

# euro-barometre

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PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



No. 19 JUNE 1983

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES  
RUE DE LA LOI 200 • 1049 BRUSSELS

EUROBAROMETER

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:

SPRING 1983

- The mood of Europeans: changes in the country's general economic situation and the financial situation of individual households; satisfaction with life and the feeling of happiness; basic attitudes to society; return to full employment and the persistence of unemployment.
- Political values and attitudes: interest in politics; exposure to information media; national pride; peace - the supreme value; main socio-political cleavages.
- Attitudes to Europe and the European Community; the Community countries to which one feels closest.
- Reactions in Spain and Portugal to the prospect of joining the Community.

No 19 - June 1983

Commission of the European Communities  
rue de la Loi, 200 - 1049 Brussels

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PRELIMINARY NOTE

EUROBAROMETER PUBLIC OPINION POLLS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES EACH SPRING AND AUTUMN SINCE SEPTEMBER 1973. THEY HAVE INCLUDED GREECE SINCE AUTUMN 1980.

AN IDENTICAL SET OF QUESTIONS IS PUT TO REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES - DIFFERENT EACH TIME - OF THE POPULATION AGED FIFTEEN AND OVER IN EACH OF THE TEN COUNTRIES. THIS SURVEY WAS CARRIED OUT BY PROFESSIONAL INTERVIEWERS BETWEEN 25 MARCH AND 27 APRIL 1983 IN THE HOMES OF THE 9 790 SELECTED RESPONDENTS.

TEN NATIONAL INSTITUTES, ALL MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING THE POLL. ALL THESE INSTITUTES COMPLY WITH THE STANDARDS SET BY THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR OPINION AND MARKETING RESEARCH. THEY WERE SELECTED BY TENDER.

THE NAMES OF THE INSTITUTES AND FIELD-WORK SPECIALISTS IN EACH COUNTRY ARE LISTED IN THE APPENDIX TOGETHER WITH THE RELEVANT TECHNICAL DETAILS.

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PRACTICE FOR THIS TYPE OF SURVEY THE COMMISSION DISCLAIMS ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUESTIONS, RESULTS AND COMMENTARIES.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	
I. <u>THE MOOD OF EUROPEANS</u>	1
1.1. CHANGES IN THE COUNTRY'S GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS	1
1.2. SATISFACTION WITH LIFE AND THE FEELING OF HAPPINESS	10
1.3. SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS	27
1.4. BASIC ATTITUDES TO SOCIETY: REVOLUTION, REFORM, DEFENSE AGAINST SUBVERSION	38
1.5. WILL UNEMPLOYMENT DISAPPEAR IF THE ECONOMY PICKS UP?	39
II. <u>POLITICAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES</u>	42
II.1. INTEREST IN POLITICS AND EXPOSURE TO INFORMATION MEDIA	43
11.2. THE FEELING OF NATIONAL PRIDE	53
11.3. PEACE, THE SUPREME VALUE	58
11.4. THE MAIN SOCIO-POLITICAL CLEAVAGES	62
III. <u>ATTITUDES TO EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY</u>	75
III.1. THE FEELING OF BEING A CITIZEN OF EUROPE	76
111.2. FOR OR AGAINST UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE	78
111.3. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY	85
111.3.1. A feeling that one's country has benefited - more or less than others - from its member- ship of the Community	85
111.3.2. Assessment of the trend in understanding between the countries of the Community	88



	<u>Page</u>
111.3.3. General attitude to Community membership	91
III.3.4. Advantages and disadvantages of belonging to the European Community	100
III.4. THE COMMUNITY COUNTRIES TO WHICH ONE FEELS THE CLOSEST	107
IV. <u>REACTIONS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL TO THE PROSPECT OF JOINING THE COMMUNITY</u>	118
IV.1. INTEREST IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS AND IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THEM	119
IV.2. ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION ON COMMUNITY AFFAIRS	122
IV.3. FOR OR AGAINST WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION	123
IV.4. ATTITUDES TO ACCESSION TO THE COMMUNITY	127

## INTRODUCTION

This Eurobarometer is one of the most important ever compiled, both because of the number of subjects covered and because it is now possible to observe many of the issues relating to the life of Europeans, the functioning of the Community and European integration over a sufficiently long period - a decade in fact<sup>1</sup>.

With only twelve months to go before the second direct elections to the European Parliament, this issue is especially significant, even though it does not deal specifically with that aspect of European political life<sup>2</sup>.

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## THE MOOD OF EUROPEANS

By way of experiment, two questions generally regarded as useful in gauging the trend of the short-term economic situation were asked again. They bear on changes over the last twelve months in the country's general economic situation and the financial situation of individual households. Negative answers still by and large outnumber the positive answers in all but one country - Denmark. The Danes, who in October 1982 took a very poor view of the trend in Denmark's economic situation, saw things in a much brighter light six months later. In Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium the feeling is less gloomy, while the Greeks, the French, the Irish and the Luxembourgers tend to appear more pessimistic. Although, as in the past, respondents tend to assess the situation of their individual households in less negative terms than the situation of the country as a whole, there are again exceptions - Greece and, in particular, Denmark. These assessments, which are supposed to reflect the short-term economic trend (and certainly do reflect it to some degree), are fairly closely correlated - especially the general assessment - with respondents' ideological leanings, as indicated by self-placement on the left/right scale; the correlation is all the closer wherever discussion of economic issues is - constantly or occasionally - "politicized"; the analysis shows that is at the moment true in France, Greece, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Germany.

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<sup>1</sup>Before this report was published, the heads of national information services of the Member States of the Community, meeting in Brussels on 27 May, unanimously expressed their high opinion of Eurobarometer as an ongoing study of European public opinion.

<sup>2</sup>Further research **was done** in conjunction with the surveys, the results of which are published here. They will subsequently be published by the European Parliament. A new poll on comparative attitudes of men and women to socio-occupational and socio-political activities was conducted as a supplement to this Eurobarometer; the report **will** be published shortly.

Compared with the previous half year, there is no significant change as regards the feeling of satisfaction with life: Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg are still leading the field, with France, Italy and Greece bringing up the rear. A look at the ten-year trend (1973-83) throws up a few interesting variations against a generally stable background: a slight upward trend in Italy (which started very low) and in Denmark (which started very high), as well as in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom; a slight downward trend in France and Ireland, a more pronounced one in Belgium. These trends probably reflect general feelings about whether one's country, considering its aims and ambitions, will be able to cope with its problems better or worse than other countries.

Expression of the feeling of happiness turns out to be relatively stable, with a slight upward trend since April 1975 (when this question first appeared in Eurobarometer), except in Belgium and Denmark. But for the first time a question was asked on what "happiness" meant to respondents in each country. A clear majority (58%) cited good health. The next two most important things were a successful marriage and getting on well together in the family; money took only fourth place. This order is much the same in all countries, which shows that these are values common to all the peoples of western Europe. At individual level the variable which appears to relate most closely and consistently with what Europeans term happiness is the personal scale of values, measured here as the preference given, when a choice has to be made, to "having" (security and material wellbeing) or to "being" (personal fulfillment, social involvement, quality of life).

Another important indicator of the social climate is satisfaction with the way democracy works. It is by definition very sensitive to political events, but our observations show that the differences between national political systems tend to remain relatively stable - Germans and Danes have for some years almost continually been showing greater satisfaction than other Europeans in these surveys, whereas the Italians are at the other end of the scale. The longer-term trend (1973-83) is definitely upwards in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom and definitely downwards in Belgium.

All the Community countries - and many others throughout the world - are faced with the problem of unemployment. At the same time, signs of economic recovery are discernible here and there. A new question aimed to find out how far the public believed that unemployment would disappear if business and the economy picked up.

The answers were clear enough: seven out of ten people believe that the problem of unemployment will not disappear if the economy picks up. The most pessimistic are the Dutch (91% of those who replied). Greece is the only country where the optimists outnumber the pessimists.

## POLITICAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES

With the European elections only twelve months away, a comparative reappraisal of political values and attitudes is of obvious interest.

Interest in politics. four out of ten Europeans say they are "a great deal" (11%) or "to some extent" (31%) interested in politics. Those who take the most interest are the Dutch, the Danes and the Germans; those taking the least are the Belgians and the Italians.

Exposure to information media. This variable is closely correlated with interest in politics: the Danes, Germans and Irish rank first; the Italians are at the bottom of the table, behind the Greeks. The relative importance of the media varies widely from country to country: television reaches well nigh all the European public; radio is a major source of information in Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, but much less so than elsewhere in Greece and Italy; the newspapers are more frequently quoted in Germany, Denmark and Luxembourg, but 20% to 30% of the Belgians, Greeks, Italians and French say they never read the political news in the dailies.

The feeling of national pride. More than three quarters of the people interviewed say they are very proud or quite proud of their country. The Greeks (90%) were the most frequently heard expressing these patriotic feelings, while the Belgians (68%) and especially the Germans (56%) are the least inclined to do so.

Peace, the supreme value. Asked about the importance they attach to peace as against other things (standard of living, liberty or human rights) worth defending, even at the risk of war, the great majority of Europeans (80% of those who replied) chose peace. The only country where the public is split into two almost equal camps is the United Kingdom: 55% of the British believe peace to be the most important thing, but 45% feel that there can be more important things to defend.

The main socio-political cleavages. The purpose of this question - already asked in 1979 and 1981 - is to determine at regular intervals how far Europeans agree or disagree on a number of political issues that are topical in most Community countries. Interest centres here on the comparison between countries and on the trend of answers from one poll to the next:

- extension of public ownership (nationalization) is a less attractive objective almost everywhere;
- increased economic aid for the Third World countries is not getting as much support as it did in 1981 or 1979, no doubt because of the economic crisis;

- the development of nuclear energy still commands fairly solid support, but with appreciable differences from country to country: the Germans, the French and the British tend to favour it, whereas all the others, but especially the Irish, the Dutch and, increasingly, the Danes, are turning against it;
- the strengthening of military defence is supported by a majority moderately in favour but, here again, with differences between countries: the Greeks, the British and the Irish are fairly positive; the Dutch, the Belgians, the Italians and especially the Danes are less keen; the trend is moving definitely against it in the Netherlands.

The issues on which European consensus is firmest are combating terrorism, protecting the environment and, albeit to a lesser degree, reducing inequality in incomes and more autonomy for the regions.

#### ATTITUDES TO EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

"Do you ever think of yourself ... as a citizen of Europe?" The value of the answers to this question is that over the next two half-years they will highlight attitudes to the election of the European Parliament; surely the very essence of citizenship is exercising the right to vote and choose one's representatives. With no significant change from last year, one person out of two says that this happens "often" (16%) or "sometimes" (34%). More Greeks and Luxembourgers than anybody else give the most positive answers and more British and Irish give the most negative answers, 68% and 74% respectively saying that they "never" think of themselves as citizens of Europe.

Attitudes towards the unification of Europe are still broadly favourable in all countries except Denmark. The climate even shows a slight improvement over the two preceding half-years, notably in Germany and Belgium, and proportionally more among opinion leaders than in the rest of the population. The general erosion of the idea of a united Europe that emerges from an analysis of the results over ten years (1973-83) therefore seems to be slowing as general economic conditions are tending to improve.

It is much the same story with the assessment of membership of the European Community. In April 1983 the majority of respondents - the United Kingdom apart - still continue to feel that belonging to the Community is "a good thing": 74% in the Netherlands, 72% in Luxembourg, 64% in Italy, 57% in France, 51% in Germany, ...

In two countries - Germany and more still Belgium - the answers even show a slight improvement on the last poll. In the United Kingdom there is a significant shift from the negative to the less categorical answers, which confirms the trend noted six months ago - the opponents of membership in the United Kingdom appear to have been losing ground over the last two years<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote on following page.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of belonging to the Community? Generally speaking, the positive assessments outnumber the negative, but there are a few exceptions - the United Kingdom (standard of living, industry, agriculture), Ireland (industry) and even Italy (agriculture). But one striking feature is that the most valuable attribute of the Community in the eyes of most respondents in most countries is its contribution to "the security of the country". The second item most frequently mentioned is "our exports". The Irish are the only ones to rank agriculture first, while the Dutch and the Greeks put it second and the Danes third.

Lastly, an entirely new question was asked on what might be called the emotional structure of the Community: which is the country to which you feel closest and which is the one most foreign to you? For the great majority of Europeans the closest is France, followed some way off by Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The most "foreign", which in fact means the most remote, is Greece. An in-depth analysis, illustrated by graphs, gives a country-by-country picture of the psycho-geography of Europeans, viewed from two angles: the distance, great or small, between one's own country and each of the others and the degree of precision in impressions of the others.

#### SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

Though showing a slight increase over the previous six months, Spanish and Portuguese involvement in Community affairs is still very confined. Roughly one Spaniard out of three and two Portuguese out of ten may be considered to be somewhat involved.

The proportion of those who feel they are adequately informed is growing in Spain: 20% in April 1983 against 12% in 1982. In Portugal, as the proportion of Don't knows diminishes, the proportion of those who think they are not adequately informed is tending to increase. We have here a threshold effect which could be defined thus: we need a little information in order to realize how little information we have.

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<sup>1</sup>Stop press. Social Surveys, a British organization, has just published the results of a field survey conducted between 25 and 30 May, one month after this Eurobarometer. The results are not strictly comparable with ours, but they leave no doubt that British public opinion is swinging.

"Generally speaking, do you think that British membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"

	<u>May 82</u>	<u>September 82</u>	<u>May 83</u>
	%	%	%
Good	27	25	43
Bad	45	45	30
Neither	21	22	22
Don't know	7	7	5

Source: Gallup Political Index, No 268, December 1982, and No 274, June 1983. These three polls are technically comparable between themselves (Great Britain only, sample of age 18 and over, etc...)

## VI

This trend in the involvement of the general public seems to have had an impact already on the general attitude in Spain towards the unification of Europe, for the favourable opinions are gaining ground. In Portugal, **there** are still more Don't knows than definite answers, and no distinct trend can be observed.

As regards attitudes to joining the Community, **46%** of Spaniards and only 28% of Portuguese were in favour. Compared with the figures for **previous** polls (1980-82), these results show that apathy is setting in as progress is slower than originally anticipated.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE MOOD OF EUROPEANS



I

THE MOOD OF EUROPEANS

In October 1982 for the first time we asked two questions taken from socio-economic surveys of consumer opinion and economic prospects; they inquired about people's views of the recent trend in the general economic situation in their country and the trend over the same period in the financial situation of their households. Since the results aroused a great deal of interest, the two questions were again asked in the April 1983 survey.

The replies to the standard questions on satisfaction with life and the feeling of happiness, satisfaction with the way democracy works and the individual's basic attitude to society, are also analysed in this chapter.

In addition, we included a new question intended to probe public opinion on the question of whether, in the event of an economic recovery, it is felt that unemployment would disappear or remain.

1.1. CHANGES IN THE COUNTRY'S GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS

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*"How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months? Would you say that **it** is now a lot better, a little better, the same, a little worse or a lot worse?"*

*"How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what **it** was 12 months ago? Is **it** a lot better, a little better, the same, a little worse or a lot worse?"*

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In both April 1983 and October 1982, there were more negative replies than positive replies in most countries, but with some exceptions: Greece in the previous survey (situation of the household and general situation) and Denmark in the latest survey (general economic situation).

In addition, it once again emerges that the assessment of the household's finances is generally less gloomy than that of the general economic situation, but here again there are exceptions: in Greece, and quite distinctly in Denmark, in the latest survey the national economy is thought to have improved more than the household finances.

This all goes to show that although there is high correlation between the two assessments<sup>1</sup> - without it being possible to state which is cause and which is effect - the movements in these two variables are quite independent, probably because of the different ways in which economic or political events are perceived<sup>2</sup>.

The most interesting information is undoubtedly provided by changes over time rather than by the levels at any one time. Between October 1982 and April 1983 the following movements are observed:

- with regard to the general economic situation of the country, the assessment improved considerably in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, whilst there was a statistically significant deterioration in Greece and in France<sup>3</sup>;
- with regard to the financial situation of the household, the changes are significant only in Ireland and - more particularly - in Greece, and in both cases the change was for the worse.

The results are summarized in Graph 1 and analysed in more detail in Tables 1 and 2 below.

(See Graph 1 and Tables 1 and 2)

As we have previously demonstrated<sup>4</sup>, assessments of the situation - particularly the assessment of the general economic situation of the country - are in high correlation with the political leanings of respondents.

Graph 2 shows - for each country in October 1982 and April 1983 - the curves relating the assessments of the change in the general economic situation and in the financial situation of individual households to respondents' political leanings<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The correlation between the national scores for each of these two assessments was 0.74 in October 1982 and 0.82 in April 1983.

<sup>2</sup> See Eurobarometer No 18, December 1982, pp. 10-21.

<sup>3</sup> Readers will be able to relate these findings to socio-political changes in these countries. For example, the strengthening of the position of the non-socialist minority government in Denmark, the change in the parliamentary majority and early elections in Germany, etc. When subjectively assessing the social and economic changes over the past 12 months, respondents tend to project their own views of socio-political events or their fears as to what may be ahead.

<sup>4</sup> See Eurobarometer No 18, pp. 17-18.

<sup>5</sup> Individuals' ideological preferences are measured empirically by their reply to a question asking them to situate themselves on a scale from one (the Left) to ten (the Right). For statistical reasons, replies are normally assembled in five groups, extreme left, left, centre, right and extreme right.

From this it can be seen that in France and Greece, in 1983 as in 1982, (but with a shift down the scale) the assessments have a negative correlation with the left/right political spectrum, i.e. in both of these countries, persons on the right take a distinctly more negative view than those of the left. In the United Kingdom the opposite is true; people on the left are the most critical. The curve for Denmark has taken the same shape as that for the United Kingdom and a similar movement seems to be emerging for Germany and the Netherlands.

(See Graphs 2 and 2a)

This all serves to corroborate what we were suggesting in Eurobarometer No 18: firstly, economic indicators are not and never will be the simple reflection of an objective assessment of the economic situation, and secondly, these indicators should not just be viewed as if they exposed a sort of national consensus but should be subjected to separate and comparative analysis for each of the major categories composing the society under examination.

Graph 1

POSITION OF EACH COUNTRY ACCORDING  
TO THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC  
SITUATION DURING THE LAST 12 MONTHS

(X/1982 —■ IV/1983)




Table 1

## ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGES IN THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION OVER THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
October 1982	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
A lot better	.	.		1	.	3		1	3	10	2
A little better	5	4	3	13	5	8	6	3	28	38	12
The same	25	15	30	29	10	10	24	10	16	23	21
A little worse	35	43	43	35	30	43	43	50	26	18	37
A lot worse	30	35	19	20	54	35	25	34	24	5	25
Don't know	5	3	5	2	1	1	2	2	3	6	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	1.65	1.63	1.76	1.92	1.46	1.75	1.75	1.67	2.11	2.75	1.88
April 1983											
A lot better		11	1	1	1	1	-	.	2	7	2
A little better	8	45	18	9	3	10	2	11	26	26	16
The same	25	16	39	29	10	18	19	21	21	21	31
A little worse	38	17	28	28	23	40	46	45	26	25	21
A lot worse	23	3	10	29	62	28	29	21	21	11	26
Don't know	6	8	4	4	1	3	4	2	4	10	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>											

<sup>1</sup> Average of replies in each country, weighted according to the section of the population surveyed, i.e. persons aged 15 and over.

<sup>2</sup> Average calculated by applying the coefficients 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively to the replies "a lot better", "a little better", "a little worse" and "a lot worse". Replies that the situation remained the same are excluded, as are the don't knows. The central point would be 2.50. Below this level, there are more negative answers and above this level more positive answers.

Table 2


## ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGES IN THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLDS OVER THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>October 1982</u>											
A lot better	1	3	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	1	0
A little better	4	13	13	9	5	15	11	6	18	32	13
The same	34	46	58	38	32	50	43	40	36	36	45
A little worse	41	25	21	35	34	24	35	40	23	15	27
A lot worse	14	6	3	14	26	8	9	10	17	6	11
Don't know	6	7	4	3	2	1	1	2	3	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	1.86	2.29	2.32	1.96	1.73	2.21	2.08	2.00	2.12	2.74	2.14
<u>April 1983</u>											
A lot better	.	4	1	1		1	2	2	4	1	5
A little better	5	14	13	8	4	16	6	8	18	19	13
The same	38	53	58	37	27	53	51	39	40	38	47
A little worse	38	22	20	31	31	23	30	38	23	26	25
A lot worse	14	5	5	21	37	6	9	11	12	11	11
Don't know	5	2	3	2	1	1	2	2	3	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	1.86	2.38	2.24	1.84	1.55	2.27	2.03	2.01	2.25	2.29	2.12

<sup>1</sup> and <sup>2</sup> See footnotes to Table 1.

Graph 2


ASSESSMENT OF THE GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION ACCORDING  
TO THE LEFT/RIGHT IDEOLOGICAL PREFERENCE





Graph 2a

ASSESSMENT OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF THE HOUSEHOLD  
ACCORDING TO LEFT/RIGHT IDEOLOGICAL PREFERENCE





## 1.2. SATISFACTION WITH LIFE AND THE FEELING OF HAPPINESS

### 1.2.1. Satisfaction with life

*"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?"*

No significant variation can be observed compared with the survey six months earlier either in the country rankings or in the individual scores on the satisfaction index. Denmark is once again at the top, followed by Luxembourg and the Netherlands, while Greece takes the last place, preceded by Italy and France.

If we go back a little further in time, a number of trends do seem to be emerging (e.g. the decline in satisfaction with life in Belgium) but the overriding impression is one of stability, particularly with regard to the gap between the "satisfied" with life (Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg) and the "dissatisfied" (France, Italy, Greece!).

(See Table 3)

Table 3

#### SATISFACTION WITH LIFE INDEX (April 1981 - April 1983)<sup>1</sup>

	April 1981	April 1982	October 1982	April 1983
Denmark	<b>3.54</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>3.53</b>	<b>3.50</b>
Netherlands	<b>3.35</b>	<b>3.37</b>	<b>3.37</b>	<b>3.29</b>
Luxembourg	<b>3.33</b>	<b>3.25</b>	<b>3.25</b>	<b>3.31</b>
Ireland	3.14		3.16	3.13
United Kingdom	3.12	3.19	3.18	3.13
Belgium	3.19	3.11	3.00	3.03
Germany	2.94	3.05	3.04	2.98
France	2.76	2.91	2.80	2.78
Italy	2.72	2.78	2.61	2.70
Greece	2.55	2.69	2.60	2.63
<u>Weighted average</u>	<u><del>2.93</del></u>	<u>3.01</u>	<u>2.94</u>	<u>2.93</u>
(Standard deviation)	(.32)	(.26)	(.31)	(.28)

<sup>1</sup> Countries are ranked according to the average score obtained in these four successive surveys. (This question was not put in October 1981). The scores are calculated by applying the coefficients 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively to the replies "very satisfied", "fairly satisfied", "not very satisfied" and "not at all satisfied". The don't knows have been excluded. A rating above 2.50 would therefore indicate satisfaction and a rating below this would indicate dissatisfaction.

If we go back even further and take as a basis the first survey covering the whole of the enlarged European Community (September 1973), somewhat differing trends are observed according to the country:

- a slightly rising trend in Italy (where the rating was the lowest in 1973) and is now still second largest, Denmark (where satisfaction was and still is the highest), Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom;
- a slightly falling trend in France and Ireland and a more marked downward trend in Belgium.

These trends are probably the reflection of popular feeling about how the country compares with others in tackling the difficulties of the moment.

(See Graph 3 on p. 12 and Table 1 in the Appendix)

As we have observed in the past, the variables - apart from nationality - which appear to be the principal determinants of the general feeling of satisfaction with life are income and political leanings (measured by the position in which respondents situate themselves on the left/right spectrum)<sup>1</sup>.

It is not certain, however, that these are the only variables, nor in particular that it is always the same variables, that determine the level of satisfaction at a given time, short-term swings and longer-term trends,

#### 1.2.2. The feeling of happiness

*"Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days - would you say you're very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy these days?"*

As is the case for satisfaction with life, and although the two variables, while in high correlation, are nonetheless totally separate, the general impression given is one of stability: more than three quarters of the Europeans questioned state that they are very happy or fairly happy and less than 20% that they are not too happy. (There are very few don't knows).

The leading group consists of the Dutch, the Irish, the Belgians, the British and the Danes. The Greeks are now behind the Italians in last place.

Compared with April 1979, a fairly generalized fall is observed (except in Italy) and this is particularly marked in Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and the Netherlands. Three of these countries started out in the leading group and still remain there.


(See Table 4)

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
<sup>1</sup> See Eurobarometer No 18, pp. 24 and 29-30

Graph 3

THE FEELING OF SATISFACTION WITH LIFE



Graph 3 (Continued)





Graph 3 (Continued)




Table 4

THE HAPPINESS INDEX  
(April 1979 - April 1983)<sup>1</sup>

	April 1979	October 1982	April 1983
Netherlands	3.22	3.05	3.05
Belgium	3.10	2.70	2.78
Ireland	2.91	2.80	2.87
Denmark	2.95	2.63	2.74
United Kingdom	2.85	2.66	2.78
Luxembourg	2.80	2.65	2.67
Germany	2.53	2.50	2.48
France	2.52	2.40	2.45
Italy	2.12	2.09	2.15
Greece		1.90	1.93
Weighted average	2.58	2.45	2.50
(Standard deviat.)	(.34)	(.34)	(.34)

If we look back as far as April 1975, when this question was first asked in a European survey, a rising trend is observed in all countries except Belgium and Denmark.

(See Graph 4 on p. 16 and Table 2 in the Appendix)

This confirms that happiness and satisfaction with life, although in high correlation, do not necessarily move in the same direction or at the same speed, nor are they related to the same determinants.


We pointed out on a previous occasion that, in addition to nationality, the respondent's family situation was a factor determining views on happiness<sup>2</sup>. It would seem that another determinant is the assessment of the short-term change in the financial situation of the household; this would explain the fairly marked fluctuations observed.


<sup>1</sup> The countries are ranked according to the average ratings obtained in these three successive surveys. (This question was not put between April 1979 and October 1982). In order to make them comparable with the findings on satisfaction with life, ratings were calculated using the following coefficients: very happy = 4, fairly happy = 2.5, not too happy = 1. The don't knows have been excluded. A rating above 2.50 would therefore indicate a fairly positive outlook and anything below this value a fairly negative one.

<sup>2</sup> See Eurobarometer No 18, pp. 35-36: "married couples (or people living together), especially if they have more than one child, more frequently tend to feel happier than those who live alone".

# THE FEELING OF HAPPINESS

Graph 4






Graph 4 (Continued)



Graph 4 (Continued)



In order to discover more about what respondents, however consciously, mean by happiness, we added the following question for the first time:

*"When you think about happiness, which one of these things comes to mind as the most important? (SHOW CARD) And in second place, and in third place?"*

For respondents generally in the ten Community countries, happiness mainly involves good health, a successful married life, getting on well in the family and in fourth place having enough money to lead an agreeable life.

As the table below shows, good health comes out well ahead, since 58% of the sample population put it in first place. A successful marriage and getting on well together in the family represent an individual's closest emotional environment. Money comes only fourth, which may come as something of a surprise, but other surveys have already shown that almost half the inhabitants of Europe have no serious problems in making ends meet<sup>1</sup>, and we should also not rule out the possibility that respondents may be reluctant to appear mercenary ("money isn't everything", we have often been told). The more surprising finding - except to those familiar with demographic statistics perhaps - is that the link between happiness and having children has been relegated to fifth place,

(See Table 5)

The sequence of replies is very similar in all countries, which goes to show that these are shared values: perhaps they are typical of European civilization'. The most one can do is to pinpoint differing shades of opinion:

- "having enough money" (fourth place on average) ranked only seventh in Denmark;
- "having children" (fifth place on average) ranked third in Denmark but only seventh in the Netherlands;
- "feeling that you are useful to others" (sixth place on average) ranked eighth in Belgium.

What are more interesting are the variations according to respondents' social category and value systems.

---

<sup>1</sup> In April 1980, 44% of respondents stated that they did not have any money problems or were fairly well-off. Eurobarometer No 13, Q 159.

<sup>2</sup> It would be possible to check this only by putting the same question to inhabitants of other continents.

Table 5

WHAT EUROPEANS THINK ABOUT HAPPINESS<sup>1</sup>

(Community as a whole)

	In first place	In first or second place	In first, second or third place
Good health	58%	72%	81%
Successful marriage	14	39	46
Getting on well together in the family	12	31	45
Having enough money to lead an agreeable life	4	17	39
Having children	2	10	22
Feeling that you are useful to others	2	8	17
Doing interesting things	2	6	14
Getting on well with your friends	2	7	13
Being thought well of by others (apart from your family)	2	5	10
Saving sufficient leisure time	1	2	7

<sup>1</sup> The various headings are shown here in the order of frequency of reply, which differ; from that of the questionnaire. Don't knows, of which there were very few, are not shown in the table. The percentage total, including don't knows, would obviously be above 100 in the second and third column.

It may be observed first and foremost that the respondents' sex has virtually no decisive effect on the reply, Nor has income; individuals with above-average incomes' refer only slightly more frequently than others to the link between money and happiness.

Age and level of education - variables which are themselves correlated - have a fairly decisive effect on attitudes to happiness, or at least on some of them. The importance attached to good health increases with age. A successful married life naturally is of special concern to men and women in their prime, whereas the fact of getting on well together in the family seems to gain in importance after the age of forty. There appears to be an inverse link between the desire for children and the level of education. Doing interesting things and getting on well with friends are most frequently quoted by young people between 15 and 24, particularly those who are still studying.

Leadership rating<sup>2</sup> only appears to be decisive for three happiness-related items. Having good health and enough money are slightly less frequently quoted by leaders than by non-leaders; on the other hand, as is to be expected, opinion leaders refer far more frequently to the ability to do interesting things when alluding to happiness.

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<sup>1</sup> For international comparisons, incomes are roughly broken down into quartiles, which gives the following breakdown for the Community as a whole in April 1983:

R--	(well below average)	21
R-	(slightly below average)	22
R+	(slightly above average)	20
R++	(well above average)	19
?	(undeclared)	18
<u>Total</u>		<u>100%</u>

<sup>2</sup> Leadership rating is the outcome of a whole set of personal qualities and social capacities enabling the individual to take an interest in subjects which are fairly complicated, removed from him or abstract, particularly social and political events. This variable is calculated in the Euro-barometers by an index combining the answers to two questions, one on the frequency of political discussion and the other in the propensity to influence people around one. In this survey the breakdown of the sample by this index for the Community as a whole is as follows:

Non-leaders	(--)	22
	(-)	37
	(+)	30
Leaders	(++)	11
	<u>Total</u>	<u>100%</u>

But the variable which seems to have the closest and most consistent link with Europeans' concepts of happiness is their value system, i.e. the psychological make-up, mainly acquired during adolescence, which enables an individual to place his actions within a broadly consistent reference framework. One's values determine the conscious or unconscious options which give life its relative degree of unity and meaning. In Eurobarometers, value systems are empirically measured by means of questions which lead the respondent, when forced to make a choice, to express his preferences for a society attaching priority to materialistic values (material security and well-being) or post-materialistic values (personal fulfilment, involvement in society and "quality of life"<sup>1</sup>.

Strangely enough, the value system appears to be a more decisive element in attitudes to happiness than the actual fact of stating that one is very happy, fairly happy or not too happy. In other words, what is interesting is not so much the fact that one declares a given degree of happiness as the deeper analysis of the explicit or implicit connotations which the respondent links to the concept. The popular saying is that you should take your happiness where you find it, and this is certainly true, but it has to be set against the reference framework of a national culture, a generation's social experience etc.

Before leaving this point for the moment, we must present Table 6, which shows the fairly tenuous link in the Community as a whole between age, happiness and what constitutes happiness, except for certain headings such **as** good health or family relations.

(See Table 6)

Table 7 shows which attributes of happiness, all other things being equal, are most closely linked to a general sense of being very happy. These are both a successful married life and, to a lesser extent, having children. On the other hand, the frequency of references to having enough money is inversely proportional to the degree of happiness; the less money one has, **the more** one thinks about it.

(See Table 7)

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<sup>1</sup> These values were rediscovered in the United States about fifteen years ago. Means of measuring them are now in general use throughout the world in various forms together with more conventional but nonetheless useful variables such as the ideological left/right spectrum, religious beliefs, etc. (See in particular Ronald Inglehart's book "The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics", Princeton University Press, 1977).

Lastly, Table 8 gives an insight into the relationship between the feeling of happiness, its attributes and the individual's value system. There are only very slight differences between materialists and post-materialists with regard to intensity of feeling; materialists feel only slightly less happy than the rest of the population. But the value system would seem to be decisive for all the attributes of happiness, without exception. There are not just marked differences in the frequency of replies to each attribute of happiness according to the value system, but the order in which they are ranked is totally different. For example, the post-materialist's concept of happiness places personal commitment and involvement (feeling that you are useful to others, doing interesting things and getting on well with your friends) before the fact of having children. It is true that age plays some part in this phenomenon, but there is nothing to suggest that this is not in fact the sign of a deep and lasting change in values<sup>1</sup>.

(See Table 8)

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<sup>1</sup> This exploratory research will be continued and extended, both generally and in relation to each individual country, because there is no doubt that the feeling of happiness and its attributes play a major role in the social, economic and political life of Europeans.

Table 6

HAPPINESS AND HOW IT IS VIEWED ACCORDING TO AGE  
(Community as a whole)

<u>General feeling of happiness</u>					
Very happy	18	20	16	20	19
Fairly happy	62	62	62	57	60
Not too happy	13	17	20	21	19
Don't knows		1	2	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>1</sup>	2.51	2.56	2.44	2.49	2.50
<u>Attributes of happiness<sup>2</sup></u> (first, second or third choice?)					
Good health	69	80	84	87	81
A successful married life	38		49	45	45
Getting on well together in the family	34	43		50	45
Having enough money to lead an agreeable life	39	38	39	39	39
Having children	16	27	23	21	22
Feeling that you are useful to other::	21	14		20	17
Doing interesting things	24	14	11	9	14
Getting on well with your friends	26	10			13
Being thought well of by others (apart from your family)		7	10	10	10
Having sufficient leisure time	11	8	6	4	7

<sup>1</sup> Very happy = 4, fairly happy = 2.5, not too happy = 1.

<sup>2</sup> Entries are shown here in descending order of the percentages they gained in the Community as a whole.

<sup>3</sup> Including respondents of indeterminate age.

Table 7

HOW **HAPPINESS** IS VIEWED ACCORDING TO DEGREE OF FEELING IN GENERAL

(Community as a whole)

	Very happy	Fairly happy	Not too happy	Combined
Having children	27	22	18	22
friends				
Being thought well of by others (apart from your family)	10	10	10	10
Having sufficient leisure time	6	7	7	7
(N)	(1839)	(5917)	(1845)	(9790) <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Note 2 to Table 6

<sup>2</sup> Includes don't knows on the question of "are you happy or not?" (n = 189)



Table 8  
HAPPINESS AND HOW IT IS VIEWED ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM  
OF MATERIALISTIC AND POST-MATERIALISTIC VALUES

(Community as a whole)

<u>General feeling of happiness</u>					
Very happy					
Fairly happy					
Not too happy					
Don't knows					
Total	100	100	100	100	
Index <sup>1</sup>	2.41	2.56	2.52	2.50	
<u>Attributes of happiness<sup>2</sup></u> (first, second or third choice)					
Good health	87	80	65	81	
A successful married life	49	47	37	46	
Getting on well together in the family	49	44	36	45	
Having enough money to lead an agreeable life	43	38	31	39	
Having children	24	22	16	22	
Feeling that you are useful to others	13	19	26	17	
Doing interesting things	9	14		14	
Getting on well with your friends	9	13	22	13	
Being thought of well by others (apart from your family)	7	12		10	
Having sufficient leisure time	5	7	11	7	
(N)	(3440)	(4807)	(1158)	(9790) <sup>3</sup>	

<sup>1</sup> and <sup>2</sup> See relevant notes to Table 6

<sup>3</sup> Includes don't knows (n = 385)

### 1.3. SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS

*"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not **very** satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)?"*

Compared with previous half years, there have been a number of significant variations in several countries:

- in Germany and Denmark the level of satisfaction attained in Autumn 1981 has been regained and even slightly exceeded;
- in Greece, the opposite trend may be observed. There was an increase in satisfaction in the twelve months following the Autumn 1981 general elections, but since then the rating appears to be taking a downward turn;
- in Luxembourg, and even more so in Ireland and in France, the downward trend is continuing. It should, however, be pointed out that in France the October-November 1981 rating, a few months after the elections, was at an all-time high;
- in the United Kingdom on the other hand the rating just obtained is the highest ever recorded.

(See Table 9)

If we go back a little further in time, to September 1973, as we did when assessing the feeling of satisfaction with life and of happiness, we can observe that the trend is definitely on the upturn in only three countries - Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. It is virtually stable in France, Luxembourg and Italy and descending slightly in Ireland and the Netherlands; it is dropping significantly in Belgium<sup>1</sup>.

(See Graph 5 and Table 3 in the Appendix)

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<sup>1</sup> It would seem, however, that the nadir was reached in Belgium in Autumn 1980.

Table 9

TREND IN THE INDEX OF SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS


(Oct.-Nov. 1980 - April 1983)<sup>1</sup>

	Oct.-Nov. 1981	April 1982	October 1982	April 1983
Germany	2.83	2.77	2.75	2.86
Denmark	2.82	2.68	2.66	2.88
Luxembourg	2.91	2.70	2.65	2.76
Greece	2.57	2.73	2.77	2.69
United Kingdom	2.45	2.68	2.50	2.73
Netherlands	2.59	2.56	2.44	2.52
Ireland		2.62	2.40	2.34
France	2.60	2.40	2.41	2.25
Belgium	2.30	2.35	2.39	2.35
Italy	1.88	1.92	1.84	1.84
<u>Weighted average</u>	<u>2.46</u>	<u>2.47</u>	<u>2.43</u>	<u>2.45</u>
(Standard deviation)	(.30)	(.26)	(.38)	(.33)


<sup>1</sup> The above countries are ranked by the average rating obtained in **four** successive surveys. Ratings are calculated by applying the coefficients **4, 3, 2** and **1** respectively to the replies "very satisfied", "fairly satisfied", "not very satisfied", and "not at all satisfied". The "don't knows" have been excluded. Scores over 2.50 show more satisfaction than dissatisfaction; those below 2.50 show more dissatisfaction than satisfaction.

SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY IS WORKING

Graph 5




Graph 5 (Continued)





Graph 5 (Continued)



Long-term variations in this indicator are, of course, heavily influenced by respondents' ideological leanings and their attitude to the government of the day. In other words, as is often the case for this type of phenomenon, care must be taken to distinguish between the national level at a given time, the relatively long-term trend, short-term fluctuations from the average trend and, lastly, the structure of individuals' and various social categories' attitudes.

Level - The national level of satisfaction, mainly determined by the level of political awareness in the country examined and the degree of confidence which its citizens have in their political system and governments (and doubtless also in their own ability to influence the course of events) shows over the past few years a higher level of satisfaction **has** almost constantly been expressed in Germany and Denmark than in other countries. This was not true in September 1973, when the question was put for the first time in a European survey. At that time, the Belgians were the Europeans most satisfied with the way democracy worked.

Trend - As we have shown, the medium-term trend measured over a decade is rising in some countries and falling in others under the impact of a variety of events. It is for each of us to identify the causes for this and draw our own conclusions.

Fluctuations - Not too much importance should be accorded to short-term fluctuations before it is clear whether they involve a change in the general trend.


Structure - Lastly, it is clear that the structure of attitudes of individuals and social categories and changes in it merit close attention, with particular reference to respondents' ideological leanings. Whether people on the left and on the right are satisfied or dissatisfied depends - other things being equal - on whether the government of the day shares their political colouring or not.

The last point can be illustrated by means of the following graph, which shows for each country the trend in satisfaction with the way democracy works according to the respondent's self-placement on the left-right spectrum between October 1980 and April 1983. This series of graphs gives an almost pictorial representation of the variations caused by minor or major changes in the political life of each country and the way in which these have been perceived and assessed by the citizens of those countries.

(See Graph 6)


Graph 6

SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY IS WORKING  
ACCORDING TO LEFT/RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT







Graph 6 (Continued)



Graph 6 (Continued)




Graph 6 (Continued)





Graph 6 (Continued)



1.4. BASIC ATTITUDES TO SOCIETY: REVOLUTION, REFORM, DEFENCE AGAINST SUBVERSION

*"(SHOW CARD). On this card there are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-a-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion.*

- 1. The entire way our society is organised must be radically changed by revolutionary action.*
- 2. ~~Our~~ society must be gradually improved by reform.*
- 3. Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces".*

This indicator, of course, is fairly stable when compared with the feeling of satisfaction with the way democracy works. It relates to the basic options which go to make up the political philosophy of a country's population. Quite apart from party-political labels, and even from positions on the left-right spectrum, a citizen's attitudes to social change can be generally "reformist", "radically revolutionary" or utterly hostile (resistance to anything which might undermine ("subvert") the established order and accepted ideas and values').

The "reformist" option, which is in a large majority, was chosen in April 1983 by a proportion of respondents ranging from slightly more than half in Germany (52%) to almost three quarters in Belgium and Luxembourg (72%) and Italy (74%). But since this reply is both pivotal (i.e. the middle one of the three options put) and "modal" (i.e. the most frequently given), close attention should be paid to the other two replies.

Level - The revolutionary option attained 8% in only one single country, Greece. In Denmark, Germany and Luxembourg it ranges from 1% to 3% of respondents. As for the reply on combating subversion, it may be observed that this is much more frequently given in Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom than elsewhere.

Trend - The revolutionary option has markedly decreased since 1976 in the two countries in which, at that time, it exceeded 10% of respondents (France and Italy). The anti-subversion option is fairly stable overall, although there is a slight trend towards an increase in France and the United Kingdom.

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<sup>1</sup> It should be stressed that this question forces an answer. Unless he does not answer, any individual asked ~~must~~ express his preference for one of the three options.

Fluctuations - There are only very slight fluctuations, and it is quite possible that one of the two opposing options determines the other. This would mean that a temporary upsurge in revolutionary action (e.g. demonstrations or terrorist attacks reported and depicted in the press) would provoke an immediate or slightly delayed increase in defensive stances. However, this link which needs to be proved over a longer period, probably depends on what type of events are perceived by the public as "revolutionary" or "subversive".

(See Table 10, and Table 3 in the Appendix)

#### 1.5. WILL UNEMPLOYMENT DISAPPEAR IF THE ECONOMY PICKS UP?

Did the onset of what is known as the "economic crisis" herald the end of a long period of full employment? This question is being asked more and more frequently by economists, but hitherto it had not been put to the general public. A tentative question was put in April **1983**; the findings are instructive, but they need to be treated with caution since they relate to a single question and not to a more thorough opinion survey.

*"All European countries are nowadays experiencing high unemployment. Do you think that unemployment will largely disappear if the economy picks up or do you think that even if the economy picks up the problem of unemployment will remain unsolved?"*

The replies to this question are unequivocal. Seven out of ten respondents feel that unemployment is here to stay even if there is an economic recovery. The Dutch are the most pessimistic (91%). The only country in which optimists outnumber the pessimists is Greece.

(See Table 11)

There is no significant variation in these replies according to age or sex. The most one can detect is a slightly higher level of pessimism amongst young people who are still studying.

Table 10

## BASIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOCIAL CHANGE

(per 100 respondents)<sup>1</sup>

	1970 (Febr.-March) <sup>2</sup>			1976 (November)			1977-1981 <sup>3</sup> (ten polls)			1982 (two polls)			1983 (April)		
	Revolu- tionary action	Reforms	Defence against sub- version	Revolu- tionary action	Reforms	Defence against sub- version	Revolu- tionary action	Reforms	Defence against sub- version	Revolu- tionary action	Reforms	Defence against sub- version	Revolu- tionary action	Reforma	Defence against sub- version
Belgium	4%	80%	16%	6%	73%	21%	7%	71%	22%	10%	72%	18%	6%	72%	22%
Denmark	:	:	:	4	55	41	3	58	39	2	59	39	1	64	35
Germany	2	76	22	2	56	42	3	50	47	4	51	45	2	52	46
France	5	82	13	14	67	19	10	69	21	5	69	26	6	67	27
Ireland	:	:	:	8	67	25	7	67	26	7	66	27	5	66	29
Italy	8	80	12	13	68	19	8	63	29	7	69	24	6	74	20
Luxembourg	1	70	29	2	59	39	5	68	27	4	65	31	3	72	25
Netherlands	6	78	16	5	60	35	6	60	34	6	61	33	5	67	28
United Kingdom	:	:	:	8	65	27	7	63	30	6	60	34	4	61	35
Greece	:	:	:	:	:	:	10	62	28	7	64	29	8	64	28
COMMUNITY <sup>4</sup>	(5)	(79)	(16)	8	64	28	7	61	32	6	62	32	5	63	32

<sup>1</sup> Meaning those who explicitly choose one of the three options. Don't knows average 7% for all countries and over the whole period, with a maximum of 15% in Belgium.

<sup>2</sup> The 1970 survey was made only in the original six countries and the reformist option was worded slightly differently ("by intelligent reforms").

<sup>3</sup> Average of only three polls for Greece: October 1980, April and October 1981.

<sup>4</sup> Weighted average.

Table 11

IF THE ECONOMY PICKS UP AGAIN

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>Of 100 people asked</u>											
- unemployment will virtually disappear	23	14	38	18	15	37	21	9	14	55	27
- the problem of unemployment will still not be solved	64	75	51	74	80	59	72	88	83	24	66
Don't knows	13	11	11	8	5	4	7	3	3	21	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2. <u>Of 100 people voicing an opinion</u>											
- unemployment will virtually disappear	26	16	43	20	15	39	23	9	15	<input type="checkbox"/>	29
- the problem of unemployment will still not be solved	74	84	57	80	85	61	77	91	85	31	71
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average



## II

### POLITICAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES

A number of questions used in previous years were asked again. These covered interest in politics, exposure to information media, the feeling of national pride and socio-political changes. A new question was added: is peace the supreme value or are other things worth defending, even at the risk of war?

#### 11.1. INTEREST IN POLITICS AND EXPOSURE TO INFORMATION MEDIA

##### II.1.1. Interest in politics

*"To what extent would you say you are interested in politics? A great deal, to some extent, not much, not at all?"*

Four out of ten Europeans say they are interested "a great deal" (11%) or "to some extent" (31%) in politics. Those who take the most interest are the Dutch, the Danes and the Germans; those taking the least are the Belgians and the Italians.

(See Table 12)

The results for the six countries where a comparison is possible are fully consistent with those obtained when a very similar question was asked in February and March 1970.

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<sup>1</sup> The question asked in 1970 was worded as follows:  
*"Do you take part in political activities, do you follow politics closely without taking an active part, is your interest in politics no greater than in other matters or are you not at all interested?"*

If the 1970 results are expressed on the same index as used in 1983, the six countries rank in almost the same order, and there is a very high correlation ( $r = .84$ ) between the scores.

Although an exact comparison is excluded by the differences in wording between the two questions, interest in politics appears to have declined slightly in Italy, whereas it has increased slightly in the other five countries:

	<u>Indexes of interest in politics</u>	
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1983</u>
Netherlands	2.31	2.56
Germany	2.27	2.54
Luxembourg	2.26	2.43
France	2.19	2.28
Italy	2.07	1.83
Belgium	1.68	1.85
<u>Weighted average</u>	<u>2.17</u>	<u>2.23</u>

**Table 12**

**INTEREST IN POLITICS**

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>Level of interest:</b>											
- a great deal	5	11	14	11	8	4	13	17	12	18	11
- to some extent	18	45	37	33	27	17	34	34	38	27	31
- not much	32	29	37	29	33	37	34	37	35	25	34
- not at all	43	13	11	27	32	42	18	12	15	30	24
Don't know	2	2	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Index<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>1.85</b>	<b>2.55</b>	<b>2.54</b>	<b>2.28</b>	<b>2.12</b>	<b>1.83</b>	<b>2.43</b>	<b>2.56</b>	<b>2.48</b>	<b>2.32</b>	<b>2.29</b>

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average

<sup>2</sup> "A great deal" = 4 ; "not at all" = 1

The comparative stability of declared interest in politics over thirteen years clearly shows that this variable reflects one of the characteristics of a country's culture. Turning to variations within the country, women show less interest in politics than men, but the gap narrows as the level of education rises and is comparatively small in the case of young people who are still studying. But then, age also exerts an influence, which explains why these young people (men or women) do not score highly<sup>1</sup>.

(See Table 13)

11.1.2. Exposure to information media

*"About how often do you ...*  
*(a) watch the news on television?*  
*(b) read about current politics in daily newspapers?*  
*(c) listen to news broadcasts on the radio?<sup>2</sup>*

As might have been expected, television is by far the most important source of information in the Community as a whole and in almost all the Member States. The radio is more important than television only in Denmark and ranks second, behind television, in Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Newspapers, which generally rank third, gain second place in Germany, where the level of exposure to information media is one of the highest, and Italy and Greece, where the level is lower than elsewhere.

(See Table 14)

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<sup>1</sup> All the comparisons between men and women will be followed up and reported on in a study to be published later.

<sup>2</sup> It will be noted that the reference is to "news" and "current politics". This is not therefore a piece of audience research strictly speaking, that is, a study of exposure to the media without reference to their socio-political information content. The difference is perhaps slight, but it should be mentioned.

Table 13

INTEREST IN POLITICS BY SEX AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION<sup>1</sup>(Community as a whole)

	Sex		Level of education: men				Level of education: women				Overall
	M	W	Low	Average	High	Still study- ing	Low	Average	High	Still study- ing	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Level of interest:											
- a great deal	15	7	10	16	28	17	4	8	12	12	11
- to some extent	35	28	32	38	41	32	19	35	47	29	31
- not much	32	36	34	31	25	35	37	37	31	36	34
- not at all	18	29	24	15	6	15	40	20	10	23	24
Don't know	.	.	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2.48	2.12	2.28	2.56	2.91	2.51	1.87	2.30	2.61	2.29	2.29

<sup>1</sup> Level of education is measured by age on finishing full-time study: 15 years and under, 16-19, 20 years and over, still studying.

<sup>2</sup> "A great deal" = 4; "not at all" = 1.

Table 14

## EXPOSURE TO INFORMATION MEDIA

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>Watch the news on television:</u>											
- every day	58	60	64	63	73	65	63	66	84	67	68
- several times a week	23	26	24	17	15	18	17	26	9	17	18
- once or twice a week	9	10	7	11	8	8	8	5	4	6	8
- less often	7	3	3	5	2	5	6	4	2	3	3
- never	3	1	1	4	2	4	6	2	1	7	3
Don't know	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	1	.	.	.
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	3.26	3.41	3.48	3.29	3.54	3.36	3.27	3.47	3.74	3.35	3.46
2. <u>Read the political news in the daily papers:</u>											
- every day						26	51				
- several times a week	15	9	18	12	16	14	18				
- once or twice a week	14	11	8	15	18	18	7	9	14	14	13
- less often	19	11	7	13	11	14	9	11	10	13	11
- never	2	6	5	2	8	27	15	17	14	23	18
Don't know	2	1	1	1	.	1		1	.	.	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2.14	3.10	3.24	2.04	2.78	1.97	2.84	2.62	2.78	2.25	2.53
3. <u>Listen to the news on the radio:</u>											
- every day	41	87	53	49	71	29	61	66	56	34	48
- several times a week	18	6	24	13	13	13	14	13	10	15	15
- once or twice a week	12	2	10	9	8	7	6	5	8	9	8
- less often	17	2	9	10	5	1	8	8	12	17	12
- never	11	2	3	1	8	3	3	11	14	25	16
Don't know	1	1	1	1	.	1	.	.	.	.	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2.60	3.75	3.15	2.67	3.43	1.86	3.06	3.21	2.82	2.17	2.68

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average<sup>2</sup> "Every day" = 4; "never" = 0. "Don't know" excluded.

There are quite considerable differences between countries, as regards both the degree of public exposure to the information media and the relative importance of each of the media:

- the smallest difference is in the degree of exposure to television. At least two-thirds of the Community's population tune in to this source each day and virtually no-one escapes it entirely;
- radio is particularly important in Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, but much less so in Greece and Italy than elsewhere;
- newspapers were most often mentioned as a source of political information in Germany, Denmark and Luxembourg, whereas between 20% and 30% of Belgians, Greeks, Italians and French said that they never read about current politics in daily papers.

There is no doubt that these differences reflect extremely complex cultural characteristics such as the level of socio-economic development, the average level of education, interest in politics, etc. and even the impact of current events (e.g. elections). The high degree of stability in these differences is shown by Table 15, which compares the degree of exposure to information media throughout the Community in 1970 (six countries), 1980 (nine countries) and 1983 (ten countries).

Looking at the total scores (which provide a rough but acceptable measure of the general level of exposure to information), the first point is that the ranking of the six countries where the survey was carried out in 1970 has changed only slightly: Germany ranked first or second out of six, and Italy ranked fifth or sixth on all three occasions. There is also a very high correlation between the overall results for the six countries if the three measuring points are considered in pairs<sup>1</sup>.

The same is true if, for the nine countries covered in 1980, the results obtained then are compared with those in 1983. Denmark ranked first and Italy **last**, on both occasions. Again, the correlation between the overall results for the two surveys is very high<sup>2</sup>.

Nevertheless, certain trends and fluctuations can be detected<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> For 1980 compared with 1970  $r = .57$ , for 1983 with 1980  $r = .83$ .

<sup>2</sup>  $r = .75$ .

<sup>3</sup> A large number of surveys at regular intervals are required to distinguish a (long-term) trend from a (short-term) fluctuation.

In general there is a trend towards greater and greater exposure to information media: this is the foreseeable consequence of the higher level of education of the younger generation. The phenomenon was observed in all the six countries surveyed in 1970 and 1980: exposure increased fractionally in the Netherlands (where the level was already extremely high), very slightly in Germany, Italy and France and quite substantially in Luxembourg and Belgium. By contrast, the nine countries covered in 1980 and 1983 showed virtually no change: only in Ireland was a slight increase observed.

More detailed consideration reveals not only that in each of the three surveys country rankings vary for each of the media considered, but also that changes are taking place at a different pace with respect to each of the three media.

- (a) Country rankings vary. For example, by 1970 television had already made considerable progress in Belgium as compared with the other media; the same applies to newspapers in Luxembourg.
- (b) Changes do not take place at the same pace. Between 1970 and 1980, exposure to newspapers grew much more strongly in Belgium than in other countries, and more strongly than exposure to other media within Belgium; the same is true, over the same period, for television in Italy and Luxembourg. The most striking feature of the period between 1980 and 1983 is the growing importance attached to radio in Ireland and the Netherlands.

(See Table 15)

What are the main variables which seem most closely connected to individuals' exposure to information media?

Television - In general women watch slightly less than men, but the difference is small and appears significant only in Belgium, Italy and Greece. The gap is tending to narrow in a number of countries; in Ireland it disappeared completely between 1980 and 1983. Viewing time tends to increase with age, especially among men, but here the concept of a threshold of access to television (availability in the country, individual inclination, changes in attitude and interest in politics, etc. is relevant; this explains why in Greece the lowest scores were amongst women aged 55 and over. Finally, leadership rating is a predicator which cannot be ignored, although it becomes less important as the influence of television spreads. Normally, opinion leaders watch more television than non-leaders, but then non-leaders close the gap and a contrary correlation may even appear; in France for example, leaders tend to be moving away from television slightly more than non-leaders in both 1980 and 1983.

Radio - Listening to radio broadcasts follows much the same pattern as that for television viewing - differences between sexes and age groups tend to disappear. Similarly, leadership rating is now unimportant in most countries, although there was a substantial difference between leaders and non-leaders in 1980.

Newspapers - Differences by sex, age-group and especially leadership rating are much more marked than in the cases of radio and television<sup>1</sup>. The short period from 1980 to 1983 provides no grounds for supposing that they are going to disappear in the near future.

\*

\*

\*

The complexity of this problem, which, as we have seen, involves a number of collective and individual variables, had led to the construction of an overall index of exposure to information via the media (EXPOINFO); this measures the degree of exposure of each individual questioned to each of the three media: television, radio and newspapers<sup>2</sup>.

As Table 16 shows, the Danes, Germans and Irish lead the field, with Italy in the rear after Greece.

In general, exposure to the media is less among women than among men but this gap is smaller in Denmark, Germany and Ireland than elsewhere and greater in Greece and Italy.

Exposure generally increases with age, but this was probably not always **so** because Greek women between 15 and 39 score more highly than their elder sisters: there is a "socialization" threshold which has to be crossed.

In most countries there is a gap between men and women which is independent of age, but this is tending to disappear. Young women are already almost as exposed to the media in Greece and the United Kingdom as are young men, and they are slightly more **so** in Germany and France.

In all countries leadership rating is the most discriminating variable, but the general trend is for these variations to diminish because, throughout the Community, there is a strong negative correlation between national levels of media exposure and the under-exposure of non-leaders as compared with leaders.

(See Table 16)

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<sup>1</sup> The reference to current politics in the wording of the question may well have magnified the differences or even introduced a topical element.

<sup>2</sup> Each individual is awarded a score from 0 to 4 corresponding to his average score for each of the three media. Hence someone who is exposed "every day" to information from television, radio and the press would score  $\frac{3 \times 4}{3} = 4$ ;  
if he were exposed to television and radio "every day" and to newspapers only "once or twice a week" he would score  $\frac{4 + 4 + 2}{3} = 3.33$  and **so** on.



Table 15

DEGREE OF EXPOSURE TO THE INFORMATION MEDIA<sup>1</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
<del>February-March 1970</del>											
Television	2.61	:	3.20	2.65	:	2.60	2.46	3.21	:	:	(2.85)
Radio	2.03	:	2.78	2.66	:	2.45	2.65	2.74	:	:	(2.61)
Newspapers	1.47	:	2.29	1.83	:	1.61	2.42	2.45	:	:	(1.93)
<b>Total</b>	6.11	:	8.27	7.14	:	6.66	7.53	8.40	:	:	(7.39)
Order of countries	6	:	2	4	:	5	3	1	:	:	
<del>April 1980</del>											
Television	3.12	3.57	3.41	3.13	3.01	3.45	3.31	3.23	3.17	:	3.28
Radio	2.72	3.54	2.96	3.05	2.70	2.23	3.29	2.59	2.41	:	2.67
Newspapers	2.31	3.28	3.00	2.02	2.71	1.93	3.29	2.71	2.89	:	2.51
<b>Total</b>	8.15	110.39	9.37	8.20	8.42	7.61	9.89	8.53	8.47	:	8.46
Order of countries	8	1	3	7	6	9	2	4	5	:	
<u>April 1983</u>											
Television	3.26	3.41	3.48	3.29	3.54	3.36	3.27	3.47	3.74	3.35	3.46
Radio	2.60	3.75	3.15	2.67	3.43	1.86	3.06	3.21	2.82	2.17	2.68
Newspapers	2.14	3.10	3.24	2.04	2.78	1.97	2.84	2.62	2.78	2.25	2.53
<b>Total</b>	8.00	110.26	9.87	8.00	9.75	7.19	9.17	9.30	9.34	7.77	8.67
Order of countries	7	1	2	7	3	10	6	5	4	9	

<sup>1</sup> Index of exposure: "every day" = 4, "never" = 0.

<sup>2</sup> Weighted average: six countries in 1970, nine in 1980, ten in 1983.

Table 16

## OVERALL INDEX OF EXPOSURE TO INFORMATION MEDIA

(April 1983)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	, I	L <sup>1</sup>	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
<u>Total</u>	2.34	3.13	3.00	2.33	2.99	2.06	2.77	2.75	2.85	2.27	2.58
<u>By sex:</u>											
Men	2.50	3.20	3.06	2.52	3.09	2.23	2.95	2.89	2.99	2.48	2.72
Women	2.18	3.06	2.95	2.16	2.90	1.89	2.60	2.63	2.71	2.08	2.46
<u>By age and sex:</u>											
Men - 15-24 years	2.33	2.86	2.74	1.87	2.82	1.83	(2.35)	2.74	2.58	2.30	2.31
25-39 years	2.42	3.02	3.03	2.51	3.14	2.25	(2.89)	2.80	3.03	2.54	2.71
40-54 years	2.44	3.39	3.05	2.58	3.21	2.23	(3.23)	2.91	3.07	2.51	2.76
55 and over	2.73	3.44	3.40	2.93	3.18	2.49	(3.14)	3.04	3.22	2.52	2.98
Women- 15-24 years	2.00	2.56	2.83		2.52	1.72	(1.93)	2.52	2.56	2.22	2.30
25-39 years	2.20	2.92	2.98	2.06	2.95	1.91	(2.54)	2.66	2.67	2.29	2.42
40-54 years	2.16	3.31	2.91	2.31	3.05	1.89	(2.65)	2.74	2.70	2.08	2.47
55 and over	2.27	3.31	3.05	2.22	3.08	2.01	(3.02)	2.57	2.85	1.85	2.59
<u>By leadership rating:</u>											
Leaders (++)	2.79	3.35	3.25	2.61	3.43	2.82	3.27	3.11	3.07	2.72	2.96
(+)	2.54	3.20	3.09	2.47	3.16	2.30	2.84	2.85	3.04	2.47	2.76
(-)	2.32	3.13	2.88	2.34	2.95	1.94	2.58	2.60	2.90	2.00	2.53
Non-leaders (--)	2.13	2.88	2.93	2.05	2.73	1.67	(2.23)	2.31	2.55	1.51	2.25

<sup>1</sup> The small size of the Luxembourg sample (N = 300) means that the results should be treated with caution. Figures in brackets are based on groups of fewer than 50 people.

<sup>2</sup> Weighted average.

## 11.2. THE FEELING OF NATIONAL PRIDE

The feeling of national identity certainly has an important place among the traditional political values. What is that place and how do the peoples of Europe compare with each other both inside and outside their **own** countries? The question asked this time had already been asked, in a slightly different form, in 1970 and in April 1982.

*"Would you say you are very proud, quite proud, not very proud, not at all proud, to **be** (nationality)?"*

The results in 1983 were very similar to those recorded in 1982<sup>1</sup>. More than three-quarters of those interviewed were very proud or quite proud of their country. Greeks were the most patriotic, followed by the British and Luxembourgers; the Irish came next, two places lower than on the previous occasion. As in 1982, the Belgians and the Germans were in the last two places although with significantly more patriotism registered among the Belgians and slightly less among the Germans.

(See Table 17)

A comparison of these results with those to a similar question<sup>2</sup> in February-March 1970, shows that, of the six countries which then made up the Community, Germany was in last place. The downwards movement of Belgium from second place between Luxembourg and France in 1970, appears to be connected with the way the country has reacted to the recent crisis.

In the six countries for which a comparison can be made, there has been a general and consistent decline in national pride between the 1970 survey and those carried out in 1982 and 1983. Translated into index scores, this trend has assumed similar proportions in five of the six countries, but is twice as strong in Belgium<sup>4</sup>.

Detailed examination of the results confirms that national pride is a feeling of the masses which correlates positively with age and negatively with level of education. From the point of view of attitudes, it generally goes with satisfaction with the way democracy is operating and a tendency to place oneself on the right of the political spectrum.

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<sup>1</sup> Correlation: rankings  $r = .92$ ; scores  $r = .96$ .

<sup>2</sup> Although phrased slightly differently and asked **as** part of a battery of questions.

<sup>3</sup> See Eurobarometer No 17, June 1982, p. 28.

<sup>4</sup> Scores for 1970 calculated in the same way as the 1982-83 index are as follows:

B	D	F	I	L	NL	EC
3.63	3.06	3.57	3.52	3.75	3.36	3.39

Table 17

FEELING OF NATIONAL PRIDE

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>April 1982</u>											
- Very proud	22	37	22	33	55	35	55	35	56	76	37
- Quite proud	34	38	38	43	29	41	30	38	32	14	37
- Not very proud	24	13	19	12	7	15	7	14	7	5	14
- Not at all proud	8	2	9	4	2	6	4	7	3	2	5
Don't know	12	10	12	8	7	3	4	6	2	3	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2.81	3.23	2.83	3.14	3.47	3.08	3.43	3.08	3.45	3.68	3.13
Orderofcountries	10	5	9	6	2	7	4	7	3	1	
<u>April 1983</u>											
- Very proud	24	39	17	36	52	40	51	34	57	76	38
- Quite proud	44	39	39	39	34	44	37	44	35	16	39
- Not very proud	17	10	24	14	7	10	4	12	5	4	13
- Not at all proud	4	2	9	5	3	4	2	4	2	2	5
Don't know	11	10	11	6	4	2	6	6	1	2	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2.98	3.28	2.73	3.14	3.40	3.23	3.46	3.15	3.49	3.70	3.17
Orderofcountries	9	5	10	8	4	6	3	7	2	1	

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average<sup>2</sup> "Very proud" = 4; "not at all proud" = 1.

This raises the question why the lasting and consistent relationship between the feeling of national pride and age exists. Is it a product of the life cycle or the result of the historical events through which a person has lived? (And, in the second case, should we distinguish between the cohort effect, which marks a generation for as long as it lives, and the period effect, which affects the whole of the population living at a given moment?).

These effects are generally confused when we talk of age differences, and only repeated observation over a long period - say at least ten years - can elucidate them. Such data are available for six countries, and a brief analysis of the trend from 1970 to 1982-83 will be made by cohort, that is according to the respondent's year of birth.

Graph 7 shows the intensity of feelings of national pride in 1970 and 1982-83 (combined results) among those born before 1915, those born between 1916 and 1920, between 1921 and 1925 and so on by five-year cohorts'.

(See Graph 7)

Leaving aside Luxembourg, for which no 1970 results are available, the first notable feature is that for four countries out of five, the 1982-83 line is below - and in the case of Belgium well below - the line for 1970. In other words, the feeling of national pride has diminished in all the cohorts: a period effect has combined with a life cycle effect. The only exception is Germany where the two lines lie very close together. There is no appreciable difference between the 1970 results and those for 1982-83, but the feeling of national pride is lower in Germany among the youngest generations than elsewhere.

More detailed examination of the graphs shows that:

- (a) in Belgium there appears to be a fall in national pride among those who were born between 1921 and 1930; today they are between 53 and 62 and in the early forties they were between 10 and 19 years<sup>2</sup>. There is a similar fall among those born just after the Second World War, from 1946 to 1949, and so aged 18 just before 1968 (between 1964 and 1967). Is this a coincidence?
- (b) In Germany, too, there is less national pride between those who were born just after the First World War (between 1921 and 1925) and were 18 between 1939 and 1943.

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<sup>1</sup> In order to obtain a sufficiently large sample (at least 100 people) in each five-year cohort, the results for April 1982 and April 1983 were combined. The small size of the sample means that the results for Luxembourg should be regarded with caution; no figures are available for 1970.

<sup>2</sup> It is generally considered that the years around 18 are very important for the formation of an individual's value system.

- (c) In France, both graphs show a decline in national pride among those born between 1916 and 1920 (and so aged between 20 and 24 in 1940) compared both with their elders and the next cohort, which was aged between 19 and 23 in 1944.
- (d) In Italy, the rise in the feeling of national pride among those born between 1921 and 1925 appears to have over-compensated for the fall which that cohort showed in 1970. By contrast, those born between 1931 and 1935 and those born between 1946 and 1949 show a fall.
- (e) In the Netherlands, the cohort effect appears to be slight or to have become very much less important.


To sum up, the feeling of national pride in these countries over the reference period appears much more closely linked to the life cycle and the general development of value systems than to the events experienced by individuals at given periods of their lives, though this influence is also perceptible<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The reader should note that these analyses are tentative and need to be extended over a very much longer period, as has been done since 1953 by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in Tokyo (Japanese National Character Surveys).

Graph 7

THE FEELING OF BEING PROUD OF THE COUNTRY  
ACCORDING TO YEAR OF BIRTH  
IN 1970 AND 1982-83



### 11.3. PEACE, THE SUPREME VALUE

Replies to a question asked in April 1982 about the great causes worth taking risks and making sacrifices for showed that, throughout the Community without exception, Europeans regarded peace as by the far most important (67%), well ahead of human rights (44%) and leaving defence trailing in sixth place (23%).

Other studies, however, have shown that Europeans are not oblivious to certain threats: more than one-third said that they feared a "critical deterioration in international relations" (a proportion rising to over half in Germany and Greece)<sup>1</sup>, while almost a fifth of those questioned at the same time, as compared with over one-third in spring 1980, thought that a world war was likely to break out in the next ten years<sup>2</sup>.

Thorough research will be required to illuminate this complex of attitudes, which combine in confused form an apprehension of various threats (particularly the destruction of mankind), the desire for tranquility in an ordered framework (the traditional definition of peace), a feeling of social unease and individual powerlessness, genuine conscientious objections and even foreign propaganda. This is a task left to others. The purpose here is simply to try to measure the phenomenon in a different way by asking the following question for the first time:

*"Some people think that peace is more important than anything else, such as our standard of living, liberty or human rights. Others think that some things are sufficiently important to be fought for, even if this risks going to war. What is your opinion about this?"*

- 1. Peace is the most important*
- 2. Other things can be more important*
- 3. Other answer, it depends (volunteered)"*

The trend of the replies is quite unambiguous. Of those replying, eight Europeans out of ten regard peace as the supreme value; two out of ten think that other values could be more important and worth defending. Only the British, who, it should be remembered, still have vivid memories of the recent Falklands conflict, came near to being equally divided at 55% against 45%.

(See Table 18)

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<sup>1</sup> See Eurobarometer No 17, pp. 31-34.

<sup>2</sup> See Eurobarometer No 18, December 1982, p. 9.



Table 18

PEACE, THE SUPREME VALUE

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>1. Percentage of those interviewed</u>											
Peace is the most important value	79	62	78	82	69	85	83	65	48	86	73
Other things can be more important	12	23	12	13	24	10	11	21	40	7	18
Other answer	5	8	5	4	4	4	3	12	8	5	6
Don't know	4	7	5	1	3	1	3	2	4	2	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>2. <del>Percentage of those replying</del></u>											
Peace is the most important value	86	73	87	86	74	89	89	76	<input type="checkbox"/>	92	80
Other things can be more important	14	27	13	14	26	11	11	24	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	8	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average

Since this was an isolated question, asked without preparation and in a form which did not explicitly invoke, for example, a possible imminent invasion, it would be foolish to exaggerate the importance of these replies. But at the same time it would be dangerous to under-estimate them.

In general, women were slightly more inclined than men to choose peace as the supreme value. The same was true, contrary to what might have been expected, of the old as compared with the young. The most discriminating variable, however, was level of education: the higher the level of education, the greater the tendency to weigh against peace at any cost: other values which might be considered more important - this variable had a particularly strong effect on men. The impact of ideological preference measured on the left/right spectrum varied from country to country: in the two where the relationship was most clearly significant - the United Kingdom and Germany - those at the extreme left end of the spectrum were the most likely to choose peace at any price.

A breakdown of replies related to sex, sex and age, sex and level of education and ideological preference measured on the left/right spectrum is given for the United Kingdom, the only country where replies from the population as a whole were almost equally divided between the two choices.

As can be seen from Table 19, the results, even in one country, appear to be affected by a number of variables which deserve more thorough study.

(See Table 19)

Table 19

ATTITUDES TO PEACE AND OTHER VALUES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM BY SEX, SEX AND AGE,  
SEX AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY~

By sex	46%	54%	63%	37%
	(n = 581)		(n = 612)	
By sex and age:				
15-24 years	39%	61%	60%	40%
	(n = 119)		(n = 99)	
25-39 years	46		56	44
	(n = 166)		(n = 186)	
40-54 years	49	51	67	33
	(n = 122)		(n = 136)	
55 and over	50	50	58	32
	(n = 171)		(n = 185)	
By sex and level of education:				
Low	52%	48%	73%	27%
	(n = 265)		(n = 285)	
Average	47	53	58	42
	(n = 205)		(n = 245)	
High	37		40	
	(n = 71)		(n = 45)	
Still studying	20		44	
	(n = 38)		(n = 32)	
Both sexes combined				
By ideological preference:	Peace is the most important		Other things may be more important	
Extreme left	78%		22%	
		(n = 60)		
Left	63		37	
		(n = 178)		
Centre	56		44	
		(n = 475)		
Right	44			
		(n = 293)		
Extreme right	44		56	
		(n = 94)		

1 "Don't knows" excluded. Actual numbers in brackets.

#### 11.4. THE MAIN SOCIO-POLITICAL CLEAVAGES

The word "cleavage" has been borrowed from crystallography to describe the way in which society divides.

At the time of the first direct elections to the European Parliament, in 1979, research was carried out into the political cleavage;; in the countries of the Community under the general heading of "European Elections Study"<sup>1</sup>. This research covered both election candidates and the general public; the same set of questions was put to representatives of the political elites and of the electorate in the nine Member States.

Analysis of the replies showed the political cleavage to be fairly similar in each of the Member States and confirmed earlier findings, according to which there are two main divisions underlying the political attitudes and debates in all the countries of the Community; one of these, the particularly important traditional division, is between those for and against a greater role of government in the economy and a reduction in the inequality of incomes, and the other, of more recent origin and still of much less significance, divides the supporters and the opponents of an ideal society, free of the constraints which weigh on the society of today and hamper the spontaneous expression of individual wishes (centralized organization, all kinds of controls, etc.)<sup>2</sup>

To follow the development of these cleavages, the questions which had proved most significant in 1979 were asked again in October 1981 and, with a few carefully thought out changes, in April 1983.

In the following, the text of the questions is given together with a comparison of the results for 1979 (candidates for election to the European Parliament and the general public) and for 1981 and 1983 (general public) and an initial analysis of the 1983 results.

*"We'd like to hear your views on some important:political issues. Could you tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following proposals. How strongly do you feel?"  
(SHOW CARD)*

The 1983 questionnaire then gave a list of eleven items, of which eight reproduced the exact words of items used early, two were new and one was worded differently.

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<sup>1</sup> Financial assistance for this research was provided by the Community institutions and the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk.

<sup>2</sup> See note 1 on next page.

An initial look at the overall results shows few changes in the distribution of answers from the general public in 1979, 1981 and 1983. The answers from the general public, moreover, were fairly similar to those of the "political elite" formed by the European election candidates in 1979. The only notable differences, apart from the fact that the candidates are more prepared to commit themselves in most cases, are as follows:

<sup>1</sup> The exact wording of these items can be seen in Table 20. The following table shows the questions asked in each survey:

	1983 (EB No 19)	1981 (EB No 6)	1979 (EB No 11)	1979 ) candidates,
- Reducing inequality of income	x	x	x	x
- Developing nuclear energy	x	x	x	x
- Reducing the number of laws	x			
- Working less and earning less	x			
- More severe penalties for acts of terrorism	x	x	x	x
- Expanding public ownership	x	x	x	x
- A stronger effort to provide military defence	x	x	x	x
- A smaller role for government in the economy	x			
- A greater role for government in the economy		x	x	x
- More economic aid to the Third World	x	x	x	x
- Firmer measures for protecting the environment	x	x	x	x
- <b>More</b> regional autonomy	x	x		

<sup>2</sup> For making these comparisons and for the following analyses, each answer to a specific item was expressed by an index of the type "agree strongly" = 4, "disagree strongly" = 1; the middle point is therefore 2.5.

The following are the correlations for the Community as a whole:

- candidates 1979/public 1979	.596
- candidates 1979/public 1981	.666
- public 1979/public 1981	.992
- public 1983/candidates 1979	.672
- public 1983/public 1979	.998
- public 1983/public 1981	.995

- the candidates (1979) were much more favourably disposed towards increasing economic aid to the Third World than respondents among the general public were (1979 and 1981) or are (1983). There has even been some falling off in public support in 1983;
- on the other hand, candidates were significantly less in favour of adopting more severe penalties against acts of terrorism than the public was or continued to be (1983).

Other, less significant differences arising from the three surveys of the general public show by way of example that:

- the public is a little less keen than the candidates on the development of nuclear energy, stepping up military defence and reducing inequality of income;
- by contrast, the public is slightly less opposed than the candidates to increased nationalization.

The results of the four surveys of the Community as a whole are given below.

(See Table 20)

Table 20

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CLEAVAGES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

(Community as a whole)<sup>1</sup>

	1979 Election candidates <sup>2</sup>	1979 General public	1981 General public <sup>3</sup>	1983 General public
Greater efforts should be made to reduce inequality of income				
Agree strongly	52	46	41	40
Agree	30	35	36	39
Disagree	8	10	12	12
Disagree strongly	2	4	5	4
Don't know	8	5	6	5
Total	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	3.45	3.28	3.20	3.21
Nuclear energy should be developed to meet future energy needs				
Agree strongly	25	20	24	19
Agree	37	32	34	35
Disagree	14	17	16	18
Disagree strongly	8	18	15	16
Don't know	16	13	11	12
Total	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	2.93	2.62	2.76	2.64
We should cut down on the number of laws we have in this country and make sure that the ones we keep are properly applied				
Agree strongly				37
Agree				38
Disagree				12
Disagree strongly				3
Don't know				10
Total				100
Index <sup>4</sup>				3.21

Table 20 (Continued)

	1979 Election candidates <sup>2</sup>	1979 General public	1981 General public <sup>3</sup>	1983 General public
(To provide work for the un- employed, those who are in work must accept shorter hours and a lower income				
Agree strongly	:			15
Agree	:			31
Disagree	:			28
Disagree strongly	:			19
Don't know	:			7
Total				100
Index <sup>4</sup>				2.46
More severe penalties should be introduced for acts of terrorism				
Agree strongly	30	69	65	66
Agree	33	19	21	21
Disagree	14	5	6	6
Disagree strongly	6	3	3	2
Don't know	17	4	5	5
Total	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	3.04	3.59	3.56	3.58
Public ownership of private industry should be expanded				
Agree strongly	12	14	14	12
Agree	16	21	21	21
Disagree	26	23	22	23
Disagree strongly	36	25	26	28
Don't know	10	17	17	16
Total	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	2.05	2.28	2.30	2.22



Table 20 (Continued)

	1979 Election candidates <sup>2</sup>	1979 General public	1981 General public <sup>3</sup>	1983 General public
Western Europe should make a stronger effort to provide adequate military defence				
Agree strongly	23	15	18	13
Agree	30	31	35	31
Disagree	18	20	18	22
Disagree strongly	13	15	13	16
Don't know	16	19	16	18
Total	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	2.76	2.57	2.69	2.51
Government should play a larger role in the manage- ment of the economy				
Agree strongly	17	21	26	:
Agree	26	34	36	:
Disagree	29	17	15	:
Disagree strongly	17	11	10	:
Don't know	11	17	13	:
Total	100	100	100	:
Index <sup>4</sup>	2.46	2.79	2.89	
Government should play a smaller role in the manage- ment of the economy				
Agree strongly				10
Agree				28
Disagree				28
Disagree strongly				15
Don't know				19
Total				100
Index <sup>4</sup>				2.42
Economic aid to Third World countries should be increased				
Agree strongly	50	20	23	18
Agree	39	30	33	32
Disagree	4	22	21	26
Disagree strongly	1	13	14	14
Don't know	6	15	9	10
Total	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	3.47	2.67	2.71	2.59

Table 20 (Continued)

	1979 Election candidates <sup>2</sup>	1979 General public	1981 General <sup>1</sup> public <sup>3</sup>	1983 'General public
Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environ- (ment against pollution				
Agree strongly	61	63	60	60
Agree	35	30	33	34
Disagree	1	3	3	3
Disagree strongly		1	1	
Don't know	3	3	3	3
Total	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	3.61	3.60	3.57	3.57
Regions of (country) should be given more freedom to handle their own affairs				
Agree strongly	:	:	29	27
Agree	:	:	37	39
Disagree	:	:	13	14
Disagree strongly	:	:	7	6
Don't know	:	:	14	14
Total			100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>			3.02	3.00

<sup>1</sup> Listed in the order used in the 1983 questionnaire.

<sup>2</sup> Sample survey of 742 candidates for election to the European Parliament, of whom 256 were elected, making 62% of the 410 members in the Assembly at the time. The results were weighted according to the strengths of the different national political parties at Strasbourg. The questions put to the candidates were the same as those put to the general public; there was only a slight change in the range of possibilities for reply, since in the questionnaire for the candidates there was the possibility of "neither one nor the other", which counted as "don't know" here. For more details on this survey, see: Ronald Ingelhart, Jacques-Rene Rabier, Ian Gordon and Carsten Lehman Sørensen, "Broader Powers for the European Parliament? The Attitudes of Candidates", (1980) 8 European Journal of Political Research, pp. 113-132.

<sup>3</sup> Including Greece from 1981.

<sup>4</sup> Calculated on the basis "agree strongly" = 4, "disagree strongly" = 1. "Don't knows" excluded,

More detailed analysis, by point and country, for which the reader should refer to the tables in series 5 in the appendix, reveals some interesting features, the most significant of which are listed below:

1. In each of the three surveys of the general public, four items (the expansion of nationalization, increased economic aid to the Third World, the development of nuclear energy and increases in military defence)<sup>1</sup> show the greatest variation in attitudes among the Member States.
  - the expansion of nationalization. This was generally opposed, except in Greece and, to a lesser extent, in Ireland. The Danes were the most hostile. There has been a general downward trend in answers between 1979 and 1983; in other words, almost everywhere nationalization is regarded as a less and less attractive option.
  - increased economic aid to the Third World. There is support everywhere, but it is muted. Those most in favour are the Greeks and the Italians, while the British and Germans have most reservations. Here, too, there is a general falling off in support, certainly due in part at least to the economic crisis.
  - the development of nuclear energy. Overall support, but considerable differences between countries. The Germans, French and British are generally in favour while the rest, particularly the Irish, Dutch and the Danes, are generally opposed. There has been little change, except that support has ebbed in Denmark.
  - increases in military defence. A small majority in the Community as a whole, but once again differences between the countries. The Greeks, British and Irish are quite convinced of the desirability of increasing Western Europe's defence effort; the Dutch, Belgians, Italians and, especially, the Danes are less certain. There has been little increase in support, and a clear decline in the Netherlands.

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<sup>1</sup> The reader will note that in each case the question dealt with a change in the status quo: greater this, stronger that, development, increase. This should be remembered when interpreting the answers.

2. There is a very strong consensus throughout the Community on all the other questions: more severe penalties for terrorism, environmental protection and even, to a lesser extent, reducing income differentials and giving more autonomy to the regions.
3. A special comment should be made on the questions asked for the first time in 1983.

Most people agreed that the number of laws should be reduced and those retained properly applied. The Italians and the Greeks, followed by the French, the Danes and the Belgians, are the most concerned by this problem.

There is, however, less clear-cut support for work-sharing, that is, agreeing to work less and earn less in order to improve the lot of the unemployed. Only the Dutch were unequivocally for the idea, while the French were generally against it.

(See Table 21)

In general, women, the old and the less well-off tended to view work-sharing more favourably.

(See Table 22)

Table 21FOR OR AGAINST WORK SHARING

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Agree strongly	17	20	15	15	14	17	22	28	9	32	15
Agree	30	30	38	28	33	27	28	38	28	16	31
Disagree	19	25	28	23	31	27	30	16	40	13	28
Disagree strongly	25	13	9	29	13	25	14	14	14	27	19
Don't know	9	12	10	5	9	4	6	4	9	12	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2.45	2.64	2.66	2.30	2.54	2.37	2.61	2.85	2.36	2.59	2.46

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average

<sup>2</sup> Agree strongly = 4; disagree strongly = 1. "Don't knows" excluded.

Table 22

RESPONDENTS FOR OR AGAINST WORK-SHARING

BY AGE, SEX AND AGE AND FAMILY INCOME

(Community as a whole)

	Agree	(Agree (strong- ly	Dis- agree	Disagree strong- ly	Don't know	Total	Index <sup>1</sup>
Overall	15%	31%	28%	19%	7%	100%	2.46
By sex:							
Men	14%	30%	29%	21%	6%	100%	2.40
Women	17	31	27	16	9	100	2.52
By sex and age:							
Men - 15-24 years	11%	29%	31%	25%	4%	100%	2.27
25-39 years	12	28	32	25	3	100	2.27
40-54 years	16	30	29	21	4	100	2.43
55 and over	18	33	26	14	9	100	2.60
Women - 15-24 years	17%	31%	28%	16%	8%	100%	2.52
25-39 years	14	28	32	21	5	100	2.38
40-54 years	15	34	28	16	7	100	2.52
55 and over	20	32	21	13	14	100	2.68
By family income:							
R --	20%	33%	23%	15%	9%	100%	2.64
R -	15	30	27	21	7	100	2.42
R +	14	29	31	21	5	100	2.39
R ++	14	33	29	21	3	100	2.41
(not stated)	14	28	31	16	11	100	(2.46)

<sup>1</sup> See note 2 to Table 21.

4. Finally, the question on government intervention asked in 1983 reversed the order used in previous surveys.

In previous years, those interviewed had been asked whether they supported governments playing a larger role in the management of the economy; in 1983 they were asked if governments should play a smaller role. This means that the replies are not comparable because not supporting a larger role does not mean supporting a smaller role and vice-versa.

In 1979 and 1981 about 60% of Community citizens (55% in 1979 and **62%** in 1981) thought that governments should play a larger role in the economy while over a quarter thought otherwise. In 1983 only 43% disagreed with the idea that government's role should be reduced while 39% agreed. There may have been a move away from government involvement but certainly not to this extent.<sup>1</sup> But it is noteworthy that in 1981 it was the Greeks who were most in favour of a greater role for government, whereas in 1983 they were most opposed to a smaller role.

(See Table 23)

---

<sup>1</sup> The correlation between national scores in 1981 and 1983 was  $-.65$ .

Table 23

	%											
Government should play a larger role in the management of the economy.												
Agree strongly	23	13	16	29	31	39	31	32	13	71	26	
Agree	32	29	30	41	47	34	30	33	45	10	36	
Disagree	11	23	22	12	10	9	18	14	19	2	15	
Disagree strongly	14	13	17	7	3	8	12	10	8	3	10	
Don't know	20	22	15	11	9	10	9	11	15	14	13	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Index <sup>2</sup>	2.81	2.54	2.54	3.05	3.17	3.15	2.88	2.96	2.74	3.75	2.89	
April 1983												
Government should play a smaller role in the management of the economy												
Agree strongly	18	8	5	14	10	13	14	16	6	14	10	
Agree	27	22	37	27	25	24	25	23	29	9	28	
Disagree	17	28	33	21	32	22	29	26	41	10	28	
Disagree strongly	11	16	7	14	16	23	14	24	10	42	15	
Don't know	27	26	18	24	17	18	18	11	14	25	19	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Index <sup>2</sup>	2.72	2.30	2.51	2.54	2.35	2.34	2.49	2.35	2.36	1.93	2.42	

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average.

<sup>2</sup> "Agree strongly" = 4, "Disagree strongly" = 1, "Don't know" excluded.



CHAPTER III

ATTITUDES TO EUROPE AND  
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

III

ATTITUDES TO EUROPE AND  
THE EUROPEAN 1

In addition to the usual questions on the feeling of being a citizen of Europe, attitudes towards the aim of unifying Europe and one's country's membership of the European Community, there were two new questions in this survey, one on the advantages and disadvantages of Community membership and the other on the member country which one feels closest to and most remote from.

III.1. THE FEELING OF BEING A CITIZEN OF EUROPE

---

*"Do you ever think of yourself as a citizen of Europe?  
Often, sometimes or never?"*

---

There is no major change here in relation to last year's results, approximately 16% of persons interviewed throughout the Community state that they "often" think of themselves as citizens of Europe, 34% that they "sometimes" do and 46% that they "never" do. People in Greece and Luxembourg most frequently replied "often".

(See Table 24)

The main value of this question will be to "map out" attitudes towards the European Parliament elections over the coming half-years. The most significant replies, or at least those which are evidence of the most vigorous reactions to development, are those relating to the two extremes "often" and "never".

Table 24

## THE FEELING OF BEING A CITIZEN OF EUROPE

[illegible]<sup>1</sup> Weighted average

111.2. FOR OR AGAINST UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE

*"In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If **for**, are you very much for or to some extent for? If **against**, are you very much against or to some extent against?"*

Attitudes - favourable by a good majority in all countries except Denmark - vary little from one half-year to the next, but the ratings for April 1983 are on the whole slightly higher than those for October and April 1982. In particular, Germany and Belgium have made up the ground lost over the previous half-years, and proportionately more amongst opinion leaders than the remainder of the population.

Viewed over a long period, i.e. since autumn 1973, the decline in public enthusiasm for the European ideal seems to be slackening.

(See Table 25 and Graph 8, together with Table 6 in the Appendix)

A more detailed analysis - of which we give only the conclusions here - shows that between 1973 and 1983 the basic attitude has improved significantly only amongst Danish and British opinion leaders<sup>1</sup>.

(See Table 26)

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<sup>1</sup> This analysis was based on **13** polls, with a total of 13 636 respondents in Denmark and 17 160 in the United Kingdom. Table 26 shows only the results for the first and last of these 13 polls.

Table 25  
GENERAL SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO UNIFY WESTERN EUROPE  
(Trend from 1973 to 1983)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK <sup>1</sup>	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>September 1973</u>											
Very much for	22	17	49	23	21	34	47	34	14	:	30
To some extent for	38	28	29	45	31	36	33	39	23	:	33
To some extent against	3	14	4	3	8	2	1	8	15	:	6
Very much against	2	18	2	1	4	1	-	7	15	:	5
Don't know <sup>3</sup>	35	23	16	28	36	27	19	12	33	:	26
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	3.24	2.56	3.50	3.25	3.07	3.41	3.57	3.15	2.53	:	3.19
<u>1975-1980 (seven polls)</u>											
Very much for	23	15	38	25	22	38	45	34	23	33	30
To some extent for	40	30	41	50	40	44	39	42	36	26	42
To some extent against	5	17	5	6	9	4	6	6	13	12	7
Very much against	2	17	1	2	4	1	2	4	9	11	4
Don't know <sup>3</sup>	30	21	15	17	25	13	8	14	19	18	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	3.22	2.54	3.35	3.18	3.07	3.36	3.39	3.24	2.88	3.00	3.20
<u>April 1981 and October 1981</u> (combined)											
Very much for	22	14	32	21	21	37	45	29	18	34	27
To some extent for	42	30	38	53	41	46	38	48	37	29	43
To some extent against	6	20	10	8	12	8	11	9	14	9	10
Very much against	3	17	4	2	5	2	3	6	13	10	5
Don't know <sup>3</sup>	27	19	16	16	21	7	3	8	18	18	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	3.15	2.50	3.18	3.12	2.98	3.27	3.30	3.09	2.73	3.05	3.07

Table 25 (Cont'd)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK <sup>1</sup>	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
<u>April 1982</u>											
Very much for	20	13	33	24	15	32	40	24	17	29	26
To some extent for	49	29	45	54	40	47	42	52	39	29	45
To some extent against	8	22	7	8	12	6	5	9	19	10	10
Very much against	2	20	3	2	5	1	3	4	12	7	5
Don't know <sup>3</sup>	21	16	12	12	28	14	10	11	13	25	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	3.10	2.41	3.23	3.14	2.90	3.27	3.31	3.08	2.69	3.07	3.08
<u>October 1982</u>											
Very much for											
To some extent for											
To some extent against											
Very much against											
Don't know <sup>3</sup>											
Total											
Index <sup>4</sup>											
<u>April 1983</u>											
Very much for	27	13	36	25	16	36	39	29	20	31	29
To some extent for	41	32	49	50	39	44	39	46	40	30	45
To some extent against	6	19	5	5	9	5	8	10	15	6	8
Very much against	1	18	1	1	4	1	3	5	5	6	3
Don't know <sup>3</sup>	25	18	9	19	32	14	11	10	20	27	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	3.25	2.48	3.30	3.20	2.98	3.34	3.27	3.11	2.93	3.17	3.18

<sup>1</sup> Excluding Northern Ireland in 1973.

<sup>2</sup> Weighted average

<sup>3</sup> One of the answer codes to this question in 1973 and 1975 was "don't care"; the corresponding percentages have here been added to the "don't knows". This change may partly explain the subsequent decrease in "don't knows".

<sup>4</sup> "Very much for" = 4, "very much against" = 1. "Don't knows" excluded.

Table 26


GENERAL SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO UNIFY WESTERN EUROPE BY LEADERSHIP RATING<sup>1</sup>

	September 1973					April 1983				
	Non- leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	(Leaders (++)	Com- bined	Non- leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	(Leaders (++)	Com- bined
<u>Denmark</u>										
Very much for	6	15	19	30	17	11	10	15	18	13
To some extent for	22	26	31	24	27	26	34	34	36	32
To some extent against	18	13	15	11	14	19	17	21	16	19
Very much against	16	18	17	25	19	12	18	19	27	18
Don't know <sup>2</sup>	38	28	18	10	23	32	21	11	3	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>3</sup>	2.27	2.53	2.62	2.67	2.56	2.52	2.45	2.51	2.46	2.48
	200	377	418	204	1199	230	346	313	138	1027
<u>Great Britain (1973) and United Kingdom (1983)</u>										
Very much for	5	11	19	36	14	15	21	21	34	20
To some extent for	13	26	31	24	23	31	44	46	31	40
To some extent against	15	17	15	8	15	15	13	15	20	15
Very much against	14	14	15	21	15	7	4	5	14	5
Don't know <sup>4</sup>	53	32	20	11	33	32	18	13	1	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>3</sup>	2.21	2.48	2.67	2.84	2.53	2.81	3.01	2.96	2.87	2.93
Base	550	729	474	180	1933	395	477	372	106	1350

<sup>1</sup> For the definition of opinion leadership rating, see p. 21 above.<sup>2</sup> For 1983 the "don't cares" have been added to the "don't knows".<sup>3</sup> "Very much for" = 4, "very much against" = 1. "Don't knows" excluded.


Graph 8

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE






Graph 8 (Continued)



Graph 8 (Continued)



### 111.3. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

#### 111.3.1. A feeling that one's country has benefited - more or less than others - from its membership of the Community

In previous surveys this question was put in a form which seemed to cause some confusion to the public and provoked a high rate of don't knows: "Would you say that your country has benefited more than or benefited less than other countries of the Common Market by its membership of the European Community". The new wording makes it possible to obtain far more relevant information.

*"Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community (Common Market)?*

*If yes, has it benefited more or less than the other countries which are members of the European Community?"*

The response to this question is totally clear; in all countries except the United Kingdom the majority, and at times the vast majority, of respondents feel that their country has benefited from Community membership:

- 78% in the Netherlands, 74% in Luxembourg and 69% in Italy;
- between 60% and 50% in Belgium, Ireland, France and even Denmark;
- 49% in Germany, and already 44% in Greece, which has only just joined the Community.

Only in the United Kingdom are the percentages reversed; 32% of people in Britain feel that their country had benefited, as against 57% who disagree.

It should be observed that there was a relatively high rate of don't knows in three countries - Greece (31%), Belgium (35%) and Germany (36%).

Given the above, the new wording of the question highlights the fact that, amongst respondents who feel that their country has benefited from membership, assessment of the advantages gained compared to other member countries differ somewhat:

- in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland and Denmark, more than 60% of respondents feel that their country has benefited at least as much as other countries;
- in France and Italy the proportion is still about 50%;
- in Greece, Germany and the United Kingdom, it lies between 35% and 40% and the most frequent reply in these three countries is that their country has benefited less from the Community than others.

It may be seen that, although the feeling of having benefited from the Community is in correlation with the feeling of having benefited at least as much as other countries, there are differences of opinion between the Member States which are far from negligible. Nationality would even seem to be the most decisive variable, if we leave aside the influence of the level of education on the number of don't knows.

(See Tables 27 and 28).

Table 27

FEELING THAT ONE'S COUNTRY HAS OR HAS NOT  
BENEFITED FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
Feel that their country has benefited from membership of the European Community of which	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	59	51	49	54	56	69	74	78	32	44	52
- more than others	11	9	8	5	16	13	15	14	4	8	8
- less than others	8	6	16	12	15	19	13	10	15	13	15
- as much	35	24	10	27	20	24	36	42	7	9	18
- don't know	5	12	15	10	5	13	10	12	6	14	11
Feel that their country has not benefited from membership of the European Community	6	31	15	21	28	14	12	11	57	25	25
Don't know	35	18	36	25	16	17	14	11	11	31	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average

Table 28

FEELING THAT ONE'S COUNTRY HAS BENEFITED MORE OR LESS THAN OTHERSFROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY(out of 100 people who feel their country has benefited from the Community)

- more than others	18	17	16	8	30	19	20	18	14	20	16		
- less than others	14	13	33	22	27	28	17	13	46	29	28		
- as much	59	46	21	51	35	34	49	54	21	20	35		
Don't know	9	24	30	19	8	19	14	15	19	31	21		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
Reminder of percentage of positive replies	59%	51%	49%	54%	56%	69%	74%	78%	32%	44%	52%		

III.3.2. Assessment of the trend in understanding between the countries of the Community

*your opinion, over the last twelve months, has the understanding between the countries of the European Community (Common Market) in general increased, decreased or stayed about the same?"<sup>1</sup>*

Whilst replies to the previous question provided information on what is presumed to be a fairly stable attitude, expressing a type of group collective, national assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of Community membership, we now have replies which are more directly influenced by the vicissitudes of Community life as reported - and at times exaggerated - by the mass media.

The outlook is still gloomy, with little change from the previous half-year, although there has been a slight improvement in Germany and the United Kingdom and a slight worsening of opinion in France and Luxembourg.

Greece is still the only country in which positive assessments outnumber negative ones, although it is true that there are 40% of don't knows.

(See Table 29, and Table 7 in the Appendix)

Leadership rating has the specific effect of causing wide variations in the number of don't knows. If these are ruled out and actual replies alone are considered, it may be seen that in the Community as a whole negative assessments are those which are least affected by this variable. In other words, leaders and non-leaders are fairly close to agreement on feeling that understanding between member countries has tended to decline.

But are opinion leaders more sensitive than the rest of the population to Community events and the way these are reported in the media? To answer this question, we shall examine how assessments have developed according to leadership rating in the three countries in which there has been a significant change between October 1982 and April 1983<sup>2</sup>. In Germany and the United Kingdom, in which negative assessments have decreased, this decrease seems to have been greater in Germany amongst non-leaders and in the United Kingdom amongst leaders. In France, in which the balance of opinion has swung strongly to the negative side, this trend appears to have affected leaders less than the rest of the population.

(See Table 30)

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<sup>1</sup> The wording of this question was slightly different in 1978.

<sup>2</sup> Luxembourg has not been used because the sample is too small.

Table 29

## UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
<u>October-November 1977</u>											
positive	21%	19%	26%	24%	42%	35%	28%	14%	32%	:	28%
Negative	18	31	24	16	9	18	19	24	17	:	19
Difference	3	-12	2	8	33	17	9	-10	15	:	9
<u>October-November 1978</u>											
Positive	27%	16%	33%	23%	46%	33%	27%	13%	27%	:	28%
Negative	8	19	9	11	9	10	10	11	17	:	12
Difference	19	-3	24	12	37	23	17	2	10	:	16
<u>April 1981</u>											
Positive	10%	11%	17%	16%	23%	19%	19%	10%	11%	23%	15%
Negative	30	35	36	20	22	24	26	34	51	9	33
Difference	-20	-24	-19	-4	1	-5	-7	-24	-40	14	-18
<u>October 1981</u>											
Positive	11%	9%	28%	16%	26%	21%	23%	10%	15%	27%	19%
Negative	31	36	21	21	14	26	31	32	34	11	26
Difference	-20	-27	7	-5	12	-5	-8	-22	-19	16	-7
<u>April 1982</u>											
Positive	8%	11%	10%	11%	19%	10%	8%	8%	11%	17%	11%
Negative	38	35	42	31	18	26	35	36	39	13	34
Difference	-30	-24	-32	-20	1	-16	-27	-28	-28	4	-23
<u>October 1982</u>											
Positive	11%	12%	12%	14%	22%	12%	12%	7%	11%	27%	13%
Negative	25	24	34	24	20	19	28	31	35	9	27
Difference	-14	-12	-22	-10	2	-7	-16	-24	-24	18	-14
<u>April 1953</u>											
Positive	11%	9%	12%	9%	17%	11%	11%	9%	11%	22%	11%
Negative	27	24	27	30	19	17	38	28	25	7	25
Difference	-16	-15	-15	-21	-2	-6	-27	-19	-14	15	-14

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average

Table 30

TREND IN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE  
COMMUNITY BY LEADERSHIP RATING  
(per 100 persons answering the question)

Assessment	October 1982					April 1983				
	Non- (leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)	Combined	Non- (leaders (--)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)	Combined
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Germany</u>										
Positive	10	16	13	15	14	16	10	16	22	14
Negative	39	36	42	43	40	21	30	31	38	31
No change	51	48	45	42	46	63	60	53	40	55
Base	(117)	(324)	(317)	(102)	(860)	(97)	(382)	(319)	(119)	(917)
<u>France</u>										
Positive	13	15	21	17	16	11	8	9	18	10
Negative	21	26	29	35	27	31	34	40	39	36
No change	66	59	50	48	57	58	58	51	43	54
Base	(211)	(286)	(231)	(98)	(826)	(173)	(311)	(264)	(106)	(854)
<u>United Kingdom</u>										
Positive	8	13	12	15	12	8	11	16	19	12
Negative	38	32	42	42	38	33	28	28	25	29
No change	54	55	46	43	50	59	61	56	56	59
Base	(315)	(411)	(362)	(140)	(1228)	(323)	(425)	(344)	(99)	(1191)



111.3.3. General attitude to Community membership

*"Generally speaking, do you think (your country's) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"*

In spite of what is commonly known as "economic crisis" and all nature of difficulties which this is causing to the Community itself, the majority of respondents in the Member States, excluding the United Kingdom, continue to feel that Community membership is "a good thing": between 6 and 7 people out of 10 in the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy, and between 5 and 6 of 10 in France and Germany.

Replies in April 1983 even show a slight decrease in favourable attitudes in two countries - Germany and even more in Belgium - as compared with October 1982. In the United Kingdom a significant fall-off in the number of previously unfavourable attitudes ("bad thing") may be observed with a trend towards the less committed opinion ("neither good nor bad"). This serves to confirm the view put forward six months ago that the anti-marketeers have been losing ground over the past two years or so, but that does not - or not yet - mean that the pro-marketeers are gaining the ascendancy<sup>1</sup>.

(See Table 31, and Table 8 in the Appendix).

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<sup>1</sup> 'An interesting graph published on page 68 of The Economist of 21 May 1983 shows how, since the end of 1980, the number of people wanting to "stay in the EEC" has climbed and the number of people wanting to "get out" has fallen. At the beginning of 1983 the two attitudes were evenly balanced, though there was a definite trend for the stayers to overtake the leavers. (Source: Market and Opinion Research International, London).

In addition, according to a poll held in Britain (people aged 18 and over) between 25 and 30 May 1983, 43% replied that membership is a "good thing", against 30% for a "bad thing". (Source: Gallup Political Index, No 274, June 1983),

Table 31

GENERAL ATTITUDE TO COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK <sup>1</sup>	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>September 1973</u>											
Good thing	57	42	63	61	56	69	67	63	31	:	56
Neither good nor bad	19	19	22	22	21	15	22	20	22	:	20
Bad thing	5	30	4	5	15	2	3	4	34	:	11
Don't know	19	9	11	12	8	14	8	13	13	:	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
Index <sup>3</sup>	2.64	2.13	2.66	2.64	2.45	2.78	2.70	2.68	1.97	:	2.52
<u>1974-1980 (14 surveys)</u>											
Good thing	61	35	60	58	54	73	75	75	35	:	57
Neither good nor bad	20	26	24	27	21	16	15	14	22	:	22
Bad thing	4	29	6	7	19	4	4	4	36	:	13
Don't know	15	10	10	8	6	7	6	7	7	:	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
Index <sup>3</sup>	2.67	2.07	2.60	2.55	2.37	2.74	2.76	2.76	1.99	:	2.48
<u>April 1981 and October 1981 (combined)</u>											
Good thing	52	30	53	51	48	71	77	75	26	40	51
Neither good nor bad	26	30	27	33	27	20	17	15	25	26	26
Bad thing	5	30	8	9	20	5	4	5	45	21	16
Don't know	17	10	12	7	5	4	2	5	4	13	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>3</sup>	2.56	2.01	2.52	2.46	2.29	2.69	2.74	2.74	1.81	2.21	2.38

Table 31 (Contd.)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK <sup>1</sup>	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
<u>April 1982</u>											
Good thing	57	33	54	55	44	68	73	74	27	33	52
Neither good nor bad	24	27	31	30	29	20	19	16	24	37	26
Bad thing	6	30	8	7	18	3	2	4	43	15	14
Don't know	13	10	7	8	9	9	6	6	6	15	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>3</sup>	2.58	2.04	2.49	2.53	2.28	2.71	2.74	2.74	1.83	2.21	2.40
<u>October 1982</u>											
Good thing	41	35	51	57	47	64	72	74	29	45	51
Neither good nor bad	30	28	34	29	27	21	21	15	26	30	27
Bad thing	9	28	9	9	21	5	4	5	40	13	15
Don't know	20	9	6	5	5	10	3	6	5	12	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>3</sup>	2.40	2.07	2.45	2.51	2.28	2.66	2.70	2.73	1.89	2.36	2.39
<u>April 1983</u>											
Good thing	62	35	61	53	45	70	72	77	28	42	53
Neither good nor bad	19	30	26	30	28	18	18	15	29	29	25
Bad thing	3	24	5	7	20	4	5	4	36	12	13
Don't know	16	11	8	10	7	8	5	4	7	17	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>3</sup>	2.70	2.12	2.60	2.51	2.27	2.71	2.71	2.75	1.91	2.35	2.45

<sup>1</sup> United Kingdom, excluding Northern Ireland in 1973 and 1974.

Weighted average

<sup>3</sup> "Good thing" = 3, "neither good nor bad" = 1.  
"Don't knows" excluded.

Viewed over the whole period from 1973 to 1983, the trend is nonetheless slightly downwards in most countries, but much more markedly so in the United Kingdom than elsewhere. The trend is rising slightly in Luxembourg and in the Netherlands and the same is true for Greece over the short period examined (1981-83).

(See Graph 9)

More detailed analysis of replies shows how useful it is, as we have already stressed, to distinguish carefully in diachronic analyses between the various factors relating to the level, trend, fluctuations and structure of the attitudes under examination<sup>1</sup>.

Level - The level of attitudes towards Community membership and towards the unification of Europe (between which the correlation is fairly high:  $r \approx .54$  on average, calculated over 13 polls between 1973 and 1983 for 9 countries) varies a great deal according to the country. The fact of being a citizen of one of the founder countries of the Community (1951) tends to produce a more favourable attitude than if one is a citizen of a country which joined later. The same is true, though to a lesser extent, if one is a citizen of one of the three Benelux countries (Benelux was set up in 1944), rather than of France.

Average score and ranking of countries  
by the two indicators on Europe and the Community<sup>2</sup>

	For or against European unification		General attitude towards Community membership	
Luxembourg	3.37	1	2.75	1
Italy	3.34	2	2.73	3
Germany	3.31	3	2.57	4
Belgium	3.19	4	2.55	5
Netherlands	3.18	5	2.75	1
France <sup>3</sup>	3.17	6	2.54	6
Greece <sup>3</sup>	3.08	7	2.26	8
Ireland	3.02	8	2.35	7
United Kingdom <sup>4</sup>	2.83	9	1.95	10
Denmark	2.51	10	2.06	9

<sup>1</sup> See page 32 above.


<sup>2</sup> It should be borne in mind that the scores for each of the two indicators are not directly comparable. The first may vary between 1.00 ("very much against") and 4.00 ("very much for"), whilst the second indicator can vary between 1.00 ("bad thing") and 3.00 ("good thing").

<sup>3</sup> Only six surveys for the first indicator and five for the second.


<sup>4</sup> Great Britain alone in 1973.

Graph 9

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY




Graph 9 (Contd.)





Graph 9 (Contd.)



Trend - Measured over the whole period examined, the trend is as we have seen falling slightly in most countries, but there are subtle differences and some exceptions:

- with regard to the overall attitude towards the unification of Europe, the trend is positive only in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand, the trend is more sharply downwards in Germany (and in Luxembourg) than elsewhere;
- with regard to Community membership, the trend is slightly upwards in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, but until recently has been sharply downwards in the United Kingdom.

Gradient of the line of best fit  
relating to the average scores for each country examined  
for the two indicators on Europe and the Community<sup>2</sup>  
(1973-83)

	For or against European unification (13 polls)	General attitude towards Community membership (18 polls)
Belgium	-.009	-.007
Denmark	-.006	-.002
Germany	<b>-.016</b>	-.001
France	-.009	-.008
Ireland	-.009	-.008
Italy	-.008	-.0001
Luxembourg	<b>-.015</b>	-.0001
Netherlands	-.011	+.001
United Kingdom <sup>3</sup>	+.007	<b>-.030</b>
Greece <sup>4</sup>	<b>+.045</b>	<b>+.033</b>

<sup>1</sup> We can attempt to explain this by the fact that at the time of entry into the Community in 1973 "European unification" perhaps appeared as an objective with too many implications, whilst now political cooperation within the Community is generally well received by the British.

<sup>2</sup> It should be borne in mind that in a longitudinal analysis of this type the line of best fit, compiled from observed data, makes it possible to measure variations over a period of time in the variable studied and to give an estimated value for the variable at any point in time for which no observations have been made. As an example, a gradient of -.016, in the case of attitudes in Germany towards European unification, calculated from 13 polls carried out between 1973 and 1983, corresponds to a fall in the value of the score for this variable from 3.50 in September 1973 to 3.30 in April 1983, with allowance being made for all the intervening surveys.

<sup>3</sup> Great Britain alone in 1973.

<sup>4</sup> Six and five surveys only for each of these two indicators.



Fluctuations - There is little variation in the results from one half-year to the next, but fluctuations do appear over larger periods and they are worthwhile studying.

Between 1973 and 1983 fluctuations occurred on a far larger scale in the United Kingdom than in other countries, with regard both to European unification generally and to Community membership in particular. The same is true of Ireland where, for Community membership alone, fluctuations have been greater than elsewhere, though still remaining only half as wide as in the United Kingdom. Whilst further study over a longer period is required, there are grounds for believing that attitudes towards Europe and the Community fluctuate more widely (attitudes are less stable) where the level of support is lower. In addition, in cases of this kind, which are well illustrated by the British and to some extent the Irish examples, there are wider fluctuations in attitudes towards membership of the Community (normally perceived as the "Common Market") than in the general level of support for European unification. The reason for this is quite simple. The Community is a historical reality; its daily ups and downs are reported in the press and the citizen assesses it in terms of its usefulness: What does it do? What does my country get out of it or have to put into it? etc. In the second case European unification is an idea or ideal which is to some extent immune to day-to-day occurrences. It may be stated without exaggeration that European unification is something people simply believe in, whereas they need tangible evidence of what the Common Market has to offer them.

Coefficient of variation in the scores  
for attitudes towards European unification and Community membership<sup>1</sup>  
(1973-83)

	For or against European unification (13 polls)	General support for Community membership (18 polls)
Belgium	2.37	2.99
Denmark	3.33	2.98
Germany	3.39	3.05
France	2.93	3.09
Ireland	3.02	4.29
Luxembourg <sup>2</sup>	(3.85)	(3.35)
Netherlands	3.01	1.45
United Kingdom <sup>3</sup>	4.44	7.73
Greece <sup>4</sup>	3.51	3.35

<sup>1</sup> The coefficient of variation (Pearson variation) measures the distribution (or standard deviation) in successive values for a variable compared to its mean value.

<sup>2</sup> Given the size of the samples, results for Luxembourg are more open to fluctuations.

<sup>3</sup> Great Britain alone in 1973.

<sup>4</sup> Six and five polls respectively.

Structure - The structure of the factors determining attitudes towards European unification and Community membership still have to be studied both synchronically and diachronically.

We shall confine our attention here to that factor which, apart from nationality, seems to be the most important: leadership rating, i.e. an individual's ability or inability to involve himself in fairly remote, complex and abstract problems.

Current research has produced the following preliminary findings:

- (a) With regard to changes over the reference period, opinion leaders tend to be more critical (or more sceptical) than non-leaders with regard to European unification and, to a lesser extent, Community membership. But here again there are exceptions. In Greece, where the reference period is far shorter, opinion leaders seem to be increasingly pro-Europe and pro-Community.
- (b) Fluctuations in both indicators are slightly more marked amongst those with the highest (L++) and lowest (NL--) ratings than the rest of the population. For the former, this is doubtless because they keep abreast of events and alter their attitudes accordingly. Low-level non-leaders' responses tend to be fairly inconsistent because of their social and cultural characteristics.

#### III.3.4. Advantages and disadvantages of belonging to the European Community

We have on several occasions attempted to gain a better insight into the factors that influence respondents' overall assessment of Community membership<sup>1</sup>. We once more tried to explore this area with the question below:

*"People disagree about the advantages and disadvantages of your country belonging to the European Community (Common Market). I am going to read out some points and, for each one, I would like you to tell me if (your country) being in the European Community has a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad effect".*

A quick glance at the results shows that, generally speaking, positive assessments outnumber negative ones. The only exceptions are:

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<sup>1</sup> See Eurobarometer No 15, June 1981, pp. 43-51.

- the United Kingdom with regard to standards of living, industry and agriculture, i.e. three points out of five;
- Ireland, with regard to industry;
- Italy, with regard to agriculture.

It may also be observed that the number of don't knows is particularly high in Greece. This is only to be expected in a country which joined the Community so recently, for little direct impact can yet be ascertained. But the level of don't knows is also quite high in Denmark and in Belgium compared to other countries.

The most popular point, i.e. the one most frequently quoted as having a positive effect in the Community as a whole, is "the country's security": it ranks first in Belgium, Germany, Italy, France, Greece and the United Kingdom. This will not come as a surprise to readers who looked carefully at the results published two years ago. When asked whether they thought belonging to the Community had had a good or bad effect on ten counts in April 1981, Europeans most frequently quoted as a good effect the reduced likelihood of being involved in a war<sup>1</sup>. It follows that the citizens of our Member States, whatever their general concerns or attitudes as regards defence<sup>2</sup>, the Community still guarantees the security of Europe. This is also the point on which opinions differ the least from country to country.

The second most frequently quoted point is "our exports", which is hardly surprising given the objective significance of the benefits accruing for consumers from the removal of national market barriers. Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Denmark, where it ranked first, are the countries where this was seen **as** a particularly important benefit.

Effects on the standard of living, industry and agriculture come next, in that order. It should be observed, however, that agriculture was placed first by respondents in Ireland, second by those in the Netherlands and Greece and third by those in Denmark<sup>3</sup>.

(See Table 32)

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<sup>1</sup> Eurobarometer No 15, p. 44.

<sup>2</sup> See page 67 above.

<sup>3</sup> The number of respondents mentioning agriculture as one of the beneficial effects of the Community in Ireland and Denmark tallies with the April 1981 result. See Eurobarometer No 15, p. 45.

Table 32

## ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BELONGING TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

EFFECT	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
<u>On our country's security</u>	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very good	23	12	19	11	10	19	33	19	16	20	16
Fairly good	41	27	53	54	35	50	44	37	40	26	47
Fairly bad	5	13	6	9	18	7	7	12	16	9	19
Very bad	2	5	1	2	9	3	3	4	7	9	4
Don't know	29	43	21	24	28	21	13	28	21	36	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>3</sup>	3.19	2.81	3.13	2.97	2.62	3.06	3.23	3.00	2.80	2.90	2.99
Point ranked <sup>4</sup>	1	5	1	1	4	1	2	4	1	1	1
<u>On our exports</u>											
Very good	24	18	20	8	14	15	38	34	7	14	15
Fairly good	43	41	53	48	38	47	42	45	38	28	45
Fairly bad	8	15	12	22	23	16	7	9	25	12	17
Very bad	1	1	3	5	10	6	2	1	11	11	6
Don't know	24	25	12	17	15	16	11	11	19	35	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>3</sup>	3.17	3.00	3.02	2.69	2.64	2.84	3.30	3.25	2.52	2.69	2.82
Point ranked <sup>4</sup>	2	1	2	3	3	3	1	1	2	4	2
<u>On our standard of living</u>											
Very good	18	14	10	5	11	11	31	16	4	13	9
Fairly good	45	35	58	53	49	56	49	55	35	37	50
Fairly bad	8	19	14	20	20	11	10	12	36	12	19
Very bad	2	2	1	2	11	2	1	1	13	7	4
Don't know	27	31	17	20	9	20	9	16	12	31	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>3</sup>	3.09	2.86	2.92	2.77	2.66	2.95	3.20	3.02	2.34	2.82	2.77
Point ranked <sup>4</sup>	3	1	4	1	4	1	2	1	3	1	3

Table 32 (Contd.)

EFFECT	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%					
On our industry																
Very good	18	15	16	6	9	12	30	17	3	11	10					
Fairly good	40	37	53	45	34	48	41	50	27	26	43					
Fairly bad	13	18	15	25	30	18	10	15	37	15	22					
Very bad	4	2	3	4	14	6	5	3	16	11	7					
Don't know	25	28	13	20	13	16	14	15	17	37	18					
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100					
Index <sup>3</sup>	2.97	2.92	2.94	2.66	2.44	2.79	3.12	2.95	2.20	2.59	2.69					
Point ranked <sup>4</sup>	5	2	3	4	5	1	5	1	5	1	4	5	1	4	1	
On our agriculture																
Very good	19	20	15	6	33	9	30	29	7	20	12					
Fairly good	40	38	34	37	38	33	41	39	23	36	33					
Fairly bad	11	22	27	33	12	30	13	17	34	12	28					
Very bad	3	3	1	9	1	7	6	14	2	3	1	2	2	9	11	
Don't know	27	17	15	17	11	14	14	12	14	23	16					
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100					
Index <sup>3</sup>	3.04	2.90	2.65	2.51	3.11	2.45	3.15	3.07	2.17	2.83	2.53					
Point ranked <sup>4</sup>	4	1	3	1	5	1	5	1	4	1	2	1	5	1	2	1

<sup>1</sup> The points are shown here in descending order of scores obtained in the Community as a whole. The order in the questionnaire was: standard of living, agriculture, industry, exports, security.

<sup>2</sup> Weighted average.

<sup>3</sup> "Very good" = 4, "very bad" = 1. "Don't know" excluded.

<sup>4</sup> Ranking in each country.

Assessments of the effects of Community membership appear to be determined mainly by nationality. Other determining variables have little impact, once the don't knows, of which the numbers in each country vary a great deal according to leadership rating, have been excluded. What needs to be examined above all, however, is the relationship between the respondent's general attitude towards the European Community and his reply regarding each of the areas where he may have perceived a good or bad effect. There is a very close correlation in this respect.

Generally speaking, the relationship is somewhat closer for the Community's effect on standards of living, which means that this is one of the most controversial points. We can also observe that for all headings the relationship is much closer in some countries than others, for example in Greece, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, which are four countries in which membership of the Community is still viewed as a matter for debate.

Table 33 shows, for the Community as a whole, what assessments were made on each of the five headings according to whether the respondent feels that belonging to the Community is a good thing, neither a good nor a bad thing, or a bad thing.

(See Table 33)

This analysis does not enable us to establish precisely which is the cause and which is the effect, nor which areas deserve priority in public information campaigns (e.g. in the run-up to the European Parliament elections).

With respect to the first point, however, respondents' overall assessments of their country's membership of the Community appear to precede and to some extent condition their evaluation of the effects.

The question of the information to be supplied to the public is not an easy one, apart from the obvious consideration that close attention should be paid to the links observed in each country<sup>1</sup>. Should the emphasis be laid on the beneficial effects with the greatest "popular appeal" such as the security of the country, or on those which are the least well received, such as effects on agriculture, or again on those which are most closely related to the overall assessment of the Community, such as effects on standards of living? We do not hazard an answer to this question here. We are content to have done something to reveal the nature of the problem.

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<sup>1</sup> Only the broad outlines have been sketched here; closer analysis will be made later.

**Table 33**

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES  
OF BELONGING TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY  
BY GENERAL ATTITUDE TO THE COMMUNITY

(Community as a whole)

<u>EFFECT</u>	%	%	%
<u>On our country's security</u>			
Very good	25	0	6
Fairly good	53	50	30
Fairly bad	6	13	24
Very bad	1	4	15
Don't know	15	25	25
Total	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	3.19	2.04	2.35
<u>On our exports</u>			
Very good	22	8	4
Fairly good	54	44	25
Fairly bad	12	24	34
Very bad	2	7	22
Don't know	10	17	15
Total	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	3.06	2.64	2.13
<u>On our standard of living</u>			
Very good	15	2	2
Fairly good	64	46	17
Fairly bad	0	20	49
Very bad	1	3	23
Don't know	12	21	9
Total	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	3.05	2.59	1.97

Table 33 (Contd.)

	Of those who feel that belonging to the Community is:		
	A good thing	Neither a good nor a bad thing	A bad thing
<u>EFFECT</u>			
<u>On our industry</u>			
Very good	17	4	2
Fairly good	55	39	14
Fairly bad	15	32	43
Very bad	2	7	29
Don't know	11	18	12
Total	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2.97	2.49	1.87
<u>On our agriculture</u>			
Very good	18	6	4
Fairly good	42	28	14
Fairly bad	25	36	37
Very bad	5	14	36
Don't know	10	16	9
Total	100	100	100
Index <sup>2</sup>	2.80	2.31	1.84

<sup>1</sup> As for the previous table, the points are listed in descending order of scores obtained in the Community as a whole.

<sup>2</sup> "Very good" = 4, "very bad" = 1. "Don't knows" excluded.



111.4. THE COMMUNITY COUNTRIES TO WHICH ONE FEELS THE CLOSEST

"Common interests", "joint institutions", "shared destiny": the notion of a Community implies that an awareness of being "us" should exist and develop between its members. Research was earlier conducted into the feeling of trust between Community Member States, i.e. the expectation by each country that the others will act in a predictable and friendly way<sup>1</sup>. This research showed that the feeling of trust was tending to increase between 1976 and 1980<sup>2</sup>. The problem of subjective links between Community member countries is now being considered again, but from a different angle in terms of the feeling of closeness:

*"Here is a Zist of the nine countries other than your own that belong to the European Communities (Common Market). (SHOW CARD). Is there a country on this Zist that you personally feel closer to than the others, whatever your reasons may be? Which one? (GIVE ONLY ONE).*

*Is there a second country you feel closer to than the rest? Which one?*

*Looking at it the opposite way, is there a country on this Zist which is more foreign to you than most? Which one?"*

Contrary to what might have been expected, this question seems to have bothered respondents, judging by the extraordinarily high proportion of them who would not or could not answer it: for the first choice, the proportion amounted to 50% in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, whilst it was only 25% in Italy and 19% in Luxembourg. Is there a deep-seated convention in certain countries which forbids judging others? We can do no more than raise the problem. Whatever the answer, these analyses show that refusals to reply **are**, in each country, closely correlated with leadership rating: if there is such a convention, it is far more widely observed by those with the lowest leadership ratings.

As for the actual replies, they clearly express the perception of closeness or remoteness in geographical, historical and cultural terms at once.

There is little doubt that the country which Europeans feel closest to overall is France, followed at a fair distance by Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands<sup>3</sup>. The country which seems the most foreign is Greece, but Germany and the United Kingdom were not far behind. One should observe, however, that the minorities of respondents who, in the Community as a whole, expressed their feeling of remoteness from Germany (11%) are less numerous than those which gave it in first place as the country they feel closest to (13%). The opposite is true of the United Kingdom (closest: 7%, most foreign: 10%) and particularly Greece (3 and 13% respectively).

<sup>1</sup> Eurobarometer No 14, December 1980, pp. 37-56.

<sup>2</sup> See forthcoming article by Ronald Inglehart and J.-R. Rabier, "Trust between Nations: Primordial Ties, Societal Learning and Economic Development".

<sup>3</sup> Previous research showed that the French are not one of the widely trusted nations (see Eurobarometer No 14, p. 41). Trust and closeness are two quite distinct concepts.

The results are summarised below, with a more detailed presentation in the following two tables.

(See Tables 34 and 35)

Closeness or remoteness  
between Community Member States<sup>1</sup>

(Summary of main findings)

- |                                    |   |
|------------------------------------|---|
| 1. <u>Feel especially close:</u>   | (quoted first or second)  |
| (a) <u>to France</u>               | 54% of the Italians<br>52% of the Luxembourgers<br>46% of the Belgians<br>36% of the Germans<br>35% of the Greeks |
| (b) <u>to Germany</u>              | 30% of the Danes<br>29% of the Luxembourgers<br>26% of the Italians<br>21% of the French                          |
| (c) <u>to the United Kingdom</u>   | 61% of the Irish<br>19% of the Italians   |
| (d) <u>to the Netherlands</u>      | 24% of the Germans<br>17% of the Belgians   |
| (e) <u>to Belgium</u>              | 31% of the Luxembourgers<br>24% of the French<br>23% of the Dutch   |
| (f) <u>to Italy</u>                | 22% of the Greeks<br>19% of the French<br>16% of the Luxembourgers<br>12% of the Germans<br>10% of the Belgians   |
| 2. <u>Feel especially remote:</u>  |   |
| (a) <u>from Greece</u>             | 29% of the Danes<br>24% of the Luxembourgers<br>18% of the British<br>15% of the Dutch<br>14% of the Germans      |
| (b) <u>from Germany</u>            | 19% of the Italians<br>15% of the Greeks  |
| (c) <u>from the United Kingdom</u> | 15% of the Italians<br>13% of the Greeks<br>13% of the Luxembourgers<br>12% of the French                         |

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<sup>1</sup> This summary only contains countries quoted by at least 10% of respondents in the Community as a whole.

Table 34

## FEELING OF CLOSENESS TO COMMUNITY COUNTRIES OTHER THAN ONE'S OWN

Country to which one feels closest (given first)	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	( % )
Belgium	-	1	2	16	2	3	15	14	3	3	6
Denmark		-	6	1	1	2	1	2	2	3	3
Germany	7	24	-	15	3	14	15	12	10	11	13
France	□	3	23		7	38	□	8	12	23	
Greece	1	1	2	3		6	1	1	1	-	3
Ireland			1	1	-		1	2	11	1	3
Italy	5	1	6	10	1	-	11	2	2	11	6
Luxembourg	12		2	2		1	-	1		1	2
Netherlands	9	4	13	3	2	4	4	-	9	3	7
United Kingdom	2	16	7	5	□	7	3	8	-	5	7
None	20	31	25	35	27	17	13	46	44	30	31
Don't know	12	19	13	9	3	8	6	4	6	9	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	2
Country to which one feels closest (given second)											
Belgium	-	1	3	8	4	6	16	9	3	6	5
Denmark		-	5	2	2	2	2	1	4	3	3
Germany	8	6	-	6	8	12	14	6	5	6	8
France	14	2	13	-	18	16	22	4	7	12	12
Greece	1	1	2	2	1	9	2		1	-	3
Ireland	1		3	2	-	1	2	1	4	1	2
Italy	5	2	6	9	6	-	5	1	3	11	5
Luxembourg	20		5	6	1	1	-	2	1	1	4
Netherlands	8	5	11	4	4	7	8	-	8	4	7
United Kingdom	2	10	7	7	7	12	4	6	-	5	8
None	23	33	23	38	40	23	17	61	54	40	35
Don't know	18	40	22	16	9	11	8	8	10	11	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	2

<sup>1</sup> Weighted average,<sup>2</sup> The total cannot come to 100: the weighting between the ten countries surveyed differs for each country mentioned, because respondents were not questioned on their own country.

Table 35

FEELING OF REMOTENESS FROM COMMUNITY COUNTRIES

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
<u>Country which seems most foreign</u>											
Belgium	1 -	1 3	2	1	5	3	4	.	2	1	2
Denmark	11	-	3	7	5	6	12	3	3	2	5
Germany	9	2	-	8	10	19	6	1	10	15	11
France	2	3	4	-	2	3	2	1	10	1	5
Greece	13	29	14	11	20	8	24	15	18	-	13
Ireland	8	10	7	6	-	9	15	14	6	5	8
Italy	2	5	3	2	5	-	4	5	7	2	4
Luxembourg	2	3	2	1	5	4	-	1	4	4	3
Netherlands	3	1	2	1	5	1 3	3	-	1	2	2
United Kingdom	6	1	8	12	5	15	13	2	-	13	10
None	23	21	31	40	32	21	9	50	33	41	32
Don't know	21	22	24	11	6	9	a	8	6	14	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	2

<sup>1</sup> and <sup>2</sup> see footnotes to Table 34.

These findings reveal the great complexity of relationships between closeness and remoteness between nations. The fact is that the citizens of a given country can perceive another country or group of countries as relatively close or "foreign" for a whole host of reasons, some include objectively quantifiable distance, subjective perception of that distance, language or cultural ties, memories of historical events acquired in youth, personal experience; there are many others.

Without attempting to unravel this knot here, we felt it was worth going beyond a straightforward description and adding a presentation in graph form - what might be called a psycho-geographic presentation - of how respondents in each of the ten Community countries locate each of their nine partners.

The technique used is a component factor analysis which reveals the dimensions within which all the replies for each respondent in each country are located.

Graph 10 sets out the results of this analysis country by country.

Two factors were selected in each case. The first, which can account for virtually all variations, doubtless tallies with the closeness/remoteness dimension of the nine "others" in relation to the respondent's country; the second is the degree of clustering of the nine countries according to the view which the respondents in the country under examination form of them.

To start with the Belgians, it is clear that France occupies a unique position in their minds: it is the country which is perceived as the closest but is separate from the other eight<sup>2</sup>. Greece is the most foreign country, but little more than Denmark, Ireland or the United Kingdom.

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<sup>1</sup> Each respondent was able to quote nine countries using the three available options: closest, second closest and most remote. Each country quoted in first place was given a score of 5, each country quoted in second place a score of 4, each country considered as the most remote the score of one and each country not quoted the score of 3 (the pivotal point). In addition, the respondent's country, although not covered by the question, was arbitrarily allocated a score of 5, so as to provide a plausible reference point.

<sup>2</sup> Additional analyses, not shown here, distinguish between the French-speaking, Dutch-speaking and Brussels regions: the results differ slightly but not as widely as might have been expected. The map of the psycho-geographical representations of French-speaking Belgium closely resembles that of Belgium as a whole. The map of Dutch-speaking Belgium shows no greater sense of closeness to the Netherlands than to France, but the Netherlands are more separate, as was France for the previous map. The map for Brussels has the characteristic of showing a far greater sense of closeness to France.

For the Danes, Greece is not just the most remote country, but it is clearly separate from the others. Germany is the closest country, followed by the United Kingdom; each of them stands apart from the others.

For the Germans, France is definitely a "special partner" and the same is true of Germany for the French. There is a virtually perfect symmetry between their replies, but the Germans place France closer to them than the French do Germany.

For the Greeks, Germany is remote and clearly separate from the eight other countries. France and Italy are both fairly close.

For the Irish, the United Kingdom occupies a privileged position, **as does** France for the Italians. It should be noted that the Italians do not feel especially close to Greece; at the same time they clearly isolate Germany, though without placing it further away than other countries.

The British seem to have a fairly disparate view of other Community countries. The exceptions to this are Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy, which are grouped together.

The Dutch have a fairly uniform view of their partners, although they consider Greece and Ireland as the two countries most foreign to them (and place them both very far from each other).


Lastly, the Luxembourgers - if the size of their sample permits observations - seem also to have a fairly dispersed view of surrounding countries, although they do recognize France's closeness (once again in a privileged position), as well as that of Belgium and Germany (very close to one another).

(See Graph 10)


Graph 10

PERCEPTION OF DISTANCES BETWEEN THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE COMMUNITY

BELGIUM




DENMARK




Graph 10 (Continued)

GERMANY




FRANCE






Graph 10 (Continued)

GREECE




IRELAND




Graph 10 (Continued)

ITALY




LUXEMBOURG




Graph 10 (Continued)

ETHERLANDS



UNITED KINGDOM



CHAPTER IV

REACTIONS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL  
TO THE PROSPECT OF JOINING THE COMMUNITY

#### IV

#### REACTIONS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL TO THE PROSPECT OF JOINING THE COMMUNITY

As in the past surveys since autumn 1981 a few questions were asked in Spain and Portugal in spring 1983 in order to gauge and compare attitudes towards the accession of those countries to the Community<sup>1</sup>.

##### IV.i. INTEREST IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS AND IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THEM<sup>2</sup>

In both countries interest in Community affairs and the importance attached to them by respondents have increased slightly since the last poll. But the involvement of the public, gauged by an index that combines the answers to the two questions is still low. Involvement is highly correlated with the leadership rating; this is even more so in Portugal than in Spain<sup>3</sup>,

In short, only about a third of the adult population in Spain and no more than a fifth in Portugal can at the moment be regarded as feeling involved to any extent by the problems of accession to the Community,

(See Tables 36 and 37)

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<sup>1</sup> These surveys were carried out by the Gallup Institute in Madrid between 18 and 29 April, and the Norma Institute in Lisbon between 26 April and 17 May, taking a representative sample of the population aged 15 and over (in Spain N = 913, in Portugal N = 1984).

<sup>2</sup> "Newspapers, radio and TV often present news and commentaries about the European Community (also called the Common Market). Are you personally very interested, a little interested or not at all interested in the problems of the European Community?"

"Whether or not you have the time to take a personal interest in the problems of the European Community, do you feel these problems are very important, not very important or unimportant for the future of (your country) and the people of (your country)?"

<sup>3</sup> For details of the leadership rating, see page 21.

Table 36

INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

	Spain		Portugal	
	Oct.- Nov. 1982	May 1983	Oct.- Nov. 1982	May 1983
	%	%	%	%
(++)Consider these affairs "very important" and are "very interested"	13	11	5	10
(+)	15	24	8	9
(=)	20	22	12	17
(-)	21	16	13	15
(--)Consider these affairs "not at all important" and are "not at all interested"	31	27	62	49
Total	100	100	100	100
Average score <sup>1</sup>	2.59	2.74	1.82	2.16
(Base)	1053	919	1853	1984

<sup>1</sup> ++ = 5, -- = 1.

Table 37

INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS  
BY LEADERSHIP RATING

Year	Average number of children per woman
1970	3.79
1980	3.66
1990	2.85
2010	3.52

#### IV.2. ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION ON COMMUNITY AFFAIRS<sup>1</sup>

The slight improvement we have seen in the public's feeling of involvement is also evident in the answers to the question on the feeling of being sufficiently or not sufficiently well informed about Community affairs.

In Spain, the proportion of those who feel they are sufficiently well informed has risen from 12% to 20% since the last survey.

In Portugal, this proportion has increased only from 6% to 9% but the sharp decline in the don't knows - already apparent between the first and second surveys last year - confirms the trend.

(See Table 38)

Table 38

#### ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION ON COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

	Suffi- ciently well informed	Not suffi- ciently well informed	Don't know	Total
<u>Spain</u>				
April-May 1982	12%	78%	10%	100%
October 1982	12	77	11	100
May 1983	20	69	11	100
<u>Portugal</u>				
February-March 1982	14%	23%	63%	100%
October-November 1982	6	54	40	100
May 1983	9	62	29	100

<sup>1</sup>"All things considered, would you say that people like yourself are sufficiently or are **not** sufficiently well informed about the problems dealt with by the European Community?"



This confirms that there is a threshold below which the question asked is completely meaningless to the respondent, It separates from the rest of the population those whose degree of involvement is so limited that they cannot even say whether they are or are not sufficiently well informed about Community affairs. But the threshold tends to sink as the media put out more and more information. As a result of this tendency, the uninvolved - we might say "subliminal" population declined from about 50% to 40% in Spain and from 75% to just over 60% in Portugal between October-November 1982 and May 1983<sup>1</sup>.

When this threshold is crossed the question begins to take on meaning for those who acquire an "average" degree of involvement; they can then say they are sufficiently well informed instead of "don't know", This is now happening in Portugal.

As more information becomes available, the proportion of those who feel sufficiently well informed grows; this is happening in Spain but not yet in Portugal<sup>2</sup>.

(See Table 39)

#### IV.3. FOR OR AGAINST WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION<sup>3</sup>

The slight increase in the involvement of the Spanish and Portuguese public in Community affairs already seems to have had, in Spain, its effect on attitudes to Europe. The proportion of those in favour of European unification rose from 59% to 61%; from one survey to the next this is hardly significant, but it does fit a positive trend, especially if the most ardent supporters are considered ("very much for" - 43% in May 1983 as against 35% in April-May 1982).

In Portugal the proportion of don't knows is still very high (56%) and only 37% say they support European unification, though this is slightly more than in previous surveys.

(See Table 40)

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<sup>1</sup> These proportions are those of persons showing (--) and (-) degrees of involvement, i.e. what we call "low".

<sup>2</sup> The proportion of persons who feel "well informed" will probably level out and may eventually even diminish, since one of the signs of involvement is the desire to know more and hence to be critical of the information available.

<sup>3</sup> Text of question, page 78.

Table 39

FEELING OF BEING SUFFICIENTLY WELL INFORMED BY DEGREE  
OF INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS<sup>1</sup>

	October-November 1982			May 1983		
	Degree of involvement			Degree of involvement		
	Low	Average	High	Low	Average	High
	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>SPAIN</u>						
- Sufficiently well informed	8	7	23	5	13	43
- Not sufficiently well informed	73	92	74	72	85	56
Don't know	19	1	3	23	2	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

<sup>1</sup> "Low" corresponds to (--) and (-) and "high" to (+) and (++) in the scale of involvement in Table 36.

Table 40

OVERALL SUPPORT FOR THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE

	Very much for	To some extent for	To some extent against	Very much against	Don't know	Total	Index <sup>1</sup>
<u>SPAIN</u>							
October 1981	36%	23%	5%	4%	32%	100%	3.33
April-May 1982	35	20	3	3	39	100	3.43
October 1982	38	21	5	3	33	100	3.40
May 1983	43	18	3	2	34	100	3.54

There is high correlation between these attitudes and degree of involvement. Not only do the don't knows diminish as we move up the scale, but even without them the positive trend is more pronounced. In other words, either those with some degree of involvement in European affairs tend to become more favourable or those who grow more favourable tend to become more involved. The threshold theory expounded above leads us to believe that the first of the two assumptions is the sounder.

(See Table 41)

<sup>1</sup> "Very much for" = 4, "very much against" = 1; don't knows excluded.

Table 41

OVERALL SUPPORT FOR UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE  
BY DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

	October-November 1982						May 1983					
	Degree of involvement						Degree of involvement					
	Low											
	%		%		%		%		%		%	
<u>SPAIN</u>												
Very much for	20		46		64		20		41		74	
To some extent for	18		32		19		15		31		14	
To some extent against	4	1	6		4		3	1	3	1	2	
Very much against	4	1	1		3	1	3		1		2	
Don't know	54		15		10		59		24		8	
Total	100		100		100		100		100		100	
Index <sup>1</sup>	3.19		3.44		3.59		3.25		3.47		3.75	
Base	542		215		296		403		199		317	
<u>PORTUGAL</u>												
Very much for	10		40		64		8		35		70	
To some extent for	7		23		18		9		28		13	
To some extent against	4		4		3		2		3		4	
Very much against	2	1	.	1	-		4		5		2	
Don't know	77		33		15		77		29		11	
Total	100		100		100		100		100		100	
Index <sup>1</sup>	3.11		3.52		3.72		2.86		3.32		3.68	
Base	1385		229		237		1268		342		374	

<sup>1</sup> See footnote to Table 40.

#### IV.4. ATTITUDES TO ACCESSION TO THE COMMUNITY<sup>1</sup>

In contrast to the relatively positive attitudes towards the ideal of unifying Western Europe, opinions on accession to the Community are tending to waver, no doubt because of the long-drawn-out negotiations, which have generated a certain boredom in both Spain and Portugal.

True, 46% of the persons interviewed in Spain believe that accession would be "a good thing" for their country, but three years ago (April 1980) 58% thought so, and the proportion of don't knows is growing, a sure sign of uncertainty or weariness.

In Portugal, the favourable answers are fairly steady (28% in May 1983 as against 31% in May-June 1981), but the declining percentage of don't knows - which reflects the involvement phenomenon described earlier - is matched by a significant increase in the negative answers (16% now as against 6 or 7% during the previous five polls).

(See Table 42)

It is clear - and analysis confirms it - that there is a positive correlation between opinions on accession to the European Community and the general attitude to unification of Europe, and that these two variables and the degree of involvement in European affairs are also correlated.

From the data at present available we can safely say that in Spain the two variables - involvement and overall attitude - have almost an equal impact on the opinion on accession, with involvement tending to have the edge as the European idea gains ground. In Portugal, however, the pro-European attitude has a stronger impact than involvement and this trend is hardening. This brings us back to the threshold theory once again. Without going into a causal explanation - in the technical sense of the term - it would appear that in Spain it is the European idea which generates involvement in European affairs and the favourable view of accession to the Community, while in Portugal - where a major proportion of the public lies below the mobilization threshold - it is involvement which is slowly generating support for the European idea.

If these assumptions are confirmed, the information campaigns in the two countries would need to be slanted accordingly, i.e. in different directions.

(See Tables 43 and 44)

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<sup>1</sup> Text of question, page 91.

Table 42

ATTITUDES TO ACCESSION

	Think accession will be:			Don't know	Total	Index <sup>1</sup>
	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing			
<u>SPAIN</u>						
April 1980	58%	13%	5%	24%	100%	2.70
December 1980	52	17	5	26	100	2.64
March 1981	53	13	6	28	100	2.65
October 1981	52	18	6	24	100	2.61
April-May 1982	51	21	5	1 2 3	100	2.60
October 1982	48	21	7	24	100	2.55
May 1983	46	17	5	32	100	2.61
<u>PORTUGAL</u>						
October 1980	24%	11%	6%	59%	100%	2.44
May-June 1981	31	10	6	53	100	2.53
October 1981	20	13	7	60	100	2.33
February-March 1982	24	14	7	55	100	2.38
October-November 1982	23	16	6	55	100	2.37
May 1983	28	8	16	48	100	2.38

<sup>1</sup> "Good thing" = 3, "bad thing" = 1, don't knows excluded.

Table 43ATTITUDES TO ACCESSION BY ATTITUDE TO UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

	October-November 1982			May 1983		
	For uni- fica- tion	Don't know	Against unifica- tion	For uni- fica- tion	Don't know	Against unifica- tion
- a good thing	63	28	28	55	28	51
- neither good nor neither good nor bad	21	18	31	16	18	20
- a bad thing	5	5	27	4	3	29
Don't know	11	49	14	25	51	-
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>1</sup>	2.65	2.44	2.01	2.67	2.49	2.31
Base	619	351	83	564	311	45
<u>PORTUGAL</u>						
<u>Think accession will be:</u>						
- a good thing	55	8	15	62	8	9
- neither good nor bad	21	4	36	24	10	21
- a bad thing	8	10	44	6	3	65
Don't know	16	78	5	8	79	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>1</sup>	2.55	2.20	1.69	2.60	2.27	1.41
Base	569	1205	79	736	1112	136

<sup>1</sup> See Footnote to Table 42.

Table 44

ATTITUDES TO ACCESSION BY DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

	October-November 1982			May 1983		
	Degree of involvement			Degree of involvement		
	Low	Mode- rate	High	Low	Mode- rate	High
	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Think accession will be:</u>						
- a good thing	28	58	79	27	68	59
- neither good nor bad	25	24	11	24	22	6
- a bad' thing	8	7	5	6	5	3
Dont know	39	11	5	43	10	32
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>1</sup>	2.32	2.58	2.79	2.36	2.65	2.83
Base	542	215	296	403	199	317
<u>PORTUGAL</u>						
<u>Think accession will be:</u>						
- a good thing	8	58	73	9	48	76
- neither good nor bad	15	21	8	15	24	12
- a bad thing	6	8	11	8	10	7
Don't know	71	13	8	68	18	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index <sup>1</sup>	2.08	2.57	2.71	2.02	2.46	2.72
Base	1385	229	237	1268	342	374

<sup>1</sup> See footnote to Table 42.



ANNEXES ET TABLEAUX DETAILLES / APPENDIX AND DETAILED TABLES

INSTITUTS CHARGES DU SONDAGE ET SPECIALISTES RESPONSABLES /  
INSTITUTES WHICH CARRIED OUT THE SURVEY AND EXPERTS IN CHARGE (x)

<b>Belgique/België</b>	DIMARSO N.V. rue des Colonies, 54 B-1000 Bruxelles Tél.: 02/219.24.08	Léo VEREYCKEN
<b>Danmark</b>	GALLUP MARKEDSANALYSE A/S Gammel Vartov Vej 6 DK-2900 Hellerup Tél.: 01/29.88.00	Rolf RANDRUP
<b>Deutschland</b>	EMNID-INSTITUT GmbH Bodelschwinghstraße, 23-25a D-4800 Bielefeld 1 Tél.: 0521/210.58	Günther BIERBAUM
<b>Ellas</b>	ICAP HELLAS S.A. Vas. Sophias, 64 GR-Athinai 615 Tél.: 01/7225.651	Anthony LYKIARDOPOULOS
<b>France</b>	INSTITUT DE SONDAGES LAVIALLE 6-8 rue du 4 Septembre F-92130 Issy-les-Moulineaux Tél.: 554.64.11	Albert LAVIALLE
<b>Ireland</b>	IRISH MARKETING SURVEYS Ltd 19-20 Upper Pembroke Street IRL-Dublin 2 Tél.: 76.11.96	John F. MEAGHER
<b>Italia</b>	ISTITUTO PER LE RICERCHE STATISTICHE E L'ANALISI DELL'OPINIONE PUBBLICA (DOXA) Galleria San Carlo, 6 1-20122 Milano Tél.: 02/790.871	Ennio SALAMON
<b>Luxembourg</b>	INSTITUT LUXEMBOURGEOIS DE RECHERCHES SOCIALES (ILRES) 6, rue du Marché-aux-Herbes GD-Luxembourg Tél.: 0352/475021	Louis MEVIS
<b>Nederland</b>	NEDERLANDS INSTITUUT VOOR DE PUBLIEKE OPINIE (NIPO) B.V. Barentzplein, 7 NL-1013 NJ Amsterdam Tél.: 020/24.88.44	Jan STAPEL
<b>United Kingdom</b> (xx)	SOCIAL SURVEYS (GALLUP POLL) 202 Finchley Road UK-LONDON NW3 6BL Tél.: 01/794.0461	Norman WEBB

Coordination internationale /  
International co-ordination

Hélène RIFFAULT'  
FAITS et OPINIONS  
25, rue Cambon  
F-75001 Paris  
Tél. : 01/296.41.65

Toutes les données relatives aux Euro-Baromètres sont déposées aux "Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences", (1 Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). Elles sont tenues à la disposition des organismes membres du European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), du Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) et des chercheurs justifiant d'un intérêt de recherche.

All Euro-Barometre data are stored at the Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences (1, Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research.

Pour tous renseignements sur les études d'opinion publique faites à l'initiative de la Commission des Communautés européennes, écrire à J.-R. RABIER Conseiller spécial, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Bruxelles.

For all information regarding opinion surveys carried out for the Commission of the European Communities, please write to J.-R. RABIER, special Counsellor, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels.

- 
- (x) Les dix instituts actuellement chargés de ces sondages ont formé entre eux THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY, dont le comité de direction comprend: Robert GIJS (DIMARSO, Bruxelles), Jan STAPEL (NIPO, Amsterdam) et Norman WEBB (Social Surveys, London). / The ten institutes which carried out these surveys have formed amongst themselves THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY of which the Management Committee comprises: Robert GIJS (DIMARSO, Brussels), Jan STAPEL (NIPO, Amsterdam) and Norman WEBB (Social Surveys, London).
- (XX) Le sondage en Northern Ireland est fait en collaboration par le Irish Marketing Surveys et le Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). / The Northern Ireland Survey is conducted jointly by Irish Marketing Surveys and the Social Surveys (Gallup Poll).

ECHANTILLONNAGE / SAMPLING

L'objectif de la méthode d'échantillonnage est de couvrir de façon représentative la totalité de la population des dix pays de la Communauté âgée de 15 ans et plus.

L'échantillon de chaque pays est constitué à deux niveaux:

1° Régions et localités d'enquête

Les statistiques de la Communauté européenne divisent l'espace européen en 117 régions (voir liste ci-jointe). L'enquête a lieu dans 115 régions (Corse et Val d'Aoste exceptés).

Chaque pays a constitué aléatoirement un échantillon-maître de localités d'enquête de telle sorte que toutes les catégories d'habitat soient représentées proportionnellement à leurs populations respectives.

Au total, les interviews de l'enquête Omnibus Européenne ont lieu dans environ 1 150 points d'enquête.

2° Choix des personnes interrogées

Les personnes interrogées sont toujours différentes d'une enquête à l'autre. L'échantillon-maître aléatoire évoqué ci-dessus indique le nombre de personnes à interroger à chaque point d'enquête. Au stade suivant, les personnes à interroger sont désignées:

- soit par un tirage au sort sur liste dans les pays où on peut avoir accès à des listes exhaustives d'individus ou de foyers: Belgique, Pays-Bas, Danemark, Luxembourg;
- soit par échantillonnage stratifié sur la base des statistiques de recensement, l'échantillon étant construit à partir des critères de sexe, âge et profession: France, Italie, Royaume-Uni, Irlande, Allemagne;
- soit par une méthode combinant les deux précédentes (cheminement systématique): Grèce.

The sample has been designed to be representative of the total population aged 15 years and over of the ten countries of the Community. In each country a two stage sampling method is used:

1° Geographical distribution

For statistical purposes the European Community divides Europe into 117 regions (see attached list). The survey takes place in 115 of these regions (Corsica and Val D'aoste excluded).

In each country a random selection of sampling points is made in such a way that all types of area (urban, rural, etc.) are represented in proportion to their populations.

The interviews are distributed in more or less 1 150 sampling points.

2° Choice of respondents

For each survey different individuals are interviewed in the master sample of sampling point described above. Within these sampling points the individuals to be interviewed are chosen:

- either at random from the population or electoral lists in those countries where access to suitable lists of individuals or households is possible: Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg;
- or by quota sampling. In these cases the quotas are established by sex, age and occupation on the basis of census data: this system is used in France, Italy, United-Kingdom, Ireland and Germany;
- or by a method combining the two precedent ones ("random route"): Greece.

# BELGIQUE/BELGIE

AN : Antwerpen  
W.V. : West-Vlaanderen  
O.V. : Oost-Vlaanderen  
BR : Brabant  
LI : Limburg  
LIE : Liège  
HAI : Hainaut  
NA : Namur  
LX : Luxembourg

LOR : Lorraine  
AL : Alsace  
B.N. : Basse-Normandie  
BRE : Bretagne  
P.LOI : Pays de la Loire  
CEN : Centre  
BOU : Bourgogne  
F.C. : Franche-Comté  
P.CH. : Poitou-Charentes  
LIM : Limousin  
AUV : Auvergne  
R-A : Rhône-Alpes  
AQU : Aquitaine

OV : Overijssel  
NH : Noord-Holland  
GEL : Gelderland  
ZH : Zuid-Holland  
UT : Utrecht  
ZE : Zeeland  
N.B. : Noord-Brabant  
LI : Limburg

# BUNDESREPUBLI

S.H. : Schleswig-Holstein  
STA : Stade  
AUR : Aurich  
OLD : Oldenburg  
B : Bremen  
LUN : Lüneburg  
BR : Braunschweig  
OSN : Osnabrück  
HAN : Hannover  
MUN : Münster  
DET : Detmold  
HIL : Hildesheim  
DUS : Düsseldorf  
ARN : Arnsberg  
KAS : Kassel  
AA : Aachen  
KOL : Köln  
TRI : Trier  
KOB : Koblenz  
DA.WI. : Darmstadt-Wiesbaden  
U.F. : Unterfranken  
O.F. : Oberfranken  
SAA : Saarland  
RH.PF. : Rheinhessen-Pfalz  
N.B. : Nordbaden  
N.W. : Nordwürttemberg  
M.F. : Mittelfranken  
O.PF. : Oberpfalz  
N.BAY. : Niederbayern  
S.B. : Südbaden  
S.W. : Südwürttemberg  
SCH : Schwaben  
O.BAY. : Oberbayern  
BER : Berlin

M.P. : Midi-Pyrénées  
LAN : Languedoc  
P.CDA : Provence-Côte d'Azur  
COR : (Corse)

# IRELAND

DON : Donegal  
N.W. : North West  
N.E. : North East  
W. : West  
M. : Midlands  
E. : East  
M.W. : Mid West  
S.E. : South East  
S.W. : South West

# ITALIA

V.D.A. : (Valle d'Aosta)  
PIE : Piemonte  
LOM : Lombardia  
T.AA : Trentino-Alto Adige  
VEN : Veneto  
F.VG : Friuli-Venezia-Giulia  
LIG : Liguria  
E-R : Emilia-Romagna  
TOS : Toscana  
UMB : Umbria  
MAR : Marche  
LAZ : Lazio  
ABR : Abruzzi  
MOL : Molise  
CAM : Campania  
PUG : Puglia  
BAS : Basilicata  
CAL : Calabria  
SIC : Sicilia  
SAR : Sardegna

# UNITED KINGDOM

SCOTL : Scotland  
N. : North  
N.I. : Northern Ireland  
N.W. : North West  
Y.H. : Yorkshire and Humberside  
WALES : Wales  
W.M. : West Midlands  
E.M. : East Midlands  
E.A. : East Anglia  
S.W. : South West  
S.E. : South East

# ELLAS

Kentriki Ellás kai Evia  
Pelopónnissos  
Iónioi Nissoi  
Ipiros  
Thessalia  
Makedonia  
Thráki  
Nissoi Aigaiou  
Kriti

# DANMARK

JYLL : Jylland  
SJA : Sjaelland  
FYN : Fyn

# FRANCE

NORD : Nord  
PIC : Picardie  
H.N. : Haute-Normandie  
R.P. : Région Parisienne  
CHA : Champagne

# LUXEMBOURG

LX : G.D. du Luxembourg

# NEDERLAND

GR : Groningen  
FR : Friesland  
DR : Drenthe

**POPULATION ETUDIEE, TAILLE DES ECHANTILLONS, DATES DU TRAVAIL /**  
**SURVEYED POPULATION, SIZE OF THE SAMPLE, DATES OF FIELDWORK**

	Population (1)		Echantillons / Samples (2) (Baro 19)	Dates (Baro 19)
	milliers / thousands	%		
B	7 856	3.69	1 038	28/III - 13/IV/1983
DK	4 054	1.91	1 027	13-23/IV
D	50 076	23.54	1 049	28/III - 19/IV
GR	7 259	3.41	1 000	25/III - 15/IV
F	41 586	19.55	1 011	28/III - 20/IV
IRL	2 342	1.10	987	31/III - 12/IV
I	44 301	20.82	1 031	1-15/IV
L	295	0.14	300	30/III - 21/IV
NL	10 907	5.13	998	7-16/IV
UK	44 061	20.71	1 348	26/III - 27/IV
CE/EC	212 737	100.0	9 790	25/III - 27/IV

**RECOMMANDATION AU LECTEUR /** **ADVICE TO READERS**

Il est rappelé que, dans les enquêtes par sondage, on doit tenir compte d'une certaine marge pour erreur d'échantillonnage. Avec des échantillons de l'ordre de 1 000 personnes interrogées, les différences de pourcentages inférieures à 5% ne devraient pas être normalement considérées comme statistiquement significatives.

Readers are reminded that in survey research, one should allow a certain margin for sampling error. With a sample of 1 000 cases, percentages differences of less than 5 points would not normally be regarded as statistically significant.

(1) 15 ans et plus / 15 years and over.

(2) Nombre d'interviews / Number of interviews.

TABLEAU 1 / TABLE 1

LE SENTIMENT GLOBAL DE SATISFACTION DE LA VIE / THE **FEELING** OF OVERALL LIFE SATISFACTION (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 V-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	43	39	36	36	40	38	46	37	46	42	35	36	29
	49	52	51	52	51	52	44	51	43	47	53	49	51
Très satisfait / Very satisfied													
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied													
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	6	5	8	a	7	8	6	9	8	7	8	10	12
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	2	2	4	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	3	4
Sans réponse / No reply		2	1	1			1	1	1	2	1	2	4
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1266	1507	1000	963	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983	1009	949	1210

(1) "Dans l'ensemble, êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas satisfait du tout de la vie que vous menez ?" / "On the whole, are **you** very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead ?"

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE; 1 (continued)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE											
	1982 X	1983 IV										
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	20	23										
Très satisfait / Very satisfied												
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	60	60										
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	12	12										
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	4	4										
Sans réponse / No reply	4	1										
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1020	1038										



TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	DANMARK												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 X-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	51	51	36	49	50	54	53	54	58	51	55	59	57
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	44	41	51	45	42	42	41	40	38	43	40	36	37
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	4	4	3	5	6	3	5	5	3	4	4	3	5
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	1		1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	
Sans réponse / No reply		4	9		1	1				1	.	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1073	1023	977	962	1010	992	983	1002	1073	994	1006	1211

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	DANMARK												
	1982 X	1983 IV											
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	57	54											
	39	41											
Très satisfait / Very satisfied													
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied													
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	3	4											
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied		1											
Sans réponse / No reply	1												
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	995	1027											

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
<b>Très satisfait / Very satisfied</b>	% 17	% 13	% 14	% 19	% 22	% 19	% 24	% 21	% 20	% 24	% 17	% 16	% 20
<b>Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied</b>	65	66	65	60	60	62	61	61	65	62	68	61	63
<b>Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied</b>	15	16	17	17	15	14	12	14	12	10	11	16	12
<b>Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied</b>	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	1	2	2	3	2
<b>Sans réponse / No reply</b>	1	3	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	4	3
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>N</b>	1957	1039	1002	1004	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003	1009	1004	1328

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND												
	1982 X	1983 IV											
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	19	18											
Très satisfait / Very satisfied													
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	65	63											
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	12	15											
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	2	3											
Sans réponse / No reply	2	1											
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1012	1049											

**TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)**

	FRANCE												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	15	16	15	14	10	11	13	12	11	10	10	12	16
	62	59	59	59	59	57	60	59	59	58	60	58	63
	17	16	18	20	22	23	19	19	23	22	22	22	16
	5	7	6	6	8	8	7	9	6	9	8	7	5
Sans réponse / No reply	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>2227</b>	<b>1156</b>	<b>1276</b>	<b>1241</b>	<b>1356</b>	<b>1256</b>	<b>1149</b>	<b>1276</b>	<b>1194</b>	<b>1152</b>	<b>443</b>	<b>1004</b>	<b>1199</b>

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	FRANCE												
	1982 X	1983 IV											
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	13	11											
Très satisfait / Very satisfied													
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	60	63											
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	20	18											
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	7	7											
Sans réponse / No reply		1											
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	939	1011											

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	IRELAND												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x - XI	1976 v - VI	1976 x - XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	53	36	40	34	37	38	42	40	41	37	34	34	40
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	39	52	50	54	50	50	47	50	45	47	52	49	46
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	6	9	7	9	9	8	6	7	8	11	11	13	11
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	2	3	3	3	4	4	5	3	5	5	3	3	2
Sans réponse / No reply	.					.			1	.		1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1000	998	1007	981	1008	997	1005	1005	997	1008	1005	1181

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	IRELAND												
	1982 X	1983 IV											
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	33	35											
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	53	47											
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	10	12											
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	4	5											
Sans réponse / No reply	.	1											
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1007	987											



TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	ITALIA												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	8	7	9	7	9	9	8	10	9	9	10	13	14
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	57	52	48	48	48	50	54	53	54	50	54	54	57
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	27	28	30	31	29	31	27	26	25	30	27	24	22
Pas satisfait <b>du</b> tout / Not at all satisfied	7	10	12	13	13	10	11	11	12	11	9	9	7
<b>Sans</b> réponse / No reply	1	3	1	1	1								
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1909	1043	1110	923	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030	1178	1116	1183	1301

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	ITALIA											
	1982 X	1983 IV										
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	11	11										
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	50	56										
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	28	24										
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	11	9										
Sans réponse / No reply	.											
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1025	1031										

**TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)**

	LUXEMBOURG												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	X	%	%	%	X	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	30	26	39	30	31	39	38	40	34	33	35	40	39
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	49	45	49	58	57	51	51	50	49	60	57	54	48
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	9	15	9	7	7	9	9	9	13	5	7	5	9
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	2	7	2	1	4	1	1	1	2	1		1	3
Sans réponse / No reply		7	1	4	1		1	.	2	1	1	.	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>311</b>	<b>297</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>344</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>291</b>	<b>299</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>399</b>

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG												
	1982 X	1983 IV											
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Très satisfait / Very satisfied	35	38										
	Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	56	54										
	Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	5	5										
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	3	1											
Sans réponse / No reply	1	2											
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	300	300											

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	NEDERLAND												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x - XI	1976 v - VI	1976 x - XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	41	33	34	41	38	38	44	46	44	46	47	44	42
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	52	52	52	48	52	54	48	47	48	49	48	48	52
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	5	7	6	9	7	6	5	6	5	4	4	6	4
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	2		1	2	1
Sans réponse / No reply	1	6	6	1	1	1	1		1	1	.		1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1464	1093	1006	904	1123	1033	943	1131	913	974	999	1091	1228

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	NEDERLAND									
	1982 X	1983 IV								
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	46	39								
	44	53								
	7	6								
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	2	2								
Sans réponse / No reply	1	.								
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1056	998								

**TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)**

	GREAT BRITAIN (1973) and UNITED KINGDOM													
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV	
	%	X	%	X	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	Très satisfait / Very satisfied	33	33	29	28	28	29	30	34	32	27	34	32	36
	Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	52	53	53	54	56	53	57	52	55	59	52	52	50
	Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	11	9	12	12	12	12	10	11	8	11	9	10	9
	Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	3	3	5	5	4	5	3	3	4	3	5	5	4
	Sans réponse / No reply	1	2	1	1		1	.		1	.	.	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N	1933	1328	1438	1340	1351	1414	1351	1426	1339	1317	1454	1369	1419

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN (1973) and UNITED KINGDOM											
	1982 X	1983 IV										
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	35	29										
	51	58										
Très satisfait / Very satisfied												
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied												
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	10	10										
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	3	3										
Sans réponse / No reply	1	.										
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1335	1348										



TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	ELLAS												
	1981 IV	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV									
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	19	18	17	17									
	39	46	39	46									
Très satisfait / Jery satisfied													
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied													
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	20	22	29	20									
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	22	13	14	17									
sans réponse / No reply	.	1	1										
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>N</b>	1000	1199	3000	1000									

**TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)**

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 V-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 x-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
<b>Très satisfait / Very satisfied</b>	% 21	% 20	% 19	% 20	% 20	% 20	% 22	% 22	% 22	% 21	% 21	% 21	% 24
<b>Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied</b>	58	57	56	55	55	55	57	55	57	56	57	55	57
<b>Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied</b>	16	16	17	18	18	18	15	16	15	17	16	17	14
<b>Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied</b>	4	5	6	6	6	6	5	6	5	5	5	6	4
<b>Sans réponse / No reply</b>	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>N</b>	3484	9550	9150	8627	9210	9044	8936	9327	8788	8976	8882	9898	11676

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'avril 1981 / Including Greece from April 1981

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)													
	1982 X	1983 IV											
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	22	20											
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	55	59											
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	17	15											
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	5	5											
Sans réponse / No reply	1	1											
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	9689	9790											

TABLEAU2 / TABLE2

LE SENTIMENT DE BONHEUR / THE FEELING OF HAPPINESS (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE											
	1975 V	1976 v - VI	1976 XI	1977 x - XI	1978 V - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1982 X	1983 Iv			
	%	%	X	%	%	%	X	%	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux / <b>Very happy</b>	36	34	31	43	34	40	45	26	27			
Assez heureux / <b>Fairly happy</b>	51	52	59	46	53	46	47	57	58			
<b>Pas trop heureux /</b> Not too happy	10	11	9	9	11	12	6	13	10			
Sans réponse / No reply	3	3	1	2	2	2	2	4	5			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1507	963	1077	1006	1013	1008	983	1020	1038			

(1) "Tout compte fait, pouvez-vous dire comment vont les choses pour vous en ce moment? Vous sentez-vous vraiment heureux, assez heureux, ou pas trop heureux en ce moment?" / "Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days - would you say you are very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy these days?"

**TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)**

	DANMARK											
	1975 V	1976 v-VI	1976 XI	1977 x - XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x - XI	1979 IV	1982 X	1983 IV			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>Vraiment heureux / Very happy</b>	38	31	35	33	37	33	34	29	29			
<b>Assez heureux / Fairly happy</b>	49	57	52	57	52	55	59	46	52			
<b>Pas trop heureux / Not too happy</b>	6	6	8	7	6	5	5	20	14			
<b>sans réponse / No reply</b>	7	6	5	3	5	7	2	5	5			
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
<b>N</b>	1073	977	962	992	983	1002	1073	995	1027			

TABLEAU 2 (suite). / TABLE 2 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND											
	1975 V	1976 v - VI	1976 X I	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1982 X	1983 I V			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux / Very happy	11	13	17	16	14	10	15	13	13			
Assez heureux / Fairly happy	63	63	62	69	66	67	68	69	68			
Pas trop heureux / Not too happy	21	18	19	12	15	16	13	13	15			
Sans réponse / No reply	5	6	2	3	5	7	4	5	4			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1039	1004	1007	999	996	1006	1003	1012	1049			

**TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)**

	FRANCE											
	1975 V	1976 V-VI	1976 XI	1977 x-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1982 X	1983 IV			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>Vraiment heureux / Very happy</b>	16	15	11	16	12	12	19	14	17			
<b>Assez heureux / Fairly happy</b>	55	61	60	63	60	59	61	64	61			
<b>Pas trop heureux / Not too happy</b>	27	22	27	20	26	26	18	21	21			
<b>Sans réponse / No reply</b>	2	2	2	1	2	3	2	1	1			
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
<b>N</b>	1156	1241	1356	1149	1276	1194	1139	939	1011			

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	IRELAND											
	1975 V	1976 v-VI	1976 XI	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1982 X	1983 IV			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Vraiment heureux / Very happy	17	35	26	40	26	29	37	32	34		
	Assez heureux / Fairly happy	53	56	55	53	59	57	53	56	54		
Pas trop heureux / Not too happy	30	8	18	6	15	12	9	12	10			
Sans réponse / No reply	.	1	1	1	.	2	1		2			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1000	1007	981	997	1005	1005	997	1007	987			



TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

ITALIA												
1975 V	1976 V-VI	1976 XI	1977 X-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1982 X	1983 IV	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux / Very happy	6	4	4	7	7	6	7	9	8			
Assez heureux / Fairly happy	48	54	42	58	48	53	59	53	60			
Pas trop heureux / Not too happy	44	38	52	34	44	38	33	36	31			
Sans réponse / No reply	2	4	2	1	1	3	1	2	1			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1043	923	1052	1155	1175	1030	1178	1025	1031			

TABLEAU2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG											
	1975 V	1976 v - VI	1976 X I	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1982 X	1983 I V			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux / <b>Very happy</b>	24	12	26	18	26	18	28	21	22			
Assez heureux / Fairly happy	50	<b>64</b>	59	61	57	61	62	67	63			
Pas trop heureux / Not too happy	21	19	13	18	15	18	8	11	11			
Sans réponse / No reply	5	5	2	3	2	<b>3</b>	2	1	<b>4</b>			
Total	<b>100</b>	100	100	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	100	100	100	100			
N	311	268	<b>301</b>	<b>344</b>	322	291	299	300	<b>300</b>			

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	NEDERLAND											
	1975 V	1976 V-VI	1976 XI	1977 X-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1982 X	1983 IV			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux / Very happy	31	38	35	47	44	39	50	44	43			
Assez heureux / Fairly happy	54	52	56	46	49	52	45	47	50			
Pas trop heureux / Not too happy	10	8	7	5	6	7	3	8	6			
Sans réponse / No reply	5	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	1			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	1093	905	1123	943	1131	913	974	1056	998			

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM											
	1975 V	1976 v-VI	1976 XI	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1982 X	1983 IV			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Vraiment heureux / Very happy	22	32	17	29	24	22	33	26	29			
Assez heureux / Fairly happy	50	56	55	61	59	58	57	59	59			
Pas trop heureux / Not too happy	27	11	27	9	17	18	10	15	11			
Sans réponse / No reply	1	1	1	1	.	2	.		1			
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
	100											
		1340	1297	1351	1426	1339	1314	1335	1348			
N	1325											

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE-2 (continued)

	ELLAS											
	1982 X	1983 IV										
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Vraiment heureux / Very happy	10	10									
	Assez heureux / Fairly happy	40	41									
	Pas trop heureux / Not too happy	48	48									
Sans réponse / No reply	2	1										
Total	100	100										
N	1000	1000										

**TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)**

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (2)											
	1975 V	1976 v-VI	1976 XI	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1982 X	1983 IV			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>Vraiment heureux / Very happy</b>	16	19	15	2c	17	15	22	18	19			
<b>Assez heureux / Fairly happy</b>	54	58	55	62	58	59	60	59	60			
<b>Pas trop heureux / Not too happy</b>	27	20	28	17	23	22	16	21	19			
<b>Sans réponse / No reply</b>	3	3	2	1	2	4	2	2	2			
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
<b>N</b>	9590	8635	9263	8978	9297	8791	8932	9689	9790			

(2) Y compris la Grèce à partir de 1982 / Including Greece from 1982.

TABLEAU 3 / TABLE 3

LE SENTIMENT DE SATISFACTION QUANT AU FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA DEMOCRATIE /

THE FEELING OF SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS (1)

	BELGIQUE/BELGIE												
	1973 IX	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 X-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	13	6	6	8	7	4	4	8	4	7	7	4	4
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	49	47	50	43	49	38	39	39	30	28	33	40	39
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	23	24	21	18	23	24	29	25	32	31	32	29	27
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	9	8	10	10	8	13	14	12	19	18	17	14	17
Sans reponse / No reply	6	15	13	21	13	21	14	16	15	16	11	13	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1266	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983	1032	1022	973	1210	1020	1038

(1) "Dans l'ensemble, êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas satisfait du tout du fonctionnement de la **démocratie** (dans votre pays) ?" / "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (in your country) ?"

**TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)**

	DANMARK													
	1973 I X	1976 X-X II	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 x	1982 IV	1982 x	1983 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
<b>Très satisfait / Very satisfied</b>	7	6	10	10	14	10	9	17	13	17	11	12	16	
<b>Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied</b>	38	49	53	57	53	54	53	54	47	50	50	45	54	
<b>Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied</b>	35	33	24	24	21	24	24	18	27	22	27	29	20	
<b>Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied</b>	18	10	5	6	7	7	8	6	8	7	8	8	4	
<b>Sans reponse / No reply</b>	2	2	8	3	5	5	6	5	5	4	4	6	6	
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>N</b>	1199	962	1010	992	983	1002	1073	1029	1024	1009	1211	995	1027	



DEUTSCHLAND													
	1973 IX	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 X-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	5	13	11	0	0	9	10	12	9	11	12	3	12
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	39	66	67	09	67	68	70	68	64	59	56	49	49
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	44	16	16	16	16	15	14	12	17	18	21	22	18
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	11	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	4	5	7	1	1
Sans réponse / No reply	1	2	4	4	5	6	5	6	6	7	4	7	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1957	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003	1005	1008	962	1328	1012	1049

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	FRANCE													
	1973 IX	1976 K-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 K-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X'	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	X	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	4	4	7	5	5	4	4	3	3	5	2	5	3	
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	37	38	38	44	44	36	37	38	33	48	42	40	33	
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	30	31	29	29	27	34	30	32	34	27	30	32	37	
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	16	15	16	11	13	17	17	15	18	7	12	14	17	
Sans réponse / No reply	13	12	10	11	11	9	12	12	12	13	14	9	10	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	2227	1356	1256	1149	1276	1194	1152	986	986	1006	1199	939	1011	

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	IRELAND													
	1973 I X	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 X-X ■	1978 V-V ■	1978 x-XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
<b>Très satisfait /</b> <b>Very satisfied</b>	9	7	10	12	13	10	5	11	7	13	12	6	6	
<b>Plutôt satisfait /</b> <b>Fairly satisfied</b>	46	52	52	57	58	51	42	46	41	46	44	41	39	
<b>Plutôt pas satisfait /</b> <b>Not very satisfied</b>	27	25	23	16	15	18	30	22	30	22	22	28	30	
<b>Pas satisfait du tout /</b> <b>Not at all satisfied</b>	16	10	10	6	7	11	13	15	16	9	11	16	19	
<b>Sans réponse /</b> <b>No reply</b>	2	6	5	9	7	10	10	6	6	10	11	9	6	
<b>Total</b>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	
<b>N</b>	<u>1199</u>	<u>98 ■</u>	<u>1008</u>	<u>997</u>	<u>1005</u>	<u>1005</u>	<u>997</u>	<u>1006</u>	<u>1007</u>	<u>985</u>	<u>1181</u>	<u>1007</u>	<u>987</u>	

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	ITALIA													
	1973 I X	1976 X-X II	1977 II-V	1977 X-X II	1978 v- VI	1978 x- XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
<b>Très satisfait /</b> <b>Very satisfied</b>	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	4	2	3	2	
<b>Plutôt satisfait /</b> <b>Fairly satisfied</b>	25	13	11	18	24	18	14	19	18	16	19	16	15	
<b>Plutôt pas satisfait /</b> <b>Not very satisfied</b>	42	43	47	45	44	46	46	41	45	43	44	38	46	
<b>Pas satisfait du tout /</b> <b>Not at all satisfied</b>	30	40	39	33	28	32	36	36	32	34	31	39	34	
<b>Sans réponse /</b> <b>No reply</b>	1	3	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	4	4	3	
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>N</b>	1909	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030	1178	1170	1108	1070	1301	1025	1031	

**TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)**

	LUXEMBOURG													
	1973	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980	1981	1982	1982	1983	
	I X	(-X ■	IV - v	x - XI	J-V ■	x - XI	I V	X	X	X	IV	X	IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
<b>Très satisfait /</b> <b>Very satisfied</b>	16	13	15	24	24	15	17	23	18	16	14	12	13	
<b>Plutôt satisfait /</b> <b>Fairly satisfied</b>	36	41	56	44	43	48	44	50	59	59	49	47	49	
<b>Plutôt pas satisfait /</b> <b>Not very satisfied</b>	28	4	22	20	24	29	29	23	17	18	26	28	23	
<b>Pas satisfait du tout /</b> <b>Not at all satisfied</b>	9	8	2	4	2	3	4	2	5	4	9	8	6	
<b>Sans réponse /</b> <b>No reply</b>	11	17	5	8	7	5	6	2	1	3	2	5	9	
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>N</b>	330	301	302	344	322	291	299	298	300	500	399	300	300	

**TABLEAU3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)**

	NEDERLAND													
	1973 I X	1976 X-XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 X-XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
<b>Très satisfait /</b> <b>Very satisfied</b>	8	12	10	9	8	9	9	7	9	6	6	7	7	
<b>Plutôt satisfait /</b> <b>Fairly satisfied</b>	44	55	57	55	61	44	55	54	42	53	49	43	46	
<b>Plutôt pas satisfait /</b> <b>Not very satisfied</b>	28	26	24	26	22	35	25	27	34	27	32	33	33	
<b>Pas satisfait du tout /</b> <b>Not at all satisfied</b>	10	6	5	6	5	8	6	7	11	9	8	14	10	
<b>Sans réponse /</b> <b>No reply</b>	10	1	4	4	4	4	5	5	4	5	5	3	4	
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>N</b>	1464	1123	1033	943	1131	913	974	1092	1114	1011	1228	1056	998	

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN (1973) and UNITED KINGDOM													
	1973 I X	1976 K-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 X-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 X-XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV	
	%	%	%	%.	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
<b>Très satisfait /</b> <b>Very satisfied</b>	7	7	10	8	9	6	7	7	9	6	14	13	12	
<b>Plutôt satisfait /</b> <b>Fairly satisfied</b>	37	44	49	54	53	45	46	45	42	42	46	45	52	
<b>Plutôt pas satisfait /</b> <b>Not very satisfied</b>	34	30	24	21	23	28	27	28	27	29	25	23	23	
<b>Pas satisfait du tout /</b> <b>Not at all satisfied</b>	20	13	12	9	8	12	13	13	16	13	9	12	7	
<b>Sans reponse /</b> <b>No reply</b>	2	6	5	8	7	9	7	7	6	10	6	7	6	
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>N</b>	1933	1351	1414	1351	1426	1339	1317	1403	1432	1395	1419	1335	1348	

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	ELLAS												
	1980 X	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV								
	%	%	%	%	%								
Très satisfait Very satisfied	20	24	19	23	19								
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	33	28	41	35	40								
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	23	18	21	25	21								
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	22	23	11	9	13								
Sans réponse/ No reply	2	7	8	8	7								
Total	100 100	100 100	00	100	100								
N	1000	1000	199	000	1000								



TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)												
	1973 I X	1976 X-X ■	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 I V	1982 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tres satisfait / Very satisfied	8	7	7	6	6	6	6	7	7	8	8	8	8
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	40	42	44	48	49	43	43	44	40	42	41	41	41
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	33	29	28	26	27	30	28	27	30	28	30	28	30
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	13	16	16	13	12	14	16	15	17	14	14	16	15
Sans réponse / No reply	6	6	5	7	6	7	7	7	6	8	7	7	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	3484	9210	9044	8936	9327	8788	8976	9021	9001	9911	1676	9689	9790

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'octobre 1980 / Including Greece from October 1980.

TABLEAU 4 / TABLE 4

L'ATTITUDE FONDAMENTALE A L'EGARD DE LA SOCIETE / BASIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOCIETY (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIË											
	1970 I-III x - XI	1976 IV-VI x - XI	1977 I-V x - V	1977 x - XI	1978 J-VI x - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
	%	%	%	X	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	3	5	6	4	4	6	5	7	9	6	7	8
Reformes / Reforms (2)	69	65	66	60	63	61	64	55	60	57	57	60
Défense contre la subversion Defence against subversion	14	19	18	19	21	15	16	21	18	20	19	18
Sans réponse / No reply	14	11	10	17	12	18	15	17	13	17	17	14
Tota 1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1298	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983	1032	1009	1022	949	

(1) "Sur cette carte (MONTRER CARTE) se trouvent trois attitudes fondamentales vis-à-vis de la société dans laquelle nous vivons. Voulez-vous choisir l'attitude qui correspond le mieux à vos idées personnelles? (UNE SEULE REPONSE). 1. ■■■ faut changer radicalement toute l'organisation de notre société par une action révolutionnaire. 2. ■■■ faut améliorer petit à petit notre société par des réformes. 3. ■■■ faut défendre courageusement notre société actuelle contre toutes les forces subversives." / "On this card (SHOW CARD) are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-à-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. 1. The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action. 2. Our society must be gradually improved by reforms. 3. Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces."

(2) En 1970 : "par des réformes intelligentes". / In 1970 : "by intelligent reforms".

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIË										
	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV								
	%	%	%								
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	8	9	5								
Réformes / Reforms (2)	69	57	61								
Défense contre la subversion Defence against subversion	13	19	19								
Sans réponse / No reply	10	15	15								
Total	100	100	100								
N	1210	1020	1038								

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

DANMARK											
1970 II-III	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 X-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	4	3	3	3	0	2	2	3	1	2	2
Réformes / Reforms	51	52	55	51	61	61	55	54	52	56	55
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	38	39	40	42	40	31	38	36	43	38	38
Sans réponse / No reply	7	6	2	4	1	6	5	7	4	4	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	962	1010	992	983	1002	1073	1029	994	1024	1006	1009

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	DANMARK											
	1982 IV	3982 X	1983 IV									
	%	%	%									
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	2	2	1									
Réformes / Reforms	56	59	61									
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	39	37	34									
Sans réponse / No reply	3	2	4									
Total	100	100	100									
N	1211	995	1027									

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND											
	1970 I-III	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 X-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%			%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	3	4	4	3	4
Réformes / Reforms (2)	70	52	43	41	41	43	52	50	47	46	41	49
Defense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	20	39	48	50	50	44			37	43	43	36
Sans réponse / No reply	8	7	7	7	8	11	7	9	12	7	13	11
Tota 1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	2021	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003	1005	1009	1008	1004	962

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND											
	I982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV									
	%	%	%									
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	4	3	2									
Réformes / Reforms (2)	44	45	49									
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	39	38	42									
Sans réponse / No reply	13	14	7									
Total	100	100	100									
N	1328	1012	1049									

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	FRANCE											
	1970 .I-III	1976 XI	1977 IV-V	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
	%	%	%	X	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	5	13	14	2	8	12	9	10	11	9	9	5
Réformes / Reforms (2)	78	64	62	65	66	70	68	63	60	64	65	65
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	12	18	19	22	20	13	16	19	24	20	20	26
Sans reponse / No reply	5	5	5	5	6	5	7	8	5	7	6	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>2046</b>	<b>1356</b>	<b>1256</b>	<b>1149</b>	<b>1276</b>	<b>1194</b>	<b>1152</b>	<b>986</b>	<b>993</b>	<b>986</b>	<b>991</b>	<b>1006</b>



TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	FRANCE										
	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV								
	%	%	%								
	4	5	6								
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action											
Réformes / Reforms (2)	67	66	63								
Défense contre la subversion , Defence against subversion	23	26	25								
Sans réponse / No reply	6	3	6								
Total	100	100	100								
N	1199	939	1011								

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	IRELAND											
	1970 II-III	1976 X-XI	1977 IV - V	1977 X-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	7	5	7	6	7	6	7	7	7	6	4
	Réformes / Reforms	60	61	64	59	61	64	58	61	65	63	59
	Defense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	23	26	26	24	20	16	28	20	20	22	27
Sans réponse / No reply	10	8	13	11	12	4	7	12	8	9	10	
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		981	1008	997	1005	1005	997	1006	1008	1007	1005	985

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	IRELAND											
	1982	1982	1983									
	IV	X	IV									
	%	%	%									
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	4	7	5									
Réformes / Reforms	64	53	61									
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	20	28	26									
Sans réponse / No reply	12	12	8									
Total	100	100	100									
N	1181	1007	987									

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	1970 I-III	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X
<b>Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action</b>	%	X	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	7	13	11	10	8	9	7	9	6	6	8	6
<b>Réformes / Reforms (2)</b>	73	66	58	61	58	63	63	60	58	61	61	61
<b>Defense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion</b>	11	18	28	27	31	24	26	27	32	29	29	29
<b>Sans reponse / No reply</b>	9	3	3	2	3	4	4	4	4	4	2	4
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>N</b>	1822	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030	1178	1170	1116	1108	1183	1070

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

		ITALIA									
	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV								
	%	%	%								
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	7	7	6								
Réformes / Reforms (2)	65	66	71								
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	23	22	19								
Sans réponse / No reply	5	5	4								
Total	100	100	100								
N	1301	1025	1031								

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG										
	1970 II-III	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 X-XI	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	1	2	3	4	5	4	2	8	5	6	4
Réformes / Reforms (Z)	65	49	56	55	65	71	70	62	64	66	67
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	27	32	32	28	22	19	25	25	25	23	25
Sans réponse / No reply	7	17	9	13	8	6	3	5	6	5	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	335	801	802	800	791	299	298	800	800	800	500

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG										
	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV								
	%	%	%								
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	6	3	3								
Réformes / Reforms (2)	64	60	67								
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	27	32	23								
Sans réponse / No reply	3	5	7								
Total	100	100	100								
N	399	300	300								

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	NEDERLAND											
	1970 I-III	1976 K- XI	1977 IV- v	1977 x- XI	1978 IV- v	1978 x- XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	6	5	5	4	5	6	4	6	6	4	7	6
	75	56	58	55	56	63	66	54	53	58	54	52
	15	32	32	37	35	25	23	34	37	33	35	32
Réformes / Reforms (2)	4	7	5	4	4	6	7	6	4	5	4	10
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion												
Sans réponse / No reply												
Tota 1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1230	1123	1033	943	1131	913	974	1092	999	1114	1091	1011



TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	NEDERLAND											
	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV									
	%	%	%									
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	6	5	4									
Réformes / Reforms (2)	60	57	65									
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	29	34	27									
Sans réponse / No reply	5	4	4									
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100									
<b>N</b>	1228	1056	998									

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM											
	1970 II-III	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 X-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action Réformes / Reforms Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion Sans réponse / No reply		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
		7	8	6	6	5	3	7	6	6	9	9
		60	59	55	54	63	67	59	56	58	54	57
		25	26	28	31	25	21	28	32	29	31	25
		8	7	11	9	7	9	6	6	7	6	9
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		1351	1414	1351	1426	1339	1317	1403	1454	1432	1369	1395

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM											
	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV									
	%	%	%									
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	6	5	4									
Réformes / Reforms	58	53	57									
Défense contre la subversion Defence against subversion	30	33	32									
Sans réponse / No reply	6	9	7									
Total	100	100	100									
N	1419	1335	1348									

TABLEAU 4 (suite) . TABLE 4 (continued)

	ELLAS							
	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV		
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	%	%	%	%	%	%		
	9	10	8	6	7	7		
Réformes / Reforms	58	55	9	62	54	60		
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	28	28	2	23	29	26		
Sans réponse / No reply	5	7	1	9	10	7		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1000	1000	1000	1199	1000	1000		

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)											
	1970 I-III	1976 X I	1977 IV-V	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action		8	8	6	5	7	5	7	6	6	7	6
Reformes / Reforms		60	55	55	55	59	62	57	55	57	55	57
Defense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion		26	31	32	33	27	26	29	31	30	31	29
Sans reponse / No reply		6	6	7	7	7	7	7	8	7	7	8
Tota 1		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		9210	9044	8936	9327	8788	8976	9021	8882	10001	9898	9911

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis octobre 1980 / Including Greece from October 1980.

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)											
	1982	1982	1983									
	IV	X	Iv									
	%	%	%									
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	5	5	4									
Réformes / Reforms	59	57	60									
Défense contre la subversion Defence against subversion	28	30	30									
Sans réponse / No reply	8	8	6									
 Total	 100	 100	 100									
 N	 1676	 9689	 9790									

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis octobre 1980 / Including Greece from October 1980

TABLEAU 5 / TABLE 5

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"Il faudrait faire des efforts pour réduire les inégalités de revenus /  
Greater effort should be made to reduce inequality of income."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord Agree strongly	56	55	47	33	21	28	31	28	27	68	64	60	34	36	29	60	49	47
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	26	28	35	40	38	34	45	42	50	25	28	27	51	46	52	31	33	36
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	7	7	8	14	21	19	14	15	16	2	5	7	6	10	8	4	9	10
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	3	5	4	5	10	10	4	7	1	2	1	3	1	1	1	2	6	5
Sans réponse/No reply	8	5	6	8	10	9	6	8	6	3	2	3	8	7	10	3	3	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	983	973	1038	1073	1009	1027	1003	962	1049	1152	1006	1011	997	985	987	1178	1070	1031

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITEDKINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY(1)		
	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV		1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	65	56			40	45	25	20	22		77	72	46	41	40
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	25	20	24	28	28	28	40	45	49		9	11	35	36	39
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	6	11	15	15	10	13	17	22	17		2	3	10	12	12
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	1	9	6	6	11	11	10	5	4		3	2	4	5	4
Sans réponse/No reply	3	4	3	2	11	3	8	8	8		9	12	5	6	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100
N	299	500	300	974	1011	998	1317	1395	1348		1000	1000	3976	911	9790
								1395	1348					911	9790

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir de 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.



TABLEAU 5a / TABLE 5a

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"Il faudrait développer l'énergie nucléaire pour répondre aux besoins d'énergie dans l'avenir /  
Nuclear energy should be developed to meet future energy needs."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	19	15	19	14	13	10	22	26	16	22	27	19	12	10	9	14	31	26
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	25	26	25	18	18	13	33	35	38	30	34	34	27	27	27	27	28	31
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	20	17	13	23	26	23	17	17	22	18	18	17	18	28	24	18	15	18
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	19	25	20	29	30	40	17	10	14	16	12	15	24	21	2c	24	17	15
Sans réponse/No reply	17	17	18	16	13	14	11	12	10	14	9	15	15	14	2c	15	9	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	983	973	1038	1073	1009	1027	1003	962	1049	1152	1006	1011	997	985	987	1178	1070	1031

TABLEAU 5a (suite) / TABLE 5a (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG				NEDERLAND		UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS		COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY (1)			
	1979 IV	1981 X			1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV		1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%			%	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	25	21			13	16	23	17	17		32	16	20	24	19
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	23	24	25	23	25	18	40	46	47		11	11	32	34	35
Plutôt pas d'accord/Disagree	19	20	20	22	18	21	12	14	16		6	10	17	16	18
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	27	30	25	37	33	37	9	11	8		28	37	18	15	16
Sans réponse/No reply	6	5	10	5	11	8	16	12	12		23	26	13	11	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100
N	299	500	300	974	1011	998	1317	1395	1348		1000	1000	8976	9111	9790

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir de 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.

TABLEAU 5b / TABLE 5b

ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES-IMPORTANTES /

AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME OF THE ISSUES

"Il faudrait réduire le nombre de lois qui existent (dans notre pays) et mieux appliquer celles qu'on garde." /

"We should cut down on the number of laws we have in this country and make sure the ones we keep are properly applied."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV
			%			%			%			%			%			%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly			38			44			25			46			32			55
Plutôt d'accord/Agree			35			35			48			36			42			30
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree			6			7			14			6			11			7
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly			3			2			2			3			4			2
Sans réponse/No reply			18			12			11			9			11			6
Total			100			100			100			100			100			100
N			1038			1027			049			011			987			1031

**TABLEAU 5b (suite) / TABLE 5b (continued)**

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY		
			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV
			%			%			%			%			%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly			40			37			22			50			37
Plutôt d'accord/Agree			32			30			44			16			38
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree			14			13			21			5			12
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly			4			8			5			5			3
Sans réponse/No reply			10			12			8			24			10
Total			100			100			100			100			100
N			300			998			348			000			1790

TABLEAU 5c / TABLE 5c

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES-IMPORTANTES /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"Pour redonner du travail aux chômeurs, il faudrait que ceux qui ont un emploi acceptent de travailler moins et de gagner moins." /  
 "To provide work for the unemployed, those who are in work must accept shorter hours and a lower income."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV
			%			%			%			%			%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly			17			20			15			15			17
Plutôt d'accord/Agree			30			30			39			28			27
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree			19			25			28			23			27
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly			25			13			29			13			25
Sans réponse/No reply			9			12			5			9			4
Total			100			100			100			100			100
N			1038			1027			1049			1011			1031

TABLEAU 5c (suite) / TABLE 5c (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY		
			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV			983 IV			983 IV
			%			%			%			%			%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly			22			28			9			32			15
Plutôt d'accord/Agree			28			38			28			16			31
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree			29			16			40			13			28
.Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly			15			14			14			27			19
Sans réponse/No reply			6			4			9			12			7
Total			100			100			100			100			100
N			300			998			1348			000			790

TABLEAU 5d/ TABLE 5d

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"Il faudrait des peines plus sévères pour les actes de terrorisme /  
More severe penalties should be introduced for acts of terrorism."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	75	69	69	63	64	67	58	52	50	67	71	75	62	52	57	76	68	69
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	13	17	16	22	22	20	28	33	30	18	17	15	27	37	32	13	16	17
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	4	5	4	6	5	4	7	6	8	5	6	5	3	5	4	6	7	8
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	1	2	2	1	2	1	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	4	7	4
Sans réponse/No reply	7	7	9	8	7	8	3	6	9	7	3	3	6	5	6	1	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	983	973	1038	1073	1009	1027	1003	962	1049	1152	1006	1011	997	985	987	1178	1070	1031

TABLEAU 5d (suite) / TABLE 5d (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE / COMMUNITY		
	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV		1981 X	1983	1979	1981	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		%				%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	80	83	77	78	72	74	73	70	68		63	77	69	65	66
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	12	8	12	13	12	14	17	20	24		15	9	19	21	21
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	2	5	5	5	5	6	4	5	3		3	3	5	6	2
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	3	2	3	2	1	3	2	1	1		6	3	3	3	2
Sans réponse/No reply	3	2	3	2	10	3	4	4	4		13	8	4	5	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100
N	299	500	300	974	1011	998	1317	1395	1348		1000	1000	3976	9911	790

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.



TABLEAU 5e/ TABLE 5e

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

1" OR DISA I OME NT POLITICAL IES

"Il faudrait que davantage d'industries privées soient nationalisées /  
Public ownership of private industries should be expanded."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	20	10	10	6	6	6	10	11	8	21	16	11	18	13	13	15	14	14
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	22	17	16	12	11	10	24	19	25	20	23	16	35	37	32	18	16	16
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	18	16	17	29	29	22	26	28	29	18	24	23	18	25	21	20	19	17
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	16	31	30	39	38	48	21	21	17	20	20	33	6	6	10	31	39	42
Sans réponse/No reply	24	26	27	14	16	14	19	21	21	21	17	17	23	19	24	16	12	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	983	973	1038	1073	1009	1027	1003	962	1049	1152	1006	1011	997	985	987	1178	1070	1031

TABLEAU 5e (suite) / TABLE 5e (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG													COMMUNAUTE / COMMUNITY		
	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV		1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	13	15	12	13	12	12	10	12	11		58	48	14	14	12	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	19	14	11	21	14	16	20	31	32		11	13	21	21	21	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	25	24	30	23	22	24	27	22	27		3	5	23	22	23	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	32	39	33	34	38	40	29	20	18		11	14	25	26	28	
Sans réponse/No reply	11	8	14	9	14	8	14	15	12		17	20	17	17	16	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100	
N	299	500	300	974	1011	998	1317	1395	348		000	000	8976	1911	9790	

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis 1-1981 / Including Greece from 1981.

TABLEAU 5f/ TABLE 5f

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH **SOME** IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"L'Europe de l'Ouest devrait faire plus d'efforts pour s'assurer une défense militaire suffisante /  
Western Europe should make a stronger effort to provide adequate military defence."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	15	15	13	8	13	9	17	17	8	9	17	16	17	12	10	9	18	13
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	20	24	25	17	21	17	37	37	36	24	36	27	41	44	32	21	27	24
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	21	20	18	30	25	25	22	19	30	21	16	17	14	17	20	22	19	21
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	19	18	20	26	20	24	8	11	13	17	11	15	4	5	7	30	22	26
Sans réponse/No reply	25	23	24	19	21	25	16	16	13	29	20	25	24	22	31	18	14	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	983	973	1038	1073	1009	1027	1003	962	1049	1152	1006	1011	997	985	987	1178	1070	1031

TABLEAU 5f (suite) / TABLE 5f (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY <sup>(1)</sup>		
	1975 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV		1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	30	26	22	20	20	16	23	16	15		46	31	15	18	13
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	35	26	19	30	26	18	42	46	45		15	15	31	35	31
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	11	19	21	21	19	23	4	16	20		6	8	20	18	22
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	13	22	22	19	22	33	4	7	5		10	16	15	13	16
Sans réponse/No reply	11	7	16	10	13	10	7	15	15		23	30	19	16	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100
N	299	500	300	974	1011	998	1317	1395	1348		1000	1000	8976	9911	9790

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.

TABLEAU 58/ TABLE 58

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

" Le gouvernement devrait intervenir davantage dans la direction de l'économie /  
Government should play a greater role in the management of the economy."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%	%	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	38	23		13	13		13	16		22	29		32	31		35	39	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	28	32		26	29		32	30		34	41		47	47		37	34	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	11	11		27	23		23	22		15	12		10	10		10	9	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	5	14		15	13		17	17		7	7		3	3		6	8	
Sans réponse/No reply	18	20		19	22		15	15		22	11		8	9		12	10	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	983	973		1073	1009		1003	962		1152	1006		997	985		1178	1070	

TABLEAU 5g (suite) / TABLE 5g (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE / COMMUNITY (1)		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X			1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%			%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	25	31		33	32		11	13			71		21	26	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	33	30		36	33		33	45			10		34	36	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	19	18		14	14		22	19			2		17	15	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	10	12		8	10		14	8			3		11	10	
Sans réponse/No reply	13	9		9	11		20	15			14		17	13	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100			100		100	100	
N	299	500		974	1011		1317	1395			1000		3976	1911	

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.

TABLEAU 5h /TABLE 5h

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"Le gouvernement devrait intervenir moins dans la direction de l'économie." /

"Government should play a smaller role in the management of the economy." (1)

	BELGIQUE BELGIË		DANMARK		DEUTSCHLAND		FRANCE		IRELAND		ITALIA	
		1983 IV		1983 IV		1983 IV		1983 IV		1983 IV		983 IV
		%		%		%		%		%		%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly		18		e		5		14		10		13
Plutôt d'accord/Agree		27		22		37		27		25		24
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree		17		28		33		21		32		22
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly		11		16		7		14		16		23
Sans réponse/No reply		27		26		18		24		17		18
Total		100		100		100		100		100		100
N				1027		1049		1011		987		1031

(1) Les résultats d'avril 1983 sont présentés séparément car la formation de la question a été délibérément inversée. Ces résultats ne sont donc pas comparables avec les précédents. /

The results for April 1983 are separately presented, because the wording of the question has been deliberately reversed. Consequently these results are not comparable with the previous ones.

TABLEAU 5h (suite) / TABLE 5h (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM						COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY		
			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV			1983 IV
			%			%			%			%			%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly			14			16			6			14			10
Plutôt d'accord/Agree			25			23			29			9			28
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree			29			26			41			10			28
.Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly			14			24			10			42			15
.Sans réponse/No reply			18			11			14			25			19
Total			100			100			100			100			100
N			300			998			348			1000			9790



TABLEAU 5i/ TABLE 'ii

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"L'aide économique aux pays du tiers monde devrait être augmentée.  
Economic aid to third world countries should be increased".

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	23	17	17	14	14	13	12	8	8	23	29	21	20	19	16	36	39	27
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	28	25	24	27	32	24	28	31	26	30	39	34	51	49	45	36	31	39
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	18	20	18	26	28	26	29	29	38	19	16	20	17	19	21	11	14	18
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	18	26	25	15	12	21	14	19	14	14	10	16	3	5	8	6	11	11
Sans réponse/No reply	13	12	15	18	14	16	17	13	14	14	6	9	9	8	12	11	5	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	983	973	1038	1073	1009	1027	1003	962	049	1152	1006	1011	997	985	987	1178	1070	1031

TABLEAU 5i (suite) / TABLE 5.i(continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY <sup>(1)</sup>		
	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV		1981 X (2)	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	34	43	36	34	28	21	9	13	11		70	60	20	23	18
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	35	28	30	30	31	32	27	34	35		8	16	30	33	32
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	15	16	21	19	15	24	28	29	32		2	3	22	21	26
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	12	10	6	10	15	17	19	16	13		4	4	13	14	14
Sans réponse/No reply	4	3	7	7	11	6	17	8	9		16	16	15	9	10
Total	100	100	100 100	100 100	100 100	100 100	100	100	100		100	100	100 100	100 100	100
N	299	500	300	974	1011	998	1317	1395	1348		1000	1000	3976	9911	9790

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.

(2) Chiffres corrigés/Corrected figures.

TABLEAU 5j/ TABLE 5j

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"On devrait prendre des mesures plus fermes pour protéger l'environnement et lutter contre la pollution.  
Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment against pollution."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	70	61	48	58	55	57	48	48	52	69	68	64	50	42	35	75	74	72
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	19	28	38	32	33	31	40	41	39	25	28	29	46	51	53	22	22	24
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	3	4	6	4	5	4	7	5	5	1	2	3	1	3	3	1	1	2
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly		2	1	1	2	1	2	1		1	1	1		1	1			
Sans réponse/No reply	8	5	7	5	5	7	3	5	4	4	1	3	3	3	8	2	3	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	983	973	1038	1073	1009	1027	1003	962	1049	1152	1006	1011	997	985	987 987	1178 1178	1070	1031

TABLEAU 5j(suite) / TABLE 5j. (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS					
	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV		1981 X	1983 IV	1979 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%		%	%		%	%	%		%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	79	81	81	76	70	70	58	45	45		94	95	63	60	60
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	17	15	16	19	19	24	36	47	49		1	2	30	33	34
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	2	3	2	2	4	3	2	4	3				3	3	3
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	1	1		1	1	1		1					1	1	
Sans réponse/No reply	1		1	2	6	2	4	3	3		5	3	3	3	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100
N	299	500	300	974	1011	998	1317	1395	1348		1000	1000	8976	9111	9790

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.

TABLEAU 5k / TABLE 5k

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"Il faudrait donner plus d'autonomie de décision aux régions de (notre pays) /  
Regions of (our country) should be given more freedom to handle her **own** affairs."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË		DANMARK		DEUTSCHLAND		FRANCE		IRELAND		ITALIA					
		1981 X					1981 X	1983 IV		1981 X	1983 IV		1981 X	1983 IV		
		%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly		25	26		32	35	17	16		40	35		20	19	30	29
Plutôt d'accord/Agree		31	34		38	32	38	43		38	42		50	49	31	34
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree		11	9		11	10	20	20		8	8		11	12	11	12
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly		6	6		3	3	7	6		2	3		3	3	12	10
Sans réponse/No reply		27	25		16	20	18	15		12	12		16	17	16	15
Total		100	100		100	100	100	100		100	100		100	100	100	100
N		97	1038		1009	1027	962	1049		1006	1011		985	987	1070	1031

TABLEAU 5k (suite) / TABLE 5k (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG		NEDERLAND		UNITED KINGDOM		ELLAS		COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY	
	1981 X	198 IV	1981 X	198 IV	1981 X	1983 IV	1981 X	198 IV	1981 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	37	3	43	30	19	19	74	7	29	27
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	28	2	32	32	50	46	10	9	37	39
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	18	2	9	14	16	20	1	1	13	14
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	8		7	10	6	5	3	4	7	6
Sans réponse/No reply	9	1	9	14	9	10	12	15	14	14
Total	100	10	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	500	30	1011	998	1395	1348	1000	1000	9911	9790

TABLEAU 6/ TABLE 6

ATTITUDE A L'EGARD DE L'UNIFICATION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE / ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE (1) (2)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIË																			
	1962	1970	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983					
	II	II	IX	V	XI	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
Très pour / For -very much	31	31	22	23	21	27	27	23	20	25	18	27	20	17	27					
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	34	35	38	32	36	42	44	46	47	40	42	43	49	43	41					
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	4	4	3	2	3	4	6	6	5	8	6	5	8	8	6					
Très contre / Against -very much	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	1					
Sans réponse / No reply	30	29	35	42	39	25	22	23	26	25	31	23	21	30	25					
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	770	298	1266	1507	000	1008	983	032	1009	1022	949	973 973	1210 1210	1020	1038					

(1) (2) Voir page A 97.

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	DANMARK																		
	1973 IX	1975 V				1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV						
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	17	17	15	15	14	13	12	16	17	12	13	12	13						
Plutôt pour / For - to some extent	28	24	27	33	35	33	27	31	29	31	29	28	32						
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	14	13	16	17	18	18	19	19	16	22	22	19	19						
Très contre / Against -very much	18	17	18	15	13	20	21	14	18	17	20	18	18						
Sans réponse / No reply	23	29	24	20	20	16	21	20	20	18	16	23	18						
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1073	1023	1002	1073	1029	994	1024	1006	1009	1211	995	027						



TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND																			
	1952 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1961 III	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 I-VI	1967 V	1970 III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 I-XI	1978 I-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	7c	8c	7:	6c	79	82	75	50	78	7E	82	87	39	49	43	37	37	36	37	36
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent								31					37	29	34	37	41	46	44	44
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	10	4	7	6	6	5	7	3	3	5	3	2	4	4	2	3	4	6	6	6
Très contre / Against -very much								1					1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1
Sans réponse / No reply	20	14	20	25	15	13	18	15	19	17	15	11	19	16	20	21	17	11	12	13
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1591	836	820	813	863	1159	1295	1523	1234	1202	1255	1000	1021	1957	1039	1002	1006	1003	1005	1009

TABLEAU 6 (suite)/ TABLE 6 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND																			
	1980 X	1981 IV	1982 X	1983 IV	1984 X	1985 IV														
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	38	3	38	38	28	36														
Plutôt pour / For - to some extent	40	39	37	41	42	49														
Plutôt contre / Against - to some extent	7	9	11		11	5														
Très contre / Against -very much	2	4	1		5	1														
Sans réponse / No reply	13	17	13	12	14	9														
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1008	004	962	328	1012	049														

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	1951 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 I/II	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 V-VI	1967 V	1970 III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 X-XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	61	63	4	45	53	67	55	28	70	80	74	72	24	23	35	26	28	25	24	19
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent								44					46	45	43	51	52	47	51	56
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent								6					6	3	4	3	5	8	7	9
Très contre / Against -very much	10	9	1	12	14	7	9	2	5	5	5	7	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	2
Sans réponse / No reply	2	28	3	43	33	26	36	20	22	15	21	21	22	28	17	19	13	18	15	14
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	134	847	900	805	800	1226	1200	1518	1307	1215	1228	1961	2046	2227	1156	1276	1194	1152	986	993

**TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)**

	FRANCE																		
	198C	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983													
	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV													
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	17	16	26	24	28	25													
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	52	56	54	54	54	50													
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	9	9	6	8	7	5													
Très contre / Against -very much	2	3	1	2	1	1													
Sans réponse / No reply	20	16	13	12	10	19													
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	986	991	1006	199	939	011													

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	IRELAND																		
	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983						
	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV	X						
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	21	23	25	24	19	25	19	19	20	21	15	16	16						
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	31	34	32	45	45	43	41	39	39	41	40	41	39						
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	8	8	8	7	9	9	10	10	15	11	12	12	9						
Très contre / Against -very much	4	7	4	3	2	5	2	7	8	5	5	5	4						
Sans réponse / No reply	36	28	31	21	25	18	28	25	18	22	28	26	32						
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1000	998	1005	997	1006	1008	1007	1005	985	1181	1007	987						

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	ITALIA																			
	1952 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V				1965 v - VI	1967 V	1970 I-III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 IX-XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much								36					40	34	39	38	32	39	40	35
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent		61	5	5	66		59	24			65	68	38	36	38	39	51	48	45	48
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent								3					4	2	2	2	4	3	4	4
Très contre / Against -very much			1	13	7		7	1			4	4	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Sans réponse / No reply	29	21	3	32	27		34	36	27	19	31	28	17	27	20	19	12	9	10	12
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1505	808	814	803	911		1269	1562	1344	1175	1166	1023	1822	1909	1043	1110	1030	1178	1170	1116

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	ITALIA																		
				1982	1982	1983													
				IV	X	IV													
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	39	36	40	32	28	36													
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	42	46	42	47	47	44													
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	6	8	5	6	6	5													
Très contre / Against -very much	1	3	4	1	2	1													
Sans réponse / No reply	12	7	11	14	17	14													
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1108	1183	107	1301	102	1031													

**TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)**

	LUXEMBOURG																	
	197C				1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981	1982	1982	983				
	CHI				X	IV	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV				
	%	%			%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	52	47	48	47	31	47	48	48	46	45	45	40	37	39				
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	24	33	31	39	43	42	40	38	39	42	38	42	41	39				
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	2	1	2	1	13	5	7	6	9	6	11	5	9	8				
Très contre / Against -very much	2	-	1	-	5	2	1	3	1	1	3	3	2	3				
Sans réponse / No reply	20	19	18	13	8	4	4	5	5	6	3	10	11	11				
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	335	330	311	297	291	299	298	300	300	300	500	399	300	300				



TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	NEDERLAND																		
	1962 III	1971 VI	1973 IX	1975	1975	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV				
	X	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	62	30	34	37	33	37	37	34	28	35	30	28	24	27	29				
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	25	44	39	29	31	46	47	48	48	44	50	46	52	48	46				
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	3	7	e	3	4	7	5	8	10	8	8	10	9	9	10				
Très contre / Against -very much	1	3	7	5	3	3	3	3	4	3	5	7	4	6	5				
Sans réponse / No reply	9	16	12	26	29	7	8	7	10	10	7	9	11	10	10				
TOTAL	100 100	100 100	100 100	100 100	100 100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	779	1230	1464	1093	1006	913	974	1092	999	1114	1091	1011	228	1056	998				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN AND UNITED KINGDOM																			
	1952 IX	1954	1955	1955	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 I-VI	1967 V	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 IX-XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	58	78	67	66	65	70	64	47	59	69	63	14	28	23	22	21	20	21	23	17
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent												23	22	28	41	40	41	38	40	35
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	15	4	10	14	16	10	12	22	18	11	15	15	11	11	12	14	15	16	14	14
Très contre / Against -very much												15	11	12	10	6	8	10	8	15
Sans réponse / No reply	27	18	23	20	19	20	24	31	23	20	22	33	28	26	15	19	16	15	15	19
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1503	832	805	814	806	1210	1232	1261	1178	1179	992	1933	1328	1438	1339	1317	403	1454	1432	369

**TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)**

	GREAT BRITAIN AND UNITED KINGDOM																			
	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV																
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	20	17	21	20																
	44	39	40	40																
	13	19	15	15																
Très contre / Against -very much	5	12	6	5																
Sans réponse / No reply	15	13	18	20																
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1395	419	1335	1348																

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE6 (continued)

	ELLAS													
	1980	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983								
	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV								
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	33	30	36	29	36	31								
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	26	30	29	29	27	30								
Plutôt contre / Against - to som extent	12	12	7	10	8	6								
Très contre / Against -very much	11	13	8	7	7	6								
Sans réponse / No reply	18	15	20	25	22	27								
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1000	1000	1000	1199	1000	1000								

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	EURO 6																				
	1962 1-11	1970 III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV						
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%						
Très pour / For -very much	4c	34	35	39	33	33	34	34	30	32	27	34	29	28	32						
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	32	40	36	37	41	47	47	46	49	44	47	44	49	47	47						
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	4	4	3	3	2	4	6	6	6	7	9	8	7	8	6						
Très contre / Against -very much	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	1						
Sans réponse / No reply	2:	20	24	20	22	14	12	12	13	15	14	12	13	14	14						
TOTAL	100	100	100			100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	6334	8752	9153			5442	5589	5585	5426	5538	5518	5522	6665	6352	6427						

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (3)																			
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV							
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	30	35	31	30	30	30	27	29	26	31	26	26	29							
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	33	34	38	45	45	45	46	43	43	43	45	44	45							
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	6	5	5	8	6	8	9	9	10	9	10	10	8							
Très contre / Against -very much	5	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	6	4	5	4	3							
Sans réponse / No reply	26	22	22	14	15	13	14	15	15	13	14	16	15							
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	3484	3550	9150	3788	8976	3021	3882	9001	3878	1911	1671	1689	9790							

(3) Voir page A 97.

- (1) "D'une façon générale, Êtes-vous pour ou contre les efforts; qui sont faits pour unifier L'Europe occidentale ?

SI POUR, Êtes-vous très pour ou plutôt pour ?

SI CONTRE, Êtes-vous plutôt contre ou très contre ?" /

"In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe ?

IF FOR, are you very much for this, or only to some extent ?

IF AGAINST, are you only to some extent against or very much against ?"

- (2) Données provenant pour les années 1952 - 1967, y compris juin 1952, des sondages commandités par La U.S. Information Agency et, pour les années suivantes, ainsi que pour février - mars 1952, des sondages commandités par La Commission des Communautés européennes.

Nonobstant quelques différences de formulation, la question était initialement : "Êtes-vous en général pour ou contre les efforts qui sont faits en vue d'unifier L'Europe occidentale ?". En Grande-Bretagne (de 1955 à 1967), en Allemagne (de février 1955 à avril 1956, ainsi qu'en juin 1962), en Italie (en 1955 et 1962), la question précisait : "... l'Europe occidentale, y compris La Grande-Bretagne". En 1970, 1973 et 1975, il était demandé aux individus interrogés s'ils étaient favorables, indifférents, ou défavorables à L'unification européenne. Cf. : "L'Opinion publique et C'Europe des Six" ; Sondages, Paris, n° 1 - 1963, p. 46 ; "Les Européens et l'unification de l'Europe", Bruxelles, juin 1972, pp. 71 - 72 ; Euro-Barometre n° 4, décembre 1975, pp. 54 - 56.

Royaume-Uni (y compris Northern Ireland) à partir de 1975. /

- (2) The data for 1952 - 1967, including June 1952, are from surveys financed by the U.S. Information Agency and, for the following years, as well as February - March 1952, from surveys financed by the Commission of the European Communities. Notwithstanding some differences in the wording, the question was, initially, as follows : "Are you in general for or against making efforts towards uniting Western Europe ?". In Great-Britain (from 1955 to 1967), in Germany (from February 1955 to April 1956, as well as in June 1962), the question specified : "... Western Europe, including Great-Britain". In 1970, 1973 and 1975, the interviewed individuals were asked whether they were in favour, indifferent or not in favour of the European unification. Cf. : "L'Opinion publique et l'Europe des Six" ; Sondages, Paris, n° 1 - 1963, p. 46 ; "Europeans and European unification", Brussels, June 1972, pp. 71 - 72 ; Euro-Barometre n° 4, December 1975, pp. 54 - 56.

- (3) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'octobre 1980 / Including Greece from October 1980.

TABLEAU 7 / TABLE 7

## L'ENTENTE ENTRE LES PAYS DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE AU COURS DES DOUZE DERNIERS MOIS /

THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS

"Au cours des 12 derniers mois, à votre avis, l'entente entre les pays de la Communauté Européenne (Marché Commun) a-t-elle, dans l'ensemble, plutôt progressé, plutôt régressé, ou est-elle restée à peu près sans changement ?"

"In your opinion, over the last 12 months, has the understanding between the countries of the European Community (Common Market) in general increased, decreased or stayed about the same ?"

	BELGIQUE/BELGIË							DANMARK						
	1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV	1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	21	27	10	11	8	11	11	19	16	11	9	11	12	9
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	18	8	30	31	38	25	27	31	19	35	36	35	24	24
A peu près sans changement/About the same	34	35	32	37	32	38	36	40	43	35	40	40	50	49
Sans réponse/No reply	27	30	28	21	22	26	26	10	22	19	15	14	14	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1006	1008	949	973	1210	1020	1038	992	1002	1006	1009	1211	995	027



TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND							FRANCE						
	1977	1978	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983	1977	1978	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983
	X-XI	X-XI	IV	X	IV	X	IV	X-XI	X-XI	IV	X	IV	X	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	26	33	17	28	10	12	12	24	23	16	16	11	14	9
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	24	9	36	21	42	34	27	16	11	20	21	31	24	30
A peu près sans changement/About the same	36	37	28	37	36	39	48	46	46	47	52	43	50	46
Sans réponse/No reply	14	21	19	14	12	15	13	14	20	17	11	15	12	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	300	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	999	1006	1004	962	1328	1012	1049	1149	1194	991	1006	1199	939	1011

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	IRELAND							ITALIA						
	1977 X-XI	1978 X-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV	1977 X-XI	1978 X-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	42	46	23	26	19	22	17	35	33	19	21	10	12	11
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	9	9	22	14	18	20	19	18	10	24	26	26	19	17
A peu près sans changement/About the same	38	31	44	46	44	46	42	22	25	41	35	36	44	46
Sans réponse/No reply	11	14	11	14	19	12	22	25	32	16	18	28	25	26
		100	100	100	100	100	00	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
		1005	1005	285	1181	1007	987	1155	1030	1183	1070	1301	1025	1031

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG							NEDERLAND						
	1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV	1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	28	27	19	23	8	12	11	14	13	10	10	8	7	9
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	19	10	26	31	35	29	38	24	11	34	32	36	31	28
A peu près sans changement/About the same	41	53	45	42	40	50	43	48	54	46	47	41	50	50
Sans réponse/No reply	12	10	10	4	17	9	8	14	22	10	11	15	12	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	344	291	300	500	399	300	300	943	913	1091	1011	1228	1056	998

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM							ELLAS						
	1977 X-XI	1978 X-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV	1977 X-XI	1978 X-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	32	27	11	15	11	11	11			23	27	17	27	22
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	17	17	51	34	39	35	25			9	11	13	9	7
A peu près sans changement/About the same	42	43	30	42	42	46	52			31	32	34	32	31
Sans réponse/No reply	9	13	8	9	8	8	12			37	30	36	32	40
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			100	100	100	100	100
N	1351	1403	1369	1395	1419	1335	1348			1000	1000	1199	1000	1000

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)						
	1977 X - XI	1978 K - XI	1981 I V	1981 X	1982 IV	1982 X	1983 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	28	28	15	19	11	13	11
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	19	12	33	26	34	27	25
A peu près sans changement/About the same	38	38	36	41	39	44	47
Sans réponse/No reply	15	22	16	14	16	16	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	8936	8788	9898	9911	1676	9689	9790

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'avril 1981 / Including Greece from April 1981.

TABLEAU 8 / TABLE 8

## JUGEMENT PORTE SUR L'APPARTENANCE A LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE /

## ATTITUDE TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)(2)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
Bonne chose / Good thing	57	68	60	57	59	62	66	69	60	58	66	65
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	5	3	6	3	3	5	3	4	5	6	3	2
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	19	15	18	21	21	17	19	17	19	21	17	20
Sans réponse / No reply	19	14	16	19	17	16	12	10	16	15	14	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1266	1017	1505	1507	1000	963	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983
(suite)/(continued)												
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83			
Bonne chose / Good thing	51	56	57	54	49	55	57	41	62			
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	3	3	2	4	6	5	6	9	3			
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	25	25	25	24	27	26	24	30	19			
Sans réponse / No reply	21	16	16	18	18	14	13	20	16			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	965	1032	1009	1022	949	973	1210	1020	1038			

(1) "D'une façon générale, pensez-vous que le fait (pour votre pays) de faire partie de la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) est une bonne chose, une mauvaise chose, ou une chose ni bonne ni mauvaise ?" / "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad ?".

(2) VI/1979. Source : International Institute of Communications (London).

**TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)**

	DANMARK											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV179
Bonne chose / Good thing.	42	35	33	36	41	36	29	30	37	34	36	37
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	30	31	35	25	27	29	34	30	33	31	25	25
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	19	24	25	28	24	22	28	30	24	27	30	26
Neither good nor bad	9	10	7	11	8	13	9	10	6	8	9	12
Sans réponse / No reply												
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1168	1100	1073	1023	977	962	1010	992	983	1002	1073

	(suite)/(continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83			
	38	39	33	32	30	31	33	35	35			
	28	27	29	29	31	29	30	28	24			
	14	24	28			29	27	28	30			
						11	10	9	11			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1018	1029		1024	1006	1009	1211	995	1027			

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing	63	59	62	56	61	48	57	54	59	58	63	66
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	4	8	10	8	6	12	5	8	7	3	4	5
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	22	26	20	28	27	30	31	23	24	24	21	20
Neither good nor bad	11	7	8	8	6	10	7	15	10	15	12	9
Sans réponse / No reply												
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1957	1060	1042	1039	1002	1004	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003
	(suite)/(continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing	59	64	65	62	49	58	54	51	61			
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	6	3	6	6	9	6	8	9	5			
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	34	25	18	22	28	26	31	34	26			
Neither good nor bad	1	8	11	10	14	10	7	6	8			
Sans réponse / No reply												
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	807	1005	1009	1008	1004	962	1328	1012	1049			



TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	FRANCE											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Bonne chose / Good thing 61	68	63	64	■ ■	■ ■	52	64	57	54	59	56
	Mauvaise chose / Bad thing 5	5	6	4			7	6	9	9	7	8
	Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad 22	20	22	25	■ ' ■	■	35	24	28	27	26	28
Sans réponse / No reply 12	7	9	7			6	6	6	6	10	8	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	2227	1308	1237	1156	1276	1241	1356	1256	1149	1276	1194	1152
	(suite) / (continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Bonne chose / Good thing 49	58	51	48	50	53	55	57	53			
	Mauvaise chose / Bad thing 9	6	9	10	11	7	7	9	7			
	Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad 31	26	32	31	32	33	30	29	30			
Sans réponse / No reply 11	10	8	11	7	7	8	5	10	10			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1002	986	993	986	991	1006	1199	939	1011			

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	IRELAND											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV179
Bonne chose / Good thing.	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	56	48	50	50	67	50	50	57	59	54	63	54
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	15	25	24	20	12	16	22	17	19	17	12	14
Neither good nor bad	21	19	22	25	17	18	22	22	19	23	20	24
Sans réponse / No reply	8	8	4	5	4	6	6	4	3	6	5	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1000	1000	1000	998	1007	981	1008	997	1005	1005	997

	(suite)/(continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83			
Bonne chose / Good thing	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	56	58	52	47	46	49	44	47	45			
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	16	12	19	26	22	19	18	21	20			
Neither good nor bad	14	25	22	21	27	27	29	27	28			
Sans réponse / No reply	14	5	7	6	5	5	9	5	7			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1276	1006	1008	1007	1005	985	1181	1007	987			

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG												
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	KI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	Bonne chose / Good thing.	67	79	73	65	78	66	77	84	73	73	63	83
	Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	3	4	3	7	4	5	2	2	3	5	14	3
	Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	22	12	13	19	12	21	17	11	17	16	15	12
Sans réponse / No reply	8	5	11	9	6	8	4	3	7	6	8	2	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	330	308	297	311	297	268	301	302	344	322	291	299	

	(suite)/(continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Bonne chose / Good thing	86	84	73	79	76	73	72	72			
	Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	3	3	3	3	5	2	4	5			
	Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	10	10	22	15	17		21	18			
Sans réponse / No reply	1	3	1	3	2	19	3	5				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		298	300	300	300	500	399	300	300			

TABLEAU 8 .suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	ITALIA											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
Bonne chose / Good thing.	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	69	77	82	71	75	63	68	71	70	65	73	78
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	2	5	3	3	4	6	5	5	5	5	3	2
Neither good nor bad	15	9	11	21	16	20	16	18	18	18	16	14
Sans réponse / No reply	14	9	4	5	5	11	11	6	7	12	8	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1909	1030	1021	1043	1110	923	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030	1178
(suite)/(continued)												
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83			
Bonne chose / Good thing	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	75	75	74	71	73	70	68	64	70			
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	4	2	3	5	5	5	3	5	4			
Neither good nor bad	13	17	16	17	19	20	20	21	18			
Sans réponse / No reply	8	6	7	7	3	5	9	10	8			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	985	1170	1116	1108	1183	1070	1301	1025	1031			

**TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)**

	NEDERLAND											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV179
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing	63	66	70	64	67	75	74	80	74	78	83	84
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	4	4	6	3	3	4	4	3	5	5	2	2
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /												
Neither good nor bad	20	14	15	18	12	15	14	13	16	14	12	10
Sans réponse / No reply	13	16	9	15	18	6	8	4	5	3	3	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1464	1000	1012	1093	1006	904	1123	1033	943	1131	913	974

	(suite) /(continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing	52	78	75	75	76	75	74	74	77			
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	6	3	3	5	6	3	4	5	4			
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /												
Neither good nor bad	16	15	16	14	14	15	16	15	15			
Sans réponse / No reply	26	4	6	6	4	7	6	6	4			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1159	1092	999	1114	1091	1011	1228	1056	998			

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	OM											
	X/72 (1)	IX/73 (2)	V/74 (2)	XI/74 (2)	V/75 (2)	XI/75 (2)	I/76 (1)	II/76 (1)	V/76 (2)	VII/76 (1)	IX/76 (1)	XI/76 (2)
Bonne chose / Good thing.	40	31	33	36	47	50	50	49	39	39	33	39
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	21	34	39	35	21	24	24	26	35	31	37	34
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	22	22	19	20	19	18	17	17	18	21	19	21
Neither good nor bad	17	13	9	9	13	8	9	8	8	9	11	6
Sans réponse / No reply												
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1028	1933	1031	1039	1328	1438	1077	992	1340	1038	976	1351

	(suite)/(continued)											
	I/77 (3)	IV-V/7 (2)	VI/77 (1)	X/77 (1)	XI/77 (2)	V/78 (2)	VII/78 (1)	X/78 (2)	IV/79 (2)	VI/79 (4)	X/79 (1)	X/79 (2)
Bonne chose / Good thing	35	35	33	37	35	29	25	39	33	36	24	29
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	41	40	42	33	37	38	48	31	34	42	54	41
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	24	22	18	22	23	28	20	25	26	16	17	25
Neither good nor bad		3	7	8	5	5	7	5	7	6	5	5
Sans réponse / No reply												
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1697	1414	945	954	1351	1426	981	1339	1317	925	1009	1403

- (1) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more, only Great Britain. / Population de 18 ans et au-delà, seulement Grande-Bretagne.
- (2) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Great Britain from 1973 to 1974; United Kingdom as from 1975 / Population de 15 ans et au-delà. Grande-Bretagne de 1973 à 1974; Royaume-Uni depuis 1975.
- (3) NOP Market Research. Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain. / Population de 18 ans et au-delà, seulement Grande-Bretagne.
- (4) International Institute of Communications (London).

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM (suite / continued)											
	XI/79 (1)	IV/80 (1)	IV/80 (2)	V/80 (1)	VI/80 (1)	X/80 (1)	X/80 (2)	III/81 (1)	IV/81 (2)	V/81 (1)	X/81 (2)	IV/82 (2)
Bonne chose / Good thing	21	22	23	26	22	24	24	24	24	21	27	27
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	55	57	49	52	54	46	49	52	48	50	41	43
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	15	13	22	17	17	24	24	20	24	21	27	24
Sans réponse / No reply	9	8	6	6	7	5	3	4	4	8	5	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	948	943	1454	1015	1046	921	1432	923	1369	972	1395	1419

	(suite)/(continued)											
	V/82 (1)	X/82	XI/82 (1)	IV/83 (2)								
Bonne chose / Good thing	22	29	25	28								
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	45	40	46	36								
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	21	26	22	29								
Sans réponse / NO reply	7	5	7	7								
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	977	1335	950	1348								

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply  Total  N	ELLAS											
	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83							
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	42	38	33	45	42							
	22	21	15	13	12							
	26	26	37	30	29							
	10	15	15	12	17							
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	1000	1000	1199	1000	1000							
Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply  Total  N	(suite)/(continued)											
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100



TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	EURO 6											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
Bonne chose / Good thing	63	67	69	63	67	57	61	64	63	60	66	68
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	4	6	6	5	4	8	5	6	7	6	4	4
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /												
Neither good nor bad	19	18	17	24	22	26	26	21	22	22	20	20
Sans réponse / No reply	14	9	8	8	7	9	8	9	8	12	10	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	9153	5723	6114	6149	5691	5303	5916	5609	5596	5913	5442	5589

	(suite)/(continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83			
Bonne chose / Good thing	60	66	64	61	58	61	60	58	63			
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	6	4	5	6	8	6	6	7	5			
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /												
Neither good nor bad	26	22	22	23	25	26	26	27	24			
Sans réponse / No reply	8	8	9	10	9	7	8	8	8			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	4938	5583	5426	5538	5518	5522	6665	5352	5427			

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (I)											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing	56	59	60	59	63	53	55	57	56	53	60	59
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	11	14	14	9	9	14	13	14	14	13	10	12
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	20	18	18	23	21	24	25	21	23	24	22	21
Sans réponse / No reply	13	9	8	9	7	9	7	8	7	10	8	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	13484	8922	9253	9550	9150	8627	9210	9044	8936	9327	8788	8976

	(suite)/(continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing	54	58	55	53	50	53	52	51	54			
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	14	12	15	16	17	14	14	15	13			
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	25	23	22	23	25	26	26	27	25			
Sans réponse / No reply	8	7	8	8	8	7	8	7	8			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
N	8126	9021	8882	9001	9898	9911	1676	9689	9790			

TABLEAU 9 / TABLE 9

L'ATTITUDE EN CAS D'ABANDON DU MARCHE COMMUN /  
ATTITUDE IF THE COMMON MARKET HAD BEEN SCRAPPED (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE												
	I/II/71	X/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	25	39	48	42	39	42	44	23	28	32	26	38	
	53	44	30	33	33	34	34	53	50	47	50	38	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	4	3	2	4	2	2	5	4	3	3	4	3	
- Sans réponse / No reply	18	14	20	21	26	22	17	20	19	18	20	21	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1364	1266	1017	1505	1507	1000	1006	949	973	1210	1020	1038	

(I) De 1971 à 1973 : " Si l'on vous annonçait demain que le Marché commun est abandonné...". En 1974 et mai 1975 : " Si l'on vous annonçait demain que (votre pays) quitte la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) ...". A partir de novembre 1975 : " Si l'on vous annonçait demain que la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) est abandonnée...". / From 1971 to 1973 : "If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped...". In 1974 and May 1975 : "If you were to be told tomorrow that (your country) was leaving the Common market...". As from November 1975 : "If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped...".

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	DANMARK											
	X/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	CI/77	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Eprouveraient / Would be :												
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	30	27	27	33	33	30	25	25	27	24	31	
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	29	27	24	22	26	25	31	31	28	29	34	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	29	31	35	26	26	34	31	24	28	30	19	
- Sans reponse / No reply	12	15	14	19	15	11	13	20	17	17	16	
Tota 1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1199	1168	1100	1073	1023	992	1006	1009	1211	995	1027	

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND												
	VII/7	IX/73	I/74	II/74	V/75	I/75	II/77	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	- De grands regrets / Very sorry	52	57	53	55	55	53	53	42	51	51	45	54
	- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	29	24	28	27	27	31	25	31	30	27	30	27
	- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	7	4	5	6	5	4	5	8	5	6	10	4
- Sans réponse / No reply	12	15	14	12	13	12	17	19	14	16	15	15	
Tota 1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
	2000	1957	1060	1042	1039	1002	999	1004	962	1328	1012	1049	

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	FRANCE												
	VII/71	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	II/77	V/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	31	42	56	50	56	50	45	34	37	40	44	40	
	52	43	30	33	31	37	39	44	48	42	40	43	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	5	2	3	4	4	3	6	8	4	4	6	4	
- Sans réponse / No reply	12	13	11	13	9	10	10	14	11	14	10	13	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1806	2227	1308	1237	1156	1276	1149	991	1006	1199	939	1011	

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	I R E L A N D											
	X/73	V/74	W/74	V/75	XI/75	CI/77	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
<b>Eprouveraient / Would be :</b>												
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	37	38	48	46	51	47	33	35	36	34	33	
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	40	27	22	32	30	30	43	35	38	38	49	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	17	28	24	19	14	18	17	16	14	17	7	
- Sans réponse / No reply	16	7	6	3	5	5	7	14	12	11	11	
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>N</b>	1999	1000	1000	1000	998	997	1005	985	1181	1007	987	

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

ITALIA											
Eprouvèrent / Would be :											
- de grands regrets /											
Very sorry											
- de l'indifférence /											
Indifferent											
- Un vif soulagement /											
Relieved											
- Sans réponse /											
No reply											
Total											
N											
VII/71	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
24	14	14	10	10	14	10	7	11	13	12	10
3	1	4	Z	3	E	4	4	3	Z	E	Z
38	44	22	ZE	35	38	38	39	41	39	89	43
35	41	60	6s	52	45	48	50	45	46	42	SP
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	-	%	%
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2000	1909	1030	1021	1043	1110	1155	1183	1070	1301	1025	1031



TABLEAU q (suite) / TABLE q (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG												
	VII/71	X/73	V/74	VI/74	V/75	XI/75	VI/77	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
<b>Eprouveraient / Would be :</b>													
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	36	51	73	70	58	60	64	59	60	61	54	57	
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	42	35	17	16	22	24	25	33	31	28	36	32	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	6	3	3	2	7	2	2	3	5	2	4	3	
- Sans réponse / No reply	16	11	7	12	13	14	9	5	4	9	6	8	
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>N</b>	302	330	308	297	311	297	344	300	500	399	300	300	

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	NEDERLAND											
	VII/71	IX/73	V/74	VI/74	V/75	XI/75	VI/77	VI/81	X/81	V/82	X/82	IV/83
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient / Would be :												
- De grands regrets /												
Very sorry	40	46	54	56	50	50	59	51	46	54	50	56
- De l'indifférence /												
Indifferent	35	37	20	25	27	28	29	34	33	32	34	31
- Un vif soulagement /												
Relieved	10	4	4	5	3	2	4	7	3	4	4	3
- Sans réponse /												
No reply	15	13	22	14	20	20	8	8	18	10	12	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1198	1464	1000	1012	1093	1006	943	1058	1011	1228	1056	998

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

		GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM														
		X/72 (1)	I/73 (1)	II-IV 73 (1)	IV-V 73 (1)	VI/73 (1)	VII 73 (1)	X/73 (1)	IX/73 (2)	X/73 (1)	XI/73 (1)	I-II 74 (1)	II-IV 74 (1)	IV/74 (1)	IV/74 (2)	V/74 (1)
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient / Would be	- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	26	27	28	21	26	20	21	20	21	13	19	27	14	24	25
	- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	33	28	27	26	24	22	24	33	26	24	26	23	21	28	33
	- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	35	31	36	41	41	48	46	37	44	42	48	43	43	40	44
	- Sans réponse / No reply	6	14	9	12	9	10	9	10	9	11	7	7	12	8	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N	1028	924	1013	873	835	998	1014	1933	902	906	1054	1055	1007	1031	985
Eprouveraient / Would be	VI/74 (1)	VII/ 74 (1)	X/74 (1)	II/74 (2)	I/75 (1)	V/75 (2)	II/75 (2)	I/76 (1)	II/76 (1)	VII / 76 (1)	IX/76 (1)	II/77 (1)	X /77 (1)	XI/77 (2)	X/79 (1)	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	28	24	26	31	24	41	40	37	34	28	25	26	28	31	16	
	21	22	24	22	24	27	28	30	30	30	30	24	30	31	28	
	44	47	38	38	40	23	26	24	28	35	34	42	32	32	50	
	7	7	12	9	12	9	6	9	8	7	11	8	10	6	6	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	908	817	1006	1039	988	1328	1438	1077	992	1038	976	945	954	1351	1009	

(1) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain. Slight difference in the wording of the question: in 1972, "very sorry, indifferent, pleased"; from V/75: "very sorry, indifferent, relieved".

(2) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Only Great Britain from 1973 to 1974; United Kingdom from 1975.

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM													
XI/79 (1)	IV/80 (1)	V/80 (1)	VI/80 (1)	X/80 (1)	II-III /81(1)	IV/81 (2)	V/81 (1)	X/81 (2)	IV/82 (2)	V/82 (1)	X/82 (2)	XI/82 (1)	IV/83 (2)
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
16	14	17	16	18	18	21	16	21	23	19	23	19	22
26	27	25	25	30	29	29	28	34	33	33	30	34	43
51	51	51	53	47	49	46	50	39	40	44	42	42	30
7	8	7	6	5	4	4	6	6	4	4	5	5	5
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
948	943	1015	1046	921	923	1369	972	1395	1419	977	1335	950	1348
Total													
8													

Prouveraient / Would be  
 -De grands regrets /  
 Very sorry  
 -De l'indifférence /  
 Indifferent  
 -Un vif soulagement /  
 Relieved  
 -Sans réponse /  
 No reply

- (1) Social Surveys (Gallup poll) Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain Slight difference in the wording of the question : in 1972 : "very sorry, indifferent, pleased" ; from V/75 : "very sorry, indifferent, relieved".
- (2) European Omnibus Survey Population of 15 years and more. Only Great Britain from 1973 to 1974 ; United Kingdom from 1-75.

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

E.L.L.A.S.						Eprouveraient / Would be :  - De grands regrets / Very sorry - De l'indifférence / Indifferent - Un vif soulagement / Relieved - Sans réponse / No reply  Total  N
	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83	
	%	X	%	%	%	
	30	17	22	27	29	
	EP	89	50	45	45	
	18	17	13	15	12	
	9	17	13	13	11	
	100	100	100	100	100	
	1000	1000	1199	1000	1000	

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	EURO 6												
	VII/71	X/73	V/74	VI/74	V/75	XII/75	XI/77	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	X/82	IV/83	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	40	41	56	56	53	49	50	42	44	46	43	47	
	40	36	26	27	31	35	33	38	39	36	38	37	
Eprouveraient / Would be :													
- De grands regrets /													
Very sorry													
- De l'indifférence /													
Indifferent													
- Un vif soulagement /													
Relieved													
- Sans réponse /													
No reply													
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	8670	7153	5723	6114	6149	5691	5596	5518	5522	6665	5352	5427	

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)											
	X/73	V/74	II/74	V/75	XI/75	II/77	IV/81	X/81	V/82	X/82	IV/83
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>Eprouveraient / Would be :</b>											
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	41	48	49	50	47	45	37	38	40	38	41
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	36	27	26	30	33	32	36	38	36	36	39
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	10	13	13	9	9	12	16	12	12	15	9
- Sans reponse / No reply	13	12	12	11	11	11	11	12	12	11	11
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>N</b>	3484	8922	9253	9550	9150	8936	9898	9911	1676	9689	9790

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'avril 1981 / Including Greece from April 1981.