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DECEMBER 1990

COMMISSION
OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES



EUROBAROMETER

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



HIGHLIGHTS

Support for the Community

* Compared to three or four years ago, EC citizens recognise that progress towards European unification is being made more quickly nowadays. Most people in all countries want it to go faster still.

* Public support for Community membership reaches an all-time high (69% versus 7% against). Danes, Germans, Portuguese and Luxembourgers substantially increase their backing for the Community compared to six months ago. East Germans' attitudes - polled for the first time as part of the Community - are also highly favourable.

Prospects for union

• **As** for the Inter-Governmental Conferences, most EC citizens believe the Community should be responsible for defence and foreign policy, a European Central Bank and have a single currency. Danes alone dissent over foreign policy and the single currency. British opposition to the single currency in October becomes support by December 1990.

* Six out of ten feel hopeful about the Single European Market. Support for '1992' picks up after a short decline, and now stands at **51%** with just 7% against. Two-thirds of Community citizens are in favour of the Social Charter.

Gulf crisis

• Seven out of ten EC citizens believe the Community can contribute towards solving the Gulf crisis. The public overwhelmingly agrees with the initiatives already taken by the Community and wants it to form a common defence organization.

* The idea of setting up a European Rapid Deployment Force gets widespread backing, although most Germans and Spaniards expressing an opinion oppose it.

Central and Eastern Europe

* Most Czechoslovakians, Hungarians and Poles have heard of the Community, like it and want their country to join it. Four out of five would like their country to have closer ties with the Community through treaties of association.

* EC citizens are strongly in favour of the Community taking measures to assist Central and Eastern Europeans and want the Community to give the Soviet Union financial aid.

The European Parliament

* Apart from the Dutch, most EC citizens think the European Parliament is currently important in the Community's life. Only in Ireland and the southern regions of the Community does a majority feel it is important in their everyday lives.

• There is overall popular backing for extending the European Parliament's powers, with only the Danes and, to a lesser degree, the British opposing some of the proposals on the table at the Inter-Governmental Conferences.

NOTE

EUROBAROMETER public opinion surveys ("standard EUROBAROMETER surveys") have been conducted on behalf of the Directorate-General for Information, Communication and Culture of the Commission of the European Communities each spring and autumn since September 1973 (EB N° 0). They have included Greece since autumn 1980, Spain and Portugal since autumn 1985, and the former German Democratic Republic from autumn 1990 onwards.

An identical set of questions is asked to representative samples of the population aged fifteen and over in each country. The standard sample is 1000 people per country except Luxembourg, with 300, and the United Kingdom, where the samples are 1000 in Great Britain and 300 in Northern Ireland. In order to monitor the integration of the five new Lander into United Germany and the European Community, 1000 persons are being sampled in West Germany and an additional 1000 in East Germany, starting with EUROBAROMETER 34. A special report on "The European Community and United Germany" has also been prepared together with a summary version. It is available from "Surveys, Research, Analyses" unit in German and English.

EB surveys 0 to 31 were carried out by the national institutes belonging to the European Omnibus Survey (EOS). The Paris-based "Faits et Opinions", working with the Commission's "Surveys, Research, Analyses" Unit, was responsible for finalisation of questionnaires, overall coordination of the survey and the preliminary statistical analysis of the data. The surveys from N° 32 onwards have been carried out by the national institutes associated with the INRA (Europe) - European Coordination Office.

All the institutes involved were selected by tender. They are all members of the European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research (ESOMAR) and comply with its standards.

The figures given for the Community as a whole are weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country. Unless otherwise specified, the results shown in the tables are expressed in percentages. Percentages do not always add up exactly to 100 (e.g. 99 or 101) because of rounding. As certain questions allow for several responses, percentages occasionally do not add up to notably more than 100%.

In accordance with normal practice for this type of survey the Commission disclaims all responsibility for questions, results and commentaries. This report, which was drawn up by the Surveys, Research and Analyses Unit of the Directorate-General for Information, Communication and Culture, is a working document for the Commission of the European Communities.

* * *

Some of the results presented here originate from other opinion polls than the standard EUROBAROMETER N° 34 such as the Flash EUROBAROMETER N° 3 and N° 4 carried out by EOS Gallup Europe in early October and mid-December 1990 respectively; and polls in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland carried out by ECOMA, MODUS and OBOP respectively from late October to early November 1990. Basic technical details about all surveys are given at the end of this report.

Detailed tables on a series of trend variables, some of which go back to 1974, were traditionally published as Appendix B or Volume II of the EUROBAROMETER report, twice a year. An extended version, incorporating also a series of more recent, medium range trends will hitherto be published separately, once a year. "EUROBAROMETER TRENDS 1974-1990" will be available in March 1991.

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

ANNEXES

1. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TODAY¹

1.1 EXPECTATIONS FOR 1991

The European Community ship is sailing on turbulent economic waters at the present time. The world economy is sluggish. GNP growth in the wealthier (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or OECD) countries of the world fell from **4.4%** in **1988** to an estimated **2.7%** in 1990 and a projected 2.0% for **1991**. This situation was exacerbated by fluctuating oil prices, increasing inflation and sliding stock markets, partly as a consequence of the global effects of the Gulf crisis and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. The breakdown of the Uruguay Round of talks aimed at a new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) left the world more vulnerable to trade wars. Despite this somewhat bleak scenario, commentators agree that the looming recession is likely **to** be a mild one and that economic growth **may** soon return to the levels of the eighties, when **30%** was added to the real wealth of **OECD** countries. If this prediction became true, economic revival would coincide with the advent of the Single European Market.

¹ The dots in **this report** is based on the standard Eurobarometer Survey N° 34 conducted in October 1990 by INRA (EUROPE) unless specified otherwise. See Annexes for more technical information.



When interviewed in October **1990**, **37%** of EC citizens felt **1991** would be a better year for them personally than **1990**, despite all the uncertainties facing the world. While 28% believed it would be much the same, the percentage saying it would be worse (**27%**) was the highest recorded in the EC since the mid-eighties (Figure 1.1, Table I).

After the recent unification of Germany, East Germans were noticeably more optimistic than anyone else (**57%** "better"). Many Irish felt they would be lucky (**46%**) while very few Danes (**13%**) reckoned things would get worse. The Greeks were the most pessimistic about their immediate future (**43%** "worse" versus **36%** "better").

Overall, people in the Community felt that their country's economy had got worse (**47%**) in the past twelve months and there was uncertainty as to how it would perform over the following year. Despite these worries, people said their household finances had not been affected much by these problems and a third (**32%**) felt their financial position would improve shortly (Figure 1.2, Tables 2-5).

Forecasts show that most EC countries will probably experience an economic slowdown in **1991**. Both Eurostat and OECD said they anticipated GNP/GDP real growth for the EC as a whole to fall from **2.9%** in 1990 to 2.2% in **1991** :

% Anticipated GNP/GDP real growth over previous year

	Bel- gium	Den- mark	Ger- many	Greece	Spain	France	Ire- land	Italy	Luxem- bourg	Nether- lands	Portu- gal	United King- dom
	(B)	(DK)	(D)	(GR)	(E)	(F)	(IRL)	(I)	(L)	(NL)	(P)	(UK)
1990	3.5	0.9	4.3	1.2	3.5	2.5	4.5	2.6	3.2	3.4	4.2	1.5
1991	2.2	0.9	3.1	1.0	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.9	2.0	3.2	0.7

(Source: Eurostat).

The standard Eurobarometer survey N° 34 showed the British having the greatest difficulties last year. More than seven out of ten (**71%**) believed their general economic situation had deteriorated, although opinion was divided as to what would happen in **1991** (**36%** "better" versus **36%** "worse"). Although half (**47%**) said their household income had declined over the past twelve months, most (**73%**) said they expected the amount of money in their pockets to stay the same or increase in the immediate future.

SATISFACTION WITH LIFE




FIGURE 1.3

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY




FIGURE 1.4

The Greeks also experienced problems. Over half felt that their economy (**58%**) and household finances (**52%**) had got worse and uncertainty reigned as to whether the situation would improve (a third "better" versus a third "worse" for both). Most Italians (59%) and French (53%) also reckoned their economies had been hammered, the French showing the greatest pessimism about their country's economy for the immediate future (**41%** "worse" versus **19%** "better"). Italians felt their household finances would stay the same (**50%**) or even improve (**34%**) over the next twelve months, despite predicting a lacklustre economic performance (26% "better" versus **36%** "worse").

The Portuguese, Irish and Germans felt on balance that their country's economy had improved and would continue to improve. East Germans were the most optimistic feeling that, despite their economic situation being worse (**55%**), there would be a financial boom in store for them next year as their economy improved (67%) and their household wealth advanced (56%). **As** we shall see, East Germans have high expectations caused, no doubt, by their recent unification with West Germany and their consequent automatic entry into the EC. Recent economic analysis is, however, much more sceptical about their economic prospects in the immediate future.

All things being considered, more than four out of five (**81%**) EC citizens expressed satisfaction with the life they lead, about the same as six months ago (**83%**). People living in the northern half of the Community, particularly Danes, Luxembourgers (both **95%**) and Dutch (**93%**) were the happiest. The Greeks were the most prone to pessimism - nevertheless, many more (63% versus 37%) were still happy rather than unhappy (Figure 1.3, Table 6).


The Germans were the most pleased about their country's democratic process (74%). While East Germans were divided (**49%** "satisfied" versus 47% "dissatisfied") about how successful their democracy had been before unification, two-thirds (67%) of them felt satisfied about West German democracy. This is why an overwhelming **78%** of East Germans and 72% of West Germans felt their newly-united Germany's democracy would work well (Table 7).

After the Germans, Luxembourgers (72%). Portuguese (71%) and Danes (70%) were the happiest with their democracy (Figure 1.4, Table 8). However, EC citizens were very much divided (**52%** versus **43%**) on the issue, with a majority of French (**51%**), Greeks (**53%**) and especially Italians (76%) being unhappy with the way their democracy worked.


THE 'EURO-DYNAMOMETER'

"In your opinion, how is the European Community, the European unification advancing nowadays? Please look at these people. No 1 is standing still, No 7 is running as fast as possible. Choose the one which best corresponds with your opinion of the European Community, the European unification. And which corresponds best to what you would like?"

'A votre avis, comment avance actuellement la Communauté européenne, l'unification de l'Europe? Veuillez regarder ces personnages. Le No 1 ne bouge pas, le No 7 court aussi vite que possible. Choisissez celui qui correspond le mieux à votre opinion de la Communauté européenne, l'unification de l'Europe. Et quel est le personnage qui correspond le mieux à ce que vous souhaiteriez?'



EUROPE'S PERCEIVED CURRENT PROGRESS
(EC 12)



EUROPE'S DESIRED PROGRESS
(EC 12)




FIGURE 16

Although the number of Greeks expressing extreme dissatisfaction halved (from 38% to 19%) over the past six months (perhaps because of the 'honeymoon period' of a new Government), overall satisfaction with democracy fell significantly among Belgians (66% to 56%), French (52% to 42%) and Italians (29% to only **22%**). The extreme dissatisfaction of Italians with their own democracy may be, in part, a plausible explanation why, as we shall see, they have generally such high hopes for the Community.

People in the Community were uncertain whether the number of strikes and industrial disputes² in their country would increase (**42%**) or stay the same (38%) in 1991 compared to 1990. Only 9% said the number would decrease (Table 9). Most French (53%) and Italians (**51%**) felt there would be more industrial trouble, while only in Luxembourg (**24%** to 22%) and the United Kingdom (**47%** to **24%**) were people less worried about these problems happening compared to a year ago.

1.2 THE COMMUNITY AND THE PERSON IN THE STREET

A great deal had happened within the Community during the months before October 1990 to spur the cause of unification in Europe (see Chapter 2 in particular). This might have affected how people view current progress towards unification as well as the speed at which they would like to see progress made (Figure 1.5, Table 10).

When the question on this subject was first asked in 1986 and 1987, people within the Community felt that progress was being made at a walking pace but that Europe should be hurrying faster - indeed almost running - towards unity. Between 1986 and 1987, there was an increase in perceived progress combined with a slight decrease in the desired speed for change, perhaps because the Single European Market started to capture people's imagination around that time.

In 1990, EC citizens believed that the Community was moving more quickly towards unification than in 1986 and 1987. The number of people saying it was going at a medium or fast speed (codes 4-7 on the "Dynamometer") increased from 39% in 1987 to 57% in 1990. Those most likely to say progress was being made at medium or fast pace were the Danes (66%). Irish and British (both 63%).

² Results for likelihood of strikes and industrial disputes in 1991 are from the EOS Gallup Europe "End of Year" poll conducted in the 12 member states of the Community. Sample 1000 per country, except for Luxembourg (350), Ireland (1400) and Spain (2000).

PERCEPTIONS AND INTEREST IN THE COMMUNITY




FIGURE 1.6

IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMUNITY




FIGURE 1.7

Perhaps because of greater satisfaction at the perceived rate of progress underway, EC citizens were slightly less enthusiastic about Europe going faster (codes 5-7) compared to three years ago (61% versus 65%). Nevertheless, most people from all countries felt that the process of European integration should be going faster than the current rate. The Italians (**76%**), Greeks (**69%**) and French (66%) were the most keen.

Despite the oftentimes heated debate over GATT and monetary union, **48%** of EC citizens felt the level of agreement between European Community countries had generally increased over the last twelve months. **34%** thought it was unchanged, while only **6%** said it had decreased. **EC** citizens in all countries felt that there had been an improvement except for the Dutch (**44%**) and British (**43%**), who felt on balance that things were not much different than before (Figure 1.6, Table 11).

Almost half of EC citizens (**47%**) mentioned being interested in European politics (Table 12). Just after the **1989** European Parliamentary elections, **54%** had expressed interest in the subject, but this had fallen to **46%** by Spring **1990**. Overall, there was marginally more interest in European politics than in politics in general (**44%**), although most EC citizens still said they were not interested in either (51% and **55%** respectively) (Table 13). Both subjects held the greatest fascination for the same three nationalities - Danes (**64%** and 60% respectively), Germans (57% and **54%**) and Greeks (**54%** and **59%**). The Portuguese showed the least interest (17% and **25%**).

Eight out of ten EC citizens (**83%**) said that European Community matters were important for the future of their country and people, especially the Danes (**89%**), Italians (**88%**), Greeks and British (both **84%**) (Figure 1.7, Table 14). Over the last six months, the Community became significantly more important for Luxembourgers (**67%** to **80%**), Danes (**82%** to **89%**) and Germans (**74%** to **81%**, thanks partly to the views of **90%** East Germans).

Just over half of EC citizens (**53%**) felt the Community and its future development would influence their lives positively, one tenth (11%) negatively while a quarter (**23%**) thought it would make no difference to them (Table 15). Most people from the least wealthy countries of the Community - Greece (**62%**), Portugal and Ireland (both 60%) - felt that the Community would have a major beneficial impact. **58%** of Britons also said it would be a positive influence on their lives. Overall, positive attitudes outnumbered negative attitudes by at least two-to-one in all countries.

SUPPORT FOR UNIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY - % AUTUMN 1990 RESULTS




FIGURE 1.8

SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE EC




FIGURE 1.9

1.3 PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The Eurobarometer uses four major measures to analyse long-term trends in public support for the Community - support for efforts being made to unify Western Europe (tracked intermittently since **1962**); support for Community membership (since **1973**); an evaluation of the benefits of Community membership for each country (since **1983**), and whether people would be very sorry if the EC was dissolved (intermittently since **1973**). The key results for these measures for standard Eurobarometer survey **N° 34** are as follow (Figure I.8, I.9, I.9a, Tables **16-19**):

* More than four out of five (**81%**) EC citizens were in favour of efforts being made to unify Western Europe, with **9%** against. The Italians (**8706**) and Spanish (**84%**) were the most in favour.

* Public support for Community membership has reached an all-time high. **69%** of EC citizens said their country's membership of the Community was a "good thing", while only **7%** thought it was a "bad thing". Public support for membership had not dropped in any EC member state since the question was last asked in Spring **1990**. At the beginning of the 1980's, the positive score had been 50%. This time, support was highest among the Dutch (**82%**) and Italians (**77%**) (Figure I.10, page 14).







* Three out of five (**59%**) said their country had benefited from the Community, two and a half times more than those who said it had not (**23%**). The Irish (**84%**) and Greeks (**78%**) felt their country had benefited the most.

* Half the Community's citizens (**49%**) said they would be very sorry if they were told tomorrow that the Community was scrapped, a third (**34%**) would be indifferent, while very few (**6%**) said they would be very relieved. The Italians (**62%**) and Luxembourgers (**61%**) said they would have been the most sorry.







In the eyes of EC citizens, the Community has never stood higher on all four measures, except on the "regret dissolution" measure in **1975 (50%)** when the **UK** held its referendum on EC membership. The Italians were the greatest Europhiles, despite the fact that they felt their country had not benefited **as** much as some others from EC membership. The British came last three out of four times (and second from last on "unification") - notwithstanding a clear majority backed West European unification and Community membership.

EUROBAROMETER 34

FIGURE 1.9a: SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE *COMMUNITY* :
TRENDS (% POSITIVE ANSWERS BY COUNTRY)



**FIGURE 1.9a: SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY:
TRENDS (% POSITIVE ANSWERS BY COUNTRY)**



EC MEMBERSHIP: "GOOD THING"




FIGURE 1.10

EC MEMBERSHIP "GOOD THING"




FIGURE 1.11

People who tended to be the most in favour of Community membership were better educated, wealthier and younger than average (Figure 1.11, Table 20). Opinion-leaders and students gave strong backing. White collar workers³ - especially general managers and professionals - were the most supportive of the socio-professional groups'. Those on the left of the political spectrum were marginally more in favour than those on the right. The same line-up was broadly true for the other three measures.

Positive results were particularly noticeable among the following :

- The Portuguese were the star performers, increasing their support on all four measures significantly. Support for "unification" and "membership" went up seven points (76% to 83% and 62% to 69% respectively). Increases of five points were also recorded on the "benefits" and "regret dissolution" measures (69% to 74% and 39% to 44% respectively). A decision by the Community to provide 130m ECU in regional aid to finance the introduction of natural gas to Portugal may be one of the reasons for this substantial improvement.

- * The Danes registered the highest continuous rise of any country in support for EC membership (from 42% a year ago to 49% in the Spring and 58% in the Autumn), easily passing the previous peak of 51% at the time of the Danish referendum on the Single European Act in 1986. The "benefits" measure improved substantially as well (53% a year ago to 58% in Spring 1990 and 64% in the Autumn), while the other two measures also went up marginally. A recent Danish AIM Research poll conducted independently of the Eurobarometer also confirmed that 58% of Danes were now saying that membership was a "good thing". German unification and the prospect of other Nordic states joining the Community may have contributed to this change - recently the Danish Government called for the EC to be given more say over the environment and social issues.

- * West Germans increased their support for EC membership from 62% to 69%, a figure rising to 73% if East Germans are included. The strength of their support gave the 17 million East Germans a considerable influence, increasing the overall positive result for the Community as a whole by one percentage point for each measure and for Germany as a whole by up to five points. On their own, they would have ranked first on all but the "benefits" measure (where they would have come second).

³ The term "socio-professional group" is based on socio-professional status, as defined in the Technical specification section of the Annexes.

AWARENESS AND IMPORTANCE OF EC PRESIDENCY




FIGURE 1.12

AWARENESS AND IMAGE OF EUROPEAN COMMISSION THROUGH THE MEDIA




FIGURE 1.13

* Luxembourgers increased their support for "unification" (69% to 78%) and on the "regret dissolution" measure (55% to **61%**) in particular. However, it should be cautioned that the low sample size in Luxembourg (N=300) could have caused greater fluctuation than the standard results in other Community countries surveyed by the Eurobarometer.

The only major disappointment was a drop in the number of Spaniards who felt their country had benefited from Community membership (57% to 51%) and a decline in the number of Greeks who would be very sorry if the Community were dissolved (62% to 57% "very sorry"). **UK** attitudes towards the Community reached an all-time high 18 months ago : they have since remained remarkably stable against a background of intense domestic debate.

1.4 THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY

Most Italians (**54%**) said they had read, seen or heard something in the media about their country's Presidency of the Council of Ministers during the second half of 1990 (Figure 1.12, Table 21). Irrespective of whether they had heard about it or not, almost three-quarters (73%) felt it was important that their country held the Presidency. The Italians were as proud of their Presidency **as** the Greeks had been of theirs (**73%**) during the second half of 1988. Only more Spanish (78%) and Irish (75%) felt their country's Presidency had been important.

1.5 THE IMAGE OF THE COMMISSION

Despite the important work undertaken by the Commission in the six months before October 1990, people's awareness of it in the media continued to decline from a peak of 53% in Autumn 1989 to **45%** today (Figure 1.13, Table 22). Its current level is about where it was in late 1987/early 1988 (**43%-44%**), around the time when the media first began to take a major interest in '1992'. The reason for the current decline may be the relative importance of other topics at that time as well as the media's general tendency to concentrate on the issues rather than the institutions tasked to deal with them in their reporting.

People's awareness of the Commission in the media dropped in all countries except Germany, where it rose (**50% to 53%**) and the Netherlands, where it stood still (**44%-45%**). It fell the most in Belgium (**55% to 43%**), where the Commission's headquarters is located, and Greece (55% to **46%**), perhaps because of domestic events.

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Just over half (**52%**) of those who were aware of media reporting recently had gained a favourable impression of the Commission from it (Table 23), while a sixth (17%) said it had been unfavourable. Since the question was first asked in Autumn 1987, the positive image of the Commission has risen from 41% to a high of 52% in Spring 1990, at which point it has remained. During the same period, those with negative perceptions declined from 27% in Autumn 1987 to 14% in Spring 1990, before its latest marginal increase to **17%**. Only among the Dutch did unfavourable impressions outweigh favourable ones (**40%** versus **34%**). Since Spring 1990, Luxembourgers, favourable impressions of the Commission increased substantially (22% to 39%), while the greatest falls were registered in the United Kingdom (**53%** to 44%) and Ireland (**76%** to a still-high 68%).

Overall, the Community is in good shape. Its citizens remain increasingly in favour of Community membership and are solidly for efforts being made towards European unification. Controversy and debate about European issues among the Twelve does not seem to be having a negative influence in the majority of cases. It is particularly significant that renewed official Danish support for the Community's activities is being matched by a sustained increase in public support as well.

2. POLITICAL AND MONETARY UNION IN A BIGGER COMMUNITY

2.1 THE GERMANIES UNITE

1990 could be called in many respects "unity year". The superpowers allowed the United Nations to act united. North and South Yemen shelved their differences and got together on a permanent basis, while the two Koreas started high-level contacts for the first time. The European Community's Inter-Governmental Conferences in Rome commenced discussions to try and bring about greater political, economic and monetary union in Europe. There were firework displays over the Brandenburg gate as Europe's greatest wound - the division of Europe epitomised by the division of Germany - was healed on 3rd October, opening the crossroads of Europe to two-way traffic again.

Perhaps the unification of Germany was the greatest success story in this respect. It was certainly popular within Europe. During the week the Berlin Wall was breached (9th November 1989), almost four out of five people within the Community (**78%**) said they supported the unification of the two Germanies. This commitment seems to have slightly ebbed by March/April 1990⁴ (71%), when uncertainties about the inviolability of the Oder-Neiße border between a united Germany and Poland threw temporarily into doubt the possibilities for lasting reconciliation between the peoples of those two countries.

⁴ Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 2 by telephone interviewing a sample of 500 people per country during the week of 9 November 1989, compared with the results of the standard Eurobarometer survey Y' 33 of Spring 1990 and N° 34 of Autumn 1990. As the methodology of the Flash is different to that of the standard Eurobarometer survey, the results are not entirely comparable.

EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR GERMAN UNIFICATION




FIGURE 2.1

ADVANTAGES OF EC MEMBERSHIP - VIEWS OF EAST GERMANS




FIGURE 2.2

By the time of standard Eurobarometer survey N° 34, however, the old support levels had been restored. Once again, almost four out of five people (78%) in the European Community were in favour of it, with only one in ten (10%) against.

The greatest enthusiasm for German unification came unsurprisingly from the Germans themselves (87%). The Portuguese (85%), Irish (83%), Spanish (81%) and Italians (80%) also liked the idea a great deal (Figure 2.1, Table 24). In all other member states of the Community, no less than three out of five supported it. Compared with the results of the standard Eurobarometer survey n° 33, support for unification increased among Luxembourgers (52% to 66%). Danes (56% to 69%). Portuguese (74% to 85%) and Dutch (59% to 70%) citizens. This is a significant result as the Luxembourgers, the Danes and Dutch had been the least in favour of German unity within the Community in Spring 1990.

Eurobarometer polls conducted in Central and Eastern Europe in October 1990 showed the Czechoslovakians strongly supportive (61%), but the Poles more cautious (44% in favour; 32% against). A similar question asked before by the Polish institute OBOP had shown Poles initially opposed to the German nations uniting (47% versus 29%) in October 1987 before becoming more supportive (47% versus 32%) at the time the Berlin Wall collapsed. However, most Poles were convinced in October 1990 that German unity would not benefit them (50% versus 29%) and that this unity might harm Polish borders (50% versus 35%).

Within the new European Community, East Germans were the most enthusiastic about German unity (94%). Only a sixth of the population (17%) said they had ever been to an EC country apart from West Germany (freedom to travel has only been possible since late 1989). It can come as hardly a surprise that two-thirds (67%) of them would like to visit other Community countries, while only a sixth (15%) was not interested. Almost two out of five (38%) said that they could imagine living and working in an EC country outside Germany, although very few (6%) considered doing so on a permanent basis (Table 25).

East Germans were asked whether EC membership would bring positive or negative consequences for their 'Lander' (Figure 2.2, Table 26). They were certainly overwhelmingly convinced that environmental protection (95%) and the availability of goods (94%) would be their greatest gains, while substantial improvements would also occur in the areas of energy supply (80%). transportation (76%) as well as security and defence (64%).

⁵ Eurobarometer survey in Central and Eastern Europe. See Chapter 4 and Annexes for technical information. Previous OBOP polls interviewed 1000 people and were nationally representative of the population in Poland.

EAST GERMAN INFORMATION NEEDS




FIGURE 2.3

COMMUNITY OR NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING BEST?




FIGURE 2.4

A smaller majority of East Germans also felt that vocational training schemes (52%) and crime-fighting (50%) would improve. Nevertheless, they feared that employment would be a problem (48% versus 38%) and that agriculture would suffer (62% versus 24%).

It is to soothe some of these apprehensions that some exceptions have been made to EC directives for the Single Market in East Germany in order to ease its integration into the Community. These are not anticipated to last longer than the beginning of 1993, when the Single Market is due to come into full force Community-wide.

Undoubtedly, the prospects of change have wetted the appetites of East Germans to seek a better understanding of what is taking place. While only 15% of them said that they had recently seen information material or advertising about the Community and only 12% said they knew enough about it, 79% were anxious to know more about what the EC was doing (Figure 2.3, Table 27).


2.2 WHAT SHOULD BE THE DOMAINS OF THE EC AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS ?

As the Community moved slowly but inexorably towards greater unity in political, economic and monetary matters, public attitudes also evolved as to how responsibilities within the Community should be carved up.

EC citizens were asked to choose whether national governments or the Community as a whole should take the decisions on a number of specific issues (Figure 2.4, Table 28). Most felt cooperation with the Third World (77%), science and technology research (75%), environmental protection (71%), the conduct of foreign policy towards non-EC countries (69%), currency (56%), security and defence (51%) as well as VAT rates (50%) should be carried out by joint decision-making among the member states within the Community.

On the other hand, only in the fields of education (60%), health and social welfare (58%) were a large majority of EC citizens convinced that national governments were the best agents to handle them. A relative majority also felt that the participation of workers' representatives on company boards of directors (49%), data protection and basic rules for broadcasting and the press (both 46%) should be the domains of national governments:

COMMUNITY OR NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING - WHERE COUNTRIES STAND.*



* MEAN SCORES FOR 12 MEASURES COMBINED

FIGURE 2.6

SUPPORT FOR ROME PROPOSALS




FIGURE 2.6

Over the past six months, there was a discernible shift in public opinion towards joint decision-making within the Community. Most now agreed that the Community should deal with security and defence (up from 47% to 53%). Support also rose substantially for the Community handling VAT rates (48% to 50%), currency issues (from 51% to 56%, almost making up a 6 point fall from Autumn 1989 to Spring 1990), foreign policy (64% to 69%) and the environment (66% to 71%).

If one takes the combined average results for the twelve issues, joint decision-making was endorsed by most Italians (63%), Dutch (58%), Belgians, French (both 57%) and Germans (52%). A relative majority of the others supported it with the exception of the Portuguese and Danes (Figure 2.5, Table 29).

Over the previous six months, West Germans, the French and Italians registered the greatest increases in backing joint decision-making, while only Luxembourgers became much more favourable towards the role of national governments. Spanish support for joint-decision-making on currency issues jumped from 41% to 53%, the highest increase measured in any country.

2.3 THE ROAD TOWARDS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION

The EC Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGC's) on political, economic and monetary union opened in Rome on 15 December 1990. Their purpose is to create the institutional framework for closer economic and monetary integration within the Community and the development of a political dimension, particularly strengthening EC institutions and activities at the 'international' level. Although economic and monetary union (**EMU**) has been a Community objective since 1969, the idea regained momentum in 1988 and, in October 1990, the Rome European Council (without the support of the British Government) reached agreement on the overall concept of EMU, which would involve the adoption of a single currency (the ECU) and the deadline of 1 January 1994 for transition to the second of the three-stage EMU process.

EC citizens were strongly in favour of major proposals for Community reform on the table at the IGC's (Figure 2.6, Table 30). By four to one, they wanted the EC to be responsible for a common policy in matters of security and defence (66% for; 15% against); by three to one, that it should have a common European Central Bank, with heads of national central banks on its board of

SUPPORT FOR SINGLE CURRENCY




FIGURE 2.7

BENEFITS + DRAWBACKS OF SINGLE CURRENCY




FIGURE 2.8

directors (56% for; 18% against); and by two to one that a single common currency should replace the different currencies of EC member states in five or six years' time (55% for; **23%** against); and that the EC be responsible for foreign policy towards countries outside the EC (51% for; 26% against) (see Chapter 5 for details on proposals to extend the European Parliament's powers).

A majority of people from all countries was in favour of the EC having a common security and defence policy - even the formerly neutrally-minded Irish were 49% to 27% in favour of it. Most of those expressing an opinion were supportive of the other three measures as well, except the Danes, who narrowly refused (**45%** versus **40%**) to give the Community responsibility for foreign policy outside EC countries; and the rejection of the single common currency by the Danes (50% versus **35%**) and, more closely, by the British (**43%** versus **38%**) (Figure 2.7). Nevertheless, a majority of British and Danes accepted the need for a European Central Bank.

It should be noted that people's views on foreign policy and defence were slightly different on the measures "Community versus national decision-making" and "support for Rome proposals", probably because of question wording and question context reasons. Nevertheless, both answers still show a majority of EC citizens backing the Community dealing with the two issues.

The fact that a majority of EC citizens were in favour of a common policy in security and defence received substantial media coverage in Europe after the early release of the results of the standard Eurobarometer survey N° 34. The issue was also prominent in discussions at the summit in Rome prior to the opening of the IGC's.

The Association for Monetary Union in Europe, participating in the Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 3 in early October⁶, asked EC citizens about the consequences of replacing national currencies by the ECU (Figure 2.8, Table 31). More than two-thirds of all those interviewed agreed that a single currency would make the European Community stronger and more united (76%); all countries would have a stable and strong currency (76%); prices would be comparable throughout the Community (75%); the Single Market would function better (74%); travel would be easier within the Community (71%); and that it would be advantageous if there was no longer a need to exchange money (65%).

⁶ Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 3 conducted by EOS Gallup Europe by telephone in the 12 member states of the European Community during the period 26 September - 9 October 1990. See Annexes for technical information.

BRITISH SUPPORT FOR SINGLE CURRENCY




FIGURE 2.9

AWARENESS OF "1992" THROUGH THE MEDIA




FIGURE 2.10



On the negative side, people thought replacing their national currencies by the ECU would be risky (57%); costly for business (**55%**); mental calculations would have to be made to convert prices into ECU (**47%**); and that their country would lose part of its sovereignty (**46%** "important" versus **44%** "not important").

A five-country Flash Eurobarometer survey⁷ conducted on the eve of the IGC's showed British opinion towards the single currency may have changed since the resignation of Mrs. Thatcher as British Prime Minister (Figure 2.9). While several polls over October and November 1990 had confirmed British public opposition to the single currency, the Flash of mid-December showed the British in favour of it (**49%** versus **43%**) for the first time. The standard Eurobarometer survey N° 35, to be conducted in Spring 1991, will confirm whether this change is sustained or not, as public debate within the UK is likely to continue on the issue for the immediate future.

2.4 SINGLE MARKET AND SOCIAL CHARTER ON TRACK

With all the debate in the media about the many issues facing the Community at the present time, one might have thought that awareness of the advent of the Single European Market in 1992 would have been pushed to the periphery of news reporting. This does not seem to have been the case. Two-thirds of EC citizens (66%) said they had read in the papers, seen on television or heard on the radio something about the Single European Market of 1992, the same as six months ago. Those who said they had heard most about it were Danes (82%), Greeks and Belgians (both 79%). Most of the citizens of each country had heard about it during that time with the exception of the Spaniards (49%), whose awareness of '1992' had registered a major fall from an all-time high of 66% in Spring 1989. The percentage of Portuguese aware also dropped from 70% to 61% in the past six months. Only 44% of East Germans said they had heard about it (Figure 2.10, Table 32).

⁷ Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 4 conducted by EOS Gallup Europe by telephone in France, Spain, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom in December 1990. Sample = 500 per country.



Around half of EC citizens (**51%**) thought '1992' was a good thing for them personally, compared to only 7% who believed it **was** a bad thing and 31% who thought it would make no difference. This is a significant improvement from the previous six months (Figure 2.11, Table 33). When the question was first asked in Autumn 1987, 57% of EC citizens said the completion of the Single Market would be a good thing. Support then slowly ebbed away until Spring 1990 when it reached a low of 45% before the current upswing. During the same period of time, the percentage of people indifferent to the issue increased from 25% to 31% while those saying the Single Market was bad remained constant at the 6%-8% level.

Support for 1992 continued to be particularly strong from people living in the southern member countries of the Community - Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal - as well as Ireland. A majority of them could be hoping that their standards of life would be brought up to the level of the richer parts of Europe in a larger market. The Italians were by far the most supportive (69% compared to 57% for Spaniards, the runners-up).

Major increases in support for the Single Market since Spring 1990 occurred among Danes (a leap of faith from 31% to 44%), Germans (36% to 48%), Portuguese (47% to 54%) and the French (36% to 42%). People from all countries increased support for '1992' with the exception of Spaniards, whose support stayed roughly the same (57%-58%). Although recovery of support for '1992' was a major highlight of this survey, some people still fell far short of the levels of support expressed when the question was first asked, especially Luxembourgers (61% in 1987; 38% today) and Belgians (66% in 1987; 43% today). Nevertheless, with the exceptions of Luxembourgers (16%), Danes (15%) and British (11%), in no country did more than one in ten citizens feel negative about '1992'.

Opinion-leaders, in particular increased their support from six months ago from 57% to 64%, while only 9% continued to be against it. Those in favour of '1992' were more likely to be men, younger people, those still studying, the better educated and those with higher incomes. Unsurprisingly, professionals (63%), employed professionals and general managers (both 60%) were the most supportive of the socio-professional groups. This gives '1992' a strong foundation, especially with those who lead public opinion in the economic field (Figure 2.12, Table 34).

"1992": HOPE OR FEAR




FIGURE 2.13

SOCIAL, CHARTER: "GOOD THING"




FIGURE 2.14

Three out of five (61%) EC citizens said they felt "very" or "rather hopeful" about the Single European Market while 19% declared themselves "rather fearful" and only 4% "very fearful". This point of view has remained fairly steady for the Community as a whole since it was first measured at the beginning of **1988**. Most felt hopeful in all countries except Luxembourg, where people, as last time, continues to be split down the middle (42% "hopeful" versus **44%** "fearful"), possibly because of fears about the effect of harmonisation of VAT rates and banking laws on the economy of that tax-haven.

The Italians (72%), Irish (70%) and Dutch (**68%**) had the highest expectations for '1992', with the greatest increases in "hope" registered among Germans (52% to **61%**, including **69%** East Germans) and Danes (**51%** to **58%**). The only significant drop in hope came from the Belgians (**69%** to **62%**) (Figure 2.13, Table 35).

As is well-known by now, '1992' is not just about economic change - there is an important social dimension which is meant to benefit all social strata. In December **1989**, the European Council adopted a Declaration constituting a Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights or 'Social Charter' to set in motion the procedures to bring this about. Two-thirds of EC citizens (67%) were in favour of it, including more than seven out of ten people in Italy (76%), the Netherlands (75%), Greece (72%), Ireland and the United Kingdom (both 71%). Such strong backing from British citizens is particularly relevant considering the **UK** Government's opposition to this measure (Figure 2.14, Table **36**). The only significant opposition to the Social Charter came from the Danes, where **20%** of the population - twice the number of other countries - believed it was a bad thing. Nevertheless they were still more than two to one in favour of it.

Over the previous six months, the Germans (60% to **67%**) and French (56% to 63%) increased their support the most for the Social Charter, while the greatest decline was among Greeks (80% to 72%). The French increase is particularly significant as they had been 77% in favour of the Charter in Spring **1989** before dropping steeply to **56%** in Spring 1990 before the current rally.

The most in favour of the Social Charter were very similar to the profile of those who supported Community membership and '**1992**'. It also received the strong endorsement of trade unionists, **76%** of whom were in favour of it, with only **5%** against. **84%** of British trade unionists and 52% of Danish trade unionists agreed with the idea.

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In general, the conditions for European union continue to **be** favourable. German unity seems to have enhanced and strengthened **both** West and East German support for the Community. There **is** general support for many measures concerning political, economic and monetary union. The Single European Market is also being seen in a better light than has been the case recently. More favourable winds also seem to **be** blowing concerning British public attitudes towards monetary union and the Social Charter in particular.

3. THE IMPACT OF THE GULF CRISIS ON THE COMMUNITY

3.1 ACTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY ASSESSED

The main news story of 1990 ~~was~~ undoubtedly the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2nd August. The European Community played a major role in the crisis at that time. Immediately following the invasion, the Twelve adopted a resolution in the framework of European Political Cooperation demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi troops. Two days later, they also announced a trade embargo and suspension of all cooperation agreements with Iraq. Following the lead given by the United States, several member states sent warships to the Gulf to help enforce the trade embargo, while both France and the United Kingdom provided substantial ground forces to protect Saudi sovereign territory from possible attack.

Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 3⁸ was conducted by telephone during the first week of October to gauge EC citizens' awareness of -and reaction to - the Community's involvement in the Gulf crisis.

⁸ Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 3 conducted by EOS Gallup Europe by telephone in the 12 member states of the European Community during the period 26 September-9 October 1990. Sample = 500 per country. Only major urban areas were polled in Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal because of poor telephone penetration in rural areas. East Germany was not polled for the same reasons. See Annexes for technical details.

AWARENESS OF THE EC PLAYING ROLE IN GULF CRISIS.





FIGURE 3.1

ABILITY TO RESOLVE GULF CRISIS



COUNTRY RESULTS RANGE FROM 29% - 70% CAPABLE

FIGURE 3.2

Almost two out of three EC citizens (**64%**) said that they had heard that the European Community was playing a role in the Gulf crisis (Figure 3.1, Table 37). Awareness of the Community's involvement was highest among Spaniards¹ (**83%**), perhaps because of the controversy surrounding its military presence in the Gulf. Only in Luxembourg (**49%**) and West Germany (**40%**) had less than half of the people heard about it. Domestic excitement about German unification (to the reduction of many other issues in the media) may be a plausible explanation for the rather low West German result. Results for Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal may be over-stated to a certain degree because only major urban areas - where news in general is more accessible - were polled.


The United Nations (UN) was considered the organisation most capable of contributing to the resolution of the Gulf crisis, followed by the United States, the European Community and the Soviet Union (Figure 3.2, Table 38). The **UN** came top of the list in all countries, with the exception of Luxembourg (where it came a narrow second after the United States) and Greece (fourth place). Trust in the UN may have been lowest in Greece because of the **UN's** continuing inability to resolve Greece's dispute with Turkey over Cyprus (in an opinion poll on behalf of the UN carried out in the framework of the standard Eurobarometer survey N° 32, Cyprus was by far the most important reason for Greeks giving the UN negative performance ratings). General public confidence in the UN has increased dramatically in the European Community since the mid-eighties, when a majority of people expressing an opinion in Greece, West Germany and the United Kingdom said the UN's overall performance was poor.

The European Community was felt by a majority of people from all countries **as** capable of contributing towards the resolution of the crisis, with the Italians (**83%**), Spanish (**77%**), Dutch (**74%**) and Luxembourgers (**73%**) showing the most confidence in it. Only the Danes (**51%** versus **42%**) showed any hesitation over the matter.

In most countries, less than half the population felt that their own country could contribute in a major way to the resolution of the conflict. The significant exceptions were among the British, Italians (both **70%**) and French (**67%**). The reasons for the prevalence of this view among the British and French may be that both countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council and had shown strong commitment by sending ground forces to the Gulf. Italy's Presidency of the Council of Ministers may have also persuaded many of its countrymen that it had a role to play as well. The people of the remaining nine members states ranked their own country as least able to contribute to the resolution of the conflict.

SUPPORT FOR GULF CRISIS INITIATIVES


HUMANITARIAN AID
TO REFUGEES



SUPPORTING COUNTRIES
WHICH ARE VICTIMS OF
THE EMBARGO - EGYPT,
JORDAN, TURKEY



LONG TERM COOPERATION
WITH MEDITERRANEAN
AND ARAB COUNTRIES



ORGANISATION
OF THE EMBARGO




FIGURE 3.3

ROLE OF EC IN COUNTRIES' DECISIONS ON THE GULF CRISIS




FIGURE 3.4

On **21** August, following the decision to impose a trade embargo on Iraq, the Council of Ministers welcomed the Commission's proposals to provide urgent assistance to refugees as well as economic and financial aid to the countries most affected by the consequences of the trade embargo - Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. In early September, a Declaration on EC-Arab relations was adopted, demonstrating the Twelve's determination to consolidate and reinforce their historic ties with the Arab world despite the crisis.

The results of the Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 3 show there was overwhelming approval by the citizens of the Community of EC initiatives on the Gulf crisis (Figure 3.3, Table 39) : humanitarian aid to refugees received the backing of **91%** of EC citizens, while more than seven out of ten people gave a vote of confidence to the EC's promotion of long-term cooperation with Mediterranean and Arab countries; its organisation of the embargo; and its support of countries most affected by the embargo. Greatest overall backing for the measures came from the Dutch and British.

More than three out of five EC citizens (**61%**) felt that their country's membership of the European Community had played an important role in the positions taken by their Governments in the crisis. The French (**70%**) and Italians (**68%**) were the most convinced. The only exception were the Irish, where a majority of those expressing an opinion thought otherwise. (Figure 3.4, Table 40).

3.2 EFFECTS ON THE COMMUNITY AGENDA

The size and complexity of the international community's response to the Gulf crisis, tested the machinery for defence and foreign policy decision-making which had not yet been geared to deal with the 'realpolitik' of post-Cold War world. In no place **was** this more true than Europe, where the front-line of the Cold War - the Berlin Wall - had just been broken down.

The Treaty of Rome does not make provision for the Community's involvement in defence matters. Nevertheless, many of the Community's political leaders and its citizens both believe the time is now ripe for such a change. In the Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 3 in early October **1990.61%** felt that a common defence organisation was necessary for the European Community, while only **29%** felt it unnecessary (Table 41).

DESIRED EC RESPONSE TO GULF CRISIS




FIGURE 3.5

EFFECTS OF GULF CRISIS ON PROSPECT FOR POLITICAL UNION




FIGURE 3.6

After the Venice meeting of EC Foreign Ministers in mid-October, when the Italian and Belgian Governments suggested that much greater competence should be transferred to the EC on foreign and defence matters, the standard Eurobarometer survey n° 34 in late October showed 70% of EC citizens supporting the formation of a common defence organisation, with only 17% against. In addition, 50% felt a European Rapid Deployment Force should be set up to deal with such crises (Figure 3.5, Table 42).

Setting up a common EC defence organisation was backed by a majority of people expressing an opinion on the subject in all EC countries. The idea of a rapid deployment force proved more controversial. The people of those countries which have a recent history of military intervention in distant lands - such as the British (69%), French (65%) and Belgians (58%) - were strongly in favour of the EC having such a role as well. The idea also received its most emphatic backing from the political right in Europe, especially those sympathetic to the European Democratic Group (71%), the European Right (67%) and the European Democratic Alliance (66%). The Germans (35%) and Spanish (33%) liked the idea least, the former perhaps because their constitution is interpreted as forbidding military deployment outside NATO territory, the latter possibly because of considerable public criticism of their navy's involvement in the Gulf.

The Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 3 showed that people were divided as to whether progress towards political union had been made easier (33%), more difficult (25%) or remained unchanged (32%) by the crisis, although more people believed it had been helped rather than hindered (Figure 3.6, Table 43). However, when EC citizens were asked in the standard Eurobarometer survey n° 34 whether they agreed or disagreed that the Community should speed up its political, economic and monetary integration as a consequence of the crisis, 61% said it should, while only 19% said it should not. The Italians were the most enthusiastic about speeding up integration (69%), followed by the Germans (67%), Portuguese (66%), Belgians and Greeks (65% each). Only the Danes were unsure as to whether it was a good idea (43% agree; 45% disagree).

3.3 IMPACT ON RELATIONS WITH ARAB WORLD AND MUSLIMS

As previously mentioned, the European Community has been concerned throughout the Gulf crisis about maintaining strong links with the Arab World. In September 1990, the Italian and Spanish Governments had gone as far as to suggest the formation of a permanent Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean, modelled on the well-known Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

IMPACT OF GULF CRISIS ON FEELINGS TOWARDS




FIGURE 3.7

LIKELIHOOD OF WAR IN NEXT TWELVE MONTHS




FIGURE 3.8

The Gulf crisis does not seem to have made many Community citizens more negative about the Arab World in general (Table 44). In Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 3, 70% of **EC** citizens felt their views about the Arab world in general had not changed **as** a consequence of the crisis, while only **21%** said they had become more negative. The Spanish (**13%**), French (**17%**) and British (**17%**) were the least negatively affected, while Belgian attitudes were the most negatively affected (30% "less favourable").

The same is broadly true concerning European attitudes towards Muslims living in the EC. 77% of EC citizens said their views had not changed about them, while **15%** felt they had a less favourable opinion of them than before the Gulf crisis happened. This time, the Irish (**9%**) and Luxembourgers (11%) had been least affected in a negative way (Figure 3.7, Table 45).

3.4 THREAT OF WAR OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS

Despite the vast Western military build-up taking place in the Gulf, **EC** citizens seemed to remain uncertain **as** to whether this would all lead to war in the end. The standard Eurobarometer survey N° 34 showed that just over half of all EC citizens (**52%**) felt in October 1990 that **war** involving military forces from several European countries was unlikely in the next 12 months. Almost two out of five (39%) said it was likely, while **9%** did not know (Figure 3.8, Table 46).

The sentiment that war was likely was the strongest among the British (**62%**), Danes (**59%**) and Dutch (**55%**). The French, Luxembourgers and Portuguese were undecided, while a majority of people from other **EC** members states were quite convinced that **war** would not happen.

Perhaps **as** a consequence of the Gulf crisis and growing turbulence within the Soviet Union, half of EC citizens (50%) believed the overall international situation' would be troubled in 1991, almost double the percentage (27%) who made that prediction for the previous year and the largest number since the early eighties (Table 47). The British (**67%**), Dutch (66%) and Danes (**57%**) once again were the most convinced that there would be trouble. Overall worries about a world war happening in the next ten years rose to the levels of 1982-3, the height of the President Reagan's arms build-up. The Irish and British were the most convinced that a world war might break out (Table 48).

⁹ Results for Likelihood of international unrest and world war are from EOS Gallup Europe's "End of Year" poll as mentioned previously.

EUROBAROMETER 34

A number of conclusions might be drawn about the effects that this crisis may have in the longer-term on Europe and its development:

- * The highly-charged atmosphere created by the Gulf crisis has made EC citizens rethink the need for greater solidarity with each other, both in political and military terms.
- * Most people from each EC country support the measures that the Community has taken as a consequence of the crisis. It seems that the Community has strong popular backing to begin discussions on the formation of an **EC** common defence organization **as** well.
- * The British, normally reticent about any move leading to greater European unity, are very keen to establish closer military ties within the Community, especially a common European defence organisation and even a European Rapid Deployment Force. This should not, however, be seen as any rejection of NATO, to which the British are closely wedded, along with all the other members of the Community except the Irish (see Eurobarometer Report N° 32).

Some commentators have speculated that the Western European Union - to which nine EC countries belong - may become the foundation of a Community-wide defence system. Whatever the outcome of the Gulf crisis, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq may be an important step towards the development of such a security structure for the Community. Despite major differences in individual country's level of response towards the Gulf crisis, it is evident that the people of the Community wish to give it a say over defence matters. At the very least, the Community's leaders now need to assess how they might create future mechanisms to react more decisively to similar crises in the future.

4. CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEANS TURN TO THE COMMUNITY



4.1 PROGRESS OF DOMESTIC REFORMS

The gradual withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Central and Eastern Europe has created a political and economic vacuum in its wake, which is causing considerable instability and hardship for the region. Central and Eastern Europeans are turning more and more to the West, both for short-term assistance and longer-term ties. The European Community, in whose 'backyard' Central and Eastern Europe now lies, is in the best position to help them.

These dramatic changes have also now made it possible for 'outsiders' to survey public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe for the first time. In Eurobarometer Report N° 33, results were given for polls commissioned by "Surveys, Research, Analyses" in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Lithuania, Moscow and the European parts of Soviet Union. In October 1990, three additional polls were conducted among the general public in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland**.

10

ECOM in Czechoslovakia, **MODUS** in Hungary and **OSOP** in Poland polled between 1000 to 1500 people in each country face-to-face at home from 20th October to 3rd November 1990. A shorter questionnaire was used in Hungary. See Annexes for more technical information.



Although the same technical standards for surveys available in the 'West' cannot be expected in Central and Eastern Europe at the present time, the results of these new polls allow us a unique insight into the attitudes of Czechoslovakians, Hungarians and Poles as they face revolutionary times in their own country's history.

At the time of the poll, more Czechoslovakians and Poles believed that things in their country were generally going in the right direction rather than the wrong direction. Twice as many Czechoslovakians were positive (53%) rather than negative (26%). Poles were less certain (43% versus 30%) about how the situation was developing (Table 49), a significant change from March 1990, when the Polish Institute CBOS showed Poles expressing much less doubt (51% versus 20%).

The most optimistic Czechoslovakians were those with higher education (71%), senior white collar workers and people on the right of the political spectrum (both 69%). People from Slovakia were much more pessimistic (42% "right" versus 36% "wrong" direction) than Czechs (58% versus 21%). In Poland, Solidarity trade unionists (57%) and those on the right of the political spectrum (52%) were the most positive. Polish farmers were the only group who felt things were going wrong rather than right (46% versus 33%), a significant source of discontent if one remembers that two-fifths of Poland's population still lives in villages.

Many Central and Eastern European countries are in the throes of major structural reforms to try and bring about a market economy. The readjustment already taking place have brought about a decline in economic growth as bankruptcies and unemployment take their toll for the first time:

	Forecasts of real GDP growth - % change on previous year		
	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
1990	-1.6	-2.5	-20.0
1991	-1.5	-1.0	+2.0

(Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Country Credit Risk)

For Poles, the drop in real GDP growth since their economic 'Big Bang' started in January 1990 has been precipitous. Despite almost half of them saying that their household finances had got worse over the last twelve months, most acknowledged that their country's economy was in better shape. Furthermore, a relative majority of Poles felt that their country's economy would continue to improve but they were uncertain if the benefits of that improvement would be passed onto them. (Figures 4.1 & 4.2, Tables 50-53).

SUPPORT FOR FREE MARKET ECONOMY





FIGURE 4.3


ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME

IS GOING ...

IS ...



CZECHOSLOVAKIA



POLAND

FIGURE 4.4

By contrast, Czechoslovakians and Hungarians were much more gloomy about their immediate prospects. Three-quarters of Hungarians (74%) felt that their country's economy and their own household finances would get worse over the next twelve months. Most Czechoslovakians felt that there would be no respite in the deterioration of their household finances; however, although almost three-quarters (72%) of them said their economy had got worse over the past twelve months, fewer (51%) thought it would continue to deteriorate during the next year.

Those who said they were personally the hardest hit by the downturn in Czechoslovakia were housewives (35% "household finances a lot worse"), low income earners (33%), villagers (29%) and people from Slovakia (27%). In Poland, housewives (24%), pensioners (22%), those aged over 60 (21%) and, significantly, opinion-leaders (24%) were the most likely to say they were much worse-off.

Despite all this hardship, most people (58%-62%) from all three countries said they were committed to the free market (Figure 4.3, Table 54). Hungarian experimentation with market economics over the past two decades did not seem to make their views much different from others polled.


Czechoslovakians were asked whether they felt that their government's reform programme was proceeding too fast, too slow, or about the right speed. The general feeling was that it was going about the right speed but that it could go a bit faster (Figure 4.4, Table 55). People on the left of the political spectrum were more than twice as likely to say that things were going too fast (33%) than those on the right (14%). Czechs were convinced that reform could speed up (35% too slow versus 18% too fast), while people from Slovakia were undecided (29% versus 30%).

Poles were asked whether they felt their country's reform programme - the most radical in Central and Eastern Europe - was likely to succeed or fail in curing the ills of the Polish economy (Figure 4.4, Table 56). The answer showed that Poles were uncertain as to whether the programme was succeeding (32%) or failing (35%), with many saying they were not sure (33%). Those most likely to say that things were succeeding were white collar workers with higher education (50% "succeeding" versus 30% "not succeeding") and Solidarity trade unionists (44% versus 27%), while Polish farmers were the most disgruntled (28% versus 44%).

Economic reform is being fuelled by the advent of multi-party democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. In the first half of 1990, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Romania all held multi-party parliamentary elections. Poland, the first country to break with the past in this respect, continued its power-sharing arrangements between former communists and Solidarity

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS

SATISFIED



NOT
SATISFIED


CZECHOSLOVAKIA

HUNGARY

POLAND

FIGURE 4.5

FREQUENCY OF THINKING ONESELF EUROPEAN



□ OFTEN ▨ SOMETIMES ■ NEVER

FIGURE 4.6

while the bitterly-fought presidential elections during November/December 1990 gave Solidarity the presidency. Yugoslavia had also held multi-party elections for the government of each of its six republics by the end of 1990.

Despite these fundamental changes, a majority of Hungarians **(75%)** and Czechoslovakians (55%) were dissatisfied with the way democracy was progressing, while Poles were only lukewarm about it (**38%** "satisfied" versus 37% "dissatisfied") (Figure 4.5, Table 57).

Czechoslovakians and Poles said that they were dissatisfied because changes were going too slowly. People said they were not used to the bickering of party politics and felt their country still had to master democracy. Worsening economic conditions, social injustices and the falling standard of living all played significant roles in their disillusionment. There seemed to be two main groupings of dissatisfied people: former communist party sympathisers and their offspring (such as the formerly-official OPZZ Polish trade unionists); and disillusioned workers most threatened by the economic downturn. People from Slovakia were also unhappy about the situation :

% Most dissatisfied with democracy at the present time		
Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
Left-wing supporters (66%)	Skilled workers (83%)	Second.school educ. (5296)
People from Slovakia (62%)	Aged 25-39 (82%)	Jun.white collars (51%)
Jun.white collars (61%)	Tech.school educ. (81%)	OPZZ trade unionists (48%)

Personal liberty and a unfettered media (especially for Poles) were the most important reasons to be satisfied with democracy. Freedom of religion, the end of one-party rule and the growth of political pluralism were applauded. There was hope that democracy would bring about improvements in people's standard of living. Czechoslovakians in particular looked forward to the advent of private enterprise and the possibilities of travelling abroad.

4.2 ASPIRATIONS TOWARDS THE COMMUNITY

In principle, Hungarians **(81%)**, Czechoslovakians **(79%)** and, to a lesser degree, Poles **(68%)** are in favour of the unification of Europe, leading to the formation of a "United States of Europe", including their respective country (Table 58). Hungarians seem to be more European-orientated than the others. While two-thirds **(66%)** thought of themselves as Europeans "often" or "sometimes", only around half of Czechoslovakians (53%) and Poles **(51%)** did (Figure 4.6, Table 59).

IMAGE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY




FIGURE 4.7

IMPACT OF PHARE PROGRAMME




FIGURE 4.8

Nevertheless, Central and Eastern Europeans still have to reconcile their many differences which had been suppressed, but by no means erased, by over forty years of membership of the same political bloc (Table 60). A majority of Czechoslovakians said they did not trust Russians (62%), Bulgarians (64%). Hungarians (67%), Poles and Romanians (both 77%). Furthermore, most Poles said they distrusted the Slovaks (51%), Bulgarians (56%), Czechs (61%). Byelorussians (63%), Romanians (64%), Russians (69%). Germans (70%) and Ukrainians (75%). Americans were the most trusted foreigners by Czechoslovakians (73%) and Poles (59%).

Awareness of the European Community is quite high. Hungarians (87%) and Czechoslovakians (84%) are more likely to have heard of the European Community than Poles (75%) (Table 61). In the three countries, around half (48%–51%) had a positive impression of the Community, a quarter (24%–27%) neutral and virtually none (1%–3%) negative (Figure 4.7, Table 62).

Following a Joint Declaration signed between the European Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the Community signed trade and cooperation agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1988 as well as Poland in 1989. As political change gathered speed, the Commission was asked to set up the PHARE operation in 1989 to coordinate a major assistance programme provided by the 24 industrialised countries (G24) to restructure the economies of Poland and Hungary. The decision was taken in July 1990 to extend the programme to cover Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Yugoslavia as well.

Three-quarters of Czechoslovakians (79%) and Hungarians (77%), as well as just over half of all Poles (55%) said they had heard of this assistance programme (Figure 4.8, Table 63). An overall majority of those expressing an opinion felt this assistance was having some impact in improving the economy of their country. However there seemed to be little correlation between the amount of funds committed by G 24 and the tendency for people to say that the assistance was having a major impact.

SUPPORT FOR ASSOCIATION TREATY




FIGURE 4.9

SUPPORT FOR FULL EC MEMBERSHIP




FIGURE 4.10

Actual assistance and perceived impact of **G 24** economic restructuring aid for **1990**.

	Czechoslovakia	Hungary*	Poland*
% Saying Major Impact	27%	22%	10%
Assistance/Total	34 MECU	97 MECU	195 MECU**

The European Community began negotiations in December **1990** to conclude treaties of association for closer political and economic cooperation between the Community and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Almost four out of five people (**78%-79%**) supported their country having closer ties with the Community through such treaties. Only **2%-4%** were against the idea (Figure **4.9**, Table **64**).

Most Poles (**55%**) and Hungarians (**51%**) wanted their country to be full members of 'the Community immediately (Figure **4.10**, Table **65**). Czechoslovakians felt they should take more time (25% "immediately" versus **37%** "in five years' time"). Only 2% from each country were against joining. This confirms the positive attitudes towards Community membership expressed in earlier Eurobarometer polls which showed **90%** of Czechoslovakians and **84%** of Hungarians in favour of joining the European Community.

By far the most important benefit of Community membership was perceived to be the overall improvement of the economy and the disappearance of shortages. The Poles, with a tradition of earning foreign exchange by working abroad, were particularly keen about the opening of frontiers with Community countries. Czechoslovakians hoped that the creation of a free market economy would become easier. Relatively few talked about the political advantages of Community membership compared to the economic benefits. The overall sentiment was a desire to see people's standard of life increase. Around a third said they could not think of any advantages or that there were none.

By contrast, more than three-quarters of Czechoslovakians, Hungarians and Poles said that they did not know of any drawbacks in their country becoming full members of the Community. Any worries were centred mainly on fears of dominance by foreign companies, leading to bankruptcies and unemployment. A small number were also concerned about possible political and cultural domination.

¹¹ Both Hungary and Poland also received 51 MECU of humanitarian aid in 1990. Source: EC/ICC Background Brief EC-Eastern Europe Relations, 7 December 1990.

DESIRE FOR CLOSER COOPERATION WJTH EC




FIGURE 4.11

LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EUROPEAN COMMUNITY




FIGURE 4.12

Reviewing some of the areas where cooperation between the Community and these countries may be fostered, there was overwhelming interest among Czechoslovakians and Poles in furthering such ties in the fields of environment, industry and many others (Figure 4.11, Table 66). Polish farmers approved of closer cooperation in agriculture by 90% to 2%. The only areas where some doubts surfaced were in defence and, to a lesser degree, foreign policy. Nevertheless, the only outright opposition to defence cooperation came from Czechoslovakians on the left of the political spectrum, who were 35% to 27% against the idea.

4.3 KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION ABOUT THE COMMUNITY'S WORK

Czechoslovakians, Hungarians and Poles are very enthusiastic about strengthening their country's ties with the Community. We have already seen that most people say they have heard of the European Community and know about the PHARE assistance programme being coordinated by the Commission (although Poles seemed substantially less informed than their neighbours). But how well informed do they feel about the Community overall?

Only between 1%-2% of people from each country said they felt very informed about the EC, while between a sixth and a quarter said they were quite informed. The overwhelming majority (71% -76%) admitted being uninformed on the matter (Figure 4.12, Table 67).

Only 13% of Poles and 22% of Czechoslovakians could identify Jacques Delors as the current President of the Commission of the European Communities from a list of the five most recent incumbents of that office (Table 68). Jacques Delors' visit to Prague during the previous month (September 1990) may be a reason for the higher Czechoslovakian awareness. By comparison, 53% of Poles were able to identify Javier Perez de Cuéllar as the UN Secretary-General when the UN asked a similar question there in August 1989.

National television (80%-87%) was the most important source of information about the activities of the Community in all three countries (Table 69). National radio came second for Poles, was as important as national newspapers for Hungarians and less important than national newspapers for Czechoslovakians. Although foreign media played a secondary role to national media in these countries, people who used this media seemed better informed than users of national media (30-33% of Czechoslovakians using foreign media were able to name Jacques Delors compared to 23-26% using national media).

EC CITIZENS' SUPPORT FOR E. EUROPEANS




FIGURE 4.13

SUPPORT FOR EC AID TO SOVIET UNION




FIGURE 4.14

4.4 THE COMMUNITY'S CITIZENS RESPOND TO EASTERN EUROPE'S NEEDS

EC citizens are concerned about the plight of Central and Eastern Europeans. By five to one, they felt that the Community should speed up its economic, political and monetary integration so that, by becoming stronger, it could participate more effectively in building a wider united democratic Europe. By more than four to one, they wanted Central and Eastern Europeans to benefit from programmes and resources currently available only to members countries in the fields of technological research, youth training and university student exchanges; for the Community to prepare itself for each country requesting it to join the EC once democracy and an open economy are established; and that treaties of association offering greater political and economic cooperation should be negotiated without EC membership necessarily being envisaged. Even increasing the **EC's** budget to assist these countries was approved by a majority of three to one EC citizens (Figure 4.13, Table 70).

Since the time the question was last asked in March/April 1990, EC citizens have increased their support for all the above measures, especially allowing Central and Eastern Europeans to benefit from Community programmes and resources in the fields of technology research, youth training and university student exchanges (64% to 69%) (see Eurobarometer Report N° 33). The Italians were the most interested in speeding up integration within the Community (**8596**) and were also the most supportive about increasing the **EC's** budget to help the reform process in Central and Eastern Europe (72%). The Italians (**74%**), alongside the British (**69%**) and the Greeks (68%), were the most interested in allowing reforming countries to become members of the Community in the future.

Alarm signals had been flashing for some time from the Soviet Union about its worsening economic condition. The European Community delayed sending substantial economic assistance to Moscow until Soviet plans for economic and institutional reform became clearer. Instead arrangements were being made at the time of the survey to send large amounts of winter food and medicine to counter the danger of mass hunger and the possible breakdown of the Soviet food distribution system during the winter.

EC citizens were 62% in favour of the European Community providing financial aid to support the Soviet Union's economic and political reforms (Figure 4.14, Table 71). Soviet support for German unity may have convinced Germans to support the idea the most (**73%**). More than two out of three Spaniards, Italians and Dutch were also in favour of it.

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What conclusions might be drawn from this analysis ?

- * Firstly, the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, even in relatively homogeneous countries like Hungary and Poland, remains potentially explosive. Ethnic problems are also developing in Czechoslovakia where the Slovaks, who make up a third of Czechoslovakia's population, are worried about their state's future, fearful that their interests are not sufficiently being represented at the federal level. Uncertainty reigns everywhere concerning whether economic reforms will really succeed.
- Mainly because of poor economic health, Czechoslovakians, Hungarians and Poles are seeking their country's salvation in closer association and membership of the European Community. Eventual membership by these countries may also more effectively control and cool ethnic tensions and the mutual suspicion that seems to characterise the ills of the region.
- * European Community citizens are strongly supportive of helping reform Central and Eastern European countries and for giving assistance to the Soviet Union in its time of crisis.

With the uncertainty of fluctuating oil prices and the introduction of hard currency trading at world prices with the Soviet Union (especially for oil) on 1st January, 1991 is likely to be another tough year for Central and Eastern Europeans. It can only be hoped that assistance and closer ties with the European Community may confound people's gloomiest predictions.

5. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND ITS FUTURE

5.1 AWARENESS AND IMAGE OF PARLIAMENT

Over the past year, the debate about the "democratic deficit" at the Community level has heightened. The European Parliament produced several reports ~~as~~ its contribution to the Inter-Governmental Conferences concerning the principle of 'subsidiarity' and improving the Community's financing and budgetary control. It also requested an enhancement of its role to gain, among others things, the power to co-decide legislation with the Council of Ministers and **to** initiate legislation on its own. These proposals have caused considerable debate among member governments, with a number of them opposing increased power to the European Parliament, arguing that national parliaments should be given more say instead and that the Council of Ministers anyhow represents Governments elected by people.

Despite the growing debate, only around half of the citizens of the European Community said they had seen or heard something about the European Parliament in the media **recently**¹², a slight decline (**52%** to **49%**) from Spring 1990. This confirms a gradual decrease in media awareness of the European Parliament that had been taking place since the time of the European Parliamentary elections in mid- 1989 (in Autumn 1989, awareness levels had been **56%**).

¹² The questions discussed in this ~~area~~ were asked primarily on behalf of the European Parliament.

IMAGE OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT THROUGH THE MEDIA'




FIGURE 6.1

AMONG THOSE WHO HEARD ABOUT IT RECENTLY

IMAGE OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT THROUGH THE MEDIA'




FIGURE .2

AM

THOSE WHO HEARD ABOUT IT



T.I.Y

There were differences in awareness levels from country to country (Table 72). Three out of five Luxembourgers (**59%**) and Portuguese (**58%**) had heard, seen or read something about it recently, while the Dutch (**41%**) and British (**39%**) seemed the least informed. Awareness only rose significantly among West Germans (**48%** to **56%**) perhaps reflecting the importance placed by the German Government in increasing the powers of the European Parliament. In Spain and the Netherlands, it stayed about the same. The biggest fall happened in Greece (68% to 52%), where the European Parliament had had the highest profile last time.

Around half (**52%**) of those who had been aware of the European Parliament in the media recently said they had a favourable impression of it. This was three times as many as those (15%) whose impression was unfavourable, while around a quarter (26%) spontaneously said it was neither.

Long-term trends showed sustained progress in people's favourable impressions of the European Parliament through the media since 1985 (Figure 5.1). These results may imply that news reporting on the European Parliament is in the process of consolidation on a fairly positive note.

The less wealthy - and largely southern - members of the Community gained the best impression of the European Parliament from the media (Figure 5.2, Table 73). Most Italians (**70%**), Greeks (66%), Irish (65%), Portuguese (**62%**) and Spaniards (56%) had a good image of it. Although the British had the highest percentage of people with unfavourable impressions (32%), the Dutch (**40%**), Danes (35%) and Luxembourgers (**32%**) had the fewest favourably impressed. Nevertheless these four publics still reported more favourable than unfavourable impressions. The greatest drop in perceptions of positive reporting over the past six months occurred among the Irish (**76%** to a still high 65%), while perceptions of negative coverage seemed to increase significantly among the British (25% to **32%**), albeit nowhere near as bad as in 1982 (18% "favourable" versus 59% "unfavourable").



Finally it may be of some value to compare the awareness and image of the European Parliament with that of the European Commission. In the Eurobarometer Report N° 33, it was noted that people's awareness and impressions of both institutions were almost exactly the same at the European level: This time, the European Parliament retained its four point advantage in terms of awareness (**45%** for Commission and **49%** for Parliament), while impressions were almost exactly the same again (both **52%** "favourable", while only two points difference on the "unfavourable" and "indifferent" measures). For better or for worse, the images of these two institutions may be linked in the minds of the public as an expression of their feelings about the Community as a whole.

5.2 IMPORTANCE OF PARLIAMENT - CURRENT AND DESIRED.

EC citizens considered that the European Parliament plays an important part in the life of the Community (**58%** "important" versus **26%** "unimportant") but much less so than in the everyday life of its citizens (**37%** versus **48%**). Nevertheless, people clearly expressed the wish that the European Parliament should play a more important role in the future (**53%** versus **17%** "stay the same" and **9%** "less important") than it does nowadays (Figure 5.3).

The European Parliament's perceived importance in the life of the Community was slightly lower than the all-time high achieved six months ago (**60%**). There was also a decline in its importance in the everyday lives of the Community's citizens (**41%** to **37%**). People mainly coming from the Community's 'south' - the Italians, Portuguese, Greeks and Irish - felt the European Parliament was important on both scores. Those from the 'north' were markedly less convinced.

Most countries' citizens felt the Parliament was important for the Community, except for the Dutch, who were uncertain on the matter (**44%** "important" versus **44%** "not important") (Figure 5.4, Table 74). The division between 'north' and 'south' was much more acute concerning Parliament's perceived impact on people's lives, with a relative majority of all 'northerners' (excluding the Irish) saying Parliament did not much affect their lives, a view felt especially strongly by the Dutch, French (both **64%**) and Danes (**61%**) (Table 75). The biggest drop over the past six months occurred among the French and Spaniards on both measures.

DESIRED IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT




FIGURE 6.6

WHO SUPPORTS PARLIAMENT BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT




FIGURE 6.6

The percentage of people wanting the European Parliament to play a more important role (53%) stayed about the same as last time (52%). After a gradual decline from 1984 to 1988, the view that it is important has been rising. Since Spring 1990, it has grown significantly among the French (52% to 59%) and Germans (43% to 49%), perhaps as a result of the intense debate taking place at that time in those countries about extending the European Parliament's powers. This was in part balanced by a corresponding drop by the Greeks (69% to 54%) and Spaniards in particular (55% to 45%).

The current line-up of support for increasing Parliament's importance is significant. Both the French and the Dutch, who did not view the Parliament as particularly important at the present time were strongly in favour of it gaining in importance (59% and 55% respectively). They joined most Italians (69%), Portuguese (60%), Greeks (54%) and Belgians (51%) in calling for this change. Only the Danes and Luxembourgers were more content to see Parliament's situation stay the same. At worst, a fifth of Danes (20%) and British (19%) wanted Parliament to lose some of its importance (Figure 5.5, Table 76).

The profile of those supporting Parliament becoming more important was a little different from those who most favoured EC membership and '1992' (see Chapters 1 & 2)(Figure 5.6, Table 77). Enthusiasm increased with better education and income, but those still studying and the young were not as ardent about this issue as with others. Opinion-leaders were the idea's most fervent backers. Those on the left of the political spectrum were more supportive than those on the right - only over a third of sympathisers of the national parties belonging to the European Democrats rejected the idea (37% "more important" versus 23% "same" and 25% "less important").

5.3 PROSPECTS FOR A FUTURE EUROPEAN UNION

By a majority of almost three to one (55% versus 19%), the citizens of Europe welcomed the idea of a future European Union with a European Government answerable to a European Parliament.

During the three years that this question has been asked, support for this idea has increased from 48% in late 1987 to 54% in early 1989, at which level it has largely remained. This has been matched by a decline of those disagreeing with the idea over the same period (24% to 19%).

FAVOURING EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT ANSWERABLE TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT






FIGURE 5.7

SUPPORT FOR EXTENSION OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S POWER


EP TO CO-DECIDE EC-
LEGISLATION WITH
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS




EP TO PUT FORWARD DRAFTLWS
FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE




EP TO APPROVE
NOMINATION OF
EC COMMISSIONERS



EP TO HAVE CONTROL OVER
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK'S
MANAGEMENT OF ECONOMIC &
MONETARY UNION



EP TO GAIN POWER TO RATIFY
ALL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
AND CONVENTIONS



IN FAVOUR

NOT IN FAVOUR

FIGURE 5.8

Greatest support came from Italians (70%) and Spaniards (**65%**). The Italians have always been its most fervent backers, while Spanish support, after increasing consistently since late 1987, stood at an all-time high in Autumn 1990.

A majority of people agreed with the idea except for the British, who were largely divided on the matter (**33%** in favour; **37%** against) and the Danes who were strongly opposed to it (23% versus **61%**). Danish views have become more positive over the past three years, largely at the expense of those who were undecided. British views have fluctuated during the same period and still do not show a definite direction. The only major movements over the past six months have been an increase in opposition to the idea from Luxembourgers (11% to **22%**) and a major decrease in opposition in West Germany (**24%** to **14%**) (Figure 5.7, Table 78).

5.4 PARLIAMENT AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCES

The European Parliament feels it should have more powers to do its job better and to make up for the 'democratic deficit' that is perceived within the Community.

EC citizens agreed with the powers that the European Parliament wished to gain within a future political union, such as the right to decide together with the Council of Ministers on **EC** legislation (**64%** versus **14%**); to put forward draft **EC** laws on its own initiative (**57%** versus 23%); and to approve the nomination of the members of the Commission (**56%** versus **18%**). They also agreed that the European Parliament should have control over the European Central Bank's management of the **EMU** (**52%** versus 21%); and have the power to ratify all EC international agreements and conventions before they come into action (**49%** versus **23%**) (Figure 5.8, Table 79).

All these questions were asked for the first time six months ago¹³ when the debate first began to crystallise. Support grew within the Community to allow the European Parliament to put forward laws on its own initiative (**52%** to **57%**) and to co-decide with the Council of Ministers on the legislation of the Community (**61%** to **64%**). However, this was counter-balanced by a slight increase in the number of people opposed to the Parliament approving the nomination of Commissioners (**15%** to **18%**), coupled with a fall in those believing the Parliament should ratify all international agreements and conventions (**55%** to **49%**).

¹³ The question wording in Spring was marginally different from Autumn 1990.

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Six months ago, most Danes were against three of the four measures on the table: the European Parliament ratifying international agreements (**45%** versus **35%**); approving the nomination of EC Commissioners (**48%** versus **33%**); and taking legislative initiatives on its own (**46%** versus **38%**). The latter was disagreeable to the British (**43%** versus **37%**) as well. This time around, majorities in all countries were in favour of all the proposals with the exception of continued (and stronger) Danish opposition to the European Parliament ratifying international agreements (**53%** versus 28%) and both the British (**39%** versus **34%**) and the Danes (**48%** versus **33%**) opposing the European Parliament's control over the European Central Bank's management of **EMU**.

Over the past six months, strongest increases in support for the above proposals were seen from the Danes while support fell significantly among the Irish on most of the measures. While public support increased in three-quarters of Community countries to give the European Parliament more legislative powers, it fell in most countries concerning the European Parliament's powers to ratify international agreements and conventions of the EC before they come into action.

Thus support is fairly solid overall for the European Parliament's powers to be enhanced, particularly concerning the right to legislate. Although the Danes became more favourable towards the above issue in particular, they still **show** the greatest resistance to giving the European Parliament more powers in other areas. It is particularly interesting that the French public was **so** strongly in favour of increasing the European Parliament's role, given France's official preference for enhancing the role of national governments and national parliaments with the Community instead.

6. ISSUES FACING EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

Several special studies were carried out as part of the standard Eurobarometer survey n° 34 on behalf of the European Parliament and various specialised services of the Commission. These included questions on youth, parents at work and the Commission's cultural activities.

External partners included the Berlin Science Centre, which asked questions on people's membership of organizations, and the European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research (ESOMAR), which tested a set of harmonised demographics to be used in all opinion and market research in Europe in the perspective of the Single European Market and "European Economic Space".

A few questions of general interest have been subjected to a rough preliminary analysis so that they could feature in early illustrative form among the results of the present report.

6.1 WHAT PARENTS EXPECT FROM THEIR CHILDREN

Three out of five people (62%) in the Community believed that one of the three most important qualities to be encouraged in their children is a sense of responsibility. Around half (49%) felt respect for others was important too (Figure 6.1, Table 80).

QUALITIES TO BE ENCOURAGED IN CHILDREN*




FIGURE 6.1

RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS WITHIN EC




FIGURE 6.2

Teaching children a sense of responsibility was the people's first choice in most countries. However, the Greeks (60%), Italians (58%) and Irish (52%) placed good manners and politeness top of their list (with responsibility coming second) while the French gave equal importance to promoting tolerance/respect as encouraging a sense of responsibility (both 62%). The Danes felt independence (61%) was almost as important as a sense of responsibility (63%).

Young people (15-24 years olds) agreed with the older generation that a sense of responsibility (64%) was the most important quality, but they felt tolerance/respect (47%) and encouraging an ability to communicate with others (39%) were the next priorities.

Older people gave more weight to the importance of good manners and politeness, conscientiousness at work and religious faith in children. Promoting an ability to communicate with others, independence and imagination in children were felt to be more important qualities by younger than older generations.

6.2 RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE COMMUNITY

People were divided as to who should decide on the social and political rights of immigrants in the Community. Four out of ten (39%) said that Community institutions should take care of the issue, while close to a third (29%) said that member state governments should merely consult each other, and a quarter (23%) that national governments should make their own decisions (Figure 6.2, Table 81).

Overall EC citizens felt that immigrants rights should stay the same (34%) or be extended (33%). Only a fifth (19%) said they should be restricted (Table 82).

In most EC countries, people felt immigrants' rights should on balance stay the same as they are. Among the southern members of the Community - Spaniards (56%), Italians (46%), Greeks (45%) and Portuguese (40%) - people felt on the whole that rights should be extended. The Irish were divided between the two options (37% "extend" versus 36% "left as they are").

Only among Belgians (32%) and Danes (30%) was there any significant feeling that immigrants' rights should be restricted in some way.

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STANDARD EUROBAROMETER SURVEY N° 34

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STANDARD EUROBAROMETER N° 34

Between October 10 and November 2 1990, INRA (EUROPE) carried out the 34.0th wave of the STANDARD EUROBAROMETER, on request of the COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Directorate General X, INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE, Unit "Surveys, Research, Analyses".

INRA (EUROPE) is a European Network of Market- and Public Opinion Research agencies, co-ordinated by the European Co-ordination Office (E.C.O.), Avenue R. Vandendriessche 18, B - 1150 Brussels.

The results of the Eurobarometer are made available through the Unit "Surveys, Research, Analyses" of the DG ICC of the Commission of the European Communities. All requests for further information should be addressed to Mr. Karlheinz REIF, DG X - ICC - SRA, "Eurobarometer", rue de la Loi, 200, B - 1049 Brussels.

All Eurobarometer data are stored at the Zentral Archiv (Universität Köln, Bachemer Strasse, 40, D - 5000 Köln 41). They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and all those interested in social science research.

DETAILS ON SAMPLING

In all 12 countries of the European Community, in total 12.872 national citizens, of 15 years and over, were interviewed in face-to-face, in their private residence.

COUNTRY/PAYS

Belgique
 Danmark
 Deutschland (Ost)
 Deutschland (West)
 Ellas
 España
 France
 Ireland
 Italia
 Luxembourg
 Nederland
 Portugal
 UK: Great Britain
 UK: Northern Ireland

The basic sample design applied in all Member States is a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In all Member States a number of sampling points was drawn with probability proportional to population size, for a total coverage of each Member State, and to population density.

Entre Le 10 octobre et le 2 novembre 1990, INRA (EUROPE) a réalisé la vague 34.0 de l'EUROBAROMETRE STANDARD, à la demande de la COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPEENNES, Direction Générale X, Information, Communication et Culture, Unité "Sondages, Recherche, Analyses".

INRA (EUROPE) est un réseau européen d'instituts de sondage d'opinion publique et d'études de marche, coordonné par le Bureau de Coordination Européen (E.C.O.), Avenue R. Vandendriessche 18, B - 1150 Bruxelles.

Les résultats de l'Eurobaromètre sont disponibles à travers l'Unité "Sondages, Recherche, Analyses" de la DG ICC de la Commission des Communautés Européennes. Toute demande d'information supplémentaire doit être adressée à Mr. Karlheinz REIF, DG X - ICC - SRA, "Eurobaromètre", rue de la Loi, 200, B - 1049 Bruxelles.

Toutes les données relatives aux Eurobaromètres sont déposées au Zentral Archiv (Universität Köln, Bachemer Strasse, 40, D - 5000 Köln 41). Elles sont tenues à la disposition des organismes membres du European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), du Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) et des chercheurs justifiant d'un intérêt de recherche.

L'ECHANTILLONNAGE

Dans les 12 pays membres de la Communauté Européenne, au total 12.872 citoyens nationaux de 15 ans et plus ont été interrogés en face-à-face à leur domicile.

NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS

996
 1000
 1002
 1021
 1008
 1000
 1022
 1022
 1073
 301
 1067
 1000
 1047
 313

Le principe d'échantillonnage, appliqué dans tous les pays membres est une sélection aléatoire à multiples phases. Dans tous les pays membres un certain nombre de points de chute sont tirés avec probabilité proportionnelle à la taille de la population, avec couverture totale de chaque état membre, et à la densité de la population.

for doing so, the points were drawn **systematically** from all "administrative regional units" (list appended), after stratification by individual unit and type of area. They thus represent the whole territory of the Member States according to the EUROSTAT-NUTS II and according to the distribution of the national, resident population in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas.

In each of the selected **sampling** points, a starting address was drawn, at random. That starting address formed the first of a cluster of addresses. The remainder of the cluster was selected as every Nth address by standard random route procedures from the initial address.

In Great Britain, a full random of respondents was applied, using electoral registers on **sampling** basis.

In each household the respondent was selected according to a random procedure, such as the first birthday method or the KISJ-grid. At every such address to 2 recalls were made to achieve an interview with that respondent. The maximum number of interviews per household is one. All interviews were taken face to face.

REALISATION OF THE FIELDWORK

COUNTRY/PAYS

FIELDWORK DATES

POPULATION TOTAL (15+ year)

Belgique	15 October-2 November	7 994.4
Danmark	14 October-1 November	4 160.4
Deutschland (Ost)	13 October-27 October	13.607.0
Deutschland (West)	13 October-31 October	51.708.0
Ellas	12 October-29 October	7 825.6
España	17 October-31 October	29 427.2
France	12 October-29 October	43 318.5
Ireland	10 October-31 October	2 501.3
Italia	15 October-26 October	45 902.8
Luxembourg	10 October-31 October	302.6
Nederland	15 October-31 October	11 603.6
Portugal	11 October-29 October	7 718.7
UK : Great Britain	15 October-30 October	44 562.0
UK : Northern Ireland	16 October-27 October	1 159.1

EC12

271 791.2

In all member States, fieldwork was conducted on the basis of detailed and uniform instructions prepared by the European Co-ordination Office (ECO) of INRA (EUROPE).

Les points de chute sont tirés **systématiquement** dans chacune des "unités régionales administratives" (liste en annexe), après stratification par unité et type de région. On représente ainsi le territoire complet de chaque pays "bre", selon les régions EUROSTAT-NUTS II et selon la distribution de la population nationale en termes d'urbanisation.

Dans chacun des points de chute, une adresse de départ est imposée, qui est sélectionnée **aléatoire**-ment. Cette adresse est la première d'un cluster d'adresses. Les autres adresses du cluster sont sélectionnées comme chaque adresse N par procédure standardisée de "random route" de l'adresse initiale.

En Grande-Bretagne, une sélection purement aléatoire des répondants est appliquée, utilisant les listes électorales comme base de sélection.

Dans chaque ménage le répondant est sélectionné selon une procédure aléatoire, comme la méthode du premier anniversaire ou la grille dite KISJ. A chaque adresse, jusqu'à 2 révisites sont faites pour réaliser une interview avec la personne sélectionnée. Pas plus d'une interview par ménage n'est admise. Toutes les interviews sont réalisées en face à face.

REALISATION DU TERRAIN

COMPARISON BETWEEN SAMPLES AND UNIVERSES AND WEIGHTING OF THE DATA

for each of the countries a comparison between the samples and a proper universe description was carried out. This Universe description was made available by the National Research Institutes and by EUROSTAT.

For all EC-member-countries a national weighting procedure, using marginal and intercellular weighting, was carried out based on this Universe description. As such in all countries, minimum sex, age, region NUTS II and size of locality were introduced in the iteration procedure. For some countries extra variables were added, when considered necessary.

COMPARAISON DES ECHANTILLONS AVEC LA POPULATION ET PONDERATION

Pour chacun des pays une comparaison entre les échantillons et les chiffres de la population, description d'univers, est réalisée. Les chiffres d'univers sont mis à la disposition par les Instituts Nationaux et par EUROSTAT.

Pour tous les pays membres, une procédure de pondération nationale est réalisée, sur des données marginales ou croisées, tirées de cette description d'univers. Ainsi, dans tous les pays, au moins le sexe, l'âge, les régions NUTS II et la taille de l'agglomération sont introduits dans la procédure d'itération. Pour certains pays, des variables supplémentaires sont introduites si nécessaire.

For international weighting INRA (EUROPE) applies the official population figures aged 15 years and older as published by EUROSTAT in the Regional Statistics Yearbook of 1988. The total population figures for input in this post-weighting procedure are listed above.

Pour pondérer au plan international, INRA (EUROPE) applique les données officielles de la population de 15 ans et plus, publiées par EUROSTAT dans L'Annuaire 1988 des Statistiques Régionales. Les chiffres exacts introduits dans cette routine de post-pondération sont résumés dans le tableau précédent.

ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONAL UNITS / UNITES ADMINISTRATIVES REGIONALES

BELGIQUE :

Hainaut
Limburg
Namur
Flandre Orientale
Flandre Occidentale
Liège
Luxembourg
Brabant Flamand
Antwerpen
Bruxelles
Brabant Wallon

DANMARK :

Hovedstadsområdet
Sjælland, Lolland-,
Falster, Bornholm
Fyn
Jylland

DEUTSCHLAND :

Schleswig Holstein
Hamburg
RB Braunschweig
RB Hannover
RB Lüneburg
RB Uckermark
Bremen
Düsseldorf
Köln
Münster
Detmold
Arnsberg
Darmstadt
Giessen
Kassel
Koblenz
Trier
Rheinland-Pfalz
Saarland
Nordrhein-Westfalen-
Stuttgart
Nordrhein-Westfalen
Südwestfalen
Südwestfalen-
Tübingen
Ostfalen
Niedersachsen
Ostfalen
Ostfalen
Mittelfranken
Unterfranken
Schwaben
Berlin-est
Berlin-Ost
Rostock
Schwerin
Neubrandenburg
Potsdam
Frankfurt/O.
Cottbus
Magdeburg
Halle
Erfurt
Gera
Suhl
Dresden
Leipzig
Chemnitz

ELLAS :

Kentriki kai Dytiki
Makedonia
Thessalie
Anatoliki Makedonia
Thraki
Anatoliki Sterea kai
Nisia
Peloponnisos & Dytiki
Sterea
Ipeiros
Kriti
Nisia Anatolikou Aigaïou

ESPAÑA :

Andalucía
Aragón
Asturias
Balears
Canarias
Cantabria
Castilla-La Mancha
Castilla-León
Cataluña
Extremadura
Galicia
Madrid
Murcia
Navarra
País Valenciano
País Vasco
La Rioja

FRANCE :

Île de France
Champagne-Ardenne
Picardie
Haute Normandie
Centre
Basse Normandie
Bourgogne
Nord-Pas-de-Calais
Lorraine
Alsace
Franche-Comté
Pays de la Loire
Bretagne
Poitou-Charentes
Aquitaine
Midi-Pyrénées
Limousin
Rhône-Alpes
Auvergne
Languedoc-Roussillon
Provence-Alpes-
Côte d'Azur
Corse

ITALIA :

Valle d'Aosta/Piemonte
Liguria
Lombardia
Milano
Trentino
Veneto
Friuli, Venezia, Giulia
Emilia
Toscana
Marche
Umbria
Lazio
Molise e Abruzzo
Campania
Puglie
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicilia
Sardegna

IRELAND :

Dublin
Rest of Leinster
Munster
Connacht/Ulster

LUXEMBOURG :

Centre
Sud
Nord
Est

NEDERLAND :

Groningen
Friesland
Drenthe
Overijssel
Gelderland
Utrecht
Noord-Holland
Zuid-Holland
Zeeland
Noord-Brabant
Limburg
Flevoland

PORTUGAL :

Norte
Centro
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo
Alentejo
Algarve
Açores
Madeira

UNITED KINGDOM :

GREAT BRITAIN :
Cleveland, Durham
Cumbria
Northumberland,
Tyne & Wear
Humberside
North Yorkshire
South Yorkshire
West Yorkshire
Derbyshire,
Nottinghamshire
Leicestershire,
Northamptonshire
Lincolnshire
East Anglia
Bedfordshire,
Hertfordshire
Berkshire,
Buckinghamshire,
Oxfordshire
Surrey,
East/West Sussex
Essex
Greater London
Hampshire, Isle of Wight
Kent
Avon, Gloucestershire,
Wiltshire
Cornwall, Devon
Dorset, Somerset
Hereford & Worcester,
Warwickshire
Shropshire, Staffordshire
West Midlands (county)
Cheshire
Greater Manchester
Lancashire
Merseyside
Clwyd, Dyfed,
Gwynedd, Powys
Gwent,
M-S-U Glamorgan
Borders, Central, Fife,
Lothian, Tayside
Dumfries-Galloway,
Strathclyde
Highlands Islands
Grampian
NORTHERN IRELAND

FLASH EUROBAROMETER N° 3

CO-OPERATING AGENCIES AND RESEARCH EXECUTIVES/INSTITUTS ET CHARGES D'ETUDES

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BELGIQUE/BELGIE	DIMARSO N.V. 78, Boulevard Lambertmont B - 1030 Bruxelles	Luc SCHULPEN	Tel. 32.2.215.19.30 Telex 046.64677 Fax 32.2.216.13.96
DANMARK	GALLUP MARKEDSANALYSE A.S. Gammel Vartovvej 6 DK - 2900 HELLERUP, COPENHAGUEN	Rolf RANDRUP	Tel. 45.31.29.88.00 Telex 055.15180 Fax 45.31.18.24.66
DEUTSCHLAND	EMNID-INSTITUT GmbH Bodelschwinghstrasse, 23-26a D - 4800 BIELEFELD 1	Franc KILZER	Tel. 49.521.26.00.10 Telex 041.932833 Fax 49.521.26.00.15
ELLAS	ICAP HELLAS S.A. Queen Sophia Avenue 64 GR - 11528 ATHENS	Anthony LYKIARDOPOULOS Tilemachos DIB	Tel. 30.1.722.56.51 Telex 0601.215736 Fax 30.1.722.02.55
ESPANA	INTERGALLUP P° de la Castellana 72-1° E - 28046 MADRID	Jaime MIQUEL ADRADA Victoria MIQUEL	Tel. 34.1.563.75.28 Telex 052.87804 Fax 34.1.563.22.26
FRANCE	I.F.O.P. 6, rue Eugene Oudine F - 75013 PARIS	Chantal CALISSON1	Tel. 33.1.45.84.14.44 Telex 200.603 Fax 33.1.45.85.59.39
IRELAND	IRISH MARKETING SURVEYS Ltd 19-20 Upper Pembroke Street IRL - DUBLIN 2	Charles COYLE ,	Tel. 353.1.76.11.96 Telex 0500.30617 Fax 353.1.76.08.77
ITALIA	ISTITUTO PER LE RICHERCHE STATISTICHE E L'ANALISI DELL'OPINIONE PUBBLICA (DOXA) Via B. Panizza 7 I - 20144 MILANO	Ennio SALAMON Alfonso del RE	Tel. 39.2.48.19.33.20 Telex 921.101 Fax 39.2.48.19.32.86
LUXEMBOURG	INSTITUT LUXEMBOURGEOIS DE RECHERCHES SOCIALES (ILRES) 6, rue du Marche aux Herben GD - 1728 LUXEMBOURG	Louis MEVIS Charles MARGUE	Tel. 352.47.50.21 Telex 0402.60468 Fax 352.46.26.20
NEDERLAND	NEDERLANDS INSTITUUT VOOR DE PUBLIEKE OPINIE (NIPO) B.V. Westerdokhuis, Barentsplein 7 NL - 1013 NJ AMSTERDAM	Arnold WEIJTLANDT Martin JONKER	Tel. 31.20.24.88.44 Telex 044.14614 Fax 31.20.26.43.75
PORTUGAL	NORMA-SOCIEDADE DE ESTUDOS PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DE EMPRESAS S.A.R.L. Avenue 5 de Outubro 122-9° P - 1000 LISBOA	Carlos Alberto LOPES SILVA	Tel. 351.1.76.76.04 Telex 0404.12604 Fax 351.1.77.39.48
UNITED KINGDOM	SOCIAL SURVEYS (GALLUP POLL) 307 Finchley Road UK - LONDON NW3 6EH	Norman WEBB Robert WYBROW	Tel. 447.17.94.0461 Telex 051.261712 Fax 447.14.31.0252

SAMPLING/ECHANTILLONNAGE

The sample has been designed to be representative of the total population aged 16 and over, except in Greece (five main cities), Spain (five main cities), Portugal (five main cities) and Ireland (greater Dublin). East Germany was not included in the survey. The interviews were conducted by telephone.

L'objectif de la méthode d'échantillonnage est de couvrir de manière représentative la totalité de la population âgée de 15 ans et plus, sauf en Grèce (cinq principales villes), en Espagne (cinq principales villes), au Portugal (cinq principales villes) et en Irlande (agglomération de Dublin). La RDA est exclue du sondage. Les interviews ont été réalisées par téléphone.

COUNTRY/PAYS	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS/NOMBRE D'INTERVIEWS	DATES
Belgique	500	3-5 October 1990
Danmark	605	26-30 Sept. 1990
Deutschland (West)	601	4-6 October 1990
Ellas	600	2-8 October 1990
España	502	1-4 October 1990
France	601	1-8 October 1990
Ireland	514	1-8 October 1990
Italia	511	1-6 October 1990
Luxembourg	604	1-9 October 1990
Nederland	602	1-8 October 1990
Portugal	606	1-4 October 1990
United Kingdom	506	1-6 October 1990

Readers are reminded that sample survey results are estimations, the degree of certainty and precision of which, everything being kept equal rests upon the number of cases. With samples of about 1,000, it is generally admitted that a percentage difference of less than five per cent is below the acceptable level of confidence.

Il est rappelé que les résultats obtenus par sondage sont des estimations dont le degré de certitude et de précision dépend, toutes choses égales d'ailleurs, du nombre d'individus constituant l'échantillon. Avec des échantillons de l'ordre de 1.000, on admet généralement qu'une différence inférieure à cinq pour cent entre deux pourcentages est au-dessous du niveau acceptable de confiance.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION / REGIONS D'ENQUÊTES

BELGIQUE/BELGIE

Antwerpen
Brabant Flamand
Bruxelles
West Flanders
East Flanders
Limbourg
Brabant Wallon
Hainaut
Namur
Luxembourg
Liège

DANMARK

Hovedstadsområdet
Sjælland, Lolland-Falster,
Bornholm
Fyn
Jylland

BUNDESREPUBLIK

DEUTSCHLAND

Schleswig-Holstein
Hambourg
Niedersachsen
Bremen
Nordrhein-Westfalen
Hessen
Rheinland-Pfalz
Baden-Württemberg
Bayern
West Berlin

ELLAS

Athènes
Salonique
Patras
Larissa
Héraklion

ESPAÑA

Madrid
Barcelone
Bilbao
Valence
Séville

FRANCE

Ile de France
Nord
Est
Bassin Parisien Est
Bassin Parisien Ouest
Ouest
Sud-Ouest
Sud-Est
Méditerranée

GREAT BRITAIN

North
Yorkshire, Humber
North West
East Midlands
West Midlands
East Anglia
South East
South West
Greater London
Wales
Scotland

IRELAND

Greater Dublin

ITALIA

Nord-Ouest
Piemonte
Liguria
Lombardie
Milano
Nord-Est
Trentino
Vénétie
Friuli-Vénétie-Giulia
Emilia
Centro
Toscane
Marche
Umbrie
Lazio
Sud
Abruzzes
Campanie
Puglie
Basilicate
Calabrie
Isole
Sicile
Sardaigne

LUXEMBOURG

Centre
Sud
Nord
Est

NEDERLAND

Groningen
Friesland
Drenthe
Overijssel
Gelderland
Utrecht
Noord-Holland
Zuid-Holland
Zeeland
Noord-Brabant
Limbourg
Flevoland

PORTUGAL

Lisboa
Oporto
Coimbra
Faro

EUROBAROMETER CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE POLL

CO-OPERATING AGENCIES AND RESEARCH EXECUTIVES/INSTITUTS ET CHARGES D'ETUDES

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HUNGARY	MODUS / Business and Social Marketing Consulting Ltd Magyeczó u.4 BUDAPEST VI 1065	Emoke Lengyel	tel.++/361 122 94 50 fax.++/361 122 98 81
POLAND	OSOP - Ośrodek Badań Opinii Publicznej, Polish Radio and Television ul. Woronicza 17, 00-900 WARSAW	Jacek Dohnal iik	tel.++/48 22 47 87 91/2 fax.++/48 22 43 74 08

Coordination directly by "Surveys, Research, Analyser", Directorate-General X, Commission of the European Communities.

SAMPLING / ECHANTILLONNAGE

The sample was designed to be representative of the total population aged 15 years and over. All citizens were interviewed face-to-face in people's homes. A shorter questionnaire was asked in Hungary.

L'objectif de la méthode d'échantillonnage est de couvrir de manière représentative la population âgée de 15 ans et plus. Toutes les interviews ont été réalisées en face à face au domicile des personnes interrogées. Un questionnaire réduit a été utilisé en Hongrie.

COUNTRY/PAYS	SAMPLE	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	DATES
Czechoslovakia	Quota	1.490	22 October - 3 November 1990
Hungary	Quota	989	20 October - 30 October 1990
Poland	Random	1.014	22 October - 23 October 1990

A 13

Table/Tableau 1 : THE NEXT YEAR : BETTER OR WORSE ? / L'année prochaine : meilleure ou moins bonne ? (% , by country/par pays)

QUESTION : As far as you are concerned, do you think that next year - 1991 - will be better or worse than 1990? / En ce qui vous concerne, pensez-vous que l'année prochaine - 1991 - sera meilleure ou moins bonne que 1990 ?

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change frm EB32 *: Non-applicable	B		DK		D				GR		E		F			
					WEST		EAST									
Better	28	-8138	+4	35	+13	40	*	57	*	36	-13	35	-12	29	-4	
Worse	30	+20	13	0	18	+7	19	*	21	*	43	+21	24	+13	30	+18
Same (SPONT)	33	-14	47	-2	40	-21	34	*	14	*	14	+3	29	-1	34	-14
Don't know	9	+3	3	-1	7	+1	7	*	8	*	8	-10	13	-2	8	+1
TOTAL	100		101		100		100		100		101		101		101	
1ère colonne: Résultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB32 *: Pas d'application	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC 12 +	
Meilleure	46	-7	39	-12	23	-7	32	-2	40	0	41	+3	36	-2	37	*
Moins bonne	24	+10	35	+16	21	+14	14	+4	28	+15	33	+3	28	+12	27	*
Sans changement (SPONT)	24	-2	19	-4	47	-10	46	0	19	-11	20	-6	29	-9	28	*
Ne sait pas	5	-2	7	0	9	+3	8	-2	12	-5	7	0	8	0	8	*
TOTAL	99		100		100		100		99		101		101		100	

Table/Tableau 2 : PERCEIVED CHANGES IN COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION - PAST 12 MONTHS / Evaluation des changements de la situation économique du pays au cours des 12 dernier mois (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in this country is ...? / Par rapport à ce qu'elle était il y a 12 mois, pensez-vous que la situation économique générale de ce pays est actuellement ...?

	B	DK	D				GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12 +
			WEST		EAST											
A lot better/Bien meilleure	3	1	7	7	5	3	4	1	7	2	3	1	4	1	3	
A Little better/Un peu mieux	25	18	31	31	32	15	25	13	37	13	35	22	36	10	20	
Stayed the same/Inchangé	37	32	41	34	8	20	28	30	26	23	42	42	28	15	28	
A little worse/Un peu moins bonne	26	39	17	20	30	36	31	40	20	48	14	28	24	43	35	
A lot worse/Bien moins bonne	5	7	2	7	25	22	6	13	9	11	1	2	3	28	12	
Don't know/Ne sait pas	4	3	2	2	1	4	5	3	2	4	6	4	5	3	3	
TOTAL	100	100	100	101	101	100	99	100	101	101	101	99	100	100	101	

Note: EC12 results exclude former DOR; EC12+ results include former DOR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 3 : ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION - NEXT 12 MONTHS / Evaluation des changements de la situation économique du pays dans les 12 prochains mois (% by country/par pays)

QUESTION : And over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation in this country will be ...? Would you say it will ...? / Et dans les 12 prochains mois, pensez-vous que la situation économique générale de ce pays va devenir ...?

	B	DK	D			GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12 +
			WEST	EAST											
Get a lot better/ Bien meilleure	2	1	6	7	10	5	2	1	6	2	1	1	3	2	3
Get a little better/ Un peu meilleure	19	19	25	32	57	29	26	18	36	24	20	19	35	34	27
Stay the same/Inchangée	38	40	35	31	14	20	32	33	31	31	45	37	25	24	30
Get a little worse/ Un peu moins bonne	30	34	27	24	11	21	24	29	17	31	26	36	22	25	27
Get a lot worse/ Bien moins bonne	5	3	4	4	5	13	4	12	6	5	1	3	3	11	7
Don't know/Ne sait pas	7	2	3	3	3	12	12	8	5	7	8	5	13	4	6
TOTAL	101	99	100	101	100	100	100	101	101	100	101	101	101	100	100

Table/Tableau 4 : PERCEIVED CHANGES IN FINANCIAL SITUATION OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS - PAST 12 MONTHS / Changements perçus dans la situation financière de son ménage - 12 derniers mois (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the financial situation of your household, now is? / Par rapport à ce qu'elle était il y a 12 mois, pensez-vous que la situation financière de votre ménage est actuellement ?

	B	DK	D			GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12 +
			WEST	EAST											
A lot better/Bien meilleure	4	4	4	4	3	4	3	4	5	3	4	6	2	5	4
A little better/Un peu meilleure	19	20	23	25	32	16	25	16	21	20	20	24	31	18	21
Stayed the same/Inchangée	53	52	60	55	39	27	54	43	40	56	63	50	42	29	47
A little worse/Un peu moins bonne	18	19	11	12	18	34	15	26	22	18	9	15	20	29	20
A lot worse/Bien moins bonne	4	4	1	2	7	18	3	9	9	3	1	3	3	18	7
Don't know/Ne sait pas	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	1	3	2	3	2	2
TOTAL	101	100	100	99	100	101	101	100	100	101	100	100	101	101	101

Note: EC12 results exclude former DOR; EC12+ results include former DOR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 5 : ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN FINANCIAL SITUATION OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS - NEXT 12 MONTHS / Evaluation des changements de la situation financière des ménages dans les 12 prochains mois (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : And over the next 12 months, do you expect the financial situation of **your** household will ...? / Et dans les 12 prochains mois, pensez-vous que La situation financière de votre ménage va devenir ...?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12 +	
			WEST	EAST											
Get a lot better/ Bien meilleure	3	4	5	6	10	5	3	6	4	4	2	5	1	5	5
Get a little better/ Un peu meilleure	24	26	24	29	46	27	28	22	28	30	29	24	33	29	27
Stay the same/Inchangée	53	52	58	50	19	23	46	43	46	50	52	53	36	39	46
Get a little worse/ Un peu moins bonne	14	15	9	11	17	22	13	18	15	11	12	14	15	17	14
Get a lot worse/ Bien moins bonne	2	1	2	2	4	12	1	5	5	1	1	1	3	6	3
Don't know/Ne sait pas	4	1	2	2	5	11	9	7	3	5	4	3	11	5	5
TOTAL	100	99	100	100	101	100	100	101	101	100	100	99	101	100	100

Table/Tableau 6 : THE FEELING OF OVERALL LIFE SATISFACTION / Le sentiment global de satisfaction de la vie (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : On the whole, are **you** very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead? Would you say you are? / D'une façon générale, êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas du tout satisfait de la vie que vous menez? Diriez-vous que vous êtes?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12 +	
			WEST	EAST											
Very satisfied/Très satisfait	23	58	24	21	9	15	23	12	28	13	44	40	5	25	20
Fairly satisfied/Plutôt satisfait	63	37	68	68	68	48	53	63	56	61	51	53	66	60	61
Not very satisfied/Plutôt pas satisfait	11	3	7	9	19	23	20	16	11	19	4	5	19	10	14
Not at all satisfied/Pas satisfait du tout	3	1	1	2	3	14	4	8	4	7	0	1	7	4	5
Don't know/Ne sait pas	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	2	1	1
TOTAL	101	99	100	100	99	101	100	100	100	100	99	101	99	100	101

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 7: DEUTSCHE ZUFRIEDENHEIT MIT DER DEMOKRATIE / German satisfaction with democracy / Satisfaction des Allemands à l'égard de la démocratie

FRAGE/QUESTION: (IN EX-DDR ONLY/EN EX-RDA EXCLUSIVEMENT) Sind Sie mit der Art und Weise, wie sich die Demokratie in der DDR bis zur Vereinigung entwickelt hat, alles in allem gesehen, sehr zufrieden, ziemlich zufrieden, ziemlich unzufrieden oder völlig unzufrieden ? / On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied with the way democracy has been developing in the GDR until unification ? / Dans l'ensemble, êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas du tout satisfait de la façon dont la démocratie s'est développée jusqu'à l'unification ? (BEFORE UNIFICATION)

(IN EX-BRD ONLY/EN EX-RFA EXCLUSIVEMENT) Sind Sie mit der Art und Weise, wie die Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis zum Beitritt der DDR funktioniert hat, alles in allem gesehen, sehr zufrieden, ziemlich zufrieden, ziemlich unzufrieden oder völlig unzufrieden ? / On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy has worked in the Federal Republic of Germany before the entry of the former GDR ? / Dans l'ensemble, Êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas du tout satisfait du fonctionnement de la démocratie en République Fédérale avant l'entrée de l'ex-RDA ? (BEFORE UNIFICATION)

FRAGE/QUESTION: (IN EX-DDR ONLY/EN EX-RDA EXCLUSIVEMENT) Und wie ist das mit der bisherigen Bundesrepublik vor der Vereinigung ? Sind Sie mit der Art und Weise, wie die Demokratie in der bisherigen Bundesrepublik funktioniert hat, alles in allem gesehen, sehr zufrieden, ziemlich zufrieden, ziemlich unzufrieden oder völlig unzufrieden ? / And as to the Federal Republic before unification: on the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy has worked in the Federal Republic before unification ? / Et si vous pensez à la République Fédérale avant l'unification: dans l'ensemble êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas satisfait du tout du fonctionnement de la démocratie en République Fédérale avant l'unification ? (SATISFIED WITH WEST GERMAN DEMOCRACY)

FRAGE/QUESTION: (IN EX-DDR ONLY/EN EX-RDA EXCLUSIVEMENT) Und was sind Ihre Erwartungen für die Zukunft : Erwarten Sie, mit der Art und Weise, wie die Demokratie in Deutschland funktionieren wird, alles in allem gesehen sehr zufrieden, ziemlich zufrieden, ziemlich unzufrieden oder völlig unzufrieden zu sein ? / And what are your expectations for the future ? On the whole, do you expect to be very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy will work in Germany ? / Et quelles sont vos attentes pour l'avenir: vous attendez-vous, dans l'ensemble, à être très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas satisfait du tout de la façon dont la démocratie fonctionnera en Allemagne ? (AFTER UNIFICATION)

(IN EX-BRD ONLY/EN EX-RFA EXCLUSIVEMENT) Und was sind Ihre Erwartungen für die Zukunft : Erwarten Sie, mit der Art und Weise, wie die Demokratie im Vereinigten Deutschland funktionieren wird, alles in allem gesehen sehr zufrieden, ziemlich zufrieden, ziemlich unzufrieden oder völlig unzufrieden zu sein ? / And what are your expectations for the future ? On the whole, do you expect to be very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy will work in United Germany? / Et quelles sont vos attentes pour l'avenir: vous attendez-vous, dans l'ensemble, à être très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas satisfait du tout de la façon dont la démocratie fonctionnera dans l'Allemagne unifiée ? (AFTER UNIFICATION)

1st column: X satisfied 2nd column: X not satisfied	WEST GERMANS		EAST GERMANS	
	+		+	
Before unification	81	15	49	47
Satisfied with West German democracy before unification			67	11
After unification	72	22	78	12

Table/Tableau 8 : THE FEELING OF **SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS** / Le sentiment de satisfaction quant au fonctionnement de la démocratie (% , by country, per pays)

QUESTION : On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (YOUR COUNTRY)? Would you say you are? / Dans l'ensemble, êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas du tout satisfait du fonctionnement de la démocratie dans (VOTRE PAYS)? Diriez-vous que vous êtes?

1st colum: EB34 result 2nd colum: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	E	DK	D				GR	E	F
			WEST*			EAST*			
Very satisfied	5 -6	15 -6	19 +4	16 *	*	*	8 +1	14 +1	5 0
Fairly satisfied	51 -4	55 0	62 -4	58 *	44 *	*	36 +9	43 0	37 -10
Not very satisfied	26 +5	22 +4	13 -2	17 *	*	*	34 +9	31 +1	32 +4
Not at all satisfied	12 +2	7 +1	2 0	5 *	*	*	19 -18	8 -3	19 +6
Don't know	6 +2	1 0	4 +2	3 *	*	*	4 0	5 +1	8 0
TOTAL	100	100	100	99	99		101	101	101
1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +	
Très satisfait	11 -6	2 0	20 -2	12 +2	6 +1	8 +1	9 0	9 *	
Plutôt satisfait	48 -1	20 -7	52 +2	55 -7	65 +3	42 0	43 -4	43 •	
Plutôt pas satisfait	20 +5	43 +2	19 +6	25 +3	14 -5	30 -3	28 +1	29 *	
Pas du tout satisfait	13 +1	33 +7	4 -1	4 +2	7 -2	14 +1	14 +1	14 •	
Ne sait pas	8 + 1	3 0	6 - 5	3 + 1	9 + 3	6 0	5 +1	5 *	
TOTAL	100	101	101	99	101	100	99	100	

*Satisfaction with the way democracy worked until (or before) unification (cf. Table 7) / Satisfaction quant à la façon dont fonctionnait la démocratie jusqu'à l'unification (cf. Tableau 7)

Table/Tableau 9: THE **EXPECTATIONS FOR THE NEXT YEAR - STRIKES AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS (IN THE COUNTRY)** / Ce que l'on attend de l'année prochaine - Greves et conflits sociaux (dans le pays) (1) (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION: Looking ahead to 1990/1991, do you think that strikes and industrial disputes (in your country) .../ Quand vous pensez à 1990/1991, croyez-vous que Les grèves et les conflits sociaux (dans votre pays) ...

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12
Will increase/ Augmenteront ?	40	35	46	41	40	53	23	51	22	44	31	24	42
Will remain same/ Resteront au niveau actuel ?	38	44	37	25	36	35	44	28	49	47	33	55	38
Will decrease/ Diminueront ?	15	13	4	20	8	6	21	11	11	7	8	14	9
Don't know/Ne sais pas	7	8	13	14	16	6	12	10	18	2	28	7	10
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	99

(1) Source: EOS Gallup Europe

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent L'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 10: "EURO-DYNAMOMETER"/"L'Euro-Dynamomètre" (% by country/par pays)

QUESTION : In your opinion, how is the European Community, the European Unification advancing nowadays ? Please look at these people (SHOW CARD**). No. 1 is standing still, No. 7 is running as fast as possible. Choose the *one* which best corresponds with your *opinion* of the European Community, European Unification. And which corresponds best to what you would like ? / A votre avis, comment avance actuellement la Communauté Européenne, L'Unification de L'Europe ? Veuillez regarder ces personnages (MONTRER CARTE**). Le No. 1 ne bouge pas, le No. 7 court aussi vite que possible. Choisissez celui qui correspond le mieux à votre opinion de la Communauté Européenne, L'Unification de L'Europe ? Et quel est le personnage qui correspond le mieux à ce que vous souhaiteriez ? (% by country, par pays)

AT WHAT SPEED IS EUROPE ADVANCING AT PRESENT ? / A QUELLE VITESSE PROGRESSE ACTUELLEMENT L'EUROPE ?			D													EC 12
		B	DK	WEST		EAST	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	
Slowly/Lentement (codes 1 - 3)	1990 1987	34 43	30 59	44 60	43 *	37 *	27 36	26 34	39 40	21 27	31 47	38 68	43 57	27 35	28 46	34 46
At medium pace /Moyennement (code 4)	1990 1987	31 24	31 16	29 18	29 *	31 *	29 20	28 19	28 28	25 26	29 26	28 18	32 26	19 19	29 27	29 24
Quickly/Rapidement (codes 5 - 7)	1990 1987	25 17	35 12	23 10	23 *	24 *	31 16	26 19	29 25	38 21	32 16	27 6	21 11	29 17	34 13	28 15
Don't know/ Ne sais pas	1990 1987	1 16	5 14	4 13	5 *	7 *	15 28	20 29	5 7	15 27	8 12	9 10	5 6	26 29	8 14	9 15
TOTAL	1990 1987	101 100	101 101	100 101	99 *	99 *	102 100	100 101	101 100	99 101	100 101	102 102	101 100	101 100	99 100	100 100
Average score/ score moyen (*)	1990 1987	3.1 35	4.1 2.9	3.7 3.0	3.7 *	3.8 *	4.1 3.5	4.0 3.7	3.8 3.7	4.3 3.8	4.0 3.4	3.8 2.8	3.7 3.2	4.1 3.6	4.1 3.4	3.9 3.4
AT WHAT SPEED SHOULD EUROPE BE ADVANCING ? / A QUELLE VITESSE L'EUROPE DEVRAIT-ELLE PROGRESSER ?			D													EC 12
		B	DK	WEST		EAST	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	
Slowly/Lentement (codes 1 - 3)	1990 1987	14 10	27 28	20 16	18 *	13 *	5 9	9 8	13 7	11 13	7 5	21 9	19 12	5 6	22 19	14 11
At medium pace /Moyennement (code 4)	1990 1987	21 16	22 13	18 15	17 *	15 *	8 7	13 8	14 8	13 10	8 5	27 14	22 14	10 7	19 11	15 10
Quickly/Rapidement (codes 5 - 7)	1990 1987	56 58	46 40	56 57	58 *	64 *	69 57	58 57	66 77	60 51	76 81	43 68	54 65	62 64	49 56	61 65
Don't know/ Ne sais pas	1990 1987	9 17	6 20	6 12	6 *	7 *	17 28	19 28	7 9	16 27	10 10	10 10	6 9	24 24	10 14	10 14
TOTAL	1990 1987	100 101	101 101	100 100	99 *	99 *	99 101	99 101	100 101	100 101	101 101	101 101	101 100	101 101	100 100	100 100
Average score/ score moyen (*)	1990 1987	4.8 5.2	4.3 4.2	4.7 5.0	4.8 *	5.1 *	5.6 5.5	5.3 5.6	5.1 5.6	5.1 5.0	5.7 6.1	4.4 5.4	4.6 5.2	5.6 5.8	4.6 4.9	5.0 5.4
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AVERAGE SCORES/DIFFERENCE ENTRE LES SCORES MOYENS																
	1990 1987	1.0 1.7	0.2 1.3	1.0 2.0	1.1 *	1.3 *	1.5 2.0	1.3 1.9	1.3 1.9	0.8 1.2	1.7 2.7	0.6 2.6	0.9 2.0	1.5 2.2	0.5 1.5	1.1 2.0

(*) Calculated according to the percentages of answers corresponding to each of the seven points on the scale; "don't knows" excluded. / Calculé selon Les pourcentages de réponses correspondant à chacun des sept codes de l'échelle, non-réponses exclues.

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former WR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 11 : LEVEL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN EC COUNTRIES / Niveau de compréhension entre les pays CE (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : In your opinion, has the level of agreement between the countries of the European Community (Common Market) generally increased, decreased or stayed about the same, over the last 12 months ? / Au cours des douze derniers mois, à votre avis, le compréhension entre les pays de la Communauté Européenne a-t-elle, dans l'ensemble, plutôt progressée, plutôt régressée, ou est-elle restée à peu près sans changement ?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12 +	
			WEST	EAST											
Generally increased/ plutôt progressé	51	49	44	47	58	37	56	49	45	56	54	38	55	36	48
Generally decreased/ plutôt régressé	7	6	7	6	3	3	3	8	6	2	5	10	3	11	6
Same/Sans changement	31	39	39	36	24	35	23	35	33	27	34	44	22	43	34
Don't know/Ne sait pas	11	6	10	11	15	25	19	8	16	15	8	9	20	10	12
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	100	100	100	101	101	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 12 : INTEREST IN POLITICS / Interêt pour la politique (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : To what extent would you say you are interested in politics ? / Dans quelle mesure diriez-vous que vous vous intéressez à la politique ?

1st coturn: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B		DK		D				GR		E		F			
					WEST		EAST									
A great deal	6	-3	18	-3	14	-3	17	*	29	*	16	-4	6	-1	10	+2
To some extent	29	+1	48	0	40	0	40	*	39	*	38	+1	26	-4	29	-3
Not much	33	-1	28	+3	33	+2	32	*	26	*	32	+3	22	+1	37	+1
Not at all	31	+3	6	0	13	+1	11	*	5	*	14	-1	45	+3	23	-1
Don't know	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	*	0	*	0	0	1	+1	1	0
TOTAL	100		100										100		100	

1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC 12 +	
Beaucoup	32	-3	24	-2	15	0	13	0	4	0	14	-1	10	-1	11	*
Assez	32	-3	24	-2	33	-4	37	-5	13	+6	40	-4	33	-2	33	*
Pas beaucoup	29	+2	41	+4	34	+6	37	+3	41	-2	31	+4	34	+2	33	*
Pas du tout	28	+3	29	0	18	-2	14	+2	4	-2	15	+1	23	+1	22	*
Ne sait pas	1	0	1	+1	0	0		+1		-3	0	0	1	0	1	*
TOTAL	99		100		100		100		101		100		101		100	

Table/Tableau 13 : **INTEREST IN EC POLITICS / Intérêt à l'égard de la politique communautaire (%)**, by country, par pays)

QUESTION : And as far as European politics are concerned, that is matters related to the European Community, to what extent would you say that you are interested in them ? / En ce qui concerne la politique européenne, c'est-à-dire les affaires liées à la Communauté Européenne, dans quelle mesure diriez-vous que cela vous intéresse ?

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B	DK	D				GR	E	F
			WEST			EAST			
A great deal	7 -1	18 -1	13 +1	15 *	22 *		20 0	8 +2	13 +3
To some extent	33 -3	42 +3	38 -2	39 *	45 •		39 +2	32 -4	38 -5
Not much	34 +1	33 +1	35 -2	33 *	27 •		27 +1	22 -1	31 0
Not at all	25 +4	8 -3	13 +2	11 *	4 •		10 -5	37 +5	18 +4
Don't know	1 -1	0 0	1 0	1 •	2 *		4 +1	2 0	1 -2
TOTAL	100	101	100	99	100		100	101	101
1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +	
Beaucoup	6 -3	9 +1	13 -1	9 0	7 +2	10 +2	11 +1	11 •	
Assez	36 +3	36 +2	34 +2	32 0	18 +6	37 -2	36 -1	36 •	
Pas beaucoup	30 +2	32 -3	38 +4	43 -5	46 -1	32 0	32 -1	32 •	
Pas du tout	27 0	21 0	14 -5	15 +4	26 -3	20 0	20 +2	19 *	
Ne sait pas	1 -1	3 0	1 0	2 +1	3 -4	1 0	1 0	2 *	
TOTAL	100	101	100	101	100	00	100	100	

Table/Tableau 14 : **IMPORTANCE OF EC MATTERS / Importance des affaires Communautaire (%)**, by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Whether or not you have the time to take a personal interest in European Community matters, do you feel that these are very important, important, not very important or not at all important for the future of (YOUR COUNTRY) and the (PEOPLE OF YOUR COUNTRY) ? / Que vous ayez ou non le temps de vous intéresser personnellement aux affaires de la communauté Européenne, est-ce que cela vous paraît, pour l'avenir de VOTRE PAYS et de (VOS CONCITOYENS), être des affaires...?

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B	DK	D				GR	E	F
			WEST			EAST			
Very important	19 -2	39 +1					32 -9	23 +1	28 +6
Important	54 0	50 +6					52 +6	55 -3	53 0
Not very important	16 +3	7 -2					7 +1	9 -1	11 -2
Not at all important	4 -1	2 -1					2 +1	3 -1	4 0
Don't know	7 0	2 -3					7 0	11 +4	4 -4
TOTAL	100	100	01	100	100		00	101	100
1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +	
Très importantes	34 0	33 -5	25 +2	22 +2	26 +3	35 +7	28 +1	29 •	
Importantes	47 +1	55 +7	55 +11	58 -4	55 -1	49 -2	54 +2	54 •	
Peu importantes	9 0	5 0	13 -3	12 +1	7 0	10 -2	10 -2	10 *	
Pas du tout importantes	5 0	1 0	3 -2	3 +2	4 +1	3 -2	3 0	3 *	
Ne sait pas	5 -1	5 -1	4 -8	6 0	9 -3	3 -1	5 -1	5 *	
TOTAL	100	99	00	101	101	00	100	101	

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 15 : **INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY** *or* OUI LIFE / Influence de la Communauté Européenne sur sa propre vie (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : How do you think the European Community and its future development will influence your own Life? / Quelle influence la Communauté Européenne et son développement futur auront-ils, selon vous, sur votre vie?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12 +	
			WEST	EAST											
Very positively/Très positive	5	6	8	9	15	14	7	6	14	9	5	5	6	11	8
Fairly positively/Plutôt positive	43	46	45	47	57	48	36	42	46	47	41	42	54	47	45
Fairly negatively/Plutôt négative	9	18	11	10	4	7	5	11	8	4	17	9	5	13	9
Very negatively/ Très négative	2	5	2	1	0	2	1	4	4	1	1	1	1	5	2
No influence at all/Pas d'influence	26	15	25	21	9	10	31	24	18	27	19	30	16	16	23
Don't know/Ne sait pas	14	10	10	11	15	20	21	13	11	13	17	12	18	8	13
TOTAL	99	100	101	99	100	101	101	100	101	101	100	99	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 16 : **SUPPORT FOR UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE** / Appui à l'unification de L'Europe occidentale (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify western Europe? Are you....? / D'une façon générale, êtes-vous pour ou contre les efforts qui sont faits pour unifier l'Europe occidentale? Êtes-vous?

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B	DK	D				GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST				
Very much for	23 -6	22 -3	36 -1	37 *	44 *	40 -8	38 -3	24 -3	
To some extent for	57 +3	42 +4	45 +2	45 *	44 *	32 +7	46 +2	56 +3	
To some extent against	7 +1	17 -2	9 -1	8 *	4 *	5 0	3 -2	9 +1	
Very much against	2 -1	12 0	2 0	2 *	1 *	3 0	1 0	2 -1	
Don't know	10 +1	6 0	8 0	8 *	6 *	12 0	11 -1	9 0	
TOTAL	99	99	100	100	99	100	99	100	

1ère colonne: Résultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB34 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Très pour	37 -2	43 -4	35 +6	24 -2	51 -1	26 -1	33 -3	34 *
Plutôt pour	45 +9	44 +3	43 +3	53 +1	32 +8	48 +4	47 +3	47 *
Plutôt contre	5 0	4 + 1	10 -4	11 0	3 -1	14 -1	8 0	7 *
Très contre	2 -1	1 0	3 -2	4 +1	2 +1	5 -1	3 0	2 *
Ne sait pas	12 -5	8 +1	10 -2	8 -1	13 -5	11 -1	9 -1	9 *
TOTAL	101	100	101	100	101	100	100	99

Table/Tableau 17 : EC MEMBERSHIP: "A GOOD THING" /Appartenance à la CE: "une bonne chose" (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY'S) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is? / D'une façon générale, pensez-vous que Le fait pour (NOTRE PAYS) de faire partie de la m a u t e Européenne (Marché Commun) est?

1st colum: EB34 result 2nd colum: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B	DK	D				GR		
			WEST	1	EAST*				
A good thing	73 +4	58 +9	69 +7	73 *	87 *	75 0			
A bad thing	4 -1	19 -6	6 -1	5 *	0 *	6 0			
Neither good nor bad	17 -3	20 -3	19 -6	17 *	8 *	13 -1	18 -3	23 -2	
Don't know	6 0	3 0	6 0	5 *	4 *	6 0	7 +1	5 0	
TOTAL	100	100				100	100	101	
1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +	
Une bonne chose	76 +2	77 +2	76 +4	82 0	69 +7	53 0	68 +3	69 *	
Une mauvaise chose	7 -1	3 0	3 -5	4 +1	6 +3	16 -3	8 0	7 *	
Une chose ni bonne ni mauv.	14 +2	14 +1	18 +2	11 +1	18 -3	24 0	19 -2	18 *	
Ne sait pas	3 -3	6 -3	3 -2	4 -1	8 -5	6 +1	6 0	6 *	
TOTAL	100	100	100	101	101	99	101	100	

* Question preceded by: "After unification united Germany is Member of the European Community" / Question précédée par: "Après réunification, l'Allemagne unifiée est un " brède la Communauté Européenne.

Table/Tableau 18 : COUNTRY HAS BENEFITED FROM EC MEMBERSHIP / Le pays a bénéficié de son appartenance à la CE (% , by country, par pays)

PUESTION : Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a "ber of the European Community (Common Market)? / Tout bien considere, estimez-vous que (NOTRE PAYS) a bénéficié : non de son appartenance à la Communauté Européenne (Marché Commun)?

1st colum: E634 result 2nd colum: Change from E633 *: Non-applicable	B	DK	D				GR	E	F
			WEST	1	EAST*				
Benefited	69 +2	64 +6	56 +3	61 *	78 *	78 -1	51 -6	57 0	
Not benefited	13 0	25 -3	24 -4	21 *	9 *	9 -1	30 +4	23 -1	
Don't know	18 -1	12 -2	19 +1	18 *	14 *	13 +2	19 +2	20 +1	
TOTAL	100	101	99	100	101	100	100	100	
1ère colonne: Résultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +	
Bénéficié	84 +4	65 -4	72 +4	75 +3	74 +5	46 -1	58 -1	59 *	
Pas bénéficié	10 -2	15 +4		0	12 -2	36 -2	23 -1	23 *	
Ne sait pas	5 -3	20 0	16 -3	13 -3	14 -3	18 +2	18	18 *	
TOTAL	99	100	100	100	100	100	99	100	

* Question : Do you think that the former GR will benefit or not from (united) Germany's membership in the European Community ? / Question : Pensez-vous que l'ex-RDA bénéficiera ou pes de l'adhésion communautaire de L'Allemagne (unifiée) ?

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 19 : ATTITUDE IF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAD BEEN SCRAPPED / L'attitude en cas d'abandon de la Communauté Européenne (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : If you were told tomorrow that the European Community (Common Market) had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or very relieved? / Si l'on annonçait demain que la Communauté Européenne (Marché Commun) est abandonnée, éprouveriez-vous de grands regrets, de l'indifférence (cela vous

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B		OK		0				GR		E		F			
					WEST		EAST									
Very sorry	40	-2	35	+1	53	+5	57	*	72	*	57	-5	45	0	49	-1
Indifferent	47	+2	33	+1	27	-3	25	*	17	•	23	+3	38	+2	38	+3
Very relieved	3	-1	22	-2	5	-2	4	*	1	*	4	0	4	-2	5	-1
Don't know	10	+2	9	-1	15	0	14	•	11	*	15	+2	13	0	8	-1
TOTAL	100		99		100		100		101		99		100		100	

1ère colonne: Resultat EBU 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC 12 +	
De grands regrets	57	-1	62	+1	61	+6	54	0	44	+5	30	-3	48	0	49	*
De l'indifférence	31	+3	28	+1	27	-3	31	-3	35	-8	45	+3	34	0	34	•
Un vif soulagement	5	-2	2	0	5	+1	4	+1	3	+1	19	0	7	-1	6	*
Ne sait pas	7	0	9	-1	8	-2	11	+2	18	+3	6	0	11	+1	11	*
TOTAL	100		101		101		100		100		100		100		100	

3 Communauté Européenne (Marché Commun) est...?

	Age				Education				Left-Right Scale		
	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+	-16	16-19	20+	still studying	Left	Centre	Right
A good thing	72	72	68	65	63	67	60	60	71	70	69
Neither good nor bad	18	17	18	19	20	21	12	12	17	18	18
A bad thing	4	7	8	8	9	7	5	4	7	7	8
Don't know	6	4	5	7	8	5	3	4	4	4	5
TOTAL	100	100	99	99	100	100	100	100	100	99	100
	Opinion leadership				Income				Sex		EC12+ ALL
	++	+	--		++	+	--		M	F	
Une bonne chose	80	74	68	54	77	73	67	61	72	66	69
Ni bonne ni mauvaise	11	16	20	25	14	17	21	21	17	20	18
Une mauvaise chose	7	6	7	10	5	6	7	9	11	7	7
Je ne sais pas	2	4	5	12	3	4	5	9	3	8	6
TOTAL	100	100	100	101	99	100	100	100	100	101	100

Note: EC12 results exclude former DOR; EC12+ results include former DOR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 21 : **PERCEPTION AND IMPORTANCE OF COUNCIL-PRESIDENCY** / La perception et l'importance de La présidence du Conseil (% by country/par pays, 1986-1990)(*)

QUESTION : In the European Community, each Member State, in turn, becomes the President of the Council of Ministers for six months. Just now, it's the turn of (your country). Have you recently read in the newspapers or heard on radio anything about (your country's) Presidency ? / Dans La Communauté Européenne, chaque Etat "breest, à son tour, le Président du Conseil des Ministres pendant six mois. A l'heure actuelle, c'est le tour (de votre pays). Avez-vous récemment lu dans Les journaux ou entendu à la radio ou à la television quelque chose au sujet de la présidence de (votre pays) ? (**AWARENESS OF PRESIDENCY**)

QUESTION : Whether you have heard about it or not, do you think it is important or not that ITALY is President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community at this time ? Would you say it is...? / Que vous ayez ou non entendu parler du quelque chose à ce sujet, pensez-vous que c'est ou non important que l'ITALIE soit en ce "entPrésident du Conseil des Ministres de la Communauté Européenne ? Diriez-vous que c'est...? (**IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENCY**)

	U.K. VII-XII 1986	B I-VI 1987	DK VIII-XII 1987	D I-VI 1988	GR VII-XII 1988	E I-VI 1989	F VII-XII 1989	IRL I-VI 1990	I VII-XII 1990
AWARENESS OF PRESIDENCY									
Yes/Oui	22	51	75	55	74	72	43	70	54
No/Non	72	37	18	31	15	20	45	24	35
Don't know/Ne sait pas	6	13	3	14	7	7	12	7	7
TOTAL	100	101	100	101	100	99	100	101	100
IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENCY									
Very important/Très importante	22	15	25	14	44	21	15	35	25
Important/Importante	37	41	36	43	29	57	45	40	48
Not very important/Pas très importante	25	24	24	23	15	6	21	11	14
Unimportant/Pas importante	8	6	8	6	4	2	4	5	3
Don't know/Ne sait pas	9	14	7	13	8	14	11	9	11
TOTAL	101	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	101

(*) This question is asked only to the citizens of the country holding the presidency/Cette question est posée exclusivement aux citoyens du pays qui assure la présidence.

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 22 : **AWARENESS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION** / L'impact de la Commission de la Communauté Européenne (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Have you recently seen or heard, in the papers, on the radio, or on television, anything about the European Commission in Brussels, that is the Commission of the European Communities ? / Avez-vous récemment lu dans les journaux ou entendu à la radio ou vu à la télévision quelque chose eu sujet de la Commission Européenne à Bruxelles, c'est-à-dire de la Commission de la Communauté Européenne ?

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST			
Yes	43 -12	55 -1	53 +3	53 *	52 *	46 -9	35 -4	45 -7
No	51 +11	41 -1	36 -5	36 *	40 *	47 +6	59 +4	52 +8
Don't know	7 +1	4 +2	11 +1	10 *	9 *	6 +3	6 +1	4 -1
TOTAL	101	100	100	99	101	99	100	101
1ère colonne: Résultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Oui	53 -1	39 -5	65 -6	45 +1	50 -6	41 -6	44 -4	45 *
No	42 +2	53 +4	31 +8	51 -1	48 +11	57 +7	50 +4	49 *
Ne sait pas	5 -1	8 +1	4 -2	4 +1	5 -5	2 -1	6 0	6 *
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 23 : **IMPRESSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION** / L'impression sur la Commission Européenne (% , by country of those who have heard of the European Commission / %, par pays, de ceux qui ont entendu quelque chose au sujet de la Commission Européenne)

QUESTION : Has what you read or heard given you a generally favourable or unfavourable impression of the European Commission ? / Est-ce que cela vous a donné plutôt une bonne impression ou plutôt une mauvaise impression de la Commission Européenne ?

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST			
Generally favourable	52 +3	36 +6	50 +6	52 *	62 *	63 -2	59 +4	45 0
Generally unfavourable	13 0	26 -9	22 +2	18 *	6 *	6 +1	4 -1	12 +1
Neither favourable nor unfavourable (SPONT)	26 -5	33 +4	23 -6	22 *	21 *	28 +3	31 -1	34 -4
Don't know	9 +2	6 0	5 -2	6 *	12 *	3 -3	7 -1	10 +4
TOTAL	100	101	100	98	101	100	101	101
1ère colonne: Résultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Plutôt bonne	68 -8	63 -2	39 +17	34 -2	65 -2	44 -9	51 -1	52 *
Plutôt mauvaise	14 +7	9 +3	19 -14	40 +10	7 +3	31 +9	17 +3	17 *
Ni bonne, ni mauvaise (SPONT)	13 0	20 -3	32 -5	20 -7	23 -3	17 +1	24 -3	24 *
Ne sait pas	5 +1	8 +2	10 +2	7 -1	5 +1	7 0	7 0	7 *
TOTAL	100	100	100	101	100	99	99	100

Note: EC12 results exclude former DOR; EC12+ results include former DOR / Les résultats EC12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats EC12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 24 : **SUPPORT FOR UNIFICATION OF BOTH GERMANIES / Soutien pour l'unification des deux Allemagnes** (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION FLASH EOS Nov. 1989 (N) : Are you for or against the reunification of both Germanies/ Etes-vous favorable ou oppose à la reunification des deux Allemagnes ?

QUESTION Spring/Printemps 1990 (S) : Are you personally in favour of, or opposed to, the unification of the two German states ? / Personnellement, êtes-vous favorable ou oppose à L'unification des deux Etats allemands?

QUESTION Autumn/Automne 1990 (A) : Are you personally in favour of, or opposed to, the unification of the two German States ? / Personnellement, êtes-vous favorable ou défavorable à l'unification des deux Etats

	B			DK			D (West)			D	D (Ost)	GR		
	N	S	A	N	S	A	N	S	A	A	A	N	S	A
In favour/ favorable	71	61	69	59	56	6	78	77	85	87	94	83	74	7
Opposed/ défavorable	15	19	16	22	26	1	14	11	6	6	4	3	11	
Don't know/ ne sait pas	14	19	15	19	18	1	8	11	9	7	2	15	15	1
TOTAL	100	99	100	100	100	10	100	99	100	100	100	101	100	10

	F			IRL			I			L					
	N	S	A	N	S	A	N	S	A	N	S	A			
In favour/ favorable	84	81	81	80	66	73	81	75	83	80	77	80	63	52	66
Opposed/ défavorable	7	5	4	9	15	13	7	8	7	10	11	9	28	25	22
Don't know/ ne sait pas	9	13	15	10	19	14	13	18	11	10	12	11	9	23	12
TOTAL	100	99	100	99	100	100	101	101	101	100	100	100	100	100	100

				UK			EC 12			EC 12 +					
	N	S	A	N	S	A	N	S	A	N	S	A			
In favour/ favorable	76	59	70	83	74	85	71	64	72	78	71	78	*	*	78
Opposed/ défavorable	12	21	16	7	5	3	17	18	16	12	13	10	*	*	10
Don't know/ ne sait pas	12	20	15	10	21	12	12	17	11	11	16	12	*	*	11
TOTAL	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	99	99	101	100	100	*	*	99

	Czechoslovakia		Ex-DDR		Poland (2)		
	S	A	S	A	N	S	A
In favour/favorable	37	61	90	94	47	48	44
Opposed/opposé	22	20	6	4	32	39	32
Don't know/ne sait pas	22	19	5	2	21	13	24
TOTAL	81(1)	100	101	100	100	100	100

(2) Polish November 1989 and Spring (March) 1990 figures provided by OBOP: "Should the German nations be united ?" with four answers options. / Pour la Pologne: chiffres de novembre 1989 et du printemps (mars) 1990 donnés par OBOP: "Les nations allemandes devraient-elles être unies ?" - 4 types de réponses possibles.

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent L'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 25 : REISEN UND LEBEN IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN ANDERN EG-LÄNDERN (NUR OSTDEUTSCHLAND) / Travelling and living in other EC countries (only East Germany) / Voyager et vivre dans d'autres pays de la CE (exclusivement Allemagne de l'Est)

FRAGE/QUESTION : Haben Sie schon einmal eine Urlaubsreise in ein anderes Land der Europäischen Gemeinschaft ausserhalb der BRD gemacht, bzw. würden Sie dies gerne tun, oder trifft keines von beiden auf Sie zu ? / Have you ever gone on holidays in another country of the European Community, outside of West Germany, or would you like to do so or does neither of these two apply ? / Avez-vous déjà voyagé, pendant vos vacances, dans un pays de la Communauté Européenne autre que L'Allemagne de l'Ouest ou aimeriez-vous le faire ou bien ni l'un ni l'autre ?

FRAGE/QUESTION : Können Sie sich vorstellen, zeitweise oder auf Dauer in einen anderen Staat der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (ausserhalb Deutschlands) zu gehen, um dort zu leben und zu arbeiten oder nicht ? / Could you imagine moving, for some time or permanently, to another country of the European Community (outside of Germany) in order to live and work there ? / Pouvez-vous imaginer d'aller, quelque temps ou définitivement, dans un autre pays de la Communauté Européenne (hors de l'Allemagne) pour y vivre et y travailler ?

Urlaubsreise/Travel for holidays/Voyage (vacances)		leben & Arbeiten/Live & Work/Vivre & Travailler	
Keines trifft zu/Neither/Ni l'un ni l'autre	15	Nicht/No/Non	60
Urlaubsreise gemacht/Has travelled for holidays/A voyagé pour vacances	17	Zeitweise/For some time/Pour quelque temps	32
Urlaubsreise gewünscht/Would like to travel for holidays/Aimerait voyager pour vacances	67	Auf Dauer/Permanently/Définitivement	6
Weiss nicht/Don't know/Ne sait pas	1	Weiss nicht/Don't know/Ne sait pas	2
TOTAL	100	TOTAL	100

Table/Tableau 26 : ERWARTETE POSITIVE UND NEGATIVE ENTWICKLUNGEN DURCH EC FÜR EX-DDR (NUR OSTDEUTSCHLAND) / Expected positive and negative developments for ex-GDR due to EC (ex-GDR only) / Développements positifs et négatifs en ex-RDA attendus de la CE (ex-RDA seulement)

FRAGE/QUESTION : In welchen der folgenden Bereiche versprechen Sie sich durch die Europäische Gemeinschaft eher positive, in welchen eher negative Entwicklungen für die bisherige DDR ? / In which of the following areas of policy do you expect rather positive and in which ones rather negative developments for the former GDR from the EC ? / Parmi les domaines suivants, quels sont ceux dont vous attendez, grâce à la CE, un développement plutôt positif pour l'ex-RDA; et quels sont ceux pour lesquels vous attendez un développement plutôt négatif ?

1st column: % positive. 2nd column: % negative	+	-	DK
Umweltschutz/Environmental protection/Protection environnement			3
Warenangebot/Availability of goods/Approvisionnement en marchandises			3
Energieversorgung/Energy supply/Approvisionnement en energie			10
Verkehrswesen/Transportation/Transports			7
Äussere Sicherheit/Security & defence/Sécurité & défense		18	18
Berufsbildung/Vocational training/Formation professionnelle	52	26	22
Verbrechensbekämpfung/Fighting crime/Lutte contre criminalité	50	37	13
Arbeitsplätze/Employment/Emploi	38	48	14
Landwirtschaft/Agriculture	24	62	14

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 27 : EAST GERMANS' INFORMATION ABOUT EC / EG Informiertheit in Ostdeutschland / Information des Allemands de l'Est sur la CE (only East Germany/nur Ostdeutschland/exclusivement Allemagne de l'Est)

QUESTION 1 : Do you feel you know enough about the European Community and what it does or would you like to know more ? / Haben Sie das Gefühl, genug über die Europäische Gemeinschaft und das was sie tut zu wissen oder würden Sie gern mehr wissen ? / Pensez-vous que vous en savez assez sur la Communauté Européenne et ce qu'elle fait ou aimeriez-vous en savoir plus ?

QUESTION 2 : Have you recently seen material or advertisements about the European Community ? / Haben Sie in der letzten Zeit Informationsmaterial oder Werbung über Europäische Gemeinschaft gesehen ? / Avez-vous vu récemment du matériel d'information ou de la publicité sur la Communauté Européenne ?

EAST GERMANS	
QUESTION 1	
Know enough/weiss genug/en sait assez	12
Would like to know more/würde gern mehr wissen/aimerait en savoir plus	79
Don't know/weiss nicht/ne sait pas	2
TOTAL	99
QUESTION 2	
Yes/ja/oui	15
No/nein/non	84
Don't know/weiss nicht/ne sais pas	1
TOTAL	100

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 28 : NATIONAL OR JOINT COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKING ? / Décisions nationales ou en commun avec la Communauté ? (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the EC. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Community ? / Il y a des personnes qui pensent que certains domaines d'action politique devraient être décidés par le gouvernement (NATIONAL) pendant que d'autres domaines devraient être décidés en commun au sein de la Communauté Européenne. Parmi les domaines d'action politique suivants, quels sont ceux, selon vous, qui devraient être décidés par le gouvernement (NATIONAL) et ceux où les décisions devraient être prises en commun au sein de la CEE ?

1st column: % National 2nd column: % EC	B		DK		D								GR		E		F	
					WEST				EAST									
	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC
Security and defence	31	62	56	41	42	54	39	58	27	70	56	36	46	39	49	67		
Environment	27	69	46	52	26	71	25	73	19	79	35	58	27	62	25	72		
Currency	26	62	37	57	44	50	44	50	45	50	36	50	30	53	22	71		
Cooperation with Third World	13	79	29	65	19	75	18	76	15	79	25	61	15	69	12	80		
Health and social welfare	53	40	85	13	61	35	64	33	74	22	43	49	49	38	67	29		
Education	62	31	74	24	63	33	67	30	79	17	47	46	51	37	59	37		
Basic rules for broadcasting	42	48	73	23	45	48	48	45	57	35	42	45	41	37	42	49		
Scientific & tech. research	13	78	21	74	28	67	25	70	13	83	16	73	14	69	15	80		
Rates of Value Added tax	24	66	40	54	43	48	46	43	54	27	45	32	28	47	21	69		
Foreign policy towards non-EC countries	14	75	38	56	26	67	26	68	24	71	38	48	19	60	21	71		
Participation of workers' reps. on company boards	50	33	78	12	55	37	57	34	66	25	48	36	46	30	48	41		
Protection of computer-based information on individuals	47	39	79	17	43	50	45	48	50	41	39	37	36	34	52	35		
1ère colonne: % National 2e colonne: % EC	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC12+			
	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC		
Sécurité et défense	68	27	31	65	36	56	30	66	62	27	55	42	45	50	44	51		
Environnement	40	55	22	76	35	58	16	80	38	50	26	72	26	70	25	71		
Monnaie	35	59	23	69	34	55	34	58	42	38	51	43	35	57	35	56		
Coopération avec les P.V.D.	16	78	9	85	14	76	18	77	21	59	15	80	15	77	15	77		
Santé et sécurité sociale	63	31	42	53	67	27	54	42	57	32	62	36	57	38	58	37		
Enseignement	67	27	42	53	61	32	63	33	62	27	71	27	59	36	60	36		
Règles de base radio/TV	49	41	38	52	39	45	43	50	49	31	59	33	46	44	46	44		
Recherche scientifique et technique	12	78	11	84	13	75	14	80	21	61	21	73	18	75	18	75		
Taux de TVA	35	56	33	52	65	25	23	69	47	31	53	37	36	51	37	50		
Politique étrangère à l'égard des pays non-CE	21	67	11	81	26	60	20	72	27	52	25	68	21	69	21	69		
Particip. représ. travailleurs à direction entreprises	45	40	42	42	57	29	53	34	54	24	46	38	49	37	49	36		
Protection information personnelles mises sur fichier informatique	55	35	32	41	56	31	52	41	49	24	58	33	46	38	46	39		

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 29 : NATIONAL OR JOINT COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKING - NATIONAL MEAN SCORES FOR 12 MEASURES COMBINED (cf. list Table 28) / Decisions nationales ou en commun au sein de la Communauté - scores nationaux moyens relatif à 12 mesures (cf. Liste Tableau 28) (% , by country, par pays)

1st colum: EB34 result 2nd colum: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B	DK	D				GR	E	F
			WEST	1		EAST			
Should be decided by (mean):									
National Government	33 -2	55 -1	41 -4	42 *		44 *	39 +1	33 -6	36 -1
Jointly within EC	57 *	41 +2	53 +3	52 *		50 *	48 +1	48 -3	57 +3
1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL		P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Devrait être décidé par (moyenne) :									
Le gouvernement national	42 -2	28 -1	42 +7	35 0		44 +3	45 0	38 -1	38 *
En commun au sein de la CE	49 +1	63 +3	47 -7	58 0		38 +1	48 -1	54 +2	53 *

Note: EC12 results exclude former DOR; EC12+ results include former DOR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 30 : ATTITUDES TOWARDS ROME INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCES PROPOSALS / Attitudes à l'égard des propositions des conférences intergouvernementales de Rome (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : The Council of Heads of State and Governments of the European Community has called for intergovernmental conferences this December to discuss details of a European Economic and Monetary Union and of a Political Union. I am going to read you a number of statements. For each one, please tell me whether you are IN FAVOUR/NOT IN FAVOUR, of / Le Conseil des Chefs d'Etats et de Gouvernements de la Communauté Européenne a demandé des conférences intergouvernementales en décembre pour discuter des détails d'une Union économique et monétaire et d'une Union politique. Je vais vous lire quelques phrases. Pour chacune, pourriez-vous me dire si vous êtes FAVORABLE/DEFAVORABLE à ce que

As an Economic and Monetary Union, the European Community having a common European Central Bank, with the heads of national central banks on its board of Directors / En tant qu'Union Economique et Monétaire, la Communauté Européenne ait une Banque Centrale commune Européenne, avec les directeurs des banques centrales nationales faisant partie de sa direction (EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK)

Within this European Economic and Monetary Union, a single common currency replacing the different currencies of the Member States in five or six years' time / Dans une Union Economique et Monétaire Européenne, une seule monnaie commune remplace dans cinq ou six ans les différentes monnaies des Etats Membres (SINGLE CURRENCY)

As a Political Union, the European Community being responsible for foreign policy towards countries outside the EC / En tant qu'Union Politique, la Communauté Européenne soit responsable de la politique étrangère vis-à-vis des pays hors de la CEE (EC RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY)

As a Political Union, the European Community being responsible for a common policy in matters of security and defence / En tant qu'Union Politique, la Communauté Européenne soit responsable d'une politique commune en matière de sécurité et de défense (EC RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY/DEFENCE)

1st column: % in favour 2nd column: % not in favour	B		DK		D				GR		E		F			
					WEST		EAST									
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-		
European Central Bank	55	11	44	38	55	20	57	19	64	13	62	9	52	9	63	15
Single Currency	61	16	35	50	50	27	50	27	53	26	64	10	53	10	62	19
EC responsible for foreign policy	53	20	40	45	52	25										
EC responsible for security/defence	66	10	50	37	66	16										
1ère colonne: % "favorable" 2e colonne: % "défavorable"	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC12+	
_____	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
European Central Bank	53	11	64	13	47	11	62	19	54	13	45	30	56	18	56	11
Single Currency	58	17	72	11	47	26	61	25	55	16	38	43	55	23	55	23
EC responsible for foreign policy	43	31	71	12	50	20	55	25	48	21	40	38	51	25	51	26
EC responsible for security/defence	49	27	82	6	55	17	70	16	65	9	57	25	66	15	66	15

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats EC12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats EC12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 31 : IMPORTANCE OF REPLACEMENT OF NATIONAL CURRENCY BY ECU / Importance des conséquences de remplacement des monnaies nationales par l'ecu (% , by country, par pays) (1)

QUESTION: The replacement of (national currency) by the ecu will have many different consequences. Please tell me for each of the following whether you personally find it really important or not. / Ce remplacement de (la monnaie nationale) par l'ecu aura différentes conséquences. Pour chaque conséquence que je vais vous citer, veuillez me dire si, pour vous personnellement, cela vous paraît vraiment important ou pas vraiment important.

1st column: % Really important 2nd column: % Not really important	B + -		DK + -		D + -		GR + -		E + -		F + -		EC12 + -	
Travels in the EC will be easier	77	1	51	45	66	21	70	11	78	13	72	21	71	23
Country will lose part of its sovereignty	45	41	64	32	37	51	44	34	45	35	53	41	46	44
Single European Market will work better with a single currency than with twelve	81	1	63	28	70	11	69	12	77	9	83	11	74	16
Expensive for business firms	65	21	58	25	47	31	41	20	55	19	63	21	55	25
EC countries will have strong and stable currency	89	1	60	26	69	11	69	12	73	10	83	1	76	13
Mental calculation necessary	43	51	42	46	39	51	40	31	43	39	52	41	47	43
EC more united	92	5	65	26	71	15	73	10	76	12	87	1	76	15
Comparison of prices possible	85	11	63	33	77	15	64	14	69	17	84	14	75	17
Risks involved	59	30	57	26	51	32	47	24	54	23	65	21	57	28
Savings on exchange	80	16	52	42	65	20	45	15	58	12	73	11	55	20
1ère colonne: % Vraiment important 2e colonne: % Pas vraiment important	IRL + -		I + -		L + -		NL + -		P + -		UK + -		EC12 + -	
Voyages plus faciles à l'intérieur CE	74	21	78	15	75	14	71	28	75	12	67	30	71	23
Le pays perdra sa souveraineté	43	43	33	48	68	24	53	42	43	41	58	40	46	44
Le grand marché européen fonctionnera mieux	74	13	79	8	79	8	77	18	65	17	64	28	74	16
Coûteux pour les entreprises	59	22	48	23	59	14	67	24	47	25	63	29	55	25
Tous Les pays auront une monnaie stable et forte	77	10	80	6	87	6	83	13	64	18	74	19	76	13
Calcul mental nécessaire	17	38	48	38	47	49	43	55	41	40	58	37	47	43
Communauté européenne plus unie	76	11	85	6	86	7	82	15	67	18	63	29	76	15
Comparaison des prix possible	82	12	74	16	87	8	71	28	63	20	71	21	75	17
Expérience risquée	55	18	50	28	68	20	55	29	55	25	62	27	57	28
Économies de change	83	16	57	13	81	13	70	26	55	19	64	25	55	20

(1) Flash Eurobarometer Survey No 3 - Question asked on behalf of the Association for Monetary Union in Europe / Sondage Eurobaromètre flash No. 3 - Pour le compte de l'Association pour l'Union Monétaire en Europe.

Note: EC12 results exclude former DOR; EC12+ results include former DOR / Les résultats EC12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats EC12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 32 : **AWARENESS OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET OF 1992** / La notoriété du Grand Marché Européen de 1992 (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Have you read in the papers, seen on television or heard about the Single European Market of 1992? / Avez-vous lu dans les journaux, vu à la télévision ou entendu parler de quelque chose au sujet du Grand Marché Européen de 1992?

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B	DK	D				GR	E	F
			WEST			EAST			
Yes	79 -5	82 +2	74 +3	68 *		44 *	79 -3	49 -2	70 -2
No	20 +4	17 -1	22 -1	28 *		51 *	17 +4	45 +3	27 0
Don't know	1 +1	1 0	4 -2	4 *		5 *	4 -1	6 0	3 +2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100
1ère colonne: Résultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL		P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Oui	72 0	68 0	73 -3	66 +5		61 -9	61 +4	67 0	66 *
Non	26 0	28 -1	25 +3	31 -6		37 +15	38 -3	30 0	31 *
Ne sait pas	2 -1	3 +1	2 +1	4 +2		2 -6	2 0	3 0	3 *
TOTAL	100	99	100	101		100	101	100	100

Table/Tableau 33 : **THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET IN 1992 - A GOOD THING ?** / Le Grand Marché Européen de 1992 - Une bonne chose ? (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Overall, do you think that the completion of the Single European Market in 1992 will be - for people like you - a good thing, a bad thing, or neither a good nor a bad thing ? / Dans l'ensemble, pensez-vous que la réalisation du Grand Marché en 1992 sera, pour des gens comme vous, une bonne chose, une mauvaise chose, ou une chose ni bonne, ni mauvaise ?

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B	DK	D				GR	E	F
			WEST			EAST			
A good thing	43 +3	44 +13	46 +9	48 *		56 *	54 +2	57 -1	42 +6
A bad thing	7 0	15 -2	7 -2	6 *		1 *	6 -1	3 -2	8 +1
Neither good, nor bad thing	37 -2	33 -5	33 -4	31 *		23 *	23 -2	26 +1	43 -6
Don't know	12 0	8 -5	12 -4	14 *		20 *	17 +1	13 +2	7 -2
TOTAL	W	100	98	99		100	100	99	100
1ère colonne: Résultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL		P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Bonne chose	56 +2	69 +5	38 +3	49 +5		54 +7	40 +3	50 +5	51 *
Mauvaise chose	8 +2	4 -2	16 -1	6 0		5 0	11 +1	7 -1	7 *
Une chose ni bonne, ni mauvaise	24 +1	18 +1	36 +2	34 -3		24 -5	34 +4	31 -1	31
Ne sait pas	12 -5	10 -4	10 -4	11 -2		16 -1	15 -8	11 -3	12
TOTAL	100	101	100	100		99	100	99	101

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 34 : THE SINGLE MARKET IN 1992 - "A GOOD THING" ? / Le Grand Marché Européen de 1992 - une bonne chose ? (X, EC12+, by socio-demographic and socio-political variables / X, CE12+ par variables socio-démographiques et socio-politiques)

QUESTION : Overall, do you think that the completion of the Single European Market in 1992 will be - for people like you - a good thing, a bad thing, or neither a good nor a bad thing ? / Dans l'ensemble, pensez-vous que la réalisation du Grand Marché Européen en 1992 sera, pour des gens comme vous, une bonne chose, une mauvaise, ou une chose ni bonne, ni mauvaise ?

	Age				Education				Left-Right Scale		
	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+	-16	16-19	20+	still studying	Left	Centre	Right
A good thing	58	53	52	43	45	48	59	67	55	50	51
A bad thing	4	6	9	7	7	8	6	4	7	7	8
Neither good nor bad	27	30	28	36	32	33	27	22	29	31	31
Don't know pas	11	11	11	14	15	11	8	8	10	11	10
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	99	100	100	101	101	99	100

	Opinion leadership				Income				Sex		EC12+ ALL
	++	+	--		++	+	--		M	F	
Une bonne chose	64	56	49	35	61	54	46	43	57	45	51
Une mauvaise chose	9	5	7	7	6	6	7	8	8	6	7
Ni bonne ni mauvaise	21	29	31	38	27	29	33	35	27	34	31
Ne sait pas	6	9	12	19	6	10	13	14	8	16	12
TOTAL	100	99	99	99	100	99	99	100	100	101	101

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; (es résultats CE12+ l'incluent.)

Table/Tableau 35 : THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET IN 1992: HOPE OR FEAR ? / Le Grand Marché Européen de 1992: espoir ou crainte ? (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Personally would you say that the Single European Market which will come about by 1992 makes you feel very hopeful, rather hopeful, rather fearful or very fearful ? / Personnellement, diriez-vous que la réalisation du Grand Marché Européen en 1992 vous donne beaucoup d'espoir, un peu d'espoir, un peu de crainte ou beaucoup de crainte ?

1st colum: EB34 result 2nd colum: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B	DK	D				GR	E	F
			WEST			EAST			
Very hopeful	16 -3	11 +3	16 +4	15 *	15 *		24 -6	12 -7	15 -3
Rather hopeful	46 -4	47 +4	44 +4				32 +7	49 +7	39 C
Rather fearful	19 +1	29 -2	21 -8				20 +2	11 -1	31 +6
Very fearful	4 -2	4 -4	4 -2				7 -7	2 -2	8 -i
Don't know	15 +9	9 -1	15 +2				16 +4	26 +3	7 +1
TOTAL	100		100	99	100		99	too	too
1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +	
Beaucoup d'espoir	23 -6	17 -5	8 +2	8 -4	15 0	8 -4	14 -3	14 •	
Un peu d'espoir	47 +5	55 +2	34 -4	60 +5	46 +3	47 +2	47 +3	47 *	
Un peu de crainte	15 +4	14 0	42 +3	14 -2	15 +1	20 +1	20 -1	19 •	
Beaucoup de crainte	5 0	4 0	2 -4	2 0	3 0	4 + 1	4 - 1	4 •	
Ne sait pas	11 -2	11 +3	14 +3	17 0	21 -4	21 0	15 +2	16 *	
TOTAL	101	101	100	101	100	100	100	100	

Table/Tableau 36 : THE EC-CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RIGHTS - A GOOD THING ? / La chartre CE des droits sociaux fondamentaux - une bonne chose ? (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : The Council of Heads of States and Governments of the European Community has adopted a declaration which constitutes a "Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights", i.e. a set of common principles in all member countries concerning the rights and responsibilities of workers and employers. Do you think such a declaration is a good thing or a bad thing ? / Le Conseil Européen des Chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de la Communauté Européenne a adopté une déclaration constituant une "Chartre Communautaire des Droits Sociaux Fondamentaux", c'est-à-dire des principes communs à tous les pays membres concernant les droits et les devoirs des travailleurs et des employeurs. A votre avis, est-ce qu'une telle déclaration est une bonne ou une mauvaise chose ?

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 *: Non-applicable	B	DK	D			GR	E	F
			WEST		EAST			
Good thing	56 +1	51 -3	66 +6	67 *	70 *	72 -8	55 -5	63 +7
Bad thing	6 +2	20 +2	4 -1	4 *	2 *	1 -1	1 -1	6 +1
Neither good, nor bad thing (SPONT)				14 *	7 *	9 0	12 -10	18 -11
Don't know	16 -9	13 -5	15 -5	15 *	20 *	100	100	100
TOTAL	100	100	99	100	99			
	22 +7	16 +7	14 0			UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P		EC 12	EC 12 +
Bonne chose	71 +5	76 +5	51 +1	75 0	65 +2	71 +4	67 +3	67 *
Mauvaise chose	2 0	2 0	2 -2	6 +3	1 +1	8 0	4 0	4 *
Une chose ni bonne, ni mauvaise (SPONT)	9 -8	9 -5	17 -11	9 -6	13 -10	8 -7	12 -7	12 *
Ne sait pas	17 +3	14 +1	29 +11	10 +3	21 +9	13 +3	16 +4	16 *
TOTAL	99	101	99	100	100	100	99	99

Table/Tableau 37 : AWARENESS OF EC'S ROLE IN GULF CRISIS / Notoriété du rôle joué par la CE dans la crise du Golfe (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION FLASH EOS Oct. 1990: Are you aware that the European Community has been playing a role in this crisis ? / A propos de cette crise, saviez-vous que la Communauté européenne y a joué un rôle?

	B	DU	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12
Yes / Oui	71	72	40	58	83	58	76	77	49	66	61	68	64
No / Non,	26	27	51	25	15	39	22	12	47	33	29	32	32
Don't know / Ne sait pas	4	1	9	7	2	3	3	5	4	1	10	1	4
TOTAL	101	100	100	100	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	101	100

Note: EC12 results exclude former WR; EC12+ results include former OOR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 38 : **ABILITY TO RESOLVE GULF CRISIS /** Qui peut résoudre la crise du Golfe ? (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION FLASH EOS Oct. 1990: I am going to read out some names of organisations and countries involved in the Gulf crisis. For each one, will you please tell me if in your opinion, it is really capable of helping to resolve the crisis or not ? / Je vais vous citer une série d'organisations et de pays impliqués dans la crise du Golfe. Pour chacun d'eux, voulez-vous me dire s'il ou elle vous paraît vraiment capable de contribuer à résoudre cette crise ou non ?

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12
THE UNITED NATIONS/L'ONU, C'EST A-DIRE L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES													
Yes / Oui	79	81	81	64	80	83	85	86	82	90	71	88	83
No / Non	12	13	10	18	16	10	10	6	9	6	22	10	10
Don't know/Ne sait pas	9	6	9	19	4	7	5	8	10	4	7	2	7
TOTAL	100	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	101	100	100	100	100
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY / LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE													
Yes / Oui	69	51	62	57	77	68	64	83	73	74	61	59	69
No / Non	25	62	28	24	12	25	28	8	17	23	31	33	24
Don't know/Ne sait pas	6	7	9	19	4	8	8	9	10	4	8	7	8
TOTAL	100	100	99	100	99	101	100	100	100	101	100	99	100
THE ARAB STATES / LES PAYS ARABES													
Yes / Oui	51	54	52	62	47	39	55	49	52	59	46	57	50
No / Non	38	34	35	18	42	51	36	31	33	33	42	36	38
Don't know/Ne sait pas	10	12	13	20	11	10	9	20	14	7	12	7	12
TOTAL	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	99	99	100	100	100
THE UNITED STATES / LES ETATS-UNIS													
Yes / Oui	73	77	75	72	69	72	60	77	84	83	69	73	74
No / Non	22	19	17	14	26	22	33	13	9	15	23	26	20
Don't know/Ne sait pas	5	4	8	14	5	6	7	10	7	2	8	3	7
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101
THE SOVIET UNION / L'UNION SOVIETIQUE													
Yes / Oui	63	68	64	65	66	62	57	74	76	77	61	64	66
No / Non	31	25	25	19	27	30	35	16	15	20	30	32	26
Don't know/Ne sait pas	6	7	11	16	7	8	8	10	9	3	9	5	8
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	100
(OUR COUNTRY) / (NOTRE PAYS)													
Yes / Oui	38	35	45	29	44	67	34	70	42	49	34	70	56
No / Non	59	63	46	60	52	29	61	20	53	48	58	27	38
Don't know/Ne sait pas	3	2	8	11	4	4	5	10	5	3	7	3	6
TOTAL	100	100	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	99	100	100
IRAQ / L'IRAK													
Yes / Oui	54	48	56	67	45	38	58	45	56	60	44	46	48
No / Non	36	64	34	15	46	53	34	38	35	35	44	48	42
Don't know/Ne sait pas	9	8	10	18	9	9	8	18	9	5	12	6	10
TOTAL	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	100

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 39 : SUPPORT FOR (ULF CRISIS INITIATIVES / Soutien aux initiatives prises face à la crise du Golfe (% by Country, par pays)

QUESTION FLASH EOS Oct. 1990: Please tell me whether you find each of the following actions taken by the European Community concerning the Gulf crisis, a good thing or a bad thing ? / Pour chacune des actions suivantes décidées par la Communauté européenne face à la crise du Golfe, veuillez me dire si vous trouvez que c'est une bonne chose ou une mauvaise chose ?

	B	DY	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EMBARGO / L'ORGANISATION DE L'EMBARGO:													
Good thing/Bonne chose	72	82	71	46	66	79	71	62	70	76	68	82	72
Bad thing/Mauvaise chose	16	9	12	19	22	11	15	19	12	12	18	8	14
Don't know/Ne sait pas	12	9	17	35	13	10	14	20	19	12	14	10	14
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	101	100	100	101	101	100	100	100	100
HUMANITARIAN AID TO REFUGEES / L'AIDE HUMANITAIRE AUX REFUGIES:													
Good thing/Bonne chose	92	90	88	85	93	92	92	92	95	95	84	93	91
Bad thing/Mauvaise chose	5	6	3	3	5	5	3	4	2	4	10	4	4
Don't know/Ne sait pas	3	4	8	12	2	3	5	3	3	1	6	3	4
TOTAL	100	100	99	100	100	100	100	99	100	100	100	100	99
SUPPORTING COUNTRIES WHICH ARE VICTIMS OF THE EMBARGO: EGYPT, JORDAN, TURKEY/ LE SOUTIEN AUX PAYS VICTIMES DE L'EMBARGO: EGYPT, JORDANIE, TURQUIE:													
Good thing/Bonne chose	84	80	88	58	81	80	83	82	85	88	80	85	83
Bad thing/Mauvaise chose	9	10	4	17	11	12	7	12	7	9	12	8	9
Don't know/Ne sait pas	6	10	8	26	8	8	10	7	8	3	8	7	8
TOTAL	99	100	100	101	100	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	100
LONG TERM COOPERATION WITH MEDITERRANEAN AND ARAB COUNTRIES / LA COOPERATION A LONG TERME AVEC LES PAYS DE LA MEDITERRANEE ET LES PAYS ARABES:													
Good thing/Bonne chose	72	75	83	63	69	63	79	62	70	84	64	82	73
Bad thing/Mauvaise chose	16	8	7	8	14	19	5	15	10	11	16	10	12
Don't know/Ne sait pas	12	17	11	30	17	18	15	23	20	5	20	8	15
TOTAL	100	100	101	101	100	100	99	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ L'incluent.

Table/Tableau 40 : **ROLE OF EC IN ONE'S COUNTRY'S DECISIONS ON THE GULF CRISIS** / L'appartenance de son pays à la CE a-t-elle joué un rôle important dans la crise du Golfe (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION FLASH EOS Oct. 1990: Do you think that (our country's) membership of the European Community has played a very important, quite important, not very important or not at all important role in the position taken by (our country's) government concerning the Gulf crisis? / Pensez-vous que l'appartenance de (notre pays) à la Communauté européenne a joué un rôle très important, assez important, peu important ou pas important du tout dans la position prise par le gouvernement (de notre pays) face à la crise du Golfe?

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	YL	P	UK	EC12
Very important / Très important	22	23	20	29	30	27	12	20	13	13	36	20	23
Quite important / Assez important	33	29	33	23	29	43	30	48	33	48	29	37	38
Not very important / Peu important	32	29	28	15	23	17	36	17	31	28	15	27	23
Not at all important / Pas du tout important	6	11	9	19	16	5	15	4	8	4	10	11	9
Don't know / Ne sait pas	7	9	10	14	3	8	8	12	15	6	10	4	8
TOTAL	100	101	100	100	101	100	101	101	100	99	100	99	101

Table/Tableau 41 : **SUPPORT FOR COMMON DEFENCE ORGANISATION** / Soutien à l'organisation de défense commune (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION FLASH EOS Oct. 1990: Currently the European Community cannot involve itself in matters of military defence. Some say that the Gulf crisis has proven that the European Community should have a common defence organisation. Others feel that such a common defence organisation is not necessary. What is your opinion? / Actuellement, la Communauté européenne n'a pas de compétence en matière de défense militaire. Certains disent que la crise du Golfe a mis en évidence que la Communauté européenne devrait avoir une Organisation de défense commune. D'autres estiment qu'une organisation de défense commune n'est pas nécessaire. Quelle est votre opinion?

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	YL	P	UK	EC12
Common defence organisation necessary / Une organisation de défense commune est nécessaire	65	40	50	68	62	73	52	66	55	50	72	59	61
Common defence organisation not necessary / Une organisation de défense commune n'est pas nécessaire	27	50	39	18	28	19	36	23	33	41			
Don't know / Ne sait pas	8	11	10	14	10	8				9			
TOTAL	100	101	99	100	100	100	101	101	100	100	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 42 : DESIRED EC RESPONSE TO GULF CRISIS / Réponse CE désirée face à la crise du Golfe (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Currently, the world is worried about the crisis in the Persian Gulf provoked by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Please tell me if you tend to agree/disagree that, in order to deal effectively with such crises, the European Community should ...? / Actuellement, le monde est inquiet à cause de la crise dans le Golfe Persique provoquée par l'invasion du Koweït par l'Irak. Pourriez-vous me dire si vous êtes plutôt d'accord/plutôt pas d'accord que, pour faire face efficacement à de pareilles crises, le Communauté Européenne devrait ...?

1st colum: X agreeing 2nd colum: X disagreeing	B		DK		D				GR		E		F	
	+	-	+	-	WEST		EAST		+	-	+	-	+	-
Speed up its political, economic and monetary integration	65	19	43	45	65	14	67	13	73	10	65	13	56	17
Form a common defence organisation	72	16	49	42	65	20	64	21	63	25	50	31	58	19
Set up a European rapid deployment force	58	27	42	46	38	44	35	47	26	59	39	40	33	41
1ère col: X plutôt d'accord 2e colonne: X plutôt pas d'accord	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12	EC 12 +
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Accélérer son integration politique, économique et monétaire	57	19	69	12	64	17	52	32	66	14	51	30	61	20
Former une organisation de défense commune	59	20	81	10	62	25	64	25	74	11	78	14	71	16
Constituer une force Européenne d'intervention militaire	40	28	51	35	43	42	54	34	47	33	69	17	51	32

Table/Tableau 43 : EFFECTS OF GULF CRISIS ON PROSPECT FOR POLITICAL UNION / Effets de la crise du Golfe sur la réalisation de l'union politique (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION FLASH EOS Oct. 1990: Do you think that the Gulf crisis will make Political Union in the European Community easier to achieve, more difficult to achieve, or does it make no difference ? / Pensez-vous que la crise du Golfe facilitera la réalisation de L'Union Politique dans la Communauté européenne ou bien qu'elle la rendra plus difficile ou bien que cela ne fera pas de différence ?

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F		1	NL	P	UK	EC12
Easier / Facilitera	29	34	32	33	39	31		30	29	42	29	33
No difference / Pas de différence	32	32	29	24	27	35		17	39	21	45	32
More difficult / Rendra plus difficile	31	18	27	18	21	23		36	28	23	21	25
Don't know / Ne sait pas	9	16	13	25	13	12		17	4	14	5	11
TOTAL	101	100	101	100	100	101	100 101	100	100	100	100	101

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-DDR; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 44 : **IMPACT ON RELATIONS WITH ARAB WORLD /** Impact sur les relations avec le monde arabe (% , by country, per pays)

QUESTION FLASH EOS Oct. 1990: As a consequence of the Gulf crisis, have your feelings towards the Arab world in general changed or not ? (if yes), are they now more favourable, or less favourable ? / A la suite de la crise du Golfe, vos sentiments à l'égard du Monde Arabe, en général, ont-ils change ou non ? (Si oui), sont-ils maintenant plus favorables ou moins favorables ?

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12
No, have not changed / Non, n'ont pas change	59	62	62	70	61	76	73	61	64	65	60	78	70
Yes, more favourable / Oui, plus favorables	6	7	5	3	3	3	6	4	6	6	10	4	4
Yes, less favourable / Oui, moins favorables	30	25	25	21	13	17	18	27	26	24	19	17	21
Don't know / Ne sait pas	6	5	7	6	2	4	3	8	5	5	10	2	5
TOTAL	101	99	99	100	99	100	100	100	101	100	99	101	100

Table/Tableau 45 : **IMPACT ON RELATIONS WITH MUSLIMS WITHIN EC/** Impact sur Les relations avec les musulmans en CE (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION FLASH EOS Oct. 1990: Many different muslim communities reside in the countries of the European Community. After the recent events in the Persian Gulf, would you say that your feelings towards muslim people in Europe have changed ? (If yes), are they now more favourable, or less favourable ? / Différentes communautés musulmanes résident dans les pays de la Communauté européenne. Après les récents événements dans le Golfe Persique, diriez-vous que vos sentiments à l'égard des musulmans en Europe ont change ? (Si oui), sont-ils maintenant plus favorables ou moins favorables ?

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12
No, have not changed / Non, n'ont pas change	75	76	74	73	81	83	87	72	75	72	70	80	77
Yes, more favourable / Oui, plus favorables	4	2	2	3	3	1	3	3	4	3	4	2	2
Yes, less favourable / Oui, moins favorables	15	17	15	16	12	12	9	16	11	17	12	16	15
Don't know / Ne sait pas	7	5	9	8	5	4	2	9	10	7	14	3	7
TOTAL	101	100	100	100	101	100	101	100	100	99	100	101	101

Table/Tableau 46 : THREAT OF WAR OVER NEXT 12 MONTHS / Crainte d'une guerre dans les 12 prochains mois (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : How likely or unlikely, do you think it is that in the next 12 months, there will be a war, involving military forces from several European countries ? Is it ...? / Dans les 12 prochains mois, quelles sont, selon vous, les chances d'une guerre où seront engagées des forces militaires de plusieurs pays Européens ? Est-ce?

	B	DK	D			GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12+
			WEST		EAST										
Very likely/ Très probable	8	21	6	6	4	7	4	8	10	7	12	17	12	22	10
Fairly likely/ Plutôt probable	28	38	20	19	15	18	23	37	28	26	32	38	32	40	29
Not very likely/ Plutôt pas probable	34	27	45	45	45	26	38	29	30	30	37	28	29	20	32
Not at all likely/ Pas du tout probable	21	12	20	22	28	37	21	18	21	30	10	12	16	11	20
Don't know/Ne sait pas	9	3	9	9	8	12	15	8	11	8	9	5	11	7	9
TOTAL	100	101	100	101	100	100	101	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 47 : THE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE NEXT YEAR - INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS / Ce que l'on attend de l'année prochaine - Conflits internationaux (% , by country, par pays) (1)

QUESTION: Looking ahead to 1991, do you think it will be a peaceful year more or less free of international disputes, a troubled year with much international discord, or remain the same ? / Quand vous pensez à 1991, croyez-vous que ce sera une année assez tranquille et sans beaucoup de conflits internationaux, ou une année agitée avec beaucoup de querelles internationales, ou comme maintenant ?

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12
Peaceful year/ Assez tranquille	8	14	16	16	15	7	21	18	17	6	17	9	13
Remain the same/ Comme maintenant	32	23	30	27	24	33	23	35	30	25	21	17	20
Troubled/Agitée	54	57	43	43	45	54	44	40	41	66	45	67	50
Don't know/Ne sait pas	6	6	11	14	16	6	12	7	12	3	17	7	9
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

(1) EOS Gallup Europe "End of Year" Survey / EOS Gallup Europe Sondage "Fin d'année"

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats EC12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats EC12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 48 : RIU: OF A NEW WORLD WAR IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS / Le danger d'une guerre mondiale au cours des 10 prochaines années (% by country, par pays) (1)

QUESTION : Here is a sort of scale (SHOW CARD). Would you, with the help of this card, tell me how you assess the chance of a world war breaking out in the next 10 years ? / Voici une sorte d'échelle (MONTRER CARTE). Voulez-vous me montrer à quel endroit, sur cette échelle, vous placez le danger qu'une nouvelle guerre mondiale se produise dans les 10 prochaines années ?

	Scale	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12
World war within the next 10 years/La guerre mondiale est certaine	100	2	2	0	1	2	5	2	2	3	1	4	7	3
	90	3	1	2	1	2	3	13	2	1	2	3	13	4
	80	5	2	1	1	3	6	12	3	3	4	3	0	4
	70	7	2	2	2	4	6	9	3	2	6	5	0	5
	60	5	2	3	2	3	7	7	5	4	5	6	5	5
	50	10	14	7	6	2	18	14	12	15	10	10	13	11
	40	6	4	4	4	5	6	5	4	5	5	4	4	5
	30	12	2	11	6	6	7	4	9	6	10	8	2	7
	20	9	12	13	7	7	8	3	10	9	11	8	4	9
	10	9	15	18	13	2	10	3	12	8	22	10	1	11
No danger of war/Aucun danger de guerre	0	19	31	26	38	36	18	23	33	38	20	23	30	28
Don't know/Ne sait pas		13	7	13	19	16	6	5	5	6	4	16	5	9
TOTAL		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Mean score/Score moyen		35	24	21	18	25	39	47	26	26	29	33	46	31

(1) EOS Gallup Europe "End of Year" Survey / EOS Gallup Europe Sondage "Fin d'Année"

Table/Tableau 49 : PROGRESS OF DOMESTIC REFORMS - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE / Progrès des réformes internes - Europe du Centre et de l'Est (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : In general, do you feel things in (OUR COUNTRY) are going in the right or in the wrong direction ? / En général, estimez-vous que la situation dans (NOTRE PAYS) évolue dans une bonne ou dans une mauvaise voie ?

	Czechoslovakia	Poland
Right direction / Bonne voie	53	43
Wrong direction / Mauvaise voie	26	30
Don't know / Ne sait pas	21	27
TOTAL	100	100

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats E12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 50 : PERCEIVED CHANGES IN COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION IN PAST 12 MONTHS - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE / Evaluation des changements de la situation économique du pays au cours des 12 mois - Europe du Centre et de l'Est (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the general economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY) has / Par rapport à ce qu'elle était il y a 12 mois, pensez-vous que la situation économique générale de (NOTRE PAYS) est actuellement?

	Czechoslovakia	Poland
Got a lot better / Bien meilleure	2	6
Got a little better / Un peu meilleure	10	46
Stayed the same / Inchangée	13	14
Got a little worse / Un peu moins bonne	42	18
Got a lot worse / Bien moins bonne	30	11
Don't know / Ne sait pas	3	5
TOTAL	100	100

Table/Tableau 51 : ANTICIPATED CHANGES IN COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION OVER NEXT 12 MONTHS - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE / Evaluation des changements de la situation économique du pays dans les 12 prochains mois - Europe du Centre et de l'Est (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : And over the next 12 months, do you think the general economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY) will.... / Et dans les 12 prochains mois, pensez-vous que la situation économique générale de (NOTRE PAYS) va devenir...?

	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
Get a lot better / Bien meilleure	2	1	5
Get a little better / Un peu meilleure	24	10	36
Stay the same / Inchangée	14	11	23
Get a little worse / Un peu moins bonne	27	34	9
Get a lot worse / Bien moins bonne	24	40	5
Don't know / Ne sait pas	8	4	22
TOTAL	99	100	100

Table/Tableau 52 : PERCEIVED CHANGES IN FINANCIAL SITUATION OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS IN PAST 12 MONTHS - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE / Changements perçus dans la situation financière de son ménage - 12 derniers mois - Europe du Centre et de l'Est (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the financial situation of your household has.... / Par rapport à ce qu'elle était il y a 12 mois, pensez-vous que la situation financière de votre ménage est actuellement

	Czechoslovakia	Poland
Got a lot better / Bien meilleure	1	2
Got a little better / Un peu meilleure	5	16
Stayed the same / Inchangée	27	34
Got a little worse / Un peu moins bonne	43	29
Got a lot worse / Bien moins bonne	23	17
Don't know / Ne sait pas	1	2
TOTAL	100	100

	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
Get a lot better / Bien meilleure	2	0	2
Get a little better / Un peu meilleure	7	6	22
Stay the same / Inchangée	17	18	31
Get a Little worse / Un peu moins bonne	33	36	16
Get a lot worse / Bien moins bonne	33	38	8
Don't know / Ne sait pas	8	2	21
TOTAL	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 54 : **FREE MARKET ECONOMY - A GOOD THING OR A BAD THING ? - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE** / Economie de marche - une bonne chose ou une mauvaise chose ? - Europe du Centre et de l'Est (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION: Do you personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that is **one** largely free from state control, is right or wrong for **(OUR COUNTRY'S)** future ? / Personnellement, pensez-vous que la création d'une economie de marche, c'est-a-dire tres peu contrôlée par l'Etat, soit une bonne ou une mauvaise chose pour l'avenir de (NOTRE PAYS) ?

	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
Right / Bonne chose	58	62	61
Wrong / Mauvaise chose	13	13	14
Don't know / Ne sait pas	30	26	25
TOTAL	101	101	100

Table/Tableau 55 : **PROGRESS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIAN ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME** / Progression du program tchéque de reformes économiques

QUESTION : The way things are going, do you feel that **Czechoslovakia's Government's** economic reform program is going ... ? / Etant donne l'évolution actuelle, estimez-vous que le program de réformes économiques adopté par le gouvernement de Tchécoslovaquie évolue ... ?

	Czechoslovakia
Too fast / Trop rapidement	22
About the right speed / Comme il convient	33
Too slow / Trop lentement	31
Don't know / Ne sait pas	14
TOTAL	100

Table/Tableau 56 : **SUCCESS OF POLISH ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME / Succes du programme polonais de réformes économiques**

QUESTION : The way things are going, do you feel that the economic reform programme initiated by the Polish Government is generally succeeding or not succeeding in curing the ills of the Polish economy at the present time ? / Etant donné l'évolution actuelle, estimez-vous qu'aujourd'hui, dans l'ensemble, le programme de réformes économiques élaboré par le Gouvernement polonais réussit ou ne réussit pas à soigner l'économie polonaise ?

	Poland
Succeeding / Réussit	32
Not succeeding / Ne réussit pas	35
Don't know / Ne sait pas	33
TOTAL	100

Table/Tableau 57 : **SATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS OF DEMOCRACY - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE / Satisfaction quant à la progression de la démocratie - Europe du Centre et de l'Est (% by country, par pays)**

QUESTION : On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in (OUR COUNTRY) ? / Dans l'ensemble, êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas du tout satisfait de la façon dont la démocratie s'installe dans (NOTRE PAYS) ?

	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
Very satisfied / Très satisfait	4	2	4
Fairly satisfied / Plutôt satisfait	26	17	34
Not very satisfied / Plutôt pas satisfait	43	44	31
Not at all satisfied/Pas du tout satisfait	12	31	6
Don't know / Ne sait pas	15		25
TOTAL	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 58 : **IN FAVOUR OF "UNITED STATES OF EUROPE" ? - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE / Favorable à des "Etats-Unis d'Europe" ? - Europe du Centre et de l'Est (% by country, par pays)**

QUESTION : In general, to what extent are you for or against the unification of Europe, leading to the formation of a "United States of Europe", including (OUR COUNTRY). Are you ...? / En général, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous favorable ou opposé à une unification européenne, aboutissant à la formation des "Etats-Unis d'Europe", dont (NOTRE PAYS) ferait partie? Etes-vous ... ?

	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
For very much / Très favorable	33	41	28
For to some extent / Plutôt favorable	46	40	40
Against to some extent / Plutôt contre	6	3	10
Against very much / Très contre	1	2	4
Don't know / Ne sait pas	14	14	18
TOTAL	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 59 : FREQUENCY OF THINKING OF ONESELF AS EUROPEAN - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE / Fréquence du sentiment d'être Européen - Europe du Centre et de l'Est (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Do you ever think of yourself as not only (NATIONALITY), but also European? Does this happen?
 / Vous arrive-t-il de penser que vous êtes non seulement un (NATIONALITE), mais aussi un Européen? Cela vous arrive-t-il ... ?

	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
Often / Souvent	13	23	9
Sometimes / Quelquefois	60	43	42
Never / Jamais	36	30	40
Don't know / Ne sait pas	12	4	9
TOTAL	101	100	100

Table/Tableau 60 : TRUST AMONG NATIONALITIES / Confiance entre Les peuples (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust in them, some trust, not very much trust in them, or no trust at all ? / Je voudrais vous poser une question à propos de la confiance que vous inspirent différents peuples. Pour chacun d'eux, vous me direz si vous avez une grande confiance, assez confiance, pas tellement confiance ou pas confiance du tout ?

	Czechoslovakia					Poland				
	ot of rust	some trust	lot much rust	lo trust it all	Don't know	rande onf.	issez onf.	Pas tell. confiance	'as conf. du tout	Ne sait pas
Americans/Américains	26	47	11	4	12	18	41	22	5	14
Austrians/Autrichiens	21	51	13	3	11	8	29	26	13	24
Belgians/Belges	14	36	12	4	34	7	28	23	8	34
British/Britanniques	20	42	14	5	20	12	36	25	9	18
Bulgarians/Bulgares	3	18	36	28	15	3	13	30	26	28
Byelorussians/Biélorusses	4	22	27	18	29	2	10	26	37	25
Czechs/Tchèques	29	47	15	4	5	2	21	31	30	16
Danes/Danois	17	36	11	4	32	5	23	24	9	39
Dutch/Néerlandais	18	39	10	4	30	6	29	23	8	34
Finnish/Finlandais	21	36	9	4	30	6	22	23	9	40
French/Français	24	47	9	3	17	13	41	22	5	19
Germans/Allemands	12	36	28	16	8	4	13	21	49	13
Greeks/Grecs	4	26	24	10	37	5	20	26	14	35
Hungarians/Hongrois	3	20	36	31	11	7	31	30	12	20
Irish/Irlandais	6	24	18	10	42	3	17	24	10	46
Italians/Italiens	10	34	26	8	23	10	37	25	5	23
Lithuanians/Lituanais	6	25	22	15	32	4	25	29	19	23
Luxemburgers/ Luxembourgeois	9	26	11	6	48	3	17	21	10	49
Norwegians/Norvégiens	14	33	14	5	34	6	25	23	7	39
Poles/Polonais	1	13	30	47	9	33	38	15	4	10
Portuguese/Portugais	5	24	18	8	45	3	16	24	9	48
Romanians/Roumains	1	10	24	53	13	2	9	23	41	25
Russians/Russes	4	25	30	32	9	2	13	28	41	16
Slovaks/Slovaques	21	37	22	13	6	4	24	32	19	21
Spaniards/Espagnols	7	34	19	6	35	5	26	25	7	37
Swedes/Suédois	29	39	9	3	21	8	31	25	10	26
Swiss/Suisses	27	41	9	3	20	12	31	22	7	28
Turks/Turcs	1	10	24	36	29	2	10	23	33	32
Ukrainians/Ukrainiens	4	26	26	19	25	1	6	18	57	18
Yugoslavs/Yougoslaves	5	29	33	16	17	3	21	29	17	30

	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
Heard / Entendu	84	87	75
Not heard / Pas entendu	16	13	25
TOTAL	100	100	100

Tableau 62 : IMPRESSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE / Impression à l'égard de la Communauté Européenne - Europe du Centre et de l'Est (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Would you say that your impressions of the aims and activities of the European Community are generally? / Dans l'ensemble, quelles sont vos impressions à l'égard des activités de la Communauté Européenne et des buts qu'elle poursuit ?

	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
Positive / Positives	48	48	51
Neutral / Neutres	24	24	27
Negative / Negatives	2	3	1
Don't know / Ne sait pas	27	24	21
TOTAL	101	99	100

Table/Tableau 63 : ASSISTANCE TO HELP IMPROVE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE / Aide à l'amélioration de l'économie du pays - Europe du Centre et de l'Est (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Have you heard anything about assistance to help improve (OUR COUNTRY'S) economy being provided by 24 industrialised nations and coordinated by the Commission of the European Communities? (IF YES) Do you feel that this assistance programme is having a major impact, minor impact or no real impact in helping improve (OUR COUNTRY'S) economy? / Avez-vous entendu quelque chose au sujet du soutien apporté par 24 pays industrialisés et coordonné par la Commission des Communautés Européennes, pour aider (NOTRE PAYS) à améliorer son économie? (SI OUI), pensez-vous que ce programme d'assistance a beaucoup d'impact, peu d'impact ou pas de réel impact sur l'amélioration de l'économie de (NOTRE PAYS) ?

Not heard / Pas entendu	21	23	45
Major impact / Beaucoup d'impact	27	22	10
Minor impact / Peu d'impact	24	34	34
No real impact/ Pas de réel impact	5	8	8
Don't know / Ne sait pas	22	13	3
TOTAL	99	100	100

Table/Tableau 64 : **SUPPORT FOR ASSOCIATION TREATY - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE** / Soutien à un traité d'association - Europe du Centre et de l'Est (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Negotiations are about to take place concerning a treaty of association for closer political and economic cooperation **between** the European **Community** and (OUR COUNTRY). Would you be in favour, or against, such a treaty being **concluded** ? / Des négociations vont être entreprises au sujet d'un traité d'association pour une coopération politique et **économique** plus **étroite** entre la **Communauté Européenne** et (NOTRE PAYS). Seriez-vous favorable ou oppose à La **conclusion** d'un tel traité ?

	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
In favour / Favorable	78	79	78
Against / Oppose	2	3	4
Don't know / Ne sait pas	20	18	18
TOTAL	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 65 : **SUPPORT FOR EC MEMBERSHIP - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE** / Soutien à l'appartenance CE de son pays - Europe du Centre et de l'Est (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : When, if ever, do you think (OUR COUNTRY) should become a **member** of the European **Community**? Should **it become** a "ber? / Etes-vous favorable à ce que (NOTRE PAYS) devienne " brede la Communauté européenne? (SI OUI), devrait-il devenir " bre...?

		Hungary	Poland
Nou / Maintenant	25	51	55
In 5 years' time / Dans 5 ans	37	25	17
In 10 years' time / Dans 10 ans	12	2	2
Later / Plus tard	5	3	4
Never / Jamais	2	2	2
Don't know / Ne sait pas	19	17	20
TOTAL	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 66 : **FIELDS OF EC-EASTERN EUROPEAN COOPERATION / Domaines de coopération CE-Europe de l'Est** (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Would you welcome, or not welcome closer cooperation between the European Community and (OUR COUNTRY) in the following fields ? / Seriez-vous favorable ou défavorable à une coopération plus étroite entre la Communauté Européenne et (NOTRE PAYS) dans les domaines suivants ?

CZECHOSLOVAKIA	Welcome / Favorable	Not welcome/Défavorable	Don't know/ NSP
Culture / Culture	78	5	17
Agriculture / Agriculture	82	3	15
Industry / Industrie	88	2	10
Higher Education / Enseignement supérieur	87	2	11
Defence / Défense	41	23	36
Foreign Policy / Politique étrangère	63	11	27
Environment / Environnement	91	2	8
Human Rights / Droits de l'homme	79	4	17
Professional Training / Formation professionnelle	86	2	11
Youth Exchange / Echange de jeunes	85	3	12
POLAND	Welcome / Favorable	Not welcome/Défavorable	Don't know/ NSP
Culture / Culture	84	4	12
Agriculture / Agriculture	89	3	8
Industry / Industrie	91	1	8
Higher Education / Enseignement supérieur	79	6	15
Defence / Défense	63	13	24
Foreign Policy / Politique étrangère	70	9	21
Environment / Environnement	90	2	8
Human Rights / Droits de l'homme	84	4	12
Professional Training / Formation professionnelle	81	4	11
Youth Exchange / Echange de jeunes	85	4	11

Table/Tableau 67 : **KNOWLEDGE OF EC - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE / Connaissance de la CE - Europe du Centre et de l'Est** (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Taking into account all you know about the European Community, how well informed do you feel about its aims and activities. Do you feel? / Si vous prenez en compte tout ce que vous connaissez de la Communauté Européenne, comment vous estimez-vous informé au sujet de ses buts et activités ? Vous trouvez-vous?

	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
Very informed / Très informé	1	2	1
Quite informed / Plutôt informé	19	25	17
Not very informed / Peu informé	61	54	58
Not at all informed / Pas du tout informé	15	17	15
Don't know / Ne sait pas	5	2	9
TOTAL	101	100	100

Table/Tableau 68 : ABILITY TO NAME COMMISSION PRESIDENT - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE / Capacité à nommer le président de la Commission - Europe du Centre et de L'Est (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Here is a list of five people's names. Can you tell me which of the five, if any, is the President of the Commission of the European Communities at the present time ? / Voici une liste de 5 noms de personnes. Pouvez-vous me dire si l'un des cinq est l'actuel Président de la Commission des Communautés Européennes? Si oui, lequel ?

	Czechoslovakia	Poland
Jean Rey	1	1
Franco Maria Malfatti	1	2
Jacques Delors	22	13
François-Xavier Ortoli	1	3
Sicco Mansholt	1	1
None of them / Aucun d'eux	6	3
Don't know / Ne sait pas	68	77
TOTAL	100	100

Table/Tableau 69 : SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT EC - CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE / Sources d'information concernant la CE - Europe du Centre et de L'Est (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Here is a list of places where you might hear about the activities of the European Community and its institutions. Which of them are your main sources of information about the European Community ? / Voici différents endroits où vous pourriez entendre quelque chose au sujet des activités de la Communauté Européenne et de ses institutions. Lesquels d'entre eux constituent vos principales sources d'information sur la Communauté Européenne ?

	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
(OUR COUNTRY'S) Newspapers/Journaux (DE NOTRE PAYS)	72	65	57
Foreign Newspapers / Journaux étrangers	6	2	2
(OUR COUNTRY'S) Television / Television (DE NOTRE PAYS)	80	87	87
Foreign Television / Télévision étrangère	20	10	7
(OUR COUNTRY'S) Radio / Radio (DE NOTRE PAYS)	54	66	71
Foreign Radio / Radio étrangère	16	5	9
(OUR COUNTRY'S) Periodicals / Périodiques (DE NOTRE PAYS)	27	22	30
Foreign Periodicals / Périodiques étrangers	7	2	3
School or University / Ecole ou Université	5	6	4
Other / Autre	1	0	4
None of them / Aucun d'eux	6	4	7

Table/Tableau 70 : **RESPONSE OF EC CITIZENS TO EASTERN EUROPE'S NEEDS** / Réponse des citoyens CE aux besoins de l'Europe de l'Est (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : We are currently witnessing changes in Central and Eastern Europe. In your opinion, what should the European Community do about this ? I am going to read you a number of statements. For each one, please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree. / En ce "ent, on assiste à des changements en Europe Centrale et de L'Est. A votre avis, que devrait faire la Communauté Européenne à ce sujet ?

Speed up its economic, political and monetary integration so that, by becoming stronger, it can participate more effectively in building a wider united democratic Europe / Accélérer son intégration économique, politique et monétaire pour qu'en devenant plus forte, elle puisse participer plus efficacement à la construction d'une Europe démocratique unie plus large (**SPEED UP EC INTEGRATION**)

Increase its budget in order to help the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in their progress towards democracy and their economic reforms / Augmenter son budget pour aider les pays d'Europe Centrale et de L'Est dans leur démocratisation politique et leurs réformes économiques (**INCREASE EC BUDGET**)

Allow the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to also benefit from the programmes and resources currently available only to member countries, in the fields of technological research, youth training and university student exchanges / Faire bénéficier les pays d'Europe Centrale et de L'Est aussi des programmes et des ressources actuellement réservés aux pays membres dans les domaines de la recherche technologique, de la formation des jeunes et des échanges d'étudiants universitaires (**GIVE EC BENEFITS**)

Offer countries undergoing genuine reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, treaties of association and close economic and political cooperation, without necessarily envisaging them becoming EC members / Offrir aux pays d'Europe Centrale et de L'Est en voie de réformes réelles, des traités d'association et une coopération économique et politique intense, sans nécessairement prévoir leur adhésion à la Communauté (**OFFER EC ASSOCIATION AND COOPERATION TREATIES**)

Prepare itself, for each of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that requests it, to join the EC, as soon as it has established democracy and an open economy / Se préparer à l'adhésion à la CE, de chacun des pays d'Europe Centrale et de L'Est qui le demandent, dès qu'il aura établi la démocratie et l'ouverture de l'économie (**ALLOW EC MEMBERSHIP**)

1st column: % in favour 2nd column: % not in favour	B		DK		UEST				EAST				GR		E		F	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Speed up EC integration	72	12	49	35	71	11	74	13	84	7	74	11	67	11	72	14		
Increase EC budget	56	29	63	28	59	25	62	23	77	15	67	15	60	14	56	31		
Give EC benefits	69	16	73	15	61	23	63	22	67	19	67	13	66	6	73	15		
Offer EC association & cooperation treaties	59	22	64	24	67	14	68	14	73	12	60	16	59	11	64	21		
Allow EC membership	59	20	58	30	64	17	66	16	72	12	68	11	65	5	62	21		
1ère colonne: % "favorable" 2e colonne: % "défavorable"	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC12+			
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-		
Speed up EC integration	69	10	85	5	72	15	64	22	72	8	64	20	71	13	72	13		
Increase EC budget	64	17	72	15	65	22	61	27	66	13	64	22	62	22	63	22		
Give EC benefits	62	17	71	14	80	10	77	12	70	11	71	16	69	15	69	15		
Offer EC association & cooperation treaties	56	18	64	16	66	12	70	16	60	15	64	17	64	16	64	16		
Allow EC membership	61	13	74	5	54	29	59	27	60	15	69	14	66	15	66	15		

Note: **EC12** results exclude former DOR; **EC12+** results include former DOR / Les résultats **CE12** excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats **CE12+** l'incluent-

Table/Tableau 71 : FINANCIAL AID TO THE SOVIET UNION / Aide financière à l'Union Soviétique (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : The Soviet Union has asked for financial aid from the European Community and other industrialised countries to support its economic and political reforms. Do you think that the European Community should aid the Soviet Union or not ? / L'Union Soviétique a demandé une aide financière à la Communauté Européenne et aux autres pays industrialisés pour soutenir ses réformes économiques et politiques. Pensez-vous que la Communauté Européenne devrait aider l'Union Soviétique ou non ?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12 +	
			WEST	EAST											
Yes/Oui	53	61	71	73	79	59	69	44	55	69	65	69	66	55	62
No/Non	21	21	8	8	8	13	11	28	20	12	15	13	8	28	17
It depends/cela dépend (SPONT)	18	14	17	16	11	17	9	22	12	13	14	14	13	11	15
Don't know/Ne sait pas	8	4	4	4	2	11	11	6	13	6	6	4	12	7	7
TOTAL	100	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	99	101	101	101

Table/Tableau 72 : AWARENESS OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT / Notoriété du Parlement Européen (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Have you recently seen or heard, in the papers, on the radio or on TV, anything about the European Parliament, that is the parliamentary assembly of the European Community ? / Avez-vous récemment lu dans les journaux ou entendu à la radio ou à la télévision quelque chose au sujet du Parlement Européen, c'est-à-dire de L'Assemblée parlementaire de la Communauté Européenne ?

1st column: EB34 result 2nd colum: Change from EB33 Non-applicable	B	DK	D				GR	E	F
			WEST			EAST			
Yes	49 -2	44 -6	56 +8	54 *	48 •	52 -16	54 0	46 -7	
No	46 +8	53 +5	35 -6	37 *	44 *	42 +14	42 0	51 +10	
Don't know	5 0	2 0	8 -2	8 *	8 •	4 + 2	4 0	3 - 3	
TOTAL	100	99	99	99	100	100	100	100	

1ère colonne: Résultat EB34 2e col:Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Oui	51 -2	51 -2	59 -4	41 +1	58 -4	39 -7	49 -3	49 •
No	44 +3	45 +8	38 +6	55 -2	38 +10	59 +6	46 +4	46 •
Ne sait pas	5 - 1	5 0	3 - 1	4 + 1	4 - 5	2 + 1	5 - 1	5 •
TOTAL	100	101	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table/Tableau 73 : IMPRESSION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT / L'impression sur le Parlement Européen (% , by country, only those who said they were aware of European Parliament / %, par pays, uniquement pour les répondants connaissant le Parlement Européen)

QUESTION : Has what you read or heard given you a generally favourable or unfavourable impression of the European Parliament ? / Est-ce que cela vous a donné plutôt une bonne impression ou plutôt une mauvaise

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 Non-applicable	B	OK	----- E S T ; 0				----- EAST		GR	E	F
Generally favourable	45 -3	35 +2	48 +2	48 *	47 *	66 -5	56 0	45 +2			
Neither favourable, nor unfavourable (SPONT)	30 0	31 -1	19 -1	17 *	7 *	5 +3	4 -2	12 a			
Don't know	7 +1	6 0	28 +1	28 *	31 *	23 -2	32 0	36 -3			
			5 -2	7 *	14 *	7 +5	8 +3	7 +1			
TOTAL	99	100	100	100	99	101	100	100			

1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Plutôt bonne	65 -11	70 -4	32 -5	30 +3	62 -2	44 -1	53 -1	52 *
Plutôt mauvaise	13 +4	10 +4	23 -6	30 +4	5 +1	32 +7	16 +2	15 *
Ni bonne, ni mauvaise (SPONT)	17 +6	17 0	40 +7	19 -4	26 -1	20 -3	26 -1	26
Ne sait pas	5 +1	3 -1	5 +2	11 +3	7 +2	4 -3	6 0	6 *
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	99

Table/Tableau 74 : THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN EC LIFE / Le Parlement Européen dans la vie de la CE (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : How important a part would you say the European Parliament plays IN THE LIFE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY nowadays...? / A votre avis, actuellement, le Parlement Européen joue-t-il un rôle dans LA VIE DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE...?

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 Non-applicable	B	DK	----- WEST 1 D EAST			GR	E	F
Very important	6 -6	9 -6	11 0	12 *	16 •	18 -13	17 -4	10 -2
Important	44 -2	45 +3	48 +6	48 *	47 *	47 +8	40 -6	41 -7
Not very important	28 +7	26 +3	26 -2	24 *	14 *	12 +1	13 -1	28 +4
Not at all important	4 -2	4 -1	7 +2	5 *	1 *	1 0	2 -2	6 +1
Don't know	18 +3	17 +1	9 -7	11 •	22 *	22 +5	27 +11	16 +4
TOTAL	100	101	101	100	100	100	99	101
1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12	EC 12 +
Très important	20 -9	20 -6	9 -4	6 -2	16 -2	10 -6	13 -4	13 *
Important	50 +2	50 +7	43 +6	38 -3	51 +4	42 +2	45 +1	45 •
Peu important	15 +4	16 +1	25 -4	39 +1	10 +2	24 +2	23 +1	22 •
Pas irrportant du tout	3 0	2 -1	9 +5	5 +1	2 0	5 +1	4 0	4 *
Ye sait pas	13 -4	12 -1	15 -3	13 +3	21 -4	18 +2	15 +1	16 •
TOTAL	101	100	101	101	100	99	100	100

Table/Tableau 75 : THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN MRYDAY LIFE OF CITIZENS / Le Parlement Européen dans la vie quotidienne des citoyens (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : And in your opinion, how important a part would you say the European Parliament plays IN THE EVERYDAY LIFE OF CITIZENS nowadays...? / Et à votre avis, **actuellement**, le Parlement Européen joue-t-il un rôle dans LA VIE QUOTIDIENNE DES CITOYENS...?

1st colum: EB34 result 2nd colum: Change from EB33 Non-applicable	B		DK		D				GR		E		F	
					WEST		EAST							
Very important	4	-3	3	-1	7	+1	7	*	6	•	10	-8	10	-3
Important	24	-4	21	0	32	+4	32	*	29	•	32	+1	32	-7
Not very important	43	+7	47	-2	36	-5	35	*	34	*	27	+2	24	-1
Not at all important	15	-1	14	+1	15	+5	14	*	7	*	8	+1	8	-3
Don't know	15	0	15	+1	9	-4	12	*	23	*	24	+4	26	+13
TOTAL	101		100		99		100		99		101		100	
1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col:Variation depuis EB33 +: Pas d'application	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12	
Très important	14	-5	11	-4	4	-3	3	0	12	-1	6	-3	7	-2
Important	39	+2	38	+4	29	+5	21	-4	42	-2	29	-2	30	-2
Peu important	28	+5	26	-3	43	+4	48	-1	20	+6	40	+4	35	0
Pas important du tout	7	0	13	+4	13	-1	16	+2	6	+2	10	+1	13	+2
Ne sait pas	12	-2	13	0	12	-5	12	+3	20	-5	15	0	15	+1
TOTAL	100		101		101		100		100		100		100	

Table/Tableau 76 : THE ROLE DESIRED FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT / Le rôle souhaité pour le Parlement Européen (% , by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Would you personally prefer the European Parliament played a more important or a less important part than it does now ? / Vous-même souhaiteriez-vous que le Parlement Européen joue un rôle plus important ou moins important qu'il l'heure actuelle ?

1st column: EB34 result 2nd column: Change from EB33 Non-applicable	B		DK		D				GR		E		F			
					WEST		EAST									
More important	51	+3	25	+1												
Less important	7	+1	20	-4	12	-2	11	*	8	•	4	0	3	0	7	+1
About the same (SPONT)	22	-2	33	+1	18	-2	16	*	12	*	14	+7	18	-1	14	-9
Don't know	19	-1	21	+2	21	-3	22	*	30	*	28	+7	33	+11	21	+2
TOTAL	99		99		100		98		100		100		99		101	
1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC 12 +	
Plus important	44	-3	69	-2	35	0	55	+1	60	+6	42	0	53	+1	53	•
Moins important	9	+2	2	-1	8	-1	11	0	4	0	19	0	9	0	9	*
Le même (SPONT)	28	+5	15	+3	43	+4	19	-4	16	-1	19	-1	17	-2	17	*
Ne sait pas	20	-4	15	0	15	-3	15	+3	21	-3	20	0	21	+1	21	•
TOTAL	101		101		101		100		101		100		100		100	

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats EC12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats EC12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 77 : THE ROLE DESIRED FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT / Le rôle souhaité pour le Parlement Européen (% , EC12+, by socio-demographic and socio-political variables / %, EC12+, par variables socio-démographiques et socio-politiques)

QUESTION : Would you personally prefer the European Parliament played a more important or a less important part than it does now ? / Vous-même souhaiteriez-vous que le Parlement Européen joue un rôle plus important ou moins important qu'à l'heure actuelle ?

	Age				Education				Left-Right Scale		
	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+	-16	16-19	20+	still studying	Left	Centre	Right
More important	53	56	55	49	49	52	64	56	58	55	50
Less important	7	a	10	10	9	11	7	5	9	9	13
About the same (SPONT)	18	1a	15	16	16	17	16	20	15	1a	19
Don't know	22	18	20	25	26	20	13	19	18	19	1a
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	100

	Opinion leadership				Income				Sex		EC12+ ALL
	++	+	-	--	++	+	-	--	M	F	
Plus important	67	58	51	37	63	58	53	46	60	47	53
Moins important	a	8	10	9	a	10	11	9	10	a	9
Le même (SPONT)	14	1a	17	1a	16	16	15	16	16	18	17
Ne sait pas	11	16	22	35	13	17	21	28	15	27	21
TOTAL	100	100	100	99	100	101	100	99	101	100	100

Table/Tableau 78 : FOR A EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT / Pour un gouvernement européen responsable devant le Parlement Européen (% , by country, par pays)

1st colum: EB34 result 2nd colum: Change from EB33 Non-applicable	B		DK		D				GR		E		F			
					WEST		EAST									
For	61	0	23	+2	55	+5	55	*	57	*	57	-3	65	+3	58	-2
Against	11	-1	61	-1	14	-10	14	*	16	*	16	0	15	-3	19	+2
Don't know	28	+1	15	-1	30	+4	30	*	26	*	28	+3	19	0	23	+1
TOTAL	100		99		99		99		99		101		99		100	

1ère colonne: Resultat EB34 2e col: Variation depuis EB33 *: Pas d'application	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC 12 +	
Pour	50	+7	70	-3	49	-6	59	+6	55	+2	33	+1	55	+1	55	•
Contre	20	+3	9	+1	22	+11	20	-5	10	-2	37	+2	19	-2	19	•
Ne sait pas	31	-10	21	+3	30	-6	21	-1	35	0	29	-3	25	+1	25	•
TOTAL	101		100		101		100		100		99		99		99	

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats EC12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats EC12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 79 : **ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCREASING THE POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT / Attitudes à l'égard de l'élargissement des pouvoirs du Parlement Européen (%)**, by country, par pays)

The Council of Heads of State and Governments of the European Community has called for intergovernmental conferences this December to discuss details of a European Economic and Monetary Union and of a Political Union. I am going to read you a number of statements. For each one, please tell me whether you are IN FAVOUR/NOT IN FAVOUR, of / Le Conseil des Chefs d'Etats et de Gouvernements de la Communauté Européenne a demandé des conférences intergouvernementales en décembre pour discuter des détails d'une Union économique et monétaire et d'une Union politique. Je vais vous lire quelques phrases. Pour chacune, pourriez-vous me dire si vous êtes FAVORABLE/DEFAVORABLE à ce que

- The European Parliament having the right to decide together with the Council of Ministers representing the national governments, on the Legislation of the European Community / Le Parlement Européen ait le droit de décider avec le Conseil des Ministres représentant les gouvernements nationaux, de la législation de la Communauté Européenne (CO-LEGISLATION)
- The European Parliament having the right to put forward draft laws for the European Community on its own initiative / Le Parlement Européen ait le droit de proposer des projets de lois pour la Communauté Européenne sur sa propre initiative (EP TO INITIATE LEGISLATION)
- The European Parliament having the right to approve the nomination of the members of the Commission of the European Community / Le Parlement Européen ait le droit d'approuver la nomination des membres de la Commission de la Communauté Européenne (EP COMMISSIONER APPROVAL)
- The European Parliament having power to ratify all international agreements and conventions of the European Community before they come into action / Le Parlement Européen ait le pouvoir de ratifier tous les accords et conventions de la Communauté Européenne avant qu'ils prennent cours (EP TO RATIFY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS)
- The European Parliament having control over a European Central Bank's management of the Economic and Monetary Union / Le Parlement Européen contrôle la gestion de l'Union Economique et Monétaire par une Banque Centrale Européenne (EP TO CONTROL EURO-BANK)

1st column: % in favour 2nd column: % not in favour	B		DK		D				GR		E		F	
					WEST		EAST							
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Co-legislation	67	10	49	36	59	18	60	18	65	15	68	7	68	13
EP to initiate legislation	63	14	51	35	57	23	56	24	54	27	51	23	49	21
EP Commissioner approval	60	13	43	38	59	17	60	16	62	14	48	18	45	16
EP to ratify international agreements	52	19	28	53	47	26	46	28	42	33	44	22	46	25
EP to control Euro-Bank	55	16	33	48	50	25	52	23	59	18	58	11	47	19
1ère colonne: % "favorable" 2e colonne: % "défavorable"	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Co-legislation	62	12	80	6	49	19	66	20	65	7				
EP to initiate legislation	39	34	73	14	52	21	58	26	60	13	41	38	57	23
EP Commissioner approval	49	23	69	11	44	20	63	18	53	16				
EP to ratify international agreements	43	28	66	13	46	23	52	28	54	15	44	30	50	23
EP to control Euro-Bank	47	24	63	12	43	25	65	17	50	16	34	39	51	22

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats EC12 excluent l'ex-RDA; Les résultats EC12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 80 : **WHAT PARENTS EXPECT FROM THEIR CHILDREN** / Ce que les parents attendent de leurs enfants
(%, by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Here is a List of qualities which parents can try to encourage in their children. Which do you consider to be especially important ? Please choose three. / Voici une liste de qualités que les parents peuvent chercher à encourager chez leurs enfants. Voulez-vous me citer celles que vous considérez comme particulièrement importantes ? Pouvez-vous s'il vous plaît en choisir trois ?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	YL	P	UK	EC1 +	
			WEST	EAST											
Good manners and politeness/Les bonnes manières et la politesse	46	3	28	34	57	60	4	34	52	58	40	39	47	52	4
Ability to communicate with others/La capacité de communiquer avec les autres	27	3	36	34	25	31	3	31	32	30	28	44	24	30	3
Independence/L'indépendance	11	6	23	21	11	18	1	13	26	17	23	23	17	25	1
Conscientiousness at work/L'application au travail	21	2	29	33	48	37	4	30	16	23	21	9	42	13	2
A sense of responsibility/Le sens des responsabilités	61	6	65	65	66	52	5	62	51	57	60	70	54	66	6
Imagination/L'imagination	1	1	11	10	7	6		10	6	3	6	7	8	7	
Tolerance & respect for others/La tolérance & le respect des autres	55	4	51	49	40	34	4	62	45	38	51	57	30	55	4
Thrift, not wasting money and other things/L'esprit d'economie ne pas gaspiller l'argent et Les choses	25		19	21	28	18	1	23	15	17	16	9	24	11	1
Religious faith/La foi religieuse	5		7	7	5	20		6	24	15	8	7	13	11	1
Obedience/L'obéissance	11		6	6	4	14	1	8	11	6	7	7	14	14	
Loyalty/la loyauté	16	1	11	10	4	2	1	19	15	29	35	18	17	15	1

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats E12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

Table/Tableau 81 : RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE EC - WHO SHOULD DECIDE ? / Droits des immigrants dans la CE - Qui devrait en décider ? (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Thinking about people living in (YOUR COUNTRY), who are not citizens of any European Community country, who should decide on their social and political rights ? / A propos des personnes qui résident en (VOTRE PAYS) qui ne sont pas citoyens d'un des pays de la Communauté Européenne, qui doit décider de leur droits sociaux et politiques ?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12 +	
			WEST	EAST											
The government of each member state should make its own decision without consulting the others/Le gouvernement de chaque pays prend ses décisions sans consulter les autres	24	49	19	19	17	28	21	27	27	18	2	23	23	31	23
The Governments of the member states should consult each other in order to produce similar national laws/Les gouvernements des pays membres se concertent pour élaborer des législations nationales similaires	27	30	37	35	29	27	26	24	30	27	2	28	35	31	21
The institutions of the European Community should produce common laws which apply in all member countries, including (YOUR COUNTRY)/Les institutions de la Communauté Européenne élaborent une législation commune applicable dans tous les pays membres, y compris en (VOTRE PAYS)	38	17	39	41	48	33	32	42	32	50	3	44	23	31	31
Don't know/Ne sait pas	11	3	5	5	5	12	21	7	12	6	1	5	19	8	1
TOTAL	100	99	100	100	99	100	100	100	101	101	10	100	100	101	91

Table/Tableau 82 : RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE EC - EXTEND OR RESTRICT ? / Droits des immigrants dans la CE - A étendre ou à restreindre ? (% by country, par pays)

QUESTION : Still thinking of these people, do you think that the rights should be... ? / Toujours en ce qui concerne ces personnes, pensez-vous que leurs droits devraient être... ?

	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12 +	
			WEST	EAST											
Extended/Etendus	24	10	33	32	29	45	56	22	37	46	27	24	40	18	33
Restricted/Restreints	32	30	19	19	20	15	6	25	6	18	5	24	6	22	19
Left as they are/ Maintenus comme ils sont	36	53	36	37	37	23	19	42	36	21	58	45	30	44	34
Don't know/Ne sait pas	8	7	11	12	15	18	19	11	21	14	11	7	24	15	14
TOTAL	100	100	99	100	101	101	100	100	100	99	101	100	100	99	100

Note: EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.

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Sondage oct.-nov. 1990/Survey carried out Oct.-Nov. 1990
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-POLITICAL VARIABLES USED IN CROSSTABULATIONS

SOCIO - PROFESSIONAL STATUS

Roughly half of our representative sample of the EC public is without paid work. Answers to the question "What is your occupation ?" show the following distribution:

OCCUPATION OF THE PERSON INTERVIEWED (n = 11.600) (weighted percentage for EC 12)

Self - employed

(1)	Farmer	1.5
(2)	Fisherman	(5)
(3)	Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, etc.)	1.4
(4)	Owners of shops or companies, craftsmen, business proprietors	5.5

Employed

(5)	Employed professional (employed lawyer, practitioner, accountant)	2.3
(6)	General management	1.9
(7)	Middle management	6.1
(8)	Other office employees	7.2
(9)	Non-office employees, not manual worker (shop assistants, etc.)	6.4
(10)	Supervisors	1.4
(11)	Skilled manual worker	9.1
(12)	Other manual worker	5.2

Without paid work

(13)	Retired	19.2
(14)	Housewife not otherwise employed	18.6
(15)	Student	9.5
(16)	Military service	0.2
(17)	Temporarily not working, unemployed	4.4

Basing cross-analyses on "occupation" would exclude half of our respondents from analysis. An alternative, also used in past EUROBAROMETER reports, is to base analyses on a (non-marxist) concept of "objective social class" using "occupation of the head of household" as reference. In order to classify as many respondents as possible with respect to their socio-professional setting, a new classification was created "SOCIO-PROFESIONAL-STATUS".

For those in paid work it is based on their own present occupation. For those not in paid work, "former occupation" was used, if applicable (retired, housewives having been in paid work in the past, temporarily not working, unemployed). For those never having been in paid work, "occupation of the head of household" was used and, if the head of household was not in paid work at the time of the interview, his or her "former occupation" was used, if applicable. SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL-STATUS

is, consequently, a classification "as close to the respondent himself/herself **as** possible" but drawing upon additional background information to extent necessary and available, in order **to** dispose of a single measure of interviewees' socio-professional setting including a maximum of respondents in the respective analyses. The resulting distribution is **as** follows :

SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL STATUS (N = 11.600)
(weighted percentages for EC 12)

Self-employed

(a)	Farmers/Fisherman	4.
(b)	Professionals	2.5
(c)	Shop/Company owners	10.9

Employed

(d)	Employed professionals	3.7
(e)	General management	6.0
(f)	Middle management	10.6
(g)	Other office employees	10.
(h)	Non office employees	8.5
(i)	Supervisors	3.6
(j)	Skilled manual	23.1
(k)	Other manual	11.7

Others (no SPS attributable)

(l)	Head of household never in paid work, n. a.	5.1
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SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS

is asked by the question "If you were asked to use one of these five names for your social class, which would you say you belong **in** ?" :

- (1) Middle class
- (2) Lower middle class
- (3) Working class
- (4) Upper class
- (5) Upper middle class
- (6) Refuses to be classified
- (7) Other (specify)
- (8) **DK**

Presented in tables are the following categories (with EC 12 weighted percentages from the Nr. 33 EUROBAROMETER survey of Spring 1990) :

Working	27 %
Lower Middle	13.2 %
Middle	43.6 %
Upper Middle	7.0 %
Upper	1.8 %
Other replies, n.a	7.2 %

99.8 %

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY PARTY PREFERENCE

is based upon the question "If there were a General Election tomorrow (say if contact under 18 : and you had a vote), which party would you support ?" in each country in the wording usually used for this topic. Answers are grouped according to the affiliation of the representatives of the respective party to a group in the European Parliament. If a party is not represented in the European Parliament at the time the survey is carried out but had been represented before, it's supporters are grouped with the EP group their party had been affiliated with. Supporters of parties represented in the European Parliament but their Members of the European Parliament not being affiliated to any group are labelled N.I. Supporters of parties not represented in the European Parliament are labelled "other". Labels are presented in the order in which they figure in the "List of Members" of the European Parliament of October 1989. Abbreviations in tables are also taken from this publication :

S	=	Socialist Group
PPE	=	Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democratic Group)
LDR	=	Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group
ED	=	European Democratic Group
V	=	The Green Group in the European Parliament
GUE	=	Group for the European Unitarian Left
RDE	=	Group of the European Renewal and Democratic Alliance
DR	=	Group Technical of the Right
CG	=	Left Unity
ARC	=	Rainbow Group in the European Parliament
NI	=	Non-attached

Weighted EC - average proportion of persons not indicating a party choice is 32 % (**8%** "would not vote" or "spoil their ballot", **24 %** do not answer or "don't know"). Consequently among those who do reply, loyal and regular supporters of the respective parties tend to be over represented.

OPINION LEADERSHIP

is based on the answers to the following two questions : (A) "When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?" and (B) "When you, yourself hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? If so, does this happen often, from time to time or rarely?" <No = never>. Labels are : ++, +, -, --. Interviewees giving affirmative answers to both questions are labelled ++, Interviewees giving negative answers to both questions are labelled --. Middle categories are constituted correspondingly.

VALUE ORIENTATION

is based on the following question:

"There is a lot of talk these days about what this country's goals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say should be given top priority (show card). Would you please say which of them you yourself consider most important in the long run ?" (one answer only)

"And what would be your second choice ?"

- Card :
- (1) Maintaining order in the nation
 - (2) Giving the people more say in important government decisions
 - (3) Fighting rising prices
 - (4) Protecting freedom of speech

Respondents combining item (1) and (3) are labelled "materialist", those combining items (2) and (4) are labelled "post-materialist", others are labelled "mixed"¹.

SELF-PLACEMENT ON THE LEFT-RIGHT-SCALE

is based upon answers to the question "In political matters, people talk of the "left" and the "right". How would you place your views on this scale ? (Show card) (Do not prompt). The 10 Boxes of the card are numbered. Ring choice. If contact hesitates, ask him to try again)

L e f t	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	R i g h t
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In this report, those who reply are grouped in tertiles of the one third of respondents placing themselves most left, the one third most right, and the centre third, for each country. The usual weighting according to each country's population aged 15 and mote is applied,

CLOSENESS TO A PARTY

is based upon answers to the following question: "Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party ? If **so**, do you feel yourself **to** be very close to this party, fairly close or merely a sympathizer?" labels were given **as** follows :

- +++ very close
- ++ fairly close
- + merely a sympathizer
- 0 close to no particular party

¹ For additional theoretical and methodological details cf. Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics", Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977.

MEDIA USE

is based upon answers to the following question :

"**About** how often do you ...

- watch the news on television ?
- read the news in the daily papers ?
- listen to news broadcasts on the radio ?

Everyday, several times a week, once or twice a week, less often, never ?"

- +++ News on TV, radio and papers every day or several times a week
- ++ Two media everyday or several times a week; the third medium once or twice a week
- One of the three media everyday or several times a week; the two others once or twice a week
- The three media no more than once or twice a week

TPOLOGY OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

is based upon answers to the following questions :

- (1) Generally speaking, do you think that (your **country's**) membership of the European Community is : good thing; Bad thing; Neither good nor bad ? (= MEMBERSHIP)
- (2) In general, are **you** for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe ? For, very much; for, to some extent; against, **to** some extent; against, very much (= UNIFICATION)

Positive attitudes	= Membership:	"good"
	+ Unification:	"for, very much"
		"for, to some extent"
Ambivalent attitudes	= Membership :	"neither good nor bad"
		"bad"
		No answer
	+ Unification :	"for, very much"
		"for, to some extent"
or	Membership :	"good"
		"neither good nor bad"
		No answer
	+ Unification :	"against, to some extent"
		"against, very much"
or	Membership :	No answer
	+ Unification :	No answer
Negative attitudes	= Membership :	"bad"
	+ Unification :	"against, to some extent"
		"against, very much"

TYPOLGY OF SINGLE MARKET ATTITUDES

is based on answers to two different questions : whether respondents react to the Single Market with hope or fear and their evaluation ("good thing" - "bad thing") of the Single Market. The Typology combines answers to those two questions in the following way :

Positive =	Q.36 or Q.36 and 4.37	"very hopeful" "rather hopeful" "a good thing"
Ambivalent =	4.37	"neither good nor bad thing"
Negative =	Q.36 or Q.36 and 4.37	"rather fearful" "very fearful" " a bad thing"

ATTITUDES TO SINGLE CURRENCY

is based on whether people are "in favour" or "not in favour" of a "single currency replacing the different currencies of the Member States of the Community in five or six years time".