

euro-barometre

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



N. 17 JUNE 1982

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
RUE DE LA LOI 200 • 1049 BRUSSELS

EUROBAROMETER

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

IN SPRING 1982

- The mood of Europeans: satisfaction with life and the way democracy works; attitudes to change; national pride
- Hopes and fears for the future
- Great causes
- Attitudes to Europe and the Community
- Reactions in Spain and Portugal to the prospect of joining the Community

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Commission of the European Communities
rue de la Loi, 200 1049 Brussels

X/179/82

PRELIMINARY NOTE

EUROBAROMETER PUBLIC OPINION POLLS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES EACH SPRING AND AUTUMN SINCE SEPTEMBER 1973. THEY HAVE INCLUDED GREECE SINCE AUTUMN 1980.

AN IDENTICAL SET OF QUESTIONS IS PUT TO REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES - DIFFERENT EACH TIME - OF THE POPULATION AGED FIFTEEN AND OVER IN EACH OF THE TEN COUNTRIES. THIS SURVEY WAS CARRIED OUT BY PROFESSIONAL INTERVIEWERS BETWEEN 22 MARCH AND 3 MAY 1982 IN THE HOMES OF THE 11 676 SELECTED RESPONDENTS.

TEN NATIONAL INSTITUTES, ALL MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING THE POLL. ALL THESE INSTITUTES COMPLY WITH THE STANDARDS SET BY THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR OPINION AND MARKETING RESEARCH. THEY WERE SELECTED BY TENDER.

THE NAMES OF THE INSTITUTES AND FIELD-WORK SPECIALISTS IN EACH COUNTRY ARE LISTED IN THE APPENDIX TOGETHER WITH THE RELEVANT TECHNICAL DETAILS.

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PRACTICE FOR THIS TYPE OF SURVEY THE COMMISSION DISCLAIMS ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUESTIONS, RESULTS AND CO ———ARIES .

C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	
I. <u>THE MOOD OF EUROPEANS</u>	1
1.1 GENERAL FEELING OF SATISFACTION OR DISSATISFACTION WITH LIFE	2
1.2 SATISFACTION OR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS	8
1.3 BASIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIAL CHANGE: REVOLUTION, REFORM, DEFENCE AGAINST SUBVERSION	21
I.4 ABILITY TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS	24
II. <u>HOPES AND FEARS FOR THE FUTURE</u>	29
II.1 HOPES	30
II.2 FEARS	31
III. <u>GREAT CAUSES WORTH FIGHTING FOR</u>	35

	<u>Page</u>
IV. <u>ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY</u>	40
IV.1 THE FEELING OF BEING A CITIZEN OF EUROPE	41
IV.2 FOR OR AGAINST WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION	43
IV.3 INTEREST IN THE PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THEM	46
IV.4 INFORMATION ABOUT EUROPEAN AFFAIRS	54
IV.4.1 Adequacy of information	54
IV.4.2 The main sources of information about European affairs	56
IV.4.3 Difficulties felt by the public in gaining access to sources of information	58
IV.5 UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE COMMUNITY	66
IV.6 GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE COMMUNITY	69
IV.7 FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY: AN ACTUAL "EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT" OR THE INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS HAVING THE FINAL SAY	72
 V. <u>REACTIONS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL TO THE PROSPECT OF JOINING THE COMMUNITY</u>	 77
V.1 INTEREST IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS AND IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THEM	78
V.2 ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION	80
V.3 MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT EUROPEAN AFFAIRS	83
V.4 FOR OR AGAINST WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION	85
V.5 ATTITUDES TO ACCESSION TO THE COMMUNITY	88
V.6 THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY	93

APPENDIX

INTRODUCTION

This Eurobarometer is a little longer than previous issues, for two reasons. The first is that the series of interviews included a survey of the attitudes of young Europeans in the ten Community countries involving an extra questionnaire and over-representation of the **15-24 age** group. Since **many** of the questions were asked both of the young people and adults, it seemed interesting to publish certain preliminary findings without waiting for more thorough analysis which will be the subject of a special report. The other reason is that, for the second time but more systematically than last autumn, some of the questions asked in the Member States were also asked in Spain and Portugal. These are two applicant countries whose accession is generally considered to be close at hand. This does not imply that the area **and** subjects covered by Eurobarometer have **now** been extended - the aim is to carry out research over an extended period **so** as to prepare the future partners for life together.

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This report on European public opinion in spring 1982 contains five chapters :

1° The mood of Europeans. - In addition to feelings of satisfaction (with life **and** with the way democracy works) **and** attitudes to change in society, this chapter covers several **new** areas - opinions about various aspects of the political system in which the interviewee lives; the sense of involvement in the political process; national pride.

2° Hopes **and** fears for the future. - For the first time, two sets of multiple-choice questions were used to discover what Europeans regarded as most likely to improve their lives over the next ten or fifteen years **and** their **main** fears for the **future** of **the** world during that time.

3° Great causes. - The question of whether there were still great causes which could command our dedication was asked **and** the answer was that there are.

4° Attitudes to Europe **and** the European Community. - The main purpose of Eurobarometer's work over almost ten years **has** been the monitoring of these attitudes. The data accumulated give a better understanding of the influence of events on the development of opinions as reflected in **views** expressed. A coherent public information policy **cannot** neglect this research: a number of questions are concerned with the very fact of being adequately or inadequately informed, the main sources of information, difficulties experienced in gaining access to sources of information, etc.

5° Reactions in Spain **and** Portugal to the prospect of joining the Community. - This **is** the first time that it has been possible to **make** a broad comparison between attitudes in the two applicant countries **and** those in the ten Member States to a series of topics such as interest in Community matters **and** the importance attached to them, the feeling of

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being adequately or inadequately informed, the main sources of information, European unity, membership of the Community, etc.

THE MOOD OF THE

Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg are still the countries where satisfaction with life is greater than in most other countries. Greece, where the question was asked for the second time, was the country where dissatisfaction was greatest and Italy, which had previously been at the bottom of the list, therefore moved up to ninth place. Nevertheless, between October 1981 and April 1982 there was a sharp fall in the number of Greeks declaring themselves "not at all satisfied".

The feeling of satisfaction with the way democracy works, which is more sensitive to changes in the political situation in each country, has increased since the last survey in Greece and, more strongly, in the United Kingdom, though it has fallen in France. In the case of the United Kingdom, this is probably due to the Falklands crisis. The diverging trends in Greece and France undoubtedly reflect changes in opinion which followed or preceded the recent general elections. While in France the "honeymoon effect" which generally follows a change of government - and was very apparent between April and October 1981 - has since dispersed somewhat, it is still strong in Greece where elections took place five months later.

This survey included for the first time questions on a number of opinions about the way the political system works.

The answers to these show that the democracies of Western Europe share a number of attitudes. In each country, the vast majority of those replying agree that "Everyone is free to express his opinions when he does not agree with something" and that "One may do almost anything one likes so long as it is lawful". But an average of 14% of those interviewed disagreed on the first point and 26% on the second - these are sizeable minorities. Special attention should also be given to the fact that an average of 54% of those replying, rising to six or seven out of ten in Belgium, Italy and France, did not agree with the view that "Everyone is truly equal before the law". Similarly, 52% consider that "Small groups with different ideas or customs from the majority are largely disapproved of". The only country in which this view was not accepted was Germany.

Another point which gives food for thought is that fewer than four people in ten (37% on average) think that they can help change anything which is wrong in their country. Greeks (perhaps as a result of the recent change of government) and Danes feel they have the most influence; Belgians feel the least able to change anything.

National pride is particularly strong in Greece, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The least nationally proud are the Germans and the Belgians, but the trend from 1970 to 1982 strongly suggests that these results have different causes.

HOPES AND FEARS FOR THE FUTURE

What might bring about changes in the next ten or fifteen years in the way people live in each of our countries?

There were few differences between the countries: in general five topics led the list of answers given:

- scientific and technological developments;
 - understanding and goodwill amongst the people of the country;
 - prospects for the standard of living;
 - the quality of life;
- and understanding between the industrialized countries and the Third World.

What are the main fears?

Once again, the replies in the various countries were similar:

- rising crime and terrorism;
- increasing unemployment;
- the despoiling of natural life¹.

GREAT CAUSES

This was an attempt to explore people's values: What is it worthwhile doing something about, even if this means taking a risk or making a sacrifice?

One great cause was unequivocally in first place in all countries: peace. The next four - human rights, the fight against poverty, freedom of the individual and the protection of nature - all received broadly equal levels of support.

Only 7% of those questioned did not cite any great cause, but the figure was around 15% in Denmark, Germany and Ireland.

ATTITUDES TO EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Europe is not in the forefront of people's concerns, but attempts at unification still receive the support of a majority of those interviewed except in Denmark, where support and opposition are equally divided at 42% each. Eurobarometer's data, which go back to 1973, do, however, reveal a slight reduction in this support. This is not so much because of an increase in the numbers of those opposed as because those strongly in favour are becoming less enthusiastic. The trend is not dramatic, but it deserves attention.

¹ All these replies will be analysed in detail later and compared with replies on questions directly concerned with European unification and the development of the European Community.

Public attitudes to Community membership do not appear to be greatly affected by current difficulties, although the public is clearly aware of them. In Luxembourg, the Netherlands **and** Italy, the overwhelming majority of those questioned regard Community membership as "**a good thing**". Public opinion in Belgium, France **and** Germany is a little less enthusiastic, while in Ireland, Greece **and**, but only just, **Denmark** there is still a majority in favour. In the United Kingdom those against are still more numerous than those in favour (**43% against 27%**).

Those who consider themselves sufficiently well informed are in a minority - four out of ten in the Netherlands, Germany, Ireland **and** Luxembourg, **and** only two out of ten in the United Kingdom **and** Greece.

The main sources of information on the Community are, of course, television, newspapers **and** the radio. Television is always cited **as** the **most** important, although newspapers are valued by those who wish to know more ■

Opinion leaders are more critical than **most**, finding that the media "do not **say** enough about European questions" or "do not deal seriously enough with European questions". The same views - or excuses - are, however, expressed by a fairly large number of respondents in all categories in **most** countries,

AND PORTUGAL

Almost a quarter of Spaniards (**24%**) but only **15%** of Portuguese say that they are "very interested" in Community matters. Compared with the previous **survey**, this represents a slight fall in Spain but a slight rise in Portugal.

The feeling of being inadequately informed - which also leads to inability or refusal to answer the question - is very widespread in Spain **and** Portugal, indeed much more **so** than in the Member States of the Community.

Naturally, the main sources of information on Community matters are the **same** as in the Member States, but the number of times they are mentioned is much lower, particularly in Portugal where newspapers **and** magazines were mentioned only half as often as in Spain.

A majority of Spaniards (**55% as** compared with **6%** against **and** **39%** don't **knows**) support general moves for European unification; the "don't knows" accounted for two thirds of those interviewed in Portugal.

Attitudes to accession are favourable in both applicant countries, although some hesitation is creeping in as negotiations become **more** protracted, Once again there are differences between the two countries:

- in Spain more than half of those interviewed support membership, while in Portugal fewer than half expressed **an** opinion;
- if the "don't knows" are excluded, neither sex nor **age** had **any** significant bearing on answers;

- the level of education has a very strong influence on the proportion of "don't knows" but, whereas in Spain a higher level of education tends to correlate with a more favourable attitude, in Portugal it tends to produce a less favourable view;
- the effect of political stance - here measured by the interviewee placing himself in the left/right spectrum - is that in Spain the left is more favourably inclined than the right while the opposite is the case in Portugal.

Further work, preferably in cooperation with Spanish and Portuguese researchers, will have to be done on these findings. Eurobarometer and data from other similar surveys will be made available without restriction.

CHAPTER ONE

THE MOOD OF EUROPEANS

I

THE MOOD OF EUROPEANS

In addition to the standard questions on overall satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with life, satisfaction with the way democracy works and basic attitude towards social change, asked regularly since 1973, a series of additional questions was included in spring 1982 covering various aspects of the political system, ability of the individual to influence social and political developments ("to help bring about a change") and national pride; these were designed to monitor and make for a better understanding of answers to the standard questions.

1.1 GENERAL FEELING OF SATISFACTION
OR DISSATISFACTION WITH LIFE

"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?"

It has already been established that answers to this question express a general diffuse feeling, generated by a host of direct and indirect perceptions, explicit and implicit judgments and comparisons concerning "living conditions" in the widest sense of the term as measured against the aspirations of the individual¹. This indicator of what could be termed "personal morale", namely the individual's frame of mind with regard to his personal and family situation, is remarkably stable in a given society and relatively unaffected by the objective differences between social categories. In other words, it genuinely reflects a general feeling endemic to a society, nation or even region, and certainly to a culture shaped by history, transmitted by education and perpetuated by the media, rather than the objective situations lived by the individual respondents. Or, to be more specific, the culture to which one belongs would seem to determine the average level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with life (hence the marked differences from one country to another), while individual situations produce only slight fluctuations from the norm.

It is therefore worth paying particular attention, firstly to the way in which average satisfaction ratings in the different countries compare and evolve in the (relatively) long term, and secondly to the way in which satisfaction ratings deviate from the norm in the individual countries, with particular reference to the groups at the extreme ends of the scale, especially the negative end: the least satisfied.

On both points the results of the April 1982 poll bear out previous findings.

¹ See Eurobarometer No. 15, June 1981, pp. 1-8.

I.1.1. Relative average ratings: past and present

The Danes, Dutch, Irish and Luxembourgers remain generally more satisfied with life than most of those questioned in the other member countries; the French and the Italians are much less satisfied than their seven partners - and the Greeks more dissatisfied still¹;

(See Table 1 and, for further details, Table A1 in the Appendix.)

The differences recorded over the twelve-month period are statistically insignificant². But observation over a long period - eight and a half years - for this particular question - reveals a number of interesting developments,

The general picture is one of stability with a very slight trend towards increased satisfaction in the majority of countries from 1973 to 1982. Only three countries (Ireland, Belgium and France) show a slightly negative trend; this may now have gone into reverse in France, but persists in Belgium.

(See Graph 1.)

¹ Greece, where this question was asked for the second time, has the lowest average satisfaction rating, which means that Italy, previously at the bottom of the list, moves up to ninth place. What distinguishes Greece from the other countries, including Italy, is the relatively high percentage of "not at all satisfied"; however, their number has dropped sharply since the last opinion poll.

² To be considered statistically significant a percentage variation has to be around 5 points, which corresponds to 0.15 on our index. The most marked changes between April 1981 and April 1982 were recorded in France (+ 0.15) and Greece (+ 0.14); the determining factor generating increased satisfaction in both cases was probably the change in the political party in power between the two opinion polls. This will emerge even more clearly when we come to examine satisfaction with the way in which democracy works.

Table 1

SATISFACTION/DISSATISFACTION WITH LIFE

(Changes between April 1981 and April 1982)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC (1)
	X	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>April 1982</u>											
Very satisfied	36	59	16	12	34	13	40	44	32	19	21
Fairly satisfied	49	36	61	58	49	54	54	48	52	39	55
Not very satisfied	10	3	16	22	13	24	5	6	10	20	17
Not at all satisfied	3	1	3	7	3	9	1	2	5	22	6
Don't know	2	1	4	1	1				1		1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	3.19	3.54	2.94	2.76	3.14	2.72	3.33	3.35	3.12	2.55	2.93
National rating	4	1	7	8	5	9	3	2	6	10	
1. <u>April 1982</u>											
Very satisfied	29	57	20	16	40	14	39	42	36	18	24
Fairly satisfied	51	37	63	63	46	57	48	52	50	46	57
Not very satisfied	12	5	12	16	11	22	9	4	9	22	14
Not at all satisfied	4		2	5	2	7	3	1	4	13	4
Don't know	4	1	3		1		1	1	1	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	3.11	3.52	3.05	2.91	3.26	2.78	3.25	3.37	3.19	2.69	3.01
National rating	6	1	7	8	3	9	4	2	5	10	

¹ Average weighted by population aged fifteen and over in each of the ten Member States.



² Average calculated by applying the following coefficients: "very satisfied" = 4, "fairly satisfied" = 3, "not very satisfied" = 2, "not at all satisfied" = 1, "don't knows" excluded. All scores over 2.50 show more satisfaction than dissatisfaction, while scores below 2.50 show more dissatisfaction than satisfaction.

Graphique 1 / Graph 1

SATISFACTION DE LA VIE / SATISFACTION WITH LIFE



BELGIQUE / BELGIE

DANMARK







DEUTSCHLAND


FRANCE



Graphique 1 (suite) / Graph 1 (continued)



Graphique 1 (suite) / Graph 1 (continued)



I.1.2. Satisfaction dispersion in the individual countries

Generally speaking, neither sex, age, education, cognitive mobilisation¹, nor religion has a significant bearing on satisfaction or dissatisfaction with life. By contrast, income and political ideology² are both determining factors. Both correlations are consistent, i.e. work in the same direction, in all countries: those with an income well below the average and those (not necessarily the same) to the left of the political spectrum tend to be "not very satisfied" with life. The first correlation is stronger than the second, and more evident in France, the United Kingdom, Greece and Luxembourg than elsewhere.

The links between satisfaction with life, income and ideology are clearly very complex. If we take the countries at opposite ends of the satisfaction pole, it is fascinating to note that the dissatisfaction felt by the least satisfied of the Danes outweighs the satisfaction felt by the most satisfied of the Greeks: the main determinant is apparently nationality.

(See Table 2.)

¹ "Cognitive mobilisation" or "leadership" rating is produced by combining the answers to two questions, one on frequency of political discussion and the second on capacity to persuade others.

In this particular poll the distribution of the population interviewed by leadership rating for the Community as a whole are as follows:

Non-leaders		Leaders		Total
<u>L --</u>	<u>L -</u>	<u>L +</u>	<u>L ++</u>	
23%	34%	31%	12%	100%
(n=2647)	(n=3997)	(n=2630)	(n=1402)	(N=11,676)

For further details on how this index is produced see Eurobarometer No. 5, July 1976, pp. 1-2.

² See following page.

² To permit international comparison, incomes as declared in national currency by interviewees have been grouped approximately in quartiles for each country: R - - indicates incomes well below average; R - and R + incomes slightly below or slightly above average; R ++ incomes well above average.

Political ideology is measured by position on a left/right spectrum graduated from 1 (Left) to 10 (Right) as determined by the person interviewed.

Contrary to what might be expected, the correlation between the above two variables is weak or non-existent in several countries (Denmark, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg) and even negative in four countries (Germany, Ireland, Italy and Greece), where those with a relatively low income tend to consider themselves rightist rather than leftist and the converse is also true. Only in Belgium, France and the Netherlands do the findings lend substance to the traditional assumption that those in a relatively low income bracket place themselves farthest to the left and those in a relatively high income bracket farthest to the right. Numerous variables other than income help determine political identity as expressed by the "left/right" indicator.

AVERAGE POSITION ON LEFT/RIGHT SPECTRUM

RELATED TO INCOME BRACKET

(April 1982)

	Family income					Total
	R- -	R-	R+	R++	Not stated	
Belgique/België	5.59	5.80	5.81	6.10	6.31	5.91
Danemark	5.60	5.50	5.60	5.53	5.81	5.61
Deutschland	6.25	6.14	5.65	5.76	5.52	5.87
France	4.67	4.77	5.05	5.11	5.31	4.94
Ireland	6.61	6.39	6.36	6.10	6.18	6.29
Italia	4.70	4.41	4.49	4.40	5.03	4.55
Luxembourg (x)	5.34	5.12	5.55	5.42	5.51	5.38
Nederland	5.11	5.28	5.13	5.65	5.73	5.38
United Kingdom	5.78	5.72	5.41	5.68	5.85	5.68
Ellas	5.39	4.93	4.69	4.82	5.21	5.03
COMMUNITY	5.38	5.23	5.28	5.23	5.58	5.33

^x Given the size of the sample (N=399) the results for Luxembourg must be treated with caution.

Table 2
SATISFACTION/DISSATISFACTION WITH LIFE
RELATED TO INCOME AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
(April 1982)

	DANMARK				ELLAS			
	Very satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Not very satisfied	Not at all satisfied	Very satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Not very satisfied	Not at all satisfied
	57%	37%	5%		18%	46%	22%	13%
Total								
Related to income:								
R --	48	44	7	1	13	39	26	21
R -	53	41	5	.	13	50	24	13
R +	62	33	4	-	21	46	23	8
R ++	71	26	3	-	24	54	13	7
Related to political ideology:								
Extreme left	46	38	13	3	10	42	27	21
Left	57	37	6	-	12	50	26	11
Centre	55	39	5	1	18	49	20	12
Right	61	34	4	-	27	45	18	10
Extreme right	60	29	7	1	29	32	22	16

¹ Interviewees who did not reply are not included.

I.2. SATISFACTION OR DISSATISFACTION
WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS

Satisfaction with the life we lead is part of what we called earlier "personal morale"; satisfaction with the way democracy works, on the other hand, is part of "public morale",

This question, like the previous one, has been asked on numerous occasions since 1973 in the following form:

"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)?"

Answers express a comprehensive implicit or explicit assessment by interviewees of the successes, failures and/or weaknesses of the government in power and the political system, i.e. an assessment which encompasses politicians, political parties, institutional organizations and the fundamental principles governing public affairs¹.

As in the case of satisfaction with life, views here differed fairly substantially from country to country but remained relatively stable from year to year; however, this variable is more sensitive to events than the previous one. Hence three significant changes between October 1981 and April 1982: an increase in satisfaction in Greece, an even greater increase in the United Kingdom and a decline in France.

(See Table 3.)

Increased satisfaction with the way democracy works in the United Kingdom is probably due to the national consensus which emerged in favour of the government on the issue of the Falkland Islands². The trend here is as follows:

¹ This variable is currently being researched by Herman SCHMITT, Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, Universität Mannheim.

² The opinion poll was conducted between 31 March and 10 April in Great Britain and between 19 and 29 April in Northern Ireland, i.e. in the first case at the time of and in the second case just after the invasion of the Falkland Islands and the breaking-off of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina.

UNITED KINGDOM

	Very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Not very satisfied	Not at all satisfied	Don't know	Total	Index ¹
October 1980	9%	42%	27%	16%	6%	100%	2.46
October 1981	6	42	29	13	10	100	2.45
April 1982	14	46	25	9	6	100	2.68

In France the sharp increase in satisfaction with the democratic system recorded between October 1980 and October 1981² has since gone into reverse but the satisfaction level is still substantially higher than in late 1980:

FRANCE

	Very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Not very satisfied	Not at all satisfied	Don't know	Total	Index ¹
October 1980	3%	33%	34%	18%	12%	100%	2.23
October 1981	5	48	27	7	13	100	2.60
April 1982	2	42	30	12	14	100	2.40

In Greece, which has also had a new political party in power since autumn 1981, there has been a significant swing from "not at all satisfied" to "fairly satisfied", reflecting what could be interpreted as a degree of public optimism.

GREECE

	Very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Not very satisfied	Not at all satisfied	Don't know	Total	Index ¹
October 1980	20%	33%	23%	22%	2%	100%	2.52
October 1981	24	28	18	23	7	100	2.57
April 1982	19	41	21	11	8	100	2.73

¹ "Very satisfied" = 4; "not at all satisfied" = 1.

² See Eurobarometer No. 16, December 1981, p. 10.

Table 3
SATISFACTION OR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS

(Changes from October 1981 to April 1982)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>October 1981</u>											
Very satisfied	7	17	11	5	13	4	16	6	6	24	8
Fairly satisfied	28	50	59	48	46	16	59	53	42	28	42
Not very satisfied	31	22	18	27	22	43	18	27	29	18	28
Not at all satisfied	18	7	5	7	9	34	4	9	13	23	14
Don't know	16	4	7	13	10	3	3	5	10	7	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.30	2.82	2.83	2.60	2.68	1.88	2.91	2.59	2.45	2.57	2.46
National ranking	9	3	2	6	4	10	1	5	8	7	
2. <u>April 1982</u>											
Very satisfied	7	11	12	2	11	2	14	6	14	19	8
Fairly satisfied	33	50	56	42	44	19	49	49	46	41	41
Not very satisfied	32	27	21	30	23	44	26	32	25	21	30
Not at all satisfied	17	8	7	12	11	31	9	8	9	11	14
Don't know	11	4	4	14	11	4	2	5	6	8	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.35	2.68	2.77	2.40	2.62	1.92	2.70	2.56	2.68	2.73	2.47
National ranking	9	4	1	8	6	10	3	7	4	2	

¹ Weighted average.

² "Very satisfied" = 4; "not at all satisfied" = 1.

As we did with the previous question, we shall now take a look at the pattern of replies since 1973 and the influence of the major determinants.

1.2.1. Pattern of satisfaction with the way democracy works

For the entire period under review Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands headed the satisfaction table, with France and Italy at the bottom.

Opinions, generally, fluctuated twice as widely as in the case of satisfaction with life¹.

The trend in six countries is marginally positive (Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Italy and France) and in three others marginally negative (Ireland, the Netherlands and most negative of all, Belgium)².

(See Graph 2.)

1.2.2. Major factors affecting satisfaction with the way democracy works

Satisfaction, or lack of, appears to be generated by a combination of numerous variables, the strongest of which are not necessarily the same in the different countries, or in some cases even in the same country.

An initial analysis based on the April 1982 results would suggest that age has a bearing on this particular form of satisfaction in Denmark, Germany and Greece, but, while in Denmark satisfaction is strongest among the young to middle-aged (15 - 49), the relationship is reversed in Germany and Greece, where those in the younger age bracket seem less satisfied with democracy than their elders.

Income would appear to have a positive bearing on satisfaction in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark and France (i.e. wealth goes hand in hand with satisfaction) but a negative bearing in Ireland.

Leadership rating is a fairly strong determinant in all ten member countries, but here too the most consistent relationship which shows least satisfaction among opinion leaders is reversed, this time in France³.

¹ Fluctuations are measured by means of the variation coefficient, i.e. the average variation from the norm multiplied by 100.


² We have only three reference points for Greece, which is not enough to establish a trend.

³ See footnote 1 on the following page.





Graphique 2 / Graph 2


SATISFACTION QUANT AU FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA DEMOCRATIE /

SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY IS WORKING



Graphique 2 (suite) / Graph 2 (continued)





Finally, political ideology (position on the left/right spectrum) would appear to be the most valuable indicator of satisfaction in a number of countries, particularly Belgium, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Respondents on the extreme left or left of the political spectrum showed significantly less satisfaction than those on the right and extreme right. But here again the relationship was not always linear and, in certain countries, the extreme right was almost as dissatisfied as the extreme left (Greece) or even more so (France).

A retroactive analysis of the situation in the last two countries shows how public satisfaction can be affected by major political events.

In France results for October/November 1980 showed dissatisfaction with the working of democracy outweighing satisfaction: the average score was 2.23. Respondents on the extreme left were by far the most dissatisfied (1.61); those on the right (but not the extreme right) were the only faction which tended to be slightly more satisfied than dissatisfied (2.66).

Twelve months later, in other words after presidential elections, change in parliamentary majority and formation of a new government, the average satisfaction level had increased to 2.60, with a very sharp upsurge on the extreme left and the left, and a slight wavering on the right and extreme right.

¹ Opinion leaders in France tend to be further left than non-leaders. By contrast non-leaders are more sensitive to certain political events with major symbolic implications, such as the election of a new head of state by direct universal suffrage.

The combination of these factors explains why French satisfaction with the working of democracy between October 1980 and April 1982 fluctuated more strongly among non-leaders than leaders:

FRANCE

Index showing satisfaction with democracy
related to leadership rating (X)

	<u>Non-leaders</u>		<u>Leaders</u>	
	(--)	(-)	(+)	(++)
October 1980	1.79 (100)	2.27 (100)	2.28 (100)	2.30 (100)
October 1981	2.58 (144)	2.63 (116)	2.61 (114)	2.56 (111)
April 1982	2.23 (125)	2.41 (106)	2.47 (108)	2.50 (109)

(X) The figures in brackets show the satisfaction index for the different leadership ratings (October 1980 = 100).

The average level of satisfaction had dropped by April 1982 but was still higher than before the events referred to above (2.40); the shortest decline was on the extreme left but even here satisfaction was still much higher than in October 1980 (2.48).

In Greece a relatively similar pattern seems to be emerging, albeit on a smaller scale, possibly because the change started five months later than in France: the change in the Greek majority dates from 18 October 1981.

The October 1980 poll showed a large measure of dissatisfaction on the extreme left, the left and even in the centre, while those on the right and extreme right declared themselves fairly satisfied.

One year later, with the elections in full swing, the average level of satisfaction had scarcely changed, but dissatisfaction on the extreme left was falling off slightly, though it was still higher than elsewhere on the political spectrum.

By April 1982 the effect of the elections was being felt: the average level of satisfaction had risen, more on the extreme left and left than in the centre; little change was recorded on the right or among those who refused to define their political leanings; satisfaction had declined on the extreme right, but was still slightly higher there than on the extreme left. The relationship between satisfaction with the democratic system and position on the left/right spectrum has changed from rectilinear in October 1980 to curvilinear, with two poles of lack of satisfaction verging on dissatisfaction,


(See Graph 3 and Table 4.)

Satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the way democracy works is clearly a highly complex emotion. As often happens when socio-political indicators are used, researchers are aware of the fact that they are measuring something important before knowing exactly what. For instance, the relative dissatisfaction being expressed by the younger generations in Germany or Greece at the moment, by the extreme left in France in 1980 and the extreme right in France in 1982, do not necessarily have the same significance. Dissatisfaction can reflect either fundamental opposition to an unpopular political system or a critical demand - revolutionary or reformist - in respect of the way the said system operates.

¹ Field work was carried out between 12 and 24 October, in other words just before and just after the elections.

Graphique 3 / Graph 3

SATISFACTION DE LA DEMOCRATIE SELON L'IDEOLOGIE POLITIQUE /
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY ACCORDING TO POLITICAL IDEOLOGY



Graphique 3 (suite) / Graph 3 (continued)




Table 4

SATISFACTION/DISSATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS RELATED TO POLITICAL IDEOLOGY¹

(France and Greece: October 1980 - April 1982)

	Extreme left	Left	Centre	Right	Extreme right	Other*	Total
<u>FRANCE</u>							
October 1980	1.61 (100)	1.99 (100)	2.37 (100)	2.66 (100)	2.41 (100)	2.33 (100)	2.23 (100)
October 1981	2.72 (169)	2.83 (142)	2.54 (107)	2.43 (91)	2.20 (91)	2.46 (106)	2.60 (117)
April 1982	2.48 (154)	2.66 (134)	2.29 (97)	2.23 (84)	2.00 (83)	2.43 (104)	2.40 (108)
<u>ELLAS</u>							
October 1980	1.74 (100)	1.95 (100)	2.34 (100)	2.95 (100)	3.09 (100)	2.70 (100)	2.52 (100)
October 1981	2.01 (116)	2.13 (109)	2.45 (105)	3.22 (109)	3.10 (100)	2.84 (105)	2.57 (102)
April 1982	2.52 (145)	2.66 (136)	2.83 (121)	2.86 (97)	2.57 (83)	2.77 (103)	2.73 (108)

*

No political leanings given.

¹ The index is calculated as follows: "very satisfied" = 4, "not at all satisfied" = 1. The figures in brackets show index changes (October 1980 = 100).

The number of people interviewed from each group as as follows:

	Extreme left	Left	Centre	Right	Extreme right	Other*	Total
France	102	254	363	143	34	168	1064
Ellas	95	192	306	102	123	248	1066

*

No political leanings given.

In April 1982, in an attempt to clarify the significance of this indicator, a set of ten extra questions was asked, five considered positive and five considered negative, the relationship between the answers and the indicator referred to above was then studied¹:

"Do you tend to agree or disagree with each of the following opinions about the way things happen in (your country)?

- *Everyone is free to express his opinions when he does not agree with something.*
- *The freedom to do as you like has gone too far, creating disorder; and in the long run disorder could bring out dictatorship.*
- *Money can fix everything.*
- *Small groups with different ideas or customs from the majority are largely disapproved of.*
- *One may do almost anything one likes so long as it is lawful.*
- *It is grossly unfair that some people possess a lot and others almost nothing.*
- *To aim for complete equality will destroy personal initiative.*
- *The welfare state reduces inequality in our society.*
- *Help via the social welfare system doesn't reach those in most need.*
- *Everyone is truly equal before the law."*

An initial examination of the findings shows that the questions were generally clearly understood; however, there were a few exceptions. This explains the abnormally high level of "don't know" - on average 10 percent for the ten questions for the Community as a whole - which would suggest either comprehension difficulties, or considerable uncertainty among interviewees, or a combination of the two. This phenomenon was fairly common in Greece and, in the Community as a whole, occurred most frequently in connection with the following statements:

- small minorities are disapproved of;
- aiming for complete equality destroys personal initiative;
- the welfare state reduces inequalities;
- the social welfare system doesn't reach those in most need.

¹ The word "democracy" does not appear in any of the questions.

As can be seen from Table 5, the answers for the ten countries overlap considerably, suggesting the existence of certain common attitudes doubtless based on a common system of values in the democracies of Western Europe:

1. The pattern of replies for the individual items is fairly similar in the ten countries; however, where there is a difference it is almost twice as high for four of the items as for the other six:
 - *"freedom to do as you like has gone too far, creating disorder and ... disorder could bring out dictatorship";*
 - *"money can fix everything";*
 - *"it is grossly unfair that some people possess a lot and others almost nothing";*
 - *"everyone is truly equal before the law".*
2. Item rankings differ very little from country to country, particularly in the case of the positive items.

(See Table 5 and Graph 4.)

Let us look first at the positive items. In all countries the vast majority of interviewees were of the opinion that *"everyone is free to express his opinions when he does not agree with something"* and that *"one may do almost anything one likes so long as it is lawful"*. But an average of 14 percent of interviewees disagreed on the first point and 26 percent on the second. These are sizeable minorities, which give the lie to the "consensus" so often referred to - an impression which is given further weight by the fact that on average 54 percent - rising to 67 percent in France, 65 percent in Italy and 62 percent in Belgium - do not agree that *"everyone is truly equal before the law"*.

To move to the negative items, the two on which the largest measure of agreement was observed were inequality (*"it is grossly unfair that some people possess a lot and others almost nothing"*) and the misdirection of welfare (*"help via the social welfare system doesn't reach those in need"*). Third on the negative list to gain most agreement was the place of minorities in our society: 52 percent of interviewees felt that *"small groups with different ideas or customs from the majority are largely disapproved of"*. The only country to reject this view was Germany: "tend to agree", 36 percent, "tend to disagree", 47 percent.

To sum up, positive opinions outweighed negative opinions in six countries (Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Greece), while negative opinions outweighed positive opinions in the remaining four (France, Ireland, Belgium and Italy). In the individual countries there was a strong correlation between opinions on all ten items taken as a whole and the overall feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the way democracy works. But the degree of correlation varied for the different items, and was close in the case of four:

¹ Correlation between national scores $r = .761$ and between national rankings $r = .755$.

- everyone is equal before the law ($r = .753$);
- freedom to do as you like could result in dictatorship ($r = -.713$)
- one can do as one likes as long as one remains within the law ($r = .448$);
- the distribution of wealth is grossly unfair ($r = -.378$)¹.

An analysis of the individual answers given by all 11.676 interviewees in the ten Community countries produced fairly similar results.

(See Graph 5.)

Subject to more detailed analysis we can accordingly conclude that satisfaction with the way in which democracy works is a valuable indicator of "public morale" and that this feeling is particularly influenced by:

- nationality and the history which gives each nation its collective identity;
- certain individual characteristics (age, income, leadership rating, political ideology), the relative influence of which varies depending on country and circumstance;
- the importance attributed to certain values and views on the way in which they are put into practice: equality before the law, freedom of expression and behaviour, social justice in the distribution of wealth, maintenance of a certain degree of public order without which democracy would be placed at risk.

Some of these values tend to be associated at the level of the individual with leftist ideology and others with rightist ideology; their co-existence is doubtless one of the pre-requisites for the "satisfactory" operation of a democratic system.

Graph 6 shows that leftist ideology tends to generate aspirations for greater equality, justice, freedom and respect for minorities, whereas interviewees on the right of the political spectrum are more aware of the dangers involved in "laissez-faire" and excessive egalitarianism.

(See Graph 6.)

¹ There is no significant correlation between satisfaction with the way democracy works and views on the unpopularity of small groups ($r = .062$), the main reason being the very bad consensus of opinion on this item in most countries.

Table 5
OPINIONS ON THE WAY THE POLITICAL SYSTEM WORKS¹

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC (2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
POSITIVE ITEMS											
<i>Everyone is free to criticize</i>											
Agree	70	83	91	77	80	79	83	88	85	79	83
Don't agree	28	11	7	20	15	18	23	9	13	12	14
Don't know	2	6	2	3	5	3	4	3	12	9	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	12.42	1.72	2.84	2.58	2.64	2.61	2.70	2.79	2.73	2.68	1.69
<i>Everyone is free to do more or less as he wishes</i>											
Agree	63	70	72	66	62	67	86	75	67	78	69
Don't agree	34	22	21	29	32	28	12	18	29	12	26
Don't know	3	8	7	5	6	5	2	7	4	10	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.29	1.48	1.51	2.38	1.30	2.40	1.74	1.57	1.38	1.66	.43
<i>Complete equality will destroy personal initiative</i>											
Agree	68	60	53	64	42	45	63	51	56	35	54
Don't agree	26	26	30	25	36	35	23	34	33	25	31
Don't know	6	14	17	11	22	20	14	15	11	40	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.43	1.33	1.23	2.40	1.07	1.09	.39	1.16	.24	1.10	.24
<i>Complete equality will destroy personal initiative</i>											
Agree	61	49	47	55	43	39	52	50	43	45	47
Don't agree	34	31	39	35	39	41	34	36	44	20	38
Don't know	5	20	14	10	18	20	14	14	13	35	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.27	.18	1.08	2.21	1.03	.98	.19	1.14	.98	.24	.08

Table 5 (contd.)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC (2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Everyone is truly equal before the law</i>											
Agree	35	39	51	24	44	27	43	55	43	49	38
Don't agree	62	50	41	67	47	65	49	39	52	40	54
Don't know	3	11	8	2	9	8	8	6	5	11	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	1.74	1.89	2.10	1.58	1.98	1.62	1.94	2.16	1.91	2.09	1.84
<u>NEGATIVE ITEMS</u>											
<i>Money can fix everything</i>											
Agree	60	53	49	46	37	49	51	53	24	66	44
Don't agree	37	38	42	51	57	46	45	40	74	29	51
Don't know	3	9	9	3	6	5	4	7	2	5	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.22	2.15	2.07	1.95	1.80	2.02	2.06	2.13	1.50	2.37	1.93
<i>Too much freedom would result in dictatorship</i>											
Agree	65	37	31	58	50	64	27	47	56	34	51
Don't agree	31	46	56	34	32	30	63	38	37	38	39
Don't know	4	17	13	8	18	6	10	15	7	28	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.35	11.91	1.75	2.23	2.18	2.34	1.64	2.09	2.19	1.97	2.11
<i>Small minorities are unpopular</i>											
Agree	64	62	36	60	58	48	65	57	59	57	52
Don't agree	31	24	47	27	28	31	25	30	30	16	33
Don't know	5	14	17	13	14	21	10	13	11	27	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.33	2.37	1.90	2.34	2.30	2.17	2.40	2.28	2.29	2.41	2.19

Table 5 (contd)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC (2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Social welfare doesn't reach those in most need</i>											
Agree	68	50	76	61	65	50	63	51	65	33	62
Don't agree	26	35	13	25	25	30	24	37	24	23	24
Don't know	6	15	11	14	10	20	13	12	10	44	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.41	2.15	2.62	2.37	2.40	2.21	2.39	2.14	2.42	2.11	2.38
<i>The distribution of wealth is grossly unfair</i>											
Agree	74	36	59	71	76	81	74	62	54	80	66
Don't agree	23	49	27	23	17	15	19	27	40	11	26
Don't know	3	15	14	6	7	4	7	11	6	9	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.52	1.87	2.32	2.48	2.60	2.66	2.56	2.36	2.14	2.70	2.40

¹ For the exact wording of these items see p. 15. Positive items are listed in descending order of index for the Community as a whole and negative items in ascending order.

² Weighted average.

³ "Tend to agree" = 3, "don't know" = 2, "tend to disagree" = 1.

Graphique 4 / Graph 4

OPINIONS SUR LE SYSTEME POLITIQUE / OPINIONS ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

(Items positifs)

(Positive items)


Chacun peut exprimer librement ses critiques

Chacun est libre de faire à peu près ce qu'il veut

A vouloir égaliser tout on perd l'esprit d'initiative

L'aide sociale diminue les inégalités

On est vraiment égal devant la loi




Everyone is free to express his opinions

One may do almost anything one likes

To aim for complete equality will destroy personal initiative

The welfare state - I reduces inequality -

Everyone is truly equal before the law



Graphique 4 (suite) / Graph 4 (continued)

OPINIONS SUR LE SYSTEME POLITIQUE / OPINIONS ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

(Items négatifs)

(Negative items)

Avec de l'argent,
tout s'arrange

Trop de laisser-faire
risque d'amener la
dictature

Les petites minorités
sont mal considérées

L'aide sociale ne pro-
fite pas à ceux qui en
auraient le plus besoin

Il y a trop d'injus-
tice dans la réparti-
tion de la richesse

1.50

2.00

2.50

Money can fix
everything

The freedom to do as
you like could bring
out dictatorship

Small groups are
largely disapproved


Help via the social wel-
fare system does not
reach those in most
need

It is grossly unfair
that some people pos-
sess a lot and other
almost nothing

1.50

2.00



2.50



Graphique 5 / Graph 5

OPINIONS SUR LE SYSTEME POLITIQUE SELON LE DEGRE DE SATISFACTION AVEC LE FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA DEMOCRATIE /

OPINIONS ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ACCORDING TO THE DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH HOW DEMOCRACY IS WORKING



Graphique 6 / Graph 6

OPINIONS SUR LE SYSTEME POLITIQUE SELON L'AUTO-
POSITIONNEMENT SUR LA DIMENSION GAUCHE/DROITE /

OPINIONS ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ACCORDING TO
SELF-PLACEMENT ON THE LEFT/RIGHT DIMENSION




- Il y a trop d'injustice dans la répartition de la richesse / It is grossly unfair that some people possess a lot and other almost nothing
- - - - Les petites minorités sont mal considérées / Small groups are largely disapproved

Graphique 6 (suite) / Graph 6 (continued)

OPINIONS SUR LE SYSTEME POLITIQUE SELON L'AUTO-
POSITIONNEMENT SUR LA DIMENSION GAUCHE/DROITE

OPINIONS ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ACCORDING TO
SELF-PLACEMENT ON THE LEFT/RIGHT DIMENSION



- A vouloir tout égaliser on perd l'esprit d'initiative / To aim for complete equality will destroy personal initiative
- Trop de laisser-faire risque d'amener la dictature / The freedom to do as you like could bring out dictatorship
- On est vraiment égal devant la loi / Everyone is truly equal before the law
- .-.-.- Chacun peut exprimer librement ses critiques / Everyone is free to express his opinions

1.3. BASIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOCIAL CHANGE:
REVOLUTION, REFORM, DEFENCE AGAINST SUBVERSION

This question, like the previous one, concerns "public morale", but viewed from the angle of social change,

"(Show card); On this card there are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-a-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion:

- 1. The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action.*
- 2. Or society must be gradually improved by reforms.*
- 3. Or present society must be valiently defended against all subversive forces."*

Consideration of replies over a long period - more than eleven years in the case of some countries - shows a very stable pattern, probably because the questions deal with value systems.

The reformist option is the most popular in all countries except Germany where in periods of terrorism, "defence against subversive forces" comes into the ascendant.

Although relatively unpopular in all countries, the revolutionary option is supported by a minority which can be clearly distinguished from the rest of society and hence merits special attention.

(See Table 6 and Table A3 in the Appendix.)

Young people (15 - 29) especially students, tend to be more in favour of revolution than their elders, but the strongest discriminants are satisfaction with the way democracy works and, above all, position of the political spectrum. Whereas the revolutionary option is very much the option of the extreme left, defence of society against subversive forces has its stronghold on the right and extreme right.

Finally, analysis of the correlation between opinions on the way the political system works and the fundamental options for social changes shows that the revolutionary minority stands out quite clearly from the rest of the population by the strength of its conviction regarding the unpopularity of non-conformist minorities and inequality before the law.

(See Table 7.)

Table 6
BASIC ATTITUDES TO SOCIAL CHANGE
 (Percentage of interviewees selecting one of the three options)¹

	1970 (February-March) ²			1976 (November)			1977- 1981 (ten surveys) ³			1982 (April)		
	evolu- tionary action	Reform	Defence against subver- sion	evolu- tionary action	Reform	Defence against subver- sion	evolu- tionary action	Reform	Defence against subver- sion	evolu- tionary action	Reform	Defence against subver- sion
Belgique / Belg ë	4%	80%	16%	6%	73%	21%	7%	71%	22%	9%	77%	14%
Danmark				4	55	41	3	58	39	2	58	40
Deutschland	2	76	22	2	56	42	3	50	47	5	50	45
France	5	82	13	14	67	19	10	69	21	5	71	24
Ireland				8	67	25	7	67	26	5	73	22
Italia	8	80	12	13	68	19	8	63	29	7	69	24
Luxembourg	1	70	29	2	59	39	5	68	27	6	66	28
Nederland	6	78	16	5	60	35	6	60	34	6	64	30
United Kingdom				8	65	27	7	63	30	7	61	32
Ellas	:	:					10	62	28	7		
COMMUNITY (4)	(5)	(79)	(16)	8	64	28	7	61	32	6	63	31

1 "Don't knows" in all countries throughout the period averaged 7%, with a maximum of 14% in Belgium.

2 The 1970 survey covered only the six countries which were then members. The wording of the "reformist" option was also slightly different ("by intelligent reforms"),

3 Average of three surveys only for Greece (October 1980, April and October 1981).

4 Weighted average.

Table 7

OPINIONS ON THE WAY POLITICAL SYSTEM WORKS RELATED TO ATTITUDE TO SOCIAL
CHANGE

(Community **as** a whole)

	Revolu- tionary action	Reform	Defence against subver- sion	Don' t know	Total
Small minorities are largely disapproved of					
Agree	65%	55%	48%	37%	52%
Don't agree	23	32	36	26	32
Difference	42	23	12	11	20
Everyone is truly equal before the law					
Agree	29%	35%	46%	36%	38%
Don't agree	64	58	47	43	54
Difference	-35	-23	- 1	- 7	-16

1.4. ABILITY TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Previous research findings have demonstrated that a very important dimension of political dissatisfaction in the most general sense of the term is the feeling of being powerless or almost powerless, unable to influence decisions which concern us: in short, politically ineffectual¹.

A question designed to sound out feelings on this issue, asked on a number of occasions since 1973, was repeated in April 1982.

"Do you think that if things are not going well (in your country) people like yourself can help to bring about a change for the better or not?"

In the Community as a whole there is a slight trend towards an increased feeling of helplessness, with fewer than four people in ten (37 percent) feeling that they can help to bring about a change.

Curiously enough, it is the Greeks who feel they have the most influence (62 percent), but this may be due to the recent change in the governing majority. Second on the list are the Danes (56 percent), with the Belgians ranking last as they did nine years ago when the question was first asked.

To summarize the findings, in September 1973 the majority of those questioned in four of the nine member countries (Denmark, Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands)(an absolute majority in the first two countries) felt that they were able to shape political developments; by 1982 this had fallen drastically to two out of ten: Denmark and Greece,

(See Table 8.)

The feeling of being able to do something in political terms is slightly more widespread among men, the active (under fifties) and those with above average education. However, the most valuable pointer is clearly leadership rating; this is scarcely surprising and confirms the relevance of this indicator, which has been used in all Eurobarometers since 1975².

¹ The other dimensions of political dissatisfaction are opposition to the authorities, discontent with their actions and lack of confidence in their ability and that of the regime itself to satisfy the aspirations and promote the interests of the citizens. See inter alia: Barbara G. FARAH, Samuel H. BARNES and Felix HEUNKS, Political Dissatisfaction in Samuel H. BARNES, Max KAASE et al, Political Action. Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (Sage, Beverly Hills, 1979) pp. 409-447.

² By contrast, the feeling of being able to influence political events as measured in our survey generally shows only a weak correlation with socio-political variables, such as position on the political spectrum, attitude to social change and even satisfaction with the way democracy works. In other words, the feeling of political effectiveness would appear to be a reflection of one's **own** personality much more than an evaluation of the political system. Research into participation would perhaps shed more light on the **full** significance of this variable.

Table 8

ABILITY TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK ¹	GR	EC (2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Yes, can help to bring about a change</i>											
September 1973	26	64	44	41	52	39	38	47	41		42
May 1975	19	53	35	36	44	36	24	29	46		37
Oct/Nov 1975	14	57	41	36	46	38	24	29	45		39
May/June 1976	21	58	35	34	46	42	31	41	42		38
April 1982	20	56	33	33	33	39	42	37	42	62	37
<i>No, cannot help to bring about a change</i>											
September 1973	66	27	37	51	37	47	55	41	46		45
May 1975	68	29	49	58	48	53	57	48	41	.	50
Oct/Nov 1975	77	28	48	58	42	49	61	46	45		50
May/June 1976	70	30	52	61	42	44	53	49	51		52
April 1982	68	33	45	62	51	51	56	56	52	27	52
<i>Don't know</i>											
September 1973	8	9	19	8	11	14	7	12	12		13
May 1975	13	18	16	6	8	11	19	23	13		13
Oct/Nov 1975	9	15	11	6	12	13	15	25	10		11
May/June 1976	9	13	13	5	12	14	16	10	7		10
April 1982	12	11	22	5	16	10	6	7	6	ii	11
Total ³	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹ Great Britain only in 1973.² Weighted average.³ 100 percent for each poll.

I.5. NATIONAL PRIDE

There are many who would assume prima facie that national pride or the conviction that one's country is in some way superior to other countries is universal. However, it was felt necessary to prove the point as there could be all sorts of reasons for reluctance to express such a feeling: unexpected modesty, built-in predilection for understatement, or genuine absence of pride on a variety of grounds.

"Would you say you are very proud, quite proud, not very proud, not at all proud, to be (nationality)?"

On average three out of every four interviewed (74 percent) were either very proud or quite proud of their country. The Greeks were top of the poll both in terms of frequency and in terms of degree, scarcely surprising in a country which won its independence only 150 years ago after five centuries of foreign occupation, which is still not totally immune to frontier threats¹.

The Greeks are followed in descending order by the Irish, again understandable for historical reasons, the British (but remember that the poll was conducted just after the invasion of the Falklands) and the Luxembourgers, whose motto is the epitome of a national pride which has formed the basis of their small country's independence over the centuries.

Those with least pride in their country are the Germans and the Belgians. In the case of Germany, this underrating of the nation as such, definitely not to be confused with a lack of confidence in the German people², nor with dissatisfaction with the way the federal political system operates³, could well be the result of events in Germany over the last fifty years; even in 1970 the Germans displayed less national pride than the other five founder members of the Community. In the case of the Belgians, this phenomenon is more recent; in 1970 they were close on the heels of Luxembourg in the national pride table.

(See Table 9.)

¹ We will see later on that the Greeks attach much more importance to "national defence" than any other Community member (see Table 13, p. 38).

² See Eurobarometer No. 14, December 1980, pp. 39-40.

³ See p. 11 above.

Table 9
NATIONAL PRIDE

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	UK	GR	ΣC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Claim to be:										
. very proud	22	37	22	33	55	35	55	56	76	3
. quite proud	34	38	38	43	29	41	30	32	14	3
. not very proud	24	13	19	12	7	15	7	7	5	
. not at all proud	8	2	9	4	2	6	4	3	2	
Don't know	12	10	12	8	7	3	4	2	3	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.81	3.23	2.83	3.14	3.47	3.08	3.43	3.45	3.68	3.13
National ranking	10	5	9	4	2	7	4	0	1	

1 right average

2 "Very proud" = 4, "not at all proud" = 1.

In point of fact a similar question, but worded slightly differently, was included in a questionnaire put to interviewees in the six founder members of the Community in February/March 1970.

One cannot be 100 percent sure as the wording was not exactly the same, but it would appear in all the countries where comparison is possible that the feeling of national pride declined substantially from 1970 to 1982. The extent of the decline (around 10 percent) is the same for Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, but double that in Belgium.

Table 10

NATIONAL PRIDE IN 1970

	B	D	F	I	L	NL	EC 6
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
I am proud to be ...							
▪ very proud	70	38	66	62	81	54	55
▪ fairly proud	18	33	22	24	10	28	27
▪ not very proud	4	14	5	5	4	13	8
▪ not at all proud	3	9	3	4	2	3	5
Don't know	5	6	4	5	3	2	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	3.63	3.06	3.57	3.52	3.75	3.36	3.39

On analysis the feeling of national pride in all countries would appear to be a "popular" sentiment. It is more widespread among the older generation, the less-educated, the less well-off and the less-mobilized; however, more specifically, there is a strong positive correlation between national pride and both satisfaction with the way democracy works and rightist political leanings. It is to a certain extent the ideology of what could be called "the silent majority".

¹ See Europeans and European Unification (Brussels) June 1972, pp. 84-91 and A2.

² "Very proud" = 4, "not at all proud" = 1.

CHAPTER II

HOPES AND FEARS FOR THE FUTURE

II

HOPES AND FEARS FOR THE FUTURE

For the first time two lengthy sets of questions were asked on the hopes and fears of Europeans for the next ten or fifteen years ahead.

An in-depth analysis of the answers will eventually be made, but it is worth showing some of the overall results now.

11.1. HOPES

" Here are a certain number of things which might bring about changes in the next 10 or 15 years in the way people live in your country. Which of them, in your opinion, are the most promising, offering the most hope for the future? (Several answers possible). (SHOW CARD).

1. *Scientific and technological developments*
2. *Changes in moral values (in your country)*
3. *Prospects for standard of living (in your country)*
4. *The unification of Europe*
5. *Understanding and goodwill amongst the people of your country*
6. *Changes in relations between East and West*
7. *Understanding between the industrialized countries and the Third World*
8. *Relations between local and regional authorities and national government*
9. *The quality of life*
10. *None of these."*

Generally speaking, five hopes - five "things" considered to be the most promising come out way ahead of the field:

- scientific and technological developments
- understanding and goodwill amongst the people of the country
- prospects for the standard of living
- the quality of life
- understanding between the industrialized countries and the Third World.

There are few differences between countries. The first of the subjects - progress - ranks first, second or third in nine out of ten countries, and the second - national consensus - in eight out of ten.

The countries in which answers rank closest to the Community average are Italy and Belgium, while the answers from the Germans, the Irish and the Dutch are quite near the average.

Without going too far into detail or prejudging later analysis, the Germans and the Dutch clearly put more weight on the hopes for international relations - changes in relations between East and West, the unification of Europe and, for the Dutch, understanding between the industrialized countries and the Third World. The Irish are more concerned about changes in moral values in their country and relations between the regions and the capital.

11.2. FEARS

"Here are some kinds of fears which are sometimes expressed about the future (say the next 10 or 15 years) of the world we live in (SHOW LIST).

I would like you to tell me which of the following really concern you or worry you (Several answers possible).

Among those that do worry you, which one is the most worrying? And after that which one?

- *More and more artificial things are coming into the life we lead (housing, traffic, food, etc. ...)*
- *The despoiling of natural life and the countryside by pollution of all kinds*
- *Increase in unemployment as a consequence of the automation of jobs*
- *(Your country's) loss of influence in Europe*
- *A prolonged breakdown in supplies of oil and natural gas*
- *The invasion of your country by low-priced products from the Far East*
- *A critical deterioration in international relations*
- *A rise in tensions between different **groups** in **our** society resulting in serious and lasting disorders*
- *A reduction in the influence of Western Europe in the world*
- *The risk that the use of new medical or pharmaceutical discoveries may severely affect the human personality*
- *Rise in crime and terrorism.*

Table 11

HOPES AND FEARS OF EUROPEANS: WHAT MAY BRING ABOUT CHANGES OVER THE NEXT TEN OR FIFTEEN **YEARS** IN THE WAY PEOPLE LIVE¹

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Scientific and technological developments	32	29	37	41	32	41	37	37	37	55	39
Understanding and goodwill amongst the people of the country	32	32	25	39	45	36	35	38	36	57	35
Prospects for the standard of living	20	14	28	31	37	31	36	19	39	56	31
The quality of life	34	26	29	40	35	24	31	17	29	47	30
Understanding between industrialized countries and Third World	17	26	23	35	20	27	35	28	27	26	27
Changes in relations between East and West	17	33	31	19	14	22	26	28	29	32	25
Changes in moral values	15	17	21	12	27	22	23	13	29	28	21
Unification of Europe	15	10	26	18	6	16	39	21	9	25	17
Relations between regions and capital	12	13	14	13	25	17	19	10	20	51	17
None of these or no answer	18	13	14	9	12	7	7	12	5	10	9
Total ³	112	213	248	257	253	243	288	223	260	387	251

¹ See page 31 for the exact wording of these items. The "hopes" are shown here in descending order of percentages of answers in the Community.

² Weighted average.

³ Total over 100 percent as several answers possible.

The answers concerning "fears" are far more numerous and definite than those in respect of "hopes". Three-factors emerge clearly at the top of the list, both in the percentage comparison of spontaneous choice from the list or in determining priority choices in first or second place:

- the rise in crime and terrorism
- rising unemployment
- the despoiling of natural life.

These are followed, but some way behind, by the fear that more and more artificial things are coming into life and fears of a rise in tensions between different groups in our society and of a deterioration in international relations.

At the bottom of the table we find the fear of one's own country's loss of influence in Europe and of the reduction in Western Europe's influence in the world¹.

The differences between countries are even less marked than for the hopes: in the ten countries these three fears almost always rank first, second or third and, if not, fourth.

It is again in Italy that the answers rank closest to the overall average. Denmark, the United Kingdom, Greece and Germany show profiles a little further from the average than those in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland and France.

Denmark, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom would appear to be more concerned about the more and more artificial conditions of life. The increase in social tensions, which rank fifth on the average and as high as third in the United Kingdom and Ireland, is pushed **down** to eighth place in Greece. On the other hand, France and the United Kingdom rank the invasion of low-priced products from the Far East one place higher than the others.

But these are only fine distinctions which later analysis should place in their correct perspective.

For both hopes and fears the most striking overall impression is the general "likemindedness" of the member countries of the European Community.

(See Table 12.)

¹ At this stage of the analysis, this may also reflect a lack of interest in these possibilities as much as a denial that they will happen.

Table 12
THE FEARS OF EUROPEANS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD OVER THE NEXT TEN OR FIFTY YEARS¹

	B %	DK %	D %	F %	IRL %	I %	L %	NL %	UK %	GR %	EC ² %
Rise in crime and terrorism	61	60	57	72	89	83	74	68	77	72	71
Increase in unemployment	76	68	75	65	73	60	77	64	61	60	66
Depleting of natural life	50	65	77	48	48	55	65	65	39	69	57
More and more racial living conditions	43	23	62	29	35	52	31	27	19	48	41
Rise in social tensions	47	32	46	29	49	32	45	40	46	20	38
Critical deterioration in international relations	32	44	51	24	25	32	32	25	28	53	35
The risk to human personality in the use of new medical or pharmaceutical discoveries	26	28	40	24	32	30	35	26	20	30	29
Prolonged breakdown in supplies of oil and natural gas	27	22	40	16	21	19	29	13	10	29	23
Invasion of Europe from the East	23	13	19	27	23	14	22	11	27	12	20
Our country's loss of influence in the world	12	17	23	8	9	9	20	6	16	16	14
Western Europe's loss of influence in the world	14	11	19	6	6	7	15	9	10	10	10
No answer	2	1	-	1	1	4	1
Total	412	384	509	348	410	393	445	355	360	424	405

¹ See page 31, la for the exact wording of these items. The 'fears' are shown here in descending order of percentage of answers in the Community.

² Weighted average.

³ Total over 100 percent as several answers possible.

CHAPTER III

GREAT CAUSES
WORTH FIGHTING FOR

III

GREAT CAUSES WORTH FIGHTING FOR

In sample surveys it is never easy to get down to the level of values - beneath the more or less consistent and firm attitudes and the opinions expressing them - by which the persons questioned set such great store that they are willing to make sacrifices¹,

An analysis of the replies to the following question should offer an insight into this highly interesting field:

"Which of the ideas or causes in the following list are sufficiently worthwhile for you to do something about, even if this might involve some risk or giving up other things? (SHOW CARD)

1. *Sexual equality*
2. *Protection of the environment (wildlife, nature, etc. . . .)*
3. *World peace*
4. *Struggle against poverty*
5. *(Our country's) defences*
6. *My religious faith*
7. *The unification of Europe*
8. *Freedom of the individual*
9. *Human rights*
10. *Revolution*
11. *None of these things*

The answers to this question show an even more striking European consensus than those concerning hopes and fears.

In all countries without exception one great cause stands out from all the others: peace (67 percent). It is followed by four others, with relatively little to choose between them:

¹ *"Le probleme des valeurs, c'est l'ensemble des questions: que devons-nous faire? A quoi devons-nous aspirer? comment devons-nous nous comporter? C'est le probleme de la boussole qui doit orienter notre chemin a travers la vie". Werner HEISENBERG, "La Partie et le Tout" (French edition) Albin Michel, 1974, p. 290*

"Values differ operationally from attitudes only in being fewer in number, more general, central and pervasive, less situation-bound, more resistant to modification and perhaps tied to developmentally more primitive or dramatic experiences". John P. ROBINSON and Phillip R. SHAVER, "Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes", Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1969, p. 410.

- human rights (45 percent)
- the struggle against poverty (40 percent)
- freedom of the individual (40 percent)
- protection of the environment (35 percent).

The other "great causes" are to be found much lower down, "revolution" coming last of all (3 percent).

Only 7 percent of the European public mention no great cause, but the proportion stands between 14 and 16 percent in Denmark, Germany and Ireland,

The country where the profile of answers veers farthest from the Community average is Germany, where protection of the environment is slightly ahead of human rights, freedom of the individual and the struggle against poverty,

Italy and the United Kingdom show somewhat similar answer profiles, both close to the Community average, which confirms a definite likemindedness among the nations of Western Europe,

(See Table 13)

The differences between the social characteristics of those mentioned tend to have little impact. These will be analysed in depth later on, with due allowance for the fact that the inclination to give more than one answer varies from country to country and from one social category to another.

(See Table 14)

Some great causes have strong links with political ideology. Human rights, the struggle against poverty, freedom of the individual, sexual equality and, of course, revolution tend to be values appreciated on the left, while national defence and religion are more highly appreciated on the right. In contrast, values such as peace, protection of the environment and - admittedly at a lower degree of consensus - unification of Europe are largely unaffected by the traditional division between left and right.

(See Table 15)

Table 13
THE GREAT CAUSES OF EUROPEANS'

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC (2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Peace	65	61	57	77	45	76	79	68	58	85	67
Human rights	43	48	38	53	41	40	59	54	44	59	44
The struggle against poverty	37	34	29	56	38	43	52	34	37	54	40
Freedom of the individual	34	29	31	55	26	34	46	34	42	60	40
Protection of the environment	33	33	39	37	20	26	46	40	36	48	35
National defence	13	18	17	28	11	23	28	9	28	44	23
My religious faith	10	8	13	12	35	21	21	15	15	41	16
Sexual equality	14	22	17	16	9	12	40	19	14	34	16
Unification of Europe	14	7	13	14	4	9	33	9	5	21	11
Revolution	3	3	3	3	1	3	3	3	2	7	3
None of these or no answer	11	14	14	3	15	3	2	6	6	5	7
Total ³	277	277	271	354	245	290	409	291	287	458	302

¹ See page 36 for the exact wording of these items. The great causes are shown here in descending order of percentages of answers in the Community.

² Weighted average.

³ Total over 100 percent as several answers possible.

Table 14
DEVOTION TO GREAT CAUSES
ACCORDING TO SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
(Whole Community)

Causes mentioned in descending order)	Frequency of answers (EC average)	Maximum frequencies of answers and corresponding social cate- gories	
Peace	67%	Incomes R ++	71%
Human rights	44	Highly educated	52
Struggle against poverty	40	Leaders ++	48
Freedom of the indivu individual	40	Highly educated	48
Protection of the environment	35	Leaders ++	42
National defence	23	60 and older	30
My religious faith	16	60 and older	25
Sexual equality	16	Young students	24
		Leaders ++	23
Unification of Europe	11	Leaders ++	14
Revolution	3	Young students	6

Table 15
DEVOTION TO GREAT CAUSES
ACCORDING TO POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
(Whole Community)

	Extreme left	Left	Centre	Right	Extreme right
Peace	69%	73%	66%	63%	63%
Human rights	51	47	39	32	26
Struggle against poverty	50	42	38	34	38
Freedom of the individual	45	40	36	34	27
Protection of the environment	37	35	37	36	29
National defence	18	20	22	30	33
My religious faith	11	13	22	20	28
Sexual equality	27	20	13	13	13
Unification of Europe	11	8	8	9	13
Revolution	10	2	2	1	1

CHAPTER IV

ES TOWARDS EUROPE
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

IV

ATTITUDES TO EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The man on the street is somewhat puzzled by terms such as "Europe", the "European Community" and "political cooperation between states" which form part of a complex historical movement with distinctly political objectives, even if the main achievements have been economic. He is equally out of his depth when faced by institutions with powers and responsibilities about which little is known or which are even deliberately concealed¹.

In addition to public attitudes about the movement to unify Europe and about membership of the European Community, the content and symbolic connotations of these attitudes, the public's degree of involvement and its sources of information must therefore be investigated from time to time².

IV. 1. THE FEELING OF BEING A CITIZEN OF EUROPE

"Do you ever think of yourself as a citizen of Europe? Often, sometimes or never?"

No more than 16 percent of the persons interviewed throughout the Community said that they often thought of themselves as citizens of Europe. The percentage rises to 33 percent in Luxembourg, 27 percent in Greece and 25 percent in Germany. People in Luxembourg and Germany have long felt a deep attachment to Europe, i.e. probably to the idea of Europe, the plan for a political union of European peoples. In the case of Greece, these replies probably show historical and cultural attachment³.

(See Table 16)

¹ To take only one example, repeated use of a term such as the "Common Market" or, worse still, of initials such as CEE, EEC or EWG probably has more of a belittling effect.

² These surveys will become more important as the date of the second election to the European Parliament approaches (1984).

³ As we shall see later, the Greeks do not diverge from the European average in their replies to the decisive question of whether they are for or against European unification. (See page 43)

Table 16
THE FEELING OF BEING A CITIZEN OF EUROPE

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC(1)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Often	11	10	25	19	9	16	33	5	7	27	16
Sometimes	30	30	50	42	23	39	46	35	20	32	37
Never	53	55	18	37	64	41	15	57	72	35	43
No reply	6	5	7	2	4	4	6	3	1	6	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

This position, like all positions concerning Europe, European unification or the European Community, is closely linked with the leadership rating.

(See Table 17)

On the other hand, there is generally a weak link between national pride and the feeling of being a citizen of Europe. In the few countries where this link is significant (Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg), it is positive, i.e. the persons who display most national pride also tend to feel Europeans.

Table 17
THE FEELING OF BEING A CITIZEN OF EUROPE
(RELATED TO LEADERSHIP RATING)
(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders		Leaders		Total
	L--	L-	L+	L++	
	%	%	%	%	%
Often	11	15	18	26	16
Sometimes	28	35	42	37	37
Never	52	44	37	34	43
No reply	9	6	3	3	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100

¹ weighted average.

IV.2. FOR OR AGAINST WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

"In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for this, or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent against, or very much against?"

The significance of the replies to this question has often been pointed out: it measures a sentiment as vague as it is diffuse, a sort of "reservoir of goodwill", as regards the idea of a united Europe and the achievements which historically come under this heading¹.

In April 1982, as in the previous survey, there were more positive than negative replies in every country except Denmark. In Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg, the six original Community members, six to seven persons out of every ten interviewed supported European unification while one in ten opposed the idea. There is even an absolute majority in support of unification in countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland and Greece which have joined the Community more recently, although it should be noted that one in three persons in the United Kingdom is against. Denmark is thus the only country in which supporters and opponents of unification are evenly balanced.

(See Table 18 and Table A5 in the Appendix)

The fluctuations in the past eighteen months are of little significance. However, if a comparison is drawn with the more distant past, the general trend is a slight drop. This is not because a greater proportion of die-hard opponents have expressed their views (as we have seen, they are only a small minority in most countries), but because relatively firm attitudes ("very much for") have tended to weaken ("only to some extent").

This trend is not dramatic, but it should be given attention.

¹ In particular, Eurobarometer No. 16, December 1981, p. 34.

Table 16

SUPPORT FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION1973 to 1982

	B	OK	O	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK ⁽¹⁾	GR	EC ⁽²⁾
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>September 1973</u>											
Very much for	22	17	49	23	21	34	47	34	14		30
To some extent for	38	28	29	45	31	36	33	39	23		33
To some extent against	3	14	4	3	8	2	1	a	15		6
Very much against	2	18	2	1	4	1	-	7	15		5
Don't know ³	35	23	16	28	36	27	19	12	33		26
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ⁴	3.24	2.56	3.50	3.25	3.07	3.41	3.57	3.15	2.53	:	3.19
2. <u>1975-1980 (seven surveys)</u>											
Very much for	23	15	38	25	22	38	45	34	23	33	30
To some extent for	40	30	41	50	40	44	39	42	36	26	42
To some extent against	5	17	5	6	9	4	6	6	13	12	7
Very much against	2	17	1	2	4	1	2	4	9	11	4
Don't know ³	30	21	15	17	25	13	a	14	19	ia	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ⁴	3.22	2.54	3.35	3.18	3.07	3.36	3.39	3.24	2.aa	3.00	3.20
3. <u>April 1981</u>											
Very much for	18	17	31	16	20	36	45	30	17	30	26
To some extent for	42	29	39	56	39	46	42	50	35	30	43
To some extent against	6	16	9	9	15	a	6	8	14	12	10
Very much against	3	ia	4	3	a	3	1	5	15	13	6
Don't know ³	31	20	13	16	ia	7	6	7	19	15	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ⁴	3.08	2.55	3.17	3.01	2.87	3.24	3.40	3.13	2.68	2.91	3.03

Table 16 (contd)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK (1)	GR	EC (2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
4. October 1981											
Very much for	27	12	38	26	21	40	45	28	20	36	31
To some extent for	43	31	37	54	41	42	38	46	44	29	43
To some extent against	5	22	11	6	11	5	11	10	13	7	9
Very much against	2	17	1	1	5	2	3	7	8	8	4
Don't know ³	23	18	13	13	22	11	3	9	15	20	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ⁴	3.21	2.47	3.28	3.20	3.01	3.35	3.29	3.04	2.89	3.15	3.16
5. April 1982											
Very much for	20	13	33	24	15	32	40	24	17	29	26
To some extent for	49	29	45	54	40	47	42	52	39	29	45
To some extent against	8	22	7	8	12	6	5	9	19	10	10
Very much against	2	20	3	2	5	1	3	4	12	7	5
Don't know ³	21	16	12	12	28	14	10	11	13	25	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ⁴	3.10	2.41	3.23	3.14	2.90	3.27	3.31	3.08	2.69	3.07	3.08

¹ Great Britain only (i.e. without Northern Ireland) in 1973.

² Weighted average.

³ In 1973 and 1975 the persons interviewed could answer "don't care"; these percentages have been added to the "don't knows" in this table. This change could partly explain why the proportion of "don't knows" has since dropped.

⁴ "Very much for" = 4, "very much against" = 1.

As we have already indicated, attitudes concerning Europe are closely linked with leadership rating: the persons most involved in public debate, those who follow current affairs., ~~in~~ other words the opinion leaders, are generally far more likely to approve of the efforts which have been made to unify Europe. This link is particularly marked in France, Ireland, Germany and Belgium. Greece and Denmark are exceptions to this general trend: in these two countries the link is negative, i.e. opinion leaders are less "European" than the non-leaders.

Whatever the leanings and firmness of attitude, opinion leaders deserve special attention in view of their mobilising role in society. Their support for European unification fell in most countries between 1973 and 1982.

IV.3. INTEREST IN THE PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THEM

We have two measures of the degree of public involvement with the European Community: the importance attached to European affairs and the interest taken in them. The two variables show a strong correlation, but are not identical; it is possible not to take an interest in a particular subject for the lack of time or for some other reason and yet consider this subject important.

The following two questions which have often been asked in recent years were asked once again in April 1982:

"Newspapers, radio and TV often present news and commentaries about the European Community (also called the Common Market). Are you personally very interested, a little interested or not at all interested in the problems of the European Community?"

Depending on the country, some 15-35% of the persons interviewed stated that they were very interested in the problems of the Community (16-17% in Belgium and the Netherlands, 29% in Italy and 34% in Luxembourg). It would be wrong to question the sincerity of these replies; they reflect well-defined attitudes since they differ from country to country and have been extremely stable in each country throughout the past ten years.

(See Table 19 and Table 6 in the Appendix)

Interest in Community affairs is closely associated with the leadership rating, which itself reflects a propensity to take part in public affairs and rises only slowly as the level of education rises; however, this interest may obviously be stimulated temporarily by events and the treatment of them in the media. Interest in the United Kingdom thus peaked at **35** percent in ~~May~~ 1975, just before the referendum on Community membership. The Belgian figure for April 1982 (16 percent) - relatively high compared with the previous six surveys - may be explained by the fact that this country was acting as President of the Council¹.

Table 19
"VERY INTERESTED" IN COMMUNITY MATTERS
(Trend from 1973 to 1982)

	<u>B</u>	<u>DK</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>IRL</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>NL</u>	<u>JK(3)</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>EC(4)</u>
1973 September ²	10%	29%	31%	20%	27%	21%	26%	23%	23%	-	24%
1975 May	9	22	26	27	24	24	33	16	35		26
Oct./Nov.	10	19	23	23	28	27	28	18	28	-	14
1976 November	10	25	23	18	21	21	22	20	28	-	22
1978 Oct./Nov.	10	19	16	14	21	24	17	21	19		19
1980 April	9	17	19	18	21	30	34	22	25	-	22
1982 April	16	23	22	19	20	29	34	17	24	26	23

¹ As can be seen below, the proportion of persons **who** are very interested in Community matters is 15 percent in Portugal, but has already reached 33 percent in Spain.

² The wording was slightly different in 1973.

³ Great Britain only in 1973.

⁴ Weighted average.

As we have stated, interest in the Community is determined to a large extent by the leadership rating of the persons interviewed. This correlation is consistent and relatively stable. At present, those persons playing the role of opinion leaders are, on average, five times more likely to be very interested in Community matters than non-leaders.

(See Table 20)

Although interest in Community matters is relatively low among the general public, the importance attached to them in connection with the future of their country **is** relatively high¹. Except in Germany, the proportion of persons who consider the Community's problems very important is larger than the proportion of persons who claim to be very interested in these problems.

(See Table 21 and Table 7 in the Appendix)

These two variables are closely interrelated and are both dependent on the leadership rating. Reciprocal analysis of these variables shows that in most countries there is what could be called a margin of potential interest, i.e., a section of the public who consider Community problems to be important or very important but are not yet very interested in them; their interest could be stimulated by a good information policy dealing with achievements of note.

Taking the Community as a whole, slightly more than 20 percent of the persons interviewed consider that the problems dealt with by the Community are important or very important and claim to be very interested in them. A further 45 percent or **so** consider the problems important or very important, but are only a little interested in them - this is what we call the margin of potential interest.

(See Table 22).

Now that we have presented this analysis method - confirmed by two successive surveys - we can show the national differences in the proportion of persons who may be considered as already committed - those who consider the Community's problems to be at least important and claim to be very interested in them - or those who could be mobilized - those who, while considering the problems important or very important, are only a little interested.

(See Table 23)

¹ Strictly, we should be able to compare interest in Community affairs and interest in similar subjects dealt with independently by the national governments. It is not certain that the difference would be very marked. We shall come across this problem below in connection with the adequacy of information.

Table 20
INTEREST IN COMMUNITY MATTERS RELATED TO LEADERSHIP RATING
(percentage "very interested")

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC (1)
<u>September 1973</u>											
Non-leaders --	2	12	5	8	9	8	(x)	10	a	:	7
-	6	21	17	15	26	15	(x)	13	20	:	16
t	20	31	38	28	40	28	(x)	30	35	:	32
Leaders ++	38	54	63	46	52	47	(x)	55	54	:	53
<u>April 1980</u>											
Non-leaders --	2	6	5	7	9	8	11	7	11	:	7
-	7	12	14	18	18	22	23	17	22	:	18
t	13	17	26	25	30	44	36	25	32	:	31
Leaders ++	46	51	52	40	44	67	71	38	42	:	49
<u>April 1982</u>											
Non-leaders --	9	9	8	10	8	16	10	6	8	13	10
-	13	19	15	13	15	22	21	11	23	16	18
t	23	29	23	28	29	33	37	15	30	26	26
Leaders ++	49	43	57	44	51	62	69	44	47	40	51

(X) Figures not available.

(1) Weighted average.

Table 21

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO CONSIDER COMMUNITY MATTERS "IMPORTANT" OR "VERY IMPORTANT"¹

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC (2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>October - November 1975</u>											
Very important	22	32	26	35	46	34	31	21	45		34
Important	40	39	45	47	38	45	50	45	37		43
Total	62	71	71	82	84	79	81	66	82		77
2. <u>April 1980</u>											
Very important	19	30	20	31	38	40	45	29	42	:	32
Important	45	43	54	49	48	43	45	52	42	:	47
Total	64	73	74	80	86	83	90	81	84		79
3. <u>April 1982</u>											
Very important	19	32	22	27	31	42	45	22	37	29	31
Important	48	47	51	54	47	43	41	56	42	37	47
Total	67	79	73	81	78	85	86	78	79	66	78

¹ For more details of the replies given in each country, see Table 7 in the Appendix.

² Weighted average.

Table 22

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO COMMUNITY MATTERS
AND PERSONAL INTEREST
(Community as a whole)

<div>April 1980</div>	Say they are interested in Community matters:			Total
	Very	A little	Not at all or don't know	
Consider these matters:				
• very important	16%	13%	3%	32%
• important	6	32	9	47
• Not very important or unimportant (or don't know)	1	7	13	21
Total	23%	52%	25%	100%
N	(1976)	(4673)	(2232)	(8881)
<div>April 1982</div>	Say they are interested in Community matters:			Total
	Very	A little	Not at all or don't know	
Consider these matters:				
• very important	15%	12%	3%	30%
• important	6	33	9	48
• Not very important or 'unimportant (or don't know)	1	8	13	22
Total	22%	53%	25%	100%
N	(2668)	(6135)	(2873)	(11676)

Table 23

IMPORTANCE LEADING TO INTEREST

Proportion of persons in each country who are interested in or could take an interest in the European problems which they consider important ¹

<u>Consider Community matters important or very important:</u>	Interested in Community matters			Base
	Very	A little	Total	
Luxembourg	32%	45%	77%	699
Italia	29	41	70	2417
Ellas	24	27	51	1199
United Kingdom	24	42	66	2873
Ireland	20	46	66	2189
Danmark	19	49	68	2205
Deutschland	19	48	67	2337
Nederland	19	48	67	2227
France	18	50	68	2122
Belgique / België	12	39	51	2219

¹ Aggregate of results for April 1980 and April 1982, except in the case of Greece. Countries are listed in descending order of percentage of respondents who feel involved.

Public involvement is at present particularly high in Luxembourg and Italy, but Greece and the United Kingdom are close behind. Belgium takes the bottom place. These results are a clear sign that the sense of involvement in Community affairs is not linked, or not exclusively linked, with attitudes towards European integration.

However, the table also shows what proportion of the population could be mobilised. This figure is around **40-50%** in all countries except two: Greece (27%), where recent accession to the Community has exhausted much of the potential for mobilising the public, and Belgium (39%) where we have repeatedly observed obvious signs of apathy towards socio-political problems, in particular European problems¹.

In short, the combination of these two variables - the importance attached to Community problems and personal interest in these problems - seems to us to provide a useful instrument for future study into information for the people of Europe².

¹ See J.-R. RABIER: "Les Etudes comparatives des publics européens", Etudes de Radio-Television. R.T.B.F., no. 29, February 1981, pp. 31-65.

² For this purpose, an index has been drawn up in line with each person's replies to these two questions.

IV.4. INFORMATION ABOUT EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

While fairly well aware of the importance of the matters dealt with by the Community, without feeling personally involved, does the great majority of the public believe that it is sufficiently well informed?

What are the main sources of information about European affairs and what are the difficulties which are met or felt in gaining access to these sources?

IV.4.1. Adequacy of information

"All things considered, would you say that people like yourself are sufficiently or are not sufficiently well informed about the problems dealt with by the European Community?"

Once again, we were struck by the consistency and stability of the replies to this question, which was asked for the fourth time since 1973. In every country, with one exception which is statistically insignificant, only a minority of the public consider themselves well informed about European matters. The vast majority do not feel well informed or don't know.

The minority which was satisfied by the information it received in April 1982 amounted to four persons out of ten in the Netherlands, Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg, but less than two out of ten in the United Kingdom and Greece.

The only significant changes compared with the previous surveys are diametrically opposed: satisfaction has increased in Ireland and the Netherlands, but dropped in Denmark and Luxembourg.

(See Table 24 and Table 8 in the Appendix)

Table 24

SATISFACTION WITH INFORMATION
ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK(1)	GR	EC(2)
1973 September	32%	37%	31%	33%	24%	17%	45%	29%	17%	:	25
1974 May	31	32	40	32	35	31	54	38	22	:	32
1980 April	33	25	31	25	32	20	42	46	21	:	26
1982 April	28	23	39	29	36	21	36	43	18	15%	27

1 Great Britain only in 1973 and 1974.

2 Weighted average.

In general, rather fewer women than men consider themselves well informed, but the difference is slight, except in Greece and Italy,

Age appears to have a cyclical effect: it is the elderly and the young who claim to be worst informed.

The descriptive variable which most strongly determines the feeling of being well-informed is the leadership rating: opinion leaders, by their nature, are or consider themselves well informed. This relationship is particularly strong in Italy, Greece and Germany, but is virtually non-existent in Denmark and the United Kingdom.

Whether or not a person attaches importance to Community affairs is not generally correlated with the feeling of being well informed. But Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland are exceptions: in these three countries the persons attaching most importance to the Community tend to claim that they are well informed.

On the other hand, the feeling of being well informed is consistently associated with the interest shown in Community affairs. However, there are two exceptions - Denmark and the United Kingdom - where this correlation does not apply, evidently because these two countries (and they alone) have a relatively high proportion of opponents to European unification and/or the European Community. The interest shown by these opponents (who are frequently opinion-leaders) is less marked than that shown by supporters, but is stronger than that shown by the dissenting minorities in other countries. As we have seen above, interest in Community affairs tends to make a person feel fairly well-informed.

For the purpose of the subsequent more detailed analysis and bearing in mind the various national characteristics, we should state in conclusion that the feeling of being well informed appears to depend on individual characteristics such as leadership rating, interest **shown** in Community affairs and position on Europe¹.

¹ It should be pointed out once again that the feeling of being sufficiently well informed appears to a certain degree independent of the subject of information. We recently compared the replies to two similar questions dealing with "*various national and international problems*" and with "*problems dealt with by the European Community*" and were able to show that the latter do not come out particularly badly.

See Eurobarometer No. 13, June 1980, pp. 30-34.

IV.4.2. The main sources of information about European affairs

*"Where do you mainly learn what you **know** about the European Community and the problems **it has** to deal with? Please **tell me** with the help of this card (SHOW CARD) (Several answers possible).*

Since the same question was asked in April 1980 in every country apart from Greece, we are able to compare replies and establish how valid they are. Not only is the order of classification for the sources of information exactly the same in every country, but the percentage for each source has remained virtually unchanged.

On average, each person interviewed mentions two sources of information; this figure is slightly lower in Italy and much higher in Greece and Luxembourg.

Television is in first place in every country, with daily newspapers and the radio some distance behind.

(See Table 25)

Although outstripped by the main media, the other sources of information are not insignificant:

- (a) because some of them are very important in certain countries, e.g. talking with people in Greece and magazines and periodicals in Germany;
- (b) because a specific source may have a special impact on certain sections of the population, e.g. on opinion leaders;
- (c) because these replies do not specify the quality of the information given or the additive or multiplier effect of one person's use (or the use by a small group of persons in frequent contact) of several sources¹,

¹ There is no study at Community level of exposure to the main information media comparable to the studies conducted from time to time in several of the Member States.

Table 25

SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC (1)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>April 1980</u>											
Television	72	81	62	76	77	79	73	77	82	.	74
Daily papers	40	54	44	39	57	40	77	73	63	.	48
Radio	36	48	25	53	33	22	56	36	29	.	32
Talking with other people		13	12	16	18	16	22	15	17	.	15
Magazines and periodicals		1	16	14	8	12	10	11	8	.	12
Specialist publications		7	8	7	6	3	5	7	5	:	6
Other		2	1	2	3	.	3	4	2	:	2
Don't know		3	13	1	3	5	.	2			
Total ²		209	181	208	205	177	246	225	207	:	194
2. <u>April 1982</u>											
Television		85	70	78	83	78	79	79	82	80	77
Daily papers		55	54	50	60	43	77	76	68	62	55
Radio		55	30	48	42	19	64	41	34	48	34
Talking with other people		12	16	20	16	15	27	16	18	46	18
Magazines and periodicals		3	24	19	8	15	15	16	10	20	17
Specialist publications		7	12	8	4	4	9	7	5	9	7
Other		2	2	3	2	.	2	2	2	1	2
Don't know		3	7	4	5	i	2	4	1	6	5
Total ²		222	215	230	220	181	275	241	220	272	215

¹ Weighted average.

² Totals are over 100 because more **than** one answer was possible.

The various sections of the population do not derive their information from the same sources in equal proportions. Generally speaking, age is of little importance, but sex is a determinant of behaviour, especially as regards access to the daily press and in particular in Italy and Greece. However, as could be expected, the use of the various sources of information depends mainly on the leadership rating. In all countries, opinion leaders mention newspapers far more often than non-leaders, and this link is particularly marked in Greece, Italy and Belgium.

(See Tables 26 and 27).

The question whether there is any correlation between reference to various sources of information on the Community and the importance attached to Community affairs or interest shown in them has still to be examined¹. The latter variable is the most decisive, not surprisingly since, as we have seen, it is itself largely determined by the leadership rating. As Table 28 shows, television is still the most frequently mentioned source of information, but the daily press and, to a lesser extent, magazines and periodicals, make a good showing as sources of information which are particularly appreciated by all those who wish to know more,

(See Table 28)

IV.4.3. Difficulties felt by the public in gaining access to sources of information

Since, as we have seen, the vast majority of Europeans feel that they are not sufficiently well informed, despite the efforts by the mass media and the European institutions themselves, we felt it necessary to make a special study of the main difficulties encountered in gaining access to the sources of information and in understanding the information they provide.

In spring 1974, the following question was asked in Eurobarometer No. 1: *"What is the main difficulty which you yourself encounter in gaining information on these problems?"*

This was an open question to which the persons interviewed could reply spontaneously without their answers being requested on a specific aspect of the problem.

The most frequent reply was *"Lack of time or interest"*, followed, in joint second position, by the lack of objectivity in the information and the fact that newspapers, the radio and television did not devote enough attention to these affairs. However, it is symptomatic that more than 40 percent of the persons interviewed were unable to answer²,

¹ As we already showed in 1980, there is virtually no relationship between the feeling of being well informed or not and the sources of information. See Eurobarometer No. 13, June 1980, p. 43.

² See Eurobarometer No. 1, July 1974, pp. 18-19 and Table 10.

Table 26

SOURCES OF INFORMATION, BY SEX¹

		B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	c (2)
<u>Television</u>												
	Men	77%	82%	68%	75%	80%	79%	78%	76%	81%	81%	76%
	Women	73	85	64	79	81	77	74	79	83	78	76
<u>Newspapers</u>												
	Men	48%	62%	54%	52%	64%	53%	82%	78%	71%	74%	59%
	Women	35	47	45	38	54	30	72	71	65	51	45
<u>Radio</u>												
	Men	41%	54%	29%	49%	41%	20%	60%	39%	32%	50%	34%
	Women	34	51	25	52	36	20	62	38	31	46	32

¹ Aggregate of the results for April 1980 and April 1982, except in the case of Greece.

² Weighted average.

Table 27
SOURCES OF INFORMATION, RELATED TO LEADERSHIP RATING¹

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC (2)
<u>Television</u>											
Non-leaders (--)	68%	81%	55%	77%	75%	74%	72%	76%	82%	65%	72%
(-)	80	85	69	79	82	78	71	76	84	84	77
(+)	79	85	69	77	83	82	82	78	82	84	67
Leaders (++)	82	81	66	68	80	79	77	81	77	80	74
<u>Newspapers</u>											
Non-leaders (--)	27%	38%	31%	34%	39%	23%	80%	55%	54%	26%	35%
(-)	45	54	50	46	60	35	69	70	66	51	50
(+)	51	61	57	50	72	51	79	80	70	70	51
Leaders (++)	71	66	65	61	78	72	85	84	74	84	70
<u>Radio</u>											
Non-leaders (--)	27%	43%	17%	47%	32%	14%	65%	25%	27%	37%	27%
(-)	39	53	25	49	40	20	57	35	31	51	32
(+)	48	56	31	56	40	23	61	41	34	49	31
Leaders (++)	47	56	43	50	45	24	64	49	37	51	40

¹ Aggregate of the results for April 1980 and April 1982, except in the case of Greece.

² Weighted average.

Table 28

SOURCES OF INFORMATION
IN RELATION TO INTEREST SHOWN IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
(Community as a whole)

Main source of information			
	Very Interested	A little interested	Not at all interested
	%	%	%
Television	79	81	72
Daily papers	68	57	40
Radio	40	35	26
Talking with other people			
Magazines and periodicals	28	16	7
Specialist publications	12	7	3
(Base)	(2668)	(6135)	(2418)

The following question was asked again in May 1975 and May 1978, and was worded as follows in April 1982:

- *The newspapers, radio and television do not deal seriously enough with European questions."*

The first statement - *"I cannot be interested in everything at once"* - appears to be a sort of excuse adopted by those who are not really interested in Community affairs. The answers are closely linked with leadership rating and, of course, with interest shown in European affairs. It is interesting to note that an average of 25 percent of the opinion leaders (L++) admit that they do not have the time to take an interest in Community affairs; this percentage is still 22 percent among persons claiming to be very interested in these affairs. This reflects the lack of interest actually shown, if not in the Community as such at least in the problems discussed in connection with the "Common Market" in the mass media.

The drop in interest measured in this way since May 1975 was particularly marked in Belgium and the United Kingdom¹,

The other two statements are more of a criticism of the media, although this criticism is probably associated with a feeling of frustration, especially in the case of the opinion leaders, arising from the following argument:

1. It's important.
2. I would like to (or I should) take more interest than I am able to because of the lack of time (or other reasons revealing that the respondent is more or less aware).
3. The media are not providing me with the means of being better informed².

(See Table 29).

Tables 30 and 31 thus show that 63 percent of opinion leaders (L++), amounting to 12 percent of all persons interviewed, and 61 percent of respondents who claim to be very interested in Community affairs - 23 percent of the sample - feel that - *"the newspapers, radio and television do not deal seriously enough with European questions"*.

This does not mean that non-leaders and people uninterested in Community affairs are satisfied by the information provided, since four persons in ten in these categories express criticism. However, the fact that criticism is more widespread among the most highly mobilized section of the public suggests that the main effort should go into getting more information about the nature of these criticisms in order to respond to them.

(See Tables 30 and 31)

¹ The May 1975 survey was just before the British referendum on Community membership.

² We do not intend to make a value judgment of the media's activities; we are merely putting forward an as yet unconfirmed hypothesis as to the origins of a number of criticisms which probably reflect a certain degree of frustration and confusion about an arcane subject,

Table 29

DIFFICULTIES FELT BY THE PUBLIC IN GAINING ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON COMMUNITY AFFAIRS¹

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC (2)
<i>"I have no time for this and cannot be interested in everything at once"</i>											
May 1975	48%	23%	41%	50%	26%	47%	40%	33%	24%	:	40%
May 1978	49	38	34	46	30	48	42	31	29	:	39
April 1982	60	30	34	52	27	50	41	41	35	42	42
<i>"The newspapers, radio and television do not say enough about European questions"</i>											
May 1975	21%	20%	34%	38%	49%	46%	30%	23%	58%	:	41%
May 1978	30	39	36	41	49	51	44	34	57	:	45
April 1982	48	42	32	42	35	49	47	32	59	55	45
<i>"The newspapers, radio and television do not deal seriously enough with European questions"</i>											
May 1975	30%	24%	35%	58%	59%	56%	42%	32%	63%	:	50%
May 1978	40	37	39	58	49	58	52	42	54	.	50
April 1982	54	37	36	64	35	58	55	45	49	59	51

¹ Percentage of respondents in agreement with each of the three statements.

² Weighted average.

It may appear contradictory that the opinion leaders and, more generally, those persons who claim to be very interested in Community affairs are, as we have seen above, more likely to consider themselves well informed and, at the same time, are more critical of the media. But this is only an apparent contradiction when, as we have suggested above, it is acknowledged that the feeling of being sufficiently well informed often reflects a certain degree of complacency which is more or less independent of the subject of information. Furthermore, it is easily conceivable that those persons who already consider themselves informed (because they consider themselves socially active, because they have a favourable attitude towards the subject in question, etc.) are just as likely to want more and better information²,

Table 30
DIFFICULTIES FELT BY THE PUBLIC
IN GAINING ACCESS TO SOURCES OF INFORMATION
ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, RELATED TO LEADERSHIP
RATING
(Community as a whole)

	Non - Leaders (--)		Leaders (+)	
		(-)		(++)
<i>"I have no time for this and cannot be interested in everything at once"</i>	55%	45%	37%	25%
<i>"The newspapers, radio and television do not say enough about European questions"</i>	37%	43%	49%	54%
<i>"The newspapers, radio and television do not deal seriously enough with European questions"</i>	40%	49%	57%	63%
(Base)	(2647)	(3997)	(3630)	(1402)

¹ See above, p. 55.

² These aspects, with their complex interrelationship, will have to be subjected to multivariate analyses based on the material and hypotheses presented here.

Table 31

DIFFICULTIES FELT BY THE PUBLIC
IN GAINING ACCESS TO SOURCES OF INFORMATION
ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, IN RELATION TO INTEREST
SHOWN
(Community as a whole)

	Percentage of respondents interested in Community affairs:		
	Very Interested	A little interested	Not at all interested
<i>"I have no time for this and cannot be interested in everything at once"</i>	22%	41%	67%
<i>"The newspapers, radio and television do not say enough about European questions"</i>	55%	45%	37%
<i>"The newspapers, radio and television do not deal seriously enough with European questions"</i>	61%	52%	42%
(Base)	(2668)	(6135)	(2418)

IV.5. UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE COMMUNITY

Attitudes, as expressed in "opinions" are determined both by the interviewee's profile (level of education, social position, and so on) and also by a relatively stable pattern of beliefs and by current events. As we saw, the attitude towards unification of Europe is relatively stable, but it can be fortified or weakened by the turn of events. That is why we attach some importance to the trend in answers to a question like - How is Europe, the Community, the Common Market, doing now?

The following question has therefore been asked since autumn 1977:

*"In your opinion, over the last 12 months, has the understanding between the countries of the European Community (Common Market) in general increased, decreased or stayed about the same?"*¹

In most countries the view is that it is decreasing, and ever more so. In the autumn of 1977 the positive assessment everywhere outnumbered the negatives, except in Denmark and the Netherlands. In April 1982 (before the agreement on farm prices and Britain's contribution to the Community budget) the negative view is predominant everywhere, except in Greece and Ireland, where in any case there is very little to choose between the frequency of the two responses.

A detailed analysis of the trend shows that opinion swung around between autumn 1978 and spring 1981². This reverse trend continued slightly less steeply until the autumn of 1981 and dived again during the next six months.

At the moment, in April 1982, the majority of the public refuses a definite judgment (an average of 55 percent of persons interviewed notice no change or do not answer the question), but among those who do the negatives outnumber the positives by about three to one in Italy, France and Denmark, four to one in the United Kingdom, Germany and Luxembourg and even more in the Netherlands and Belgium. Greece, which has only just joined the Community, and Ireland are the odd ones out, but even there some two thirds of the respondents do not give a definite answer³.

(See Table 32, and for more details, Table 9 in the Appendix)

¹ The wording of the question was slightly different in 1978, but this does not appear to have affected the comparison. See Eurobarometer No. 15, June 1981, pp. 24 und 25.

² Unfortunately this question was not asked between those two dates.

³ The aggregate percentages of "stayed about the same" and "don't know" are 70 percent in Greece and 63 percent in Ireland,

Table 32

UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS¹

(Trend between 1977 and 1982)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC (2)
1. <u>October-November 1977</u>											
Positive	21%	19%	26%	24%	42%	35%	28%	14%	32%	:	28%
Negative	18	31	24	16	9	18	19	24	17	:	19
Difference	3	-12	2	8	33	17	9	-10	15	:	9
2. <u>October-November 1978</u>											
Positive	27%	16%	33%	23%	46%	33%	27%	13%	27%		28%
Negative	8	19	9	11	9	10	10	11	17		12
Difference	19	- 3	24	12	37	23	17	2	10		16
3. <u>April 1981</u>											
Positive	10%	11%	17%	16%	23%	19%	19%	10%	11%	23%	15%
Negative	30	35									
Difference	-20	-24	-	- 4	1	• 5	• 7	-24	-40	14	-18
4. <u>October 1981</u>											
Positive	11%	9%	28%	16%	26%	21%	23%	10%	15%	27%	19%
Negative	31	36	21	21	14	26	31	32	34	11	26
Difference	-20	-27	7	- 5	12	-5	- 8	-22	-19	16	- 7
5. <u>April 1982</u>											
Positive	8%	11%	10%	11%	19%	10%	8%	8%	11%	17%	11%
Negative	38	35	42	31	18	26	35	36	39	13	34
Difference	-30	-24	-32	-20	1	-16	-27	-28	-28	4	-23

¹ The answers "stayed about the same" and the "don't know" are excluded in this table. See Table 9 in the Appendix.

² Weighted average.

The views of opinion leaders are particularly interesting, especially as they more readily answer this type of question. Here in the most highly mobilized section of the population negative assessments are today even more predominant than among the rest of the public.

(See Table 33)

The next question is whether the fact that a fairly substantial proportion of the European public - and an even greater proportion of the opinion leaders - gives a negative assessment of the trend in understanding has an effect on attitudes towards Community membership.

Table 33

UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ACCORDING TO
LEADERSHIP RATING
(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders		Leaders	
	--	-	+	++
1. <u>October-November 1977</u>				
positive	21%	28%	32%	33%
Negative	14	18	21	26
Difference	7	10	11	7
2. <u>October-November 1978</u>				
positive	16%	29%	33%	34%
Negative	12	11	11	15
Difference	4	18	22	19
3. <u>April 1981</u>				
Positive	11%	16%	17%	20%
Negative	24	31	37	41
Difference	-13	-15	-20	-21
4. <u>October 1981</u>				
positive	16%	20%	20%	25%
Negative	21	24	27	35
Difference	- 5	- 4	- 7	-10
5. <u>April 1982</u>				
Positive	7%	10%	13%	15%
Negative	23	33	38	42
Difference	-16	-23	-25	-27

IV.6. GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE COMMUNITY

"Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's membership of the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?"

The economic crisis and the problems of Western Europe at the time of the survey seems to have scarcely any adverse effect on attitudes towards Community membership, at least as compared with spring and autumn 1981. Affirmative answers are still comfortably in the majority in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy, but slightly less so in Belgium, France and Germany; they continue to outnumber the negatives in Ireland and Greece and even - though only just - in Denmark, while in the United Kingdom Community membership is "a bad thing" for 43 percent of the interviewees and "a good thing" for only 27 percent.

(See Table 34)

The assessment of "understanding between the countries of the European Community" has certainly affected attitudes towards Community membership, or more specifically the trend in those attitudes.

A look at both the affirmative and negative answers to these two questions in each country from autumn 1977 to spring 1982 confirms this, but also shows once again that the relationship is not clearcut.

Graph 7 shows the trend measured at five points in time, of the difference between the affirmative and negative answers to each of these two questions - the trend in understanding and assessment of Community membership - in the Community as a whole.

The overall correlation is close ($r = 0.868$) and in most countries the curves are similar. But there are exceptions, even if we discount Greece (which has only just joined and for which we still have only three successive polls) and Luxembourg (where the correlation is negative but the sample is very small)¹.

¹ One cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the perception of present problems between the member countries of the Community, when compared with the insuperable difficulties that a country like Luxembourg would be facing were it not a member, tends to reinforce favourable attitudes.

Table 34

GENERAL ATTITUDE COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

(Trend between 1973 and 1982)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK ⁽¹⁾	GR	EC ⁽²⁾
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>September 1973</u>											
Good thing	57	42	63	61	56	69	67	63	31	.	56
Neither good nor bad	19	19	22	22	21	15	22	20	22	.	20
Bad thing	5	30	4	5	15	2	3	4	34	.	11
Don't know	19	9	11	12	8	14	8	13	13	.	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	.	100
Index ³	2.64	2.13	2.66	2.64	2.45	2.78	2.70	2.68	1.97	:	2.52
2. <u>1974-1980 (14 surveys)</u>											
Good thing	61	35	60	58	54	73	75	75	35	:	57
Neither good nor bad	20	26	24	27	21	16	15	14	22	:	22
Bad thing	4	29	6	7	19	4	4	4	36	:	13
Don't know	15	10	10	8	6	7	6	7	7	:	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
Index ³	2.67	2.07	2.60	2.55	2.37	2.74	2.76	2.76	1.99	:	2.48
3. <u>April 1981</u>											
Good thing	49	30	49	50	46	73	79	76	24	42	50
Neither good nor bad	27	30	28	32	27	19	15	14	24	26	25
Bad thing	6	31	9	11	22	5	3	6	48	22	17
Don't know	18	9	14	7	5	3	3	4	4	10	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.54	1.99	2.47	2.42	2.26	2.69	2.77	2.73	1.76	2.23	2.29

Table 34 (contd.)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK(1)	GR	EC (2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
4. <u>October 1981</u>											
Good thing	55	31	58	53	49	70	76	75	27	38	53
Neither good nor bad	26	29	26	33	27	20	17	15	27	26	26
Bad thing	5	29	6	7	19	5	5	3	41	21	14
Don't know	14	11	10	7	5	5	2	7	5	15	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.58	2.02	2.57	2.49	2.32	2.68	2.73	2.76	1.85	2.20	2.41
5. <u>April 1982</u>											
Good thing	57	33	54	55	44	68	73	74	27	33	52
Neither good nor bad	24	27	31	30	29	20	19	16	24	37	26
Bad thing	6	30	8	7	18	3	2	4	43	15	14
Don't know	13	10	7	8	9	9	6	6	6	15	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³	2.58	2.04	2.49	2.53	2.28	2.71	2.74	2.74	1.83	2.21	2.40

¹ Great Britain, excluding Northern Ireland, in 1973 and 1974.


² Weighted average.

³ "Good thing" = 3, "neither good nor bad" = 2, "bad thing" = 1.
"Don't know" excluded,

Graphique 7 / Graph 7

LA PERCEPTION DE L'EVOLUTION DE L'ENTENTE ENTRE LES PAYS MEMBRES ET
L'ATTITUDE SUR L'APPARTENANCE DE SON PAYS A LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE /

THE PERCEPTION OF RECENT TRENDS IN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES,
AND ATTITUDES TO ONE'S OWN COUNTRY'S MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



———— % "plutôt progressé" - % "plutôt régressé" /
% "increased" - % "decreased"

- - - - % "bonne chose" - % "mauvaise chose" /
% "good thing" - % "bad thing"

The two most interesting exceptions are Italy and France. In both countries, but especially in France, the relationship between views on the trend in understanding and attitudes to Community membership is less marked than elsewhere ($r = 0.512$ in Italy and 0.339 in France). In Italy, this could be attributed to the fact that favourable attitudes to Community membership, widely spread across all strata of society, are more resistant than elsewhere to disillusion and misgivings. In France, the fact that the gap between favourable and unfavourable attitudes towards Community membership has widened slightly since April 1981, though perception of misunderstanding between the member countries is, as elsewhere, growing, might be interpreted as one of the effects, in the public mind, of the change of government.

(See Graph 8)

IV.7. FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY: AN ACTUAL "EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT" OR THE INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS HAVING THE FINAL SAY

In the previous Eurobarometer we published for the first time the answers to a question how Europeans expected the Community to develop over the next ten years¹. An average of 33 percent of respondents believed that "cooperation between the countries belonging to the Community will carry on more or less as it is now", 25 percent that the "ties between the member countries of the Community will get weaker" and 30 percent that "ties will get stronger".

But expectations are not wishes and "cooperation" and "ties" are rather vague terms. So in April 1982 we again asked a question already put, in exactly the same words, in May 1978.

"There are two ways of looking at the more distant future of the European Community (SHOW CARD):

- some people think the Community should not only have a directly elected Parliament, but also an actual Government which would have the final say in decisions in some important areas,*
- others think that the individual governments of member countries should have the final say.*



Which of these two comes nearest to your way of thinking?"

¹ See Eurobarometer No, 16, December 1981, pp. 43-46,

Graphique / Graph 8

LA PERCEPTION DE L'EVOLUTION DE L'ENTENTE ENTRE LES PAYS MEMBRES ET
L'ATTITUDE SUR L'APPARTENANCE DE SON PAYS A LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE /

THE PERCEPTION OF RECENT TRENDS IN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES,
AND ATTITUDES TO ONE'S OWN COUNTRY'S MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



Cf. graph. 7

Whereas in 1978, opinion in the Community as a whole was evenly divided between those who supported an actual European Government and those who wanted individual governments to have the final say (41 percent against 41 percent), the majority now favour the second opinion (46 percent against 36 percent).

The "supranational" option has lost ground everywhere, but for the interviewees who actually reply, it is still the majority preference in Italy (50 against 32 percent), Luxembourg (44 against 39 percent) and, by a short lead, in France (40 against 36 percent).

(See Table 35)

These attitudes towards the political future of Europe obviously depend on leadership rating, if only because the leaders are more inclined to take a position.

If we analyse the trend between 1979 and 1982 according to leadership rating, we can distinguish between the founder countries of the European Community and the newcomers:

- among the Six, as a whole, opinion leaders are more inclined than the rest of the population to support a European Government; but the difference between the two options, though still positive, is now much smaller than it was in 1979;
- in Denmark, on the other hand, the leaders are more inclined than non-leaders to plump for the second option but the difference remains very much the same;
- in the United Kingdom, the percentage gap between the two options in 1979 was slightly narrower compared with other categories of the public; the gap has widened in 1982;
- the trend in Ireland closely follows that in the United Kingdom;
- lastly, in Greece, where we have the results of only one poll, preference for the second option over the first increases with the degree of leadership.

To sum up, in all countries, even in those where three years ago the leaders were most inclined to want the Community to move towards a European Government, this attitude has lost ground.

There are not many countries (only Belgium, Italy, France and Luxembourg), where opinion leaders still go for the "supranational" option.

(See Table 36)

¹ See following page.

¹ Opinions of the most highly mobilised opinion leaders (L ++) in the six founder countries of the Community in 1979 and 1982:

	The Community should have an actual European Government		National governments should have the final say	
<u>Belgique / België</u> (n = 72 et 171)	60%	64%	32%	33%
<u>Deutschland</u> (n = 94 et 152)	55%	47%	37%	48%
<u>France</u> (n = 191 et 131)	48%	52%	34%	43%
<u>Italia</u> (n = 196 et 151)	66%	58%	29%	35%
<u>Luxembourg</u> (n = 44 et 71)	57%	51%	41%	37%
<u>Nederland</u> (n = 188 et 180)	47%	35%	45%	58%

Table 35
EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT OR ¹ SAY FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC (1)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>May 1979</u>											
An actual European Government	36	16	40	45	18	57	42	41	28	:	41
Final say for national governments	35	65	40	34	68	29	47	49	56		41
Other responses	29	19	20	21	14	14	11	10	16	:	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
2. <u>April 1982</u>											
An actual European Government	34	7	35	40	18	50	44	32	28	24	36
Final say for national governments	39	78	49	36	62	32	39	58	61	43	46
Other responses	27	15	16	24	20	18	17	10	11	33	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹ Weighted average.

Table 36

EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT OR FINAL SAY FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS ACCORDING TO
LEADERSHIP RATING

		Non-leaders		Leaders	
<u>Average of six founder countries</u>		--	-	+	++
1979	(European Government (National Governments	37% 30 (n=1288)	44% 38 (n=1849)	50% 38 (n=1991)	56% 34 (n=784)
1982	(European Government (National Governments	30% 34 (n=1552)	40% 40 (n=2144)	45% 44 (n=2187)	52% 43 (n=779)
<u>DANMARK</u>					
1979	(European Government (National Governments	14% 57 (n=209)	14% 66 (n=346)	18% 65 (n=301)	17% 74 (n=127)
1982	(European Government (National Governments	6% 69 (n=277)	7% 79 (n=396)	8% 82 (n=367)	10% 83 (n=171)
<u>IRELAND</u>					
1979	(European Government (National Governments	12% 64 (n=319)	17% 68 (n=343)	21% 73 (n=256)	31% 63 (n=87)
1982	(European Government (National Governments	11% 55 (n=311)	17% 62 (n=411)	24% 65 (n=356)	22% 70 (n=102)
<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u>					
1979	(European Government (National Governments	25% 51 (n=388)	28% 58 (n=526)	30% 57 (n=396)	31% 54 (n=117)
1982	(European Government (National Governments	30% 54 (n=341)	29% 59 (n=496)	25% 68 (n=420)	26% 67 (n=161)
<u>ELLAS</u>					
1982	(European Government (National Governments	10% 22 (n=189)	21% 35 (n=306)	28% 47 (n=357)	31% 56 (n=347)

CHAPTER V

REACTIONS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL
TO THE PROSPECT OF JOINING THE
COMMUNITY

V

REACTIONS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL
TO THE PROSPECT OF JOINING THE
COMMUNITY

In the first half of 1982, following up last autumn's survey, the Commission again asked a number of questions in Spain and Portugal about the prospect of these two countries' joining the Community¹.

This does not mean that Eurobarometer has expanded its geographical coverage or subject matter; the survey is an extended comparative research experiment to prepare the Spanish and Portuguese for life in the Community,

The questions asked in Spain and Portugal are as close as possible to those asked in the Member States.

V.1. INTEREST IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS AND IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THEM²

Almost one quarter of the Spanish (24 percent) and only 15 percent of the Portuguese said they were very much interested in Community matters. Compared with the previous report, there has been a slight drop in interest in Spain and a slight increase in Portugal. In Portugal, where some political parties oppose accession and have laid down conditions for membership, almost one third of the don't-knows of autumn 1981 appear to have replied "not at all interested"; this shift may be considered as the beginning of a trend which will continue in the months to come.

(See Table 37)

Contrary to what we have observed in the Member States, the difference between the percentage of those who are very much interested in Community affairs and those who consider these problems very important is minimal.

(See Table 38).

¹ These surveys were carried out by the Gallup Institute in Madrid between 23 April and 3 May, and the Norma Institute in Lissabon between 22 February and 19 March, taking a representative sample of the population aged 15 and over (in Spain N = 1004, in Portugal N = 1928).

² See page 46 for the wording of these questions. The Spanish and Portuguese versions are available on request.

Table 37

INTEREST IN COMMUNITY MATTERS

	Say they are interested			Don't know	Total
	<u>Very much</u>	A little	Not at all		
Spain					
April 1980	32%	26%	26%	16%	100%
October 1981	31	30	20	19	100
April-May 1982	<u>24</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>100</u>
Portugal					
October 1981	13%	19%	14%	54%	100%
February-March 82	15	19	28	38	100

Table 38

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY

					Don't know	Total
	Very important	Important	Not very important	Not at all important		
Spain	21	39	9	6	25	100
Portugal	14	23	5	5	53	100

The correlation with the level of education is a determining factor in both cases, especially as regards interest¹. But whereas interest is tending to fall off in Spain, even among the relatively more educated people, the reverse appears to be true in Portugal².

(See Table 39)

v.2. ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION³

Not surprisingly, the feeling of being well informed of the problems dealt with by the European Community is not very widespread in these countries which are not yet Member States - only 12 percent of the Spanish and 14 percent of the Portuguese claim they are well informed⁴.

(See Table 40)

The specific character of Portugal emerges even more clearly in the following analysis. We observed above that people interested in Community affairs are more likely to consider themselves sufficiently well informed⁵. This correlation is close to zero in Spain, where there is a general feeling of not being well informed; it is, however, very strong in Portugal, where those "in the know" appear to form a very close-knit category,

(See Table 41)

¹ We do not yet possess the variable for measuring leadership rating in these countries.

² Excessive importance should not be attached to these fluctuations - only two surveys have been conducted and the general public in these countries do not yet feel really involved in the problem of accession.

³ See p. 54 for the wording of the question,

⁴ The difference between Spain and Portugal can be seen in the distribution of replies between "don't know" and "not sufficiently well informed". The don't knows may mean "I don't know anything about the subject", "I don't wish to know anything about the subject", "I cannot or will not give an opinion", etc. Whatever the case, the don't know response appears to be far more negative than the feeling of being not sufficiently well informed.

⁵ See p. 55 above.

Table 39

INTEREST IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION

		Say they are:					
		Very interested	A little interested	Not at all interested	Don't know	Total	Base
<u>SPAIN</u> (Level of education)							
1. <u>October 1981</u>							
- sub-primary	19%	13%	30%	38%	100%	201	
- primary	27	33	21	19	100	502	
- secondary	41	40	13	6	100	173	
- higher	56	28	8	8	100	119	
2. <u>April-May 1982</u>							
- sub-primary	9%	18x	35%	38%	100%	235	
- primary	24	33	30	13	100	387	
- secondary	28	41	25	6	100	226	
- higher	43	39	16	2	100	153	
<u>PORTUGAL</u> (Age on completing education)							
1. <u>October 1981</u>							
- under 15	11%	18%	16%	55%	100%	1191	
- between 15 and 18	38	36	8	18	100	203	
- 19 or over	40	29	9	14	100	131	
- still studying	30	35	21	14	100	97	
2. <u>February-March 1982</u>							
- under 15	9%	15%	30%	46%	100%	1538	
- between 15 and 18	37	31	21	11	100	167	
- 19 or over	55	28	8	9	100	99	
- still studying	26	50	17	7	100	123	

Table 40

ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

	Percentage of respondents claiming to be:		Don't know	Total
	Sufficiently well informed	Not sufficiently well informed		
Spain	12%	78%	10%	100%
Portugal	14	23	63	100

Table 41

ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION

IN RELATION TO INTEREST SHOWN IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

	Percentage of respondents interested in Community affairs:		
	Very interested	A little interested	Not at all interested
<u>Spain</u>	%	%	%
Sufficiently well informed	19	12	11
Not sufficiently well informed	80	85	79
Don't know	1	3	10
Total	100	100	100
(Base)	(243)	(325)	(281)
<u>Portugal</u>			
Sufficiently well informed	59	18	4
Not sufficiently well informed	35	57	15
Don't know	6	25	81
Total	100	100	100
(Base)	(295)	(368)	(529)

v.3. MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT EUROPEAN AFFAIRS'

It should be stated that the number of information sources in Spain is some 30 percent higher than in Portugal. Since the various sources have a complementary and cumulative effect, there is every likelihood that the information available to the Portuguese will be scantier than that available to the Spanish.

This being said, the ranking of sources is almost exactly the same in Spain as in the Member States of the Community. In Portugal, radio is more important than the daily newspapers. In both countries, as in the Community countries, television is the source mentioned most frequently.

(See Table 42)

Another similarity with the Community countries - and no doubt other countries besides - is that women and less-educated people mention newspapers far less frequently than men and persons of more advanced education.

(See Tables 43 and 44)

In view of this very close relationship between level of education and the seeking of information in the daily newspapers, it is not surprising that those who are very interested in the Community mention this source more frequently. Nevertheless, as in the Member States of the Community, television is the major source of information about European affairs, irrespective of the degree of personal interest.

(See Table 45)

Table 42

SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'

	Spain	Portugal
Television	69%	56%
Daily papers	43	20
Radio	35	27
Talking with other people	18	15
Magazines and periodicals	10	3
Specialist publications	3	1
Other	.	1
Don't know	11	23
Total ³	189	146

¹ See p, 56 for the wording of the question.

² The sources are listed here in the order of the average replies given in the Member States of the Community. See p, 57.

³ Totals are over 100 because more than one answer was possible.

Table 43
MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION BY SEX

	Spain		Portugal	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Television	69%	69%	55%	57%
Newspapers	55	32	33	12
Radio	40	31	26	27
(Base)	(476)	(528)	(737)	(1191)

Table 44
MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION

	Spain			Portugal		
	Low	Average	High	Low	Average	High
Television	69%	77%	60%	54%	64%	55%
Newspapers	30	53	78	11	52	64
Radio	33	37	43	27	25	27
(Base)	(622)	(226)	(153)	(1538)	(290)	(99)

¹ In Spain, low means pre-primary and primary; in Portugal it means studies completed before the age of 16. In Spain, high means higher education; in Portugal it means continued studies after the age of twenty. Young people in Portugal who are still at school are classified at average level.

Table 45

SOURCES OF INFORMATION
IN RELATION TO INTEREST SHOWN IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

	Spain			Portugal		
	Very inter- ested	A little inter- ested	Not at all in- terested	Very inter- ested	A little inter- ested	Not at all in- terested
	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Main sources of information</u>						
Television	73	77	70	58	61	58
Daily papers	67	50	31	55	38	12
Radio	49	36	31	27	31	25
Talking with other people	27	20	14	17	11	15
Magazines and periodicals	18	11	6	3	1	3
Specialist publications	8	2	2	1	2	2
(Base)	(243)	(325)	(281)	(295)	(368)	(529)

v.4. FOR OR AGAINST WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

Few changes are observed in Spain from one six-month period to the next, apart from the slight increase in don't-knows, which may well be due to the drop in less committed answers ("to some extent for" or "to some extent against"). In other words, the Spanish are largely in favour of European unification (55 percent for, 6 percent against), but a certain degree of uncertainty is emerging. This is not surprising since we have observed the same phenomenon in the Member States².

In Portugal, on the other hand, there had been a slight drop in support and a corresponding increase in opposition. However, the main feature is still that two thirds of the persons interviewed are don't-knows. A small minority is opposed to unification (in all 8 percent, i.e. little more than in Spain), but the support (37 percent) is less by half what it is in Spain. The vast majority of Portuguese still have no opinion on the subject.

(See Table 46)

¹ See p. 43 for the wording of the answer.

² See p. 43.

The correlation between these attitudes and the level of education is very strong in each of the two countries, but this variable mainly determines the rate of reply. In other words, those who feel they are able to reply give similar answers - a large majority for and a small minority against - whatever their level of education.

(See Table 47)

Table 46

SUPPORT FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

	Very much for	To some extent for	To some extent against	Very much against	Don't know	Total	Index ¹
<u>Spain</u>							
October 1981	36%	23%	5%	4%	32%	100%	3.33
April-May 1982	35	20	3	3	39	100	3.43
<u>Portugal</u>							
October 1981	22%	9%	2%	2%	55%	100%	3.47
Febr.-March 1982	17	10	4	4	65	100	3.19

¹ "Very much for" = 4; "very much against" = 1; "don't knows" excluded.

Table 47

SUPPORT FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN RELATION TO LEVEL OF
EDUCATION

<u>Autumn 1981</u>	Spain			Portugal		
	Low	Average	High	Low	Average	High
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very much for	31	41	55	19	48	42
To some extent for	22	36	17	7	17	16
To some extent against	3	7	10	2	4	3
Very much against	4	4	6	1	4	5
Don't know	40	12	12	71	27	34
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	3.33	3.29	3.37	3.48	3.51	3.46
(Base)	(703)	(173)	(119)	(1191)	(300)	(131)
<u>First half of 1982</u>						
Very much for	27	47	50	11	40	44
To some extent for	19	19	24	7	24	19
To some extent against	3	2	7	4	3	6
Very much against	2	4	4	3	5	8
Don't know	49	28	15	75	28	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	3.39	3.52	3.42	3.08	3.36	3.27
(Base)	(622)	(226)	(153)	(1538)	(290)	(99)

¹ Harmonized levels of education. See footnote to Table 44.

² "Very much for" = 4; "very much against" = 1; "don't know" excluded.

V.5. ATTITUDES TO ACCESSION TO THE COMMUNITY

"In general, do you think that for (your country), becoming a member of the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?"

This question has been asked in Spain and Portugal since 1980. Once again, the replies (and trends) vary between them.

In Spain, more than half the people interviewed support accession, but a degree of indecision (the reply "neither good nor bad") is tending to develop among the general public as negotiations drag on.

In Portugal, the don't knows account for more than half of the persons interviewed. As a result, only a quarter support accession, but they are still in a majority. As in Spain, uncertainty is tending to increase as time goes by.

(See Table 48)

Two variables appear to determine these attitudes to accession - the level of education and political leanings. However, these variables have different effects in Spain and in Portugal. The other variables, such as sex and age, only show the determinant role of the two abovementioned variables, i.e., the fact that, for instance, men and the young are relatively better educated and tend to be more left-wing¹.

¹ The following table shows how the Spanish and Portuguese describe their political leanings. This variable - the ideological dimension - is described on p. 5 above.

THE LEFT-RIGHT SPECTRUM
(First half of 1982)

	Spain		Portugal	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
	%	%	%	%
Extreme left	13.2	7.2	6.3	5.1
Left	30.5	21.2	14.2	10.8
Centre	20.2	20.4	25.1	17.1
Right	7.8	9.5	11.0	8.0
Extreme right	3.3	3.6	4.3	5.1
Not placed	25.0	38.1	39.1	53.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Average score*	4.34	4.91	5.21	5.35
(Base)	(476)	(528)	(737)	(1191)

* Calculated on a scale of 1 = left-wing to 10 = right-wing, excluding don't knows.

Table 48

ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

	Think that access		ion will be:		Total	Index ¹
	A good thing	neither good nor bad	A bad thing	Don't know		
<u>Spain</u>						
April 1980 ²	58%	13%	5%	24%	100%	2.70
December 1980	52	17	5	26	100	2.64
March 1981	53	13	6	28	100	2.65
October 1981	52	18	6	24	100	2.61
April-May 1982	51	21	5	23	100	2.60
<u>Portugal</u>						
October 1980	24%	11%	6%	59%	100%	2.44
May-June 1981	31	10	6	53	100	2.53
October 1981	20	13	7	60	100	2.33
February-March 1982	24	14	7	55	100	2.38

Among those who actually reply, i.e. discounting don't-knows, sex has no effect on the attitude towards accession.

Similarly, age has no influence in Spain in these conditions while in Portugal the young (15 - 24) and the elderly (55+) of both sexes, but especially men, tend to be more favourable.

(See Table 49)

The level of education (once again eliminating the don't-knows, the proportion of which is obviously very closely linked with this variable) appears to have a positive effect in Spain and a negative effect in Portugal. In Spain, the most educated are more likely to be favourable while the small dissenting minority is equally divided between the various levels of education. In Portugal, however, the proportion of the population opposing accession tends to increase with the level of education, but it is always a minority.

¹ "Good thing" = 3, "bad thing" = 1; don't-knows excluded.

² In April 1980 no distinction was made between "neither good nor bad" and "don't know". The figures were calculated on the basis of the results of the two subsequent surveys.

Table 49

ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
IN RELATION TO SEX AND AGE

	Think that accession is:			Don' t know	Total	Index	Base
	A goo' thing	Neither good no bad	A bad thing				
<u>SPAIN</u>							
<u>In relation-to sex</u>							
Men	60%	21%	6%	13%	100%	2.62	476
Women	43	20	4	33	100	2.59	528
<u>In relation-to-age</u>							
15-24	58%	28%	4%	10%	100%	2.60	253
25-39	54	25	5	16	100	2.59	261
40-54	51	16	5	28	100	2.62	181
55+	44	13	6	37	100	2.59	305
<u>In relation to sex and age</u>							
M - 15-24	64%	26%	5%	5%	100%	2.62	137
25-39	60	24	7	9	100	2.58	132
40-54	62	18	6	14	100	2.64	78
55+	56	13	8	23	100	2.63	128
W - 15-24	51%	29%	3%	17%	100%	2.58	116
25-39	49	26	2	23	100	2.60	129
40-54	43	14	5	38	100	2.61	103
55+	35	14	5	46	100	2.56	177
<u>PORTUGAL</u>							
<u>In relation to sex</u>							
Men	31%	17%	9%	43%	100%	2.37	737
Women	20	13	5	62	100	2.38	1191
<u>In relation-to-age</u>							
15-24	39%	21%	7%	33%	100%	2.48	307
25-39	25	15	13	47	100	2.22	431
40-54	22	16	6	56	100	2.35	470
55+	18	10	4	68	100	2.45	718
<u>In relation to sex and age</u>							
M - 15-24	43%	18%	6%	33%	100%	2.56	134
25-39	29	19	23	29	100	2.08	139
40-54	33	20	10	37	100	2.36	167
55+	25	13	5	57	100	2.47	296
W - 15-24	35%	23%	8%	34%	100%	2.42	173
25-39	24	13	8	55	100	2.34	292
40-54	16	14	4	66	100	2.35	303
55+	13	14	3	76	100	2.42	422

"Good thing" = 3, "bad thing" = 1; don't-knows excluded.

In Portugal, the replies are linked with the ideology of the respondents since the Communist Party and the extreme left-wing political organisations oppose accession.

(See Table 50)

Table 50
ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
IN RELATION TO LEVEL OF EDUCATION¹

	Think that accession will be:			Don't know	Total	Index ²	Base
	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing				
<u>Spain</u>							
Low	44%	20%	4%	32%	100%	2.58	622
Average	59	25	6	10	100	2.53	226
High	71	16	6	7	100	2.68	153
<u>Portugal</u>							
Low	18%	13%	5%	64%	100%	2.35	1538
Average	46	25	11	18	100	2.44	290
High	46	12	23	19	100	2.28	99

Let us now turn to the political leanings of the respondents, according to where they place themselves on a 1 - 10 scale from left to right.

When don't-knows are excluded, the only impact which this ideological variable has in Spain is that uncertainty (the reply "neither good nor bad") is far more common on the extreme right-wing; as a result, the replies supporting accession are appreciably lower among this section of the population than in other groups.

In Portugal, the reverse is true: support for accession tends to increase from extreme left to extreme right.

(See Table 51)

¹ "Good thing" = 3; "bad thing" = 1; don't-knows excluded.

Table 51

ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN RELATION TO POLITICAL LEANINGS

	Think that accession will be:			Don't know	Total	Index ¹	Base
	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing				
<u>Spain</u>							
Extreme left	56%	19%	2%	23%	100%	2.70	101
Left	64	21	6	9	100	2.63	257
Centre	62	19	6	13	100	2.64	204
Right	59	17	5	19	100	2.67	87
Extreme right	43	31	-	26	100	2.58	35
Not placed	(32)	(21)	(5)	(42)	(100)	(2.46)	(320)
<u>Portugal</u>							
Extreme left	15%	16%	32%	37%	100%	1.72	108
Left	18	23	18	41	100	2.00	233
Centre	46	19	6	29	100	2.56	388
Right	39	18	5	38	100	2.55	174
Extreme right	49	12	2	37	100	2.74	94
Not placed	(12)	(10)	(2)	(76)	(100)	(2.38)	(929)

The presentation of these initial findings once again demonstrates the complexity of the variables determining attitudes towards European unification and the European Community. In addition, the interaction between these variables sometimes differs from country to country and is likely to develop in line with internal or external events.

These special surveys of Spain and Portugal should therefore be continued and become more detailed.

¹ "Good thing" = 3, "bad thing" = 1, don't-knows excluded.

V.6. THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY'

As we have seen above, the question asked appears easy to grasp in the Member States **of** the Community since more than 80 percent, on average, of the persons interviewed gave an answer. This was not the case in the two applicant countries where the corresponding percentages were 42 percent in Spain and 22 percent in Portugal.

The majority of those who actually answered said that the last word should remain with the national governments.

(See Table 52)

Table 52

EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT OR LAST WORD WITH NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

	Actual European Government	Last word with national governments	Don't know	Total
Spain	15%	27%	58%	100%
Portugal	6	16	78	100

¹ See p. 72 for the wording of the question.

ANNEXES ET TABLEAUX DETAILLES / APPENDIX AND DETAILED TABLES

INSTITUTS CHARGES DU SONDAGE ET SPECIALISTES RESPONSABLES /
INSTITUTES WHICH CARRIED OUT THE SURVEY AND EXPERTS IN CHARGE (x)

Belgique/België	(B)	DIMARSO	Leo VEREYCKEN
Danmark	(DK)	GALLUP MARKEDSANALYSE	Rolf RANDRUP
Deutschland	(D)	EMNID-INSTITUT	Günther BIERBAUM
Ellas	(GR)	ICAP HELLAS	Anthony LYKIARDOPOULOS
France	(F)	INSTITUT DE SONDAGES LAVIALLE	Albert LAVIALLE
Ireland	(IRL)	IRISH MARKETING SURVEYS	John MEAGHER
Italia	(I)	ISTITUTO PER LE RICERCHE STATISTICHE E L'ANALISI DELL'OPINIONE PUBBLICA (DOXA)	Ennio SALAMON
Luxembourg	(L)	INSTITUT LUXEMBOURGEOIS DE RECHERCHES SOCIALES (ILRES)	Louis MEVIS
Nederland	(NL)	NEDERLANDS INSTITUUT VOOR DE PUBLIEKE OPINIE (NIPO)	Jan STAPEL
United Kingdom	(UK)	SOCIAL SURVEYS (GALLUP POLL)	Norman WEBB
		(xx)	

Coordination internationale / International coordination * * * Helene RIFFAULT ("Faits et Opinions", Paris)

Toutes les données relatives aux Euro-Barometres sont déposées aux "Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences", (1 Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). Elles sont tenues à la disposition des organismes membres du European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), du Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) et des chercheurs justifiant d'un intérêt de recherche. Pour tous renseignements sur les études d'opinion publique faites à l'initiative de la Commission des Communautés Européennes écrire à J.-R. RABIER, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Bruxelles.

All Euro-Barometre data are stored at the Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences (1, Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research. For all information regarding opinion surveys carried out for the Commission of the European Communities, please write to J.-R. RABIER, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels.

(x) Les dix instituts actuellement chargés de ces sondages ont formé entre eux THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY, dont le comité de direction comprend : Robert GIJS (DIMARSO, Bruxelles), Jan STAPEL (NIPO, Amsterdam) et Norman WEBB (Social Surveys, London). / The ten institutes which carried out these surveys have formed amongst themselves THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY of which the Management Committee comprises : Robert GIJS (DIMARSO, Bruxelles), Jan STAPEL (NIPO, Amsterdam) and Norman WEBB (Social Surveys, London).

(xx) Le sondage en Northern Ireland est fait en collaboration par le Irish Marketing Surveys et le Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). / The Northern Ireland survey is conducted jointly by Irish Marketing Surveys and the Social Surveys (Gallup Poll).

2 ECHANTILLONNAGE / SAMPLING

L'objectif de la méthode d'**échantillonnage** est de couvrir de façon représentative la totalité de la **population** des neuf pays de la **Communauté** âgée de 15 ans et plus, ainsi que de la Grèce.

L'échantillon de chaque pays est **constitué** à deux niveaux :

1° Regions et localités d'enquête.

Les statistiques de la Communauté européenne divisent l'espace européen en 129 régions (voir liste ci-jointe). L'enquête a lieu dans 126 régions (Corse, Groenland et Val d'Aoste exceptés).

Chaque pays a constitué **aléatoire-**ment un **échantillon-maître** de localités d'enquête de telle sorte que **toutes** les catégories d'habitat soient représentées proportionnellement à leurs populations respectives.

Au total, les interviews de l'enquête Omnibus **Européenne** ont lieu dans **environ** 1.150 points d'enquête.

2° Choix des personnes interrogées.

Les personnes interrogées sont **toujours** différentes d'une enquête à l'autre. L'**échantillon-maître** aléatoire **évoqué** ci-dessus indique le nombre de personnes à interroger à chaque point d'enquête. Au stade suivant, les personnes à interroger sont désignées :

- soit par un tirage au sort sur liste dans les pays où on peut avoir accès à des Listes exhaustives d'individus ou de foyers : Belgique, Pays-Bas, Danemark, Luxembourg,
- soit par échantillonnage stratifié sur la base des statistiques de recensement, l'échantillon étant **construit** à partir des critères de sexe, âge et profession : France, Italie, Royaume-Uni, Irlande, Allemagne,
- soit par une méthode combinant les deux **précédentes** (**cheminement** systématique) : Grèce.

The sample has been designed to be representative of the total population aged 15 years and over of the nine countries of the Community, as well as of Greece.

In each country a two stage sampling method is used :

1° Geographical distribution .

For statistical purposes the European Community divides Europe into 129 regions (see attached list). The survey takes place in 126 of these regions (Corsica, Groenland and Val d'Aoste excluded).

In each country a random selection of sampling points is made in such a way that all types of area (urban, rural, etc.) are represented in proportion to their populations.

The interviews are distributed in **more or less** 1.150 sampling points.

2° Choice of respondents.

For each survey different individuals are interviewed in the master sample of sampling point described above. Within these sampling points the individuals to be interviewed are chosen :

- either at random from the population or electoral lists in those countries where access to suitable lists of individuals or households is possible : Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg,
- or by quota sampling. In these cases the quotas are established by sex, age and profession on the basis of census data : this system is used in France, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany,
- or by a method combining the two precedent ones ("random route") : Greece.

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

AN : Antwerpen
 W.V. : West-Vlaanderen
 O.V. : Oost-Vlaanderen
 BR : Brabant
 LI : Limburg
 LIE : Liege
 HAI : Hainaut
 NA : Namur
 LX : Luxembourg

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

S.H. : Schleswig-Holstein
 STA : Stade
 AUR : Aurich
 OLD : Oldenburg
 B : Bremen
 LUN : Lüneburg
 BR : Braunschweig
 OSN : Osnabrück
 HAN : Hannover
 MUN : Münster
 DET : Detmold
 HIL : Hildesheim
 DUS : Düsseldorf
 ARN : Arnsberg
 KAS : Kassel
 AA : Aachen
 KOL : Köln
 TRI : Trier
 KOB : Koblenz
 DA.WI. : Darmstadt-Wiesbaden
 U.F. : Unterfranken
 O.F. : Oberfranken
 SAA : Saarland
 RH.PF. : Rheinhessen-Pfalz
 N.B. : Nordbaden
 N.W. : Nordwürttemberg
 M.F. : Mittelfranken
 O.PF. : Oberpfalz
 N.BAY. : Niederbayern
 S.B. : Südbaden
 S.W. : Südwürttemberg
 SCH : Schwaben
 O.BAY. : Oberbayern
 BER : Berlin

DANMARK

JYLL : Jylland
 SJA : Sjælland
 FYN : Fyn
 GRØ : (Grønland)

FRANCE

NORD : Nord
 PIC : Picardie
 H.N. : Haute-Normandie
 R.P. : Région Parisienne
 CHA : Champagne
 LOR : Lorraine

AL : Alsace
 B.N. : Basse-Normandie
 BRE : Bretagne
 P.LOI : Pays de la Loire
 CEN : Centre
 BOU : Bourgogne
 F.C. : Franche-Comté
 P.CH : Poitou-Charentes
 LIM : Limousin
 AUV : Auvergne
 R-A : Rhône-Alpes
 AQU : Aquitaine
 M.P. : Midi-Pyrénées
 LAN : Languedoc
 P.CDA : Provence-Côte d'Azur
 COR : (Corse)

IRELAND

DON : Donegal
 N.W. : North West
 N.E. : North East
 W. : West
 M. : Midlands
 E. : East
 M.W. : Mid West
 S.E. : South East
 S.W. : South West

ITALIA

V.D.A. : (Valle d'Aosta)
 PIE : Piemonte
 LOM : Lombardia
 T.AA : Trentino-Alto Adige
 VEN : Veneto
 F.VG. : Friuli-Venezia Giulia
 LIG : Liguria
 E-R : Emilia-Romagna
 TOS : Toscana
 UMB : Umbria
 MAR : Marche
 LAZ : Lazio
 ABR : Abruzzi
 MOL : Molise
 CAM : Campania
 PUG : Puglia
 BAS : Basilicata
 CAL : Calabria
 SIC : Sicilia
 SAR : Sardegna

LUXEMBOURG

LX : G.D. du Luxembourg

NEDERLAND

GR : Groningen
 FR : Friesland
 DR : Drenthe
 OV : Overijssel
 NH : Noord-Holland
 GEL : Gelderland

ZH : Zuid-Holland
 UT : Utrecht
 ZE : Zeeland
 N.B. : Noord-Brabant
 LI : Limburg

UNITED KINGDOM

SCOTL : Scotland
 N. : North
 N.I. : Northern Ireland
 N.W. : North West
 YH : Yorkshire and Humberside
 WALES : Wales
 W.M. : West Midlands
 EM : East Midlands
 E.A. : East Anglia
 S.W. : South West
 S.E. : South East

ELLAS

Kentriki Ellás kai Evia
 Pelopónnisos
 Iónioi Nissoi
 Ipiros
 Thessalia
 Makedonia
 Thráki
 Nissoi Aigaiou
 Kriti

3. POPULATION ETUDIEE, TAILLE DES ECHANTILLONS, DATES DU TRAVAIL /SURVEYED POPULATION, SIZE OF THE SAMPLES, DATES OF FIELDWORK

	Population (1)		Echantillons / Samples (2) (Baro 17)	Dates (Baro 17)
	milliers / thousands	%		
B	7.802	3.70	1.210	23/III - 9/IV/1982
DK	4.009	1.90	1.211	3-18/IV
D	49.533	23.50	1.328	29/III - 16/IV
GR	7.219	3.43	1.199	22/III - 15/IV
F	41.241	19.57	1.199	8/IV - 3/V
IRL	2.328	1.10	1.181	8-21/IV
I	43.837	20.80	1.301	30/III - 22/IV
L	296	0.14	399	25/III - 22/IV
NL	10.738	5.09	1.228	1-16/IV
UK	43.767	20.77	1.419	31/III - 29/IV
CE/EC	210.770	100.00	11.675	

4. RECOMMANDATION AU LECTEUR

/

ADVICE TO READERS

Il est rappelé que, dans les enquêtes par sondage, on doit tenir compte d'une certaine marge pour erreur d'échantillonnage. Avec des échantillons de l'ordre de 1.000 personnes interrogées, les différences de pourcentages inférieures à 5 % ne devraient pas être normalement considérées comme statistiquement significatives.

Readers are reminded that in survey research, one should allow a certain margin for sampling error. With a sample of 1.000 cases, percentage differences of less than 5 points would not normally be regarded as statistically significant.

(1) 15 ans et plus / 15 years and over

(2) Nombre d'interviews / Number of interviews.

TABLEAU 1 / TABLE 1

LE SENTIMENT GLOBAL DE SATISFACTION DE LA VIE / THE FEELING OF OVERALL LIFE SATISFACTION (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE													
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 X-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	Très satisfait / Very satisfied	43	39	36	36	40	38	46	37	46	42	35	36	29
	Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	49	52	51	52	51	52	44	51	43	47	53	49	51
	Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	6	5	8	8	7	8	6	9	8	7	8	10	12
	Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	2	2	4	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	3	4
Sans réponse / No reply		2	1	1			1	1	1	2	1	2	4	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1266	1507	1000	963	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983	1009	949	1210	

(1) "Dans l'ensemble, êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas satisfait du tout de la vie que vous menez ?" / "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead ?"

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	DANMARK												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	% 51	% 51	% 36	% 49	% 50	% 54	% 53	% 54	% 58	% 51	% 55	% 59	% 57
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	44	41	51	45	42	42	41	40	38	43	40	36	37
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	4	4	3	5	6	3	5	5	3	4	4	3	5
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	1		1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	
Sans réponse / No reply	.	4	9		1	1	.	.	.	1		1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1073	1023	977	962	1010	992	983	1002	1073	994	1006	1211

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 V-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 x-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	17	13	14	19	22	19	24	21	20	24	17	16	20
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	65	66	65	60	60	62	61	61	65	62	68	61	63
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	15	16	17	17	15	14	12	14	12	10	11	16	12
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	1	2	2	3	2
Sans réponse / No reply	1	3	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	4	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1957	1039	1002	1004	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003	1009	1004	1328

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE I (continued)

	FRANCE												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 X-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	% 15	% 16	% 15	% 14	% 10	% 11	% 13	% 12	% 11	% 10	% 10	% 12	% 16
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	62	59	59	59	59	57	60	59	59	58	60	58	63
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	17	16	18	20	22	23	19	19	23	22	22	22	16
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	5	7	6	6	8	8	7	9	6	9	8	7	5
Sans réponse / No reply	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	2227	1156	1276	1241	1356	1256	1149	1276	1194	1152	993	1004	1199

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	IRELAND												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 V-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	53	36	40	34	37	38	42	40	41	37	34	34	40
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	39	52	50	54	50	50	47	50	45	47	52	49	46
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	6	9	7	9	9	8	6	7	8	11	11	13	11
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	2	3	3	3	4	4	5	3	5	5	3	3	2
Sans réponse / No reply						.			1	.		1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1000	998	1007	981	1008	997	1005	1005	997	1008	1005	1181

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

Très satisfait / Very satisfied Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied Sans réponse / No reply Total N	ITALIA												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 V - VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV - V	1977 x-XI	1978 V - VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	8	7	9	7	9	9	8	10	9	9	10	13	14
	57	52	48	48	48	50	54	53	54	50	54	54	57
	27	28	30	31	29	31	27	26	25	30	27	24	22
	7	10	12	13	13	10	11	11	12	11	9	9	7
	1	3	1	1	1								
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	1909	1043	1110	923	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030	1178	1116	1183	1301

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	30	26	39	30	31	39	38	40	34	33	35	40	39
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	49	45	49	58	57	51	51	50	49	60	57	54	48
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	9	15	9	7	7	9	9	9	13	5	7	5	9
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	2	7	2	1	4	1	1	1	2	1		1	3
Sans réponse / No reply		7	1	4	1		1		2	!	1		1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	330	311	297	268	301	302	344	322	291	299	300	300	399

TABLEAU I (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	NEDERLAND												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	41	33	34	41	38	38	44	46	44	46	47	44	42
	52	52	52	48	52	54	48	47	48	49	48	48	52
	5	7	6	9	7	6	5	6	5	4	4	6	4
Très satisfait / Very satisfied													
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied													
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied													
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	.	1	2	1
Sans réponse / No reply	1	6	6	1	1	1	1		1	1			1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1464	1093	1006	904	1123	1033	943	1131	913	974	999	1091	1228

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN (1973) and UNITED KINGDOM												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	33	33	29	28	28	29	30	34	32	27	34	32	36
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	52	53	53	54	56	53	57	52	55	59	52	52	50
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	11	9	12	12	12	12	10	11	8	11	9	10	9
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	3	3	5	5	4	5	3	3	4	3	5	5	4
Sans réponse / No reply	1	2	1	1		1	.		1			1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1933	1328	1438	1340	1351	1414	1351	1426	1339	1317	1454	1369	1419

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	ELLAS											
	1981 IV	1982 IV										
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait Very satisfied	19	18										
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	39	46										
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	20	22										
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	22	13										
Sans réponse / No reply		1										
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1000	1199										

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)												
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x - XI	1976 v - VI	1976 x - XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 IV	1980 IV	1981 IV	1982 IV
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	21	20	19	20	20	20	22	22	22	21	21	21	24
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	58	57	56	55	55	55	57	55	57	56	57	55	57
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	16	16	17	18	18	18	15	16	15	17	16	17	14
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	4	5	6	6	6	6	5	6	5	5	5	6	4
Sans réponse / No reply	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	13484	9550	9150	8627	9210	9044	8936	9327	8788	8976	8882	9898	1676

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'avril 1981 / Including Greece from April 1981

TABLEAU 2 / TABLE 2

LE SENTIMENT DE SATISFACTION QUANT AU FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA DEMOCRATIE /

THE FEELING OF SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS (1)

	BELGIQUE/BELGIE											
	1973 I X	1976 X-X ■	1977 IV - v	1977 X-X ■	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 I V	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	13	6	6	8	7	4	4	8	4	7	7	
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	49	47	50	43	49	38	39	39	30	28	33	
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	23	24	21	18	23	24	29	25	32	31	32	
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	9	8	10	10	8	13	14	12	19	18	17	
Sans réponse / No reply	6	15	13	21	13	21	14	16	15	16	11	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1266	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983	1032	1022	973	1210	

(1) "Dans l'ensemble, êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas satisfait du tout du fonctionnement de la démocratie (dans votre pays) ?" / "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (in your country) ?"

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	DANMARK										
	1973	1974		1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980	1981	1982
	I X	x - XI		x - XI	v - VI	X - XI	I V	X	X	x	IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	7	6	10	10	14	10	9	17	13	17	11
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	38	49	53	57	53	54	53	54	47	50	50
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	35	33	24	24	21	24	24	18	27	22	27
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	18	10	5	6	7	7	8	6	8	7	8
Sans réponse / No reply	2	2	8	3	5	5	6	5	5	4	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1199	962	1010	992	983	1002	1073	1029	1024	1009	1211

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND											
	1973 I X	1976 X-XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 K - XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 I V	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Tres satisfait / Very satisfied	5	13	11	9	9	9	10	12	9	11	12	
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	39	66	67	69	67	68	70	68	64	59	56	
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	44	16	16	16	16	15	13	12	17	18	21	
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	11	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	4	5	7	
Sans réponse / No reply	1	2	4	4	5	6	5	6	6	7	4	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1957	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003	1005	1008	962	1328	

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	FRANCE										
	1973 IX	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 X-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tres satisfait / Very satisfied	4	4	7	5	5	4	4	3	3	5	2
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	37	38	38	44	44	36	37	38	33	48	42
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	30	31	29	29	27	34	30	32	34	27	30
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	16	15	16	11	13	17	17	15	18	7	12
Sans réponse / No reply	13	12	10	11	11	9	12	12	12	13	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	2227	1356	1256	1149	1276	1194	1152	986	986	1006	1199

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	IRELAND											
	1973 I X	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 x - XI	1978 V-V ■	1978 X-X ■	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	9	7	10	12	13	10	5	11	7	13	12	
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	46	52	52	57	58	51	42	46	41	46	44	
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	27	25	23	16	15	18	30	22	30	22	22	
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	16	10	10	6	7	11	13	15	16	9	11	
Sans réponse / No reply	2	6	5	9	7	10	10	6	6	10	11	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1199	981	1008	997	1005	1005	997	1006	1007	985	1181	

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	ITALIA											
	1973 IX	1976 x - XI	1977 ■V-V	1977 X-X ■	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	4	2	
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	25	13	11	18	24	18	14	19	18	16	19	
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	42	43	47	45	44	46	46	41	45	43	44	
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	30	40	39	33	28	32	36	36	32	34	31	
Sans réponse / No reply	1	3	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	4	
Tota1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
	1909	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030	1178	1170	1108	1070	1301	

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG										
	1973 I X	1976 x - XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 X - X I	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tres satisfait / Very satisfied	16	13	15	24	24	15	17	23	18	16	14
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	36	41	56	44	43	48	44	50	59	59	49
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	28	4	22	20	24	29	29	23	17	18	26
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	9	8	2	4	2	3	4	2	5	4	9
Sans réponse / No reply	11	17	5	8	7	5	6	2	1	3	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	330	301	302	344	322	291	299	298	300	500	399

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	NEDERLAND										
	1973 IX	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	8	12	10	9	8	9	9	7	9	6	6
Plutôt satisfait / fairly satisfied	44	55	57	55	61	44	55	54	42	53	49
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	28	26	24	26	22	35	25	27	34	27	32
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	10	6	5	6	5	8	6	7	11	9	8
Sans réponse / No reply	10	1	4	4	4	4	5	5	4	5	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1464	1123	1033	943	1131	913	974	1092	1114	1011	1228

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN (1973) and UNITED KINGDOM											
	1973 I X	1976 X-X ■	1977 IV - v	1977 X-XI	1978 V-V ■	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X '	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	7	7	10	8	9	6	7	7	9	6	14	
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	37	44	49	54	53	45	46	45	42	42	46	
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	34	30	24	21	23	28	27	28	27	29	25	
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	20	13	12	9	8	12	13	13	16	13	9	
Sans réponse / No reply	2	6	5	8	7	9	7	7	6	10	6	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1933	1351	1414	1351	1426	1339	1317	1403	1432	1395	1419	

TABLEAU Z (suicé) / TABLE 2 (conclusion)

[illegible]

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)										
	1973 I X	1976 x - XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 X - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	1982 I V
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tres satisfait / Very satisfied	8	7	7	6	6	6	6	7	7	8	8
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	40	42	44	48	49	43	43	44	40	42	41
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	33	29	28	26	27	30	28	27	30	28	30
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	13	16	16	13	12	14	16	15	17	14	14
Sans réponse / No reply	6	6	5	7	6	7	7	7	6	8	7
Tota	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	13484	9210	9044	8936	9327	8788	8976	9021	9001	9911	1676

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'octobre 1980 / Including Greece from October 1980.

TABLEAU 3 / TABLE 3

L'ATTITUDE FONDAMENTALE A L'EGARD DE LA SOCIETE / BASIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOCIETY (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIË											
	1970 I-III	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 X-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	3	5	6	4	4	6	5	7	9	6	7	8
Réformes / Reforms (2)	69	65	66	60	63	61	64	55	60	57	57	60
Défense contre la subversion Defence against subversion	14	19	18	19	21	15	16	21	18	20	19	18
Sans réponse / No reply	14	11	10	17	12	18	15	17	13	17	17	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	298	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983	1032	1009	1022	949	973

(1) "Sur cette carte (MONTRER CARTE) se trouvent trois attitudes fondamentales vis-à-vis de la société dans laquelle nous vivons. Voulez-vous choisir l'attitude qui correspond le mieux à vos idées personnelles? (UNE SEULE REPONSE). 1. Il faut changer radicalement toute l'organisation de notre société par une action révolutionnaire. 2. Il faut améliorer petit à petit notre société par des réformes. 3. Il faut défendre courageusement notre société actuelle contre toutes les forces subversives." / "On this card (SHOW CARD) are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-à-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. 1. The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action. 2. Our society must be gradually improved by reforms. 3. Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces."

(2) En 1970 : "par des réformes intelligentes". / In 1970 : "by intelligent reforms".

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIË									
	1982 IV									
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	%									
Réformes / Reforms (2)	8									
Défense contre la subversion Defence against subversion	69									
Sans réponse / No reply	13									
	10									
Total	100									
N	1210									

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	DANMARK											
	1970 I-III	1976 x - XI	1977 IV-V	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	4	3	3	3	4	2	2	3	1	2	2
	Reformes / Reforms	51	52	55	51	61	61	55	54	52	56	55
	Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	38	39	40	42	29	31	38	36	43	38	38
	Sans réponse / No reply	7	6	2	4	6	6	5	7	4	4	5
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		962	1010	992	983	1002	1073	1029	994	1024	1006	1009

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND											
	1970 II-III	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1979 x	1980 IV	1980 x	1981 IV	1981 x
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	3	4	4	3	4
Réformes / Reforms (2)	70	52	43	41	41	43	52	50	47	46	41	49
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	20	39	48	50	50	44	39	38	37	43	43	36
Sans réponse / No reply	8	7	7	7	8	11	7	9	12	7	13	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	2021	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003	1005	1009	1008	1004	962

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND											
	1982											
	IV											
	%											
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	4											
Réformes / Reforms (2)	44											
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	39											
Sans réponse / No reply	13											
Total	100											
N	1328											

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	FRANCE											
	1970 [I-III]	1976 X I	1977 IV-v	1977 x - XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x - XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	5	13	14	8	8	12	9	10	11	9	9	5
Reformes / Reforms (2)	78	64	62	65	66	70	68	63	60	64	65	65
Defense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	12	18	19	22	20	13	16	19	24	20	20	26
Sans reponse / No reply	5	5	5	5	6	5	7	8	5	7	6	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	2046	1356	1256	1149	1276	1194	1152	986	993	986	991	1006

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	FRANCE											
	1982 IV											
	%											
	Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	4										
	Réformes / Reforms (2)	67										
	Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	23										
	Sans réponse / No reply	6										
Total	100											
N	1199											

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	IRELAND											
	1970 I - III	1976 x - XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	7	5	7	6	7	6	7	7	7	6	4
	Réformes / Reforms	60	61	64	59	61	64	58	61	65	63	59
	Defense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	23	26	26	24	20	16	28	20	20	22	27
Sans réponse / No reply	10	8	13	11	12	4	7	12	8	9	10	
Tota 1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	981	1008	997	1005	1005	997	1006	1008	1007	1005	985	

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	IRELAND											
	1982 IV											
	%											
	4											
	64											
	20											
	12											
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action												
Réformes / Reforms												
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion												
Sans réponse / No reply												
Total	100											
N	1181											

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	CITILIQ											
	1970 II-III	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 X-XI	1978 V-VI	1978 X-XI	1978 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	7	13	11	10	8	9	7	8	6	6	0	6
Réformes / Reforms (Z)	73	66	58	61	58	63	63	60	58	61	60	61
Défense contre la subversion / Defence Against subversion	11	18	28	27	21	24	26	27	22	29	29	29
Sans réponse / No reply	9	3	3	2	3	4	4	4	4	4	2	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
8	1822	1088	925	1155	1175	1040	1178	1170	1116	108	1183	1070

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG											
	1970 II-III	1976 x-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	1	2	3	4	3	5	4	2	8	5	6	4
	65	49	56	55	59	65	71	70	62	64	66	67
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action												
Réformes / Reforms (2)												
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion												
Sans réponse / No reply												
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	335	301	302	344	322	291	299	298	300	300	300	500

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

LUXEMBOURG												
1982 IV												
%												
6												
64												
27												
3												
Total	100											
N	399											

Action révolutionnaire /
Revolutionary action

Réformes / Reforms (2)

Défense contre la subversion /
Defence against subversion

Sans réponse / No reply

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	NEDERLAND											
	1970 II-III	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 X-XI	1978 IV-V	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	6	5	5	4	5	6	4	6	6	4	7	6
Réformes / Reforms (2)	75	56	58	55	56	63	66	54	53	58	54	52
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	15	32	32	37	35	25	23	34	37	33	35	32
Sans réponse / No reply	4	7	5	4	4	6	7	6	4	5	4	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1230	1123	1033	943	1131	913	974	1092	999	1114	1091	1011

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM											
	1970 I - III	1976 x - XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action		7	8	6	6	5	3	7	6	6	9	9
Réformes / Reforms		60	59	55	54	63	67	59	56	58	54	57
Défense contre La subversion / Defence against subversion		25	26	28	31	25	21	28	32	29	31	25
Sans réponse / No reply		8	7	11	9	7	9	6	6	7	6	9
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		1351	1414	1351	1426	1339	1317	1403	1454	1432	1369	1395

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM										
	1982 IV										
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	6										
Réformes / Reforms	58										
Défense contre la subversion Defence against subversion	30										
Sans réponse / No reply	6										
Total	100										
N	1419										

TABLEAU 3 (suite)

	ELLAS									
	1980 X	1981 IV	198 X	98 IV						
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	%	%								
Réformes / Reforms	9	10								
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	58	55								
Sans réponse / No reply	28	28								
	5	7								
Total	100	100	100	100						
N	1000	1000								

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)											
	1970 II-III	1976 XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action		8	8	6	5	7	5	7	6	6	7	6
Reformes / Reforms		60	55	55	55	59	62	57	55	57	55	57
Defense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion		26	31	32	33	27	26	29	31	30	31	29
Sans réponse / No reply		6	6	7	7	7	7	7	8	7	7	8
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		9210	9044	8936	9327	8788	8976	9021	8882	10001	9898	9911

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis octobre 1980 / Including Greece from October 1980.

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)										
	98										
	IV										
	%										
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	5										
Réformes / Reforms	59										
Défense contre la subversion Defence against subversion	28										
Sans réponse / No reply	8										
Total	100										
N	11676										

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis octobre 1980 / Including Greece from October 1980

TABLEAU 4 / TABLE 4

LE SENTIMENT D'ETRE POLITIQUEMENT EFFICACE / THE FEELING OF SELF POLITICAL EFFICACY (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIË						DANMARK					
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x - XI	1976 v - VI	1982 IV		1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x - XI	1976 v - VI	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Peuvent changer les choses / Can help to bring about a change	26	19	14	21	20		64	53	57	58	56	
Ne peuvent pas / Cannot	66	68	77	70	68		27	29	28	29	33	
Sans réponse / No reply	8	13	9	9	12		9	18	15	13	11	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1266	1507	1000	963	1210		1199	1073	1023	980	1211	

(1) "Estimez-vous que si quelque chose ne va pas bien (dans votre pays) des gens comme vous peuvent aider à changer quelque chose ?" / "Do you think that if things are not going well (in your country), people like yourself can help to bring about a change for the better or not ?"

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND						FRANCE					
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 V-VI	1982 IV		1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Peuvent changer les choses / Can help to bring about a change	44	35	41	35	33	41	36	36	34	33	
	Ne peuvent pas / Cannot	37	49	48	52	45	51	58	58	61	62	
	Sans réponse / No reply	19	16	11	13	22	8	6	6	5	5	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1957	1039	1002	1004	1328		2227	1156	1276	1241	1199	

TABLEAU d (suico) / ABLE d (continued)

	IRELAND						ITALIA			
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 X-XI	1976 V-VI	1976 IX	1975 V	1975 X-XI	1976 V-VI	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Peuvent changer leur choix / Can help to bring about a change	52	44	46	46	33	39	36	38	39	
Ne peuvent pas / Cannot	37	48	42	42	51	47	53	49	51	
Sans réponse / No reply	11	8	12	12	16	14	11	13	10	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1 99	1000	998	1006	1181	1909	1043	1110	1301	

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG						NEDERLAND					
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1982 IV		1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 J-VI	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	38	24	24	3	42		47	29	29	41	37	
	55	57	61	53	52		41	48	46	49	56	
Peuvent changer les choses / Can help to bring about a change	7	19	15	16	6		12	23	25	10	7	
Ne peuvent pas / Cannot												
Sans réponse / No reply												
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	330	311	297	268	399		1464	1093	1006	905	1228	

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM (2)						ELLAS					
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x - XI	1976 v - VI	1982 IV		1973 IX	1975 V	1975 R - XI	1976 v - VI	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Peuvent changer les choses / Can help to bring about a change	41	46	45	42	42						62	
Ne peuvent pas / Cannot	46	41	45	51	52						27	
Sans réponse / No reply	13	13	10	7	6						11	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1933	1328	1438	1340	1419						1199	

(2) Great Britain in 1973

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 v-VI	1982 IV							
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Peuvent changer les choses / Can help to bring about a change	42	37	39	38	37							
Ne peuvent pas / Cannot	45	50	50	52	52							
Sans réponse / No reply	13	13	11	10	11							
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	13484	9550	9150	8635	1676							

TABLEAU 5 / TABLE 5

ATTITUDE A L'EGARD DE L'UNIFICATION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE / ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE (1) (2)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIË																	
	1962	1970	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981	1982					
	II	I/II	IX	V	XI				IV	X	IV	X	IV					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	31	31	22	23	21	27	27	23	20	25	18	27	20					
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	34	35	38	32	36	42	44	46	47	40	42	43	49					
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	4	4	3	2	3	4	6	6	5	a	6	5	a					
Très contre / Against -very much	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	3	2	2					
Sans réponse / No reply	30	29	35	42	39	25	22	23	26	25	31		21					
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	770	1298	1266	1507	1000	008	983	1032	009	1022	949	973	1210					

(1) (2) Voir page A70

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	DANMARK																			
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV									
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	17	17	15	15	14	13	12	16	17	12	13									
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	28	24	27	33	35	33	27	31	29	31	29									
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	14	13	16	17	18	18	19	19	16	22	22									
Très contre / Against -very much	18	17	18	15	13	20	21	14	18	17	20									
Sans réponse / No reply	23	29	24	20	20	16	21	20	20	18	16									
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1073	1023	1002	1073	1029	994	1024	1006	1009	1211									

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND																			
	1952 IX	195 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 III	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 V-VI	1967 V	1970 I-III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 (-XI)	1978 I-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	70	8	73	69	79	82	75	50	78	78	82	87	39	49	43	37	37	36	37	36
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent								31					37	29	34	37	41	46	44	44
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	10		7	8	6	5	7	3	3	5	3	2	4	4	2	3	4	6	6	6
Très contre / Against -very much								1					1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1
Sans réponse / No reply	20	1	20	25	15	13	18	15	19	17	15	11	19	16	20	21	17	11	12	13
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1591	80	820	813	863	1159	1299	1523	1234	1202	1255	1000	2021	1957	1039	1002	1006	1003	1005	1009

TABLEAU 5 (suite)/ TABLE 5 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND																			
	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X	IV																
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	38	31	38	33																
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	40	39	31	45																
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	7	9	11	7																
Très contre / Against -very much	2	4	1	3																
Sans réponse / No reply	13	17	13	21																
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1008	1004	962	1328																

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	FRANCE																			
	1952 IX	1953 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 I/II	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 V-VI	1967 V	1970 I-III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 X-XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	60	6	45	45	50	67	55	28	70	80	74	72	24	23	35	26	28	25	24	19
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent								44					46	45	43	51	52	47	51	56
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	16		15	11	14	7	9	6	8	5	5	7	6	3	4	3	5	8	7	9
Très contre / Against -very much								2					2	1	1	1	2	2	3	2
Sans réponse / No reply	24	2	30	43	30	26	36	20	22	15	21	21	22	28	17	19	13	18	15	14
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1345	84	900	805	800	1226	1200	1518	1307	1215	1228	1961	2046	2227	1156	1276	1194	1152	986	993

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	FRANCE																			
	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV																
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	17	16	26	24																
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	52	56	54	54																
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	9	9	6	8																
Très contre / Against -very much	2	3	1	2																
Sans réponse / No reply	20	16	13	12																
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	986	991	1006	199																

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	IRELAND																			
	1973 IX																			
								1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV									
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Très pour / For -very much	21	23	25	24	19	25	19	19	20	21	15									
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	31	34	32	45	45	43	41	39	39	41	40									
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	15	8	8	7	9	9	10	10	15	11	12									
Très contre / Against -very much	4	7	4	3	2	5	2	7	8	5	5									
Sans réponse / No reply	31	28	31	21	25	18	28	25	18	22	28									
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1195	1000	998	1005	997	1006	1008	1007	1005	985	1181									

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

ITALIA																				
	1952 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 II	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 V-VI	1967 V	1970 I-III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 X-XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IX
Très pour / For -very much Plutôt pour - For -to some extent	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	57	63	55	55	66		59	36	67	78	65	68		36	39	38	32	39	40	35
								24												
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	14	9	11	13	7		7	3	6	3	4	4		2	2	2	4	3	4	4
Très contre / Against -very much								1						1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Sans réponse / No reply	29	28	34	32	27		34	36	27	19	31	2		27	20	19	12	9	10	12
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	1	1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1505	808	814	803	911		1269	1562	1344	1175	1166	12		1909	1043	1110	1030	1178	170	1116

TABLE 5 ($\varepsilon_{\text{wide}}$) / TABLE 5 (continued)

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG																		
	1970 I-II	1973 IX	1975 V				1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV							
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	52	47	48	47	31	47	48	48	46	45	45	40							
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	24	33	31	39	43	42	40	38	39	42	38	42							
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	2	1	2	1	13	5	7	6	9	6	11	5							
Très contre / Against -very much	2	-	1	-	51	2	1	3	1	1	3	3							
Sans réponse / No reply	20	19	18	13	8	4	4	5	5	6	3	10							
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	335	330	311	297	291	299	298	300	300	300	500	399							

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	NEDERLAND																		
	1962	1970	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981	1982						
	[HII]	[HII]	IX	V	XI	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV						
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	62	30	34	37	33	37	37	34	28	35	30	28	24						
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	25	44	39	29	31	46	47	48	48	44	50	46	52						
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	3	7	8	3	4	7	5	8	10	8	8	10	9						
Très contre / Against -very much	1	3	7	5	3	3	5	3	4	3	5	7	4						
Sans réponse / No reply	9	16	12	26	29	7	8	7	10	10	7	9	11						
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	779	1230	1464	1093	1006	913	974	1092	999	1114	1091	1011	228						

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN AND UNITED KINGDOM																			
	1952 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 V-VI	1967 V	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 I-XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For - very much	58	78	67	66	65	70	64	47	59	64	63	14	28	23	22	21	20	21	23	17
Plutôt pour / For - to some extent												23	22	28	41	40	41	38	40	35
Plutôt contre / Against - to some extent	15	4	10	14	16	10	12	22	18	11	15	15	11	11	12	14	15	16	14	14
Très contre / Against - very much												15	11	12	10	6	8	10	8	15
Sans réponse / No reply	27	18	23	20	19	20	24	31	23	2c	22	33	28	26	15	19	16	15	15	19
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1503	832	805	814	806	1210	1232	1261	1178	1179	992	1933	1328	438	339	1317	403	1454	432	369

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN AND UNITED KINGDOM																			
	1981	1982																		
	X	IV																		
	%	%																		
Très pour / For -very much	20	17																		
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	44	39																		
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	13	19																		
Très contre / Against -very much	8	12																		
Sans réponse / No reply	15	13																		
TOTAL	100 100	100 100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1395 1395	1419 1419																		

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	ELLAS													
	1980	1981	1981	1982										
	X	IV	X	IV										
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	33	30	36	29										
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	26	30	29	29										
Plutôt contre / Against - to some extent	12	12	7	10										
Très contre / Against -very much	11	13	8	7										
Sans réponse / No reply	18	15	20	25										
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	000	1000	1000	1199										

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	EURO 6																					
	1962	1970	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981	1982									
	1-11:	III:	IX	V	XI	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV									
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%									
Très pour / For -very much	40	34	35	39	33	33	34	34	30	32	27	34	29									
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	32	40	36	37	41	47	47	46	49	44	47	44	49									
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	4	4	3	3	2	4	6	6	6	7	9	8	7									
Très contre / Against -very much	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	3	2	2									
Sans réponse / No reply	23	20	24	20	22	14	12	12	13	15	14	12	13									
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	6334	8752	9153	6149	5691	5442	5589	5583	5426	5538	5518	5522	6665									

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (3)																		
	1973	1975	1975	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981	1982								
	IX	V	XI	X	IV	X	IV	X	IV	1981	1982								
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	30	35	31	30	30	30	27	29	26	31	26								
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	33	34	38	45	45	45	46	43	43	43	45								
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	6	5	5	8	6	8	9	9	10	9	10								
Très contre / Against -very much	5	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	6	4	5								
Sans réponse / No reply	26	22	22	14	15	13	14	15	15	13	14								
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	3484	3550	3150	3788	3976	4021	3882	3001	3878	3911	11676								

(3) Voir page A 70

- (1) "D'une façon générale, êtes-vous pour ou contre les efforts qui sont faits pour unifier L'Europe occidentale ?
 SI POUR, êtes-vous très pour ou plutôt pour ?
 SI CONTRE, êtes-vous plutôt contre ou très contre ?" /
 "In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe ?
 IF FOR, are you very much for this, or only to some extent ?
 IF AGAINST, are you only to some extent against or very much against ?"

- (2) Données provenant pour les années 1952 - 1967, y compris juin 1952, des sondages commandités par la U.S. Information Agency et, pour les années suivantes, ainsi que pour février - mars 1952, des sondages commandités par la Commission des Communautés européennes. Nonobstant quelques différences de formulation, la question était initialement : "Êtes-vous en général pour ou contre les efforts qui sont faits en vue d'unifier l'Europe occidentale ?". En Grande-Bretagne (de 1955 à 1967), en Allemagne (de février 1955 à avril 1956, ainsi qu'en juin 1962), en Italie (en 1955 et 1962), la question précisait : "... l'Europe occidentale, y compris la Grande-Bretagne". En 1970, 1973 et 1975, il était demandé aux individus interrogés s'ils étaient favorables, indifférents, ou défavorables à l'unification européenne. Cf. : "L'Opinion publique et L'Europe des Six" ; Sondages, Paris, n° 1 - 1963, p. 46 ; "Les Européens et l'unification de l'Europe", Bruxelles, juin 1972, pp. 71 - 72 ; Euro-Baromètre n° 4, décembre 1975, pp. 54 - 56.

Royaume-Uni (y compris Northern Ireland) à partir de 1975. /

- (2) The data for 1952 - 1967, including June 1952, are from surveys financed by the U.S. Information Agency and, for the following years, as well as February - March 1952, from surveys financed by the Commission of the European Communities. Notwithstanding some differences in the wording, the question was, initially, as follows : "Are you in general for or against making efforts towards uniting Western Europe ?". In Great-Britain (from 1955 to 1967), in Germany (from February 1955 to April 1956, as well as in June 1962), the question specified : "... Western Europe, including Great-Britain". In 1970, 1973 and 1975, the interviewed individuals were asked whether they were in favour, indifferent or not in favour of the European unification. Cf. : "L'Opinion publique et L'Europe des Six" ; Sondages, Paris, n° 1 - 1963, p. 46 ; "Europeans and European unification", Brussels, June 1972, pp. 71 - 72 ; Euro-Barometre n° 4, December 1975, pp. 54 - 56.

- (3) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'octobre 1980 /
 Including Greece from October 1980.

Tableau n° 6 / Table Nr 6

L'INTERET PERSONNEL POUR LES PROBLEMES DONT S'OC PE LE COMMUNITE EUROPEENNE /

PERSONNEL INTEREST IN THE PROBLEMS OF THE EU

	BELGIQUE / BELGIË							
	1973 IX	1975 V	1978 X-XI	1976 XI	1978 X-XI	1980 IV	1982 IV	
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
S'intéressent / Personally interested :								
beaucoup / very interested	10	9	10	10	10	9	16	
un peu / a little interested	39	39	38	46	40	48	49	
pas du tout / not at all interested	46	47	49	41	43	35	23	
Sans réponse / No reply	5	5	3	3	7	8	12	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1266	1507	1000	1077	1008	1009	1210	

(1) "Il est souvent question dans la presse (journaux, radio, télévision) de la Communauté européenne, appelée aussi "Marché Commun". Personnellement, est-ce que vous vous intéressez beaucoup, un peu ou pas du tout aux problèmes de la Communauté européenne ?" / "Newspapers, radio, TV often present news and commentaries about the European Community (also called Common Market). Are you personally very interested, a little interested, or not at all interested in the problems of the European Community ?"

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

<p>S'intéressent Personally interested</p> <p>■ beaucoup / very interested</p> <p>■ un peu / a little interested</p> <p>■ pas du tout / not at all interested</p> <p>Sans réponse / No reply</p> <p>Total</p> <p>N</p>	DANMARK											
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x - XI	1976 XI	1978 x - XI	1980 IV	1982 IV					
	y.	y.	%	%	%	%	%					
	29	22	19	25	19	17	23					
	51	50	51	53	54	59	59					
	19	24	28	20	25	23	17					
1	4	2	2	2	2	1	1					
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100					
1199	1073	1023	962	1002	994	1211						

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND										
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x - XI	1976 XI	1978 x - XI	1980 IV	1982 IV				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%				
S'interessent / Personally interested											
▪ beaucoup / very interested	31	26	23	23	16	19	22				
▪ un peu / a little interested	48	48	51	50	53	60	59				
▪ pas du tout / not at all interested	16	22	23	24	25	15	12				
Sans réponse / No reply	5	4	3	3	6	6	7				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1957	1039	1002	1007	1006	1009	1328				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	FRANCE										
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 X-XI	1976 XI	1978 X-XI	1980 IV	1982 IV				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%				
	S'intéressent / Personally interested :										
	▪ beaucoup / very interested	20	27	23	18	14	18	19			
	▪ un peu / a little interested	45	53	54	57	54	54	58			
	▪ pas du tout / not at all interested	33	19	22	24	30	27	22			
	Sans réponse / No reply	2	1	1	1	2	1	1			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	2227	1156	1276	1356	1194	993	1199				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

		IRELAND						
	1993 IX	1975 V	1975 X-XI	1976 XI	1978 X-XI	1982 IV		
	%	%	%	%	%	%		
S'intéressent / Personally interested :								
- beaucoup / - very interested	27	24	28	21	21	20		
- un peu / - a little interested	44	48	46	48	48	46		
- pas du tout / - not at all interested	29	27	25	30	30	31		
Sans réponse / No reply	.	1	1	1	1	1		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1199	1000	998	981	1005	1008	1181	

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	ITALIA											
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1976 XI	1978 x-XI	1980 IV	1982 IV					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%					
S'intéressent / Personally interested :												
▪ beaucoup / very interested	21	24	27	21	24	30	29					
▪ un peu / a little interested	44	46	46	48	49	48	46					
▪ pas du tout / not at all interested	29	27	22	29	21	19	21					
Sans réponse / No reply	6	3	5	2	6	3	4					
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100					
N	1909	1043	1110	1052	1030	1116	1301					

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

S'interessent / Personally interested : ▪ beaucoup / very interested ▪ un peu / a little interested ▪ pas du tout / not at all interested Sans reponse / No reply Tota1 N	LUXEMBOURG											
	1973 I X	1975 V	1975 x - XI	1976 X I	1978 X-XI	1980 IV	1982 IV					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%					
	26	33	28	22	17	34	34					
	54	45	55	50	55	54	49					
	18	16	13	24	26	12	16					
	2	6	4	4	2		1					
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100					
	330	311	297	301	291	300	399					

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

S'intéressent / Personally interested :											
	1973 I X	1975 V	1975 x - XI	1976 XI	1978 x - XI	1980 I V	1982 IV				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%				
	23	16	18	20	21	22	17				
	47	45	47	57	57	58	57				
■ beaucoup / very interested											
■ un peu / a little interested											
■ pas du tout / not at all interested	27	31	27	21	19	19	23				
Sans réponse / No reply	3	8	8	2	3	1	3				
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100				
N	1464	1093	1006	1123	913	999	1228				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN (1973) / UNITED KINGDOM										
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 X-XI	1976 XI	1978 X-XI	1980 IV	1982 IV				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%				
S'intéressent / Personally interested :											
▪ beaucoup / very interested	23	35	28	28	19	25	24				
▪ un peu / a little interested	43	42	45	48	50	47	49				
▪ pas du tout / not at all interested	31	19	25	23	29	28	26				
Sans reponse / No reply	3	4	2	1	2						
Total	100	100	100	100	100						
N	1933	1328	1438	1351	1339	1454	1419				

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

<p>S'intéressent / Personally interested :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ beaucoup / very interested ▪ un peu / a little interested ▪ pas du tout / not at all interested <p>Sans réponse / No reply</p> <p>Total</p> <p>N</p>	ELLAS										
	1982 IV										
	%										
	26										
	35										
	29										
	10										
	100										
	1199										

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)										
	1973 I X	1975 V	1975 x - XI	1976 XI	1978 x - XI	1980 IV	1982 IV				
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%				
	S'intéressent / Personally interested :										
	■ beaucoup / very interested	24	26	24	22	19	22	23			
	■ un peu / a little interested	45	47	49	51	51	53	52			
	■ pas du tout / not at all interested	27	23	24	25	26	22	21			
	Sans reponse / No reply	4	4	3	2	4	3	4			
	Tota 1	100	100	100	100	100	100				
	N	13484	9550	9150	9210	8788	8882	11676			

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis avril 1982 / Including Greece from April 1982

TABLEAU 7 / TABLE 7

L'IMPORTANCE ATTACHEE AUX PROBLEMES DONT S'OCCUPE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE /
 HOW IMPORTANT ARE THE PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIË				DANMARK				DEUTSCHLAND			
	1975	1980	1982		1975	1980	1982		1975	1980	1982	
	x-XI	IV	IV		x-XI	IV	IV		x-XI	IV	IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très important / Very important	22	19	19		32	30	32		26	20	22	
Important / Important	40	45	48		39	43	47		45	54	51	
Peu important / Not very important	11	13	12		11	12	10		17	16	16	
Pas important du tout / Unimportant	7	5	3		6	4	4		5	2	4	
Sans réponse / No reply	20	18	18		12	11	7		7	8	7	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1000	1009	1210		1023	994	1211		1002	1009	1328	

- (1) "Que vous ayez ou non le temps de vous intéresser personnellement à ces problèmes de la Communauté européenne, est-ce que cela vous paraît, pour l'avenir (de votre pays et de vos concitoyens), des problèmes très importants, importants, peu importants ou pas importants du tout ?" / "Whether or not you have the time to take a personal interest in the problems of the European Community, do you feel that those problems are very important, important, not very important or unimportant for the future of (your country) and the (people of your country) ?"

	FRANCE				IRELAND				ITALIA			
	1975 x-XI	1980 I V	1982 I V		1975 x-XI	1980 I V	1982 I V		1975 x-XI	1980 I V	1982 I V	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très important / Very important	35	31	27		46	38	31		34	40	42	
Important / Important	47	49	54		38	48	47		45	43	43	
Peu important / Not very important	10	11	9		9	9	11		9	8	5	
Pas important du out / Unimportant	3	3	2		2	2	3		4	3	2	
Sans réponse / No reply	5	6	8		5	3	8		8	6	8	
Tota	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1276	993	1199		998	1008	1181		1110	1116	1301	

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG				NEDERLAND				UNITED KINGDOM			
	1975 X-XI	1980 IV	1982 IV	%	1975 X-XI	1980 IV	1982 IV	%	1975 X-XI	1980 IV	1982 IV	%
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Tres important / Very important	31	45	45		21	29	22		45	52	37	
Important / Important	50	45	41		45	52	56		37	52	42	
Pas important / Not very important	7	7	9		11	11	11		8	9	11	
Pas important du tout / Unimportant	3	1	2		5	2	3		5	3	6	
Sans réponse / No reply	0	2	3		18	6	8		5	4	4	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	297	000	399		1000	999	1228		1438	1454	1419	

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	ELLAS				COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)			
	1982 IV				1975 x-XI	1980 IV	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très important / Very important	29				34	32	31	
Important / Important	37				43	47	47	
Peu important / Not very important	12				11	11	11	
Pas important du tout / Unimportant	4				4	3	4	
Sans réponse / No reply	18				8	7	7	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199				9141	8881	11676	

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'avril 1982 / Including Greece from April 1982

TABLEAU 8 / TABLE 8

S'ESTIMENT D'ETRE OU NON SUFFISAMMENT BIEN INFORMES SUR LES PROBLEMES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE
 FEELING OF BEING SUFFICIENTLY WELL INFORMED OR NOT ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIË					DANMARK				
	1973 IX	1974 V	1980 IV	1982 IV		1973 IX	1974 V	1980 IV	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Suffisamment bien informés / Sufficiently well informed	32	31	33	28		37	32	25	23	
Pas suffisamment bien informés / Not sufficiently well informed	43	48	45	55		55	44	64	64	
Sans réponse / No reply	25	21	22	17		8	24	11	13	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1266	1017	1009	1210		1199	1168	994	1211	

- (1) "Tout bien considéré, diriez-vous que des gens comme vous personnellement, sont suffisamment bien informés ou pas suffisamment bien informés sur les problèmes dont s'occupe la Communauté européenne ?" /
 "All through considered, would you say that people like yourself are sufficiently or are not sufficiently well informed about the problems dealt with by the European Community ?"
 (Formulation légèrement différente en 1973 et 1974 / Wording slightly different in 1973 and 1974)

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND					FRANCE				
	1973 IX	1974 V	1980 IV	1982 IV		1973 IX	1974 V	1980 IV	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Suffisamment bien informés / Sufficiently well informed	31	40	31	39		33	32	25	29	
Pas suffisamment bien informés / Not sufficiently well informed	54	42	52	46		52	62	68	63	
Sans réponse / No reply	15	18	17	15		15	6	7	8	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1957	1060	1009	1328		2227	1308	993	1199	

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	IRELAND					ITALIA				
	1973 IX	1974 V	1980 IV	1982 IV		1973 IX	1974 V	1980 IV	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Suffisamment bien informés / Sufficiently well informed	24	35	32	36		17	31	20	21	
Pas suffisamment bien informés / Not sufficiently well informed	71	56	62	51		77	53	75	74	
Sans réponse / No reply	5	9	6	13		6	16	5	5	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1000	1008	1181		1909	1030	1116	1301	

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG					NETHERLAND				
	1973 IX	1974 V	1980 IV	1982 I ³		1973 IX	1974 V	1980 IV	1982 I ³	
Suffisamment bien informés / Sufficiently well informed	% 45	% 54	% 42	% 36	% 36	% 53	% 5	% 44	% 46	% 46
Pas suffisamment bien informés / Not sufficiently well informed	37	37	54	54	54	53	5	44	46	46
Sans réponse / No reply	18	9	4	10	10	18	7	10	11	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	330	308	300	399		1464	1000	999	1228	

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN UNITED KINGDOM (1973-1974)					ELLAS				
	1973 IX	1974 V	1980 IV	1982 IV					1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Suffisamment bien informés / Sufficiently well informed	17	22	21	18				15	
	Pas suffisamment bien informés / Not sufficiently well informed	76	70	74	77				79	
	Sans réponse / No reply	7	8	5	5				6	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1933	1031	1454	1419					1199	

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)				
	1973 IX	1974 V	1980 IV	1982 IV	
	%	%	%	%	%
Suffisamment bien informés / Sufficiently well informed	25	32	26	27	
Pas suffisamment bien informés / Not sufficiently well informed	63	54	65	64	
Sans réponse / No reply	12	14	9	9	
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	3484	8922	8881	1676	

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'avril 1982 / Including Greece from April 1982

TABLEAU 9 / TABLE 9

L'ENTENTE ENTRE LES PAYS DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE AU COURS DES DOUZE DERNIERS MOIS /

THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS

"Au cours des 12 derniers mois, à votre avis, l'entente entre les pays de la Communauté Européenne (Marché Commun) a-t-elle, dans l'ensemble, plutôt progressé, plutôt régressé, ou est-elle restée à peu près sans changement ?

In your opinion, over the last 12 months, has the understanding between the countries of the European Community (Common Market) in general increased, decreased or stayed about the same ?"

	BELGIQUE/BELGIË							DANMARK						
	1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV			1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV		
	%	%	%	%	%			%	%	%	%	%		
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	21	27	10	11	8			19	16	11	9	11		
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	18	8	30	31	38			31	19	35	36	35		
A peu près sans changement/About the same	34	35	32	37	32			40	43	35	40	40		
Sans réponse/No reply	27	30	28	21	22			10	22	19	15	14		
Total	100	100	100	100	100			100	100	100	100	100		
N	1006	1008	949	973	1210			992	1002	1006	1009	1211		

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND						FRANCE					
	1977 X-XI	1978 X-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IX		1977 X-XI	1978 X-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IX	
	%	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%	%	
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	26	33	17	28	10		24	23	16	16	11	
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	24	9	36	21	42		16	11	20	21	31	
A peu près sans changement/About the same	36	37	28	37	36		46	46	47	52	43	
Sans réponse/No reply	14	21	19	14	12		14	20	17	11	15	
Total	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100	
N	999	1006	1004	962	1328		1149	1194	991	1006	1199	

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	IRELAND						ITALIA					
	1977	1978	1981	1981	1982		1977	1978	1981	1981	1982	
	x-XI	x-XI	IV	X	IV		x-XI	x-XI	IV	X	IV	
	%	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%	%	
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	42	46	23	26	19		35	33	19	21	10	
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	9	9	22	46	44		18	10	24	26	26	
A peu près sans changement/About the same	38	31	44	14	19		22	25	41	35	36	
Sans réponse/No reply	11	14	11				25	32	16	18	28	
Total	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100	
N	997	1005	1005	985	1181		1155	1030	1183	1070	1301	

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG							NEDERLAND						
	1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV			1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV		
	%	%	%	%	%			%	%	%	%	%		
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	28	27	19	23	8			14	13	10	10	8		
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	19	10	26	31	35			24	11	34	32	36		
A peu près sans changement/About the same	41	53	45	42	40			48	54	46	47	41		
Sans réponse/No reply	12	10	10	4	17			14	22	10	11	15		
Total	100	100	100	100	100			100	100	100	100	100		
N	344	291	300	500	399			943	913	1091	1011	1228		

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM							ELLAS						
	1977 X-XI	1978 X-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV			1977 X-XI	1978 X-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV		
	%	%	%	%	%			%	%	%	%	%		
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	32	27	11	15	11					23	27	17		
Plutôt progressé/Decreased in general	17	17	51	34	39					9	11	13		
A peu près sans changement/About the same	42	43	30	42	42					31	32	34		
Sans réponse/No reply	9	13	8	9	8					37	30	36		
Total	100	100	100	100	100					100	100	100		
N	1351	1403	1369	1395	1419					1000	1000	1199		

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)						
	1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X	1982 IV		
	%	%	%	%	%		
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	28	28	15	19	11		
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	19	12	33	26	34		
A peu près sans changement/About the same	38	38	36	41	39		
Sans réponse/No rep y	15	22	16	14	16		
Total	100	100	100	100	100		
N	8936	5788	3898	9911	1676		

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'avril 1981 / Including Greece from April 1981.

TABLEAU 10 / TABLE 10

JUGEMENT PORTE SUR L'APPARTENANCE A LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE /

ATTITUDE TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)(2)

BELGIQUE / BELGIE													
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79		
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
57	68	60	57	59	62	66	69	60				65	
5	3	6	3	3	5	3	4	5				2	
19	15	18	21	21	17	19	17	19	21	17	20		
19	14	16	19	17	16	12	10	16	15	14	13		
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
1266	1017	1505	1507	1000	963	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983		
(suite / continued)													
VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82							
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
51	56	57	54	49	55	57							
3	3	2	4	6	5	6							
25	25	25	24	27	26	24							
21	16	16	18	18	14	13							
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
965	1032	1009	1022	949	973	1210							
Bonne chose / Good thing													
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing													
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /													
Neither good nor bad													
Sans réponse / No reply													
Total													
N													
Bonne chose / Good thing													
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing													
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /													
Neither good nor bad													
Sans réponse / No reply													
Total													
N													

(1) "D'une façon générale, pensez-vous que le fait (pour votre pays) de faire partie de la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) est une bonne chose, une mauvaise chose, ou une chose ni bonne ni mauvaise ?" / "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad ?".

(2) VI/1979. Source : International Institute of Communications (London).

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	DANMARK											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing	42	35	33	36	41	36	29	30	37	34	36	37
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	30	31	35	25	27	29	34	30	33	31	25	25
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	19	24	25	28	24	22	28	30	24	27	30	26
Sans réponse / No reply	9	10	7	11	8	13	9	10	6	8	9	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1168	1100	1073	1023	977	962	1010	992	983	1002	1073
(suite / continued)												
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Sonne chose / Good thing	38	39	33	32	30	31	33					
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	28	27	29	29	31	29	30					
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	20	24	28	30	30	29	27					
Sans réponse / No reply	14	10	10	9	9	11	10					
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1018	1029	994	1024	1006	1009	1211					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Bonne chose / Good thing 63	59	62	56	61	48	57	54	59	58	63	66
	Mauvaise chose / Bad thing 4	8	10	8	6	12	5	8	7	3	4	5
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	22	26	20	28	27	30	31	23	24	24	21	20
Sans réponse / No reply	11	7	8	8	6	10	7	15	10	15	12	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1957	1060	1042	1039	1002	1004	1007			996	1006	1003
	(suite / continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Bonne chose / Good thing 59	64	65	62	49	58	54					
	Mauvaise chose / Bad thing 6	3		6	9	6	8					
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	34	25	18	22	28	26	31					
Sans réponse / No reply	1	8	11	10	14	10	7					
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	807	1005	1009	1008	1004	962	1328					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply Total N	FRANCE											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	61	68	63	64	67	57	52	64	57	54	59	56
	5	5	6	4	4	7	7	6	9	9	7	8
	22	20	22	25	24	30	35	24	28	27	26	28
12	7	9	7	5	6	6	6	6	10	8	8	
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	2227	1308	1237	1156	1276	1241	1356	1256	1149	1276	1194	1152

Sonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply Total N	(suite / continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	49	58	51	48	50	53	55					
	9	6	9	10	11	7	7					
	31	26	32	31	32	33	30					
11	10	8	11	7	7	8						
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	1002	986	993	986	991	1006	1199					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	IRELAND											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
Bonne chose / Good thing.	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	56	48	50	50	67	50	50	57	59	54	63	54
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	15	25	24	20	12	16	22	17	19	17	12	14
Neither good nor bad	21	19	22	25	17	18	22	22	19	23	20	24
Sans réponse / No reply	8	8	4	5	4	6	6	4	3	6	5	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1000	1000	1000	998	1007	981	1008	997	1005	1005	997

	(suite / continue)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82					
Bonne chose / Good thing	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	56	58	52	47	46	49	44					
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	16	12	19	26	22	19	18					
Neither good nor bad	14	25	22	21	27	27	29					
Sans réponse / No reply	14	5	7	6	5	5	9					
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1276	1006	1008	1007	1005	985	1181					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply Total N	ITALIA											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	69	77	82	71	75	63	68	71	70	65	73	78
	2	5	3	3	4	6	5	5	5	5	3	2
	15	9	11	21	16	20	16	18	18	18	16	14
14	9	4	5	5	11	11	6	7	12	8	6	
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	1909	1030	1021	1043	1110	923	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030	1178

Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply Total N	(suite / continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	75	75	74	71	73	70	68					
	4	2	3	5	5	5	3					
	13	17	16	17	19	20	20					
8	6	7	7	3	5	9						
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	985	1170	1116	1108	1183	1070	1301					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	II/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing	67	79	73	65	78	66	77	84	73	73	63	83
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	3	4	3	7	4	5	2	2	3	5	14	3
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /												
Neither good nor bad	22	12	13	19	12	21	17	11	17	16	15	12
Sans réponse / No reply	8	5	11	9	6	8	4	3	7	6	8	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	330	308	297	311	297	268	301	302	344	322	291	299

	(suite / continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing		86	84	73	79	76	73					
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing		3	3	3	3	5	2					
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /												
Neither good nor bad		10	10	22	15	17	19					
Sans réponse / No reply		1	3	2	3	2	6					
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		298	300	300	300	500	399					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply Total N	NEDERLAND											
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	63	66	70	64	67	75	74	80	74	78	83	84
	4	4	6	3	3	4	4	3	5	5	2	2
	20	14	15	18	12	15	14	13	16	14	12	10
	13	16	9	15	18	6	8	4	5	3	3	4
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	1464	1000	1012	1093	1006	904	1123	1033	943	1131	913	974

Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply Total N	(suite / continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	52	78	75	75	76	75	74					
	6	3	3	5	6	3	4					
	16	15	16	14	14	15	16					
	26	4	6	6	4	7	6					
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	1159	1092	999	1114	1091	1011	1228					

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM											
	X/72 (1)	IX/73 (2)	V/74 (2)	XI/74 (2)	V/75 (2)	XI/75 (2)	I/76 (1)	II/76 (1)	V/76 (2)	VII/76 (1)	IX/76 (1)	XI/76 (2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing	40	31	33	36	47	50	50	49	39	39	33	39
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	21	34	39	35	21	24	24	26	35	31	37	34
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	22	22	19	20	19	18	17	17	18	21	19	21
Sans réponse / No reply	17	13	9	9	13	8	9	8	8	9	11	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1028	1933	1031	1039	1328	1438	1077	992	1340	1038	976	1351

	(suite / continued)											
	I/77 (3)	IV-V/77 (2)	VI/77 (1)	X/77 (1)	XI/77 (2)	V/78 (2)	VII/78 (1)	X/78 (2)	IV/79 (2)	VI/79 (4)	X/79 (1)	X/79 (2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Sonne chose / Good thing	35	35	33	37	35	29	25	39	33	36	24	29
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	41	40	42	33	37	38	48	31	34	42	54	41
Chose ni Sonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	24	22	18	22	23	28	20	25	26	16	17	25
Sans réponse / No reply		3	7	8	5	5	7	5	7	6	5	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1697	1414	945	954	1351	1426	981	1339	1317	925	1009	1403

- (1) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more, only Great Britain. / Population de 18 ans et au-delà, seulement Grande-Bretagne.
- (2) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Great Britain from 1973 to 1974; United Kingdom as from 1975 / Population de 15 ans et au-delà. Grande-Bretagne de 1973 à 1974; Royaume-Uni depuis 1975.
- (3) NOP Market Research. Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain. / Population de 18 ans et au-delà, seulement Grande-Bretagne.
- (4) International Institute of Communications (London).

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM (suite / continued)											
	XI/79 (1)	IV/80 (1)	IV/80 (2)	V/80 (1)	VI/80 (1)	X/80 (1)	X/80 (2)	III/81 (1)	IV/81 (2)	V/81 (1)	X/81 (2)	IV/82 (2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing	21	22	23	26	22	24	24	24	24	21	27	27
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	55	57	49	52	54	46	49	52	48	50	41	43
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	15	13	22	17	17	24	24	20	24	21	27	24
Sans réponse / No reply	9	8	6	6	7	5	3	4	4	8	5	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	948	943	1454	1015	1046	921	1432	923	1369	972	1395	1419

	(suite / continued)											
	V/82 (1)											
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Sonne chose / Good thing	27											
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	45											
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	21											
Sans réponse / No reply	7											
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	977											

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

ELLAS												
	IV/81	X/81	IV/82									
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing	42	38	33									
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	22	21	15									
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /												
Neither good nor bad	26	26	37									
Sans réponse / No reply	10	15	15									
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1000	1000	1199									
(suite / continued)												
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bonne chose / Good thing												
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing												
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /												
Neither good nor bad												
Sans réponse / No reply												
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N												

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	EURO 6											
	IXI/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79
Bonne chose / Good thing	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	63	67	69	63	67	57	61	64	63	60	66	68
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	4	6	6	5	4	8	5	6	7	6	4	4
Neither good nor bad	19	18	17	24	22	26	26	21	22	22	20	20
Sans réponse / No reply	14	9	8	8	7	9	8	9	8	12	10	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	9153	5723	6114	6149	5691	5303	5916	5609	5596	5913	5442	5589

	(suite / continued)											
	VI/79	X/79	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	IV/82					
Sonne chose / Good thing	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	60	66	64	61	58	61	60					
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	6	4	5	6	8	6	6					
Neither good nor bad	26	22	22	23	25	26	26					
Sans réponse / No reply	8	8	9	10	9	7	8					
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	4918	5583	5426	5538	5518	5522	6665					

TABLEAU 11 / TABLE 11

L'ATTITUDE EN CAS D'ABANDON DU MARCHÉ COMMUN /
 ATTITUDE IF THE COMMON MARKET HAD BEEN SCRAPPED (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	VII/71	X/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77	IV/81	X/81	IV/82
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient / Would be:										
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	25	39	48	42	39	42	44	23	28	32
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	53	44	30	33	33	34	34	53	50	47
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	4	3	2	4	2	2	5	4	3	3
- Sans réponse / No reply	18	14	20	21	26	22	17	20	19	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1364	266	1017	1505	1507	1000	1006	949	973	1210

(1) De 1971 à 1973 : " Si l'on vous annonçait demain que le Marché commun est abandonné...". En 1974 et mai 1975 : " Si l'on vous annonçait demain que (votre pays) quitte la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) ...". A partir de novembre 1975 : " Si l'on vous annonçait demain que la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) est abandonnée...". / From 1971 to 1973 : "If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped...". In 1974 and May 1975 : "If you were to be told tomorrow that (your country) was leaving the Common market...". As from November 1975 : "If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped...".

TABLEAU II (suite) / TABLE 11 (continued)

	DANMARK									
		X/73	V/74	VI/74	V/75	VI/75	11/77	IV/81	X/81	IV/82
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient / Would be :										
- De grands regrets /										
Very sorry		30	27	27	33	33	30	25	25	27
- De l'indifférence /										
Indifferent		29	27	24	22	26	25	31	31	28
- Un vif soulagement /										
Relieved		29	31	35	26	26	34	31	24	28
- Sans réponse /										
No reply		12	15	14	19	15	11	13	20	17
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		1199	1168	1100	073	1023	992	1006	1009	1211

TABLEAU 11 (suite) / TABLE 11 (continued)

Eprouveraient / Would be : - De grands regrets / Very sorry - De l'indifférence / Indifferent - Un vif soulagement / Relieved - Sans réponse / No reply Total	DEUTSCHLAND										
	VII/7'	IX/73	V/74	I/74	V/75	I/75	I/77	IV/81	X/81	IV/82	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	52	57	53	55	55	53	53	42	51	51	
	29	24	28	27	27	31	25	31	30	27	
	7	4	5	6	5	4	5	8	5	6	
	12	15	14	12	13	12	17	19	14	16	
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
	2000	1957	1060	1042	1039	1002	999	1004	962	1328	

TABLEAU 11 (suite) / TABLE 11 (continued)

FRANCE												
	VII/71	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77	IV/81	X/81	IV/82		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
Eprouveraient / Would be :												
- De grands regrets /	31	42	56	50	<6	50	45	34	37	40		
Very sorry												
- De l'indifférence /	52	43	30	33	≥1	37	39	44	48	42		
Indifferent												
- Un vif soulagement /	5	2	3	4	4	3	6	8	4	4		
Relieved												
- Sans réponse /	12	13	11	13	9	10	10	14	11	14		
No reply												
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1806	2227	1308	1237	1156	1276	1149	991	1006	1199		

TABLEAU 11 (suite) / TABLE 11 (continued)

	IRELAND									
		X/73	V/74	CI/74	V/75	CI/75	11/77	V/81	X/81	IV/82
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Eprouveraient / Would be : - De grands regrets / Very sorry	37	38	48	46	51	47	33	35	36
	- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	40	27	22	32	30	30	43	35	38
	- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	17	28	24	19	14	18	17	16	14
	- Sans réponse / No reply	16	7	6	3	5	5	7	14	12
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		1999	1000	1000	1000	998	997	1005	985	1181

TABLEAU 11 (suite) / TABLE 11 (continued)

ITALIA											
N	Total										
	0000	1000	2000	3000	4000	5000	6000	7000	8000	9000	10000
Epreuve/ient / Would be :	el2	E	1	4	10	2	5	10	14	22	39
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
- De grands regrets / - Very sorry	SE	41	60	69	72	75	78	81	84	87	90
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
- De l'indifférence / - Indifferent	SE	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
- Un vif soulagement / - Relieved	E	1	4	10	2	5	10	14	22	39	56
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
- Sans réponse / - No reply	el2	E	1	4	10	2	5	10	14	22	39
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

TABLEAU 11 (suite) / TABLE 11 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG										
	VII/71	X/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	VI/77	IV/81	X/81	V/82	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	36	5	73	70	58	60	64	59	60	61	
	42	35	17	16	22	24	25	33	31	28	
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	6	3	3	2	7	2	2	3	5	2	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	16	11	7	12	13	14	9	5	4	9	
- Sans réponse / No reply											
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	302	330	308	297	311	297	344	300	500	399	

TABLEAU 11 (suite) / TABLE 11 (continued)

	NEDERLAND										
	VII/71	IX/73	V/74	II/74	V/75	II/75	II/77	V/81	X/81	V/82	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Eprouveraient / Would be :											
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	40	46	54	56	50	50	59	51	46	54	
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	35	37	20	25	27	28	29	34	33	32	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	10	4	4	5	3	2	4	7	3	4	
- Sans reponse / No reply	15	13	22	14	20	20	8	8	18	10	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1198	1464	1000	1012	1093	1006	943	1058	1011	1228	

TABLEAU 11 (suite) / TABLE 11 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM														
	X/72 (1)	I/73 (1)	II-IV 73 (1)	IV-V 73 (1)	VI/73 (1)	VII 73 (1)	X/73 (1)	IX/73 (2)	X/73 (1)	XI/73 (1)	-II '4 (1)	II-IV '4 (1)	IV/74 (1)	IV/74 (2)	4/74 (1)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient / Would b															
- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	26	27	28	21	26	23	21	20	21	13	19	27	14	24	25
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	33	28	27	26	24	22	24	33	26	24	26	23	21	28	33
- Un vif soulagement Relieved	35	31	36	41	41	48	46	37	44	42	48	43	43	40	44
- Sans réponse / No reply	6	14	9	12	9	10	9	10	9	11	7	7	12	8	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1028	924	1013	873	885	998	818	1933	902	906	1054	1055	1007	1031	985
Eprouveraient / Would b	II/74 (1)	III/ 74 (1)	X/74 (1)	XI/74 (2)	I/75 (1)	V/75 (2)	XI/75 (2)	I/76 (1)	II/76 (1)	VII / 76 (1)	X/76 (1)	VI/77 (1)	X/77 (1)	XI/77 (2)	X/79 (1)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	28	24	26	31	24	41	40	37	34	28	25	26	28	31	16
	21	22	24	22	24	27	28	30	30	30	30	24	30	31	28
	44	47	38	38	40	23	26	24	28	35	34	42	32	32	50
	7	7	12	9	12	9	6	9	8	7	11	8	10	6	6
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	908	817	1006	1039	988	1328	438	1077	992	1038	976	945	954	1351	1009

(1) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain. Slight difference in the wording of the question: in 1972, "very sorry, indifferent, pleased"; from V/75: "very sorry, indifferent, relieved".

(2) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Only Great Britain from 1973 to 1974; United Kingdom from 1975.

TABLEAU 11 (suite) / TABLE 11 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM										
	XI/79 (1)	V/80 (1)	V/80 (1)	VI/80 (1)	X/80 (1)	II-III '81(1)	V/81 (2)	V/81 (1)	X/81 (2)	V/82 (2)	V/82 (2)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient /Would b											
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	16	14	17	16	18	18	21	16	21	23	19
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	26	27	25	25	30	29	29	28	34	33	33
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	51	51	51	53	47	49	46	50	39	40	44
- Sans réponse / No reply	7	8	7	6	5	4	4	6	6	4	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	948	943	1015	1046	921	923	1369	972	1395	1419	977

(1) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain. Slight difference in the wording of the question : in 1972 : "very sorry, indifferent, pleased" ; from V/75 : "very sorry, indifferent, relieved".

(2) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Only Great Britain from 1973 to 1974 ; United Kingdom from 1975.

TABLEAU 11 (suite) / TABLE 11 (continued)

Eprouveraient / Would be :	ELLAS		
	IV/81	X/81	V/82
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	% 30	% 17	%
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	43	49	50
- un vif soulagement / Relieved	18	17	
- Sans réponse / No reply	9	17	
Total	100	100	100
N	1000	1000	1199

TABLEAU 11 (suite) / TABLE 11 (continued)

	EURO 6										
	VII/71	IX/73	V/74	VI/74	V/75	VI/75	VI/77	V/81	X/81	V/82	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Eprouveraient / Would be :											
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	40	41	56	56	53	49	50	42	44	46	
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	40	36	26	27	31	35	33	38	39	36	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	5	10	4	4	4	3	5	6	4	4	
- Sans réponse / No reply	15	13	14	14	12	13	12	14	13	14	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	8670	9153	5723	6114	6149	5691	5596	5518	5522	6665	

TABLEAU 11 (suite) / TABLE 11 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)									
		IX/73	V/74	IX/74	V/75	XI/75	IX/77	V/81	X/81	V/82
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient / Would be :										
- De grands regrets / Very sorry		41	48	49	50	47	45	37	38	40
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent		36	27	26	30	33	32	36	38	36
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved		10	13	13	9	9	12	16	12	12
- Sans réponse / No reply		13	12	12	11	11	11	11	12	12
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		13484	8922	9253	9550	9150	8936	9898	9911	1676

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'avril 1981 / Including Greece from April 1981.