS-MONDE EN **1991**" / "THE WAY EUROPEANS PERCEIVE THE THIRD WORLD IN **1991**" (FR/EN)  
Sondage octobre-novembre 1991 / Survey carried out in October-November 1991  
A paraître en 1993 / Forthcoming in 1993
- (64) "LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ET L'ALLEMAGNE UNIE EN AUTOMNE **1991**" / "THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNITED GERMANY IN AUTUMN **1991**" (DE/FR/EN)  
Rapport special sur les resultats du sondage Eurobarometre N° 36, octobre-novembre 1991 / Special report on the results of the October-November 1991 Eurobarometer survey N° 36.  
Rapport décembre 1991 / Report December 1991 - 20 p.
- (65) "LES EUROPEENS ET L'ENVIRONNEMENT EN **1992**" / "THE EUROPEANS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN **1992**" (FR/EN)  
Sondage mars-avril 1992 / Survey carried out in March-April 1992  
Rapport novembre 1992 / Report November 1992 - 118 p.  
(Brochures disponibles en FR/EN / Brochures available in FR/EN)
- (66) "SEMAINE EUROPEENNE DE PREVENTION DE LA TOXICOMANIE" / "EUROPEAN WEEK FOR DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION" (FR/EN)  
Sondage mars-avril 1992 / Survey carried out in March-April 1992  
Rapport novembre 1992 / Report November 1992
- (67) "LA SECURITE SOCIALE" / "SOCIAL SECURITY"  
Sondage mars-avril 1992 / Survey carried out in March-April 1992
- (68) "LES ATTITUDES FACE AU VIEILLISSEMENT" / "AGE AND ATTITUDES" (FR/EN)  
Sondage mars-avril 1992 / Survey carried out in March-April 1992  
Rapport janvier 1993 / Report January 1993 - 36 p.

- (69) "LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENE ET L'ALLEMAGNE UNIE AU PRINTEMPS 1992" / "THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNITED GERMANY IN SPRING 1992" (FR/EN/DE)  
Rapport special sur les resultats du sondage Eurobarometre No.37, mars 1992 / Special report on the results of the March 1992 Eurobarometer survey No.37  
Rapport mai 1992 / Report May 1992 -23 p.
- (70) "LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENE ET L'ALLEMAGNE UNIE EN AUTOMNE 1992"  
/ "THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNITED GERMANY IN AUTUMN 1992" (DE/FR/EN)  
Rapport spéciale sur les resultats du sondage Eurobarometre N° 38, septembre-octobre 1992 / Special report on the results of the September-October 1992 Eurobarometer survey N° 38  
Rapport février 1993 / Report February 1993
- (71) "LES EUROPEENS ET LE TABAGISME PASSIF EN 1992" / "EUROPEANS AND PASSIVE SMOKING IN 1992"  
Sondage septembre-octobre 1992 / Survey carried out in September-October 1992  
Rapport 8 paraître en 1993 / Report forthcoming in 1993
- (72) "LES EUROPEENS ET LA COUR EUROPEENNE DE JUSTICE EN 1992" / "EUROPEANS AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE IN 1992"  
Sondage septembre-octobre 1992 / Survey carried out in September-October 1992  
Rapport 8 paraître en 1993 / Report forthcoming in 1993
- (73) "LA SECURITE DES PRODUITS" / "PRODUCT SAFETY"  
Sondage septembre-octobre 1992 / Survey carried out September-October 1992  
Rapport 8 paraître en 1993 / Report forthcoming in 1993
- (74) "LE MARCHE UNIQUE DES CONSOMMATEURS" / "THE CONSUMER'S SINGLE MARKET"  
Sondage novembre 1992 / Survey carried out November 1992  
Rapport 8 paraître en 1993 / Report forthcoming in 1993



## TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-POLITICAL VARIABLES USED IN **CROSSTABULATIONS**

### SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL STATUS

Roughly half of our representative sample of the EC public is without paid work. Answers to the question "What is your occupation ?" show the following distribution:

#### OCCUPATION OF THE PERSON INTERVIEWED (n = 12.800) (weighted percentage for EC 12+ - EB37.0)

##### Self - employed

(1)	Farmer . . . . .	2%
(2)	Fishermen . . . . .	0%
(3)	Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, etc.) . . . . .	2%
(4)	Owners of shops or companies, craftsmen, self-employed persons . . .	5%
(5)	Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company . . . . .	2%

##### Employed

(6)	Employed professional (employed lawyer, practitioner, accountant) . .	1%
(7)	General management, director or top management . . . . .	2%
(8)	Middle management, other management . . . . .	7%
(9)	Employed position, working mainly at a desk . . . . .	7%
(10)	Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver) . . . .	3%
(11)	Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, firemen, ...) . . . . .	5%
(12)	Supervisors . . . . .	1%
(13)	Skilled manual workers . . . . .	9%
(14)	Other (unskilled) manual workers, servants . . . . .	5%

##### Non-active

(15)	Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any current occupation, not working . . . . .	15%
(16)	Student . . . . .	11%
(17)	Unemployed or temporarily not working . . . . .	5%
(18)	Retired or unable to work through illness . . . . .	20%

Basing cross-analyses on "occupation" would exclude half of our respondents from analysis. An alternative, also used in past EUROBAROMETER reports, is to base analyses on a (non-marxist) concept of "objective social class" using the occupation of the "person who contributes most to the household income" as reference. In order to classify as many respondents as possible with respect to their socio-professional setting, a new classification was created : the "SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL-STATUS".

For those in paid work it is based on their own present occupation. For those not in paid work, "former occupation" was used where applicable (retired, housewives having been in paid work in the past, temporarily not working, unemployed). For those never having been in paid work, the occupation of the "person who contributes most to the household income" was used and, if the head of household was not in paid work at the time of the interview, his or her "former occupation" was used, where applicable. SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL-STATUS is, consequently, a classification "as close to the respondent himself/herself as possible" but drawing upon additional background information to the extent necessary and available, in order to determine the interviewee's socio-professional status, including a maximum of respondents in the respective analyses. The resulting distribution is as follows :

SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL STATUS (n = 12.800)  
(weighted percentages for EC 12+ - EB 37.0)

Self-employed

(a)	Farmers/Fishermen .....	.4%
(b)	Professionals .....	.3%
(c)	Shop/Company owners .....	.8%
(d)	Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company .....	3%.

Employed

(e)	Employed professionals .....	.3%
(f)	General management .....	.4%
(g)	Middle management .....	10%
(h)	Employed position, working mainly at a desk .....	9%
(i)	Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver,...) ..	4%
(j)	Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, firemen,) .....	5%
(k)	Supervisors .....	.3%
(l)	Skilled manual workers .....	17%
(m)	Other (unskilled) manual workers, servants .....	.6%

**Others (non-SPS attributable)**

(n)	"Main income earner" never in paid work, no answer, etc .....	23%
-----	---	-----

## SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS

is asked by the question "If you were asked to choose one of these five names for your social class, which would you say you belong to?" :

- (1) Middle class
- (2) Lower middle class
- (3) Working class
- (4) Upper class
- (5) Upper middle class
- (6) Refuses to be classified
- (7) Other
- (8) **DK**

Presented in tables are the following categories (with EC 12 weighted percentages from the Nr.37 EUROBAROMETER survey of Spring 1992) :

Working	28 %
Lower Middle	11 %
Middle	<b>44 %</b>
Upper Middle	8 %
<b>Upper</b>	1 %
Other replies, n.a	8 %
	<hr/>
	100 %

## OPINION LEADERSHIP

is based on the answers to the following two questions : (A) "When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?" and (B) "When you, yourself hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? If so, does this happen often, from time to time or rarely?" <No = never> . Labels are : ++, +, -, --. Interviewees giving affirmative answers to both questions are labelled ++, Interviewees giving negative answers to both questions are labelled --. Middle categories are constituted correspondingly.

## EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY PARTY PREFERENCE

is based upon the question "If there were a General Election tomorrow (say if contact under 18 : and you had a vote), which party would you support ?" in each country in the wording usually used for this topic. Answers are grouped according to the affiliation of the representatives of the respective party to a group in the European Parliament. If a party is not represented in the European Parliament at the time the survey is carried out but had been represented before, its supporters are grouped with the EP group their party had been affiliated with. Supporters of parties represented in the European Parliament but their Members of the European Parliament not being affiliated to any group are labelled N.I. Supporters of parties not represented in the European Parliament are labelled "other". Labels are presented in the order in which they figure in the "List of Members" of the European Parliament of October 1989. Abbreviations in tables are also taken from this publication :

S	=	Socialist Group
PPE	=	Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democratic Group)
LDR	=	Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group
V	=	Green Group
GUE	=	Group for the European Unitarian Left
RDE	=	Group of the European Renewal and Democratic Alliance
DR	=	Group Technical of the Right
CG	=	Left Unity
ARC	=	Rainbow Group
NI	=	Non-attached

Weighted EC - average proportion of persons not indicating a party choice ("would not vote", "spoil one's ballot", "do not answer" or "don't know") is 35 %. Consequently among those who do reply, loyal and regular supporters of the respective parties tend to be over represented.

## MEDIA USE

is based upon answers to the following question :

"About how often do you ...

- ..... watch the news on television ?
- ..... read the news in the daily papers ?
- ..... listen to news broadcasts on the radio ?

Everyday, several times a week, once or twice a week, less often, never ?"

+++ .....	News on TV/ radio/ papers every day or several times a week
++ .....	Two media everyday or several times a week; the third medium, not more than once or twice a week
-- .....	One of the three media everyday or several times a week; the two others, not more than once or twice a week
--- .....	The three media no more than once or twice a week

## TYPOLOGY OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

is based upon answers to the following questions :

- (1) Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Community is : good thing; Bad thing; Neither good nor bad ? (= MEMBERSHIP)
- (2) In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe ? For, very much; for, to some extent; against, to some extent; against, very much (= UNIFICATION)

Positive attitudes	= Membership:	"good"
	+ Unification:	"for, very much" "for, to some extent"
Ambivalent attitudes	= Membership:	"neither good nor bad" "bad"
	+ unification:	No answer "for, very much" "for, to some extent"
or	Membership:	"good" "neither good nor bad" No answer
	+ Unification:	"against, to some extent" "against, very much"
or	Membership:	No answer
	+ Unification:	No answer
Negative attitudes	= Membership:	"bad"
	+ Unification:	"against, to some extent" "against, very much"

## SELF-PLACEMENT ON THE LEFT-RIGHT-SCALE

is based upon answers to the question "In political matters, people talk of the "left" and the "right". How **would** you place your **views** on this scale ? (Show card (Do not prompt). The 10 Boxes of the card are numbered. Ring choice. If contact hesitates, ask him to try again)

Left	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Right
------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	-------

## EUROPEAN SOCIAL GRADE (ESOMAR 7-POINT SCALE)

is based on the recommendation of the European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research (ESOMAR) to harmonise the measurement of social grade across borders. This approach uses three different types of input variables (Occupation of the Main Income Earner, Education level of the Main Income Earner and Household purchase power operationalized as ownership of selected Durables). The combination of these input variables results in a new social grade classification with, as categories, (upper to lower) A, B, C, D, E1, E2, E3.

### Input variable 1: Occupation of the Main Income Earner

is based on a classification into 16 groups (E. 1 to E. 16) of the occupation of the Main Income Earner:

- E.1 General management, director or top management/6 empl or +
- E.2 Self employed professional
- E.3 Employed professional
- E.4 General management, director or top management/5 empl or -
- E.5 Middle management, other management/6 empl or +
- E.6 Middle management, other management/5 empl or -
- E.7 Business proprietors, owner (full/partner) of company AND owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self employed person/6 empl or +
- E.8 Employed position, working mainly at a desk
- E.9 Business proprietors, owner (full/partner) of company/5 empl or -
- E.10 Student
- E.11 Employed position, not at a desk but travelling or in a service job
- E.12 Farmer & Fisherman
- E.13 Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, housewife
- E.14 Supervisor & skilled manual worker
- E.15 Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant
- E.16 Retired or unable to work through illness, unemployed or temporarily not working

### Input variable 2: Education level of the Main Income Earner

is based on a classification into 6 groups of education level (adjusting the finishing age of general education in accordance with extra general education or specific apprenticeship and/or professional training):

- 1. up to 14 years
- 2. 15 - 16 years
- 3. 17 - 18 years
- 4. 19 - 20 years
- 5. 21 - 24 years
- 6. 25 years and over

Input variable 3: Household Ownership of selected Durables  
is based on ownership in terms of number of products owned (list of products measured):

- a colour TV set,
- a video recorder,
- a video camera,
- a radio-clock,
- a PC/home computer,
- a still camera,
- an electric drill,
- an electric deep fat fryer,
- 2 or more cars,
- a second home or a holiday home/flat,

Combination of input variables :

On the basis of all active MIE:  
Occupation of **MIE**:

Education:

	E1 + E4	E2 + E6	E3 + E5 + E6	E7 + E8	E11	E14	E12
21 +	A	A	B	B	C	D	D
17-20	A	A	B	C	C	D	D
15-16	C	C	C	D	E1	E1	E3
14	C	D	D	D	E1	E2	E3
13-	D	D	D	E2	E2	E3	E3

On the basis of all non active MIE (E10 + E13 + E16):

	5+	4	3	2	1	0
21 +	A	A	B	C	C	D
17-20	A	B	B	D	D	D

## RESPONDENT OCCUPATION SCALE

is based on a combination/selection of the current respondent occupation variables:

1. Self employed  
= Farmer + Fisherman + Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, ...) + Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self employed person + Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company
2. Managers  
= Employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect) + General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other director) + Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician)
3. Other white collars  
= Employed position, working mainly at a desk + Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, ...)
4. Manual Workers  
= Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, fireman, ...) + Supervisor + Skilled manual worker + Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant
5. House persons  
= Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any current occupation, not working
6. Unemployed  
= Unemployed or temporarily not working.



