

euro-barometre

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



No. 22 DECEMBER 1984

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
RUE DE LA LOI 200 - 1049 BRUXELLES

EUROBAROMETER

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

AT THE END OF 1984

- The mood of Europeans: expectations for 1985
- Attitudes towards Europe, the European Community, and the idea of a "United States of Europe"
- The European elections of June 1984 in retrospect
- Reactions in Spain and Portugal to the prospect of joining the Community

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PRELIMINARY NOTE

EUROBAROMETER PUBLIC OPINION POLLS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES EACH SPRING AND AUTUMN SINCE SEPTEMBER **1973**. THEY HAVE INCLUDED GREECE-SINCE AUTUMN **1980 AND** WILL BE EXTENDED TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN DUE COURSE. HOWEVER, SELECTED QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN PUT TO SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE RESPONDENTS EVERY SIX MONTHS SINCE AUTUMN **1981**.

AN IDENTICAL SET OF QUESTIONS IS PUT TO REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES - DIFFERENT EACH TIME - OF THE POPULATION AGED FIFTEEN AND OVER IN EACH OF THE TEN COUNTRIES. THIS SURVEY WAS CARRIED OUT BY PROFESSIONAL INTERVIEWERS BETWEEN 2 OCTOBER **AND 4 NOVEMBER 1984** IN THE HOMES OF THE **9 911** SELECTED RESPONDENTS.

SPECIALIST NATIONAL INSTITUTES, ALL MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY, WERE RESPONSIBLE **FOR** CONDUCTING THE POLL. ALL THESE INSTITUTES, WHICH WERE SELECTED BY TENDER, BELONG TO THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR OPINION AND MARKETING RESEARCH AND COMPLY WITH ITS STANDARDS.

THE NAMES OF THE INSTITUTES AND FIELD-WORK SPECIALISTS IN EACH COUNTRY ARE LISTED IN THE APPENDIX TOGETHER WITH THE RELEVANT TECHNICAL DETAILS.

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PRACTICE FOR THIS TYPE OF SURVEY THE COMMISSION DISCLAIMS ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUESTIONS, RESULTS AND COMMENTARIES.

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INTRODUCTION

This twenty-second Eurobarometer centres on three main topics: people's views, expectations and aspirations for the new year; the recent second elections to the European Parliament; and the negotiations for Spanish and Portuguese accession as they enter their final phase.

It also offered an opportunity for the first assessment of public reaction in the Community to the recent revival of the idea of a "United States of Europe".

THE MOOD OF EUROPEANS AT THE END OF 1984

As at the end of each year, questions were asked about the expectations of Europeans for the year ahead and about their mood in general.

The general trend is less pessimistic, more markedly so than at the end of 1983; there are even some signs of a resurgence of optimism.

There are three basic patterns:

1. in some countries, the majority remain pessimistic, as in Belgium, France and Ireland;
2. in others, optimism and pessimism are more or less even — balanced, as in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom;
3. elsewhere, the optimists substantially outnumber the pessimists, as in Denmark, Germany, Italy and Greece.

(See Table 2, p. 4)

There is a correlation between these attitudes and people's assessment of developments over the past year both in the general economic situation of their country and, to a lesser extent, in the financial situation of their own household.

In most countries views are still gloomy rather than bright. The exceptions are:

- Denmark and the Netherlands as regards the national situation; and
- Germany and Greece as regards the situation of individual households.

However, by comparison with the two previous years, the results in October 1984 show an improvement almost everywhere; the sole exceptions are France, Greece and the United Kingdom.

(See Tables 4 and 5, pp. 8 and 9)

Still on the subject of mood, the probability of a world war breaking out in the next ten years is felt to have receded considerably everywhere in the Community, after an upsurge of disquiet in 1980-81.

Women are slightly more worried on this front than men and young people between the aged of 15 and 24 more so than their elders.

Every six months people's satisfaction with life and feeling of happiness are measured as a guide to their general mood.

Here emotions have changed very little by comparison with the last few surveys: some, notably the Danes, are still far more positive than others such as the French, the Italians and the Greeks. This has to do with cultural norms and it would be rash to read into the replies an expression of changing mood, even though circumstantial factors may cause short-term fluctuations. By comparison with the autumn of 1973, for example, two countries show a significant drop in the level of satisfaction with life: in Ireland since 1974-75 and in Belgium since 1980-81.

(See Tables 8 and 9, pp. 14 and 15)

Satisfaction with the way democracy works is far more strongly influenced by political events, but here again the fluctuation level seems to be determined by cultural norms. Since 1973, when this question was first asked, there have been two opposite trends: growing satisfaction in Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom; and growing dissatisfaction in Belgium, although this downward trend may now have halted. In France there has been no significant change.

(See Table 10, p. 17)

ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Questions on possible Community developments were added to the regular questions designed to measure emotional attachment to European unification and views on Community membership.

A large majority of interviewees in all countries except Denmark continued to support European unification: on average eight out of every ten in the six founder members and between six and seven out of every ten in three of the others were *pro*; in Denmark, however, a lot more were *against* than *pro* (43% compared with 38%).

While attitudes have changed little in the short term, a comparison with autumn 1973 shows that support is declining in three of the founder members (Germany, Italy and Luxembourg) and in Denmark. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, there has been a considerable increase in support *pro* European unification.

(See Table 12, p. 24)

And what about the longer term? Attitudes in the six founder members can be compared over a period of twenty-two years. Two facts emerge. Firstly, there are now fewer "don't knows" in nearly all the countries in question, which means that the threshold of information enabling people to form an opinion has been crossed. But in two of the six (Germany and the Netherlands) the decline in the number of "don't knows" has been accompanied by a shift from the positive reply ("very much *pro*") to the less committed ("to some extent *pro*"); now, as in 1952, few people are "against" but most of the former "don't knows" are not sufficiently convinced or well-informed to join the ranks of the "very much *pro*".

(See Table 13, p. 25)

And what about membership of the Community? On average, one European in two felt that his or her country had benefited from being a member of the Community but views differed considerably from one country to another: in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy and Ireland there was a large majority of positive replies while in the United Kingdom 57% of the replies were negative.

(See Table 16, p. 30)

There is a correlation between these replies and general attitudes to Community membership; however, in some countries the supporters of Community membership outnumber those who feel that their country has (already) benefited from being a member, while in other countries the reverse is true. The six founder members fall into the first category and three of the four others into the second.

Be that as it may, in autumn 1984 almost six Europeans in ten thought that Community membership was "a good thing", and only one in ten that it was "a bad thing". In all countries without exception, supporters outnumbered opponents, but still only by a small margin in Denmark and the United Kingdom.

(See Table 18, p. 34)

On several occasions in the last ten years a question has been asked in various forms to find out which issues people feel could be dealt with better at Community level than at national level.

The results are interesting. In all the countries without exception, a majority - and often a large one at that - is in favour of decisions on all the issues mentioned being taken by "the member countries of the Community acting together" rather than by "each country separately".

The priorities for joint or collective action are, in order of preference:

- helping the Third World;*
- protecting the environment and fighting pollution;*
- guaranteeing energy supplies;*
- helping the least developed regions;*
- fighting rising prices;*
- protecting national security against external threats;*
- stimulating the economy to help fight unemployment.*

Of the individual countries, those most likely on average to opt for Community action are Luxembourg, Italy and Belgium, with Denmark, Greece and the United Kingdom at the other end of the scale.

(See Table 19, p. 37)

There is therefore a fairly clear consensus in favour of endeavouring to resolve some of the problems currently facing our countries at Community level. Does that mean that interviewees were prepared to support radical changes to the Community? Not necessarily.

Two tests were conducted to find out.

The first test involved seeing what proportion of the population felt that European unification should be speeded up, stowed down or continued at the present rate.

In six countries there was a majority in favour of speeding it up: Italy, Luxembourg, Greece, Germany, Belgium and France. In the other four countries it was the conservative option ("continued as at present") that carried the day; however, the negative option ("stowed down") was much more common in Denmark than elsewhere.

(See Table 24, p. 45)

In the second test a question was asked for the first time about the idea of some day "forming a United States of Europe" or "a kind of political union like there is between the fifty states of the USA or the ten provinces that form Canada".

Just over half the interviewees (52%) felt it would be "a good idea" while two in ten (22%) thought it "a bad idea". As was to be expected, opinions varied greatly from country to country:

- in Luxembourg, Italy, France, Greece, Belgium and Germany, between six and seven interviewees in ten were in favour;
- in the Netherlands and Ireland there was still a clear majority in favour albeit small;
- in the United Kingdom, and even more so in Denmark, the negative response predominated.

In all countries the percentage in favour of the idea of some day forming a "United States of Europe" was higher than the percentage even vaguely wishing to speed up the movement towards European unification. This would suggest that the expression itself - doubtless because of its evocative and mythical connotations - holds a certain attraction for a large section of European public opinion.

(See Tables 26 and 27, p. 50)

TUE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE ELECTIONS OF JUNE 1984

One of the main problems confronting the European Parliament, the only Community institution to have direct and continuous contact with the man in the street, is its visibility, its ability to be seen "in all weathers" so to speak. One objective of the direct elections was in fact to enhance this visibility, an objective which was clearly not attained either in 1979, or in 1984.

We are thinking not only of the slight fall in the overall poll but more especially of the ~~lack~~ of interest shown by a large number of voters before, during and after the election campaign.

In October 1964, about four months after the election, only two out of every three interviewees claimed to have read or heard something "recently" about the European Parliament. This compares with three out of four in March-April of the same year and the election campaign must surely have increased this proportion. The event has therefore been blotted out - or banished from the mind very quickly. In several countries, particularly in Belgium, where voting is compulsory, the number who claimed in October to have read or heard something was lower than the number who voted in June.

(See Tables 34 and 35, pp. 63 and 64)

Another significant question: the importance attributed to the election by the people one normally comes into contact with.

In all countries without exception (Greece, which was not a member of the Community in 1979, was not included), this estimated importance diminished to a greater or lesser degree between October 1979 and October 1984.

(See Table 35, p. 67)

The reasons most frequently advanced to explain the low polls in some countries are first and foremost public ignorance about the European Parliament ("many people did not really know what it was about") and secondly Parliament's ~~lack~~ of power ("with the European Parliament having so little power, many people thought it was not worthwhile taking the trouble to vote").

(See Table 36, p. 68)

¹ This ~~lack~~ of interest on the part of the electorate is correlated - cause or effect? - with the indifference of the mass media. A study conducted in Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom on television coverage of the European Parliament revealed that, after a peak in December 1979 when the newly elected House rejected the draft budget, the number of messages steadily declined over the period covered by the study (1979-83). See The 1954 European election. What went wrong by Niels Sonntag; paper presented at the third international symposium on the European elections (Mannheim, November 1964).

Other questions were also put during this survey, particularly to those who did not vote. After personal reasons - sickness, holidays, job obligations - that can only be accepted at face value, the main "excuses" were that the respondent was not interested in politics or European affairs. Hostility towards the European institutions was rarely mentioned, even in Denmark (8%).

What is more, the great majority of those who did not vote did not regret it.

(See Table 41, p. 79)

Did the election do anything to change Parliament's image? Apparently not. The answers obtained in October 1984 on Parliament's present role were much the same as those given in March-April except that the number of "don't knows" declined in all countries in an apparent swing towards the intermediate answers of "important" or "not very important".

As for Parliament's future role, the preference for expanding it is prevalent in all countries except Denmark and has actually increased slightly in these countries between March-April and October 1984. In the last analysis it could well be that the only effect of the election campaign has been to persuade a few more people to vote (this is already something) and to make the public a little more aware of Parliament's existence and the relative insignificance of its present role.

(See Tables 44 and 45, pp. 83 and 84)

As a provisional conclusion to this election post-mortem, a tentative analysis reported at the end of Chapter VII attempts to identify voter and non-voter profiles. It shows how attitudes to the Community and to Parliament as well as other individual characteristics (including cognitive mobilisation and political allegiance) helped encourage certain sections of the electorate to turn out on polling day.

REACTIONS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL TO THE PROSPECT OF JOINING THE COMMUNITY

A "mini-poll" has been conducted in Spain and Portugal every six months since autumn 1981. In addition to the regular questions designed to assess overall attitudes to accession and to gauge public interest in the Community and the importance attached to it, a specific question first put in 1951 was repeated in an attempt to pinpoint the various factors contributing to overall attitudes.

Briefly, public interest is increasing slightly in both countries as the negotiations continue. By contrast, while support for membership remains relatively high, it shows little if any increase; indeed it has fallen off somewhat since 1950, doubtless reflecting disillusionment as the negotiations drag on.

(See Tables 50, 52, 53, 54 and 55)

An analysis of all these attitudes combined with answers given to questions on the effects expected from membership in a number of areas reveals that, in both countries, involvement in Community affairs tends to go hand-&hand with support for accession and in particular with high expectations that it will help Spain and Portugal cope with the world crisis and play a bigger role in international affairs.

In other words, Spanish and Portuguese with a minimal degree of awareness regard the Community, which their countries are eagerly awaiting the green light to enter, as a haven of solidarity in an unsettled world.

I

THE MOOD OF EUROPEANS

As in previous years, a number of questions were asked about the expectations of Europeans for the year ahead, in an attempt to measure whether the general trend is one of optimism or pessimism.

In addition, interviewees were again questioned about their perceptions of recent economic changes, fears of another world war, satisfaction with life and feelings of happiness, and attitudes to change in society.

All these questions measure the "mood" of Europeans; the answers to them are interesting in their own right but they also provide a broader framework in which to view attitudes towards Europe and the Community.

1.1. WHAT EUROPEANS EXPECT FROM 1985¹

"So far as you are concerned, do you think that 1985 will be better or worse than 1984?"

"Looking ahead to next year, 1985, do you think ...

... strikes and industrial disputes in (your country) will increase, decrease, or remain the same?

... it will be a peaceful year more or less free of international disputes, a troubled year with much international discord, or remain the same?"

These three questions are exactly the same as the ones asked at the end of 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983, so the results are comparable and can be used to establish a pattern.

The general trend is less pessimistic; there are even some signs of a resurgence of optimism. However, a distinction has still to be drawn between general expectations for the coming year and more specific views on harmony at home (strikes and industrial disputes) and abroad (international disputes).

¹ As in previous years, these questions were asked in many countries throughout the world for the Gallup International Association. In the Community they were added to the Eurobarometer questionnaire. Findings for the Community countries were kindly made available to us by Mr. Norman Webb, General Secretary of the Gallup International Association, London.

1.1.1. General expectations for the coming year

... In the Community as a whole, for the first time in four years, on average the optimists marginally outnumber the pessimists. However, the majority of those interviewed felt that 1985 would be "the same" as 1984.

(See Table 1)

Country-by-country analysis reveals three different situations and trends:

1. Countries where the majority remain pessimistic: this is true of Belgium, France and Ireland. However, although Belgium and Ireland were less pessimistic at the end of 1984 than they had been a year earlier, opinion in France seems more undecided.
2. Countries where optimism and pessimism are more or less equally balanced: this is the case in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
3. Countries where there is considerably more optimism than pessimism: Denmark, Germany, Italy and Greece fall into this category. In Greece the trend began in 1981 and there has been no accentuation of the slight downturn noted at the end of 1983. Optimism has been gaining ground fairly steadily in Germany over the last four years, while in Italy it now outweighs pessimism for the first time since the question was first asked.

(See Table 2 and Table 1 in the Appendix)

1.1.2. Harmony at home and abroad

Not surprisingly, general expectations for the year ahead correlate with expectations for harmony at home and abroad¹. However, as is frequently the case when answers to questions on the "general" are compared with answers to questions on the "specific", the relationship is complex: some people may be optimistic or pessimistic about the situation at home or abroad, or, indeed, about something else entirely (which may or may not correspond to a variable in the survey).

As will be seen later, retrospective judgments on the trend in the economic situation of the country or the financial situation of individual households over the previous twelve months correlate more strongly with general expectations for the year ahead than expectations for harmony at home or abroad.

¹ The coefficients of correlation for the sample as a whole were respectively $r = .260$ and $r = .247$.

Table 1

.. EXPECTATIONS FOR THE COMING YEAR¹
(Community as a whole)²

	October 1980	October 1981	October: 1982	October: 1983	October 1984
Feel that the coming year will be:					
- better	20%	25%	25%	26%	29%
- the same	30	30	31	32	35
- worse	43	38	38	35	30
Strikes and industrial disputes (in your country)					
- will increase	43%	44%	49%	45%	42%
- will remain the same	36	34	31	36	36
- will decrease	14	14	18	13	15
The year on the inter- national front will be:					
- fairly peaceful	10%	10%	9%	7%	13%
- remain the same	28	32	39	37	48
- troubled	53	50	44	49	32

¹ Don't knows excluded from the table but included in the calculation of percentages.

² Average of answers given in the ten countries weighted by proportion of population in each country aged 15 and over.

Table 2
TREND IN GENERAL EXPECTATIONS FOR THE COMING YEAR BY COUNTRY
(1980 - 1984)¹

	Pessimism predominant			Pessimism decreasing				Optimism predominant		
	B	F	IRL	L	NL	UK	DK	D	I	GR
<u>Expect the coming year to be:</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>"better"</u>										
October 1980	7	15	29	14	13	31	14	8	28	39
October 1981	5	32	26	11	15	30	13	13	25	72
October 1982	7	18	23	8	16	43	14	13	27	59
October 1983	8	17	19	18	18	35	27	20	32	50
October 1984	12	15	25	26	26	32	30	25	45	53
<u>"the same"</u>										
October 1980	32	35	19	37	34	15	37	48	24	13
October 1981	26	28	16	37	40	19	13	50	23	9
October 1982	26	36	18	33	30	21	31	53	15	10
October 1983	33	31	20	50	33	22	47	51	24	15
October 1984	34	36	24	48	41	24	47	58	22	14
October 1980	53	39	48	45	49	48	42	37	45	39
October 1981	62	32	53	51	41	44	13	28	49	6
October 1982	59	42	55	56	49	30	47	22	56	18
October 1983	53	46	55	30	46	36	19	17	41	27
October 1984	51	41	45	23	28	36	17	22	31	21
<u>Index of optimism/pessimism²</u>										
October 1980	1.49	1.73	1.81	1.67	1.63	1.81	1.71	1.68	1.82	1.99
October 1981	1.39	2.00	1.73	1.60	1.73	1.85	1.3	1.84	1.76	2.75
October 1982	1.43	1.76	1.67	1.51	1.65	2.14	1.65	1.90	1.70	2.48
October 1983	1.53	1.70	1.62	1.88	1.71	1.99	2.09	2.03	1.91	2.24
October 1984	1.60	1.71	1.79	2.03	1.98	1.96	2.13	2.14	2.14	2.37

¹ Don't knows excluded from the table but included in the calculation of percentages.

² Index obtained by applying the following coefficients: "better" = 3, "the same" = 2 and "worse" = 1. The mid-point is therefor 2: Where the index is above this point, the mood is predominantly optimistic, where it is below, predominantly pessimistic. Differences of less than .16 between two values cannot be considered significant. The highest scores recorded during the period in question are underlined.

Be that as it may, without going into the detail to be found in the Appendix, at the end of 1984 pessimism about prospects for social harmony was declining slightly, pessimism about prospects for international peace more so.

However, in two countries - Denmark and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom - fears of an increase in strikes and industrial disputes are more common now than a year ago¹.

(See Table 3 and Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix).

¹ The change in France and Ireland was not significant.

Table 3

HARMONY AT HOME AND ABROAD IN 1985¹

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ²
<u>Strikes and industrial disputes will:</u>											
- <u>increase</u>											
October 1983	40	38	48	55	43	43	29	72	32	34	45
October 1984	41	66	27	59	46	43	25	50	41	34	52
- <u>remain the same</u>											
October 1983	39	42	37	38	31	33	62	20	12	29	36
October 1984	42	24	48	30	33	31	57	35	33	33	36
- <u>decrease</u>											
October 1983	14	11	6	5	1	9	20	0	5	23	13
October 1984	13	3	17	4	16	22	12	11	20	16	15
<u>The year on the Internat — front will be:</u>											
- <u>fairly peaceful</u>											
October 1983	4	6	8	4	12	10	8	4	7	16	7
October 1984	8	5	18	6	13	23	10	6	9	14	13
- <u>remain the same as this year</u>											
October 1983	37	33	36	35	36	32	34	38	43	35	37
October 1984	43	48	19	52	40	46	38	46	48	36	48
- <u>troubled</u>											
October 1983	51	53	48	56	41	52	51	52	44	34	49
October 1984	44	39	26	34	41	28	46	40	37	32	32

¹ Don't knows excluded from the Table but included in the calculation of percentages.

² Weighted average.

I.2. APPRAISAL OF CHANGES IN THE COUNTRY'S GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION
AND THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF HOUSEHOLDS

"How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months? Would you say that it is now a lot better, a little better, the same, a little worse or a lot worse?"

"How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago? Is it a lot better, a little better, the same, a little worse or a lot worse?"

These two questions provide an excellent indicator not only of views on the socio-economic situation but also of the mood of interviewees.

Answers to both are in high correlation but, as previous surveys have demonstrated, they reflect quite separate elements in the appraisal of the social environment. The first relates to the general situation of the country (not just the short-term "economic" situation in the narrow sense of the term; the second relates to the position of a particular household (not just its financial situation).

Both variables correlate with general expectations for the coming year, which shows that, not surprisingly, the optimism/pessimism indicator is affected by recent experiences both at national and at household level (or, to be more precise, by the way these experiences are selectively perceived).

In most countries, negative assessments of the last twelve months continue to outnumber positive ones. The exceptions are Denmark and the Netherlands in the case of the national situation and Germany and Greece in the case of the household situation.

However, by comparison with the two previous years, the results for October 1984 show an improvement almost everywhere; the sole exceptions are France, Greece and the United Kingdom.

(See Tables 4 and 5)

¹ See Eurobarometer No. 20, December 1983, p. 9.

² The coefficients of correlation with general expectations for the coming year are as follows:

	<u>for individuals</u>	<u>for the ten countries</u>
- recent changes in the general economic situation of the country	.352	.734
- recent changes in the financial situation of the household	.319	.861

As can be seen, correlations for countries are much higher than for individual respondents. This emphasizes that these variables are strongly influenced by national contexts.

Table 4
ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGES IN THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION
OVER THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>October 1982</u>											
	.	.	1	.	3	.	1	3	10	2	
	4	3	13	5	8	6	3	28	38	12	
	15	30	29	10	10	24	10	16	23	21	
	43	43	35	30	43	43	50	26	18	37	
	35	19	20	54	35	25	34	24	5	25	
Index ³	1.65	1.63	1.76	1.92	1.46	1.75	1.75	1.67	2.11	2.75	1.88
	11	1	1	1	1	-	.	2	7	1	2
	45	18	9	3	10	2	1	1	2	6	1
	16	39	29	10	18	19	21	21	21	26	
	17	28	28	23	40	46	45	26	25	31	
	3	10	29	62	28	29	21	21	11	21	
Index ³	1.80	2.83	2.18	1.72	1.35	1.79	1.65	1.87	2.13	2.42	1.97
<u>October 1983</u>											
A lot better	1	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	1	2
A little better	9	44	23	16	7	15	9	19	28	31	20
The same	29	20	37	26	14	16	22	18	22	21	25
A little worse	42	13	29	33	32	43	53	46	27	26	33
A lot worse	16	6	7	21	45	23	11	15	19	10	17
Index ³	1.92	2.79	2.29	1.98	1.57	1.94	1.98	2.08	2.14	2.49	2.10
<u>April 1984</u>											
A lot better	:	:	1	-	:	1	:	:	3	:	:
A little better	:	:	24	5	:	17	:	:	27	:	:
The same	:	:	46	27	:	22	:	:	27	:	:
A little worse	:	:	21	35	:	36	:	:	23	:	:
A lot worse	:	:	5	28	:	20	:	:	17	:	:
Index ³		:	2.42	1.67	:	2.00	:	:	2.24	:	:
<u>October 1984</u>											
A lot better	.	6	3	.	1	2	1	1	2	6	2
A little better	13	38	25	11	9	32	32	46	18	29	23
The same	32	20	45	24	15	20	27	23	16	25	27
A little worse	37	22	20	36	29	32	31	20	33	21	29
A lot worse	17	8	5	26	45	12	5	8	28	11	16
Index ³	1.96	2.59	2.47	1.79	1.57	2.29	2.42	2.54	1.93	2.45	2.15

¹ Don't knows excluded from the Table but included in the calculation of percentages.

² Weighted average.

³ Index calculated by applying the coefficients 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively to the replies "a lot better", "a little better", "a little worse" and "a lot worse". Replies that the situation remained the same are excluded, as are the don't knows. The mid-point is 2.50. Below this level, the negative answers predominate and above, the positive ones.

⁴ The April 1984 survey covered only four countries. Findings were kindly made available by Professor Michael S. Lewis-Beck, University of Iowa, USA, who is currently researching these data with support from the National Science Foundation, Washington.

Table 5

**ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGES IN THE FINANCIAL SITUATION
OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS OVER THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS**

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>October 1982</u>											
A lot better	1	3	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	10	2
A little better	4	13	13	9	5	15	11	6	18	32	13
The same	34	46	58	38	32	50	43	40	36	36	45
A little worse	41	25	21	35	34	24	35	40	23	15	27
A lot worse	14	6	3	14	26	8	9	10	17	6	11
Index ³	1.86	2.29	2.32	1.96	1.73	2.21	2.08	2.00	2.12	2.74	2.14

<u>April 1983</u>												
A lot better	.	4	1	1	.	1	2	2	4	1	5	2
A little better	5	14	13	8	4	16	6	8	18	19	13	13
The same	38	53	58	37	27	53	51	39	40	38	46	46
A little worse	38	22	20	31	31	23	30	38	23	26	26	26
A lot worse	14	5	5	1	2	1	1	3	7	6	9	11
Index ³	1.86	2.38	2.24	1.84	1.55	2.27	2.03	2.01	2.25	2.29	2.12	2.12

<u>October 1983</u>													
A lot better	1	5	3	2	1	1	1	2	5	7	1	3	1
A little better	5	15	14	8	6	17	8	7	17	25	14	14	14
The same	35	52	59	33	31	50	43	38	38	35	44	44	44
A little worse	45	19	20	34	31	24	38	40	24	23	26	26	26
A lot worse	12	5	2	21	27	7	8	12	15	10	11	11	11
Index ³	1.94	2.46	2.43	1.85	1.70	2.24	2.05	1.98	2.19	2.44	2.15	2.15	2.15

<u>April 1984</u>											
A lot better	:	:	2	2	:	1	:	:	5	:	:
A little better	:	:	13	6	:	13	:	:	19	:	:
The same	:	:	62	38	:	56	:	:	43	:	:
A little worse	:	:	18	35	:	22	:	:	18	:	:
A lot worse	:	:	3	16	:	6	:	:	14	:	:
Index ³	:	:	2.34	1.88	:	2.21	:	:	2.28	:	:

<u>October 1984</u>															
A lot better	2	5	1	4	1	2	1	3	1	3	1	5	7	1	3
A little better	9	17	17	5	7	17	12	10	15	26	14	14	14	14	14
The same	35	50	61	29	31	54	52	44	38	40	45	45	45	45	45
A little worse	43	20	15	38	34	19	24	31	24	18	25	25	25	25	25
A lot worse	10	5	2	24	26	7	8	10	15	8	11	11	11	11	11
Index ³	2.02	2.46	2.57	1.78	1.75	2.31	2.19	2.12	2.16	2.55	2.18	2.18	2.18	2.18	2.18

1, 2, 3 See notes to Table 4.

1.3. FEAR OF A THIRD WORLD WAR IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS

"Here is a sort of scale [Show CARD]. Would you with the help of this card, tell me how you assess the chances of a world war breaking out in the next ten years?"

This question was first asked in the Community of Six in July 1971. It was asked again in the Nine in autumn 1977 and in spring 1980 and has been repeated in the Ten every autumn since 1981.

Analysis of findings and of changes over time shows that, after an upsurge of anxiety in all countries in 1980-81, ¹ probability of a third world war in the next ten years is felt to ² declined sharply.

Neither the level of anxiety nor its trend differs much from one country to another; this shows that the feeling is general.

(See Table 6)

As we found before³, women are slightly more worried than men and young people (15-24 years) considerably more worried than their elders. But the most important variable would seem to be the value system of the interviewees: for post-materialists, who rate freedom of expression more highly than social order, the risk of a world war is considerably greater than for materialists.

(See Table 7)

¹ Graduated scale in multiples of ten. 100 = "war certain" and 0 = "no danger of war".

² Two events took place in December 1979 which may have influenced the answers recorded a few months later: NATO's decision to deploy new missiles in Western Europe if the arms limitation talks failed and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Subsequent findings suggest that any influence these events may have had on public opinion has now worn off.

³ See Eurobarometer No. 20, p. 18.

Table 6

THOSE WHO CONSIDER A WORLD WAR "PROBABLE" WITHIN THE NEXT TEN YEARS'
(per 100 actually replying)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ²
July 1971	8%	:	11%	12%	:	13%	7%	11%	:	:	12%
Oct.- Nov. 1977	21	10%	13	14	14%	14	11	17	13%	:	14
April 1980	33	18	25	42	31	32	15	24	39	:	34
October 1981	32	:	32	25	28	18	27	20	21	8 %)	24
October 1982	20	10	19	20	25	14	19	19	17	9	18
October 1983	17	15	18	24	27	18	14	13	17	12	19
October 1984	16	13	14	13	18	12	15	21	14	10	13

¹ By this we mean those who feel that there is more than a one-in-two chance of war breaking out (i.e. 50 on the scale).

² Weighted average.

Table 7

BREAKDOWN OF THOSE WHO CONSIDER A WORLD WAR "PROBABLE"
BY SEX, AGE AND VALUE SYSTEM'
(Community as a whole; per 100—actually replying)

BY SEX:		
Men	12%	(n = 4390)
Women	14	(n = 5021)
BY AGE:		
15-24	18%	(n = 1843)
25-39	12	(n = 2568)
40-54	11	(n = 2176)
55 and over	13	(n = 2822)
BY VALUE SYSTEM:		
Materialists	12%	(n = 2876)
Mixed	12	(n = 4907)
Post-materialists	20	(n = 1186)

¹ As in the previous table, the percentages refer to those who feel that there is a more than one-in-ten chance of a third world war in the next ten years.

For each category, the figures in brackets show the number of people interviewed who actually replied.

I. SATISFACTION WITH LIFE AND FEELING OF HAPPINESS

As previous surveys have shown, feelings of satisfaction with life, like those of happiness, reflect a combination of short-, medium- and long-term personal feelings; they are also a product of the interaction between cultural and personal influences¹. In other words, every national culture (and no doubt every regional culture too) is characterized by an average level of satisfaction (and happiness), which in turn is determined by a sort of cultural norm: the tendency of individuals who share certain values (possibly religious in origin) to describe themselves as satisfied or dissatisfied, happy or unhappy. If we look simply at Community countries, we find that the Danes and the Dutch are much more likely to say that they are satisfied with life than the French, Greeks or Italians. The same is true of feelings of happiness².

Around this average, individuals express feelings which, at any given moment, depart to a greater or lesser extent from the cultural norm, doubtless as a result of their position in society, their aspirations, the comparisons they make with those around them, or for other reasons. For example, it has been observed that satisfaction with life is particularly strongly influenced by a recent change in the respondent's financial position.

1.4.1. S with life

"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?"

As expected, the Danes are the most satisfied, followed by the Dutch. The least satisfied are the French, the Italians and, in last place, the Greeks.

¹ On the conclusions and hypotheses based on research in this subject, including the use made of Eurobarometer surveys, see the articles by Ronald INGLEHART and J.-J. RABIER, Les aspirations s'adaptent aux situations and Sentiment personnel et norme culturelle, published in Futuribles, Paris, No. 80, September 1984 (pp. 29-58) and No. 81, October 1984 (pp. 3-29).

² The two concepts are related (and the variables which express them correlate strongly) but analyses show them to be distinct.

There have been no significant changes since the last few surveys but, by comparison with autumn **1973**, the level of satisfaction has dropped considerably in **two** countries: Ireland and, to an even greater extent, Belgium. In the first case the decline appears to have begun in **1974-75** while, in the second, it seems to be more recent (**1980-81**).

(See Table **8** and Table **4** in the Appendix)

1.4.2. Feeling of happiness

"Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days - would you say you're very happy, fairly happy, or not so happy these days?"

Just like the last time around, In October **1983**, the Dutch came out on top of the happiness league, followed by the Irish and the Danes; at the other end were the Italians, with the Greeks in last place.

A comparison with spring **1975**, when the question was first asked in the Community, shows that scores have risen considerably in Ireland and Italy (even though the level in Italy is still relatively low) and fallen sharply in Belgium.

In other words, the gaps seem to be levelling out around the Community average, which itself appears to be rising¹.

	May 1975		October 1984	
	Score	Position	Score	Position
Denmark	3.03	1	2.84	3
Belgium	2.90	2	2.62	6
Netherlands	2.84	3	3.07	1
Luxembourg	2.54	4	2.65	5
United Kingdom	2.42	5	2.68	4
Germany	2.34	6	2.46	7
France	2.33	7	2.37	8
Ireland	2.30	8	2.87	2
Italy	1.90	9	2.23	9
Community	2.32		2.49 ²	

(See Table **9** and Table **5** in the Appendix)

¹ Greece is not included because it was not part of the Community in **1975**. For calculation of index see Table **9**.

² Weighted average, excluding Greece.

Table 8
SATISFACTION WITH LIFE

	B	OK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>September 1973</u>											
Very satisfied	43	51	17	15	53	8	30	41	33	:	21
Fairly satisfied	49	44	65	62	39	57	49	52	52	:	58
Not very satisfied	6	4	15	17	6	27	9	5	11	:	16
Not at all satisfied	2	1	2	5	2	7	2	1	3	:	.4
Don't know	.	.	1	1	.	1	.	1	1	:	1
 Index ³	3.34	3.45	2.97	2.89	3.42	2.67	3.26	3.34	3.16	:	2.98
<u>October 1983</u>											
<u>April 1984</u>											
Very satisfied	30	56	20	12	36	10	38	44	32	19	21
Fairly satisfied	46	37	63	60	47	54	51	48	53	46	56
Not very satisfied	15	4	12	20	10	26	6	6	10	21	16
Not at all satisfied	8	1	2	7	6	10	3	1	3	14	6
Don't know	1	2	3	1	1	.	2	1	2	.	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ¹	2.99	3.52	3.05	2.76	3.13	2.64	3.27	3.36	3.16	2.69	2.94
Very satisfied	16	58	13	10	30	12	32	47	30	15	19
Fairly satisfied	63	37	71	63	55	57	59	45	56	48	60
Not very satisfied	15	3	13	21	11	23	7	5	10	25	16
Not at all satisfied	5	.	2	5	4	7	1	1	3	12	4
Don't know	1	2	1	1	.	1	1	2	.	.	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.91	3.55	2.96	2.80	3.12	2.74	3.25	3.40	3.15	2.65	2.94

¹ Excluding Northern Ireland in 1973.

² Weighted average, excluding Greece in 1973.

3 "Very satisfied" = 4; "not at all satisfied" = 1. Don't knows excluded. The mid-point is 2.5: higher scores reflect relative satisfaction and lower scores relative dissatisfaction.

Table 9
FEELING OF HAPPINESS

	8	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
May 1975											
Very happy	36	38	11	16	17	6	24	31	22	:	16
Fairly happy	51	49	63	55	53	48	50	54	50	:	54
Not too happy	10	6	21	27	30	44	21	10	27	:	27
Don't know	3	7	1	5	1	2	5	5	1	:	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
Index ²	2.90	3.03	2.34	2.33	2.30	1.90	2.54	2.84	2.42	:	2.32
October 1983											
Very happy	26	36	11	13	32	6	23	41	27	12	16
Fairly happy	60	47	69	63	57	59	66	50	58	46	61
Not too happy	10	14	16	23	11	34	9	8	14	41	21
Don't know	4	1	3	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.76	2.84	2.42	2.34	2.82	2.08	2.71	3.00	2.70	2.06	2.43
October 1984											
Very happy	22	35	12	13	35	11	19	43	27	11	18
Fairly happy	62	50	70	63	54	58	69	50	59	51	61
Not too happy	14	12	14	22	10	29	9	5	14	37	19
Don't know	2	3	4	1	2	1	3	2	.	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.62	2.84	2.46	2.37	2.87	2.23	2.65	3.07	2.68	2.09	2.48

¹ Weighted average.

² "Very happy" = 4; "fairly happy" = 2.5; "not too happy" = 1.
Don't knows excluded.

1.5. SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS

"On the whole, are you very satisfied, &u~.tgsatisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)?"

By contrast with the previous questions on satisfaction with life and feelings of happiness, which measure an essentially private mood, this one provides information on a public mood: an overall judgment on political systems and governments¹. As a result, this variable is strongly influenced by political events: government crises, elections, and so on. It is, therefore, relatively unstable, although here again there are certain cultural norms which come into play: for example, the Germans have tended over the last eight years (although not in 1973) to be markedly more satisfied with the way democracy works than have the French and the Italians.

In October 1984 the most satisfied were the Danes, the Germans, the Luxembourgers and the Greeks, while the Italians were the least satisfied.

There had been no significant changes since the previous survey in April 1984 but a comparison with the autumn 1983 survey showed a slight increase in dissatisfaction in Belgium, France and Greece, and a slight increase in satisfaction in Italy.

Since September 1973, when this question was asked for the first time, there have been two opposite trends: growing satisfaction in Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom; and growing dissatisfaction in Belgium.

Only closer analysis of these variations over a relatively long period of time would reveal to what extent this is due to the popularity of successive governments and to what extent it is a more general attitude to the system².

(See Table 10 and Table 6 in the Appendix)

1 There is a very strong correlation ($r = .573$) between satisfaction with life and feelings of happiness. It is less strong ($r = .335$) between satisfaction with life and satisfaction with democracy, and still less strong ($r = .229$) between satisfaction with democracy and feelings of happiness.

2 See Eurobarometer No. 19, June 1983, pp. 27-37, and in particular the graphs showing the correlation - in intensity and popularity - between satisfaction with the way democracy is working and political ideology.

1.6. BASIC ATTITUDES TO SOCIETY: - ~~REVOLUTION~~, ~~REFORM~~, ~~DEFENCE AGAINST~~
SUBVERSION

"(SHOW CARD) . On this card there are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-a-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion.

- 1. The entire way owl society is organised must be radically changed by revolutionary action.*
- 2. Our society must be gradually improved by reforms.*
- 3. OWL present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces."*

This indicator which also measures what we have described as a public mood, reflects the basic options which go to make up a value system. Freed from the constraints of party political labels and without really being tied to a position on the left/right spectrum to actual level of satisfaction with the way democracy works, the respondent is given the opportunity of expressing an attitude on the future of society; the choice is between a fairly reformist attitude, a radical revolutionary one or an attitude of resistance to anything which could disrupt (subvert) the established order and accepted ideas and values¹.

As in previous surveys, the reformist option, which commands a large majority, was selected by more than ²two in every three Europeans and as many as three in every four Italians².

The anti-subversion option was chosen by a sizeable minority - as much as or more than one third in Denmark, the United Kingdom and Germany.

The revolutionary option *is* supported by a very *small* minority, ranging from only 2% to 8%. The lowest figures were recorded in Denmark and Luxembourg, and the highest in Greece.

Comparisons with previous surveys show that support for the anti-subversion option has decreased since 1976 in Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and increased slightly in Belgium and the United Kingdom. However, the most significant change is in support of the revolutionary option, which was as high as 13% or 14% in Italy and France eight years ago and has now dropped by half.

¹ It should be stressed that this is a forced-choice question. Apart from refusing to answer at all, the respondent must express a preference. The number of don't knows have proved to be very low: on average 7% since the question was first put.

² Since under 30% of Italians are satisfied with the way democracy works, the chronic dissatisfaction expressed by the majority of respondents is clearly directed against the government in office rather than against the system. In the Community as a whole, answers to this question correlate to about the same degree with religious feelings as with satisfaction with democracy; however, in both cases the correlations are weak.

Where comparisons with 1970 are possible, they should be carried out with caution as the wording of the question has changed slightly. This said, it would seem that the defence option has gained a certain amount of ground over the past fourteen years.

(See Table 11 and Table 7 in the Appendix)

Table 11

BASIC ATTITUDES TO SOCIETY
(per 100 actually replying)¹

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
February-March 1970³											
Revolutionary action	4	-	2	5	-	6	1	6	-	-	(5)
Reforms	80	-	76	82	-	80	70	78	-	-	(79)
Defence against subversion	16	-	22	13	-	12	29	16	-	-	(16)
October-November 1976											
Revolutionary action	6	4	2	14	8	13	2	5	8	-	8
Reforms	73	55	56	67	67	68	59	60	65	-	64
Defence against subversion	21	41	42	19	25	19	39	35	27	-	28
October 1983											
Revolutionary action	7	2	3	8	9	6	3	8	5	9	6
Reform	70	62	53	69	66	72	69	63	66	63	65
Defence against subversion	23	36	44	23	25	22	28	29	29	28	29
April 1984											
Revolutionary action	9	2	3	6	6	6	3	4	4	7	5
Reforms	73	66	56	70	66	76	75	71	70	68	68
Defence against subversion	18	32	41	24	28	18	22	25	26	25	27
October 1984											
Revolutionary action	5	2	3	7	5	6	2	5	5	8	5
Reforms	68	65	62	70	70	75	68	68	64	65	68
Defence against subversion	27	33	35	23	25	18	30	27	31	27	27

¹ Meaning those who explicitly choose one of the three options offered.

² Weighted average: six countries in 1970, nine in 1976, and ten in 1983 and 1984.

³ In 1970 the wording of the reformist option was 'slightly different' ('by intelligent reforms'). This may have made it somewhat more attractive.

CHAPTER II

ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

II

ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Besides the regular questions designed to measure emotional attachment to European unification and views on Community membership, other questions were asked to explore attitudes to possible developments within the Community.

II.1. FOR OR AGAINST WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

"In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for, or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent against, or very much against?"

This survey confirmed once again the remarkable stability of attitudes to the efforts being made to advance the unification of Western Europe at least in the short term. There was widespread support in all Community countries except Denmark. At least eight out of every ten interviewed in the six founder members and between six and seven out of every ten in Ireland, Greece and the United Kingdom were in favour. There were few opponents, but there was a comparatively high percentage of don't knows in Ireland.

The results for the ten countries may be summarized as follows:

	For	Against	Don't know	Total
Six founder members	82%	8%	10%	100%
United Kingdom	69	15	16	100
Greece	67	16	17	100
Ireland	60	13	27	100
Denmark	38	43	19	100
Community	77	10	13	100

However, with answers so stable, even relatively long-term variations become significant.

A comparison with the surveys undertaken since 1975 shows a decline in support in three of the founder members (Germany, Italy and Luxembourg) and in Denmark. By contrast, there has been a considerable increase in support in the United Kingdom. These trends are even more pronounced by comparison with the autumn 1973 survey.

(See Table 12 and Table 8 in the Appendix)

In the case of the original Member States, it is possible to go even further back, as the question was first asked there early in 1962 - twenty-two years ago.

The first point to emerge is that some of the ~~don't~~ knows have come off the fence in nearly all the countries surveyed; this means that the threshold of information required to form an opinion has been crossed.

The second point to emerge is the thinning out of the ranks of the most committed supporters in Germany and the Netherlands. The total number of favourable responses ("very much for" and "to some extent for") has remained fairly stable everywhere and has even increased in Italy¹. It is, however, clear that most of the former ~~don't~~ knows (ignorance or indecision) have moved to the lukewarm camp: they are not against European unification but neither are they sufficiently convinced (or well-informed) to join the ranks of the "very much for". Given the feeble results of the "efforts" referred to in the question, this is hardly surprising.

(See Table 13)

For the countries where it is technically possible, it seemed worthwhile to compare the results for 1984 with those for 1962 and to break them down by age². This can be done in two ways: by making a straightforward comparison using the same age group twenty-two years on, for example the 20-34 year-olds in 1962 and their peers in 1984; or by studying the trend of a given cohort over the period in question, for example young people aged between 20 and 34 in 1962 and the same generation now aged between 42 and 56.

1. We shall begin with the simpler method, comparing the same age group in each survey³.

It is difficult to reach valid conclusions for the four countries concerned.

¹ Luxembourg is excluded, since the 1962 results appear aberrated.

² This comparison cannot be made for Luxembourg. The breakdown by age of the 1962 results for Italy is not available.

³ Such analyses should obviously be treated with caution, given the size of sub-samples for each group.

Table 12
SUPPORT FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION
(1973-84)

	B	DK	O	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK ¹	GR	EC ²
September 1973	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very much for	22	17	49	23	21	34	47	34	14	:	30
To some extent for	38	28	29	45	31	36	33	39	23	:	33
To some extent against	3	14	4	3	8	2	1	8	15	:	6
Very much against	2	18	2	1	4	1	-	7	15	:	5
Don't know ³	35	23	16	12	8	13	6	11	9	11	26
Total Index ⁴	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
	3.24	2.56	3.50	3.25	3.07	3.41	3.57	3.15	2.53	:	3.19
1975-1982 (eleven surveys)										(5)	
Very much for	22	15	36	24	21	37	44	32	22	34	29
To some extent for	42	30	41	51	40	44	39	44	37	28	42
To some extent against	6	18	7	6	10	5	7	7	13	9	8
Very much against	2	17	2	2	4	1	2	4	9	8	4
Don't know ³	28	20	14	17	25	13	8	13	19	21	17
Total Index ⁴	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	3.18	2.53	3.30	3.18	3.04	3.34	3.35	3.19	2.87	3.10	3.15
April 1983											
Very much for	27	13	36	25	16	36	39	29	20	31	29
To some extent for	41	32	49	50	39	44	39	46	40	30	45
To some extent against	6	19	5	5	9	5	8	10	15	6	6
Very much against	1	18	1	1	4	1	3	5	5	6	3
Don't know ³	25	18	9	19	32	14	11	10	20	27	15
Total Index ⁴	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	3.25	2.48	3.30	3.20	2.98	3.34	3.27	3.11	2.93	3.17	3.18
October 1983											
Very much for	23	12	34	29	21	35	47	33	29	40	31
To some extent for	48	27	42	50	41	45	32	39	41	29	44
To some extent against	7	20	6	7	7	5	9	9	9	5	7
Very much against	3	23	2	2	4	2	3	6	5	5	3
Don't know ³	19	18	16	12	27	13	9	13	16	21	15
Total Index ⁴	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	3.13	2.34	3.27	3.21	3.07	3.31	3.35	3.13	3.12	3.33	3.21
Don't know	13	19	9	13	27	9	5	8	16	17	12
Total Index ⁴	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	3.23	2.33	3.26	3.24	3.01	3.28	3.28	3.18	3.07	3.11	3.19

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 see following page.

Table 13

GENERAL I F

IN THE SIX FOUNDER MEMB OF THE COMMUNITY

(1962-84)⁶

	B	D	F	I	L	NL	EUR 6
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>February-March 1962</u>							
Very much for	31	50	28	36	11	62	40
To some extent for	34}65	31}81	44}72	24}60	16}27	25}87	32}72
To some extent against	4	3	5	3	3	3	4
Very much against	1	1	2	1	2	1	1
Don't know	30	15	21	36	68	9	23
Index	3.35	3.53	3.24	3.48	3.11	3.62	3.44
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	3.24	3.25	3.23	3.29	3.30	3.18	3.25

¹ Excluding Northern Ireland in 1973.

² Weighted average.

³ In 1973 and 1975 the answer "indifferent" was also possible. The percentages for this answer have been added to the **don't knows**; this may go some way to explaining the subsequent fall in the number of those not replying.

⁴ "Very much for" = 4; "very much against" = 1. Don't knows excluded.

⁵ Five surveys only, starting in October 1980.

⁶ The 1962 survey covered only respondents aged at least 20; the 1984 results have been recalculated on the same basis. Mainly because of the size of the sample (N = 184), the 1962 results for Luxembourg are not significant.

The results in Belgium reflect the combined effects of firstly, the don't knows making up their minds and secondly, their apparent shift to a generally favourable, but not deeply committed stance. This is true of all four age groups but today's 50-64 year-olds seem to be less in favour of European unification than their predecessors twenty-two years ago .

In Germany enthusiastic support has declined among all age groups. As in Belgium, today's 50-64 year-olds are considerably less in favour than their predecessors were in 1962. By contrast, those now aged 65 and over, who were born before 1919, are more enthusiastic than the same age group in 1962, who were born just before the beginning of the century.

Attitudes in France have remained remarkably stable over the twenty-two years; the most that can be said in terms of change is that while in 1962 it was those under 50 who were slightly more in favour of European unification, it is now those over 50 who tend to be stronger supporters.

(See Table 14)

2. Analysis by cohort reveals two different kinds of trend, except in the case of France where the amazingly stable attitudes require no further comment.

In Belgium and Germany, support had declined most among the cohorts born before 1928, i.e. those aged under 35 in 1962. This decline seems slightly greater in Belgium among the oldest age group (the over-50s in, 1962, born before the 1914-18 war) and in Germany among those aged between 35 and 49 in 1962, who were born between 1913 and 1927 and were 18 between 1931 and 1945.

In the Netherlands, by contrast, it is among the youngest cohort, born between 1928 and 1942, whose formative years coincided with the birth of European unification during the fifties, that enthusiasm has declined most .

(See Table 15)

If these tentative findings are confirmed in subsequent polls, they will demonstrate once again that attitudes to European unification are extremely complex and are strongly influenced in the long term not just by political events, successes, crises and setbacks in the Community, but also by the historical and cultural background in each country.

¹ In 1962, those aged between 50 and 64, who were born between 1898 and 1912, had had personal experience of two world wars. Could this experience have predisposed them in favour of European unification?

Table 14
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION
(1962)
BY EUROPEAN GROUP¹

	20-34	35-49	50-64	65 or over	20-34	35-49	50-64	65 or over
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	X
Don't know	34	31	22	38	10	13	14	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	3.37	3.34	3.38	3.26	3.26	3.27	3.21	3.18
N	213	293	188	74	351	219	239	166
GERMANY								
Very much for	51	52	48	49	38	40	37	30
To some extent for	30	32	33	28	41	47	42	43
Don't know	14	12	16	19	12	7	7	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	3.51	3.54	3.52	2.87	3.32	3.35	3.22	3.10
N	388	514	421	182	241	263	221	202
FRANCE								
Very much for	28	29	27	29	23	29	32	31
To some extent for	45	45	44	41	56	54	48	45
To some extent against	6	3	6	7	5	7	6	6
Very much against	1	2	2	1	2	1	.	1
Don't know	20	21	21	22	14	9	14	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	3.25	3.26	3.20	3.24	3.17	3.22	3.29	3.29
N	450	430	392	240	308	229	215	169
NETHERLANDS								
Very much for	30	25	26					
To some extent for	1	4	3					
To some extent against	2	.	.					
Very much against	9	8	7	14	9	8	7	7
Don't know								
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	3.57	3.64	3.63	3.62	3.06	3.16	3.32	3.31
N	252	278	185	64	319	264	192	134

¹ Results for Luxembourg are not included in this Table because of the small size of the samples. The breakdown by age of the 1962 results for Italy is not available.

Table 15
ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNIFICATION
(1962-84)
BY COHORT¹

	aged 20-34	aged 42-56	aged 35-49	aged 57-71	aged 50 or	aged 72 or
Don't know	34	15	31	12	26	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	3.37	3.29	3.34	3.19	3.35	3.15
Y	213	214	293	223	262	93
GERMANY						
Don't know	14	5	12	11	16	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	3.51	3.34	3.54	3.11	3.53	3.20
Y	388	266	514	215	603	92
FRANCE						
Don't know	20	12	21	16	21	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	3.25	3.27	3.26	3.28	3.22	3.35
Y	450	213	430	183	632	97
NETHERLANDS						
Don't know	9	9	8	4	8	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	3.57	3.14	3.64	3.42	3.63	3.29
N	252	218	278	155	249	79

¹ See note Table 14.

11.2. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE J []

11.2.1. Feeling that one's country has benefited - more or less than others - from its membership of the Community

"Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community (Common Market)?

If yes, has it benefited more or less than the other countries which are members of the European Community?"

For the sake of clarity we shall look in turn at the two questions: does the respondent feel that his country has benefited from Community membership; and has it benefited more or less (or as much as) the others?

1. On average, one European in two feels that his country has benefited from Community membership but views differ considerably from one country to another: between six and seven out of every ten respondents in Ireland (61%), Italy (63%), the Netherlands (64%) and Luxembourg (72%) answered in the affirmative, while almost six Britons in ten (57%) answered in the negative. The United Kingdom was the only country where the majority felt that their country had not benefited.

Over the last eighteen months (three surveys), replies have remained fairly stable in the Community as a whole, though with a significant fall in positive answers in Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and France and an increase in Ireland and Greece.

Clearly, this question will have to be repeated over a longer period of time if variations are to be interpreted accurately.

(See Table 16)

2. Since a comparatively high proportion of interviewees - which varied from one country to another - failed to reply to the first question, the don't knows will be excluded from our analysis of answers to the second question.

This question explicitly provides for two possible replies: "more than the others" and "less than the others". In fact, in most countries the majority of interviewees spontaneously volunteered what could be described as an equivocal answer: "as much as the others". The only exceptions were the United Kingdom and Greece where the majority opted for the negative reply. However, it should be noted that in Germany there were almost as many negative replies (40%) as positive ones (42%).

Table 16

**FEELING THAT ONE'S COUNTRY HAS OR HAS NOT BENEFITED FROM MEMBERSHIP
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY**

	B	OK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ¹
	X	%	%	X	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>March-April 1983</u>											
Feel that their country has benefited from membership of the European Community	59	51	49	54	56	69	74	78	32	44	52
Feel that their country has not benefited	6	31	15	21	28	14	12	11	57	25	25
Don't know	35	18	36	25	16	17	14	11	11	31	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>March-April 1984</u>											
Feel that their country has benefited from membership of the European Community	49	42	39	50	59	58	73	67	32	44	46
Feel that their country has not benefited	22	34	24	24	29	20	14	17	56	35	30
Don't know	29	24	37	26	12	22	13	16	12	21	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>October 1984</u>											
Feel that their country has benefited from membership of the European Community	48	44	46	47	61	63	72	64	32	51	48
Feel that their country has not benefited	28	34	35	28	28	23	16	19	57	28	34
Don't know	24	22	19	25	11	14	12	17	11	21	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹ Weighted average

Since there were in fact three possible answers, it is easier to interpret the results using an index, with the maximum value (3.00) corresponding by convention to the answer "more than the others", the minimum value (1.00) to the answer "less than the others", and the mid-point (2.00) to the spontaneous answer "as much as the others".

This shows that, of those who consider that their country has benefited from Community membership, the Irish and the Danes, followed by the Luxembourgers and the Dutch, are the most likely to consider the benefits equal to or greater than those enjoyed by other countries. Analysis also shows that there is a high positive correlation between the first and the second answers: the larger the proportion of the population which considers that membership has on the whole been beneficial, the more likely it is that those who hold this belief will consider that their country has benefited at least as much as, if not more than, other countries. There is a sort of psychological motivation to associate advantage in itself with comparative advantage.

Let us now turn to the trend in answers over the last twelve months, as we have a time scale with three reference points.

The present survey shows only slight changes by comparison with the previous two but those that there are, appear to point in opposite directions' a slight increase in positive replies in Denmark and Luxembourg' but a considerable decrease in Ireland.

(See Table 17)

Answers to this double question on the advantages of Community membership may be summarized as follows.

1. In all countries except the United Kingdom, the majority feel that their country has benefited from Community membership. Length of membership does not appear to be a decisive factor since the Irish and the Greeks are more convinced than the Belgians, French and Germans.

2. Even though they entered the Community more recently than the six founder members, the Irish and even the Danes who have an opinion on the subject are more likely to consider that their countries have benefited at least as much as the others.

3. In the United Kingdom, the only country where the majority (57%) feel that they have not benefited from Community membership, even those who do not hold this view (32%) feel that they have done less well than the other countries.

4. In Germany there is a growing minority who think that their country has not benefited from Community membership and even among those who do not hold this view, there has been some increase in the number who believe that Germany has lost out to some extent.

5. The trend in Italy is less clearcut but suggests that criticism has increased in recent months.

¹ The variation in Luxembourg is not significant.

Table 17

FEELING THAT ONE'S COUNTRY HAS BENEFITED MORE OR LESS THAN OTHERS

FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

(out of 100 people who feel their country has benefited from membership)

October 1984													March-April 1984													March-April 1983												
Index ³													Index ³													Index ³												
Total													Total													Total												
Don't know													Don't know													Don't know												
- less than the others													- less than the others													- less than the others												
- as much as the others ²													- as much as the others ²													- as much as the others ²												
- more than the others													- more than the others													- more than the others												
Feel that their country has benefited:													Feel that their country has benefited:													Feel that their country has benefited:												
B	16	51	24	8	14	21	42	48	12	34	18	27	16	55	48	11	25	30	12	15	43	38	19	23	33	25	12	1.82	100	2.01	100	2.05	100					
DK	21	57	8	14	5	13	40	21	9	8	20	12	16	46	29	17	24	16	30	16	59	46	21	33	24	30	8	2.15	100	2.12	100	2.06	100					
D	13	48	21	5	14	21	40	21	9	9	20	25	16	51	29	18	24	16	33	16	59	46	21	33	24	30	8	1.71	100	1.90	100	1.75	100					
F	12	48	21	9	8	20	38	21	9	10	22	33	14	41	26	9	16	16	22	30	35	35	27	27	18	18	30	1.89	100	1.92	100	1.84	100					
IRL	34	38	20	8	10	22	33	14	10	20	22	33	14	18	26	18	14	14	18	19	34	28	17	13	14	19	19	2.16	100	2.22	100	2.95	100					
I	18	45	25	12	12	12	45	25	8	10	22	33	14	18	26	18	14	14	20	20	49	28	17	13	14	20	18	1.92	100	1.81	100	1.89	100					
L	27	46	16	9	16	9	46	16	27	10	20	50	20	24	48	24	14	14	20	20	49	28	17	13	14	20	20	2.12	100	2.07	100	2.04	100					
NL	16	55	13	16	16	9	55	13	16	10	20	50	20	24	48	24	14	14	20	20	49	28	17	13	14	20	18	2.04	100	2.11	100	2.07	100					
UK	12	29	48	11	11	11	29	48	11	11	29	48	11	8	22	8	53	39	17	15	20	29	17	22	19	14	14	1.59	100	1.47	100	1.61	100					
GR	19	23	38	25	11	25	23	38	19	25	23	38	19	15	17	15	39	29	29	20	20	29	17	22	19	14	14	1.81	100	1.67	100	1.86	100					
EC ¹	15	43	30	12	100	100	43	30	100	100	43	30	100	15	37	15	39	28	20	16	35	28	29	31	21	21	21	1.83	100	1.84	100	1.84	100					

Weighted average

Volunteered 7

3 "More than the others" = 3; "Less than the others" = 1; don't know

excluded.

Since the code for "as much as the others" was omitted, the results for Denmark were estimated using the average replies for the survey immediately before and the survey immediately after.

11.2.2. VIEWS ON COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

"Generally speaking, do you think (your country's) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"

Although answers to this question are in high correlation with those to the previous one, the two variables are nevertheless distinct. Depending on the country, the percentage of people who think that membership of the Community is a "good thing" is sometimes larger and sometimes smaller than the percentage of people who think that their country has already benefited from membership. Country-by-country analysis of the results shows that all the founder members of the Community fall into the first category and three of the four other countries into the second. The United Kingdom could also be included in the second category as the difference between the two percentages is so slight.

There are two possible explanations - which are not mutually exclusive. It is possible - and, indeed, probable - that the fact of having belonged to the Community for a long time leads to a degree of identification or at least a sort of unthinking acceptance: "We're in it so it must be all right". But it also seems that a positive view of membership has a greater pro-European ideological content (and no doubt emotional content) than a spur-of-the-moment assessment of the advantages secured¹.

In autumn 1984 almost six Europeans in ten thought that their country's membership of the Community was "a good thing" while only one in ten held the opposite view. In all countries without exception, supporters outnumbered opponents although the margin is still narrow in Denmark and the United Kingdom.

There has been practically no change since early 1983, except in the United Kingdom where support overtook opposition in autumn 1983; however, there has been no further progress since then.

Comparison with September 1983, when this question was first asked, again shows considerable stability, although there has been a slight fall in support in Germany, a somewhat larger one in Ireland, and a slight increase in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

(See Table 18 and Table 9 in the Appendix)

¹ This hypothesis is supported by the fact that views in Community membership correlate more with support for European unification than utilitarian assessments of the advantages secured. The coefficients of correlation for the sample as a whole are respectively $r = .459$ and $r = .336$.

Table 18
GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK ¹	GR	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
September 1973											
Good thing	57	42	63	61	56	69	67	63	31	:	56
Neither good nor bad	19	19	22	22	21	15	22	20	22	:	20
Bad thing	5	30	4	5	15	2	3	4	34	:	11
Don't know	19	9	11	12	8	14	8	13	13	:	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
Index ³	2.64	2.13	2.66	2.64	2.45	2.78	2.70	2.68	1.97	:	2.52
1974-1982 (18 surveys)										(4)	
Good thing	59	35	59	57	52	73	75	75	33	40	56
Neither good nor bad	22	26	25	28	23	16	15	14	23	27	23
Bad thing	4	29	6	7	19	4	4	4	37	20	13
Don't know	15	10	10	8	6	7	6	7	7	13	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.65	2.07	2.58	2.54	2.35	2.73	2.75	2.76	1.96	2.23	2.46
April 1983											
Good thing	62	35	61	53	45	70	72	77	28	42	53
Neither good nor bad	19	30	26	30	28	18	18	15	29	29	25
Bad thing	3	24	5	7	20	4	5	4	36	12	13
Don't know	16	11	8	10	7	8	5	4	7	17	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.70	2.12	2.60	2.51	2.27	2.71	2.71	2.75	1.91	2.35	2.45
October 1983											
Good thing	62	35	57	55	42	76	70	60	36	47	55
Neither good nor bad	19	28	24	29	26	17	16	10	30	30	24
Bad thing	5	26	9	9	25	5	6	4	28	12	13
Don't know	14	11	10	7	7	2	8	6	6	11	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.66	2.10	2.53	2.49	2.18	2.70	2.73	2.81	2.09	2.40	2.47
March-April 1984											
Good thing	59	31	53	62	43	70	80	80	34	38	55
Neither good nor bad	25	30	31	27	27	20	14	13	30	35	27
Bad thing	7	29	5	4	23	3	3	3	30	18	11
Don't know	9	10	11	7	7	7	3	4	6	9	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.58	2.02	2.54	2.62	2.22	2.71	2.80	2.79	2.04	2.22	2.48
October 1984											
Good thing	65	33	57	63	47	72	80	79	38	45	58
Neither good nor bad	25	29	33	27	27	20	15	13	25	29	26
Bad thing	5	28	5	5	20	2	4	4	33	16	11
Don't know	5	10	5	5	6	6	1	4	4	10	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.63	2.06	2.55	2.60	2.29	2.73	2.77	2.78	2.05	2.33	2.49

¹ Excluding Northern Ireland in 1973 and 1974.

² Weighted average including Greece from autumn '1980.'

³ "Good thing" = 3; "neither good nor bad" = 2; "bad thing" = 1. Don't knows excluded.

⁴ Five surveys only, from October 1980.

The results would seem to indicate that, in eight of its ten member countries, the European Community still enjoys the permissive support of public opinion. Possibly, through force of habit, this support is sufficiently strong to have survived years of economic recession but not strong enough to motivate citizens and political parties to press for further progress towards European unification.

This will be considered in detail in the next two sections.

II.2.3. Solving problems at national or at Community level

On several occasions in the last ten years a question has been asked in various forms to find out which issues people feel could be dealt with better at Community level than at national level. It was repeated in autumn 1984.

"Here are a number of present day problems (Show CARD). For each one would you tell me if it is better that decisions about it should be taken by each country separately or by the member countries of the European Community (Common Market) acting together?"

Let us start by looking at the most recent answers.

The first point to emerge is that in all the countries without exception, a majority - and often a large one at that - is in favour of decisions on all the issues mentioned being taken by "the member countries of the Community acting together" rather than by "each country separately".

Admittedly, we may well wonder how accurate these replies are. They express opinions, or an amalgam of fairly vague ideas or feelings, which are not necessarily translated into the corresponding behaviour. Moreover, those who reply "by the member countries acting together" probably do not fully understand all the implications of their choice: who would decide, in what way, and so on. But the facts are impressive: the majority of Europeans in every country are in favour of collective or joint action in preference to separate action.

The size of the majority varies according to the country and the issue. Let us look at this in a little more detail.

In the Community as a whole, the priorities for joint or collective action are, in order of preference:

¹ There followed a list of seven problems, which are given below.

- helping the countries of the Third World (78% as against 13%);
- protecting the environment and fighting pollution (76% as against 20%);
- guaranteeing energy supplies (71% as against 22%);
- helping the least developed regions (66% as against 26%);
- fighting rising prices (65% as against 30%);
- protecting national security against external threats (63% as against 30%);
- stimulating the economy to help fight unemployment (61% as against 34%).

Of the individual countries, those most likely on average to opt for Community action are Luxembourg, Italy and Belgium, with Denmark, Greece and the United Kingdom not surprisingly at the other end of the scale, but - it should not be forgotten - still with a preference for this option.

(See Table 19)

A "political" interpretation of these results must remain tentative. A different selection of problems, even changes in the wording of the question, could have produced different answers. It is also likely that the problems for which people are most likely to advocate collective or joint action are those which are rated relatively unimportant, such as aid to the Third World and protection of the environment, whereas sovereign decisions at national level are more generally preferred for questions of national security and general socio-economic policy (employment and inflation).

In this connection, it is interesting to note which combination of problems and countries produces the narrowest margin between the two options¹. They are:

- Denmark: the fight against unemployment (working together 47%, separately 44%) and the fight against rising prices (48% as against 42%);
- Ireland: national security (48% as against 45%);
- the United Kingdom: the fight against unemployment (50% as against 44%).

This highlighting of the points which remain sensitive in certain countries to some extent confirms the accuracy of the answers and the relevance of the question.

The answers to these questions, and undoubtedly the attitudes they reflect, are influenced very little by the level of cognitive mobilization of the interviewees: opinion leaders and non-leaders are distinguished only by the higher proportion of don't knows among the latter².

¹ Only differences of less than ten percentage points between the two options have been included.

² By cognitive mobilization, we mean the ability to take an interest in relatively complex, remote or abstract ideas. This variable is measured here by replies to two questions, one on ability to persuade others, and the second on frequency of political discussions. To see how the index was produced, see Eurobarometer No. 5, July 1976, pp. 1 and 2.

Table 19

SEPARATE OR JOINT ACTION TO DEAL WITH CERTAIN PROBLEMS

	B	OK	O	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
										19	26
										66	66
Don't know	10	13	11	6	8	6	5	7	9	15	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Protecting the environment and											
										34	20
										56	76
Don't know	5	6	2	3	5	5	1	4	5	10	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Fighting rising prices											
										30	30
										60	65
Don't know	5	10	5	3	3	6	3	7	5	10	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Stimulating the economy so as											
										35	34
										55	61
										10	5
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
										30	22
										57	71
										13	7
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
										15	13
										71	78
										14	9
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Protecting (your country's) security against external threats both present and future											
Separately	21	30	34	26	45	20	13	28	36	34	29
Together	69	58	60	68	48	72	82	64	57	53	64
Don't know	10	12	6	6	7	8	5	8	7	13	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Weighted average

As might have been expected, preference for joint rather than separate action correlates with general attitudes towards Western European unification. The correlation is in the same direction for all countries and problems but varies in intensity.

As regards countries, it is higher in Greece and Denmark than elsewhere¹ and as regards problems, it is highest on average on the subject of national security, particularly in Denmark and Greece.

*
* *

These analyses show that, with some variations in emphasis but generally fairly consistently, most Europeans claim that they are prepared to accept decisions on objectively important topics being taken by the Community acting collectively rather than by each country acting separately. This has not always been the case.

The data available over a period of time show a growing trend towards the European option. Although it suffered a fairly general decline in popularity between 1976 and 1978, it then picked up again and had overtaken its previous level by early 1983.

It would be tedious to spell out the findings of this historical analysis for all the problems included in the 1984 survey. We shall look here at only four, selected from those for which we have a long series of comparable data:

- two problems where the Community option now has the greatest lead over the national option ("protecting the environment and fighting pollution" and "guaranteeing energy supplies");
- two problems where its lead is smallest ("stimulating the economy so as to help fight unemployment" and "protecting the security² (of the country) against external threats both present and future")².

1. Environment policy

This is the classic example of the type of problem which seems to lend itself to a Community-level solution. In fact, in 1974-75 on average more than two in every three interviewees selected this option in preference to the national one.

¹ Apart from Luxembourg, where the size of the sample precludes any comment.

² There have been some differences in wording from one survey to another. These will be mentioned as and when appropriate.

In 1976-78, for reasons which are not immediately clear but which could be looked into, only just over half the respondents (52% in autumn 1976 and 54% in autumn 1978) favoured the Community option.

In October 1984, as in April 1983, three quarters of those interviewed were in favour of collective action.

(See Table 20)

2. Energy policy

There is a high level of stability here, with seven in every ten Community citizens coming out in favour of joint action over the last decade. The numbers have increased significantly in Ireland and the United Kingdom but decreased in Germany and the Netherlands.

(See Table 21)

3. The fight against unemployment

There has been a remarkable increase in favour of joint action in all countries between 1976 and 1983-84, reversing the results almost everywhere: a sizeable majority in favour of individual action in five out of nine countries in 1976 to a sizeable majority in favour of a joint approach in all ten countries in 1983-84.

(See Table 22)

4. Security and defence

Although security and defence are not part of the Community's present remit, their objective importance makes it interesting to see how public thinking about them has changed.

Since the questions asked in 1983-84 were slightly different from those used in 1976-78, comparisons must be made with caution. However, there is no reason to believe that this makes the results any less valid as the trend follows the very same lines as we noted above. In all nine countries where the findings can be compared over a period of eight years, the Community option has gained ground.

(See Table 23)

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To sum up, there would appear to be a fairly general consensus among Community citizens that unity means strength. However, they clearly underestimate the wide variety of difficulties which would have to be overcome before aspirations can become political goals.

Table 20

SEPARATE OR JOINT ACTION

"PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT AND FIGHTING POLLUTION"

October-November 1974		May 1975				November 1976				November 1976				October-November 1978				April 1983				October 1984														
Separately	Together	Don't know	Total	Separately	Together	Don't know	Total	Separately	Together	Don't know	Total	Separately	Together	Don't know	Total	Separately	Together	Don't know	Total	Separately	Together	Don't know	Total													
19	67	14	100	17	26	21	18	62	24	71	5	100	37	56	38	100	42	57	34	9	100	41	52	37	11	100	30	14	82	61	9	100	20	29	75	100
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC 1																										

¹ Weighted average including Greece from 1983.

Table 21

SEPARATE OR JOINT ACTION
"GUARANTEEING ENERGY SUPPLIES"

	8	DK	D	F	IRL	I	1	NL	UK	GR	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>October-November 1974²</u>											
• Separately	9	15	12	12	12	13	10	15	35	:	18
• Together	75	69	83	76	67	82	77	82	54	:	74
Don't know	16	16	5	12	6	5	13	3	11	:	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
<u>May 1975²</u>											
• Separately	9	20	13	12	35	15	11	9	34	:	18
• Together	70	57	77	76	56	78	62	71	53	:	70
Don't know	21	23	10	12	9	7	27	20	13	:	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
<u>April 1983</u>											
Don't know	19	14	5	8	8	8	6	5	7	20	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>October 1984</u>											
Don't know	6	10	4	5	7	8	3	6	9	13	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹ Weighted average including Greece from 1983.

² In 1974 and 1975 the wording was "a policy on energy supplies".

Table 22

SEPARATE OR JOINT ACTION

"STIMULATING THE ECONOMY SO AS TO HELP FIGHT UNEMPLOYMENT"

IRL											
Don't know	13	11	10	9	4	9	29	8	5		9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
October-November 1978 ¹											
Don't know	15	11	14	6	3	8	29	11	6		9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
October 1982											
Don't know	20	15	18	12	8	11	10	10	9	17	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
April 1983											
Don't know	16	12	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	14	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Don't know	5	9	4	4	3	5	2	6	6	10	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹ Weighted average including Greece from 1983.

² In 1976 and 1978 the wording was "fighting unemployment".

Table 23

SEPARATE OR JOINT ACTION
SECURITY AND DEFENCE

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ¹
Don't know	23	19	15	17	15	23	(52)	15	9		16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
<u>October-November 1978</u> ²											
Don't know	29	24	18	16	11	21	16	19	8		17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
<u>October 1984</u> ³											
Don't know	23	17	11	8	12	10	11	10	7	14	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>October 1984</u> ³											
Don't know	10	12	6	6	7	8	5	8	7	13	7
Total	100	100	100	160	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹ The 1976 results for Luxembourg seem rather strange.

² Weighted average including Greece from 1983.

³ "Strengthening (the country's) military defence against possible enemies".

II.2.4. Speeding up or slowing down European unification

"Some people consider the Common Market as being a step towards a closer union between the member states. Personally, do you yourself think the movement towards the unification of Europe should be speeded up, slowed down, or continued as it is at present?"

While the previous question dealt with hopes for improved management of the major problems facing our countries through collective or joint action, this question is more ideological. Answers correlate highly with general support for European unification and have remained very stable over the last ten years.

In the Community as a whole, the vast majority of interviewees felt that unification should be either "speeded up" (42%) or "continued as at present" (38%). With the exception of Denmark, only a very small minority (8%) chose the third option, "slowed down".

If we look in detail at the replies for each country, it will be seen that in autumn 1984 there was a majority in favour of speeding up in six countries: Italy (59%), Luxembourg (55%), Greece (49%), Germany (45%), and Belgium and France (43%). In the other four countries the cautious option, "continued as at present", came out on top: 49% in the United Kingdom, 46% in the Netherlands, 41% in Ireland and 40% in Denmark.

¹ The correlation for the sample as a whole is $r = .591$. The following table shows the breakdown of answers to the two questions in the Community as a whole:

	Attitude towards European unification			
	Very much in favour	To some extent in favour	To some extent against	Very much against
Consider that unification should be:				
- speeded up	76	37	7	6
- continued as at present	20	51	42	18
- slowed down	2	5	38	57
Don't know	-2	7	13	19
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(n=2945)	(n=4661)	(n=788)	(n=243)

More than three quarters of those who are "very much in favour" of unification consider that the process should be "speeded up" while six in every ten of those who are "very much against" think that it should be "slowed down". In between the two extremes, the preference is for continuation as at present.

Analysis over time shows that, since this question was last asked in 1979, support for "speeding up" has increased slightly in Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The percentage favouring this course is slightly higher in Greece than in Germany or France.

A comparison over the decade as a whole shows that the "slowing down" option is losing ground in Denmark and even more so in the United Kingdom. It would seem that the British are not yet ready to press on towards a closer union between the Member States but they are turning an increasingly deaf ear towards the small number who want to slow the process down.

(See Table 24)

But the trend in answers to this question throws up another point. Their relative stability hides a levelling-out which has some worrying connotations. Between 1973 and 1984, support for unification dropped sharply among opinion leaders at the very time when it was rising slightly among the general public. Could it be that the idea of European unification is becoming more popular with the man-in-the-street as enthusiasm for it wanes on the part of some of the leaders of society?

Table 24
SPEED UP OR SLOW DOWN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>September 1973</u>											
Speed up	33	12	49	36	25	55	56	32	17	:	38
Continue as at present	43	44	34	40	45	18	29	47	40	:	35
Slow down	3	36	4	3	12	2	1	6	1 2 4	:	8
	21	8	13	21	18	25	14	15	19	:	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100
Index ²	2.37	1.70	2.26	2.42	2.16	2.70	2.64	2.31	1.91		2.36
<u>October 1975</u>											
Speed up	39	13	47	45	35	61	52	33	24	:	43
Continue as at present	28	33	36	36	40	18	33	38	45	:	34
Slow down	3	37	6	6	12	4	4	4	18	:	8
Don't know	30	17	11	13	13	17	11	25	13	:	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100
Index ²	2.51	1.71	2.46	2.46	2.27	2.70	2.54	2.38	2.07		2.41
<u>May-June + Nov. 1976 (combined)</u>											
Speed up	40	13	40	43	32	62	55	42	24	:	41
Continue as at present	35	32	36	36	40	15	23	40	44	:	33
Slow down	5	35	9	9	1 1 2	5	7	6	21	:	11
Don't know	20	20	15	12	16	18	15	12	11	:	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100
Index ²	2.36	1.73	2.35	2.39	2.24	2.69	2.56	2.41	2.04		2.35
<u>April-May 1977 and</u> <u>October-November 1978 (combined)</u>											
Speed UP	37	12	38	42	31	63	50	37	23		41
Continue as at present	38	40	34	37	45	18	30	48	37		35
Slow down	4	28	8	6	11	4	10	4	1 2 0		9
Don't know	21	20	20	15	13	15	10	11	10		15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100
Index ²	2.43	1.79	2.38	2.43	2.23	2.70	2.45	2.37	2.04		2.37
<u>April + October 1979 (combined)</u>											
Speed UP	34	10	39	31	28	61	45	33	23	:	37
Continue as at present	41	43	41	45	45	23	45	52	46	:	40
Slow down	3	30	7	7	10	2	3	5	17	:	8
Don't know	22	17	13	17	17	14	7	10	14	:	15
						100	100	100	100		100
Index ²	2.40	1.				2.68	2.44	2.31	2.07		2.34
<u>October 1984</u>	43	9	45	43	28						
Speed up						59	55	40	25	49	42
Continue as at present	39	40	36	41	41	28	31	46	49	21	38
Slow down	6	30	9	5	1 8	4	6	4	13	8	8
Don't know	12	21	10	11	23	9	8	10	13	22	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.42	1.73	2.40	2.43	2.25	2.60	2.53	2.40	2.14	2.53	2.39

¹ Weighted average including Greece in 1984.

² "Speed up" = 3; "slow down" = 1. Don't knows excluded.

Table 25

SPEED UP OR SLOW DOWN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

BY COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION¹

(1973-84)

(Community as a whole)

	1973				1984			
	Leaders		Non-leaders		Leaders		Non-leaders	
	++	+	-	--	++	+	-	--
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Speed up								
Continue as at present								
Slow down								
Don't know								
Total								
Index ²	2.66	2.48	2.29	2.16	2.53	2.46	2.36	2.25
Base								

¹ Cognitive mobilization (or leadership rating) is measured by ability to persuade others and frequency of political discussions.

² "Speed up" = 3; "slow down" = 1. Don't knows excluded.

II.3. A "UNITED STATES OF EUROPE"

The term "United States of Europe" has a long history going back, apparently, to the middle of the last century (1847 or 1848). First popularized by Victor Hugo in 1849, later attacked by Lenin, who countered with the slogan of the "United States of the World" in 1915, the idea was revived in various quarters during the Thirties (in particular by Pierre Mendes France), and taken up immediately after the Second World War by Winston Churchill in his famous speech at Zurich in 1946¹ and subsequently by Jean Monnet in 1955, shortly after the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. More recently still, the historian of world-wide reputation, Fernand Braudel, wrote in support of the idea in 1983 while the current British Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, stated November 1984 that she did not believe it possible².

It is a term with strong ideological associations, both because of the comparison it suggests and because of the idealistic picture it conjures up. It was therefore felt that it would be interesting to measure its impact on the European public.

The following questions were asked:

"Some people talk of the idea of forming a "United States of Europe" putting together the member countries of the European Community. This means a kind of political union like there is between the fifty states of the USA, or the ten provinces that form Canada. Does this idea of forming a United States of Europe some day, including (your country), seem a good or bad idea to you?"

"Whether you like the idea or not, do you think that a United States of Europe is likely to come about, and if so in about how many years: the next ten, ten to fifteen, twenty to thirty years from now, in several generations or never?"

We shall first examine how acceptable people found the idea, before turning to their views on the likely time-scale involved³.

II.3.1. Attitude towards the idea

Slightly more than half of those questioned (52%) thought that the idea of forming a United States of Europe was a good idea, with only two out of ten (22%) taking the opposite view.

¹ "We must build a kind of United States of Europe If at first all the states of Europe are not willing to join the union, we must nevertheless proceed to assemble and combine those who will and those who can." Winston Churchill, A speech at Zurich University (19 September 1946).

² "I do not believe that we shall ever have a United States of Europe in the same way that there is a United States of America. The whole history of Europe is too different." Margaret Thatcher, The Times (1 December 1984).

³ The replies to the second question will be compared with the response to a similar question in 1962.

Strikingly enough, the percentage of those in favour of the idea was higher than that in favour of speeding up the movement towards European Unification (42%). Although the two variables strongly correlate, it would appear that generally speaking, the term "United States of Europe" has a mobilizing effect.

Not surprisingly, the impact varies considerably from one country to another:

- in six countries, between six and seven interviewees in ten expressed support for the idea (69% in Luxembourg, 64% in Italy, 58% in France and Greece, 57% in Belgium and 56% in Germany);
- in the Netherlands (45%) and Ireland (34%) those in favour still outnumbered those against by a wide margin;
- in the United Kingdom and even more so in Denmark, the predominant response was unfavourable.

(See Table 26)

The mobilizing effect noted above is apparent in every single country throughout the Community: the proportion of those in favour of the idea is higher than that in favour of speeding up the movement towards unification. A "United States of Europe" is a meaningful concept which carries a significance and points towards an objective that is comprehensible and easily popularized. How did different categories of people react to the term and the concept it embodies?

There is no significant correlation between people's attitudes to a "United States of Europe" and their sex, age, income bracket, or even political leanings (left or right). The most that can be said is that on the whole men respond slightly more positively than women and those aged over forty and over somewhat more so than those under forty. The most marked distinguishing factor is leadership rating: not only are opinion leaders more likely to express an opinion, but they are also much more favourably inclined towards the idea.

(See Table 27)

Nevertheless, the idea of a "United States of Europe" seems relatively more attractive than other closely-related ideas among the least politically sophisticated - precisely because of its evocative connotation.

This was checked by comparing the level of positive response to two similar questions - "speeding up movement towards the unification of Europe" and "forming a United States of Europe" - by nationality and by each of the individual characteristics for which information was available on those questioned. The mobilizing emotive power of the idea of a "United States of Europe" was particularly marked among non-leaders, i.e. those with the poorest educational background. Because of its historical connotations it seems to reflect the rather vague feelings of the public at large better, in relative terms, than the sophisticated reasoning and critical approach of opinion leaders.

(See Table 28)

In fact the idea of a "United States of Europe" seems to possess a rather dreamlike quality for many of those who support it, appearing as something desirable, but attainable only in the distant future, if at all.

Table 26

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE IDEA OF A "UNITED STATES OF EUROPE"

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EU
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Good idea	57	12	56	58	34	64	69	45	32	58	52
It depends ²	22	16	22	11	15	15	13	19	8	12	15
Bad idea	11	55	10	18	21	11	13	25	48	15	21
Don't know	10	17	12	13	30	10	5	11	12	15	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.52	1.49	2.52	2.47	2.19	2.59	2.59	2.23	1.82	2.51	2.34

Table 27

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE IDEA OF A "UNITED STATES OF EUROPE"

BY LEADERSHIP RATING⁴

(Community as a whole)

	Leaders		Non-leaders	
	++	+	-	--
	%	%	%	%
Good idea	63	58	50	42
It depends ²	12	13	17	14
Bad idea	20	22	22	22
Don't know	5	7	11	22
Total	100	100	100	100
Index ³				
Base	1097	2797	3516	2499

¹ Weighted average.

² Spontaneous reply.

³ "Good idea" = 3; "bad idea" = 1. Don't knows excluded.

⁴ See footnote to Table 25.

Table 28

EMOTIVE POWER OF THE IDEA OF A "UNITED STATES OF EUROPE"

(Community as a whole)

	Movement towards the unification should be speeded up (a)	Forming a "United States of Europe" some day is a good idea (b)	Ratio (b)/(a) 1	N
OVERALL				
SEX :				
Men	48	57	1.18	4539
Women	37	47	1.27	5362
AGE:				
15-24	38	50	1.32	1912
25-39	42	49	1.18	2678
40-54	46	54	1.18	2275
55 and over	42	53	1.24	3035
LEADERSHIP RATING:				
Leaders (++)	58	63	1.07	1097
(+)	50	58	1.16	2797
(-)	40	50	1.26	3516
Non-leaders (--)	29	41	1.42	2499
POLITICAL LEANINGS:				
Extreme left	51	51	1.00	790
Left	49	56	1.14	2129
Right	41	53	1.29	3416
Extreme right	42	52	1.25	1699
	42	53	1.28	626
NATIONALITY:				
Belgium	43	57	1.31	1035
Denmark	9	12	1.35	990
Germany	45	56	1.26	1053
France	43	58	1.36	1006
Ireland	28	34	1.25	1008
Italy	59	64	1.09	1097
Luxembourg	55	69	1.25	299
Netherlands	40	45	1.11	1018
United Kingdom	25	32	1.31	1405
Greece	49	58	1.20	1000

¹ This ratio (calculated on the basis of the unrounded percentages) gives a rough measure of the attractiveness of the idea of a "United States of Europe" by comparison with a similar notion expressed in different terms.

² See footnote to Table 25.

³ Self-assessment of interviewees on political spectrum.

II.3.2. Time-scale for attainment

In Europe as a whole for interviewees in ten, regardless of their attitude to the idea as such, thought that a "United States of Europe" was unlikely ever to come about (234;) or could not give any answer (18%), making a total of 41%.

This opinion (or lack of it) was shared by more than six Britons in ten (65%), by six Danes in ten (61%) and by almost five in every ten interviewees in Ireland (46%). Even in countries where support for the idea was stronger, such as Luxembourg, Italy, France, Greece, Belgium and Germany, between three and four in ten thought the prospect unlikely or could not give an answer.

Among those who did indicate a specific time scale, however remote, there is a fairly even breakdown between three possibilities: within ten to fifteen years, within twenty to thirty years and in several generations. This breakdown is much the same for all age groups and leadership ratings, although those lower down the leadership scale tend to opt for a somewhat shorter time scale, probably because they underestimate the difficulties.

Among those who think it likely to come about some day, regardless of their attitude to the Idea itself, the prospect is more frequently viewed as remote in those countries where the general attitude is more hostile:

	Likely time scale for attainment of a "United States of Europe" (among those who think it will come about)			
	In the next 15 years	20 to 30 years from now	In several generations	Total
Belgium	50%	25%	25%	100%
France	42	32	26	100
Luxembourg	40	31	29	100
Italy	39	26	35	100
Greece	36	26	38	100
Ireland	31	28	41	100
Germany	30	35	35	100
Netherlands	28	33	39	100
United Kingdom	26	33	41	100
Denmark	18	32	50	100
COMMUNITY ²	35	31	34	100

(For further details, see Table 29)

- ¹ Of course, those who think that forming a "United States of Europe" is a good idea are much more inclined to expect it to be attained in the not-too-distant future.
- ² Weighted average.

Table 29

A "UNITED STATES OF EUROPE" - A DISTANT IDEAL

	B	OK	O	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Likely to come about</u>											
1. <u>Of every 100 interviewed</u>											
• In the next 10 years	17	3	6	11	6	11	10	4	3	9	8
• 10 to 15 years from now	16	4	18	17	11	13	18	12	6	10	13
• 20 to 30 years from now	17	12	26	22	15	17	22	18	13	15	19
• Might take several generations	17	20	25	17	22	22	21	22	16	21	20
• Never	13	35	14	13	22	19	21	29	46	20	23
• Don't know	20	2	6	1	1	3	1	2	0	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2. <u>Of every 100 interviewed who think it likely to come about</u>											
• In the next 10 years	26	7	8	16	11	18	14	7	9	17	13
• 10 to 15 years from now	24	11	22	26	20	21	26	21	17	19	22
• 20 to 30 years from now	25	32	35	32	28	26	31	33	33	26	31
• Might take several generations	25	50	35	26	41	35	29	39	41	38	34
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.51	1.76	2.04	2.32	2.01	2.23	2.25	1.96	1.93	2.14	2.14

¹ Weighted average.

² "In the next 10 years" = 4; "might take several generations" = 1.

These responses throw some light on the reaction to the first question on the idea of forming a United States of Europe "some day", showing that it is a distant ideal even for those in favour of it.

However, the likely time-scale apparently lengthens with the passage of time. This emerges from a further comparison of the 1984 replies with those given to a similar question¹ asked in the six original Member States some twenty years earlier in 1962.

In five of the six countries the proportion of "don't knows" has dropped, in some cases quite markedly, especially in Italy and Luxembourg. The number of outright negative replies ("never") has risen slightly, except in Germany. But the most striking feature is the general lengthening of the time-scale, particularly in Germany. Thus not only is a "United States of Europe" seen as a distant prospect even by those who are in favour, but it appears to be seen as an increasingly distant one as time passes.

(See Table 30)

As it is a question of perceived time-scale, it is interesting to consider how responses have changed as a function of age group and cohort².

1. Changes as a function of age group. - In the four countries for which comparisons can be made, the drop in the proportion of those replying "don't know" or "never" is a fairly general phenomenon in all the four age groups considered, the sole exception being that the proportion of young people (particularly those between the ages of 20 and 34) in the Netherlands who feel that a United States of Europe will never come about, has increased sharply between 1962 and 1984.

At the same time the lengthening of the perceived time-scale is also a fairly general phenomenon and is particularly marked among young people in Germany and the Netherlands.

(See Table 31)

2. Changes as a function of cohort. - The greatest change in response between 1962 and 1984 in the four countries in question³ is found among the youngest cohort, i.e. those born between 1928 and 1942³. The change is more marked in the Netherlands and even more so in Germany than in Belgium or France. But whereas in Germany the proportion of "don't knows" and "nevers" among people of that generation, who were between 20 and 34 in 1962, has fallen considerably, the opposite is true in the Netherlands, where the "nevers" have gained ground.

¹ The question was similar, but not identical: "Do you think that a united Europe will come about? If so, how long do you think it will take?" (The options available for people to choose from were the same in 1962 and 1984).

² For the definitions, see p. 23.

³ This is the algebraic sum, for each cohort and each country, of the differences between the replies (or non-replies) given in 1984 and 1962. Among the 1928-42 cohort in Belgium, for example, the sum of the differences is 48 percentage points; the figure in Germany is 90, in France 46 and in the Netherlands 74.

Table 30

WHEN IS A UNITED EUROPE LIKELY TO COME ABOUT?

	B	D	F	I	L	IL	EUR 6
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>February-March 1962</u>							
		26	21	10	14	15	19
		16	14	9	12	21	14
		10	14	8	18	23	12
		4	12	3	10	11	6
		17	11	9	6	18	13
		27	28	61	40	12	36
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>October-November 1984</u>							
		6	11	11	10	4	9
		16					
▪ Right take several generations	17	26					
	17	25					
▪ Never	13	14					
Don't know	20	13	20	18	8	15	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>Change in perceived time-scale¹</u>							
▪ In the next 10 years							
▪ 10 to 15 years from now	- 6	-20	-10	+ 1	- 4	-11	-10
▪ 20 to 30 years from now	- 4	0	+ 3	+ 4	+ 6	- 9	+ 1
▪ Right take several generations	+ 3	+16	+ 8	+ 9	+ 4	- 5	+ 9
	+ 8	*21	+ 5	+19	+11	+11	+16
▪ Never	+ 4	- 3	+ 2	+10	+15	+11	+ 3
Don't know	- 5	-14	- 8	-43	-32	+ 3	-19

¹ This part of the Table shows the difference between the percentages for each of the possible replies in 1984 and 1962. The total sum of these percentages is zero.

Table 31
A "UNITED STATES OF EUROPE"
COMPARISON BETWEEN 1984 AND 196. BY AGE GROUP¹

				or over				65 or over
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
								20 13 16
								15 9
Don't know	30	22	23	30	17	20	19	27
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	213	293	188	74	351	219	239	166
								8 12 9
								30 19
Don't know	27	25	29	37	10	12	11	22
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	388	514	421	182	241	263	221	202
Don't know	27	26	29	33	17	15	27	31
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	450	430	392	240	308	229	215	169
Don't know	10	12	12	17	12	15	19	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	252	278	185	64	319	264	192	134

A further change since 1952, particularly among the youngest cohort in Germany - which is even more marked in the Netherlands - is that the proportion of those who think in terms of the relatively near future (in the next ten years) has fallen.

The overall trend of the changes in replies from the 1928-1942 cohort is not the same in Germany as in the Netherlands. In Germany the apparent shift is towards a more distant date of attainment ("in 20 to 30 years" or "in several generations"), whereas in the Netherlands the shift, as we have already noted, is towards discounting the prospect outright.

(See Table 32)

Table 32
A "UNITED STATES OF EUROPE"
COMPARISON BETWEEN 1984 AND 1962 BY COHORT

	Cohort born between 1928 and 1942		Cohort born between 1913 and 1927		Cohort born in 1912 or before	
	aged 20-34 in 1962	aged 42-56 in 1984	aged 35-49 in 1962	aged 57-71 in 1984	aged 50 or over in 1962	aged 72 or over in 1984
		%	%	%	%	%
					19	19
					14	10
					11	16
					10	19
					21	8
Don't know	30	19	22	21	25	28
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	213	214	293	223	262	93
GERMANY						
▪ In the next 10 years	27	7	26	4	25	9
▪ 10 to 15 years from now	16	18	16	17	17	13
▪ 20 to 30 years from now	8	27	11	15	9	11
					3	35
					15	16
Don't know	27	9	25	23	31	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	388	266	514	215	603	92

Don't know	27	20	26	31	31	28
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	450	213	430	183	632	97

Don't know	10	16	12	20	14	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	252	218	278	155	249	79

CHAPTER III

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE JUNE 1984 ELECTIONS

III

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE JUNE 1984 ELECTIONS

In June 1979 (and in October 1981 for Greece), the members of the European Parliament were elected by 62.4% of registered voters. In June 1984, the turnout decreased slightly in six of the ten countries - Greece included - to 59.1%. The difference is slight but nevertheless significant.

(See Table 33)

As we did five years ago in October 1979, we used the Eurobarometer survey immediately following the elections to try and build up a picture of the behaviour and motivation of voters and non-voters¹.

111.1. AWARENESS OF THE INSTITUTION AND THE ELECTIONS

Before the 1984 elections the public were asked, as they had been just before and just after the 1979 elections, whether and to what extent they remembered having seen or heard anything about the European Parliament and the elections. The same question was put in October 1984.

*Have you seen or heard in the papers or on the radio or TV anything about the European Parliament? This is the parliamentary assembly of the European Community (Common Market).
If yes: Can you remember what it was that you heard then?*

It is a fact that newsworthy events lose their impact all too soon and that while press, radio and television may talk of nothing else for a few days or weeks, they very soon move on to other topics. When the event is an election generally recognized as being of secondary importance compared with a national election which may bring a change of government, the media are all too ready to turn the page. And since by definition an event which is regarded as secondary has little chance of affecting public opinion, it is likely to be forgotten very quickly. This was the case in 1984, in most countries, even more so than in 1979.

¹ This survey was requested by the European Electoral Studies group, set up in 1979 at the University of Mannheim, with assistance from the Commission, the European Parliament and the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk.

² The question has been worded in exactly the same way as in October 1979. It varies slightly from the wording used before the election.

Table 33

TURNOUT IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS
IN 1979 AND 1984¹

	1979	1984	Ratio 1984/1979
<u>Compulsory voting (or non-discriminatory as such)</u> ²			
Belgium	91.4%	92.1%	1.01
Luxembourg	88.9	88.8	1.00
Italy	84.9 ³	83.4	0.98
Greece	78.6	77.2	0.98
<u>Countries where voting is compulsory</u>			
Germany	65.7%	56.8%	0.86
Ireland	63.6	47.6	0.75
France	60.7	56.7	0.93
Netherlands	57.8	50.6	0.88
Denmark	47.8	52.4	1.10
United Kingdom	32.3	32.6	1.01
including:			
Great Britain	31.8	31.8	1.00
Northern Ireland	55.6	63.5	1.14
COMMUNITY	62.4%	59.1%	0.95

¹ Source: European Parliament

² In Belgium and Luxembourg voting is legally compulsory and, in principle, failure to vote is penalized; in Greece it is also compulsory, but fairly extensive dispensations are allowed. In Italy the constitution states that voting is a "civic duty"; the law on elections to the Camera dei Deputati stipulates that "did not vote" must be entered for five years on certificates of good conduct issued by the authorities to persons who failed to vote without good reason. It would therefore seem that voting is generally regarded as compulsory.

³ October 1981.

As table 34 shows, only two thirds of the people interviewed in October 1984, around four months after the election, claimed to have seen or heard something about the European Parliament "recently".

In March-April three quarters of the people interviewed had seen or heard something, and with the election campaign this proportion no doubt increased later on. The event seems to have been forgotten particularly quickly in Greece, but in three other countries, especially in Belgium where voting is compulsory, the number of people who said in October that they had seen or heard something was far fewer than the number of voters on 17 June 1984.

If we compare the 1984 findings with those for 1979, it can be seen that on a corresponding timescale a larger proportion of respondents had forgotten the event in several countries in 1984.

Another interesting comparison, which at first sight appears surprising, concerns (for each of the two elections) the proportion of people who claim to have seen or heard something about the European Parliament and can spontaneously give the right answer and say what it was.

In 1979 the proportion was roughly the same before and after the elections: 65% and 66%. In 1984 it increased appreciably between March-April and October, from 39% to 61%. *The* explanation for this has to be found in the fact that there was very little awareness of the elections in spring 1984, even among people who said that they had seen or heard something¹ however vague their recollection² about the European Parliament.

(See Table 34)

¹ Research is already under way in all Community countries on the complex relationship between the election campaign, awareness of the event and turnout. It is being guided by the European Electoral Studies group already mentioned. For an initial overview, see the special issue of Electoral Studies, Volume 3, No 3, December 1984, Butterworth and Co, Guildford, England.

Table 34

AWARENESS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE ELECTIONS

1. 1984 ELECTIONS

	B					I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ¹
	%					%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>March-April 1984</u>											
Had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament	74	74	79	82	75	71	81	73	72	67	75
- spontaneously mentioned elections	(40)	(36)	(38)	(39)	(27)	(29)	(21)	(24)	(10)	(24)	(29)
- did not spontaneously mention elections	(34)	(38)	(41)	(43)	(48)	(42)	(60)	(49)	(62)	(43)	(46)
Had not seen or heard anything (don't know included)	26	26	21	18	25	29	19	27	28	33	25
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Of every 100 who had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament, percentage who mentioned elections	54%	49%	48%	47%	36%	41%	26%	33%	14%	36%	39%
<u>October 1984</u>											
Had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament	71	59	75	66	61	72	84	67	58	43	67
- spontaneously mentioned elections ²	(55)	(28)	(47)	(39)	(31)	(55)	(54)	(36)	(24)	(22)	(41)
- did not spontaneously mention elections	(16)	(31)	(28)	(27)	(30)	(17)	(30)	(31)	(34)	(21)	(26)
Had not seen or heard anything (don't know included)	29	41	25	34	39	28	16	33	42	57	33
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Of every 100 who had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament, percentage who mentioned elections	78%	47%	63%	58%	51%	76%	65%	53%	41%	49%	61%

¹ Weighted average.

² Including answers referring explicitly to recent Parliament activities (election of its President, debates, etc.).

Table 34 (continued)

AWARENESS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE ELECTIONS

2. 1979 ELECTIONS

	%	%	%	%	%	I %	L %	NL %	UK %	GR %	EC ¹ %
<u>April 1979</u>											
Had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament	65	76	60	65	73	77	76	76	55	:	65
- spontaneously mentioned elections	(47)	(51)	(46)	(38)	(48)	(60)	(57)	(53)	(25)	:	(43)
- did not spontaneously mention elections	(18)	(25)	(14)	(27)	(25)	(17)	(19)	(23)	(30)	:	(22)
Had not seen or heard anything (don't know's included)	35	24	40	35	27	23	24	24	45	:	35
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
Of every 100 who had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament, percentage who mentioned elections	72%	68%	76%	59%	66%	78%	75%	70%	46%	:	67%
<u>October 1979</u>											
Had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament	45	65	77	67	67	66	76	64	55	:	66
- spontaneously mentioned elections ²	(33)	(36)	(55)	(48)	(34)	(49)	(66)	(35)	(26)	:	(44)
- did not spontaneously mention elections	(12)	(29)	(22)	(19)	(33)	(17)	(10)	(29)	(29)	:	(22)
Had not seen or heard anything (don't know's included)	55	35	23	33	33	34	24	36	45	:	34
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
Of every 100 who had recently seen or heard something about the European Parliament, percentage who mentioned elections	74%	56%	71%	71%	51%	75%	87%	55%	47%	:	66%

¹ Weighted average.

² Including answers referring explicitly to recent Parliament activities (election of its President, debates, etc.).

111.2. THE IMPORTANCE OF PARLIAMENT IN THE LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY AND REASONS PUT FORWARD TO EXPLAIN THE LOW TURNOUT

Two questions were asked: the first had already been asked in October 1979 and the second, which tries to explore the public's motivations or explanations, was put for the first time.

In June elections were held *in* every country of the European Community, including (your country), *for* members of the European Parliament. Would you say *that* the people you normally come into contact with considered this election as *very important*, *quite important*, *of little importance* or *of no importance at all*?

In this election, a lot of people in some countries did *not* vote. Here is a list of *possible reasons* why they did not go and vote. Which of these, in your opinion, explains why *lots* of people did *not* vote?

- Many people did not *really* know what it was *about*
- With the European Parliament having so *little* power, many people thought it was not *worthwhile* taking the trouble to *vote*
- The parties and the candidates spoke too much *about* problems in *their own countries* and not enough *about* Europe
- As *far* as unification of Europe is concerned, it was not *clear* who was *for* and who was *against*
- The *issues* talked about *most during* the election campaign were not the ones which *really* interested people
- European Community *will* never *work* whatever *they* do
- Other

III.2.1. Importance attached to the elections by respondent's acquaintances

In every one of the countries (leaving aside Greece, which did not belong to the Community in 1979), the importance attached to the elections - or more precisely the importance which people claimed that their everyday acquaintances attached to the elections - decreased between 1979 and 1984. Although not very significant in Belgium, France and Italy, the decline was particularly marked in Germany.

In Greece, where for the first time voting took place at the same time as in the other Member States, the importance attached to the event seems to have been greater than elsewhere; it is in fact the only country where the majority of respondents felt that it was a "very important" or "important" event.

In countries other than Greece, replies are fairly similar: very few people felt that the event had been regarded as "very important" (Italy having the highest score with 10%); one or two people out of ten, according to the country, considered it "not at all important"; the majority of respondents chose one of the two intermediate replies, with a clear tendency emerging for the countries other than Greece.

The fact must be faced that Europeans saw the second election - even more than the first - as "a not very important event". Why should this be so?

(See Table 35)

III.2.2. The reasons put forward to explain the low turnout

This question, like the preceding one, is put indirectly: it asks the respondents not to explain (or justify) their own behaviour, but to comment on the behaviour of other people, in this case those who did not vote.

Each respondent had to choose between six critical attitudes towards the European elections. They could choose more than one and even add others. With the exception of Greece, where approximately 30% were unable to reply, the don't knows accounted for an average of 6%. The question was therefore well understood and, in all the countries except Greece, each respondent gave more than one reply.

The reply most frequently given concerned the public's ignorance about the European Parliament and its elections; this accounted for over half the replies (57% in France, 62% in the United Kingdom and 63% in Ireland).

In second place, but well behind, was the reply concerning Parliament's lack of power: "it was not worthwhile taking the trouble to vote" (29% on average, but 35% in the Netherlands, 37% in Germany and 39% in Denmark).

In third and fourth place, virtually neck and neck, came the two replies dealing with the lack of relevance of the problems under discussion to the public's concerns (20% on average, but 27% in France and 29% in Ireland) and the fact that parties and candidates spoke too much about problems in their own countries and not enough about Europe (20% on average, but 30% in France and 33% in Luxembourg).

The other replies on the list were chosen only by a very low percentage of respondents.

(See Table 36)

Since this was a multiple choice question, it is interesting to see which reply combinations were most frequently given by individual respondents.

Table 35

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO ELECTIONS BY RESPONDENT'S ACQUAINTANCES

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>October 1979</u>											
Very important	8	16	12	5	18	11	17	9	12	.	10
Important	24	21	41	27	33	36	38	32	22		31
Not very important	34	38	29	41	32	37	31	40	42	.	37
Not at all important	19	10	7	13	12	9	7	12	18	.	12
Don' t know	15	15	11	14	5	7	7	7	6	.	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100
Index ²	1.24	2.52	2.65	2.29	2.58	2.52	2.70	2.39	2.28	:	2.44
<u>October 1984</u>											
Very important	7	6	5	5	7	10	6	5	6	21	7
Important	22	23	28	24	29	29	34	22	22	47	26
Not very important	43	45	46	47	36	43	34	49	45	18	45
Not at all important	21	9	15	14	21	11	17	16	21	5	15
Don' t know	7	17	6	10	7	7	9	8	6	9	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	1.16	2.33	2.23	2.23	2.23	2.40	2.33	2.17	2.14	2.94	2.27

Weighted average. ² "Very important" = 4, "not at all important" = 1; Don't knows excluded.

Table 36

WHY DID MANY PEOPLE NOT VOTE?¹

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ²								
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%								
Many people did not really know what it was about	53	43	47	57	63	50	51	56	62	26	53								
With the European Parliament having so little power, many people thought it was not worthwhile taking the trouble to vote	19	39	37	22	17	27	30	35	29	12	29								
The issues talked about most during the election campaign were not the ones which really interested people	17	11	18	27	29	20	20	17	21	19	20								
The parties and the candidates spoke too much about problems in their own countries and not enough about Europe	19	6	22	30	10	22	33	12	12	16	20								
As far as unification of Europe is concerned, it was not clear who was for and who was against	12	7	17	11	8	9	10	6	12	8	12								
European Community will never work whatever they do	9	13	10	8	4	1	1	2	1	1	9	1	1	2	1	0	1	4	10
Number of replies given for every 100 respondents	133	121	153	159	135	140	170	143	151	93	147								
Don't know	6	1	3	9	6	4	7	4	4	4	2	9	7						

¹ Each respondent could choose more than one reply. The percentages correspond to the number of replies given in each case for 100 people interviewed.

² Weighted average.

The most frequent explanations of the low turnout - given either individually or jointly - are the public's ignorance and Parliament's lack of power. Then comes the reply, either alone or associated with the first two, that the parties and candidates spoke too much about problems in their own countries and not enough about Europe.

It should, however, be noted that more than one Dane (12%) and more than one Greek (11%) out of ten attributed the low turnout solely to the lack of relevance of the problems under discussion.

In short, the general opinion of respondents is that many people did not go and vote because they were not really sure what it was all about, because the little they did know suggested that the European Parliament had very little power, and because parties and candidates did not talk enough about Europe.

Would anyone claim that good sense is not the most widespread attribute in Europe?

111.3. VOTERS AND NON-VOTERS

We know all the exact results of the European election¹. But we needed to reconstruct the vote - or abstention - of each of the persons interviewed in this poll in order to be able to analyse the factors that lay behind individual decisions.

The following question was therefore asked:

"Were you of voting age at the time of this election? If Yes: Were you able to go and vote or didn't you vote?"

This was followed by one set of questions put to those who said they did vote and another set to those who said they didn't.

Before going into the questions, let us consider the relatively good match (as in 1979) between the answers to the survey and the actual results of the election.

As table 37 shows, the percentage of respondents of voting age who say that they voted is higher in all countries than the actual turnout. This is a well-known phenomenon: quite apart from certain technical problems of sampling, a small proportion of abstainers make believe that they did in fact vote. The differential here is an average 17% for the whole Community. While it is insignificant in Belgium and Luxembourg, where voting is compulsory, it peaks in Ireland and the United Kingdom; as it happens Ireland showed the biggest drop in turnout between 1979 and 1984 and the United Kingdom the lowest turnout in each of the two elections.

(See Table 37)

¹ Though some countries had still not published the final results in December 1984.

Table 37

INTENTION OF VOTING, ACTUAL VOTING
AND RECOLLECTION OF VOTING

	Certainly intended to vote (March-April 1984 ¹)	Actually voted (14-17 June 1984)	Recollect voting (October 1984)
Belgium	-	92.1	94
Luxembourg		88.8	93
Italy	76	83.4	92
Greece ²	81	77.2	89
Germany	67	56.8	64
France	73	56.7	65
Denmark	55	52.4	61
Netherlands	64	50.6	60
Ireland	55	47.6	69
United Kingdom	36	32.6	50

Be that as it may, the analyses that follow have been made - unless otherwise stated - on the basis of the answers given by persons interviewed on how they voted.

¹ See Eurobarometer No 21, May 1984, pp. 17 and 18. The percentages for Belgium and Luxembourg, countries where voting is compulsory and failure to vote is penalized, have no relevance, for the question was preceded by "Supposing voting were not compulsory in this country ...".

² In Germany, in both 1984 and 1979, the answers "will probably go and vote" had to be added to the answers "will certainly go" in order to arrive at a valid estimate.

The reader must remember that the number of those claiming to have voted is slightly higher than the number of actual voters, and the other way round for the non-voters. This difference does not impair the value of the analysis, since in most cases voting and recollection of voting coincide.

III.3.1. Questions put to "those who vote"

The questions put to those who claim to have voted bear on two "relatively unresearched" aspects of a voter's choice in this type of election of secondary importance:

- was the vote cast for a list or candidate as a means of expressing a political conviction or did it go to the second best because they had a better chance of being elected?
- how much importance was attached to the fact that the candidate was a man or a woman?

III.3.1.1. Strategic voting or pleasing oneself?

"Did you vote for the party or candidate you liked most, or did you decide to vote for the second best because they had a better chance to be elected?"

The answers leave no doubt: the great majority of Europeans who turned out voted for the list or candidate they liked most.

Since in most countries the election was on the proportional representation system it is no surprise that voters gave free rein to their preferences rather than seek to avoid a "wasted" vote. Yet the same thing happened in Britain, where a straight majority wins the seat.

(See Table 38)

A closer study, which might be made later on, would mean analysing these answers with reference to the preferences that the respondents say they actually voiced, in other words the votes for the candidates of such and such a party. The only point we shall make here is that according to the very first analyses, there was a stronger tendency among opinion leaders and voters who place themselves on the extreme left than among the others to allow their preferences to prevail instead of trying to avoid a wasted vote.

Table 38

STRATEGIC VOTING OR PLEASING ONES¹

1. Of 100 persons saying they voted											
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Voted for the party or candidate they liked most - Voted for those with the best chance of being elected 											
Don't know	14	18	3	7	6	4	8	3	4	6	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	929	580	615	624	635	941	264	543	665	832	6379
2. OF 100 persons giving a definite answer											
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Voted for the party or candidate they liked most - Voted for those with the best chance of being elected 											
	15	10	7	18	16	8	14	5	11	7	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	796	473	597	582	599	901	242	524	636	783	6043

¹ Since roughly 15% of the persons included in our samples claiming to have voted probably did not do so, we will systematically give the results for all persons interviewed and for those who answer one way or the other, the assumption being that the Don't knows probably did not vote.

² Weighted average.

III.3.1.2. Importance attached to voting for a man or a woman

The objective of equality in civic rights and then equal opportunity in political life underlies the history of what is called "women's lib". This equality of opportunity is still a long way off and in the Community, for example, while women account for more than 51% of the total population, 37.5% of those in civil employment and 41% of the unemployed, their representation in political bodies, notably parliaments, remains very low.

In the European Parliament the proportion of women elected was 16.3% in June 1979 and 17.3% in June 1984.

Knowing that the processes of selecting candidates within parties and of allocating positions on lists (or constituencies) often act as so many successive filters that stop women from getting elected, it was worth asking male and female voters:

- whether, generally speaking, it made no difference to them to vote for a man or for a woman;
- whether, for a specific election, they attached (and just how much) importance to the fact that some parties had more women candidates than others.

The general attitude has been measured in other studies, and we know that six out of ten men and six out of ten women say, in principle , that it makes no difference to them to be represented in Parliament by a man or a woman.

¹ See in European Women and Men in 1983, Brussels, 1984, p. 121, the answers given by Europeans to the following question (March-April 1983): "Generally speaking, would you have more confidence in a man or in a woman as your member of Parliament?"

[illegible]

But what becomes of this averred principle during a particular election, or in other words in a case where, in all likelihood women will be globally discriminated against, although certain parties did take the precaution of including quite a number of women among the candidates with good prospects of being elected?

Or to put it another way, are men and women voters alive to the efforts of the parties to put up more women candidates? And does such party strategy carry more or less weight with voters of either sex than a party's political platform?

"For this European election, did you attach a great deal of importance, some importance, or no importance to the fact that some parties had more women candidates than others?"

"More precisely, would you say that the fact that the candidates were men or women, was, in your decision, as important as their political view, more important or less important?"

1. The importance of the number of women candidates

The answer is clear: the great majority (70%) of Europeans - men or women - feel that it has "no importance". Only a small minority think that it has "some importance" (20%), or even a "great deal of importance" (7%).

Opinions expressed are very much the same from one country to another and for both men and women. The Luxembourg, Irish and Dutch voters - and in precisely those three countries, women slightly more than men - attach some importance to the matter. The British, the French and the Germans, on the other hand - both men and women - are those who attach the least.

How do we interpret these answers? It would seem that the attitude is not born of indifference: there are very few 'don't knows', even among the non-leaders. Egalitarian language has perhaps so deeply permeated public opinion that it is no longer considered appropriate to talk about a "problem": some think it is a thing of the past, so it now means nothing to them, while others will not admit its existence, so they tend to play down its importance.

In most countries opinion leaders are slightly more inclined to attach some importance to the problem.

The correlation with ideological preference shows that it is the electors who place themselves at the extremes, but more on the far left than on the far right, who tend most to attach importance to the presence of a greater number of women candidates.

(See Table 39)

Table 39

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THE PROPORTION OF WOMEN AMONG CANDIDATES
IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTION

	8	OK	O	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
All voters											
Great deal of importance	9	11	4	3	9	12	17	11	5	13	7
Some importance	26	22	20	20	34	18	23	26	17	15	20
No importance	60	63	74	75	55	67	57	60	75	67	70
Don't know	5	4	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	5	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Indu2	1.46	1.45	1.28	1.27	1.53	1.42	1.59	1.50	1.29	1.44	1.35
N	929	580	615	624	635	941	264	543	665	832	6379
men											
Great deal of importance	9	8	3	5	7	11	11	8	4	13	7
Some importance	23	20	19	23	29	17	23	23	15	16	19
No importance	63	67	76	70	63	69	62	66	79	68	72
Don't know	5	5	2	1	1	3	4	3	2	3	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index2	11.43	1.37	1.25	1.33	1.45	1.40	1.47	1.41	1.24	1.43	1.34
N	448	307	314	292	321	464	143	273	302	407	3105
Women											
Great deal of importance	9	14	4	2	11						
Some importance	30	24	22	18	38						
No importance	57	58	72	78	47						
Don't know	4	4	2	2	4	3	1	3	4	7	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	1.49	1.55	1.31	1.22	1.63	1.45	1.73	1.59	1.33	1.45	1.31
N	481	273	301	331	314	477	121	270	361	425	3271

¹ Weighted average.

² "Great deal of importance" = 3; "no importance" = 1. Don't knows excluded.

2 Relative importance attached to the sex of candidates as opposed to their politics

Here again the egalitarian answer is well ahead: 54% of voters interviewed believe that a candidate's sex is less important than his or her politics, or in other words do not weigh, as citizens, their own political preferences against their being a man or a woman.

The differences between countries are slightly more marked than for the preceding question. It is in Italy that voters are most inclined to believe that sex and political views are of equal importance, but in Germany that a candidate's sex counts least when it comes to voting.

Differences between the opinions of men and women are even less marked for this question than for the preceding one.

(See Table 40)

It would therefore seem that variables other than the sex of the respondents determine their answers. But which? Subject to further analyses, cognitive mobilization and political ideology are clearly once again discriminant variables, but would appear to act in opposite directions in each of the two cases. We saw earlier that the most mobilized voters, who are also those who tend to place themselves on the far left or the far right, are a little more inclined to attach importance to the fact that a party is presenting more women among its candidates. Here, however, where we are dealing with the relative importance of a candidate's sex and politics, the least mobilized voters seem a little more inclined¹ to give some weight, in their decision, to sex as opposed to politics.

11.3.2. Questions put to those who did not vote

Two questions were put to persons who said they didn't vote in the European election. One sought to discover the main reason for not voting and the other to see whether there were any subsequent regrets.

Which would you say was the main reason that you did not vote?

- 1 *Was not eligible to vote/not on register*
- 2 *Personal reason: sickness, holiday, business commitments*
- 3 *Lack of interest in politics/elections*
- 4 *Lack of interest in European elections, European Parliament, European affairs*
- 5 *Hostility to European institutions or ties with Europe*
- 6 *Not informed enough to vote in the European election*
- 7 *There was no party or candidate that I could support*
- 8 *Thought the result was a foregone conclusion*
- 9 *Didn't realize there was an election*
- X *Other reply*

¹ Further work will be done on these analyses later on.

Table 40

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO CANDIDATES' SEX AS OPPOSED
TO THEIR POLITICS

	8	OK	O	F	IRL	I	L	IL	UK	GR	EC ¹
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

Don't know	9	7	5	12	10	7	7	6	7	12	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	1.50	1.31	1.15	1.45	1.44	1.78	1.61	1.54	1.32	1.38	1.46
N	929	580	615	624	635	941	264	543	665	832	6379

Don't know	8	9	4	14	9	7	6	6	7	7	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	1.59	1.30	1.17	1.43	1.37	1.73	1.54	1.50	1.28	1.38	1.44
N	448	307	314	292	321	464	143	273	302	407	3105

Don't know	10	5	6	9	11	6	9	6	8	18	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	1.61	1.33	1.12	1.47	1.52	1.82	1.71	1.58	1.35	1.39	1.48
N	481	273	301	331	314	477	121	270	361	425	3271

¹ Weighted average.

² "More important" = 3, "less Important" = 1. Don't knows excluded.

*"Now the election is over and the results are known,
are you sorry you did not vote?"*

III 1.2. Personal reasons for not voting

As might be supposed from the answers to a preceding question, which bore on the reasons given by all respondents to explain, in general terms, why the turnout had been so low in some countries, the non-voters themselves cited mainly - apart from "personal reasons" (sickness, holidays, business commitments) and lack of interest in politics - their lack of interest in these elections, in the European Parliament and in European affairs, and inadequate information.

In view of the small size of the sub-samples in several countries, detailed analyses would be scarcely reliable; however, the following points emerge:

1. "Personal reasons" are invoked mainly in countries where voting is compulsory or considered as such (Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and Greece).
2. The lack of interest in politics seems greater in France and Ireland than elsewhere, but this lack of interest is probably particularly marked for this election of secondary importance.
3. The next two reasons - lack of interest in Europe and lack of information on Europe - are cited by 30% to 40% of those who did not vote in France, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Britain. As mentioned earlier it is not easy to separate general political apathy from lack of interest in this particular election.
4. Hostility towards Europe is rarely given as a reason for not voting, except in Denmark (8%). This does not mean that there is no link between attitudes to Europe and voting, but that non-voters do not use this as their main excuse or explanation.

(See Table 41)

The analyses made on all those who did not vote show that a slightly larger proportion of women - who account for 55% of the non-voters - than of men cite lack of interest in politics, but not lack of interest in Europe.

(See Table 42)

Table 41

THE MAIN REASON FOR NOT GOING TO VOTE¹

	8	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Was not eligible to vote/ not on register	38	20	22	27	22	41	80	25	18	55	23
Personal reason: sickness, holiday, business commitments	18	17	16	27	28	18	5	12	19	6	19
Lack of Interest in politics/elections	11	18	22	14	25	9	5	16	21	-	19
Lack of Interest in European elections, European Parliament, European affairs	2	16	10	15	5	10	5	23	19	2	15
Hostility to European institutions or ties with Europe	2	3	6	4	4	14	-	4	3	3	5
Not informed enough to vote in the European election	-	8	3	-	1	-	5	2	4	-	3
There was no party or candidate that I could support	-		2	1	1	1	-	1	2	.	1
Thought the result was a foregone conclusion	-	2	1	3	.	-	-	1	1	2	1
Other reply	16	2	5	7	7	-	-	12	7	32	7
Don't know	13	14	13	2	7	7	-	4	6	-	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	55	318	335	275	269	78	20	366	625	65	2655

¹ Those who said they were not eligible to vote or not on the electoral register (8% for the whole Community) have not been counted here as non-voters. In view of the size of the sub-samples in certain countries - Belgium, Italy, Greece and in particular Luxembourg - these figures must be treated with caution.

² Weighted average.

Table 42

THE MAIN REASON FOR NOT GOING TO VOTE

BY SEX

(Community as a whole)

	Men	Women
	%	%
Personal reasons	20	26
Lack of interest in politics	16	22
Lack of interest in European elections	22	16
Not informed enough to vote	16	14
No party or candidate to support	6	4
Hostility to Europe	4	1
Didn't realize there was an election	1	2
Thought the result was a foregone conclusion	1	1
Other reply	7	6
Don't know	7	8
Total	100	100
N	1188	1465

III.3.2.2. Regret at not having voted

Non-voters are unrepentant and unashamed. In all countries the vast majority of those who did not vote in June 1984 regret nothing, although there may be a slight hesitation in Italy and Greece.

(See Table 43)

Table 43

REGRET AT NOT HAVING VOTED¹

	8	DK	D	F	IRL	I.	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Don't know	14	10	21	5	13	12	10	8	8	22	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	58	369	352	329	280	82	20	369	671	96	2885

111.4. THE IMAGE OF PARLIAMENT

As on a number of occasions before the June 1984 election, an attempt was made after the election to assess the image of the European Parliament in order to see whether and how it had changed.

"Whether or not you voted, how important, would you say is the European Parliament in the life of the European Community nowadays?"

Would you, personally, prefer that the European Parliament played a more or a less important role than it does now?"

111.4.1. Parliament's present importance

Contrary to what might have been expected, the election campaign and the ensuing rather sour comments by the European press on turnout have had very little effect on the assessment of Parliament's role in the life of the Community.

The results in the autumn were very similar to those recorded in spring, although the proportion of don't knows had fallen in all countries; they appear to have moved to the intermediate camp: "important" or "not very important".

¹ In view of the size of the sub-samples in certain countries, these figures must be treated with caution.

² Weighted average.

To sum up, although there are differences of emphasis between the various countries, most respondents accorded Parliament an intermediate level of importance varying upwards or downwards in line with their attitudes to European unity and the Community¹.

(See Table 44)

11.4.2. What role should Parliament play?

Although few people think that the European Parliament has a "very important" role, a clear majority (54%) would like its role to be enhanced. Denmark is the one big exception, although opinions tend to be more evenly divided in the United Kingdom and in Ireland.

Here too, although to a lesser extent than in the previous question, the number of don't knows is falling.

In conclusion, it may well be that the sole effect of the election campaign was to persuade a few more people to vote (in those countries where voting is not compulsory) and to make the public a little more aware of Parliament's existence and the insignificance of its present role.

(See Table 45)

¹ Analyses show that replies on the importance of Parliament's present role are in fairly high correlation ($r = .295$) with the feeling that the respondent's country has benefited from Community membership.

Table 44

THE IMPORTANCE OF PARLIAMENT IN THE LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY

	B	OK	O	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>April-May 1977</u>											
very important											
Important											
Not very important											
Not at all important											
Don't know	40	41	25	25	18	25	14	13	18		24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
Index ²	2.46	2.40	2.07	2.36	2.00	2.80	2.71	2.60	2.73	:	2.49
<u>April 1983</u>											
very important											
Important											
Not very important											
Not at all important											
Don't know	25	35	12	22	18	17	12	13	16	29	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.69	2.85	2.42	2.77	3.03	2.87	2.81	2.57	2.73	2.96	2.69
<u>March-April 1984</u>											
very important											
Important											
Not very important											
Not at all important											
Don't know	18	35	19	22	19	23	16	12	15	20	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.59	2.58	2.42	2.61	2.70	2.65	2.74	2.48	2.52	2.67	2.55
<u>October 1984</u>											
Very important											
Important											
Not very important											
Not at all important											
Don't know	8	19	5	12	8	8	5	9	8	16	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.48	2.64	2.36	2.59	2.75	2.81	2.69	2.39	2.63	2.06	2.58

¹ Weighted average.

² "Very important" = 4, "not at all important" = 1; don't knows excluded.
The mid-point is therefore 2.5.

Table 45

WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PLAY?

<u>April 1983</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>DK</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>IRL</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>NL</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>EC</u> ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
The role of the European Parliament should be:											

Don't know	30	38	23	26	29	18	11	14	19	33	22
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

October 1983

- more important

Don't know	22	29	21	21	24	15	13	16	15	21	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

- less important	10	19	10	4	11	2	3	8	24	4	10
Don't know	16	40	26	24	27	23	14	15	19	21	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Don't know	11	30	15	17	20	10	8	14	14	20	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹ Weighted average.

² Volunteered.

³ As a result of a technical error, the results for Italy were collected in November, a little later than in the other countries, and covered only the population aged 18 and over.

111.5. TENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF FACTORS DETERMINING PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

As can be seen from the preceding pages of this section, attitudes to European unification, the European Community, the European Parliament and the European elections are extremely complex.

Merely to examine the intercorrelations between answers given by all those interviewed reveals interesting links, for example between the feeling that one's country has benefited from Community membership, support for European unification, the importance attributed to Parliament's present role and support for a greater role for Parliament, the importance attached to the elections and propensity to go out and vote.

Analyses made five years ago on the 1979 elections and, more recently, on voting intentions in 1984 identify the main variables determining voting propensity.

First of all, there is the case of countries where voting is compulsory (Belgium and Luxembourg) or virtually compulsory (Italy and Greece). But notwithstanding this obligation, the actual motivation to go and vote can vary¹.

Some vote mainly through a sense of civic duty; others use the European elections to express their opinion of the government or political system in their country; others vote out of allegiance to the party to which they feel closest.

There is also no doubt that those who strongly support European unification - and, in a country like Denmark, those who are opposed to it - are strongly motivated to vote in European elections. However, the electors who are mobilized for or against Europe - actively or not - are usually also opinion leaders, or even political activists.


Everything else being equal, the following explanatory model of electoral participation can be constructed. The model has been tested on data relating to voting intentions and should be tested later on recollections of voting.

(See Diagram 1)

¹ For example, in Belgium in spring 1984 fewer than four electors in ten (39%) said that they would "certainly" vote if this were not compulsory in their country. See Eurobarometer No. 22, p. 17. This cannot be taken as an indication of how many would not actually have voted, but it does show that obligation does not necessarily create motivation.

DIAGRAM 1

THEORETICAL MODEL OF PAT IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS



The initial analysis set out below is a simplified version which does no more than attempt to construct a "classification" of voters and non-voters, grouping them into a restricted number of "types", each of which consists of the individuals whose answers to the relevant questions most closely resemble each other and can be clearly differentiated from all the other types .

€11.5. Classification of voters²

Those who voted in the European elections can be divided into four main types.

1. First of all there are those whom we are happy to describe as "good Europeans"; on average they account for almost six out of ten of the voters (59%). They are not only better informed than their fellow citizens but also much more favourable to European unification and the Community. Eight out of ten of them (78%) think that their country has benefited from membership and six out of ten (62%) would like to see progress towards unification speeded up. Seven out of ten see Parliament as having a "very important" (18%) or "important" (52%) role.

This category contains slightly more men than women (which is not so taking the electorate as a whole) and, although their age structure resembles that of the rest of the population, they tend to be better educated, opinion leaders and close to a political party.

They are convinced Europeans and active citizens: for the European institutions, and for Parliament in particylar, they constitute a reserve of allegiance and a source of legitimation¹ .

This category is over-represented in the Netherlands (where it constitutes 74% of voters), Luxembourg (71%) and Italy (69%).

¹ The "active variables" chosen are the replies to fourteen questions on the Community, European unification, perception of the European Parliament and elections and attitudes to this topic. The types obtained were then related to other characteristics of each individual interviewed such as sex, age, education and nationality.

² Of the total of registered voters in the Community, 59% voted. Our sample slightly over-represents this category but this makes scarcely any difference to the results.

³ This type accounts for 57% of voters, or about one third of all electors. This brings us back to the 33% of Europeans found in a previous survey, using different data and another analysis, to be "in favour of European unification and the Community" (see Eurobarometer No 21, p. 51).

2. Another, much smaller, type is made up of the 10% of voters whom we shall label "duty voters". They are less favourably disposed towards Europe than the previous type but nevertheless attribute the same amount of importance to Parliament's present role and even a little more to its future role. During the election, they said that they were not in-different to the fact that certain parties had tried to put up more women than others. This type contains slightly more women, particularly young women, than men and it is also the type with the largest proportion of supporters of a political party, that is citizens who have convictions and know how to exercise their rights without being very committed politically.

This type is over-represented in France and, as far as can be judged from a very small sample, in Northern Ireland.

3. The third type (19%) is that of the "semi-indifferent". They voted and, given the low turnouts that was a good thing. But the main characteristic of this type, which "among the voters" is the one containing the highest proportion of women, is the number of don't knows to all questions concerning Europe, the Community and Parliament. More than four out of ten did not know whether their country had benefited or not from Community membership and more than five out of ten had no views on Parliament's future role. Even worse, almost two thirds could not say without prompting at the beginning of this part of the interview whether they had recently seen or heard anything about the European Parliament. As can be seen, voting did not make a great impression on this type of voter.

This type - as already stated - contains a lot of women; it is also comparatively old, poorly educated, short of leaders and with little political awareness: almost four out of ten have no party leanings. Greece, where it accounts for 26% of voters, is the only country where this type is significantly over-represented.

4. The fourth type of voter (12%) is easily defined: these are the "Community opponents". As with the previous group, the level of education is comparatively low, but this group has more opinion leaders and is more politicized. This means that its vote is generally a vote against the Community, if not against European unification. Eight out of ten (80%) think that their country has not benefited from membership but opinions on European unification are evenly divided (45% for and 44% against). Two thirds of these voters said that they had not seen or heard anything about the European Parliament; there may be doubts about whether this is an honest answer but the message is clear: the event has been swept under the carpet.

This type is strongly over-represented in Denmark (the only country where there is an organized political movement working actively against Community membership) and, to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom¹.

¹ It may be noted that in Denmark the proportion of this type amongst voters (39%) corresponds to about 21% of the total electorate and that the anti-Community movement (Folkebevægelsen mod EF) obtained 20.8% of the vote.

111.5.2. Classification of non-voters

Using an identical procedure, non-voters can be classified in four main types.

1. We will call the most common type (37%) "underinformed and unrepentant pro-Europeans". They are almost as pro-European as the "good Europeans" who, as we have seen, make up the great majority of voters: seven in ten consider that their country has benefited from Community membership (73%) and more than six in ten would like to see the European Parliament play a more important role (64%). Why did they not go and vote? Firstly, they are clearly influenced by the opinions of people with whom they come into contact and a large majority (74%) of them feel that those people saw the election as having little or no importance. Secondly, many of this group, while fairly young and well-educated, are not leaders and are not very politically aware: almost half (46%) do not consider themselves close to any political party. While undoubtedly feeling "European", they lack the political conviction to act. This group of voters is certainly not lost for ever but we must make Europe more attractive to them and stimulate their civic conscience. Nine in ten stated that they did not regret having voted.

This type is over-represented in Luxembourg and the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, in Belgium and Italy. Since voting in three of these countries is compulsory or considered as such, it is possible that a more detailed country-by-country analysis would give a clearer insight into the various reasons why people did not vote: personal reasons (sickness, holidays, etc.), lack of information and so on.

2. The second type of non-voter differs from the first in that most regret not having voted. Why did they not vote and why do they regret it? By analogy with the second type of voter, whom we have called "duty voters", this group could be termed "guilty non-voters". They account for 11% of non-voters.

Three-quarters of them said that they had neither seen nor heard anything about Parliament and the elections. However, when their attention was drawn to the issue during the interview, six in ten felt that the European Parliament's present role was important (60%) and as many as five in ten wanted to see it play a more important part (51%). The same proportion (52%) think that their country's membership of the Community is "a good thing", although opinions are divided about whether their country has gained from membership ("benefited": 37%, "not benefited": 39%). They see European unification as a somewhat vague project and would prefer the process to be continued as at present rather than speeded up towards European union. They are more interested in an existing institution - even one they probably know virtually nothing about - than what they see as a distant project. When asked why they did not go and vote, they made excuses, mainly citing "personal reasons", or did not reply; very few, however, gave their reason as lack of interest

¹ A greater proportion than among other non-voters mentioned the fact that "Many people did not really know what it was about".

in politics or European affairs. There seems to be an air of embarrassment about these non-voters: while 55% say that they regret not having voted, 39% do not answer the question.

Who are these people? A large majority are women (66%) and they are younger than other non-voters and fairly well-educated; indeed this group has the highest proportion of people with further education.

This type is very over-represented in Greece. An analysis centred on Greece might therefore provide a clearer insight.

3. With the third type of non-voter we come to those who are hostile in some degree to European unification and the Community. This type, which accounts for 31% of the non-voters, is characterized more by negative indifference than by active hostility: these are the "moderate opponents" who, to some extent, are the counterparts of the "semi-indifferent" type identified among voters.

The vast majority of them have neither read nor heard anything about the European Parliament: this is the type which seems most impervious to information and is least likely to answer the questions asked. It is difficult to say whether most of them are against Europe, the Community, the European Parliament and the elections because they do not want to hear about them or whether, on the other hand, they ignore them because they tend to be against. One thing that is clear is that their opposition is far from vehement. Nine out of ten do not regret that they did not vote. One in four cites a lack of interest in politics (24%) rather than in Europe (22%), and far fewer cite hostility to Europe.

Non-voters of this type also include a high proportion of women, their average age is slightly higher than for the other types of non-voters, they are not very well educated and have few leader qualities; they include the highest proportion (60%) of people with no political affiliations.

This type is fairly evenly distributed in most countries, with slight over-representation in Germany and Ireland.

4. The fourth and last type is clearly identified by its hostility to the Community; these are the "hard-line opponents" (21% of non-voters).

Almost three quarters of them say that they have neither read nor heard anything about the European Parliament recently; nevertheless, the response levels for the various questions are fairly high. But attitudes are plainly negative: their country has not benefited from being a member of the Community (85%), which is in itself "a bad thing" (56%); 59% were even hostile to the movement towards European unification, the highest proportion among all the types studied.

There is the question of why people of this type did not go and vote when other avowed opponents of Europe and the Community did. It is true that the "anti-Europeans" who did not vote are even more negative about Europe and the Community than those who did. But it is unlikely that this is the only explanation. The difference is more that anti-Europeans who did not vote are even more convinced than anti-Europeans who did that the European Parliament has not and should not acquire any importance:

	<u>Anti-Europeans</u>	
	<u>Non-voters</u>	<u>Voters</u>
- The country has not benefited from being a member of the Community	85%	80%
- Community membership is a bad thing	56	48
- Against European unification	59	44
- The movement towards unification should be slowed down	48	39
- The European Parliament's present role is of little or no importance	80	55
- The future role of the European Parliament should be less important	61	43

In terms of the socio-demographic profile of the two types, non-voting anti-Europeans are slightly more common among the **25** to **39** age group than those who voted; there are more with an average level education, they have fewer opinion leaders and, above all, a higher proportion of them have no party affiliations. If they voted, they might well be "floating voters".

This type is over-represented in Denmark and the United Kingdom.

*
* *

The detailed results **obtained** from this typological analysis are given in Tables **46** and **47**. But it is, perhaps, a good idea to summarize briefly the variables which - all other things being equal - can go some way towards identifying those who voted and those who did not.

They include neither sex nor age, although slightly more women than men did not vote and there was a slighter higher turnout among those aged **40** and over.

Contrary to what might be expected, it does not appear - at least in this study - that level of education in itself is a factor **determining** whether or not people vote: those with the lowest and highest levels of education voted more than the others, while those with an intermediate education level tended not to vote. However, cognitive mobilization, and even more **so** identification with a political party, had a positive influence on the propensity to vote.

Information about the event, that is to say the fact of having read or heard something recently about the European Parliament, clearly distinguishes between voters and non-voters, but what is difficult to believe is that, even among voters, when asked without any prompting, one in two had no precise recollection of what he or she had heard or read. It was only during the interview that an image crystallized and attitudes were revealed.

Two sets of variables ultimately seem the clearest distinguishing factors. They are correlated but seem to have a separate and probably cumulative effect. They are, firstly, people's image of the European Parliament and the importance they attribute to its present and, more especially, future role and, secondly, attitudes towards the Community and its development .

(See Tables 46 and 47)

¹ As already stated, these exploratory analyses ignored variables peculiar to individual countries (national culture, political system, voting procedure, etc.). However, it is clear from the simple fact that turnout varied between 32.6% and 92.1% in the ten countries that national variables are extremely important. Future analyses must therefore, firstly, consider how the different variables, including nationality, interact and rank in the Community as a whole and, secondly, how the general model applies to each country taken separately.

It is clear that such research, begun in 1979 and continued in 1984, should be undertaken more frequently in order to give the institutions and the rival parties an early indication of what action they might take before 1989 to arouse the interest of voters.

Table 46
TENTATIVE CLASSIFICATION OF VOTERS AND NON-VOTERS
IN THE ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

	VOTERS					NON-VOTERS					TOTAL ELECTO- RATE
	Good Euro- peans	Duty voters	Semi- indif- ferent	Commu- nity oppo- nents	All voters	Under- infor- med and unrepen- tant	Guilty non- voters	Moder- ate oppo- nents	Hard- line oppo- nents	All voters	
	(59%)	(10%)	(19%)	(12%)	(100%)	(37%)	(11%)	(31%)	(21%)	(100%)	
SEX											
Male	52%	44%	41%	47%	48%	51%	34%	39%	52%	46%	48%
Female	48	56	59	53	51	49	66	61	48	54	52
AGE											
18-24	12%	14%	11%	11%	12%	21%	27%	20%	9%	19%	14%
25-39	28	26	20	28	26	37	31	30	34	33	28
40-54	27	28	30	22	27	20	16	19	23	20	25
55 or over	33	32	39	39	35	22	26	31	34	28	33
LEVEL OF EDUCATION											
Low	46%	49%	60%	57%	51%	33%	43%	51%	54%	44%	49%
Intermediate	33	35	30	32	32	46	33	40	36	41	35
High	21	16	10	11	17	21	24	9	10	15	16
COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION											
High (leader)	15%	9%	9%	14%	13%	9%	12%	4%	8%	8%	11%
Above average	34	26	19	26	29	34	32	19	21	26	29
Below average	33	39	35	29	34	37	31	42	41	39	35
Low (non-leader)	18	26	37	31	24	20	25	35	30	27	25
PARTY ALLEGIANCE											
Very close	15%	5%	7%	15%	12%	3%	6%	5%	5%	4%	10%
Fairly close	26	16	21	23	24	17	23	12	20	17	22
Merely a sympathizer	39	43	34	30	37	34	35	23	29	30	35
Close to no political party	20	36	38	32	27	46	36	60	46	49	33
INFORMATION ABOUT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT											
Read or heard something	55%	42%	35%	31%	47%	39%	24%	17%	26%	28%	41%
Neither read nor heard something	45	58	65	69	53	61	76	83	74	72	59
PERCEPTION OF PRESENT ROLE OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT											
Very important or important	49%	40%	16%	25%	39%	21%	52%	9%	10%	18%	33%
Not very or not at all important	49	56	67	71	55	74	36	71	86	72	60
Don't know	2	4	17	4	6	5	12	20	4	10	7
PERCEPTION OF PRESENT ROLE OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT											
Very important or important	71%	62%	24%	41%	57%	49%	60%	16%	16%	33%	50%
Not very or not at all important	27	34	53	55	36	46	27	58	80	55	42
Don't know	2	4	23	4	7	5	13	26	4	12	8

											TOTAL ELECTO- RATE
					All voters	Under- infor- med and unrepen- tant	Guilty non- voters	Moder- ate oppon- ents	Hard- line oppon- ents	All voters	
					(100%)	(37%)	(11%)	(31%)	(21%)	(100%)	
<u>PREFERRED ROLE FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT</u>											
More important	53%	55%	38%	12%	46%	64%	51%	22%	7%	38%	43%
About the same	10	13	10	29	13	15	15	22	18	18	14
Less important	2	3	1	43	6	3	9	9	61	17	10
Don't know	35	29	51	16	35	18	25	47	14	27	33
<u>EUROPEAN UNIFICATION</u>											
Very much or to some extent for	95%	88%	63%	45%	82%	93%	78%	56%	35%	68%	78%
Very much or to some extent against	3	5	5	44	8	2	11	6	59	16	10
Don't know	2	7	32	11	10	5	11	38	6	16	12
<u>SPEED UP OR SLOW DOWN MOVEMENT TO UNIFICATION</u>											
Speed up	62%	52%	32%	6%	48%	52%	32%	18%	2%	29%	43%
Continue as at present	34	40	31	48	36	43	48	45	40	44	38
Slow down	1	4	2	39	6	2	11	1	48	12	8
Don't know	3	4	35	6	10	3	9	36	10	15	11
<u>THE COUNTRY AND THE COUNCIL</u>											
Benefited	78%	53%	8%	9%	54%	73%	37%	4%	4%	33%	48%
Did not benefit	13	31	51	80	30	14	39	59	85	46	35
Don't know	9	16	41	11	16	13	24	37	11	21	17
<u>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</u>											
Good thing	88%	66%	30%	8%	65%	83%	52%	11%	5%	41%	58%
Neither good nor bad	10	27	43	43	22	16	31	53	39	34	25
Bad thing	1	6	10	48	9	1	12	17	56	18	12
Don't know	1	1	17	1	4	1	5	19	.	7	5
<u>MAIN REASON FOR NOT VOTING</u>											
Personal reasons						29%	46%	18%	10%	23%	
Lack of interest in politics						17	6	24	20	19	
Lack of interest in Europe						14	4	22	27	19	
Not informed enough						17	10	16	13	15	
Hostility toward Europe						1	.	1	7	2	
Other reasons						17	14	12	16	14	
Don't know						5	19	7	7	8	
<u>REGRET NOT HAVING VOTED</u>											
Yes						3%	55%	-	1%	8%	
No						89	6	92%	91	81	
Don't know						8	39	8	8	11	

Table 47

DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF VOTER AND NON-VOTER BY COUNTRY¹

								Mode-	Hard-	All

CHAPTER IV

REACTIONS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL
TO THE PROSPECT OF JOINING THE
COMMUNITY

IV

REACTIONS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL
TO THE PROSPECT OF JOINING THE COMMUNITY

A "mini-poll" has been conducted in Spain and Portugal every six months since autumn 1981 and the findings published in Eurobarometer. The results of the spring 1984 survey, which could not be published at the time because of preparations for a special edition on the elections to the European Parliament, are included below¹.

IV.1. INTEREST IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS AND IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THEM

The replies to two questions, one on personal interest in Community affairs and the other on the importance attached to them, enable us to gauge how relevant or irrelevant² to the problems of day-to-day living Community affairs are felt to be.

The questions were first asked in spring 1980 in Spain and in autumn 1981 in Portugal.

In Spain the starting level was fairly high: in April 1980 32% of interviewees claimed to be "very interested" in Community affairs and 60% felt them to be "very important" or "important". The interest rating has now risen to 35% and the importance rating to 73%.

The starting level in Portugal was much lower: in October 1981 only 13% were "very-interested" in Community affairs and in early 1982 only 37% felt them to be "very important" or "important". The interest rating has now risen to 17% and the importance rating to 48%, a considerably smaller increase than in Spain.

¹ The 1984 spring and autumn surveys were conducted in Spain by Emopublica between 10 and 17 March (N=1016) and Gallup between 17 and 21 October (N=1029) and in Portugal by Nonna between 20 February and 20 March (N=1958) and between 16 October and 13 November (N=1976), on a sample of the population aged 15 and over.

² "Newspapers, radio and TV often present news and commentaries about the European Community (also called the Common Market). Are you personally very interested, a little interested or not at all interested in the problems of the European Community?"

"Whether or not you have the time to take a personal interest in the problems of the European Community, do you feel these problems are very important, important, not very important or unimportant for the future of (your country) and the people of (your country)?"

In both countries there has been a sharp decrease in the number of "don't knows", indicating at least a minimum degree of involvement on the part of respondents.

(See Tables 48 and 49)

To give a clearer picture of the pattern, an "involvement index" has been produced by combining the replies to the two questions².

Movement in the index since autumn 1982 clearly shows the difference between the two countries in this respect. In Spain the degree of involvement remained fairly constant until spring 1984, since when it has risen considerably. In Portugal, after a fairly sharp rise between autumn 1982 and autumn 1983, progress is now much slower.

(See Table 50)

For a more in-depth analysis in both countries, the level and trend of the involvement index have been related to cognitive mobilization, i.e. the capacity of interviewees to act as opinion leaders².

In both Spain and Portugal there is a very high correlation between degree of cognitive mobilization and involvement in Community affairs: leaders are much more involved than non-leaders. However, whereas the gap between leaders and non-leaders is narrowing in Spain, in Portugal it is more or less constant.

(See Table 51)

The maximum score (5.0) goes to those who both feel that Community affairs are "very important" and are personally "very interested"; the minimum score (1.0) is for the combination "unimportant" and "not at all interested".

- ² The cognitive mobilization index is produced by combining the replies to two questions, one on ability to persuade others, and the second on frequency of political discussions.

Table 48

INTEREST IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

	Claim to be:			Don't know	Total
	very interested	a little interested	not at all interested		
<u>SPAIN</u>					
April 1980	32%	26%	26%	16%	100%
October 1981	31	30	20	19	100
April-May 1982	24	33	28	15	100
October 1982	24	26	32	18	100
May 1983	32	20	25	15	100
October 1983	28	26	28	18	100
March 1984	26	30	30	14	100
October 1984	35	35	25	5	100
<u>PORTUGAL</u>					
October 1981	13%	19%	14%	54%	100%
February-March 1982	15	19	28	38	100
October-November 1982	10	20	29	41	100
May 1983	16	25	28	31	100
October-November 1983	19	25	32	24	100
February-March 1984	20	28	30	22	100
October-November 1984	17	29	29	25	100

Table 49

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

	Consider Community affairs:				know't	Total
	very important	important	not very important	un-important		
<u>SPAIN</u>						
April-May 1982	21%	39%	9%	6%	25%	100%
October 1982	21	41	8	4	26	100
May 1983	16	49	7	4	24	100
October 1983	21	37	8	7	27	100
March 1984	21	39	8	8	24	100
October 1984	31	42	9	4	14	100
<u>PORTUGAL</u>						
February-March 1982	14%	23%	5%	5%	53%	100%
October-November 1982	10	22	7	5	56	100
May 1983	17	25	7	8	43	100
October-November 1983	18	27	10	9	36	100
February-March 1984	16	28	10	8	38	100
October-November 1984	18	30	8	6	38	100

Table 50

INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

		Oct.-Nov. 1982	May 1983	October 1983	March 1984	October 1984
		%	%	%	%	%
<u>SPAIN</u>						
(++)	Consider these affairs "very important" and are "very interested"	13	11	14	14	21
(+)		15	24	16	13	18
(-)		20	22	19	23	26
(--)	Consider these affairs "unimportant" and are "not at all interested"	21	16	17	20	16
		31	27	34	30	19
Total		100	100	100	100	100
Index ¹		2.59	2.74	2.61	2.63	3.08
Base		1053	919	996	1016	1029
		oct.-nov. 1982	mai 1983	oct.-nov. 1983	fév.-mars 1984	oct.-nov. 1984
		%	%	%	%	%
<u>PORTUGAL</u>						
(++)	Consider these affairs "very important" and are "very interested"	5	10	12	10	10
(+)		8	9	9	12	13
(-)		12	17	16	18	18
(--)	Consider these affairs "unimportant" and are "not at all interested"	13	15	18	15	15
		62	49	45	45	44
Total		100	100	100	100	100
Index ¹		1.82	2.16	2.25	2.28	2.31
Base						

1 (++) - 5; (--) = 1.

Table 51

INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
BY LEADERSHIP RATING

	October-November 1982				Hay 1983				October-November 1983			
	Non-leaders			Leaders	Non-leaders			Leaders	Non-leaders			Leaders
	(--)	(-)	(+)	(++)	(--)	(-)	(+)	(++)	(--)	(-)	(+)	(++)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
SPAIN												
(++) Maximum involvement	7	9	17	36	6	8	17	31	4	15	22	35
(+)	6	12	21	32	8	38	21	32	9	15	25	27
(=)	12	23	30	14	15	18	37	18	14	23	25	13
(-)	21	26	19	12	19	15	15	11	16	22	15	10
(--) Minimum involvement	54	30	13	6	52	21	10	8	57	25	13	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ¹	1.94	2.46	3.11	3.79	1.98	2.97	3.19	3.66	1.87	2.71	3.29	3.57
Base	352	303	300	98	298	355	213	53	387	265	252	92
	February-March 1984				October 1984							
	Non-leaders			Leaders	Non-leaders			Leaders				
	(--)	(-)	(+)	(++)	(--)	(-)	(+)	(++)				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%				
(++) Maximum involvement	6	12	24	32	11	16	29	52				
(+)	6	11	22	25	12	20	24	14				
(=)	16	26	29	19	19	34	27	19				
(-)	22	23	15	11	19	16	14	8				
(--) Minimum involvement	50	28	10	13	39	14	6	7				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				
Index ¹	1.96	2.58	3.34	3.50	2.35	3.08	3.50	3.90				
Base	366	297	262	91	326	293	337	73				

¹ (++) = 5; (--) = 1.

Table 51 (contd.)

INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY ACTION
BY LEADERSHIP RATING

PORTUGAL		October-November 1982					May 1983		October-November 1983				
		Non-leaders			Leaders	Non-leaders			Leaders	Non-leaders			Leaders
		(--)	(-)	(+)	(++)	(--)	(-)	(+)	(++)	(--)	(-)	(+)	(++)
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
(++) Maximum involvement		2	12	7	24	4	14	21	31	4	15	24	36
(+) Maximum involvement		4	13	18	15	4	16	16	17	5	12	16	20
(=) Maximum involvement		8	18	29	17	10	24	28	34	9	26	22	19
(-) Maximum involvement		11	20	17	9	14	17	19	11	18	17	23	11
(--) Minimum involvement		75	37	29	35	68	29	16	7	64	30	15	14
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index		1.47	2.44	2.58	2.85	1.63	2.69	3.06	3.52	1.68	2.64	3.10	3.54
Base		1241	373	176	62	1159	444	297	84	1056	489	351	92
February-March 1984					October-November 1984								
					Leaders	Non-leaders							

IV.2. ATTITUDES TOWARDS ACCESSION AND RELATED EXPECTATIONS

Besides the usual question, based on the one put regularly in the Member States to gauge overall attitude towards the European Community, this survey included a question asked for the first time in 1981 on the possible advantages and disadvantages of Community membership in a number of areas.

IV.2.1. Views on Community membership

This question has been asked in Spain since April 1980 and in Portugal since October 1980.

Whereas, as we have seen, involvement is on the increase in both countries clearly as a result of regular media coverage, support for accession, albeit more widespread than opposition, is not. Here again a distinction has to be made between the two countries.

In Spain six in every ten now think that accession will be "a good thing"; the figures are more or less the same as in April 1980 apart from a noticeable drop in the number of "don't knows". There had been a fairly sharp decline in support in the interim (46% in May 1983 and 47% in March 1984), no doubt reflecting public disillusionment as the negotiations dragged on, but now that the date is more or less definite, support is strengthening again.

In Portugal, where the number of "don't knows" has also fallen but is still very high (almost three times more than in Spain), there has been no increase in support, which has been hovering around the 27% mark since 1980.

Opponents of accession are very much in the minority in both countries: fewer than 10% in Spain and slightly more in Portugal.

(See Table 52)

In both Spain and Portugal there seem to be two variables affecting overall attitudes: cognitive mobilization (or leadership rating) which, as we have seen, is responsible for determining the degree of involvement in Community affairs, and political leanings, measured here by where people place themselves in the political spectrum. In other words, the first obstacles to be overcome are lack of knowledge and lack of involvement; political differences produce attitudes, positive or negative only among the section of the public which is aware of what is involved.

We must, therefore, look first at the number and pattern of "don't knows" in both countries before turning to the actual-replies.

Table 52

ATTITUDES TOWARDS ACCESSION

		Think accession will be:			Don't know	Total	Index'
		a good thing	neither good nor bad	a bad thing			
<u>SPAIN</u>							
April	1980	58%	13%	5%	24%	100%	2.70
December	1980	52	17	5	26	100	2.64
March	1981	53	13	6	28	100	2.65
October	1981	52	18	6	24	100	2.61
April-May	1982	51	21	5	23	100	2.60
October	1982	48	21	7	24	100	2.55
May	1983	46	17	5	32	100	2.61
October	1983	50	17	5	28	100	2.62
March	1984	47	19	7	27	100	2.55
October	1984	60	16	8	16	100	2.62
<u>PORTUGAL</u>							
October	1980	24%	11%	6%	59%	100%	2.44
Hay-June	1981	31	10	6	53	100	2.53
October	1981	20	13	7	60	100	2.33
February-March	1982	24	14	7'	55	100	2.38
October-November	1982	23	16	6	55	100	2.37
May	1983	28	16	8	48	100	2.38
October-November	1983	30	23	9	38	100	2.35
February-March	1984	28	19	12	41	100	2.26
October-November	1984	27	16	11	46	100	2.30

¹ "In general, do you think that for (your country), becoming a member of the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing; a bad thing or neither good nor bad?"

² "A good thing" = 3; "a bad thing" = 1. Don't knows excluded.

Let us begin with Spain. We have seen that 60% of the population think Community accession will be "a good thing". Only 7% of men did not express an opinion compared with 24% of women but, of the women who replied, the percentage of favourable responses was almost as high as among the men (68%). The same was true of age: those aged 40 and over were less likely to express an opinion than their juniors but when they did, it tended to be slightly more favourable.

Cognitive mobilization is particularly interesting. Firstly, 32% of "non-leaders" (who account for almost a third of the total population) did not reply, whereas the figure for leaders, which is four and a half times lower, was only 9%. But these opinion leaders include a substantial minority - twice as many as among non-leaders - of opponents of accession; opinion leaders, precisely because they are "mobilized", are more affected by political differences than non-leaders.

To sum up then, subject to more detailed analysis, it would appear that the Spaniards most in favour of accession are those who are cognitively mobilized, are able to define themselves in political terms and belong neither to the extreme right nor the extreme left. They are in fact the very ones who are most involved in Community affairs. Cause or effect? Difficult to say. But the fact remains that this 40% or so of the Spanish population will undoubtedly play a major role in Spain's integration into the Community.

(See Table 53)

And what about Portugal? It would be fair to say that the same variables produce the same effects as in Spain but with a much lower average level of education, cognitive mobilization and involvement. For example, whereas opinion leaders account for about 7% and non-leaders for about 32% of the Spanish population, the figures for Portugal are 3% and 56% respectively. Another example: 42% of Portuguese interviewees refused to define themselves in political terms, compared with 18% of Spaniards.

However, as we pointed out earlier, the very high number of "don't knows" makes it difficult to compare the two countries.

That said, two major differences do emerge: firstly, with the same level of "don't knows" among opinion leaders in both countries, two thirds in Spain think accession will be "a good thing" while in Portugal the three possible options ("a good thing", "a bad thing", "neither good nor bad") rate more or less equally. Secondly, leanings are a more decisive factor in Portugal than in Spain, with the strongest supporters apparently slightly right of centre.

(See Table 54)

Table 53
FOR OR AGAINST ACCESSION
(SPAIN: October 1984)

<p><u>OVERALL</u></p> <p><u>SEX:</u></p> <p>Men</p> <p>Women</p> <p><u>AGE:</u></p> <p>15-24</p> <p>25-39</p> <p>40-54</p> <p>55 and over</p> <p><u>COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION:</u></p> <p>High (leader)</p> <p>Above average</p> <p>Below average</p> <p>Low (non-leader)</p> <p><u>DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT:</u></p> <p>Low</p> <p>Medium</p> <p>High</p> <p><u>POLITICAL LEANINGS</u></p> <p>Extreme left</p> <p>Left</p> <p>Right</p> <p>Extreme right</p> <p>(Not specified)</p>	Think accession will be:																		
	neither good																		

Table 54
FOR OR AGAINST ACCESSION
(PORTUGAL: October-November 1984)

	Think accession will be:			Don't know	Total	Index	Base
	a good thing	neither good nor bad	a bad thing				
<u>OVERALL</u>	27%	16%	11%	46%	100%	2.30	1985
<u>SEX :</u>							
Men	35%	19%	16%	30%	100%	2.27	953
Women	20	13	7	60	100	2.34	1032
<u>AGE :</u>							
15-24	37%	22%	8%	33%	100%	2.42	466
25-39	30	19	16	35	100	2.22	532
40-54	26	16	11	47	100	2.27	459
55 and over	18	8	8	66	100	2.27	528
<u>COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION :</u>							
High (leader)	30%	31%	30%	9%	100%	2.00	52
Above average	47	18	22	13	100	2.29	318
Below average	40	18	14	28	100	2.35	505
Low (non-leader)	16	13	6	65	100	2.29	1110
<u>DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT:</u>							
Low	10%	14%	9%	67%	100%	2.00	1165
Medium	48	21	13	18	100	2.42	363
High	57	17	14	12	100	2.49	457
<u>POLITICAL LEANINGS</u>							
Extreme left	43%	8%	25%	24%	100%	2.23	68
left	31	21	26	22	100	2.06	259
Right	39	23	8	30	100	2.45	554
Extreme right	45	16	12	27	100	2.46	207
(Not specified)	38	8	16	38	100	2.36	58
	(12)	(11)	(7)	(70)	(100)	(2.18)	(839)

IV 2.2. Possible advantages and disadvantages of membership

A question asked in the ten member countries in April 1981 showed that most people think the good effects of membership outweigh the bad in seven of the ten areas listed. The beneficial effects most commonly cited were reducing the risk of war and improving the selection of goods available in the shops. However, negative opinions outweighed positive opinions in three major areas - the price of products in the shops, agriculture, and jobs and employment¹.

The same question was asked in Spain and Portugal in both spring and autumn 1981. It was repeated in autumn 1984² so that the latest findings can be compared with those of three years ago.

Views have changed little in either country; the one exception is the decline in benefits now expected for agriculture. It is significant that in 1984 as in 1981 a large majority of respondents expected accession to be beneficial in all the areas listed. This is admittedly consistent with the overall view expressed by most respondents that accession is "a good thing". But it should be remembered that negative views predominated in three areas when the same question was asked in the Member States in April 1981. The very high percentage of "don't knows" (on average 32% in Spain and 62% in Portugal) also means that care must be exercised in interpreting the results in Spain and even more so for Portugal.

In 1984 as in 1981 by external benefits ("exports" and "the country's role in the world") and consolidation of the political system ("the way democracy works in the country") were top of the Spanish list. Opinions were more divided, albeit still largely positive, on prices and better prospects of avoiding a war.

Portuguese hopes rest mainly with exports, the choice of products available and the country's role in the world. Benefits for the country's energy supply were mentioned a little less often in 1984 than in 1981 but still more often than in Spain. As with Spain, prices and better prospects of avoiding a war come bottom of the list but, unlike Spain, so did agriculture. Lastly, the Portuguese would seem to relate the workings of democracy more closely to Community accession than do the Spaniards.

(See Table 55)

¹ See Eurobarometer No. 15 (June 1981), p. 44.

² See Eurobarometer No. 16 (December 1981), pp. 66-68. The results of the two surveys carried out in 1981, which were very similar, have been combined for purposes in the following comparison.

Table 55
POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ACCESSION¹
1. SPAIN

	March and October 1981							October 1984						
	Consider that effects will be				Don't know	Total	Index ²					Don't know	Total	Index ²
	very good	fairly good	fairly bad	very bad				very good	fairly good	fairly bad	very bad			
Better prospects of avoiding war	10%	21%	11%	5%	53%	100%	2.76	8%	29%	17%	5%	41%	100%	2.67
Choice of products available in shops and stores	15	38	5	1	41	100	3.13	15	51	7	2	25	100	3.06
The country's role in the world	14	33	5	2	46	100	3.10	17	44	6	2	31	100	3.09
The chances of coping as far as possible with the current world economic crisis	12	33	5	2	48	100	3.07	13	45	8	3	31	100	2.98
The country's energy supply	9	31	8	2	50	100	2.94	10	41	8	2	39	100	2.96
The way democracy works in the country	17	33	3	1	46	100	3.20	14	41	6	2	37	100	3.07
Exports	22	34	6	3	35	100	3.14	23	44	9	2	22	100	3.12
The price of products in shops and stores	12	32	10	3	43	100	2.93	13	39	17	2	29	100	2.87
Agriculture	23	31	7	5	34	100	3.09	20	37	12	7	24	100	2.92
Jobs and employment	14	32	8	2	44	100	3.02	15	40	10	4	31	100	2.96
Average	14	32	7	3	44	100	3.04	15	41	10	3	31	100	2.97

¹ The items are ranked in descending order of index score for the Community as a whole (April 1981). Percentages for each item total 100.

² "Very good" = 4; "very bad" = 1. Don't knows excluded.

Table 55 (Contd.)
POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ACCESSION¹
2. PORTUGAL

	July-June and October 1981							October-November 1984							
	Consider that effects will be:				Don't know	Total	Index ²	Consider that effects will be:				Don't know	Total	Index ²	
	very good	fairly good	fairly bad	very bad				very good	fairly good	fairly bad	very bad				
Better prospects of avoiding war	3%	172	62	2%	72%	100%	2.76	2%	16%	9%	12	72%	100%	2.70	
Choice of products available in shops and stores	4	25	5	1	65	100	2.95	5	3	0	1	7	57	100	2.90
The country's role in the world	4	20	4	1	71	100	2.95	3	23	5	1	68	100	2.88	
The chances of coping as far as possible with the current world economic crisis	3	22	4	1	70	100	2.92	4	24	7	1	64	100	2.82	
The country's energy supply	4	25	3		68	100	3.01	2	23	5	1	69	100	2.84	
The way democracy works in the country	3	22	5	1	69	100	2.90	3	22	6	1	68	100	2.03	
Exports	6	22	6	1	65	100	2.93	10	23	10	2	55	100	2.92	
The price of products in shops and stores	3	21	8	1	67	100	2.77	3	23	12	3	59	100	2.64	
Agriculture	4	21	8	2	65	100	2.75	3	22	14	5	56	100	2.53	
Jobs and employment	4	22	7	1	66	100	2.82	7	23	10	3	57	100	2.79	
Average	4	22	5	1	68	100	2.88	4	23	9	2	62	100	2.77	

¹ The items are ranked in descending order of index score for the Community as a whole (April 1981). Percentages for each item total 100.

² "Very good" = 4; "very bad" = 1. Don't knows excluded.

As in the case of overall attitudes to accession, each of these replies correlates with the degree of cognitive mobilization and political leanings of the respondent. But we will concentrate here on the correlation between overall attitude and the individual areas of expected advantage and disadvantage.

The correlation is particularly high in both countries in the case of coping with the world economic crisis. In other words, it is clear that the view of the Community as a haven of solidarity in an unsettled world plays an important part in shaping support for accession.

This is proved by factor analysis. In both Spain and Portugal an initial factor, which explains 44% of the variance in replies, corresponds to support for accession expressed mainly through high expectations that it will help both countries cope with the world crisis and play a bigger role in world affairs; this favourable attitude goes hand-in-hand with interest in Community affairs and importance attached to them. A second factor, which accounts for 9 to 10% of the variance, combines interest in and importance attached to Community affairs and corresponds to a fair measure of support for accession but with reservations; it is even in negative correlation:

- in Spain: with reducing the risk of war and limiting price increases;
- in Portugal: with jobs, agriculture and price increases.

The other factors are insignificant and more difficult to interpret.

This analysis is useful in highlighting the areas where the waverers - individuals or groups - albeit relatively in favour of accession, do have doubts or fears about its effects.

(See Table 56)

Table 56

FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS ACCESSION¹

	SPAIN		PORTUGAL	
	Factor I (44.3%)	Factor II (9.3%)	Factor I (44.1%)	Factor II (10.4%)
Overall attitude	.685	.172	.656	(.061)
Interest	.440	.738	.277	.786
Importance	.478	.658	.351	.698
Coping with the crisis	.803	(-.085)	.786	(-.070)
Country' role in the world	.761	(-.061)	.785	(.001)
Jobs and employment	.738	(-.099)	.644	-.299
Exports	.724	(-.063)	.692	-.163
Better prospects of avoiding war	.543	-.288	.689	(-.027)
The way democracy works	.718	(.020)	.759	(.006)
Price of products	.668	-.245	.695	-.200
Choice of products	.694	(-.086)	.736	.124
Energy supply	.669	-.141	.705	(.088)
Agriculture	.623	-.100	.625	-.231

¹ Analysis of principal components. The coefficients in brackets are insignificant.

ANNEXES ET TABLEAUX DETAILLES / APPENDIX AND DETAILED TABLES

INSTITUTS CHARGES DU SONDAGE ET SPECIALISTES RESPONSABLES /
INSTITUTES 1 CARRIED OUT THE SURVEY 1 EXPERTS IN CHARGE (x)

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Danmark	GALLUP MARKEDSANALYSE A/S Gammel Vartov Vej 6 DK-2900 Hellerup Tél.: 01/29.88.00	Rolf RANDRUP
Deutschland	EMNID-INSTITUT GmbH Bodelschwinghstraße, 23-25a D-4800 Bielefeld 1 Tél.: 0521/210.58	Walter TACKE Klaus Peter SCHOEPPNER
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France	INSTITUT DE SONDAGES LAVIALLE 6-8 rue du 4 Septembre F-92130 Issy-les-Moulineaux Tél.: 554.64.11	Albert LAVIALLE
Ireland	IRISH MARKETING SURVEYS Ltd 19-20 Upper Pembroke Street IRL-Dublin 2 Tél.: 76.11.96	John F. MEAGHER Charles COYLE
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Toutes les données relatives aux Euro-Baromètres sont déposées aux "Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences", (1 Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). Elles sont tenues à la disposition des organismes membres du European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), du Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) et des chercheurs justifiant d'un intérêt de recherche.

All Euro-Barometre data are stored at the Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences (1, Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research.

Pour tous renseignements sur les études d'opinion publique faites à l'initiative de la Commission des Communautés européennes, écrire à J.-R. RABIER, Conseiller spécial, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Bruxelles.

For all information regarding opinion surveys carried out for the Commission of the European Communities, please write to J.-R. RABIER, special Counsellor, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels.

-
- (x) Les dix instituts actuellement chargés de ces sondages ont formé entre eux THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY, dont le comité de direction comprend: Robert GIJS (DIMARSO, Bruxelles), Jan STAPEL (NIPO, Amsterdam) et Norman WEBB (Social Surveys, London). / The ten institutes which carried out these surveys have formed amongst themselves THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY of which the Management Committee comprises: Robert GIJS (DIMARSO, Brussels), Jan STAPEL (NIPO, Amsterdam) and Norman WEBB (Social Surveys, London).
- (xx) Le sondage en Northern Ireland est fait en collaboration par le Irish Marketing Surveys et le Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). / The Northern Ireland Survey is conducted jointly by Irish Marketing Surveys and the Social Surveys (Gallup Poll).

ECHANTILLONNAGE / SAMPLING

L'objectif de la méthode d'échantillonnage est de couvrir de façon représentative la totalité de la population des dix pays de la Communauté âgée de 15 ans et plus.

L'échantillon de chaque pays est constitué à deux niveaux:

1° Régions et localités d'enquête

Les statistiques de la Communauté européenne divisent l'espace européen en 117 régions (voir liste ci-jointe). L'enquête a lieu dans 115 régions (Corse et Val d'Aoste exceptés).

Chaque pays a constitué aléatoirement un échantillon-martre de localités d'enquête de telle sorte que toutes les catégories d'habitat soient représentées proportionnellement à leurs populations respectives.

Au total, les interviews de l'enquête Omnibus Européenne ont lieu dans environ 1 150 points d'enquête.

2° Choix des personnes interrogées

Les personnes interrogées sont toujours différentes d'une enquête à l'autre.

L'échantillon-martre aléatoire évoqué ci-dessus indique le nombre de personnes à interroger à chaque point d'enquête. A l'étape suivante, les personnes à interroger sont désignées:

- soit par un tirage au sort sur liste dans les pays où on peut avoir accès à des listes exhaustives d'individus ou de foyers: Belgique, Pays-Bas, Danemark, Luxembourg;
- soit par échantillonnage stratifié sur la base des statistiques de recensement, l'échantillon étant construit à partir des critères de sexe, âge et profession: France, Italie, Royaume-Uni, Irlande, Allemagne;
- soit par une méthode combinant les deux précédentes (cheminement systématique): Grèce,

The sample has been designed to be representative of the total population aged 15 years and over of the ten countries of the Community.

In each country a two stage sampling method is used:

1° Geographical distribution

For statistical purposes the European Community divides Europe into 117 regions (see attached list). The survey takes place in 115 of these regions (Corsica and Val D'aoste excluded).

In each country a random selection of sampling points is made in such a way that all types of area (urban, rural, etc.) are represented in proportion to their populations.

The interviews are distributed in more or less 1 150 sampling points.

2° Choice of respondents

For each survey different individuals are interviewed in the master sample of sampling point described above. Within these sampling points the individuals to be interviewed are chosen:

- either at random from the population or electoral lists in those countries where access to suitable lists of individuals or households is possible: Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg;
- or by quota sampling. In these cases the quotas are established by sex, age and occupation on the basis of census data: this system is used in France, Italy, United-Kingdom, Ireland and Germany;
- or by a method combining the two precedent ones ("random route"): Greece.

REGIONS D'ENQUETES / GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

BELGIQUE/BELGIE

AN : Antwerpen
W.V. : West-Vlaanderen
O.V. : Oost-Vlaanderen
BR : Brabant
LI : Limburg
LIE : Liège
HAI : Hainaut
NA : Namur
LX : Luxembourg

LOR : Lorraine
AL : Alsace
B.N. : Basse-Normandie
BRE : Bretagne
P.LOI : Pays de la Loire
CEN : Centre
BOU : Bourgogne
F.C. : Franche-Comté
P.CH. : Poitou-Charentes
LIM : Limousin

OV : Overijssel
NH : Noord-Holland
GEL : Gelderland
ZH : Zuid-Holland
UT : Utrecht
ZE : Zeeland
N.B. : Noord-Brabant
LI : Limburg

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

S.H. : Schleswig-Holstein
STA : Stade
AUR : Aurich
OLD : Oldenburg
B : Bremen
LUN : Lüneburg
BR : Braunschweig
OSN : Osnabrück
HAN : Hannover
MUN : Münster
DET : Detmold
HIL : Hildesheim
DUS : Düsseldorf
ARN : Arnsherg
KAS : Kassel
AA : Aachen
KOL : Köln
TRI : Trier
KOB : Koblenz

AUV : Auvergne
R-A : Rhône-Alpes
AQU : Aquitaine
M.P. : Midi-Pyrénées
LAN : Languedoc
P.CDA : Provence-Côte d'Azur
COR : (Corse)

IRELAND

DON : Donegal
N.W. : North West
N.E. : North East
W. : West
M. : Midlands
E. : East
M.W. : Mid West
S.E. : South East
S.W. : South West

UNITED KINGDOM

SCOTL : Scotland
N. : North
N.I. : Northern Ireland
N.W. : North West
Y.H. : Yorkshire and Humberside
WALES : Wales
W.M. : West Midlands
E.M. : East Midlands
E.A. : East Anglia
S.W. : South West
S.E. : South East

ITALIA

V.D.A. : (Valle d'Aosta)
PIE : Piemonte
LOM : Lombardia
T.AA : Trentino-Alto Adige
VEN : Veneto
F.VG : Friuli-Venezia-Giulia
LIG : Liguria
E-R : Emilia-Romagna
TOS : Toscana
UMB : Umbria
MAR : Marche
LAZ : Lazio
ABR : Abruzzi
MOL : Molise
CAM : Campania
PUG : Puglia
BAS : Basilicata
CAL : Calabria
SIC : Sicilia
SAR : Sardegna

ELLAS

Kentriki Ellas kai Evia
Pelopónnissos
Iónioi Nissoi
Ipiros
Thessalia
Makedonia
Thráki
Nissoi Aigaiou
Kriti

DANMARK

JYLL : Jylland
SJAE : Sjaelland
FYN : Fyn

FRANCE

NORD : Nord
PIC : Picardie
H.N. : Haute-Normandie
R.P. : Région Parisienne
CHA : Champagne

LUXEMBOURG

LX : G.D. du Luxembourg

NEDERLAND

GR : Groningen
FR : Friesland
DR : Drenthe

POPULATION ETUDIEE, TAILLE DES ECHANTILLONS, DATES DU TRAVAIL /
SURVEYED POPULATION, SIZE OF THE SAMPLE, DATES OF FIELDWORK

	Population (1)		Echantillons / Samples (2) (Baro 22)	Dates (Baro 22)
	milliers/ thousands	%		
B	7 878	3.66	1 035	2-19/X/1984
DK	4 070	1.89	990	27/X-4/XI
D	50 656	23.55	1 053	11-25/X
GR	7 551	3.51	1 000	10-25/X
F	41 904	19.48	1 006	4-30/X
IRL	2 408	1.12	1 008	15-26/X
I	44 739	20.80	1 097	10-28/X
L	298	0.14	299	15/X-2/XI
NL	11 075	5.15	1 018	12-22/X
UK	44 489	20.69	1 405	7-24/X
CE/EC	215 068	100.00	9 911	2/X-4/XI/1984

Il est rappelé que les résultats obtenus par sondage sont des estimations dont le degré de certitude et de précision dépend, toutes choses égales d'ailleurs, du nombre des individus constituant l'échantillon. Avec des échantillons de l'ordre de 1000, on admet généralement qu'une différence inférieure à cinq pour cent entre deux pourcentages est au-dessous du niveau acceptable de confiance.

*

* *

Les annexes statistiques -qui permettent de comparer, pour chaque pays et pour l'ensemble de la Communauté, les résultats du plus récent Euro-Baromètre et ceux des précédents- ont été composées sur machine à traitement de texte ET 351, suivant les conseils techniques et avec la coopération gracieuse de la société OLIVETTI S.A. Belge.

The statistical appendix which enable one to compare the results of the most recent Euro-Barometre with the previous ones, per country and for the Community as a whole, have been put together on a word-processing machine ET 351, according to the technical advice and with the kind assistance of

OLIVETTI S.A. Belge.

(1) 15 ans et plus / 15 years and over.

(2) Nombre d'interviews / Number of interviews.

TABLEAU 1 / TABLE 1

L'ANNEE PROCHAINE : MEILLEURE OU MOINS BONNE / THE NEXT YEAR : BETTER OR WORSE (1)

En ce qui vous concerne, pensez-vous que l'année prochaine (...) sera meilleure ou moins bonne que (l'année qui s'achève) / So far as you are concerned, do you think that (the next year) will be better or worse than (the year which is ending) ?

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984					
	x - XI	x - XI	X	X	X - XI					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Meilleure / Better	71	51	71	8	12					
Moins bonne / Worse	53	62	59	53	51					
Sans changement / Same	32	26	26	33	34					
Sans réponse / NO reply	8	7	8	6	3					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1022	973	1020	995	1035					

	DANMARK									
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984					
	x - XI	x - XI	X	X	x - XI					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Meilleure / Better	14	:	14	27	30					
Moins bonne / Worse	42	:	47	19						
Sans Changement / Same	37	:	31	47	47					
Sans réponse / NO reply	7	:	8	7	6					
Total	100	:	100	100	100					
N	1024	:	995	1000	990					

	DEUTSCHLAND									
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984					
	x - XI	x - XI	X	X	x - XI					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Meilleure / Better	8	13	13	20	25					
Moins bonne / Worse	37	28	22	17	12					
Sans changement / Same	48	50	53	51	58					
Sans réponse / NO reply	7	9	12	12	5					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1008	962	1012	1058	1053					

(1) The Gallup International Association.

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

(Meilleure / Better Moins bonne / Worse Sans changement / Same Sans reponse / No reply	9	13	13	8	12					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000					

	FRANCE									
	1980 x - XI	1981 x - XI	1982 X	1983 X	1984 x - XI					
	%	%	%	%	X	%	%	X	%	%
Meilleure / Better	15	32	18	17	15					
Moins bonne / Worse	39	32	42	46	41					
Sans changement / Same	25	28	36	31	36					
Sans reponse / No reply	11									
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	986	1006	939	1000	1006					

Sans réponse / No reply	4	5	4	6	6					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1010	985	1007	1002	1008					

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

ITALIA										
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984					
	x - XI	x - XI	X	X	x - XI					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
(Meilleure / Better	28	25	27	32	45					
Moins bonne / Worse	45	49	56	41	31					
Sans changement / Same	24	23	15	24	22					
Sans réponse / No reply	3	3	2	3	2					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1108	1070	1025	1033	1097					

LUXEMBOURG										
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984					
	x - XI	x - XI	X	X	x - XI					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Meilleure / Better	14	11	8	18	26					
Moins bonne / Worse	45	51	56	30	23					
Sans changement / Same	37	37	33	50	48					
Sans réponse / No reply	4	1	3	2	3					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	300	500	300	304	299					

NEDERLAND										

Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1114	1011	1056	1050	1018					

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM									
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984					
	X-XI	X-XI	X	X	X-XI					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Meilleure / Better	31	30	43	35	32					
Moins bonne / Worse	48	44	30	36	36					
Sans changerent / Sare	15	19	21	22	24					
Sans réponse / No reply	6	7	6	7	8					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1432	1395	1335	1277	1405					

Total	100	100	100	100	100					
	10004	9911	9689	9725	9909					

TABLEAU 2 / TABLE 2

CE QUE L'ON ATTEND DE L'ANNEE PROCHaine / THE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE NEXT YEAR (1)

Quand vous pensez à (l'année prochaine), croyez-vous que les grèves et conflits sociaux (dans votre pays) ... / Looking ahead to (next year) do you think that strikes and industrial disputes (in this country)

		BELGIQUE / BELGIE							
Sans réponse/No reply		9	10	11	7	4			
Total		100	100	100	100	100			
N		1022	973	1020	995	1035			
		DANMARK							
Sans réponse/No reply		9		8	9	7			
Total		100		100	100	100			
N		1024		995	1000	990			
		DEUTSCHLAND							
..augmenteront/will increase ?									
..diminueront/will decrease ?									
..resteront au niveau actuel ?									
/will remain the same ?									
Sans réponse/No reply		9	11	12	9	8			
Total		100	100	100	100	100			
N		1008	962	1012	1058	1053			

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	ELLAS							
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984			
	x - XI	x - XI	X	X	x - XI			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
				34	34			
				20	16			
				29	33			
				17	17			
Total	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000			

	FRANCE				
				1984	
				x - XI	
				%	%
				59	
				4	
				30	
				7	
Sans réponse/No reply	12	9	5	7	
Total	100	100	100	100	
N	986	1006	939	1000	1006

	IRELAND							
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984			
	X-XI	X-XI	X	X	X-XI			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
..augmenteront/will increase ?	41	52	45	43	46			
..diminueront/will decrease ?	20	11	18	19	16			
..resteront au niveau actuel ? /will remain the same ?	33	31	31	31	33			
Sans réponse/No reply	6	6	6	7	5			
Total	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1010	985	1007	1002	1008			

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	ITALIA							
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984			
	X-XI	X-XI	X	X	X-XI			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
..augmenteront/will increase ?	45	53	54	43	43			
..diminueront/will decrease ?	23	16	16	20	22			
..resteront au niveau actuel ? /will remain the same ?	29	26	26	33	31			
Sans réponse/No reply.	3	5	4	4	4			
Total	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1108	1070	1025	1033	1097			

	LUXEUBOURG							
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984			
	X-XI	X-XI	X	X	X-XI			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Sans réponse/No reply	7	3	4	5	6			
Total	100	100	100	100	100			
N	300	500	300	304	299			

	NEDERLAND							
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984			
	X-XI	X-XI	X	X	X-XI			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
..augmenteront/will increase ?	55	55	72	72	50			
..diminueront/will decrease ?	8	7	6	5	11			
..resteront au niveau actuel ? /will remain the same ?	32	32	19	20	35			
Sans réponse/No reply	5	6	3	3	4			
Total	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1114	1011	1056	1050	1018			

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM								
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984				
	x-XI	x-XI	X	X	x-XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
..augmenteront/will increase ?	38	42	39	32	41				
..diminueront/will decrease ?	26	19	19	23	20				
..resteront au niveau actuel ? /will remain the same ?	32	33	37	42	33				
Sans réponse/No reply	4	6	5	3	6				
Total	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1432	1395	1335	1277	1405				

	COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY								
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984				
	x-XI	x-XI	X	X	x-XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
..augmenteront/will increase ?	43	44	49	45	42				
..diminueront/will decrease ?	14	14	13	13	15				
..resteront au niveau actuel ? /will remain the same ?	36	34	31	36	36				
Sans réponse/No reply	17	8	7	6	7				
Total	100	100	100	100	100				
N	10004	9911	9689	9725	9909				

TABLEAU 3 / TABLE 3

CE QUE L'ON ATTEND DE L'ANNEE PROCHAINE / THE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE NEXT YEAR (1)

Quand vous pensez à (l'année prochaine), croyez-vous que ce sera une année assez tranquille et sans beaucoup de conflits internationaux, ou une année agitée avec beaucoup de querelles internationales, ou comme maintenant ? / Looking ahead the (next year), do you think it will be a peaceful year more or less free of international disputes, a troubled year with much international discord, or remain the same ?

BELGIQUE / BELGIE								
	1980							
	X-XI							
	%							
Assez tranquille/Peaceful year	4							
Agitée/Troubled year	55							
Comme maintenant/ Remain the same	32							
Sans réponse/No reply	9							
Total	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1022	973	1020	995	1035			

Sans réponse/No reply	91	:	6	8	8			
Total	100		100	100	100			
N	1024		995	1000	990			

(1) The Gallup International Association.

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

DEUTSCHLAND									
Sans réponse/No reply	8	10	12	8	7				
Total	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1008	962	1012	1058	1053				

ELLAS									
Sans réponse/No reply	11	19	19	15	18				
Total	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000				

FRANCE									
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984				
	x - XI	X - XI	X	X	x - XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Assez tranquille/Peaceful year	5	9	6	4	6				
Agitée/Troubled year	41	50	43	56	34				
Comme maintenant/ Remain the same	31	33	45	35	58				
Sans réponse/No reply	11	8	6	5					
Total	100	100	100	100	100				
N	986	1006	939	1000	1006				

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	FINLAND								
	1980 X-XI	1981 X-XI	1982 X	1983 X	1984 X-XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Assez tranquille/Peaceful year	15	13	14	12	13				
Agitée/Troubled year	45	46	43	41	41				
Comme maintenant/ Remain the same	32	33	33	36	40				
Sans réponse/No reply	8	8	10	11	6				
Total	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1010	985	1007	1002	1008				

	ITALIA								
	1980 X-XI (2)	1981 X-XI	1982 X	1983 X	1984 X-XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	X	%	%	%
Assez tranquille/Peaceful year	17	10	13	10	23				
Agitée/Troubled year	39	48	46	52	28				
Comme maintenant/ Remain the same	33	35	37	32	46				
Sans réponse/No reply	11	7	4	6	3				
Total	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1108	1070	1025	1033	1097				

(2) Résultats italiens recalculés / Italian results recalculated.

	LUXEMBOURG								
								%	%
Assez tranquille/Peaceful year									
Agitée/Troubled year									
Comme maintenant/ Remain the same									
Sans réponse / No reply	41	3	3	71	6				
Total	100	100	100	100	100				
N	300	500	300	304	299				

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	NEDERLAND								
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984				
	x - XI	x - XI	X	X	x - XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Assez tranquille/Peaceful year	31	41	41	41	6				
Agitée/Troubled year	56	57	51	52	40				
Comme maintenant/ Remain the same	33	32	39	38	46				
Sans réponse/No reply									
Total	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1114	1011	1056	1050	1018				

	UNITED KINGDOM								
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984				
	x - XI	x - XI	X	X	x - XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Assez tranquille/Peaceful year	6	6	12	7	9				
Agitée/Troubled year	50	50	35	44	37				
Comme maintenant/ Remain the same	39	38	44	43	48				
Sans réponse/No reply	5	6	9	6	6				
Total	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1432	1395	1335	1277	1405				

	COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY								
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984				
	x - XI	x - XI	X	X	x - XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Assez tranquille/Peaceful year	10	10	9	7	13				
Agitée/Troubled year	53	50	44	49	32				
Comme maintenant/ Remain the same	28	32	39	37	48				
Sans réponse/No reply			8	7	7				
Total	100	100	100	100	100				
N	10004	9911	9689	9725	9909				

TABLEAU 3 / TABLE 3

LE DANGER D'UNE NOUVELLE GUERRE MONDIALE AU COURS DES DIX PROCHAINES ANNEES

RISK OF A NEW WORLD WAR IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS

Voici une sorte d'échelle (MONTRER CARTE). Voulez-vous me montrer à quel endroit, sur cette échelle, vous placez le danger qu'une nouvelle guerre mondiale se produise dans les dix prochaines années ? Here is a sort of scale (SHOW CARD). Would you, with the help of this card, tell me how you assess the chance of a world war breaking out in the next 10 years ?

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	1971	1977	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984			
	VII	x - XI	IV	x - XI	X	X	x - XI			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
					2.1	0.9	0.9			
					2.7	1.2	1.9			
					3.1	3.7	4.3			
					4.2	4.5	28			
					5.9	4.9				
					11.5	7.9				
					6.1	8.5				
					8.5	9.3				
					9.7	10.8				
					8.9	9.7				
					21.1	26.1				
Sans réponse/No reply	14	14.5	16.1	17.0	16.2	12.3	6.9			
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			
Score moyen/Mean score	1.86	3.03	4.24	4.00	3.23	2.78	2.80			
N	1364	1006	1009	973	1020	995	1035			

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

DANMARK									
	1971 VII	1977 X-XI	1980 IV	1981 X-XI	1982 X	1983 X	1984 X-XI		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
La guerre est certaine/ World War Within the next ten years	100	:	3.2	2.7	:	1.7	2.1	0.8	
	90	:	0.5	2.3	:	0.9	0.6	0.6	
	80	:	1.5	3.6	:	1.0	2.5	6.0	
	70	:	1.4	3.0	:	2.8	3.1	1.6	
	60	:	2.2	2.6	:	2.4	4.3	2.7	
	50	:	9.5	14.9	:	14.5	14.7	12.8	
	40	:	1.3	4.1	:	6.3	6.2	4.4	
	30	:	4.7	5.7	:	6.9	7.7	8.0	
	20	:	5.7	5.2	:	7.7	8.4	10.3	
	10	:	7.4	9.1	:	14.1	13.6	13.6	
Aucun danger de guerre/ No danger of war	0	:	47.9	26.3	:	26.5	13.6	30.5	
Sans réponse/No reply		:	14.6	20.5	:	15.3	13.1	8.6	
Total		:	100.0	100.0	:	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Score moyen/Mean Score		:	1.85	3.02	:	2.53	2.84	2.50	
N		:	992	994	:	995	1000	990	

DEUTSCHLAND									
	1971 VII	1977 X-XI	1980 IV	1981 X-XI	1982 X	1983 X	1984 X-XI		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
La guerre est certaine/ World War Within the next ten years	100	0.6	1.8	2.7	4.4	2.6	2.5	1.8	
	90	0.7	1.1	1.3	1.6	2.5	1.2	1.0	
	80	1.8	2.3	5.6	6.4	2.5	3.4	1.4	
	70	2.6	3.8	4.7	9.3	3.8	4.0	4.7	
	60	4.6	3.1	7.6	7.3	4.7	5.3	3.7	
	50	11.0	9.3	12.9	12.5	11.5	11.4	9.6	
	40	7.2	8.0	9.4	6.6	6.7	8.4	5.2	
	30	11.9	11.5	11.5	9.6	11.4	9.0	9.9	
	20	10.6	15.1	8.9	10.5	8.9	8.6	12.3	
	10	11.0	14.9	8.1	8.1	8.1	10.4	9.8	
Aucun danger de guerre/ No danger of war	0	30.4	21.0	13.8	12.7	20.7	25.2	31.0	
Sans réponse/No reply		8.0	8.0	13.6	11.0	16.7	10.6	9.5	
Total		00.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Score moyen/Mean score		2.44	2.72	3.75	4.11	3.21	2.99	2.50	
N		2000	999	1009	962	1012	1058	1053	

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	ELLAS									
	1971	1977	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984			
	VII	X-XI	IV	X-XI	X	X	X-XI			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Total	:		:	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			
Score moyen/Mean score	:		:	1.64	1.83	2.25	1.97			
N	:		:	1000	1000	1000	1000			

	FRANCE									
	1971	1977	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984			
	VII	X-XI	IV	X-XI	X	X	X-XI			
	%	X	X	%	X	%	%	%	%	%
La guerre est certaine/ World War within the next ten years	100	2	2.3	3.0	2.8	3.8	4.4	2.4		
	90	1	1.7	3.4	2.7	2.2	2.6	0.8		
	80	3	3.3	19.5	4.6	2.7	5.0	2.7		
	70	2	2.1	8.5	6.3	6.0	5.5	3.8		
	60	2	3.0	7.8	7.2	5.6	5.4	2.7		
	50	13	14.2	16.2	18.8	19.0	18.6	19.1		
	40	4	4.7	8.4	8.8	7.0	7.1	6.4		
	30	8	9.4	9.0	9.6	12.0	8.7	10.9		
	20	8	7.6	7.7	7.8	9.9	11.8	11.1		
	10	10	11.6	6.3	10.1	10.0	10.4	13.7		
Aucun danger de guerre/ No danger of war		32	28.1	10.4	14.8	20.9	17.6	24.7		
Sans réponse/No reply		15	11.9	0.0	6.6	0.9	2.8	1.7		
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			
Score moyen/Mean score		2.47	2.76	4.85	3.84	3.47	3.71	2.91		
N		1806	1149	993	1006	939	1000	1006		

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

		IRELAND								
		1971 VII	1977 X-XI	1980 IV	1981 X-XI	1982 X	1983 X	1984 X-XI		
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
La guerre est certaine/ World War within the next ten years	100	:	2.6	4.0	5.9	3.0	4.2	2.2		
	90	:	1.8	4.4	3.5	3.3	2.8	2.5		
	80	:	2.8	7.0	5.3	5.3	3.2	4.3		
	70	:	2.2	7.4	6.3	5.2	7.9	4.1		
	60	:	3.3	5.3	5.4	6.6	6.8	3.7		
	50	:	10.7	15.1	14.8	13.2	13.9	12.4		
	40	:	5.7	7.5	5.6	6.5	5.0	4.3		
	30	:	4.9	6.7	6.2	7.8	7.8	5.5		
	20	:	6.7	8.5	6.5	6.9	7.2	7.5		
	10	:	7.9	7.6	5.3	8.9	7.4	8.8		
Aucun danger de guerre/ No danger of war	0	:	46.1	16.3	29.9	27.9	26.2	36.9		
Sans réponse/No reply										
Total		:	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		
Score moyen/Mean score		:	2.24	4.11	3.62	3.33	3.50	2.70		
N			997	1008	985	1007	1002	1008		

		ITALIA								
		1971 VII	1977 X-XI	1980 IV	1981 X-XI	1982 X	1983 X	1984 X-XI		
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
La guerre est certaine/ World War within the next ten years	100	3.5	2.7	3.1	3.3	2.5	2.2	0.7		
	90	1.3	2.0	3.9	2.5	1.2	1.5	1.2		
	80	2.0	2.6	8.5	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.4		
	70	2.5	3.2	7.4	5.0	3.6	5.2	3.5		
	60	3.0	3.4	7.4	4.0	3.7	5.2	3.4		
	50	7.0	8.8	13.4	13.8	11.5	14.1	11.0		
	40	6.1	5.1	6.9	8.1	7.2	9.1	6.3		
	30	8.5	9.3	10.4	10.5	11.6	11.0	10.1		
	20	9.1	8.7	7.5	9.8	10.1	9.8	10.7		
	10	9.5	12.6	6.5	13.0	12.5	10.2	12.6		
Aucun danger de guerre/ No danger of war	0	37.7	38.6	20.2	24.8	30.3	27.0	35.8		
Sans réponse/No reply		9.8	3.0	4.7	2.2	2.7	1.5	1.4		
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		
Score moyen/Mean score		2.34	2.38	3.98	3.11	2.68	3.03	2.37		
N		2017	1155	1116	1070	1025	1033	1097		

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

LUXEMBOURG										
Sans réponse/No reply	16	8.7	53	0.0	0.0	3.9	2.3			
Total	1100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			
Score moyen/Mean score	1.95	2.53	2.50	3.58	3.06	3.07	2.78			
N	302	344	300	500	300	304	299			
										%
										%
Sans réponse/No reply	14	2.9	14.3	5.6	5.7	4.0	4.4			
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			
Score moyen/Mean score	2.38	3.41	3.66	3.65	3.43	2.91	2.67			
N	1198	943	999	1011	1056	1050	1018			

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continuei)

UNITED KINGDOM										
		1971 VII	1977 x - XI	1980 IV	1981 x - XI	1982 X	1983 X	1984 X - XI		
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	X
La guerre est certaine/ World War within the next ten years	100	:	3.6	4.8	4.0	3.8	2.0	3.0		
	90	:	0.8	9.3	1.7	0.9	1.4	1.0		
	80	:	2.1	6.8	4.7	3.6	4.2	3.1		
	70	:	3.1	8.5	4.0	3.1	5.0	3.7		
	60	:	2.5	6.7	5.5	4.5	4.1	2.6		
	50	:	10.0	15.2	16.0	12.7	14.9	11.1		
	40	:	3.6	3.6	6.5	4.9	6.7	4.5		
	30	:	7.5	5.9	8.8	8.4	12.7	8.1		
	20	:	7.5	7.7	7.0	7.7	11.8	7.1		
	10	:	8.4	5.4	7.0	9.5	12.5	0.5		
Aucun danger de guerre/ No danger of war		:	44.6	18.9	28.7	34.8	20.4	42.9		
Sans réponse/No reply		:	6.2	7.0			4.2	4.4		
Total		.	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		
Score moyen/Mean score		.	2.22	2.70	2.27	2.70	3.15	2.37		
N			1351	1454	1395	1335	1277	1405		

EURO 6										
		1971 VII	1977 x - XI	1980 IV	1981 x - XI	1982 X	1983 X	1984 x - XI		
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
La guerre est certaine/ (World War within the next ten years	100	1.9	2.3	2.8	3.5	2.8	2.8	1.5		
	90	0.9	1.6	2.9	2.3	1.8	1.6	1.0		
	80	2.2	2.8	10.4	4.6	2.8	3.7	2.5		
	70	2.3	3.3	6.5	6.9	4.4	4.7	4.0		
	60	3.2	3.3	7.3	6.2	4.8	5.2	3.4		
	50	10.4	11.3	13.7	15.2	13.9	14.3	12.9		
	40	5.6	6.2	8.3	7.7	7.0	8.3	6.1		
	30	9.3	10.3	10.2	9.9	11.6	9.7	10.6		
	20	9.3	10.7	8.9	9.3	9.7	10.3	11.5		
	10	10.7	12.7	7.0	10.1	10.2	10.5	12.4		
Aucun danger de guerre/ No danger of war		33.2	27.9	14.5	17.0	23.2	23.4	29.6		
Sans réponse/No reply		11.1	7.6	7.6	7.2	7.6		4.6		
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0		
Score moyen/Mean score		2.38	3.11	4.15	3.70	3.12		2.60		
N		8687	5596	5426	5522	5292		5508		

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

		COMMUNAUTE /COMMUNITY (1)									
		1977 x - XI	1980 I V	1981 x - XI	1982 X	1983 X	1984 x - XI				
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
La guerre est certaine/ World War within the next ten years	100					2.6	1.9				
	90					1.6	1.0				
	80					3.7	2.7				
	70					4.7	3.8				
	60					5.0	3.1				
	50					14.2	12.4				
	40					7.8	5.6				
	30					10.2	9.9				
	20					10.5	10.3				
	10					10.9	11.6				
Aucun danger de guerre/ No danger of war	0					23.3	33.0				
Sans réponse/No reply						5.6	4.7				
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				
Score moyen/Mean score		2.57	4.20	3.54	3.01	3.15	2.53				
N		8936	8882	9911	9689	9725	9909				

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'octobre 1981. / Including Greece from October 1981.

TABLEAU 4 / TABLE 4

LE SENTIMENT GLOBAL DE SATISFACTION DE LA VIE / THE FEELING OF OVERALL LIFE SATISFACTION

Dans l'ensemble, êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas satisfait du tout de la vie que vous menez ? / On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead ?

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE								
	1973 IX	1975 V-VI	1975 X-XI						1979 IV
	%	%	%						%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	43	39	36						42
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	49	52	51						47
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	6	5	8						7
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	2	2	4						2
Sans réponse/No reply	.	2	1						2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1266	1507	1000	963	1077	988	1006	1013	983

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE								
	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 III-IV	1982 X	1983 III-IV	1983 X	1984 III-IV	1984 X-XI	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	35	36	29	20	23	18	30	16	
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	53	49	51	60	60	60	46	63	
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	8	10	12	12	12	15	15	15	
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	3	3	4	4	4	4	8	5	
Sans réponse/No reply	1	2	4	4	1	3	1	1	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1009	949	1210	1020	1038	995	1018	1035	

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	DANMARK									
	1973	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979
	IX	v-VI	x-XI	v-VI	XI	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	x-XI	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ (Very satisfied	51	51	36	49	50	54	53	54	58	51
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	44	41	51	45	42	42	41	40	38	43
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	4	4	3	5	6	3	5	5	3	4
(Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	1	.	1	1	1	.	1	1	1	1
Sans réponse/No reply	.	4	9	.	1	1	.	.	.	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1073	1023	977	962	1010	992	983	1002	1073

	DANMARK									
	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984			
	IV	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	59	57	57	54	55	56	58			
	36	37	39	41	40	37	37			
	3	5	3	4	4	4	3			
	1	.	.	1	.	1	.			
	1	1	1	.	1	2	2			
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	994	1006	1211	995	1027	1000	996	990		

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND									
	1973	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979
	X	v-VI	x-XI	v-VI	XI	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	x-XI	N
	X	%	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	17	13	14	19	22	19	24	21	20	24
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	65	66	65	60	60	62	61	61	65	62
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied,	15	16	17	17	15	14	12	14	12	10
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	1	2
Sans réponse/No reply	1	3	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1957	1039	1002	1004	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003

	DEUTSCHLAND									
	1980	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984		
	N	N	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	17	16	20	19	18	12	20	13		
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	68	61	63	65	63	66	63	71		
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	11	16	12	12	15	15	12	13		
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	2		
Sans réponse/No reply	2	4	3	2	1	5	3	1		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1009	1004	1328	1012	1049	1058	992	1053		

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

ELLAS									
		1982 III-IV	1982 X	1983 III-IV	1983 X	1984 III-IV	1984 x-XI		
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
		18	17	17	18	19	15		
		46	39	46	45	46	48		
		22	29	20	24	21	25		
N	1000	13 1	14	17	12	14	12		
		100	100	100	100	100	100		
		1199	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000		

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	FRANCE									
	1973	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979
	IX	v - VI	XI	v - VI	XI	IV - v	x - XI	v - VI	x - XI	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	15	16	15	14	10	11	13	12	11	10
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	62	59	59	59	59	57	60	59	59	58
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	17	16	18	20	22	23	19	19	23	22
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	5	7	6	6	8	8	7	9	6	9
Sans réponse/No reply										1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	2227	1156	1276	1241	1356	1256	1149	1276	1194	1152

	FRANCE									
	1980	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984		
	IV	IV	III - IV	X	III - IV	X	III - IV	x - XI		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	10	12	16	13	11	15	12	11		
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	60	58	63	60	63	60	60	62		
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	22	22	16	20	18	18	20	21		
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	8	7	5	7	7	6	7	5		
Sans réponse/No reply		1			1	1				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	993	1004	1199	939	1011	1000	1008	1006		

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	IRELAND									
	1973	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979
	I X	v - VI	x - XI	v - VI	X I	IV - v	x - XI	v - VI	x - XI	I V
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	53	36	40	34	37	38	42	40	41	37
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	39	52	50	54	50	50	47	50	45	47
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	6	9	7	9	9	8	6	7	8	11
(Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	2	3	3	3	4	4	5	3	5	5
Sans réponse/No reply	1	.
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1000	998	1007	981	1008	997	1005	1005	997

	IRELAND									
	1980	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984		
	I V	I V	III - IV	X	III - IV	X	III - IV	x - XI		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	34	34	40	33	35	27	36	30		
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	52	49	46	53	47	53	47	55		
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	11	13	11	10	12	12	10	11		
(Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	3	3	2	4	5	8	6	4		
Sans réponse/No reply	.	1	1	.	1	.	1	.		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1008	1005	1181	1007	987	1002	1000	1008		

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	ITALIA									
	1973	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979
	IX	V-VI	X-XI	v-VI	XI	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	x-XI	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied				71	9	9	8	10	91	91
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied				48	48	50	54	53	54	50
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied				31	29	31	27	26	25	30
Pas satisfait du tout/ Sans réponse/No reply				13	13	10	11	11	12	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1909	1043	1110	923	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030	1178

	ITALIA									
	1980	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984		
	IV	IV	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	10	13	14	11	11	8	10	12		
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	54	54	57	50	56	57	54	57		
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	27	24	22	28	24	25	26	23		
Pas satisfait du tout/ Sans réponse/No reply	9	9	71	11	91	10	10	71		
	1		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1116	1183	1301	1025	1031	1033	1060	1097		

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG									
	1973	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979
	X	V-V	X-X	V-V	X	IV-V	X-X	V-V	X-X	V
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
									34	33
									49	60
									13	5
									2	1
Sans réponse/No reply	.	7	1	4	1	.	.		2	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	330	311	297	268	301	302	344	322	291	299

	LUXEMBOURG									
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied										
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied										
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied										
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied										
Sans réponse/No reply	1	.	1	1	2	2	2	1		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	300	300	399	300	300	304	300	299		

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	NEDERLAND							1978	1978	1979
								v-VI	x-XI	IV
								%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	41	33	34	41	38	38	44	46	44	46
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	52	52	52	48	52	54	48	47	48	49
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	5	7	6	9	7	6	5	6	5	4
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	.
Sans réponse/No reply	1	6	6	1	1	1	1	.	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	1	100	100	100	100	100
N	1464	1093	1006	904	11			1131	913	974

	NEDERLAND									
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	999	1091	1228	1056	998	1050	1015	1018		

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

GREAT BRITAIN (1973) and UNITED KINGDOM										
	1973 K	1975 v-VI	1975 X-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 N
	%	%	%	%	%	X	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	33	33	29	28	28	29	30	34	32	27
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	52	53	53	54	56	53	57	52	55	59
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	11	9	12	12	12	12	10	11	8	11
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	3	3	5	5	4	5	3	3	4	3
Sans réponse: No reply						1		.	1	.
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1933	1328	1438	1340	1351	1414	1351	1426	1339	1317

GREAT BRITAIN (1973) and UNITED KINGDOM										
	1980 N	1981 N	1982 III-IV	1982 X	1983 III-IV	1983 X	1984 III-IV	1984 x-XI		
	X	X	X	X	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	34	32	36	35	29	29	32	30		
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	52	52	50	51	58	54	53	56		
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	9	10	9	10	10	11	10	10		
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	5	5	4	3	3	5	3	3		
Sans réponse/No reply	.	1	1	1		1	2	.		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1454	1369	1419	1335	1348	1277	1355	1405		

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

Très satisfait/ Very satisfied										
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied										
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied										
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied										
Sans réponse/No reply	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	13484	9550	9150	8627	9210	9014	8936	9327	8788	8976

COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY (i)									
			1982 X	1983 III-IV	1983 X	1984 III-IV	1984 X-XI		
			X	X	%	%	%	%	%
			22	20	18	21	19		
			55	59	58	56	60		
			17	15	16	16	16		
			5	5	6	6	4	1	
			1	1	2	1	1		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	8882	9898	11676	9689	9790	9725	9746	9909	

3

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'avril 1981. / Including Greece from April 1981.

TABLEAU 5 / TABLE 5

LE SENTIMENT DE BONHEUR / THE FEELING OF HAPPINESS

Tout **compte** fait, pouvez-vous dire comment **vous** les choses pour vous en ce **moment** ? Vous sentez-vous **vraiment** .heureux, assez heureux, ou pas trop heureux en ce **moment** ? / Taking all things together, how would you say things **are** these days - would you say you are very happy, fairly happy, **or** not too happy these days ?

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	1975 v - VI	1976 v - VI	1976 XI	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 IV	1982 X	1983 III - IV	1983 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux/ Very happy	36	34	31	43	34	40	45	26	27	26
Assez heureux/ Fairly happy	51	52	59	46	53	46	47	57	58	60
Pas trop heureux/ Not too happy	10	11	9	9	11	12	6	13	10	10
Sans réponse/No reply	3	3	1	2	2	2	2	4	5	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1507	963	1077	1006	1013	1008	983	1020	1038	995

[illegible]

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

DANMARK									
	1976 v - VI	1976 XI	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 IV	1982 X	1983 III - IV	1983 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	31	35	33	37	33	34	29	29	36
	57	52	57	52	55	59	46	52	47
	6	8	7	6	5	5	20	14	14
	6	5	3	5	7	2	5	5	3
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1073	977	962	992	983	1002	1073	995	1027
									1000

Sans réponse/No reply	3								
Total	100								
N	990								

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

		DEUTSCHLAND								
	1975 v - VI	1976 v - VI	1976 X I	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 IV	1982 X	1983 III - IV	1983 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux/ Very happy	11	13	17	16	14	10	15	13	13	11
Assez heureux/ (Fairly happy)	63	63	62	69	66	67	68	69	68	69
Pas trop heureux/ Not too happy	21	18	19	12	15	16	13	13	15	16
Sans réponse/No reply	5	6	2	3	5	7	4	5	4	4
Total	100								100	100
N	1039	1004	1007	999	996	1006	1003	1012	1049	1058

[illegible]

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	ELLAS									
								1982	1983	1983
								X	III-IV	X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux/ Very happy								10	10	12
Assez heureux/ Fairly happy								40	41	46
Pas trop heureux/ Not too happy								48	48	41
Sans réponse/No reply										
Total								100	100	100
N								1000	1000	1000

Sans réponse/No reply	1								
Total	100								
N	1000								

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	FRANCE									
	1975 v - VI	1976 v - VI	1976 X I	1977 x - XI	1978 V - V -	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1982 X	1983 III - IV	1983 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux/ Very happy	16	15	11	16	12	12	19	14	17	13
Assez heureux/ Fairly happy	55	61	60	63	60	59	61	64	61	63
Pas trop heureux/ Not too happy	27	22	27	20	26	26	18	21	21	23
Sans réponse/No reply	2	2	2		2	3	2	1	1	1
Total					100	100				
N	1156	1241	1356	1149	1276	1194	1139	939	1011	1000

[illegible]

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	IRELAND									
Vraiment heureux/ Very happy										
Assez heureux/ Fairly happy										
Pas trop heureux/ Not too happy										
Sans réponse/No reply										
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1000	1007	981	997	1005	1005	997	1007	987	1002

Sans réponse/No reply	1									
	100									
	1008									

...

Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	311	268	301	344	322	291	299	300	300	304

Sans réponse/No reply	3								
Total	100								
N	299								

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM									
	1975 v- VI	1976 v- VI	1976 XI	1977 x- XI	1978 v- VI	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1982 X	1983 III- IV	1983 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux/ Very happy	22	32	17	29	24				29	27
Assez heureux/ Fairly happy	50	56	55	61	59				59	58
Pas trop heureux/ Not too happy	27	11	27	9	17				11	14
Sans réponse/No reply	1	1	1	1					1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1325	1340	1297	1351	1426	1339	1314	1335	1348	1277

[illegible]

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY (1)									
	1975	1976	1976	1977	1978	1978	1979	1982	1983	1983
	v - VI	v - VI	X I	X-XI	V-VI	X-XI	IV	X	III-IV	X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux/ Very happy	16	19	15	20	17	15	22	18	19	16
Assez heureux/ Fairly happy	54	58	55							
Pas trop heureux/ Not too happy	27	20	28							
Sans réponse/No reply	3	3	2							
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	9590	8635	9263	8978	9297	8791	8932	9689	9790	9725

	COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY (1)									
	1984									
	X	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux/ Very happy	18									
Assez heureux/ Fairly happy	61									
Pas trop heureux/ Not too happy	19									
Sans réponse/No reply	2									
Total	100									
N	9909									

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir de 1982.

TABLEAU 6 / TABLE 6

LE SENTIMENT DE SATISFACTION QUANT AU FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA DEMOCRATIE

THE FEELING OF SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS

Dans l'ensemble, êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas satisfait du tout du fonctionnement de la démocratie (dans votre pays) ? / On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (in your country) ?

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	1973	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980	1981
	IX	XI	IV - V	X - XI	V - VI	X - XI	IV	X	X - XI	X - XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	13	6	6	8	7	4	4	8	4	7
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	49	47	50	43	49	38	39	39	30	28
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	23	24	21	18	23	24	29	25	32	31
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	9	8	10	10	8	13	14	12	19	18
Sans réponse/No reply	6	15	13	21	13	21	14	16	15	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1266	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983	1032	1022	973

Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1210	1020	1038	995	1018	1035				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	DANMARK									
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied										
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied										
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied										
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied										
Sans réponse/No reply	2	2	8	3	5	5	6	5	5	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	962	1010	992	983	1002	1073	1029	1024	1009

	DANMARK									
	1982 III-IV	1982 X	1983 III-IV	1983 X	1984 III-IV	1984 x-XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	11	12	16	21	20	20				
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	50	45	54	50	48	50				
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	27	29	20	19	21	19				
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	8	8	4	3	6	5				
Sans réponse/No reply	4	6	6	7	5	6				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1211	995	1027	1000	996	990				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND									
	1973	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980	1981
	X	XI	IV-V	x-XI	v-VI	x-XI	IV	X	x-XI	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tris satisfait/ Very satisfied	5	13	11	9	9	9	10	12	9	11
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	39	66	67	69	67	68	70	68	64	59
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	44	16	16	16	16	15	13	12	17	18
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	11	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	4	5
Sans réponse/No reply	1	2	4	4	5	6	5	6	6	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1957	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003	1005	1008	962

	DEUTSCHLAND									
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984				
	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tris satisfait/ Very satisfied	12	8	12	7	12	11				
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	56	59	59	59	59	62				
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	21	22	18	21	19	21				
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	7	4	4	3	3	5				
Sans réponse/No reply	4	7	7	10	7	1				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1328	1012	1049	1058	992	1053				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	FRANCE									
	1973	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980	1981
	IX	XI	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	x-XI	IV	X	X-XI	X-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	4	4	7	5	5	4	4	3	3	5
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	37	38	38	44	44	36	37	38	33	48
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	30	31	29	29	27	34	30	32	34	27
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	16	15	16	11	13	17	17	15	18	7
Sans réponse/No reply	13	12	10	11	11	9	12	12	12	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	2227	1356	1256	1149	1276	1194	1152	986	986	1006

	FRANCE									
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984				
	III-IV	X	IV	X	III-IV	x-XI				
	%	%	X	X	%	X	%	%	%	X
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	2	5	3	7	4	4				
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	42	40	33	39	36	34				
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	30	32	37	30	34	38				
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	12	14	17	13	18	14				
Sans réponse/No reply	14	9	10	11	8	10				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1199	939	1011	1000	1008	1006				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	ELLAS									
	1980	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984		
	x-XI	X-XI	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	20	24	19	23	19	24	19	18		
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	33	28	41	35	40	37	41	39		
Plutôt pas satisfait (Not very satisfied)	23	18	21	25	21	20	21	24		
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	22	23	11	9	13	11	13	13		
Sans réponse/No reply	2	7	8	8	7	8	6	6		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1000	1000	1199	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000		

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	IRELAND									
	1973	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980	1981
	IX	XI	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	x-XI	IV	X	x-XI	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	9	7	10	12	13	10	5	11	7	13
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	46	52	52	57	58	51	42	46	41	46
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	27	25	23	16	15	18	30	22	30	22
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	16	10								
Sans réponse/No reply	2	6	5	9	7	10	10	6	6	10
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	1199	981	1008	997	1005	1005	997	1006	1007	985

	IRELAND									
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984				
	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	12	6	6	6	7	6				
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	44	41	39	37	43	38				
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	22	28	30	29	27	30				
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	11	16								
Sans réponse/No reply	11	9	6	8	7	6				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1181	1007	987	1002	1000	1008				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	ITALIA									
	1973	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980	1981
	X	XI	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	x-XI	IV	X	x-XI	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	4
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	25	13	11	18	24	18	14	19	18	16
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	42	43	47	45	44	46	46	41	45	43
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	30	40	39	33	28	32	36	36	32	34
(Sans réponse/No reply	1	3	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1909	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030	1178	1170	1108	1070

	ITALIA									
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984				
	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	X-XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	2	3	2	1	1	3				
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	19	16	15	19	19	25				
(Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	44	38	46	46	45	45				
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	31	39	34	31	31	1				
Sans réponse/No reply	4	4	3	3	4					
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1301	1025	1031	1033	1060	1097 1097				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG									
							1979	1979	1980	1981
							IV	X	X-XI	X-XI
							%	%	%	%
							17	23	18	16
							44	50	59	59
							29	23	17	18
							4	2	5	4
Sans réponse/No reply	11	17	5	8	7	1 5	6	2	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	330	301	302	344	322	291	299	298	300	500

	LUXEMBOURG									
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984				
	III-IV	VX ■ ■ ■		X	III-IV	X-XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	14	12	13	11	11	11				
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	49	47	49	49	53	57				
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	26	28	23	22	20	24				
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	9	8	6	10	9	5				
Sans réponse/No reply	2	5	9	8	7	3				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	399	300	300	304	300	299				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	NEDERLAND									
	1973	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980	1981
	I X	X I	IV - V	x - XI	v - VI	x - XI	I V	X	x - XI	x - XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tris satisfait/ Very satisfied	8	12	10	9	8	9	9	7	9	6
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	44	55	57	55	61	44	55	54	42	53
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	28	26	24	26	22	35	25	27	34	27
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied										
Sans réponse/No reply	10	1	4	4	4	4	5	5	4	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1464	1123	1033	943	1131	913	974	1092	1114	1011

	NEDERLAND									
Tris satisfait! Very satisfied										
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied										
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied										
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied										
Sans réponse/No reply	5	3	4	5	3	3				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1228	1056	998	1050	1015	1018				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN (1973) and UNITED KINGDOM									
	1973	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980	1981
	IX	XI	IV-V	X-XI	V-VI	X-XI	IV	X	X-XI	X-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	7	7	10	8	9	6	7	7	9	6
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	37	44	49	54	53	45	46	45	42	42
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	34	30	24	21	23	28	27	28	27	29
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	20	13	12	9	8	12	13	13	16	13
Sans réponse/No reply	2	6	5	8	7	9	7	7	6	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1933	1351	1414	1351	1426	1339	1317	1403	1432	1395

	GREAT BRITAIN (1973) and UNITED KINGDOM									
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984				
	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	X-XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	14	13	12	12	11	12				
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	46	45	52	49	49	48				
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	25	23	23	20	25	27				
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	9	12	7	12	9	10				
Sans réponse/No reply	6	7	6	7	6	3				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1419	1335	1348	1277	1355	1405				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY (1)									
	1973	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980	1981
	IX	XI	IV-V	x-XI	v-VI	x-XI	IV	X	x-XI	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	8	7	7	6	6	6	6	7	7	8
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	40	42	44	48	49	43	43	44	40	42
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	33	29	28	26	27	30	28	27	30	28
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	13	16	16	13	12	14	16	15	17	14
Sans réponse/No reply	6	6	5	7	6	7	7	7	6	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	13484	9210	9044	8936	9327	8788	8976	9021	9001	9911

	COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY (1)									
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984				
	III-IV	V-XI	■ ■ ■	X	III-IV	x-XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
					8	8				
					42	43				
					30	32				
					14	13				
					6	4				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	11676	9689	9790	9725	9746	9909				

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'octobre 1980. / Including Greece from October 1980.

TABLEAU 7 / TABLE 7

L'ATTITUDE FONDAMENTALE A L'EGARD DE LA SOCIETE / BASIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOCIETY

Sur cette carte (MONTRER CARTE) se trouvent trois attitudes fondamentales vis-à-vis de la **société** dans laquelle nous vivons. Voulez-vous choisir l'attitude qui correspond le mieux à vos idées personnelles ? (UNE SEULE REPONSE). 1.11 faut changer radicalement toute l'organisation de notre **société** par une action **révolutionnaire**. 2.11 faut **améliorer** petit à petit notre **société** par des réformes (1). 3.11 faut défendre courageusement notre **société** actuelle contre toutes les forces subversives. / On this card (SHOW CARD) are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-à-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. 1.The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action. 2.Our society must be gradually improved by reforms (1). 3.Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.

BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	1970 III - III	1976 XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	3	5	6	4 1	4 1	6	5 1	7	9
Réformes/Reforms	69	65	66	60	63	61	64	55	60
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	14	19	18	19	21	15	16	21	18
Sans réponse/No reply	14	11	10	17	12	18	15	17	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1298	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983	1032	1009

BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	1980 x - XI	1981 IV	1981 x - XI	1982 III - IV	1982 X	1983 III - IV	1983 X	1984 III - IV	1984 x - XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	6	7	8	8	9 1	5	6	8	4 1
Réformes/Reforms	57	57	60	69	57	61	61	67	65
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion									
Sans réponse/No reply	17	17	14	10	15	15	13	8	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1022	949	973	1210	1020	1038	995	1018	1035

(1) En 1970: par des réformes intelligentes. / In 1970: by intelligent reforms.

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7. (continued)

	DANMARK								
	1970	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980
	III-III	XI	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	x-XI	IV	X	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action revolut							2 61	2 55	3 54
Sans réponse/No reply	:	7 1	6	2	4	6	31 6	38 5	36 7
Total	.	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		962	1010	992	983	1002	1073	1029	994

	DANHARK					
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984
	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	2	2	1	2	2	1
Réformes/Reforms	56	59	61	58	62	61
Defense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	39	37	34	35	30	31
Sans réponse/No reply	4	4	5	3	2	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1024	1006	1009	1211	995	1027

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND								
	1970	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980
	II-III	XI	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	x-XI	IV	X	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
								3	4
								50	47
								38	37
Sans réponse/No reply	8	7	7	7	8	11	7	9	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	2021	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003	1005	1009

	DEUTSCHLAND								
	1980	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984
	x-XI	IV	x-XI	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	4	3	4	4	3	2	3	2	3
Réformes/Reforas	46	41	49	44	45	49	48	48	58
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	43	43	36	39	38	42	39	35	32
Sans réponse/No reply	7	13	11	13	14	7	10	15	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1008	1004	962	1328	1012	1049	1058	992	1053

Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1000	1000	1000	1199	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	FRANCE								
	1970	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980
							IV	X	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	5	13	14	8	8	12	9	10	11
Réformes/Reforms	78	64	62	65	66	70	68	63	60
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	12	18	19	22	20	13	16	19	24
Total	5	5	5	5	6	5	7	8	5
Sans réponse/No reply									
N	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	2046	1356	1256	1149	1276	1194	1152	986	993

Sans réponse/No reply	7 1	6	4	6	3	6	6	4	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	986	991	1006	1199	939	1011	1000	1008	1006

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	IRELAND								
	1970 II-III	1976 XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	:	7	5	7	6				7
Réformes/Reforms	:	60	61	64	59				61
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	:	23	26	26	24				20
Sans réponse/No reply	:	10	8	13	11				12
Total	:	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	:	981	1008	997	1005	1005	997	1006	1008

	IRELAND								
	1980 X-XI	1981 IV	1981 x - XI	1982 III-IV	1982 X	1983 III-IV	1983 X	1984 III - IV	1984 X-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	7	6	4	4	7	5	8	6	4
Réformes/Reforms	65	63	59	64	53	61	61	62	64
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	20	22	27	20	28	26	23	26	23
Sans réponse/No reply	8	9	10	12	12	8	8	6	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1007	1005	985	1181	1007	987	1002	1000	1008

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	ITALIA								
	1970 II-III	1976 XI	1977 IV-v	1977 X-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	7	13	11	10	8	9	7	9	6
Réformes/Reforms	73	66	58	61	58	63	63	60	58
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	11	18	28	27	31	24	26	27	32
Sans réponse/No reply	9	3	3	2	3	4	4	4	4
Total	100	100	100	100					
N	1822	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030	1178	1170	1116

	ITALIA								
	1980 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 x-XI	1982 III-IV	1982 X	1983 III-IV	1983 X	1984 III-IV	1984 x-XI
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Réformes/Reforms (2)	61	861	61	65	7166	671	668	672	672
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	29	29	29	23	22	19	21	17	18
Sans réponse/No reply	4	2	4	5	51	4	5	51	41
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1108	1183	1070	1301	1025	1031	1033	1060	1097

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG								
	1970	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980
	II - III	XI	IV - V	x - XI	v - VI	x - XI	IV	X	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	1	2	3	4	3	5	4	2	8
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	65	49	56	55	59	65	71	70	62
Réformes/Reforms									
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	27	32							
Sans réponse/No reply	7	17							
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	335	301	302	344	322	291	299	298	300

	LUXEUBOURG								
	1980	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984
	x - XI	IV	x - XI	III - IV	X	III - IV	X	III - IV	x - XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	5 1	6	4 1	6	3 1	3 1	3 1	2	2
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	64	66	67	64	60	67	65	72	64
Réformes/Reforis									
Defense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	25	23	25	27	32	23	26	21	29
Sans réponse/No reply	6	5	4	3	5	7 1	6	5 1	5 1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	300	300	500	399	300	300	304	300	299

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	NEDERLAND								
	1970	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980
	II-III	XI	IV-v	x-XI	IV-v	x-XI	IV	X	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	6	5	5	4	5	6	4	6	6
Réformes/Reforms	75	56	58	55	56	63	66	54	53
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	15	32	32	37	35	25	23	34	37
Sans réponse/No reply	4	7	5	4	4	6	7	6	4
Total									
N	1230	1123	1033	943	1131	913	974	1092	999

	NEDERLAND								
	1970	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984
	X-XI	IV	X-XI	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	X-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action									
Réformes/Reforms									
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion									
Sans réponse/No reply	51	41	10	5	4	4	6	5	51
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1114	1091	1011	1228	1056	998	1050	1015	1018

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM								
	1970	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980
	II-III	XI	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	X-XI	IV	X	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	:	7	8	6	6	5	3	7	6
Réformes/Reforms	:	60	59	55	54	63	67	59	56
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	:	25	26	28	31	25	21	28	32
Sans réponse/No reply	:	8	7	11		7	9	6	6
Total	:	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	:	1351	1414		1426	1339	1317	1403	1454

	UNITED KINGDOM								
	1980	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984
	x-XI	IV	x-XI	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	:								
Réformes/Reforms	:								
Défense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	:								
Sans réponse/No reply	:								
Total	:	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	:	1432	1369	1395	1419	1335	1348	1277	1355

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	.	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	:	9210	9044	E936	9327	8788	8976	9021	8882

	COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY (i)								
	1980 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 x-XI	1982 III-IV	1982 X	1983 III-IV	1983 X	1984 III-IV	1984 x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary action	6	7	6	5	5	4	6	4	5
Réformes/Reforms	57	55	57	59	57	60	60	63	63
Defense contre la subversion/ Defence against subversion	30	31	29	28	30	30	27	25	26
sans réponse/No reply	7	7	8	8	8	6	7	8	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	10001	9898	9911	11676	9689	9790	9725	9746	9909

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis octobre 1980. / Including Greece from October 1980.

TABLEAU 8 / TABLE 8ATTITUDE A L'EGARD DE L'UNIFICATION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALEATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE

D'une façon générale, êtes-vous pour ou contre les efforts qui sont faits pour unifier l'Europe occidentale ? **SI POUR**, êtes-vous **très** pour ou plutôt pour ? **SI CONTRE**, êtes-vous plutôt contre ou très c ntre ? / In general, are you for, or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe ? IF FOR, are you very much for this, or only to some extent ? IF AGAINST, are you only to some extent against or very much against ?

Données provenant pour les années 1962/1967, y compris juin 1962, des sondages commandités par la U.S. Information Agency et, pour les années suivantes, ainsi que pour février/mars 1952, des sondages commandités par la Comoiission des Communautés européennes.

Nonobstant quelques différences de formulation, la question était initialement : " Etes-vous en général pour ou contre les efforts qui sont faits en vue d'unifier l'Europe occidentale " ? En Grande-Bretagne (de 1955 à 1967), en Allemagne (de février 1955 à avril 1956, ainsi qu'en juin 1962), en Italie (en 1955 et 1962), la question précisait : "...l'Europe occidentale, y compris la Grande-Bretagne". En 1970, 1973 et 1975, il était demandé aux individus interrogés s'ils étaient favorables, indifférents, ou défavorables à l'unification européenne. Cf. : "L'Opinion publique et l'Europe des Six" ; Sondages, Paris, n° 1 - 1963, p. 46 ; "Les Européens et l'unification de l'Europe, Bruxelles, juin 1972, pp. 71/72 ; Euro-Baromètre n° 4, décembre 1975, pp. 54/56.

The data for 1952/1967, including June 1962, are from surveys financed by the U.S. Information Agency and, for the following years, as well as February/March 1952, from surveys financed by the Commission of the European Communities. Notwithstanding some differences in the wording, the question was, initially, as follows : "Are you in general for or against making efforts towards uniting Western Europe" ? In Great-Britain (from 1955 to 1967), in Germany (from February 1955 to April 1956, as well as in June 1962), the question specified : "...Western Europe, including Great-Britain". In 1970, 1973 and 1975, the interviewed individuals were asked whether they were in favour, indifferent or not in favour of the European unification. Cf. : "l'Opinion publique et l'Europe des Six" ; Sondages, Paris, n° 1-1963, p. 46 ; "Europeans and European unification", Brussels, June 1972, pp. 71/72 ; Euro-Baromètre n° 4, December 1975, pp. 54/56.

Royaume-Uni (y compris Northern Ireland) à partir de 1975. / United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland) . . . from 1975.

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	1962	1970	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980
	II-III	II-III	IX	V-VI	X	X-XI	IV	X	IV	X-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much	31	31	22	23	21	27	27	23	20	25
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent	34	35	38	32	36	42	44	46	47	40
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent	4	4	3	2	3	4	6	6	5	8
Très contre/ Against very much	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2
Sans réponse/No reply	30	29	35	42	39	25	22	23	26	25
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	770	1298	1266	1507	1000	1008	983	1032	1009	1022

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984		
	IV	X-XI	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	X-XI		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
Très pour/ For very much	18	27	20	17	27	23	20	29		
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent	42	43	49	43	41	48	47	51		
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent	6	5	8	8	6	7	9	6		
Très contre/ Against very much	3	2	2	2	1	3	3	1		
Sans réponse/No reply	31	23	21	30	25	19	21	13		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	949	973	1210	1020	1038	995	1018	1035		

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	DANMARK									
	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981
	IX	v-VI	X	X-XI	IV	X	IV	x-XI	IV	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tris pour/ For very much	17	17	15	15	14	13	12	16	17	12
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent	28	24	27	33	35	33	27	31	29	31
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent	14	13	16	17	18	18	19	19	16	22
Tris contre/ Against very much	18	17	18	15	13	20	21	14	18	17
Sans réponse/No reply	23	29	24	20	20	16	21			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1199	1073	1023	1002	1073	1029	994	1024	1006	1009

	DANMARK									
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984				
	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tris pour/ For very much	13	12	13	11	11	8				
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent	29	28	32	27	25	30				
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent	22	19	19	20	20	23				
Très contre/ Against very much	20	18	18	23	23	20				
Sans réponse/No reply	16	23	1	19	21	19				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1211	995	1027	1000	996	990				

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND									
	1952	1954	1955	1955	1956	1956	1957	1962	1962	1962
	IX	X	II	XII	IV	XI	V	II-III	VI	II
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much))))))))))
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent) 70) 82) 73) 69) 79) 82) 75) 50) 78) 78
)))))))) 31))

Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1591	836	820	813	863	1159	1299	1523	1234	1202

	DEUTSCHLAND									
	1965	1967	1970	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980
	V-VI	V	II-III	IX	V-VI	X	X-XI	IV	X	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much))))))))))
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent) 82) 87) 39) 49) 43) 37) 37) 36) 37) 36
))) 37) 29) 34) 37) 41) 46) 44) 44
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent))) 4) 4) 2) 3) 4) 6) 6) 6
Très contre/ Against very much) 3)) 1) 2) 1) 2) 1) 1) 1) 1
Sans réponse/No reply) 15) 11) 19) 16) 20) 21) 17) 11) 12) 13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1255	1000	2021	1957	1039	1002	1006	1003	1005	1009

	DEUTSCHLAND									
	1980	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984	
	x-XI	IV	x-XI	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much))))))))))
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent) 38) 31) 38) 33) 28) 36) 34) 27) 36)
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent) 40) 39) 37) 45) 42) 49) 42) 45) 44)
Très contre/ Against very much) 7) 9) 11) 7) 11) 5) 6) 10) 9)
Sans réponse/No reply) 2) 4) 1) 3) 5) 1) 2) 3) 2)
) 13) 17) 13) 12) 14) 9) 16) 15) 9)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1008	1004	962	1328	1012	1049	1058	992	1053	

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	ELLAS									
	1980	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984	
	X-XI	IV	x-XI	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much	33	30	36	29	36	31	40	28	32	
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent	26	30	29	29	27	30	29	29	35	
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent	12	12	7	10	8	6	5	11	9	
Très contre/ Against very much	11	13	8	7	7	6	5	9	7	
Sans réponse/No reply	18	15	20	25	22	27	21	23	17	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1000	1000	1000	1199	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	

	1952 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 II-III	1962 VI	1964 II
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much Plutôt pour/ For to some extent		63								80

8

Sans réponse/No reply	24	28	36	43	33	26	36	20	22	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1345	847	900	805	800	1226	1200	1518	1307	1215

	1965 v-VI	1967 V	1970 II-III	1973 IX	1975 v-VI	1975 X	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much Plutôt pour/ For to some extent										
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent Très contre/ Against very much Sans réponse/No reply	21	21	22	28	17	19	13	18	15	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1228	1961	2046	2227	1156	1276	1194	1152	986	993

	FR NCE									
	1980 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 x-XI	1982 III-IV	1982 X	1983 III-IV	1983 X	1984 III-IV	1984 x-XI	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much Plutôt pour/ For to some extent Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent Très contre/ Against very much Sans réponse/No reply	17	16	26	24	28	25	29	29	28	
	52	56	54	54	54	50	50	52	52	
	9	9	6	8	7	5	7	6	6	
	2	3	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	
	20	16	13	12	10	19	12	11	13	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	986	991	1006	1199	939	1011	1000	1008	1006	

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	IRELAND									
	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981
	I X	v - VI	X	X - XI	I V	X	I V	x - XI	I V	x - XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ (For very much	21	23	25	24	19	25	19	19	20	21
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent	31	34	32	45	45	43	41	39	39	41
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent	8	8	8	7	9	9	10	10	15	11
Très contre/ Against very much	4 1	7	4	3	2	5 1	2	7	8	5
Sans réponse/No reply	36	28	31	21	25	18	28	25	18	22
(Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1000	998	1005	997	1006	1008	1007	1005	985

	IRELAND									
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984				
	III-IV	X	III - IV	X	III - IV	x - XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ (For very much	15	16	16	21	17	18				
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent	40	41	39	41	41	42				
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent	12	12	9	7 1	9 1	8				
Très contre/ Against very much	5 1	5 1	4	4 1	4	5				
Sans réponse/No reply	28	26	32	27	29	27				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1181	1007	987	1002	1000	1008				

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	1952	1954	1955	1955	1956	1956	1957	1962	1962	1964
	IX	X	II	XII	IV	XI	V	II-III	VI	III
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much	57	63	55	55	66	:	59	36	67	78
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent								24		
Plutôt contre/ (Against to some extent)	14	9	11	13	7	:	7	3	6	3
Très contre/ Against very much										
Sans réponse/No reply										
Total	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100
N	1505	808	814	803	911	:	1269	1562	1344	1175

	1965	1967	1970	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980
	v - VI	V	II-III	IX	v - VI	X	X	IV	X	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much										
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent										
Sans réponse/No reply	31	28	17	27	20	19	12	9	10	121
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1166	1023	1822	1909	1043	1110	1030	1178	1170	1116

Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	.
N	1108	1183	1070	1301	1025	1031	1033	1060	1097	

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG									
	1970	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981
	II-III	IX	v-VI	X	x-XI	IV	X	IV	x-XI	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ (For very much	52	47	48	47	31	47	48	48	46	45
Plutôt pour/ (For to some extent	24	33	31	39	43	42	40	38	39	42
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent	2	1	2	1	13	5	7	6	9	6
Très contre/ Against very much										
Sans réponse/No reply										
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	335	330	311	297	291	299	298	300	300	300

	LUXEMBOURG									
	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984			
	x-XI	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much	45	40	37	39	47	43	44			
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent	38	42	41	39	32	39	38			
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent	11	5	9	8						
Très contre/ Against very much	3	3	2	3						
Sans réponse/No reply										
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	500	399	300	300	304	300	299			

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	NEDERLAND									
	1962	1970	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980
	II-III	II-III	IX	V-VI	X	x-XI	IV	X	IV	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
For very much Plutôt pour/	62	30	34	37	33	37	37	34	28	35
For to some extent Plutôt contre/	25	44	39	29	31	46	47	48	48	44
Against to some extent Très contre/	3	7	8	3	4	7	5	8	10	8
Against very much	1	3	7	5	3	3	3	3	4	3
				1				7	10	10
Total								100	100	100
N	779	1230	1464	1093	1006	913	974	1092	999	1114

	NEDERLAND									
	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984		
	IV	x-XI	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much	30	28	24	27	29	33	30	30		
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent	50	46	52	48	46	39	51	52		
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent	8	10	9	9	10	9	7	7		
Très contre/ Against very much	5	7	4	6	5	6	3	3		
Sans réponse/No reply	7	9	11	10	10	13	9	8		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1091	1011	1228	1056	998	1050	1015	1018		

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued).

	1952 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 II-III	1962 VI	1964 II
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

65

Against to some extent Très contre/ Against very much Sans réponse/No reply) 15	4	10		16	10	12		22	18
				20	19	20	24	:	31	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100	100
N	1503	832	805	814	806	1210	1232	:	1261	1178

	1965 v - VI	1967 V	1970 II-III	1973 IX	1975 v - VI	1975 X	1978 x - XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much Plutôt pour/ For to some extent) 69	63	:	14	28	23	22	21	20	21
				23	22	28	41	40	41	38
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent Très contre/ Against very much Sans réponse/No reply) 11	15	:	15	11	11	12	14	15	16
				15	11	12	10	6	8	10
	20	22	:	33	28	26	15	19	16	15
Total	100	100	-	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1179	992	-	1933	1328	1438	1339	1317	1403	1454

	UNITED KINGDOM									
	1980 X-XI	1981 IV	1981 X-XI	1982 III - IV	1982 X	1983 III - IV	1983 X	1984 III - IV	1984 x - XI	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much Plutôt pour/ For to some extent	23	17	20	17	21	20	29	17	25	
	40	35	44	39	40	40	41	45	44	
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent Très contre/ (Against very much Sans réponse/No reply	14	14	13	19	15	15	9	16	11	
	8	15	8	12	6	5	5	7	4	
	15	19	15	13	18	20	16	15	16	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1432	1369	1395	1419	1335	1348	1277	1355	1405	

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	EURO 6									
	1962	1970	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980
	II-III	II-III	IX	V-VI	X	X-XI	IV	X	IV	X-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much	40	34	35	39	33	33	34	34	30	32
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent	32	40	36	37	41	47	47	46	49	44
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent	4	4	3	3	2	4	6	6	6	7
Très contre/ Against very much	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2
Sans réponse/No reply	23	20	24	20	22	14	12	12	13	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	6334	8752	9153	6149	5691	5442	5589	5583	5426	5538

	EURO 6									
	1962	1970	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980
	II-III	II-III	IX	V-VI	X	X-XI	IV	X	IV	X-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much										
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent										
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent										
Très contre/ Against very much										
Sans réponse/No reply	14	12	13	14	14	14	14	10		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	5518	5522	6665	5352	5427	5440	5393	5508		

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY (i)									
	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981
	IX	v-VI	X	x-XI	IV	X	IV	x-XI	IV	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour/ For very much	30	35	31	30	30	30	27	29	26	31
Plutôt pour/ For to some extent	33	34	38	45	45	45	46	43	43	43
Plutôt contre/ Against to some extent	6	5	5	8	6	8	9	9 1	10	9 1
Très contre/ Against very much	5	4	4	3	4 1	4 1	4	4 1	6	4 1
Sans réponse/No reply	26	22	22	14	15	13	14	15	15	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	13484	9550	9150	8788	8976	9021	8882	9001	9878	9911

Sans réponse/No reply	14	16	15	15	15	12				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	11676	9689	9790	9725	9746	9909				

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'octobre 1980. / Including Greece from October 1980.

TABLEAU 9 / TABLE 9

JUGEMENT PORTE SUR L'APPARTENANCE A LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE

ATTITUDE TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

D'une façon générale, pensez-vous que le fait (pour votre pays) de faire partie de la Communauté Européenne (Marché commun) est une bonne chose, une mauvaise chose, ou une chose ni bonne ni mauvaise ? / Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad ?

	1973 IX %	1974 IV-V %	1974 X-XI %	1975 V-VI %	1975 X %	1976 V-VI %	1976 X-I %	1977 IV-V %	1977 X-XI %
Bonne chose/Good thing	57	68	60						
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	5	3	6						
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	19	15	18						
Sans réponse/No reply	19	14	16	19	17	16	12	10	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1266	1017	1505	1507	1000	963	1077	988	

	1978 V-VI %	1978 X-XI %	1979 I-IV %	1979 VI (1) %	1979 X %	1980 IV %	1980 X-XI %	1981 IV %	1981 X-XI %
Bonne chose/Good thing	58	66	65						
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	6	3	2						
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	21	17	20						
Sans réponse/No reply	15	14	13	21	16	16	18	18	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1013	1008	983	965	1032	1009	1022	949	973

	1982 I-IV %	1982 XV %	1983 I-IV %	1983 VX %	1984 I-IV %	1984 X-XI %			

Total	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1210	1020	1038	995	1018	1035			

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLEAU 9 (continued)

	DANMARK								
	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977	1977
	IX	IV-V	x-XI	v-VI	X	v-VI	XI	IV-v	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing									
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing									
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad									
Sans réponse/No reply	9	10	7	11	8	13	9	10	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1168	1100	1073	1023	977	962	1010	992

	DANMARK								
	1978	1978	1979	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981
	v-VI	x-XI	IV	VI (1)	X	IV	x-XI	IV	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	34	36	37	38	39	33	32	30	31
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	31	25	25	28	27	29	29	31	29
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	27	30	26	20	24	28	30	30	29
Sans réponse/No reply	8	9	12	14	10	10	9	9	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	983	1002	1073	1018	1029	994	1024	1006	1009

	DANMARK								
N	1211	995	1027	1000	996	990			

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND								
	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977	1977
	IX	IV-V	X-XI	v - VI	X	v - VI	XI	IV - v	x - XI
	%	%	%	X	%	%	%	X	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	63	59	62	56	61	48	57	54	59
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	4	8	10	8	6	12	5	8	7
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	22	26	20	28	27	30	31	23	24
Sans réponse/No reply	11	7	8	8	6	10	7	15	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1957	1060	1042	1039	1002	1004	1007	1005	999

	DEUTSCHLAND								
	1978	1978	1979	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981
	v - VI	x - XI	IV	VI (1)	X	IV	x - XI	IV	x - XI
	%	X	%	X	%	%	%	%	X
Bonne chose/Good thing	58								
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	3								
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	24								
Sans réponse/No reply	15								
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	996	1006	1003	807	1005	1009	1008	1004	962

	DEUTSCHLAND								
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984			
	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	X-XI	X	%	%
	%	X	X	X	%	X	X	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	54	51	61	57	53	57			
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	8	9	5	9	5	5			
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	31	34	26	24	31	33			
Sans réponse/No reply	7	6	8	10	11	5			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1328	1012	1049	1058	992	1053			

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLEAU 9 (continued)

	ELLAS								
	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984	
	IV	X	IV	X	IV	X	III - IV	X - XI	
	%	X	X	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	42	38	33	45	42	47	38	45	
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	22	21	15	13	12	12	18	16	
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	26	26	37	30	29	30	35	29	
Sans réponse/No reply									
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1000	1000	1199	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	FRANCE								
	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977	1977
	I X	IV - v	x - XI	v - VI	X	v - VI	X I	IV - v	x - XI
	%	%	%	%	%				
Bonne chose/Good thing	61	68	63	64	67				
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	5	5	6	4	4				
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	22	20	22	25	24				
Sans réponse/No reply.	12	7	9	7	5	6	6	6	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	2227	1308	1237	1156	1276	1241	1356	1256	1149

	FRANCE								
	1978	1978	1979	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981
	v - VI	x - XI	IV	VI (1)	X	IV	x - XI	IV	x - XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	X /
Bonne chose/Good thing	54	59	56	49	58	51	48	50	53
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	9	7	8	9	6	9	10	11	7
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	27	26	28	31	26	32	31	32	33
Sans réponse/No reply	10	8	8	11	10	8	11	7 1	7 1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1276	1194	1152	1002	986	993	986	991	1006

	FRANCE									
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984				
	III-IV	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x - XI				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	55	57	53	55	62	63				
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	7	9	7	9	4	5				
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	30	29	30	29	27	27				
Sans réponse/No reply	8	5	10	7	7	5				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1199	939	1011	1000	1008	1006				

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	IRELAND							
	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977
	I-X	IV-V	X-XI	V-VI	X	V-VI	XI	IV-V
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	56	48	50	50	67	50	50	57
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	15	25	24	20	12	16	22	17
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	21	19	22	25	17	18	22	22
Sans réponse/No reply	8	8	4	5	4	6	6	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1000	1000	1000	998	1007	981	1008

	IRELAND							
	1978	1978	1979	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981
	V-VI	X-XI	IV	VI (1)	X	IV	X-XI	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
(Bonne chose/Good thing	54	63	54	56	58	52	47	46
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	17	12	14	16	12	19	26	22
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	23	20	24	14	25	22	21	27
Sans réponse/No reply	6	5	8	14	5	7	6	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1005	1005	997	1276	1006	1008	1007	1005

Sans réponse/No reply	9	5	7	7	7	6		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1181	1007	987	1002	1000	1008		

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

Sans réponse/No reply	14	9	4	5	5	11	11	6	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1909	1030	1021	1043	1110	923	1052	1025	1155

Bonne chose/Good thing									
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing									
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad									
Sans réponse/No reply	12	8	6	8	6	7	7 1	3 1	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1175	1030	1178	985	1170	1116	1108	1183	1070

Sans réponse/No reply	9	10	8	8	7 1	6			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1301	1025	1031	1033	1060	1097			

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG								
	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977	1977
	I X	IV - v	x - XI	v - VI	X	v - VI	X I	IV - v	x - XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	67	79	73	65	78	66	77	84	73
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	3	4	3	7	4	5	2	2	3
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	22	12	13	19	12	21	17	11	17
Sans réponse/No reply	8	5	11	9	6	8	4	3	7
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	330	308	297	311	297	268	301	302	344

	LUXEMBOURG								
	1978	1978	1979	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981
	v - VI	x - XI	IV	VI	X	IV	x - XI	IV	x - XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	73	63	83		86	84	73	79	76
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	5				3	3	3	3	5
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	16				10	10	22	15	17
Sans réponse/No reply	6	8	2						
Total	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100
N	322	291	299		298	300	300	300	500

	LUXEMBOURG								
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984			
	III - IV	X			III - IV	x - XI			
	%	%	+%		%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	73	72	72	76	80	80			
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	2	4	5	5	3	4			
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	19	21	18	17	14	15			
Sans réponse/No reply	6	3	5	2	3	1			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	399	300	300	304	300	299			

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	NEDERLAND							
							1977 IV-V %	1977 X-XI %
							80 31	74 5
Sans réponse/No reply	13	16	9	15	18	6	13 4	16 51
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1464	1000	1012	1093	1006	904	1033	943

	NEDERLAND									
	1978	1978	1979	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981	
	v - VI	x - XI	IV	VI (1)	X	IV	x - XI	IV	x - XI	
	%	X	%	X	X	X	%	%	%	
	Bonne chose/Good thing	78	83	84	52	78	75	75	76	75
	Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	5	2	2	6	3 1	3	5	6	3
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	14	12	10	16	15	16	14	14	15	
Sans réponse/No reply			4	26	4	6	6	4	7	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1131 3	913 3	974	1159	1092	999	1114	1091	1011	

	NEDERLAND							
	1982 III-IV	1982 X	1983 III-IV	1983 X	1984 III-IV	1984 X-XI		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	74	74	77	80	80	79		
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	4	5	4	4	3	4		
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	16	15	15	10	13	13		
Sans réponse/No reply	6	6	4	6	4	4		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1228	1056	998	1050	1015	1018		

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM								
	1972	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1976	1976	1976
	X	IX	IV - V	x - XI	v - VI	X	I	II	v - VI
	(2)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(2)	(3)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	40	31	33				50	49	39
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	21	34	39				24	26	35
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	22	22	19				17	17	18
Sans réponse/No reply	17	13	9				9	8	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1028	1933	1031	1039	1328	1438	1077	992	1340

	UNITED KINGDOM								
	1976	1976	1976	1977	1977	1977	1977	1977	1978
	VII	IX	XI	I	IV - V	VI	X	x - XI	V - VI
	(2)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(3)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	39	33	39	35	35	33	37	35	29
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	31	37	34	41	40	42	33	37	38
(Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	21	19	21	:	22	18	22	23	28
Sans réponse/No reply	9	11	6	24	3	7	8	5	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1038	976	1351	1697	1414	945	954	1351	1426

	UNITED KINGDOM								
	1978	1978	1979	1979	1979	1979	1980	1980	1980
	VII	x - XI	IV	VI	X	X	XI	IV	IV
	(2)	(3)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(2)	(2)	(3)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	25	39	33	36	24	29	21	22	23
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	48	31	34	42	54	41	55	57	49
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	20	25	26	16	17	25	15	13	22
Sans réponse/No reply	7	5	7	6	5	5	9	8	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	981	1339	1317	925	1009	1403	948	943	1454

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

Total N	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	1015	1046	921	1432	923	1369	972	1395

Sans réponse/No reply	7	1	—	5	7	7	5	1	8	6	17	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	977	1335	950	1348	918	910	1277	1898	1013			

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM								
	1984 IV (3)	1984 IV (2)	1984 V (2)	1984 X-XI (3)					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	34	32	33	38					
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	30	38	32	33					
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	30	24	29	25					
Sans réponse/No reply	6	5	6	4					
Total	100	100	100	100					
N	1355	961	997	1405					

(1) International Institute of Communications (London).

(2) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more, only Great Britain. / Population de 18 ans et au-delà, **seulement** Grande-Bretagne.

(3) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Great Britain from 1973 to 1974 ; United Kingdom as from 1975 / Population de 15 ans et au-delà. Grande-Bretagne de 1973 à 1974 ; Royaume-Uni depuis 1975.

(4) NOP Market Research. Population of 18 years and more, only Great Britain. / Population de 18 ans et au-delà, **seulement** Grande-Bretagne.

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	EURO 6								
	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977	1977
	IX	IV - v	x - XI	v - VI	X	v - VI	XI	IV - v	x - XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	63	67	69	63	67	57	61	64	63
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	4	6	6	5	4	8	5	6	7
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	19	18	17	24	22	26	26	21	22
Sans réponse/No reply	14	9	8	8	7	9	8	9	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	9153	5723	6114	6149	5691		5916	5609	5596

	EURO 6								
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984			
	III - IV	X	XI	V	X	XI			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Sans réponse/No reply	12	10	8	8	8	9	10	9	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	5913	5442	5589	4918	5583	5426	5538	5518	5522

	EURO 6								
	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984			
	III - IV	X	XI	V	X	XI			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	60	58	63	62	63	65			
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	6	7	5	7	4	4			
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	26	27	24	22	25	26			
Sans réponse/No reply	8	8	8	9	8	5			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	6665	5352	5427	5440	5393	5508			

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY (i)								
	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1976	1976	1977	1977
	IX	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	X	v-VI	XI	IV-v	x-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose/Good thing	56	59	60	59	63	53	55	57	56
Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	11	14	14	9	9	14	13	14	14
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	20	18	18	23	21	24	25	21	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	13484	8922	9253	9550	9150	8627	9210	9044	8936

Sans réponse/No reply	10	8	8	8	7 1	8	8	8	7 1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	9327	8788	8976	8126	9021	8882	9001	9898	9911

	COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY									
	1982 III-IV^	1982 X ■ ■ ■	1983	1983 X ■ ■ ■	1984	1984 X-XI				
	%	%	%	%	X	X	%	%	%	
	Bonne chose/Good thing	52	51	54	55	55	58			
	Mauvaise chose/Bad thing	14	15	13	13	11	11			
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise/ Neither good nor bad	26	27	25	24	27	26				
Sans réponse/No reply	8	7	8	8	7	5				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	11676	9689	9790	9725	9746	9909				

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'octobre 1980. / Including Greece from October 1980.

TABLEAU 10 / TABLE 10

L'ATTITUDE EN CAS D'ABANDON DU MARCHÉ COMMUN / ATTITUDE IF THE COMMON MARKET HAD BEEN SCRAPPED

De 1971 à 1973 : Si l'on vous annonçait demain que le Marché commun est abandonné. En 1974 et mai 1975 : Si l'on vous annonçait demain que (votre pays) quitte la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) A partir de novembre 1975 : Si l'on vous annonçait demain que la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) est abandonnée.../From 1971 to 1973 : If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped...In 1974 and May 1975 : If you were to be told tomorrow that (your country) was leaving the Common market...As from November 1975 : If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped..

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	1971 VII	1973 IX	1974 IV-V	1974 X-XI	1975 V-VI	1975 X	1977 X-XI	1981 IV	1981 X-XI	1982 III-IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	25	39	48	42	39	42	44	23	28	32
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	53	44	30	33	33	34	34	53	50	47
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved										
Sans réponse/No reply	18	14	20	21	26	22	17	20	19	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1364	1266	1017	1505	1507	1000	1006	949	973	1210

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	1982 X	1983 III-IV	1983 X	1984 III-IV	1984 X-XI					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	26	38	36	31	34					
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	50	38	41	53	51					
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved										
Sans réponse/No reply	20	21	19	13	10					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1020	1038	995	1018	1035					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	DANMARK									
	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1977	1981	1981	1982	1982
	IX	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	X	X-XI	IV	X-XI	III-IV	X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	30	27	27	33	33	30	25	25	27	24
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	29	27	24	22	26	25	31	31	28	29
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved	29	31	35	26	26	34	31	24	28	30
Sans réponse/No reply	12	15	14	19	15	11	13	20	17	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1168	1100	1073	1023	992	1006	1009	1211	995

	DANMARK									
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry										
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent										
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved										
Sans réponse/No reply	16	17	18	19						
Total	100	100	100	100						
N	1027	1000	996	990						

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND									
	1971	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1977	1981	1981	1982
	VII	IX	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	X	x-XI	IV	X-XI	III-IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	52	57	53	55	55	53	53	42	51	51
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	29	24	28	27	27	31	25	31	30	27
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved	7	4	5	6	5	4	5	8	5	6
Sans réponse/No reply	12	15	14	12	13	12	17	19	14	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	2000	1957	1060	1042	1039	1002	999	1004	962	1328

	DEUTSCHLAND									
	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984					
	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	X-XI					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	45	54	45	45	49					
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	30	27	32	32	34					
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved	10	4 1	5 1	4	4					
- Sans réponse/No reply	15	15	18	19	13					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1012	1049	1058	992	1053					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	ELLAS									
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1000	1000	1199	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000		

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	FRANCE									
	1971	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1977	1981	1981	1982
	II	IX	IV-v	x-XI	v-VI	X	x-XI	IV	x-XI	III-IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	31	42	56	50	56	50	45	34	37	40
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	52	43	30	33	31	37	39	44	48	42
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved	5	2	3 1	4	4 1	3	6	8	4	4
Sans réponse/No reply	12	13							11	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1806	2227	1308	1237	1156	1276	1149	991	1006	1199

	FRANCE									
	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984					
	X	III-IV	X	III-IV	x-XI					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	44	40	42	44	42					
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	40	43	39	38	46					
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved	6	4 1	7	4 1	4					
Sans réponse/No reply	10	13 1	11	14	8					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	939	1011	1000	1008	1006					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

IRELAND										

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	ITALIA									
	1971	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1977	1981	1981	1982
	VII	IX	IV - v	x - XI	v - VI	X	x - XI	IV	x - XI	III-IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/										
Very sorry	35	41	60	65	52	45	48	50	45	46
- De l'indifférence/										
Indifferent	38	44	22	23	35	38	38	39	41	39
- Un vif soulagement/										
Relieved	3	1	4	2	3	3	4	4	3	2
Sans réponse/No reply	24	14	14	10	10	14	10	7	11	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	2000	1909	1030	1021	1043	1110	1155	1183	1070	1301

	ITALIA									
	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984					
	X	III - IV	X	III - IV	x - XI					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/										
Very sorry	42	45	43	41	40					
- De l'indifférence/										
Indifferent	43	43	40	41	48					
- Un vif soulagement/										
Relieved	3	2	5	3	3					
Sans réponse/No reply	12	10	12	15	9					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1025	1031	1033	1060	1097					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG									
	1971	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1977	1981	1981	1982
	VII	IX	IV-V	X-XI	V-VI	X	X-XXI	IV	X-XXI	III-IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	36	51	73	70	58	60	64	59	60	61
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	42	35	17	16	22	24	25	33	31	28
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved	6	3 1	3 1	2	7 1	2	2	3 1	5	2 9
Sans réponse/No reply										
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	302	330	308	297	311	297	344	300	500	399

	LUXEMBOURG									
	1971	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1977	1981	1981	1982
	VII	IX	IV-V	X-XI	V-VI	X	X-XXI	IV	X-XXI	III-IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Sans réponse/No reply	6	8	5	7	3 1					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	300	300	304	300	299					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

NEDERLAND										
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry										
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent										
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved										
Sans réponse/No reply	15	13	22	14	20	20	8	8	18	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1198	1464	1000	1012	1093	1006	943	1058	1011	1228

NEDERLAND										
	1982	1983	1983							
	X	III-IV	X							
	%	%	%							
		56	54							
		31	32							
		3	4							
N		10	10	9	9					
		100	100	100	100					
	1056	998	1050	1015	1018					

	1972	1973	1973	1973	1973	1973	1973	1973	1973	1973
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry										
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent										
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved										
Sans réponse/No reply	6	14	9	12	9	10	9	10	9	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1028	924	1013	873	885	998	818	1933	902	906

	1974 1-11 (1) %	1974 11-11-IV (1) %	1974 IV (1) %	1974 IV-v (2) %	1974 (1) %	1974 (1) %	1974 (1) %	1974 (1) %	1974 (2) %	1975 (1) %
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	19	27	24	24	25	28	24	26	31	24
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	26	23	21	28	33	21	22	24	22	24
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved	48	43	43	40	44	44	47	38	38	40
Sans réponse/No reply	7	7	12	8	8	7	7	12	9	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1054	1055	1007	1031	985	908	817	1006	1039	988

	1975	1975	1976	1976	1976	1976	1977	1977	1977	1979
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry										
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent										
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved										
Sans réponse/No reply,										
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1328	1438	1077	992	1038	976	945	954	1351	1009

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 [continued]

	1979 XI (1)	1980	1980	1980	1980	1981	1981	1981	1981	1982 III-IV (2)
										%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	16									23
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	26									33
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved	51									40
Sans réponse/No reply	7	8	7	6	5	4	4	6	6	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	948	943	1015	1046	921	923	1369	972	1395	1419

	UNITED KINGDOM									
	1982	1982	1982	1983	1983	1983	1983	1984	1984	1984
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	19	23	19	22	30	24	28	19	24	26
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	33	30	34	43	35	33	39	37	41	39
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved	44	42	42	30	29	36	27	40	31	31
Sans réponse/No reply	4	5	5	5	6	7	6	4	4	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	977	1335	950	1348	918	910	1277	1013	1355	1405

- (1) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain. Slight difference in the wording of the question : in 1972 : very sorry, indifferent, pleased ; from V/75 : very 'sorry, ... indifferent, relieved.
- (2) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Only Great Britain from 1973 to 1974 United Kingdom from 1975.

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry										
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent										
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved										
Sans réponse/No reply	15	13	14	14	12	13	12	14	13	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	8670	9153	5723	6114	6149	5691	5596	5518	5522	6665

	EURO 6									
	1982 X %	1983 III-IV %	1983 X %	1984 III-IV %	1984 X-XI %					
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	43	47	44	43	44					
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	38	37	37	37	42					
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved										
Sans réponse/No reply	13	13	14	16	10					
Total	100	100	100	100	100					
N	5352	5427	5440	5393	5508					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY (i)									
	1973	1974	1974	1975	1975	1977	1981	1981	1982	1982
	IX	IV - v	x - XI	v - VI	X	x - XI	IV	x - XI	III - IV	X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	41	48							40	38
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	36	27							36	36
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved	10	13							12	15
Sans réponse/No reply	13	12							12	11
		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	13484	8922	9253	9550	9150	8936	9898	9911	11676	9689

	COMMUNAUTE/COMMUNITY (1)									
	1983	1983	1984	1984						
	III-IV	X	III-IV	x - XI						
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient/Would be										
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	41	40	38	39						
- De l'indifférence/ Indifferent	39	37	39	42						
- Un vif soulagement/ Relieved	9	11	10	10						
Sans réponse/No reply	11	12	13	9						
Total	100	100	100	100						
N	9790	9725	9746	9909						

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'avril 1981. / Including Greece from April 1981.