

# euro-barometre

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



No. 16 DECEMBER 1981

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES  
RUE DE LA LOI 200 • 1049 BRUSSELS

# EUROBAROMETER

## PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

### AT THE END OF 1981

- The mood of Europeans : what they expect from 1982 ; the risk of a third world war ; satisfaction with the way democracy is working ;
- Agreement or disagreement on the main socio-political problems ;
- Attitudes towards Europe and the Community ;
- Reactions in Spain and Portugal to the prospect of joining the Community.

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## PRELIMINARY NOTE

EUROBAROMETER PUBLIC OPINION POLLS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES EACH SPRING AND AUTUMN SINCE SEPTEMBER **1973**. THEY HAVE INCLUDED GREECE SINCE AUTUMN **1980**.

AN IDENTICAL SET OF QUESTIONS IS PUT TO REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES – DIFFERENT EACH TIME – OF THE POPULATION AGED FIFTEEN AND OVER IN EACH OF THE TEN COUNTRIES. THIS SURVEY WAS CARRIED OUT BY PROFESSIONAL INTERVIEWERS BETWEEN **8** OCTOBER AND **20** NOVEMBER **1981** IN THE HOMES OF THE **9 912** SELECTED RESPONDENTS.

TEN NATIONAL INSTITUTES, ALL MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING THE POLL. ALL THESE INSTITUTES COMPLY WITH THE STANDARDS SET BY THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR OPINION AND MARKETING RESEARCH. THEY WERE SELECTED BY TENDER, THE NAMES OF THE INSTITUTES AND FIELD-WORK SPECIALISTS IN EACH COUNTRY ARE LISTED IN THE APPENDIX TOGETHER WITH THE RELEVANT TECHNICAL DETAILS.

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**IN** ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PRACTICE FOR THIS TYPE **OF** SURVEY THE COMMISSION DISCLAIMS ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUESTIONS, RESULTS AND COMMENTARIES.

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## INTRODUCTION

*This survey, conducted in the field in October and November, makes a new and important contribution to what the peoples of Europe know about each other and especially about their attitudes to the Community. For the first time, some of the questions asked in the Member States (including Greece since October 1980) were also asked in Spain and Portugal. This does not mean that these two countries now take part in the Euro-Barometre survey but it is a step in that direction.*

*This report on European public opinion contains four chapters :*

*1° The mood of Europeans. - Compared with previous surveys, this chapter has been extended to include the results of an investigation of Europeans' hopes and fears for the year that is about to begin (1).*

*2° Agreement or disagreement on the main socio-political problems. - This chapter is new. It continues a line of research begun in 1979 in connection with the first direct elections to the European Parliament.*

*3° Attitudes to Europe and the Comity. - The constant monitoring of these opinions is the main function of Euro-Barometres. This time, in addition to the usual questions, which derive a great deal of their value from the fact that they have been asked every six months since 1973 or even earlier, two new ones were introduced : one on the development of relations between the countries of Western Europe over the last twenty-five years and one on the prospects for the development of the Comity over the next ten years.*

*4° Reactions in Spain and Portugal to the prospect of joining the Community*

### THE MOOD OF EUROPEANS

*What do Europeans expect from next year? For most of those who commit themselves, the reply is quite clear: 1982 will be worse than 1981, Unemployment will increase, as will strikes and industrial disputes; there will be economic difficulties at home and trouble and international discord throughout the world.*

*Nevertheless, this pessimism -or rather this concern caused by events as reported in the press- is no greater this year than last. In fact overall there would appear to be slightly less worry about unemployment compared with a year earlier.*

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*(1) Annual survey carried out by Gallup International Research Institutes which have kindly made available to us the results for the Community countries,*

As would be expected, views about what the coming year has in store differ appreciably from country to country, and a comparison with the end-1980 results reveals no consistent pattern of change.

As last year, the countries which are most uneasy are Belgium and the Netherlands, while Greece is by far the least pessimistic, followed by France. These two countries have, of course, recently experienced major political changes. The fact that the survey was conducted in Greece at the same time as the election campaign probably goes a long way to explaining the extremely optimistic expectations expressed. (See Tables 1 and 2).

During recent years a number of international events have revived fears of a third world war. This fear remained slight between 1971 and 1977 but increased sharply from autumn 1977 to spring 1980. Concern in autumn 1981 lay between the Zevels observed in the two previous surveys. (See Table 5).

Respondents' satisfaction with the way democracy works in their own country is an interesting indicator. As previous surveys have shown, this feeling varies in intensity from one country to another: Denmark and the Netherlands are countries with a high degree of satisfaction, while Italians are the most dissatisfied.

A comparison of results obtained in April and October 1981 shows a significant increase in the average level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in France. According to their political persuasion, a large proportion of those who were "dissatisfied" before now say (or, to be precise, said in October) that they are "satisfied" while conversely some (although a smaller proportion) of those who were "satisfied" before are now "dissatisfied". This is an empirical observation of the way the level of political satisfaction alternates. (See Tables 6 and 7).

#### AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT ON SOME IMPORTANT PROBLEMS

At the time of the first direct elections to the European Parliament, research was carried out into what were perceived as the most important socio-political problems (other than the building of Europe) in the Member States.

The line of research is now continued with an eye to preparations for the elections in 1984.

To summarize, there appear to be two distinct divisions between the protagonists in the debates; the traditional division on the problems of the industrial society of yesterday and today (more equal distribution of income, more State intervention in the economy, etc.) and another, of more recent origin, on the new problems, in particular the development of nuclear energy an issue which divides the traditional political groupings themselves,

The analysis of the correlation between a favourable attitude towards the Community and views on each of the main socio-political problems produces some particularly interesting findings. If the results for all the Member States are taken together, it is seen that those who are most favourably disposed to the Community are also likely to support increased environmental protection, more economic aid to the Third World and the development of nuclear energy and are more likely to oppose further nationalization of private industry (1). (See Table 31).

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(1) Researchers will be given unrestricted access to all data; it will then be for them to analyse in greater depth the findings for their own countries.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE AND THE COMMUNITY

*As in previous surveys, the purpose of this part of Euro-Barometre is both to compare and investigate.*

*Comparison reveals that the decline in support for European unification and the Community which was evident in April has not continued. In most countries, especially in Germany, the ground lost has been regained. We shall have to wait for the next Euro-Barometre in spring 1982 to see whether the "reservoir of goodwill" available to decision-makers on European matters has been breached or not (1).*

*On average, 74 % of those interviewed now say that they favour the movement towards European unification while only 13 % oppose it. On the second question, 53 % of respondents consider their own country's membership of the Community "a good thing" and 14 % "a bad thing".*

*While in all countries a majority of those interviewed supported the principle of European unification, those giving a definite answer in Denmark were almost equally divided between supporters and opponents of membership (31 % against 29 %) while opponents in the United Kingdom had a clear lead (41 % against 27 %). But in the United Kingdom too, there seem to be signs of a shift away from opposition and towards uncertainty (or indifference). (See Tables 14 and 24).*

*By means of a very detailed analysis of replies to a question proposing a number of possible advantages of Community membership it has been possible to identify the main reasons underlying a positive attitude towards the Community. In most countries, the leading opinion is that by acting together the Community members should be better able to cope with the world economic crisis.*

*In Germany the main reason seems to be that, thanks to the common market, consumers are offered a wider selection of products in shops.*

*In France and Luxembourg the Community is primarily perceived as an organization which permits the country to play a more important part in the world.*

*Greeks expect the main advantages of accession to be 'in the economic field, the development of agriculture, and, in the political field, improvements in the way to democracy works.*

*Naturally, the fact that one reason is singled out as the most widely held view in a particular country does not mean that the others are not represented as well. In any case, these analyses will have to be repeated to see if they are confirmed. (See Table 30).*

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(1) A survey shows the situation at a given moment, two successive surveys allow a line to be drawn but only with the third survey can a curve be drawn and hence a tendency (or a change of tendency) be noted.



#### IV

##### REACTIONS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL TO THE PROSPECT OF JOINING THE COMMUNITY

*The public supports membership in both countries, but the degree of involvement is very different.*

*Public opinion in Spain has a very similar profile to that in the Member States. Although a large majority of Spaniards still feel only slightly concerned, the percentage of those who feel very concerned by Community matters is higher than in most of the Member States (30 % of those interviewed as against **only** 9 % in Belgium).*

*Furthermore, 36% of Spaniards said they "strongly support" European unification as compared with an average of 31% in the Member States.*

*Finally, 52% of Spaniards think that membership will be "a good thing" - this is in line with the average in the Community at present,*

*In Portugal, while those in favour of membership **far** outnumber those against, there is a very large proportion of "don't knows". There are some possible explanations for this: a lower average level of education than elsewhere and less exposure to the information media, but the fact remains that the majority of Portuguese do not regard Community membership as a burning issue.*

*Further analysis shows that those Spaniards who are well informed and in favour of accession (characteristics which often go together) see the Community as a means of safeguarding democracy, stimulating economic development and enabling their country to play a bigger role in world affairs. In Portugal, economic considerations are paramount but the large proportion of "don't knows" means that these results must be interpreted with caution: the trend is in favour of the Community but the pattern is not yet clear, (See Tables 32 to 35).*

CHAPTER ONE

THE MOOD OF EUROPEANS

I

THE MOOD OF EUROPEANS

The aim of the questions asked from time to time in the Euro-bärometre polls is not so much to provide a detailed and penetrating analysis of all aspects of public opinion in each of the Member States of the Community as to pick out some general trends through answers on topical matters in each country which seem likely to reflect attitudes - whether positive or negative - to the European Community.

The first replies considered here are those to a series of end-of-year questions asked in 1981, as in 1980, for Gallup International Research Institutes.<sup>1</sup>

Questions on the following topics have been asked in a number of recent Euro-barometres:

- the fear of world war;
- the sense of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the way democracy works ;
- basic attitudes to social and political change.

I.1. WHAT EUROPEANS EXPECT FROM THE COMING YEAR'

*So far as you are concerned, do you think that 1982 will be better or worse than 1981?*

*Looking ahead to next year, 1982, do you think ...*

- ... the number of unemployed in this country will increase, decrease or remain the same?*
- ... strikes and industrial disputes in this country will increase, decrease, or remain the same?*
- ... it will be a year of economic prosperity or economic difficulty, or remain the same?*
- ... it will be a peaceful year more or less free of international disputes, a troubled year with much international discord, or remain the same?*

1 These findings, recently published in Princeton and London, were kindly made available to us by Mr. Webb, General Secretary of the Gallup International Research Institutes.

2 These questions were not asked in Denmark in 1981.

In the Community as a whole, there is concern about what next year will bring. The majority of those who commit themselves consider that 1982 will be worse than 1981: there will be more unemployment, more strikes and more social unrest; there will be economic difficulties at home and trouble and international discord throughout the world.

It is interesting to note that this pessimism, which is no more than a reflection of the present situation as portrayed by the media, is no greater this year than last. In fact overall there would appear to be slightly less worry about unemployment than a year ago.

(See Table 1).

As would be expected, views about what the coming year has in store differ appreciably from country to country, and a comparison with the end-1980 results reveals no consistent pattern of change. Differences between countries have even increased, which means that pessimism has decreased in some countries over the past year while it has increased in others.<sup>1</sup> These changes are probably the result of new political parties coming to power in some countries.

(See Table 2).

The countries which are most pessimistic overall are, as last year, Belgium and the Netherlands, while the most optimistic by far is Greece, followed by France. These two countries, which have recently experienced major political changes, are also those where concern about the immediate future decreased by the largest margin between the end of 1980 and the end of 1981.<sup>2</sup> One might go so far as to say that, under the combined effects of accession to the Community and a change of government, Greeks have an amazingly optimistic view of 1982 compared with the previous year. The relative stability of opinions in the other countries makes these two changes all the more striking.<sup>3</sup>

(See Table 3).

- 
- 1 The dispersion of average national replies, measured by standard deviation, has almost doubled from one year to the next.
  - 2 This overall attitude can be clearly seen by adding the percentage responses to each question for each country.  
In Belgium, for example, the overall degree of pessimism rose by 28 points from 303 in 1980 to 331 in 1981, while in France it fell by 50 points from 267 to 217 and in Greece by 174 points from 247 to 73.

OVERALL DEGREE OF PESSIMISM

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC
Oct. 1980	303	300	226	267	255	257	243	323	277	247	266
Oct. 1981	331	:	243	217	279	286	262	308	263	73	252
Change	+28	:	+17	-50	+24	+29	+19	-15	-14	-174	-14

- 3 For a detailed breakdown of answers by country see Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.

Table 1

EUROPEANS' VIEW OF THE COMING YEAR

(Community as a whole)<sup>1</sup>

	<u>October 1980</u>	<u>October 1981</u>
The coming year will be ...		
better	20%	25%
worse	43	38
Other answer or don't know	37	37
The number of unemployed will ...		
increase	69%	64%
decrease	7	11
Other answer or don't know	24	25
Strikes and social unrest will ...		
increase	43%	44%
decrease	14	14
Other answer or don't know	43	42
This will be a year of ...		
economic prosperity	6%	8%
economic difficulty	58	56
Other answer or don't know	36	36
... and abroad it will be ...		
a fairly quiet year	10%	10%
a rather difficult year	53	<b>50</b>
Other answer or don't know	37	40

1 Average of answers given in each country weighted by proportion of population aged 15 and over.

Table 2

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUNTRIES IN LEVEL AND CHANGE IN LEVEL OF CONCERN<sup>1</sup>

	0	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
The coming year will be worse											
October 1980	53	42	37	39	48	45	45	49	48	39	43
October 1981	62	:	28	32	53	49	51	41	44	6	38
Change <sup>3</sup>	+9	:	-9	-7	+5	(+4)	+6	-8	(-4)	-33	-5
The number unemployed will increase											
October 1980	75	81	56	74	59	66	54	84	77	51	69
October 1981	79	:	69	46	64	70	62	86	69	15	64
Change <sup>3</sup>	(+4)	:	+13	-28	+5	(+4)	+8	(+2)	-8	-36	-5
Strikes and social tensions will increase											
October 1980	54	57	37	47	41	45	25	55	38	54	43
October 1981	61	:	43	37	52	53	29	55	42	10	44
Change <sup>3</sup>	+7	:	+6	-10	+11	+8	(+4)	(0)	(+4)	-44	(+1)
The coming year will be one of economic difficulty											
October 1980	66	64	41	60	62	62	59	79	64	59	58
October 1981	68	:	49	52	64	66	59	69	58	18	56
Change <sup>3</sup>	(+2)	:	+8	-8	(+2)	(+4)	(0)	-10	-6	-41	(-2)
The coming year will bring trouble and discord throughout the world											
October 1980	55	56	55	47	45	39	60	56	50	44	53
October 1981	61	:	54	50	46	48	61	57	50	24	50
Change <sup>3</sup>	+14	:	(-1)	(+3)	(+1)	+9	(+1)	(+1)	(0)	-20	(-3)

1 These questions were not asked in Denmark in 1981.

2 Weighted average.

3 Figures in brackets are not regarded as statistically significant.

Table 3

VIEWS OF THE COMING YEAR IN FRANCE AND GREECE

	France		Greece	
	Oct. 1980	Oct. 1981	Oct. 1980	Oct. 1981 <sup>1</sup>
The coming year will be ...				
better	15%	32%	39%	72%
worse	39	32	39	6
The number of unemployed will ...				
increase	74%	46%	51%	15%
decrease	5	20	15	47
Strikes and social tensions will ...				
increase	47%	37%	54%	10%
decrease	4	16	8	51
The coming year will be one of ...				
economic prosperity	3%	10%	10%	41%
economic difficulty	60	52	59	18
The coming year will be ...				
fairly quiet	5%	9%	14%	35%
disturbed	47	50	44	24

- 1 Since this survey was carried out in Greece between 12 and 24 October, it is likely that the results were affected to some extent by the euphoria of the elections of 18 October and the preceding campaign. Opinion polls cannot escape this kind of "turbulence".

More detailed analysis shows that in each country all age groups share broadly similar views of the coming year. Nevertheless, in 1981 as in 1980, young people are slightly more likely than their elders to consider that the next year will be better, even though they expect unemployment to increase. No doubt this apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that replies to the first question are influenced by a general feeling of optimism for the future which diminishes with age while replies to the second are the result of an objective fact: the increase in unemployment and the employment difficulties of young people.

(See Table 4).

Table 4

OPTIMISM FOR THE FUTURE AND THE FEAR OF UNEMPLOYMENT

BREAKDOWN OF REPLIES BY AGE

(Community as a whole)

	October 1980				October 1981			
	15-24	25-39	40-55	55+	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+
The coming year will be ...								
better	27%	21%	17%	16%	32%	27%	22%	21%
worse	38	42	46	45	36	37	40	40
The number of unemployed will ...								
increase	72%	70%	70%	63%	66%	64%	67%	59%
decrease	7	6	7	10	11	10	10	13
Base	2075	3042	2674	3170	1783	2623	2249	2798



I.2. THE FEAR OF A WORLD WAR<sup>1</sup>

Several events of recent years seem to have revived fears of a world war. This question was first asked in the six members of the Community in July 1971 and again in autumn 1977; it was asked in the Nine in spring 1980 and in this survey it was asked in all these countries except Denmark and in Greece.

*"Here is a sort of scale; (SHOW CARD). Would you, with the help of this card, tell me how you assess the chances of a world war breaking out in the next ten years?"<sup>2</sup>*

Despite what might have been expected from reading the newspapers, fear of a world war in most Community countries where the comparison can be made is at a lower level than in April 1980 - the only exceptions are Germany and Luxembourg. However, this fear was greater everywhere in autumn 1981 than in autumn 1977 and therefore also greater than in 1971.

It is assumed that those people giving a definite reply who estimate the risk of a world war at greater than one in two (i.e. those who choose a figure on the scale greater than 50) consider that war is probable",<sup>3</sup> The percentage of the Community population replying in this way rose from 12% in 1971 to 34% in 1980 and then fell again to 24% in this survey.

(See Table 5 and, for further details, Table A3 in the Appendix.)

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1 This question was not asked in Denmark in 1981.

2 Scale graduated in tens: 100 means war certain, 0 means no danger.

3 This is a logical assumption and appears to correspond increasingly well with reality, as can be seen by comparing results of surveys carried out in the same country at the same time which ask the same question using different words.

Table 5

THOSE WHO CONSIDER A WORLD WAR "PROBABLE" WITHIN THE NEXT TEN YEARS'

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>2</sup>
July 1971	8%	.	11%	12%		13%	7%	11%			12%
Oct. - Nov. 1977	21	10%	13	14	14%	14	11	17	13%		14
April 1980	33	18	25	42	31	32	15	24	39	.	34
October 1981	32		32	25	28	18	27	20	21	0%	24

- 1 Probability greater than 50%; .percentage of people giving a definite reply.
- 2 Community of Six in 1971 and of Nine in 1977 and 1980. This question was not asked in Denmark in 1981.

1.3. SATISFACTION OR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS

The first two questions dealt with evaluations of the immediate situation but the next two deal more directly with socio-political attitudes from two closely-related but distinct points of view: the sense of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the way the system works and the fundamental choice about changing society.

Experience and analyses of previous surveys have shown that these attitudes are very stable, though not constant, and that they are fairly similar in all the Member States, though their distribution and intensity may vary quite sharply in certain circumstances. In other words, they reflect both the deeply entrenched national political culture and individual or collective reactions to events.

Because they have both aspects, continuous comparison of these attitudes is a necessary, though not of course a condition for understanding the psychological and political context in which other attitudes, e.g. to Europe, the European Community, the European Parliament and the election of its members, are being moulded and changed.

*"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)?"*

The overall impression from the ten surveys carried out over the last eight years is one of stability, both in the Community as a whole and in most of the individual countries.

(See Table 6 and, for more details, Table A4.)

In general there is more satisfaction than dissatisfaction. The only exception, and this is true throughout the period considered here, is Italy, where almost eight people in ten say they are "dissatisfied" with the way democracy works.

With the exception of autumn 1973, satisfaction predominates by a wide margin in Germany, where more than seven people in ten are "satisfied".

Satisfaction is also predominant in Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and Greece (for which comparisons can be made with only two previous surveys). In the case of the United Kingdom, however, there has been a sharp drop in satisfaction since 1978.

In Belgium, which in autumn 1973 had 62% "satisfied" as compared with 32% "dissatisfied", dissatisfaction has prevailed for a year or so.

In France, where satisfaction and dissatisfaction were almost balanced until autumn 1980, with one view prevailing over the other by a few points depending on circumstances, there has been a sharp change:

	<u>France</u>	
	<u>Satisfied</u>	<u>Dissatisfied</u>
October 1980	36%	53%
October 1981	53	34

This is a good example of what this indicator reveals: deeply entrenched attitudes to the way the political system works and the rationalization, to a greater or lesser extent, of feelings towards or judgments on the government in power, parties and political behaviour, etc.

These are not greatly affected by socio-demographic variables (sex, age) or by socio-cultural variables (education, leadership). There is, on the other hand, a strong connection with the political ideologies of the person being interviewed and the government of the day. In certain circumstances, we should therefore expect to see sharp and thorough-going changes in these attitudes. France provides a particularly

Table 6

SATISFACTION OR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS:

CHANGES FROM 1973 to 1981<sup>1</sup>

	1973 (September)		1978 (April-May)		1981 (October)		Average 1973-81 (ten surveys)	
	Satis- fied	Dissat- isfied	Satis- fied	Dissat- isfied	Satis- fied	Dissat- isfied	Satis- fied	Dissat- isfied
Deutschland	44%	55%	76%	19%	71%	23%	74%	22%
Luxembourg	52	37	67	26	75	22	66	27
Danmark	45	53	67	28	68	28	62	33
Nederland	52	38	69	27	59	36	61	35
Ireland	55	43	71	22	58	32	59	34
United Kingdom (2)	44	54	62	31	48	43	53	40
Belgique/België	62	32	56	31	35	49	48	37
El las					52	41	53(3)	43(3)
France	41	46	49	40	53	34	44	45
Italia	27	72	25	72	19	78	19	78
COMMUNITY	48	46	55	39	49	43	50	43

1 In this table, "satisfied" is the total of "very satisfied" and "fairly satisfied" replies and "dissatisfied" is the total of "not very satisfied" and "not at all satisfied" replies. Countries are listed in descending order of the difference between "satisfied" and "dissatisfied" calculated on the average of the ten surveys (1973-1981).

2 Great Britain only, in 1973.

3 Average of October 1980 and October 1981.

4 Weighted average.

striking example. Between October 1980 and October 1981, those who placed themselves on the left and the extreme left moved from a high degree of dissatisfaction to a high degree of satisfaction while those on the right moved in the opposite direction. These changes were, however, more marked in the first instance than the second and the satisfaction of those in the centre of the political spectrum and those who did not place themselves at all also increased - hence the growth in satisfaction in the population as a whole.

(See Table 7.)

Table 7

**SATISFACTION OR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS**  
BY POSITION ON THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM:  
CHANGES IN FRANCE 1980-1981<sup>2</sup>

	Far Left (1-2)	Left (3-4)	Centre (5-6)	Right (7-8)	Far Right (9-10)	Refusals	Overall
<u>October 1980</u>							
Satisfied			44%	60%	57%	31%	36%
Dissatisfied			46	32	43	40	53
	(n= 86)	(n=227)	(n=344)	(n=112)	(n= 30)	(n=186)	(N=986)
<u>October 1981</u>							
Satisfied	65%	67%	52%	46%	32%	34%	53%
Dissatisfied	27	23	36	43	65	32	34
	(n=109)	(n=242)	(n=369)	(n=134)	(n= 31)	(n=121)	(N=1006)

- 1 As can be seen from Table 6 above, these feelings last for varying lengths of time.
- 2 Position on the left/right scale is determined by the person interviewed who places himself on a scale graduated from 1 (Left) to 10 (Right). In 1980 almost 20% of those interviewed in France refused to place themselves but in 1981 this figure fell to only 12%.

The figures in brackets are the basis used for calculating the percentages.

1.4. BASIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIETY

*"(Showcard); On this card there are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-à-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion;*

- 1. The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action.*
- 2. Our society must be gradually improved by reforms.*
- 3. Our present society must be valiently defended against all subversive forces."*

As in the previous case, the importance of this question lies in comparisons between one country and another, between different social or political groups in the same country or between different countries.

Previous studies have shown that the "revolutionary" option contrasts very sharply with the other two and that, of these, the "reformist" option expresses greater confidence in the functioning of institutions and the future of society than the "defence against subversive forces."

Consideration of the replies over a long period - more than ten years in the case of some countries - shows a stable pattern in most countries. Changes are slow because these questions deal with value systems rather than attitudes or opinions as such.

Among those who selected one of the three options,<sup>1</sup> the reformist option was the most popular everywhere, regaining the lead in Germany where, as we have noted, "defence against subversive forces" was the most popular choice in 1977-78 and again in April 1981. On this occasion, this option was selected by one in four of those interviewed in Germany and Denmark.

Only a small minority selected the revolutionary option, which lost ground in France and Italy though it gained support in Belgium and the United Kingdom. The 10% threshold, whose importance should not be overestimated but which forms a useful marker, was reached in both these countries and Greece was not far behind.

(See Table 8 and, for more details, Table A5 in the Appendix.)

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<sup>1</sup> An average of 92%.

Table 8

## BASIC ATTITUDES TO SOCIETY

(Percentage of those selecting one of the three options)<sup>1</sup>

	1970 (February–March) <sup>2</sup>			1976 (November)			1977–1979 (six surveys) <sup>3</sup>			1981 (October)		
	Revolu- tionary action	Reform	Defence against subver- sion	Revolu- tionary action	Reform	Defence against subver- sion	Revolu- tionary action	Reform	Defence against subver- sion	Revolu- tionary action	Reform	Defence against subver- sion
Belgique/België	4%	80%	16%	6%	73%	21%	6%	72%	22%	10%	70%	20%
Danmark				4	55	41	3	59	38	2	58	40
Deutschland	2	76	22	2	56	42	2	49	49	5	55	40
France	5	82	13	14	67	19	11	70	19	5	67	28
Ireland				8	67	25	7	67	26	4	65	31
Italia	8	80	12	13	68	19	9	63	28	6	64	30
Luxembourg	1	70	29	2	59	39	4	68	28	5	70	25
Nederland	6	78	16	5	60	35	5	62	33	6	58	36
United Kingdom				8	65	27	7	64	29	10	62	28
Ellas							10	60	30	9	66	25
COMMUNITY <sup>4</sup>	(5)	(79)	(16)	8	64	28	7	61	32	7	62	31

1 "Don't knows" in all countries throughout the period averaged 7%, with a maximum of 15% in Belgium.

2 The 1970 survey covered only the six countries which were then members. The wording of the "reformist" option was also slightly different ("by intelligent reforms").

3 Average of two surveys only for Greece (October 1980 and April 1981).

4 Weighted average.

As previous studies have already shown, there is a direct correlation between preference for one or other of these choices, especially for the "revolutionary" option which is the most sharply differentiated from the others, on the one hand and satisfaction or dissatisfaction and the ideology of the person interviewed on the other.

In Euro-barometre No. 15 (page 10), we demonstrated a correlation between the "revolutionary" option and dissatisfaction with life; the correlation with dissatisfaction with the way democracy works is considerably stronger. In other words, satisfaction with the life they lead is manifested by many - 60% - of those who choose the "revolutionary" option which fewer such people are "satisfied" with the way democracy works in their country.

(See Table 9.)

Table 9

THE "REVOLUTIONARY" OPTION RELATED TO DISSATISFACTION WITH LIFE'

(Community as a whole)

	Percentage choosing "revolutionary" option	
	Satisfaction with life (April 1981)	Satisfaction with the way democracy works (October 1981)
	%	%
Very satisfied	15	6
Fairly satisfied	45	30
Not very satisfied		32
Not at all satisfied	16	32
	60	36
	40	64
Total <sup>2</sup>	100	100
Base	500	566

1 Since the two questions on satisfaction are not asked in every Euro-barometre, the results given here were collected at an interval of six months. This makes virtually no difference to the value of the comparison.

2 "Don't knows" excluded.



The correlation between the "revolutionary" attitude and placing on the left/right scale is no less interesting and appears to vary between countries. While in France and Italy the "revolutionaries" are where we would expect to find them, on the left and extreme left of the political spectrum, many of them in other countries put themselves in the centre of the scale or refuse to commit themselves: the figures are 50% in Luxembourg, 47% in Belgium, 43% in the United Kingdom and Ireland and 42% in Germany. Proportionately, there are more "revolutionaries" in Germany on the extreme right than on the extreme left.

This point deserves closer study, but the evidence so far suggests that potential for discontent exists to different degrees and in different forms in most of the Member States. It is not, however, the product of any one extremist ideology and even, in some cases, may be linked to a degree of alienation from politics or lack of interest.<sup>1</sup>

Table 10

THE "REVOLUTIONARY" OPTION AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY<sup>2</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	10 <sup>3</sup>
Percentage of those in each country identifying themselves as 'revolutionaries'	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Far left	15	(37)	1	47	21	43	(17)	24	17	29	29
Left	15	(13)	27	24	13	21	(17)	25	17	26	21
Centre	24	(13)	31	13	30	12	(42)	23	37	18	23
Right	9	(.)	18	1	15	3	(12)	10	17	4	9
Extreme right	13	(7)	12	3	8	9	(4)	5	6	8	7
Don't know	23	(20)	11	12	13	12	(8)	13	6	15	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base	131	(39)	70	139	103	129	(41)	132	255	178	301

- 1 It remains to be seen, of course, whether the words "radically changed" and "revolutionary action" convey the same meaning in every country.
- 2 Because of the small proportion of those interviewed who chose the "revolutionary" option, this analysis is based on the combined results of the April and October 1981 surveys. Nevertheless, the results for Denmark and Luxembourg must be treated with caution.
- 3 Weighted average.

CHAPTER II

AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT

ON THE MAIN SOCIO-POLITICAL . . . BI

## II

### AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT

#### ON THE MAIN SOCIO-POLITICAL PROBLEMS

At the time of the first direct elections to the European Parliament, in 1979, research was carried out into the political cleavages in the countries of the Community under the general heading of "European Elections Study".<sup>1</sup> This research covered both election candidates and the general public; the *same* set of questions was put to representatives of the political elites and of the electorate in the nine Member States.

Analysis of the replies showed the political cleavages to be fairly similar in each of the Member States and confirmed earlier findings, according to which there are two main divisions underlying the political attitudes and debates in all the countries of the Community: one of these, the particularly important traditional division, is between those for and against a greater role of government in the economy and a reduction in the inequality of incomes, and the other, of more recent origin and still of much less significance, divides the supporters and the opponents of an ideal society, free of the constraints which weigh on the society of today and hamper the spontaneous expression of individual wishes (centralized organization, all kinds of controls, etc.).<sup>2</sup>

To obtain a better picture of the socio-political background to attitudes to the European Community in each country, the questions in the 1979 survey which the analysis showed to be the most meaningful were repeated in October 1981.

In the following, the text of the questions is given together with a comparison of the results for 1979 (candidates for election to the European Parliament and the general public) and for 1981 (general public) and an initial analysis of the 1981 results.

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1 The general coordinator of research was Dr. Karlheinz Reif of the Institut für Sozialwissenschaften and the Europa-Institut of the University of Mannheim. Financial assistance was provided by the Community institutions and the Volkswagenwerk Stiftung.

2 This research will be published subsequently under the scientific responsibility of their respective authors. This is not the place to expand on, justify or criticize the first results to come out.

*"We'd like to hear your views on some important political issues; Could you tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following proposals; How strongly do you feel?" (SHOW CARD)*

The questionnaire then gave a list of nine items, eight of which reproduced the exact words of one of the thirteen items used in 1979, with one new item.<sup>1</sup>

An initial look at the overall results shows few changes in the distribution of answers from the general public in 1979 and 1981. In both years, moreover, the answers from the general public were fairly similar to those of the "political elite" formed by the European election candidates.<sup>2</sup> The only notable differences, apart from the fact that the candidates are more prepared to commit themselves in most cases, are as follows:

- 1 The exact wording of these items can be seen in Table 11. The weighting and polarity of these items for the two divisions as shown by factor analysis can be illustrated schematically as follows"

	<u>Traditional cleavage</u>	<u>New cleavage</u>
- Reducing inequality of income	++	+
- Developing nuclear energy		--
- More severe penalties for acts of terrorism		--
- Expanding public ownership	++	
- A stronger effort to provide military defence		---
- A greater role of government in the economy	++	
- More economic aid to the Third World	++	
- Firmer measures for protecting the environment	++	

- 2 For making these comparisons and for the following analyses, each answer to a specific item was expressed by an index of the type strongly = 4, "disagree strongly" = 1; the middle point is therefore 2.5.

The following are the correlations for the Community as a whole:

- candidates 1979/public 1979	0.596
- candidates 1979/public 1981	0.666
- public 1979/public 1981	0.992

- the candidates (1979) were much more favourably disposed towards increasing economic aid to the Third World than the respondents among the general public were (1979) or are (1981) ;
- the general public was (1979) and still is (1981) significantly more strongly in favour of adopting more severe penalties for acts of terrorism than the candidates (1979);
- to a lesser extent, the public tends to be more clearly in favour of State intervention in the economy than the candidates.

In each of these cases there seems to be a difference of rationale between the population and the "political elites". There can be no doubt that the latter recognize the economic and political benefits of increased aid to relatively underdeveloped countries better than the population; in the same way, when confronted by a phenomenon like terrorism the political elites are less inclined to panic and want emergency action.<sup>1</sup>

The detailed results for the Community as a whole are given in Table 11 below.

This table brings together a number of countries which do, admittedly, have many features in common but also some historical and cultural characteristics of their own. We will not go into too much detail here, but will confine ourselves to noting the main differences.<sup>2</sup>

---

1 With regard to government's role in the economy, the difference between the candidates' answers and those of the general public is greater in 1981 than it was in 1979. A plausible explanation for this still remains to be discovered and proved empirically. It may perhaps be a result of the increase in unemployment.

2 For the details, see Table A6 in the Appendix.

Table 11

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CLEAVAGES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

(Community as a whole)<sup>1</sup>

	1979 Election candidates %	1979 General public %	1981 General public <sup>3</sup> %
1. <u>Traditional cleavage</u>			
1.1. <i>"The Government should play a greater role in the management of the economy"</i>			
Agree strongly	17	21	26
Agree	26	34	36
Disagree	29	17	15
Disagree strongly	17	11	10
Don't know	11	17	13
Total	100	100	100
Index <sup>4</sup>	2.46	2.79	2.89
1.2. <i>"Greater effort should be made to reduce inequality of income",</i>			
Agree strongly	52	46	41
Agree	30	35	36
Disagree	8	10	12
Disagree strongly	2	4	5
Don't know	8	5	6
Total	100	100	100
Index	3.45	3.28	3.20
1.3. <i>"Public ownership of private industry should be expanded"</i>			
Agree strongly	12	14	14
Agree	16	21	21
Disagree	26	23	22
Disagree strongly	36	25	26
Don't know	10	17	17
Total	100	100	100
Index	2.05	2.28	2.30

Table 11 (continued)

	1979 Election candidates <sup>2</sup>	1979 General public	1980 General public <sup>3</sup>
1. <u>Traditional cleavage</u>			
1.4. <i>"Economic aid to Third world countries should be increased"</i>	%	%	%
Agree strongly	50	20	23
Agree	39	30	33
Disagree	4	22	21
Disagree strongly	1	13	14
Don't know	6	15	9
Total	100	100	100
Index	3.47	2.67	2.71
I. 5. <i>"Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment against pollution"</i>			
Agree strongly	61	63	60
Agree	35	30	33
Disagree	1	3	3
Disagree strongly		1	1
Don't know	3	3	3
Total	100	100	100
Index	3.61	3.60	3.57
2 <u>New cleavage</u>			
2.1. <i>"Western Europe should make a stronger effort to provide adequate military defence"</i>			
Agree strongly	23	15	18
Agree	30	31	35
Disagree	18	20	18
Disagree strongly	13	15	13
Don't know	16	19	16
Total	100	100	100
Index	2.76	2.57	2.69

Table 11 (continued)

	1979 Election candidates <sup>2</sup>	1979 General public	1980 General public
<b>2.2. "Nuclear energy should be developed to meet future energy needs"</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
Agree strongly	25	20	24
Agree	37	32	34
Disagree	14	17	16
Disagree strongly	8	18	15
Don't know	16	13	11
Total	100	100	100
Index	2.93	2.62	2.76
<b>2.3. "More severe penalties should be introduced for acts of terrorism"</b>			
Agree strongly	30	69	65
Agree	33	19	21
Disagree	14	5	6
Disagree strongly	6	3	3
Don't know	17	4	5
Total	100	100	100
Index	3.04	3.59	3.56
<b>3. <u>New item</u><sup>5</sup> "Regions of our country should be given more freedom to handle their own affairs"</b>			
Agree strongly	:	:	29
Agree	:	:	37
Disagree	:	:	13
Disagree strongly	:	:	7
Don't know	:	:	14
Total	:	:	100
Index	:	:	3.02

1 The items are classified here in order of weighting in the division to which they primarily belong.

2, 3, 4, 5 See following page.



The differences in the answers between countries are fairly slight, but rather more substantial among the 1979 candidates than among the general public. This is easy to explain since the candidates are probably more aware of the problems and have formed more definite opinions.

The differences vary according to the problem.

In 1979, the divergence of the answers from the candidates or the general public between the nine countries was greatest with regard to the strengthening of military defence and the government's role in the economy:

- most in favour of a greater defence effort were the British and least in favour were the Danes;
- the Belgians were the most in favour of government intervention in the economy, and those least in favour were Luxembourg's European Parliament candidates and the Danish general public.

In 1981, the structure has changed slightly:

- the maximum divergence is seen to be in the extension of public ownership, with Greece at one end of the scale (69% for and 14% against) and Denmark at the other (17% versus 67%);
- next comes government intervention, as in 1979, with Greece once again contrasting with Denmark;
- defence is least divisive than it was in 1979, has increased in support in several countries (notably France) and seems to be clearly more favoured by the general public in Greece than in other Member States.

---

2 Sample survey of 742 candidates for election to the European Parliament, of whom 256 were elected, making **62%** of the 410 members in the Assembly at the time. The results were weighted according to the strengths of the different national political parties at Strasbourg. The questions put to the candidates were the same **as** those put to the general public; there was only a slight change in the range of possibilities for reply, since in the questionnaire for the candidates there was the possibility of "neither one nor the other", which counted as "don't know" here. For more details on this survey, see: Ronald Inglehart, Jacques-René Rabier, Ian Gordon and Carsten Lehman Sørensen, "Broader Powers for the European Parliament? The Attitudes of Candidates", (1980) 8 European Journal of Political Research, pp. 113-132.

3 Including Greece,

4 Calculated on the basis "agree strongly" = 4, "disagree strongly" = 1, "don't know" being discounted.

5 This item was not included in the 1979 questionnaire. Its relationship with one of the other of the two divisions will be examined later.

Graph 1 shows how the general public in the Member States stand with regard to the problems corresponding to what we have termed the traditional cleavage. Graph 2 has the same structure but deals with the problems corresponding to the new cleavage and with the freedom of the regions.<sup>1</sup>

Analyses according to socio-demographic or socio-cultural category do not reveal many significant variations. In particular it is seen that men and women reply in much the same way. These analyses do, however, confirm the observations made at the beginning of this chapter:

1. The younger generations are more in favour than their elders of increasing aid to the Third World; they are, moreover, sensitive to the problems corresponding to what we have called the new cleavage and more frequently declare themselves to be opposed to strengthening military defence, developing nuclear energy and enforcing stricter penalties against terrorists.

(See Table 12.)

2. The opinion leaders are substantially more in favour of increasing Third World aid than the non-leaders and less in favour of severer penalties for terrorists.

(See Table 13.)

As might be expected, however, the strongest correlations are evident in the left/right division, particularly as regards:

- increasing aid to the Third World, reducing inequality of income and protecting the environment, where the left is more favourable than the right;
- developing nuclear energy, applying stricter penalties against terrorists and strengthening military defence, where the right is more favourable than the left.

Curiously enough, in the Community as a whole State intervention in the economy and the nationalization of industry are less closely correlated with the left/right division: this indicates that the left, and perhaps the right as well, is more divided on this problem, from one country to another, than on the others. The same applies to the question of more freedom for the **regions**.<sup>2</sup>

(See graphs 3 and 5.)


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1 To simplify the presentation of the results, the survey of candidates has been left out. The agree/disagree index has been calculated on the basis "agree strongly" = 4, "disagree strongly" = 1. For more details see Table A6 in the Appendix.

2 All these analyses will be continued at individual country level.

Graphique n° 1 / Graph 1

LE CLIVAGE TRADITIONNEL / THE TRADITIONAL CLEAVAGE



Graphique n° 2 / Graph 2'

LE NOUVEAU CLIVAGE / THE NEW CLEAVAGE




Table 12  
ATTITUDES BY AGE  
(Community as a whole)

	15-24	25-39	40-54	55 and over	All
	%	%	%	%	%
More economic aid to the Third World					
Agree	66	58	53	50	56
Disagree	27	35	38	39	35
Index <sup>1</sup>	2.93	2.75	2.62	2.62	2.71
Greater efforts to provide military defence					
Agree	46	53	53	56	53
Disagree	39	33	31	24	31
Index	2.55	2.63	2.71	2.84	2.69
Developing nuclear energy					
Agree	48	58	61	61	58
Disagree	41	33	28	24	31
Index	2.53	2.71	2.81	2.89	2.76
More severe penalties for acts of errorism					
Agree	81	86	88	90	86
Disagree	14	11	7	4	9
Index	3.37	3.49	3.59	3.71	3.56

Table 13  
ATTITUDES BY LEADERSHIP RATING<sup>1</sup>  
(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders		Leaders		All
	L--	L-	L+	L++	
	%	%	%	%	%
More economic aid to the Third World					
Agree	47	56	59	70	56
Disagree	38	36	35	26	36
Index	2.59	2.69	2.75	2.97	2.71
More severe penalties for acts of terrorism					
Agree	89	90	86	74	86
Disagree	4	6	10	22	9
Index	3.68	3.62	3.51	3.23	3.56

- 1 The leadership index is produced by combining the answers to two questions which appear in all Euro-barometres: one on frequency of political discussions and the other on tendency to try to persuade others, as estimated by the respondent.

In this survey, the breakdown by leadership rating was as follows for the Community as a whole:


Non-leaders		Leaders		Total
L--	L-	L+	L++	
27%	34%	28%	11%	100%

For further details on the construction of the index see Euro-barometre No. 5 (July 1976), pp.1 and 2.

Graphique n° 3 / Graph 3

LA GAUCHE PLUS FAVORABLE QUE LA DROITE /


THE LEFT MORE FAVOURABLE THAN THE RIGHT



Graphique n° 4 / Graph 4

LA GAUCHE MOINS FAVORABLE QUE LA DROITE /

THE LEFT LESS FAVOURABLE THAN THE RIGHT






Graphique n° 5 / Graph 5

LA GAUCHE ET LA DROITE DIVISEES /

THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT DIVIDED



CHAPTER III

ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE  
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

### III

#### ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The six questions contained in this section of the autumn 1981 survey were designed to throw light on:

- general attitude towards efforts being made to unify western Europe;
- public opinion on the trend in relations between the countries of western Europe over the last twenty-five years;
- public opinion on the recent trend in understanding between Community countries;
- prospects for Community development over the next ten years;
- views on and commitment to Community membership.

#### III.1, FOR OR AGAINST WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

*"In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify western Europe? If for, are you very much for this, or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent against, or very much against?"*

This question has been asked at frequent intervals in most of the Community countries and is now a Euro-barometre regular. It is designed to measure a sentiment as vague as it is diffuse, a sort of "reservoir or goodwill"; the level varies from country to country but remains relatively stable, despite being subject to long-term evolution and short-term fluctuation.<sup>1</sup>

Table 14 shows that the results for October 1981 are very close to 1975-80 average, i.e. up on September 1973, except in Germany and Denmark.

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1 See Euro-barometre No. 14, December 1980, p. 16, with particular reference to the quotation from the American political scientist, David Easton, on the concept of "diffuse support".

Nor has the drop in the number of positive replies recorded in the spring of 1981 persisted; in most countries this trend has even gone into reverse with a return to the previous level of support.

This would ~~seem~~ to indicate that the present climate has little impact on the general attitude in favour of European unification.

The actual level of support, which varies from country to country, is significantly higher in the six original member countries.

(See Table 14 and Table A7 in the Appendix.)

Neither sex nor age has a significant bearing on general support for unification. Even position on the political spectrum is fairly irrelevant except in a minority of countries (Greece, Denmark).<sup>1</sup> The most valuable indicator is still leadership rating: the most highly mobilized section of the population, who also tend to have had an above-average education, to read newspapers and to be interested in politics, are more inclined to support unification. However, the link between support for European unification and leadership rating is showing signs of weakening, as the pro-European trend, on the decline among opinion leaders, gradually affects a larger cross-section of the public.

(See Table 15.)

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<sup>1</sup> In both countries those on the right of the political spectrum tend more often than not to be in favour.

TABLE 14  
SUPPORT FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION  
1970 TO 1981<sup>1</sup>

	1970 (February–March) <sup>2</sup>		1973 (September)		1975–1980 (seven polls) <sup>3</sup>		1981 (April)		1981 (October)	
	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against
Belgique/België	66%	5%	60%	5%	65%	6%	60%	9%	69%	8%
Danmark			45	32	45	34	46	34	43	39
Deutschland	76	5	78	6	79	6	70	13	75	12
France	70	8	68	4	75	8	73	11	79	8
Ireland			52	12	62	13	59	23	62	16
Italia	78	5	70	3	82	5	82	11	82	7
Luxembourg	76	4	80	1	84	8	87	7	83	14
Nederland	74	10	73	15	76	10	80	13	74	17
United Kingdom <sup>4</sup>			37	30	58	21	52	29	64	21
Ellas	,				59	23	60	25	65	16
COMMUNITY <sup>5</sup>	(74)	(6)	63	11	73	11	69	16	74	13

1 "For" includes the total percentage of favourable replies ("very much for" and "to some extent for") and "against" the total percentage of unfavourable replies ("to some extent against" and "very much against"). Don't knows are not included.

2 The 1970 survey was conducted only in the six countries which were then Community members.

3 Average of seven polls conducted between May 1975 and October 1980; one poll only in Greece (October 1980).

4 Great Britain only in 1973.

5 Weighted average.

Table 15  
SUPPORT FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION  
RELATED TO LEADERSHIP RATING  
(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders		Leaders		Total
	L--	L-	L+	L++	
<u>September 1973</u>	%	%	%	%	%
Very much for	22 } 40	25 } 62	38 } 76	28 } 80	30 } 63
To some extent for	28 } 35	37 } 26	38 } 17	7 } 11	33 } 24
To some extent against	7 } 25	19 } 12	11 } 7	4 } 9	17 } 13
Very much against					
Don't know					
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Index	2.58	2.90	3.17	3.41	3.00
Base	3386	4251	3968	1549	13154
<u>October 1981</u>					
Very much for	22 } 61	28 } 75	37 } 80	44 } 84	31 } 74
To some extent for	39 } 13	47 } 13	43 } 13	40 } 13	43 } 13
To some extent against	10 } 26	10 } 12	9 } 7	7 } 3	9 } 13
Very much against	3 } 3	3 } 3	4 } 4	6 } 6	4 } 4
Don't know					
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Index	3.06	3.15	3.21	3.26	3.16
Base	2607	3288	2706	1095	9696

1 "Very much for" = 4; "very much against" = 1. Don't knows are discounted.

## III. 2. TREND IN RELATIONS BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OVER THE LAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

As we have seen above, on average three in every four Europeans (74%) - and the majority of those interviewed in each member country - came out in favour of the unification of western Europe. The European movement can be traced back to the fifties and gained much of its momentum in March 1957 with the signing of the Treaties of Rome. Hence the decision to investigate whether and to what extent Community citizens are aware of the radical change in relations between the countries and peoples of western Europe triggered off a quarter of a century ago.<sup>1</sup>

It was with this in mind that the following question was asked:

*"Compared with twenty-five years ago, that is to say the fifties, do you think that the relations of (your country) and (your people) with the other countries of western Europe are, generally speaking, better or worse nowadays?"*

Approximately six in every ten interviewed (63%) felt that their country's relations with the rest of western Europe were better than twenty-five years ago and two in every ten (19%) felt that they were worse; the remainder fell into the "don't know" category.

Positive reactions predominated most in Greece, the newest member country, and in Luxembourg, Germany and Ireland. The most sceptical of the Ten is the United Kingdom: 47% feel that relations are better and 34% worse. But Belgium is not far behind: 44% better as against 28% worse and 28% don't know.

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1 "... Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared". (Preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community.)

	Positive reaction	Negative reaction	Difference
Ellas	75%	6%	69
Luxembourg	80	12	68
Deutschland	76	10	66
Ireland	70	12	58
France	64	15	49
Italia	66	19	47
Nederland	64	20	44
Danmark	53	15	38
Belgique/België	44	28	16
United Kingdom	47	34	13

(See Table 16 for more details.)

Table 16

RELATIONS BETWEEN OWN COUNTRY AND OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS ON

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EG <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Feel that relations are :											
- much better	14	14	33	21	41	25	36	21	16	48	24
- a little better	30	39	43	43	29	41	44	43	31	27	39
- a little worse	19	13	8	12	6	14	9	15	21	3	13
- much worse	9	2	2	3	6	5	3	5	13	3	6
don't know	28	32	14	21	18	15	8	16	19	19	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

1 Weighted average.



Contrary to what might have been expected there is no link between views on the development of relations between the countries of western Europe since a generation ago and the age of the person expressing them. But there is a significant correlation with leadership rating in Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Italy. This is less marked in the other countries. In Greece the link is a negative one, in that more non-leaders than leaders feel there has been an improvement.

The above analyses would seem to indicate that views on the trend in European relations are conditioned by attitudes towards European unification. This hypothesis has been borne out. However, also interesting is the fact that, even among opponents of unification, slightly over a half of those who replied felt that relations had improved.

(See Table 17.)

Table 17

VIEWS ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE

RELATED TO ATTITUDE TOWARD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

(Community as a whole)

	Attitude towards the unification of Western Europe			
	Very much for	To some extent for	To some extent against	Very much against
	%	%	%	%
Feel that relations are:				
- much better	41	20	13	13
- a little better	35	46	39	32
- a little worse	10	14	24	20
- much worse	4	5	8	21
don't know	10	15	16	14
Total	100	100	100	100

111.3. RECENT TREND IN UNDERSTANDING  
BETWEEN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES

The previous question dealt with developments since the fifties; this question, which has already been asked a number of times, deals with a shorter-term trend:

*"In your opinion, over the last twelve months, has the understanding between the countries of the European Community (Common Market) in general increased, decreased or stayed about the same?"<sup>1</sup>*

As we saw in earlier Euro-barometres, the answers to this question shed light on the general climate of opinion on European affairs; they are largely conditioned by the economic ups-and-downs and to a great extent reflect the information broadcast by the mass media (only more frequent polls could show just how much).

The trend measured on four occasions since autumn 1977 is adverse: if we exclude the don't knows, those who felt that there had been an increase in understanding were in a clear majority in 1977 and 1978; the reverse is true of 1981. However, the results for October were marginally less gloomy than for April, mainly as a result of opinion in Germany, where the positive view once again predominates, the United Kingdom, where the negative view is on the decline, and Ireland, where there is also evidence of progress.

(For more details see Table A8 in the Appendix.)

As in the case of all the questions on the European Community, it is particularly interesting to analyse the replies given by opinion leaders for the simple reason that they tend to hold definite views in one direction or another more frequently than non-leaders.

In this connection comparison of replies given in April and October 1981 for the Community as a whole shows that the predominance of the negative view over the positive view is still slightly more marked among the most highly mobilized opinion leaders; it would seem that the slight recovery referred to above applies more to the middle bracket, i.e. the 60% or so of interviewees between the most highly mobilized (L++) and the least highly mobilized (L-).

This trend should be carefully monitored over the next few years and analysed on a country-by-country basis as new information comes to light, particularly with an eye to the European elections in 1984.

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1 There was a slight difference in the wording used in 1978, but this does not seem to have affected the results. See Euro-barometre No. 15, June 1981, pp. 24 and 25.

Table 18

IG BETWEEN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES  
INCREASE OR DECREASE OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS

	April 1981			October 1981		
	Positive	Negative	Difference	Positive	Negative	Difference
Greece	23%	9%	14	28%	11%	17
Ireland	23	22	1	26	14	12
Germany	17	36	-19	28	21	7
France	16	20	- 4	16	20	- 4
Italy	19	24	- 5	21	26	- 5
Luxembourg	19	26	- 7	23	31	- 8
United Kingdom	11	51	-40	15	34	-19
Belgium/België	10	31	-20	11	31	-20
Denmark	11	35	-24	9	36	-27
COMMUNITY	15	33	-18	19	26	- 7

Table 19

BY LEADERSHIP RATING  
OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS  
BY LEADERSHIP RATING

	Non-leaders		Leaders		All
	L--	L-	L+	L++	
<u>April 1981</u>					
Positive	11%	16%	17%	20%	15%
Negative	24	31	37	41	33
Difference	-13	-15	-20	-21	-18
<u>October 1981</u>					
Positive	16%	20%	20%	25%	19%
Negative	21	24	27	35	26
Difference	- 5	- 4	- 7	-10	- 7

1 "About the same" and "don't know" are not included.

111.4. PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT  
OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS

A study on the future of the European Community was published last June by the European Research Centre of a leading international organization.<sup>1</sup> After analysing a large number of factors affecting the economic, social and technological scene the authors came up with three positive theories: (i) "continued cooperation", or a continuation of the current trend; (ii) "weaker solidarity", or a revival of national ideologies; (iii) "convergence of interests", or a revival of the European ideal and the emergence of a united Europe.

The conclusion was that the first theory, that of "continued cooperation", was the most realistic.

We decided to put the three hypotheses to the interviewees and included the following question in the autumn poll.

*"Here are three ways in which the European Community (the Common Market) might develop in the course of the next ten years; (SHOW CARD,) Can you tell me which of these is the most likely to happen? (ONE RESPONSE ONLY.)*

- 1. The ties between the member countries of the Community will get weaker because in these times of great difficulties each country will be thinking above all of its own interests.*
- 2. Cooperation between the countries belonging to the Community will carry on more or less as it is now;*
- 3. The ties between the member countries of the Community will get stronger because in these times of great difficulties the member countries will become more and more aware that they cannot solve their problems on their own."*

As normally happens with this type of question the "neutral" reply, i.e. in this case "carry on as it is now", was the most common among those who actually replied<sup>2</sup> 1 but only just: the positive answer, "links will get stronger", came a very close second. The positive reply was the most popular of the three in Italy and the Netherlands; it also outnumbered the negative reply in France, Luxembourg, Ireland, and Greece and - though only just - in Germany. By contrast, more than a third of the British and the Danish are of the opinion that the ties between Community members will get weaker over the next ten years.

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1 François Escher and Sophie Valticos, The European Community in the 1980s (Battelle Centre for Applied Economics, Geneva). See Agence Europe daily press release, No. 3159, 17 June 1981, p. 4.

2 The percentage of don't knows is relatively low: 12% on average but rising to 23% in Greece and 19% in Belgium.

The countries can be listed by average score and by frequency of the most common reply (don't knows are not included).

(See Table 20 and, for more details, Table 21.)

Table 20

MOST LIKELY PROSPECT FOR THE COMMUNITY  
OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS'

Ties will get weaker	Cooperation will carry on <b>as</b> it is now	Ties will get stronger
		Italia (2.21)
	France (2.15)	
	Luxembourg (2.11)	
	Ireland (2.09)	
	Ellas (2.06)	Nederland (2.06)
	Deutschland (2.02);	
	Belgique/ België (1.97)	
United Kingdom (1.91)		
Danmark (1.80)		

---

1 Scores are calculated as follows: "get weaker" = 1, "carry on as now" = 2, "get stronger" = 3. Column entries are based on the most common reply in the country concerned.

Table 21  
PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT  
OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Ties will get weaker	26	36	20	20	21	20	24	29	35	20	25
Cooperation will carry on as it is now	31	29	42	36	37	29	38	33	27	32	33
Ties will get stronger	24	19	22	34	30	39	36	36	27	25	30
Don't know	19	16	16	10	12	12	2	2	11	23	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

As was to be expected, the replies to this question are in direct correlation with leadership rating and general attitude towards European unification. But the nature and strength of the links vary substantially; it will be worth studying how they interrelate in each country at a later date.

Leadership rating mainly affects selection of a position, i.e., actual commitment to one of the three hypotheses. Opinion leaders tended to opt for the neutral reply ("carry on as it is now") slightly less often than non-leaders but there was no sign of a more marked preference for the positive reply.

(See Table 22.)

By contrast, the link between choice of hypothesis for the future of the Community and general attitude towards European unification was much stronger: the more the respondent was in favour, the stronger the tendency to feel that ties between member countries would strengthen; the converse was also true.

(See Table 23.)

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1 Weighted average.

Table 22

VIEWS ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole: out of every 100 replying)

	Non-leaders		Leaders		All
	L--	L-	L+	L++	
	%	%	%	%	%
Ties will get weaker	27	28	27	32	28
Cooperation will carry on as it is now	43	38	36	34	38
Ties will get stronger	30	34	37	34	34
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Don't know	(25%)	(10%)	(6%)	(4%)	(12%)

Table 23

VIEWS ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

RELATED TO VIEWS ON EUROPEAN UNIF

(Community as a whole)

	Views on European unification			
	Very much for	To some extent for	To some extent for	Very much against
	%	%	%	%
Ties will get weaker	22	27	38	48
Cooperation will carry on as it is now	36	40	38	26
Ties will get stronger	42	33	24	18
Total	100	100	100	100
Don't know	(7%)	(8%)	(10%)	(8%)

111.5. VIEWS ON AND COMMITMENT TO  
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Two Euro-barometre regulars help monitor the pattern of views on and commitment to the Community;<sup>1</sup>

*"Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"*

*"If you were to be told tomorrow that the European Community (Common Market) had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or relieved?"*

The more or less general decline in support recorded by the previous Euro-barometre would seem to have halted in October'; however, it would be premature to say whether this marks a levelling-off or reversal of the trend hitherto.

In fact, support for the Community peaked nearly everywhere in 1974-75 and 1977-79. Since then, probably as a result of the economic crisis in general and the rise in unemployment in particular, there has been a significant dropping off in support, but without a parallel increase in opposition. The short-term swing in basic attitude, which still tends to be favourable in all countries except the United Kingdom and is conditioned by relatively stable cognitive or ideological variables, would seem to be the result of fluctuations in the neutral replies ("neither good nor bad", "indifferent"); Specifically negative replies remain consistently very low (except in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland and Greece).

Table 24 looks at how the answers to the question on Community membership have changed since 1973.

(For more details see Tables A9 and A10 in the Appendix.)

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1 These two questions are complementary in that the wording of the first one tends slightly to condition the interviewee into giving a positive reply while the second one tends to have the opposite effect. (See Euro-barometre No. 15, p. 30.)



Table 24

VIEWS ON COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP.1973-1981

	1973 (September)			1974-1980 (14 polls) <sup>2</sup>			1981 (April)			1981 (October)		
	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing
Belgique/België	57%	19%	5%	61%	20%	4%	49%	27%	6%	55%	26%	5%
Danmark	41	19	30	35	26	29	30	30	31	31	29	29
Deutschland	63	22	4	60	24	6	49	28	9	58	26	6
France	60	22	5	58	27	7	50	32	11	53	33	7
Ireland	56	21	15	54	21	19	46	27	22	49	27	19
Italia	69	15	2	73	16	4	73	19	5	70	20	5
Luxembourg	68	22	3	75	15	4	79	15	3	76	17	5
Nederland	64	19	4	75	14	4	76	14	6	75	15	3
United Kingdom <sup>3</sup>	31	22	34	35	22	36	24	24	48	27	27	41
Ellas							42	26	22	38	26	21
COMMUNITY <sup>4</sup>	56	20	11	57	22	13	50	25	17	53	26	14

1 Don't knows are not included.

2 Average of 14 polls.

3 Great Britain only in 1973 and 1974.

4 Weighted average.

In an attempt to achieve a more accurate insight into public opinion and to trace its development an index was produced combining the answers to the above two questions on Community membership and commitment to the Community, present and future.

Tables 25 and Graph 6 below give the breakdown of attitudes for each Community country tested on six occasions from September 1973 to October 1981.<sup>2</sup>

The sensitivity of the index produces some interesting conclusions on the period as a whole:

1. The proportion of interviewees at the bottom of the scale (1 = very "anti") is generally very low, except in Denmark and the United Kingdom. The balance in Denmark does tend to be weighted slightly on the "pro" side with the average score over 3. In the United Kingdom the reverse has been true for a number of years now, just as it was before the 1975 referendum. It remains to be seen whether the recovery recorded between April and October will last; but the intervening six months did at least see a significant drop in out-and-out hostilities.

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1 The index was constructed as follows:

	Community membership:		
	A good thing	Neither good nor bad (or don't know)	A bad thing
<b>If it were scrapped:</b>			
- regret	5	4	3
- indifference (or don't know)	4	3	2
- relief	3	2	1

- 2 As a result of errors in the calculation of the index, the results published in Euro-barometre No. 15 (Tables 15 to 19 and Graph 2) contained certain inaccuracies, which were reflected in the corresponding comments (pp. 34-35). We apologize for this; the questions used to produce the index were asked again in October and the results and comments have been corrected and up-dated accordingly.

2. At the other end of the scale the proportion of interviewees at the highest level (5 = very "pro") has tended to drop everywhere since the economic crisis first made itself felt (1975-77). But, on average one in three Europeans (**33%**) still falls into this bracket.
3. The modal score, i.e. the one for the majority of respondents and by extension the population at large, is generally **3**, except;
  - in Denmark and the United Kingdom, where 75% to 80% of respondents are spread more or less evenly between levels 1, **3** and 5; in other words, outright opposition, total commitment and indifference are more or less on level pegging;
  - in Belgium, where the "indifferent" (level **3**) slightly outnumber the very "pro" (level 5).<sup>1</sup>

(See Table 25.)

The above index also provides a better gauge of the attitudes of the various categories of the population and gives a closer insight into the whys and wherefores of public opinion on the Community.

Once again, in nearly every country, and particularly Belgium and Germany, leadership rating is the most discriminating variable most mobilized leaders are less in favour than the rest of the population.

By contrast, position on the political spectrum, which has relatively little bearing in certain countries (including Italy), is the most powerful determining factor in Greece and Denmark.

(See Tables 26 to 29.)<sup>2</sup>

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1 Only two opinion polls have been conducted in Greece, but it would appear that the "indifferent" (level **3**) are in the majority, with the fairly "pro" (level 4) in second place.

2 These tables correct and update Tables 16 to 19 in Euro-barometre No. 15 (pp. 41-42).

Table 25

COMMUNITY POPULARITY RATING<sup>1</sup>

	Very "anti" 1	2	3	4	Very "pro" 5	Average score
<b><u>Belgique/België</u></b>						
1973 September	2%	3%	34%	27%	34%	3.88
1975 May	1	2	38	22	37	3.91
Oct/Nov.	1	2	36	21	40	3.95
1977 Oct/Nov.	2	4	30	25	39	3.95
1981 April	2	5	42	30	21	3.63
October	1	4	37	34	24	3.75
<b><u>Danmark</u></b>						
1973	23%	12%	22%	15%	28%	3.14
1975	20	11	30	10	29	3.17
	22	8	27	13	30	3.21
1977	27	12	22	13	26	2.93
1981	23	13	29	16	19	2.95
	20	12	33	15	20	3.02
<b><u>Deutschland</u></b>						
1973	1%	4%	27%	16%	52%	4.2
1975	3	4	30	17	46	3.98
	2	5	27	19	47	4.04
1977	3	6	25	21	45	4.00
1981	4	7	34	20	35	3.75
	1	7	29	19	44	3.96
<b><u>France</u></b>						
1973	1%	4%	30%	28%	37%	4.05
1975	1	4	25	20	50	4.12
	2	3	24	26	45	4.09
1977	4	6	29	22	39	3.86
1981	4	9	32	27	28	3.64
	3	5	33	28	31	3.79
<b><u>Ireland</u></b>						
1973	10%	9%	25%	22%	34%	3.62
1975	14	9	23	15	39	3.57
	9	6	17	20	49	3.91
1977	13	10	16	18	43	3.68
1981	11	14	26	21	28	3.40
	11	12	25	20	32	3.50
<b><u>Italia</u></b>						
1973	1%	2%	27%	31%	39%	4.06
1975	1	2	22	26	49	4.18
	2	2	20	32	44	4.13
1977	2	3	22	28	45	4.03
1981	2	4	17	32	45	4.14
	2	4	21	31	42	4.06

Table 25 (continued)

	Very "anti" 1	2	3	4	Very "pro" 5	Average score
<b><u>Luxembourg</u></b>						
1973 September	1%	3%	24%	24%	48%	4.14
1975 May	1	12	21	14	52	4.04
Oct/Nov.	1	3	16	24	56	4.32
1977 Oct/Nov.	.	4	19	17	60	4.33
1981 April	1	2	16	27	54	4.14
October	1	4	16	24	55	4.27
<b><u>Netherlands</u></b>						
1973	2%	3%	28%	25%	42%	4.02
1975	2	1	31	18	48	4.08
	1	3	27	21	48	4.11
1977	2	4	17	22	55	4.23
1981	3	4	16	29	48	4.14
	2	3	17	36	42	4.13
<b><u>United Kingdom</u></b> <sup>2</sup>						
1973	28%	13%	27%	14%	18%	2.81
1975	18	10	25	11	36	3.35
	21	9	23	13	34	3.29
1977	27	13	22	13	25	2.95
1981	39	14	21	11	15	2.51
	32	16	24	11	17	2.67
<b><u>Wallas</u></b>						
1981 April	13	12	30	21	24	3.31
October	12	13	37	23	15	3.16
<b>COMMUNITY</b> <sup>3</sup>						
1973	8%	5%	28%	22%	37%	3.75
1975	6	5	26	18	45	3.92
	6	5	24	22	43	3.90
1977	9	1	24	21	39	3.75
1981	11	8	27	23	31	3.53
	9	8	27	23	33	3.63

1 The percentages in each line total 100.


2 Great Britain only in 1973.

3 Weighted average.


Graphique n° 6 / Graph 6.

INDICE D'ATTITUDE  
A L'EGARD DE LA COMMUNAUTE

COMMUNITY  
POPULARITY RATING



Graphique n° 6 (suite) / Graph . 6 (continued)



Graphique n° 6 (suite) / Graph 6 (continued)






Table 26

COMMUNITY POPULARITY RATING  
RELATED TO LEADERSHIP RATING<sup>1</sup>

(Community as a whole: Aggregate  
of results for April and October 1981)

	Very "anti" 1	2	3	4	Very "pro" 5	Average score
<b>Non-leaders (--)</b>	11%	10%	37%	23%	19%	3.31
<b>(-)</b>	10	8	27	25	30	3.56
<b>(+)</b>	9	7	21	23	40	3.78
<b>leaders (++)</b>	13	6	16	19	46	3.80
Population as a whole	<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>3.58</b>

Table 27

AVERAGE SCORE IN THE COMMUNITY POPULARITY RATING  
RELATED TO LEADERSHIP RATING

(Results by country: Aggregate of results for  
April and October 1981)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL			EC <sup>2</sup>
<b>Non-leaders (--)</b>	3.38	2.89	3.52	3.43	3.18	3.97	3.99	3.86	2.31	3.39	3.31
<b>(-)</b>	3.73	3.04	3.84	3.73	3.42	4.08	4.32	4.00	2.59	3.38	3.56
<b>(+)</b>	3.91	2.97	4.02	3.92	3.70	4.22	4.33	4.24			3.78
<b>Leaders (++)</b>	4.24	3.04	4.32	3.97	3.88	4.16	4.44	4.47			3.80
Population as a whole	3.68	2.98	3.85	3.72	3.45	4.10	4.28	4.14	2.59	3.24	3.58

1. The percentages in each line total 100.

2 Weighted average.

Table 28

COMMUNITY POPULARITY RATING  
RELATED TO POSITION ON THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM'  
 (Community as a whole: Aggregate of results  
 for April and October 1981)

	Very "anti" 1	2	3	4	Very "pro"	Average score
Extreme left	15%	11%	26%	23%	25%	3.31
Left	10	8	24	23	35	3.65
Centre	11	8	26	22	33	3.55
Right	9	7	23	21	40	3.76
Extreme right	11	6	22	22	39	3.73
Don't know	2	8	40	25	19	3.41
Population as a whole	10	8	29	23	32	3.58

Table 29

AVERAGE SCORE IN THE COMMUNITY POPULARITY RATING  
RELATED TO POSITION ON THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM  
 (Results by country: Aggregate of results  
 for April and October 1981)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC <sup>1</sup>
Extreme left	3.59	1.97	3.25	3.77	3.11	3.74	4.12	3.83	2.01	1.85	3.31
Left	3.74	2.38	3.80	3.78	3.29	4.20	4.22	4.16	2.50	2.49	3.05
Centre	3.73	2.96	3.92	3.71	3.47	4.30	4.31	4.18	2.56	3.13	3.58
Right	3.92	3.61	3.95	4.00	3.62	4.26	4.34	4.32	3.01	4.03	3.77
Extreme right	3.80	3.80	4.29	3.86	3.76	3.92	4.35	4.08	2.72	4.13	3.75
Don't know	3.47	2.71	3.54	3.60	3.16	3.89	4.13	3.88	2.27	3.34	3.40
Population as a whole	3.68	12.98	3.85	3.72	3.45	4.10	4.28	4.14	2.59	3.24	3.58

1 Percentages in each line total 100.

2 Weighted average.

The index also enables us to take a closer look at the various advantages and disadvantages attributed by interviewees to Community membership.

Euro-barometre No. 15 contained a fairly detailed question on the effects of Community membership.<sup>1</sup> A multiple classification analysis conducted after the initial results were published showing clearly the similarities and differences between member countries depending on what their inhabitants expect or fear most from the Community.<sup>2</sup>

The results, shown in Table 28, deserve some attention.

In most countries the number-one advantage of Community membership is considered to be the resulting ability to cope better with the world economic crisis, in what is a modern illustration of the age-old adage about strength in numbers.

However, there are certain exceptions:

- Germany, where the top rating goes to the better choice of products resulting from the Common Market;
- France and Luxembourg, where the main advantage of Community membership is seen as being the role which the country in question can play in the world; and
- Greece, where **the** effect of membership on agriculture is top of the league, closely following by the link with the way democracy works.

(See Table 30.)

The value of such analyses is obviously limited by the fact that they refer to one poll only and are based on a relatively limited number of items, viz. ten advantages or disadvantages commonly attributed to Community membership.

The exercise must therefore be repeated to take account of the influence of short-term economic developments; widened to include other items possibly better suited to individual national situations; extended to the two applicant countries, Spain and Portugal.

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1 See Euro-barometre No. 15, p. 43.

2 The multiple classification analysis referred to was conducted last August by Ann Arbor for the Institute for Social Research, (University of Michigan). This type of analysis makes it possible to measure the specific influence of each explanatory variable (in this case) the ten items corresponding to the advantages and disadvantages of Community membership listed in the questionnaire) on the variable to be explained (in this case the score of each respondent in respect of the Community's overall popularity rating), allowance being made for the interrelations between the explanatory variables, i.e. all the responses by each individual to the ten items.

TABLE 30  
MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES  
OF COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP<sup>1</sup>

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	GB	N. IRL	GR	EC
Coming with the crisis	.206	.176	.094	.129	.188	.162	(.183)	.253	.202	(.272)	.080	.147
Role in the world	.139	.118	.148	.185	ns	.132	(.301)	.139	.147	(.186)	.091	.144
Energy supply	.097	.120	.100	.120	.169	.098	(ns)	.100	ns	(.008)	.113	.113
Exports	ns	.132	.137	ns	.117	.114	(.113)	ns	.135	(.102)	ns	.105
Prices	.112	.109	.124	ns	.110	ns	(.215)	.078	.131	(.200)	ns	.103
Jobs and empl yment	.166	ns	ns	.132	ns	ns	(.118)	ns	.123	(.170)	.173	.095
Choice of products	.168	.095	.214	.155	.122	.176	(.151)	.108	.173	(.151)	ns	.089
Agriculture	ns	.138	.152	.178	ns	.095	(.160)	.085	.080	(.134)	.288	.082
Democracy works	.144	.125	.157	.098	ns	.135	(.149)	.110	ns	(.177)	.188	.079
Better prospects of avoiding war	.186	.121	.120	.125	.115	.120	(.209)	.079	.102	ns	ns	(.055)
Explained variance	39.8%	38.1%	32.3%	35.8%	28.4%	31.2%	(26.7%)	35.5%	42.5%	47.9%	54.9%	40.1%

1 The coefficients are the Beta coefficients of the Multiple Classification Analysis Programme. They are listed by country in descending order of rating for the Community as a whole (N = 9898); the top-ranking item in each country is boxed in and the second- and third-ranking items are underlined. Coefficients of less than .070 are not considered significant (ns). The results for Luxembourg and Northern Ireland should be treated with caution in view of the small size of the samples.

We can now go back to the socio-political problems looked at in Chapter II and see what bearing Community popularity has on each of the main issues discussed.

Four of the nine issues emerge as having a significant link with Community popularity: the more highly interviewees rate the Community, the more they are in favour of stronger measures to protect the environment, an increase in economic aid to Third World countries and the development of nuclear energy, and the more they tend to oppose the nationalization of private industry.

(see Table 31.)

Table 31

AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT ON MAJOR SOCIO-POLITICAL PROBLEMS

RELATED TO COMMUNITY POPULARITY RATING

(Community as a whole)

	Score: Community rating					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
<u>Score: Agreement/ disagreement</u>						
Stronger measures to protect the environ- ment	3.48	3.43	3.53	3.64	3.62	3.57
Increase in economic aid to the Third World	2.49	2.42	2.61	2.79	2.87	2.71
Development of nuclear energy	2.60	2.63	2.69	2.66	2.93	2.76
Expansion of nation- alisation or private industry	2.55	2.60	2.45	2.27	2.07	2.30
<b>Ease</b>	<b>864</b>	<b>760</b>	<b>2644</b>	<b>2234</b>	<b>3196</b>	<b>9697</b>

CHAPTER IV

REACTION IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL  
TO THE PROSPECT OF ACCESSION

#### IV

#### REACTION IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

#### TO THE PROSPECT OF ACCESSION

At the same time as the present Euro-barometre survey was being carried out in the Ten member countries of the Community a small survey was for the first time also carried out on behalf of the Commission in Spain and Portugal.

The results are set out below and a comparison given, wherever possible, with the results of earlier surveys on the same subject in one or other of those two countries.

#### IV.1. INTEREST IN COMMUNITY MATTERS

*"Newspapers, radio and TV often present news and commentaries about the European Community (the Common Market); Are you personally interested very much, a little, or not at all in the problems of the European Community?"<sup>1</sup>*

Almost a third of the Spaniards interviewed, but only 13% of the Portuguese, say they are very interested in the problems of the Community.

In the case of Spain this is a very respectable figure when compared with the response to the same question in Community countries in April 1980, which showed that on average 22% of interviewees (30% in Italy, 25% in the United Kingdom and only 9% in Belgium) were very interested.

Even though interest in the Community is still very low in Portugal, it is nevertheless higher than in Belgium (the only difference being that 54% of the Portuguese replied "don't know", whereas in April 1980 35% of the Belgians replied that they were not interested at all).

(See Table 32.)

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1 These surveys were carried out by the Gallup Institute in Madrid and the Norma Institute in Lisbon, taking a representative sample of the population aged 15 and over (in Spain N = 1000, in Portugal N = 2000).

2 This question was asked several times between 1973 and 1980 in the Community. See Euro-barometre No. 13, June 1980, pp.25-29.

**Table 32**

**INTEREST IN COMMUNITY MATTERS**

	Interest			Don't know	Total
	Very much	a little	Not at all		
<b>Spain</b>					
April 1980	32%	26%	26%	16%	100%
October 1981	31	30	20	19	100
<b>Portugal</b>					
October 1981	13%	19%	14%	54%	100%
<b><u>For comparison:</u> April 1980</b>					
Belgique	9%	48%	35%	8%	100%
Denmark	17	59	23	1	100
Deutschland	19	60	15	6	100
France	18	54	27	1	100
Ireland	21	53	26		100
Italy	30	48	19	3	100
Luxembourg	34	54	12		100
Niederland	22	58	19	1	100
United Kingdom	25	47	28		100
COMMUNITY	22	53	22	3	100



IV.2. ATTITUDES TOWARDS WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

*"In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for this or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent against or very much against?"*

Almost six Spaniards in ten (59%), but only one Portuguese in three (29%), says he is very much or to some extent for European unification. Very few said they were against. The breakdown of opinions in Spain is almost the same as in Greece. In Portugal the proportion of "don't knows" is still very high (almost twice as high as in Spain).

(See Table 33.)

Table 33

SUPPORT FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

	Very much for	To some extent for	To some extent against	Very much against	Don't know	Total
Spain	36%	23%	5%	4%	32%	100%
Portugal	20	9	2	2	67	100
For comparison: Community (Greece) <sup>1</sup>	31% (36)	43% (29)	9% (7)	4% (3)	13% (20)	100% (100)

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<sup>1</sup> See p. 36 and Table A7 in the Appendix.

#### IV.3 ATTITUDES TO ACCESSION TO THE COMMUNITY

*"In general, do you think that for (your country), becoming a member of the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?"*

The great majority of Spaniards were in favour of accession; more than half of those interviewed felt that their country's entry into the Community was a good thing, while only 6% held the opposite view. Opinions have remained very stable since spring 1980, when the question was first asked. The results indicate that the Spanish are far less divided on the question of their entry into the Community than the Greeks were in October 1980, a few months before they joined.<sup>1</sup>

In Portugal the public is still largely unaware of or indifferent to the problem. However, three successive surveys show marked fluctuations in both favourable responses and "don't know" between April 1980 and October 1981. This confirms that, although the general attitude is positive, people have not yet fully made up their minds.

(See Table 34.)

Table 34

#### ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

	Think that accession will be:			Don't know	Total
	A good thing	neither good nor bad	A bad thing		
Spain					
April 1980 <sup>2</sup>	58%	13%	5%	24%	100%
December 1980	52	17	5	26	100
March 1981	53	13	6	28	100
October 1981	52	18	6	24	100
Portugal					
October 1980	24%	11%	6%	59%	100%
May-June 1981	31	10	6	53	100
October 1981	19	13	6	62	100
<u>For comparison:</u>					
Greece					
October 1980	38%	28%	21%	13%	100%

1 See Euro-barometre No. 14, December 1980, pp.28-30.

2 In April 1980 no distinction was made between "neither good nor bad" and "don't know". The figures were calculated on the basis of the results of the two subsequent surveys.

IV.4. POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ? ON

*"Could you tell me in which area you think belonging to the European Community (the Common Market) will have a very good effect, a good effect, a bad effect or a very bad effect? (SHOW CARD)"<sup>1</sup>*

In the Community countries most people think the good effects outweigh the bad in seven of the ten areas listed. The beneficial effects most commonly cited were reducing the risk of war and improving the selection of goods available in the shops. However, negative opinions outweighed positive opinions in three major areas - the price of products in the shops, agriculture, and jobs and employment.<sup>2</sup>

In both Spain and Portugal positive expectations outweigh negative expectations in all ten areas.

Spanish hopes rest mainly on the Community's influence on the way democracy works, exports, the selection of goods in the shops, agriculture and Spain's role in the world.

Those Portuguese who gave a definite response expect accession to be beneficial above all for energy supplies, the selection of goods available, the country's role in the world, exports and the country's ability to cope with the world recession.

Expectations in the two countries appear, then, to be broadly similar. However, it should be emphasized that views were expressed by only a small minority of the population. Only one Spaniard in three and one Portuguese in four gave a definite response to these questions. On the other hand, the fact that the degree of dispersion in the answers was fairly low indicates that those who did reply - in other words those who are informed and mobilized - are generally in favour of their country joining the Community.

(See Table 35.)

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1 A list of ten items was shown; see overleaf. This question was asked in the Community countries in April 1981 (Euro-barometre No. 14, June 1981, pp. 43-49), in Spain in March 1981 and in Portugal in May-June 1981. In these two countries the introduction to the question was phrased slightly differently.

2 See Euro-barometre No. 15, June 1981, p. 44.

Table 35

## EXPECTED ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BELONGING TO THE COMMUNITY'

## 1. Spain

	March 1981						October 1981					
	Think that the effects will be:				Don't know	Index <sup>2</sup>	Think that the effects will be:				Don't know	Index
	Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad			Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad		
Better prospects of avoiding war	10%	25%	9%	4%	52%	2.85	9%	18%	12%	7%	54%	2.63
The choice of goods available in shops and stores	13	45	5	1	36	3.09	16	32	5	2	45	3.13
The country's role in the world	13	39	4	2	42	3.09	15	28	6	2	49	3.10
Our chances of coping as far as possible with the world economic crisis	10	37	5	2	46	2.96	14	29	4	2	51	3.12
The country's energy supply	8	33	8	3	48	2.88	10	30	7	2	51	2.98
The way democracy works in the country	16	37	3	1	42	3.14	17	29	4	2	48	3.17
Our exports	20	40	6	3	31	3.12	24	27	7	4	38	3.15
The price of goods in shops and stores	10	37	11	4	38	2.90	13	28	9	2	48	3.00
Our agriculture	21	37	7	5	30	3.10	24	26	8	5	37	3.10
Jobs and employment	13	35	8	3	41	2.98	16	29	8	2	45	3.07
Average	13	36	7	3	41	3.01	16	27	7	3	47	3.05

Table 35 (continued)  
EXPECTED ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BELONGING TO THE COMMUNITY

2. Portugal

	March 1981						October 1981					
	Think that the effects will be:				Don't know	Index <sup>1</sup>	Think that the effects will be:				Don't know	Index <sup>2</sup>
	Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad			Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad		
Better prospects of avoiding war	4 %	19 %	7 %	2 %	68 %	2.77	2 %	14 %	6 %	1 %	77 %	2.71
The choice of goods available in shops and stores	5	27	4	1	63	3.01	2	21	5	1	71	2.87
The country's role in the world	6	22	4		68	3.02	2	17	5		76	2.83
Our chances of coping as far as possible with the world economic crisis	5	23	4		68	2.99	2	18	5	1	74	2.83
The country's energy supply	6	27	2		65	3.07	1	20	4		75	2.92
The way democracy works in the country	5	23	5	1	66	2.92	2	19	4	1	74	2.84
Our exports	8	23	6	1	62	2.99	3	20	6	1	70	2.85
The price of goods in shops and stores	5	22	7	1	65	2.88	2	17	8	1	72	2.68
Our agriculture	5	24	7	2	62	2.84	2	18	9	1	70	2.66
Jobs and employment	5	23	7	1	64	2.88	2	20	6	2	70	2.75
Average	5	24	5	1	65	2.94	2	18	6	1	73	2.79

1 The points are ranked in descending order of index scores for the Community as a whole. The total percentage for each point is 100.

2 "Very good" = 4; "very bad" = 1.

ANNEXES ET TABLEAUX DETAILLES / APPENDIX AND DETAILED TABLES

■ NST ■ TUTS CHARGES DU SONDAGE ET SPEC ■ AL ■ STES RESPONSABLES /  
INSTITUTES WHICH CARRIED OUT THE SURVEY AND EXPERTS IN CHARGE (x)

Belgique/Belgie	(B)	DIMARSO/INRA	Graham KEEN
Danmark	(DK)	GALLUP MARKEDSANALYSE	Rolf RANDRUP
Deutschland	(D)	EMNID-INSTITUT	Günther BIERBAUM
ELLas	(GR)	ICAP HELLAS	Anthony LYKIARDOPOULOS
France	(F)	INSTITUT DE SONDAGES LAVIALLE	Albert LAVIALLE
Iretand	(IRL)	IRISH MARKETING SURVEYS	John MEAGHER
Italia	(I)	ISTITUTO PER LE RICERCHE STATISTICHE E L'ANALISI DELL'OPINIONE PUBBLICA (DOXA)	Ennio SALAMON
Luxembourg	(L)	INSTITUT LUXEMBOURGEOIS DE RECHERCHES SOCIALES (ILRES)	Louis MEVIS
Neder Land	(NL)	NEDERLANDS INSTITUUT VOOR DE PUBLIEKE OPINIE (NIPO)	Jan STAPEL
United Kingdom	(UK)	SOCIAL SURVEYS (GALLUP POLL)	Norman WEBB

(xx)

Coordination internationale /  
International coordination

Helene RIFFAULT  
("Faits et Opinions", Paris)

\* \* \*

Toutes les données relatives aux Euro-Baromètres sont déposées aux "Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences", (1 Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). Elles sont tenues à la disposition des organismes membres du European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), du Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) et des chercheurs justifiant d'un intérêt de recherche. Pour tous renseignements sur les études d'opinion publique faites à l'initiative de la Commission des Communautés Européennes écrire à J.-R. RABIER, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Bruxelles.

All Euro-Barometre data are stored at the Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences (1, Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research.

For all information regarding opinion surveys carried out for the Commission of the European Communities, please write to J.-R. RABIER, 200 rue de la loi, B-1049 Brussels.

(x) Les dix instituts actuellement chargés de ces sondages ont formé entre eux THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY, dont le comité de direction comprend : Robert GIJS (DIMARSO, Bruxelles), Jan STAPEL (NIPO, Amsterdam) et Norman WEBB (Social Surveys, London). / The ten institutes which carried out these surveys have formed amongst themselves THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY of which the Management Committee comprises : Robert GIJS (DIMARSO, Bruxelles), Jan STAPEL (NIPO, Amsterdam) and Norman WEBB (Social Surveys, London).

(xx) Le sondage en Northern Ireland est fait en collaboration par le Irish Marketing Surveys et le Social Surveys (Gallup Poll).. / The Northern Ireland survey is conducted jointly by Irish Marketing Surveys and the Social Surveys (Gallup Poll).

## 2. ECHANTILLONNAGE / SAMPLING

L'objectif de la méthode d'**échantillonnage** est de couvrir de façon représentative la totalité de la population des neuf pays de la Communauté âgée de 15 ans et plus, ainsi que de la Grèce.

L'échantillon de chaque pays est **constitué** à deux niveaux :

### 1° Régions et localités d'enquête.

Les statistiques de la Communauté européenne divisent l'espace européen en 129 régions (voir liste ci-jointe). L'enquête a lieu dans 126 régions (Corse, Groenland et Val d'Aoste exceptés).

Chaque pays a constitué **aléatoirement** un **échantillon-maître** de localités d'enquête de telle sorte que toutes les catégories d'habitat soient représentées proportionnellement à leurs populations respectives.

Au total, les interviews de l'enquête Omnibus Européenne ont lieu dans environ 1.150 points d'enquête.

### 2° Choix des personnes interrogées.

Les personnes interrogées sont toujours différentes d'une enquête à l'autre. L'**échantillon-maître** aléatoire évoqué ci-dessus indique le nombre de personnes à interroger à chaque point d'enquête. Au stade suivant, les personnes à interroger sont désignées :

- soit par un tirage au sort sur liste dans les pays où on peut avoir **accès** à des listes exhaustives d'individus ou de foyers : Belgique, Pays-Bas, Danemark, Luxembourg,
- soit par échantillonnage stratifié sur la base des statistiques de recensement, l'échantillon étant construit à partir des **critères** de sexe, âge et profession : France, Italie, Royaume-Uni, Irlande, Allemagne,
- soit par une méthode combinant les deux **précédentes** (cheminement **systématique**) : Grèce.

The sample has been designed to be representative of the total population aged 15 years and over of the nine countries of the Community, as well as of Greece.

In each country a two stage sampling method is used :

### 1° Geographical distribution.

For statistical purposes the European Community divides Europe into 129 regions (see attached list). The survey takes place in 126 of these regions (Corsica, Groenland and Val d'Aoste excluded).

In each country a random selection of sampling points is made in such a way that all types of area (urban, rural, etc.) are represented in proportion to their populations.

The interviews are distributed in **more or less** 1.150 sampling Points.

### 2° Choice of respondents.

For each survey different individuals are interviewed in the master sample of sampling point described above. Within these sampling points the individuals to be interviewed are chosen :

- either at random from the population or electoral lists in those countries where access to suitable lists of individuals or households is possible : **Belgium**, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg,
- or by quota sampling. In these cases the quotas are established by sex, age and profession on the basis of census data : this system is used in France, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany,
- or by a method combining the two precedent ones ("random route") : Greece.



**BELGIQUE/BELGIË**

AN : Antwerpen  
 W.V. : West-Vlaanderen  
 O.V. : Oost-Vlaanderen  
 BR : Brabant  
 LI : Limburg  
 LIE : Liège  
 HAI : Hainaut  
 NA : Namur  
 LX : Luxembourg

**BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND**

S.H. : Schleswig-Holstein  
 STA : Stade  
 AUR : Aurich  
 OLD : Oldenburg  
 B : Bremen  
 LUN : Lüneburg  
 BR : Braunschweig  
 OSN : Osnabrück  
 HAN : Hannover  
 MUN : Münster  
 DET : Detmold  
 HIL : Hildesheim  
 DUS : Düsseldorf  
 ARN : Arnsherg  
 KAS : Kassel  
 AA : Aachen  
 KOL : Köln  
 TRI : Trier  
 KOB : Koblenz  
 DA.WI. : Darmstadt-Wiesbaden  
 U.F. : Unterfranken  
 O.F. : Oberfranken  
 SAA : Saarland  
 RH.PF. : Rheinhessen-Pfalz  
 N.B. : Nordbaden  
 N.W. : Nordwürttemberg  
 M.F. : Mittelfranken  
 O.PF. : Oberpfalz  
 N.BAY. : Niederbayern  
 S.B. : Südbaden  
 S.W. : Südwürttemberg  
 SCH : Schwaben  
 O.BAY. : Oberbayern  
 BER : Berlin

**DANMARK**

JYLL : Jylland  
 SJÆ : Sjælland  
 FYN : Fyn  
 GRØ : Grønland

**FRANCE**

NORD : Nord  
 PIC : Picardie  
 H.N. : Haute-Normandie  
 R.P. : Région Parisienne  
 CHA : Champagne  
 LOR : Lorraine

AL : Alsace  
 B.N. : Basse-Normandie  
 BRE : Bretagne  
 P.LOI : Pays de la Loire  
 CEN : Centre  
 BOU : Bourgogne  
 F.C. : Franche-Comté  
 P.CH : Pottou-Charentes  
 LIM : Limousin  
 AUV : Auvergne  
 R-A : Rhône-Alpes  
 AQU : Aquitaine  
 M.P. : Midi-Pyrénées  
 LAN : Languedoc  
 P.CDA : Provence-Côte d'Azur  
 COR : (Corse)

**IRELAND**

DON : Donegal  
 N.W. : North West  
 NE : North East  
 W. : West  
 M. : Midlands  
 E. : East  
 M.W. : Mid West  
 SE : South East  
 S.W. : South West

**ITALIA**

V.D.A. : (Valle d'Aosta)  
 PIE : Piemonte  
 LOM : Lombardia  
 T.AA : Trentino-Alto Adige  
 VEN : Veneto  
 F.V.G. : Friuli-Venezia Giulia  
 LIG. : Liguria  
 E-R : Emilia-Romagna  
 TOS : Toscana  
 UMB : Umbria  
 MAR : Marche  
 LAZ : Lazio  
 ABR : Abruzzi  
 MOL : Molise  
 CAM : Campania  
 PUG : Puglia  
 BAS : Basilicata  
 CAL : Calabria  
 SIC : Sicilia  
 SAR : Sardegna

**LUXEMBOURG**

LX : GD. du Luxembourg

**NEDERLAND**

GR : Groningen  
 FR : Friesland  
 DR : Drenthe  
 OV : Overijssel  
 NH : Noord-Holland  
 GEL : Gelderland

ZH : Zuid-Holland  
 UT : Utrecht  
 ZE : Zeeland  
 N.B. : Noord-Brabant  
 LI : Limburg

**UNITED KINGDOM**

SCOTL : Scotland  
 N. : North  
 N.I. : Northern Ireland  
 N.W. : North West  
 YH : Yorkshire and Humberside  
 WALES : Wales  
 W.M. : West Midlands  
 EM : East Midlands  
 EA : East Anglia  
 S.W. : South West  
 SE : South East

**ELLAS**

Kentriki Ellás kai Evia  
 Peloponnissos  
 Iónioi Nissoi  
 Ipiros  
 Thessalia  
 Makedonia  
 Thráki  
 Nissoi Aigaiou  
 Kriti

### 3. POPULATION ETUDIEE, TAILLE DES ECHANTILLONS, DATES DU TRAVAIL /

#### SURVEYED POPULATION, SIZE OF THE SAMPLES, DATES OF FIELDWORK

	Population (1)		Echantillons / Samples (2) (Baro 16).	Dates (Baro 15)
	milliers / thousands	%		
B	7 755	3,71	973	12/X-20/XI
DK	3 977	1,90	1 009	10-18/X
D	49 121	23,51	962	15/X-9/XI
GR	7 123	3,41	1 000	12-24/X
F	40 908	19,58	1 006	15-28/X
IRL	2 273	1,09	985	14-26/X
I	43 406	20,78	1 070	16-30/X
L	287	0,14	500	15-26/X
NL	10 584	5,07	1 011	8-21/X
UK	43 488	20,82	1 395	15-26/X
CE/EC	208 922	100,00	9 911	

### 4. RECOMMANDATION AU LECTEUR /

### ADVICE TO READERS

Il est rappelé que, dans Les enquêtes par sondage, on doit tenir compte d'une certaine marge pour erreur d'échantillonnage. Avec des échantillons de l'ordre de 1.000 personnes interrogées, les différences de pourcentages inférieures à 5 % ne devraient pas être normalement considérées comme statistiquement significatives.

Readers are reminded that in survey research, one should allow a certain margin for sampling error. With a sample of 1.000 cases, percentage differences of less than 5 points would not normally be regarded as statistically significant.

(1) 15 ans et plus / 15 years and over

(2) Nombre d'interviews / Number of interviews

TABLEAU 1 / TABLE 1

L'ANNEE PROCHAINE : MEILLEURE OU MOINS BONNE / THE NEXT YEAR : BETTER OR WORSE (1)

En ce qui vous concerne, pensez-vous que l'année prochaine (...) sera meilleure ou moins bonne que (l'année qui s'achève)?/  
 So far as you are concerned, do you think that (the next year) will be better or worse than (the year which is ending) ?

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
	7	5		14			8	13		15	32		29	26		28	25	
Meilleure/Better																		
Moins bonne/Worse	53	62		42			37	28		39	32		19	16		45	49	
Sans changement/Same	32	26		37			48	50		35	28		4	5		24	23	
Sans réponse/No reply	8	7		7			7	9		11	8					3	3	
	100	100											100	100				
Total				100			100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	1022	973														1108	1070	
	1022	973		1024			1008	962		986	1006		1010	985		1108	1070	

(1) International Gallup Research Institutes.

TABLEAU 1 (suite) / TABLE 1 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY		
	1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X	
Meilleure/Better	14	11		13	15		31	30		39	72		20	25	
Moins bonne/Worse	45	51		49	41		48	44		39	6		43	38	
Sans changement/Same	37	37		34	40		15	19		13	9		30	30	
Sans réponse/No reply	4	1		4	4		6	7		9	13		7	7	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	300	500		1114	1011		1432	1395		1000	1000		0004	9911	

TABLEAU 2 / TABLE 2

CE QUE L'ON ATTEND DE L'ANNEE PROCHAINE / THE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE NEXT YEAR (1)

Quand vous pensez à (l'année prochaine), croyez-vous que le nombre des chômeurs (dans votre pays) ... /  
 Looking ahead to next year (...), do you think that the number of unemployed (in this country) ...

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
... augmentera/ will increase ?	75	79		81	:		56	69		74	46		59	64		66	70	
... diminuera/ will decrease ?	3	4		2	:		8	3		5	20		19	16		10	10	
... restera au niveau actuel/will remain the same ?	16	13		12	:		31	21		16	29		19	18		21	18	
Sans réponse/No reply	6	4		5	:		5	7		5	5		3	2		3	2	
Total	100	100		100	:		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	1022	973		1024	:		1008	962		986	1006		1010	985		1108	1070	

(1) International Gallup Research Institutes.

TABLEAU 2 (suite) / TABLE 2 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMLINITY		
	1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
... augmentera/ will increase ?	54	62		84	86		77	69		51	15		69	64	
... diminuera/ will decrease ?	15	11		5	3		8	11		15	47		7	11	
... restera au niveau actuel/will remain the same ?	28	26		10	9		12	17		23	19		20	20	
Sans réponse/No reply	3	1		1	2		3	3		11	19		4	5	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100 100	100 100	
N	300	500		1114	1011		1432	1395		1000	1000		0004	9911	

TABLEAU 2a / TABLE 2a

CE QUE L'ON ATTEND DE L'ANNÉE PROCHAINE / THE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE NEXT YEAR (1)

Quand vous pensez à (l'année prochaine), croyez-vous que ces grèves et conflits sociaux (dans votre pays) ... /  
 Looking ahead to next year (...) do you think that strikes and industrial disputes (in this country) ...

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X	
... augmenteront/ will increase ?	54	61		57			37	43		47	37		41	52		45	53	
... diminueront/ will decrease ?	1	4		4			7	6		4	16		20	11		23	16	
... resteront au niveau actuel/will remain the same ?	30	25		30			47	40		37	38		33	31		29	26	
Sans réponse/No reply	9	10		9			9	11		12	9		6	6		3	5	
Total	100	100		100			100	100		100 100	100 100		100	100		100	100	
N	1024	973		1024	:		1008	962		986 986	1006 1006		1010	985		1108	1070	

(1) Gallup International Research Institutes.

TABLEAU 2a (suite) / TABLE 2a (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG		NETHERLAND		UNITED KINGDOM		ELLAS		COMMUNAUTE / COMMUNITY	
	1980 X	1981 X	1980 X	1981 X	1980 X	1981 X	1980 X	1981 X	1980 X	1981 X
... augmenteront/ will increase ?	28		55	55	38	42	54	10	03	44
... diminueront/ will decrease ?	2		8	7	26	19	8	51	10	14
... resteront au niveau actuel/will remain the same ?	70	3	37	32	32	33	24	17	36	34
Sans réponse/No reply	7	3	5	6	4	6	14	22	17	8
Total	100		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	300		1114	1011	1432	1395	1000	1000	1520	911



TABLEAU 2b / TABLE 2b

CE QUE L'ON ATTEND DE L'ANNEE PROCHAINE / THE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE NEXT YEAR (1)

Quand vous pensez à (l'année prochaine), croyez-vous que ce sera une année de prospérité économique ou de difficultés économiques, ou comme maintenant /

Looking ahead to next year (...), do you think that it will be a year of economic prosperity or economic difficulty, or remain the same ?

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Prospérité/ Economic prosperity	2	2		4			4	2		3	10		8	7		10	9	
Difficultés/ Economic difficulty	66	68		64			41	49		60	52		62	64		62	66	
Comme maintenant/ Remain the same	26	24		26			46	39		29	33		25	24		25	22	
Sans réponse/No reply	6	6		6			9	10		8	5		5	5		3	3	
Total	100	100		100			100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	1022	973		1024	:		1008	962		986	1006		1010	985		1108	1070	

(1) Gallup International Research Institutes

TABLEAU 2b ( suite) / TABLE 2b (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELIAS			COMMUNAUTE / COMMUNITY		
	1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Prosperité Economic prosperity	3	6		5	6		7	8		10	41		6	8	
Difficultés/ Economic difficulty	59	59		79	69		64	58		59	18		58	56	
Comme maintenant/ Remain the same	35	33		14	20		27	29		25	25		30	30	
Sans réponse/No reply	3	2		2	5		2	5		6	16		6	6	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	
N	300	500		1114	1011		1432	1395		1000	1000		0004	9911	

TABLEAU 2c / TABLE 2c

## CE QUE L'ON ATTEND DE L'ANNEE PROCHAINE / THE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE NEXT YEAR (1)

Quand vous pensez à (l'année prochaine), croyez-vous que ce sera une année assez tranquille et sans beaucoup de conflits internationaux ou une année agitée avec beaucoup de querelles internationales, ou comme maintenant /

Looking ahead to next year (...), do you think it will be a peaceful year more or less free of international disputes, a troubled year with much international discord, or remain the same ?

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X	1981 X		1980 X (2)	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Assez tranquille/ Peaceful year	4	4		3	:		6	10		5	9		15	13		17	10	
Agitée/Troubled year	55	61		56	:		55	54		47	50		45	46		39	48	
Comme maintenant/ Remain the same	32	26		32	:		31	26		37	33		32	33		33	35	
Sans réponse/No reply	9	9		9	:		8	10		11	8		8	8		11	7	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	1022	973		1024	:		1008	962		986	1006		1010	985		1108	070	

(1) Gallup International Research Institutes.

(2) Résultats italiens recalculés/Italian results recalculated.

TABLEAU 2c (suite) / TABLE 2c (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY		
	1980	1981		1980	1981		1980	1981		1980	1981		1980	1981	
	X	X		X	X		X	X		X	X		X	X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Assez tranquille/ Peaceful year	7	7		3	4		6	6		14	35		10	10	
Agitée/Troubled year	60	61		56	57		50	50		44	24		53	50	
comme maintenant/ Remain the same	29	29		33	32		39	38		31	22		28	32	
Sans réponse/No reply	4	3		8	7		5	6		11	19		9	8	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	300	500		1114	1011		1432	1395		1000	1000		0004	9911	

TABLEAU 3 / TABLE 3

LE DANGER D'UNE NOUVELLE GUERRE MONDIALE AU COURS DES DIX PROCHAINES ANNEES /

RISK OF A NEW WORLD WAR IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS

(1)

		BELGIQUE/BELGIË					DANMARK						
		1971 VII	1977 x - XI	1980 IV	1981 X			1971 VII	1977 x - XI	1980 IV	1981 X		
		%	%	%	%			%	%	%	%		
La guerre est certaine/ World War within the next ten years	100	2	3.3	4.5	3.6				3.2	2.7			
	90	0	1.7	3.9	3.2				0.5	2.3			
	80	1	3.8	8.0	5.9				1.5	3.6			
	70	1	4.0	5.6	7.0				1.4	3.0			
	60	3	4.7	6.0	6.9				2.2	2.6			
	50	8	11.5	13.5	12.9				9.5	14.9			
	40	4	5.0	6.0	6.3				1.3	4.1			
	30	8	7.4	7.1	7.0				4.7	5.7			
	20	8	7.9	8.0	6.2				5.7	5.2			
	10	11	9.4	7.1	6.5				7.4	9.1			
Aucun danger de guerre/ No danger of war	0	40	26.9	14.1	17.5				47.9	26.3			
Sans réponse/No reply		14	14.5	16.1	17.0				14.6	20.5			
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				100.0	100.0			
Score moyen/Mean score		1.86	3.03	4.24	4.00				1.85	3.02			
N		1364	1006	1009	973				992	994			

- (1) "Voici une sorte d'échelle (MONTRER CARTE). Voulez-vous me montrer à quel endroit, sur cette échelle, vous placez le danger qu'une nouvelle guerre mondiale se produise dans les dix prochaines années"./"Here is a sort of scale (SHOW CARD). Would you, with the help of this card, tell me how **you** assess the chance of a world war breaking out in the next 10 years?!"

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND					FRANCE				
	1971 VII	1977 X-XI	1980 IV	1981 X		1971 VII	1977 X-XI	1980 IV	1981 X	
La guerre est certaine/ World War within the next ten years	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%	
	0.6	1.8	2.7	4.4		2	2.3	3.0	2.8	
	0.7	1.1	1.3	1.6		1	1.7	3.4	2.7	
	1.8	2.3	5.6	6.4		3	3.3	19.5	4.6	
	2.6	3.8	4.7	9.3		2	2.1	8.5	6.3	
	4.6	3.1	7.6	7.3		2	3.0	7.8	7.2	
	11.0	9.3	12.9	12.5		13	14.2	16.2	18.8	
	7.2	8.0	9.4	6.6		4	4.7	8.4	8.8	
	11.9	11.5	11.5	9.6		8	9.4	9.0	9.6	
	10.6	15.1	8.9	10.5		8	7.6	7.7	7.8	
Aucun danger de guerre/ No danger of war Sans réponse/No reply	11.0	14.9	8.1	8.1		10	11.6	6.3	10.1	
	30.4	21.0	13.8	12.7		32	28.1	10.4	14.8	
	8.0	8.0	13.6	11.0		15	11.9	0.0	6.6	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Score moyen/Mean score	2.44	2.72	3.75	4.11		2.47	2.76	4.85	3.84	
N	2000	999	1009	962		1806	1149	993	1006	

**TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)**

	IRELAND						ITALIA					
	1971 VII	1977 x-XI	1980 IV	1981 X			1971 VII	1977 x-XI	1980 IV	1981 X		
	%	%	%	%			%	%	%	%		
<b>Laguerreest certaine/ World War within the next ten years</b>	100	2.6	4.0	5.9			3.5	2.7	3.1	3.3		
	90	1.8	4.4	3.5			1.3	2.0	3.9	2.5		
	80	2.8	7.0	5.3			2.0	2.6	8.5	2.9		
	70	2.2	7.4	6.3			2.5	3.2	7.4	5.0		
	60	3.3	5.3	5.4			3.0	3.4	7.4	4.0		
	50	10.7	15.1	14.8			7.0	8.8	13.4	13.8		
	40	5.7	7.5	5.6			6.1	5.1	6.9	8.1		
	30	4.9	6.7	6.2			8.5	9.3	10.4	10.5		
	20	6.7	8.5	6.5			9.1	8.7	7.5	9.8		
	10	7.9	7.6	5.3			9.5	12.6	6.5	13.0		
<b>Aucun danger de guerre/ No danger of war</b>	0	46.1	16.3	29.9			37.7	38.6	20.2	24.8		
<b>Sans réponse/No reply</b>		5.1	10.1	5.2			9.8	3.0	4.7	2.2		
<b>Total</b>		100.0	100.0	100.0			100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		
<b>Score moyen/Mean score</b>		2.24	4.11	3.62			2.31	2.38	3.98	3.11		
<b>N</b>		997	1008	985			1017	1155	1116	1070		

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG						NEDERLAND					
	1971 VII	1977 X - XI	1980 IV	1981 X			1971 VII	1977 X - XI	1980 IV	1981 X		
	%	%	%	%			%	%	%	%		
La guerre est certaine / World War within the next ten years	100											
90	0	1.7	0.0	11.2			1	1.9	0.0	2.4		
80	2	0.6	0.0	3.0			1	1.8	4.4	1.9		
70	2	1.7	5.7	4.6			3	3.5	6.7	2.7		
60	1	2.6	4.0	5.2			2	5.3	4.0	5.6		
50	2	3.5	4.7	2.6			2	3.9	5.2	6.2		
40	13	15.7	15.7	16.6			13	19.0	8.6	21.0		
30	2	6.1	4.7	1.8			4	8.3	10.5	8.6		
20	9	6.7	6.3	7.4			6	14.7	10.0	12.3		
10	7	11.3	5.3	5.0			10	12.6	20.4	9.7		
Aucun danger de guerre / No danger of war	0	5	8.3	7.8			17	9.5	6.5	10.8		
Sans réponse / No reply	42	32.3	40.0	34.8			27	16.5	9.5	13.3		
	16	8.7	5.3	0.0			14	2.9	14.3	5.6		
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		
Score moyen / Mean score	1.95	2.53	2.50	3.58			2.38	3.41	3.66	3.65		
N	302	344	300	500			1198	943	999	1011		



TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN/UNITED KINGDOM					ELLAS			
	1971 VII	1977 X-XI	1980 IV	1981 X		1971 VII	1977 X-XI	1980 IV	1981 X
La guerre est certaine / World War within the next ten years	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%
		3.6	4.8	4.0					1.2
		0.8	9.3	1.7					0.3
		2.1	6.8	4.7					1.8
		3.1	8.5	4.0					2.2
		2.5	6.7	5.5					1.4
		10.0	15.2	16.0					6.6
		3.6	3.6	6.5					3.4
		7.5	5.9	8.8					7.2
		7.5	7.7	7.0					6.1
Aucun danger de guerre / No danger of war		8.4	5.4	7.0					12.6
		44.6	18.9	28.7					3.9
Sans réponse/No reply		6.2	7.0	6.1					11.3
TOTAL		100.0	100.0	100.0					100.0
Score moyen/Mean score		2.21	4.48	3.27					1.64
N		1351	1454	1395					1000

TABLEAU 3 (suite) / TABLE 3 (continued)

	EURO 6						COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE/ EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)					
	1971 VII	1977 X-XI	1980 IV	1981 X				1977 X-XI	1980 IV	1981 X		
	%	%	%	%				%	%	%		
<b>La guerre est certaine/ World War within the next ten years</b>												
100	1.9	2.3	2.8	3.5				2.6	3.5	3.5		
90	0.9	1.6	2.9	2.3				1.4	4.3	2.1		
80	2.2	2.8	10.4	4.6				2.6	9.4	4.5		
70	2.3	3.3	6.5	6.9				3.2	6.9	6.0		
60	3.2	3.3	7.3	6.2				3.1	7.1	5.8		
50	10.4	11.3	13.7	15.2				11.0	14.0	14.8		
40	5.6	6.2	8.3	7.7				5.5	7.2	7.2		
30	9.3	10.3	10.2	9.9				9.5	9.1	9.4		
20	9.3	10.7	8.9	9.3				9.9	8.6	8.5		
10	10.7	12.7	7.0	10.1				11.6	6.7	9.3		
<b>Aucun danger de guerre/ No danger of war</b>												
0	33.2	27.9	14.5	17.0				32.1	15.7	20.3		
<b>Sans réponse/No reply</b>												
	11.1	7.6	7.6	7.2				7.4	7.7	8.9		
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				100.0	100.0	100.0		
<b>Score moyen/Mean score</b>	2.38	3.11	4.15	3.70				2.57	4.20	3.54		
<b>N</b>	1687	1596	1426	1522				1936	8882	1911		

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'octobre 1981 / Including Greece from October 1981.

TABLEAU 4 / TABLE 4

LE SENTIMENT DE SATISFACTION QUANT AU FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA DEMOCRATIE /

THE FEELING OF SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS (1)

	BELGIQUE/BELGIE										
	1973 I X	1976 X-X ■	1977 IV-v	1977 K-X ■	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	13	6	6	8	7	4	4	8	4	7	
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	49	47	50	43	49	38	39	39	30	28	
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	23	24	21	18	23	24	29	25	32	31	
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	9	8	10	10	8	13	14	12	19	18	
Sans réponse / No reply	6	15	13	21	13	21	14	16	15	16	
Tota 1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1266	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983	1032	1022	973	

(1) "Dans l'ensemble, êtes-vous très satisfait, plutôt satisfait, plutôt pas satisfait ou pas satisfait du tout du fonctionnement de La démocratie (dans votre pays) ?" / "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (in your country) ?"

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	DANMARK										
	1973 IX	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	7	6	10	10	14	10	9	17	13	17	
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	38	49	53	57	53	54	53	54	47	50	
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	35	33	24	24	21	24	24	18	27	22	
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	18	10	5	6	7	7	8	6	8	7	
Sans réponse / No reply	2	2	8	3	5	5	6	5	5	4	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1199	962	1010	992	983	1002	1073	1029	1024	1009	

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND										
	1973 I X	1976 X-XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	5	13	11	9	9	9	10	12	9	11	
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	39	66	67	69	67	68	70	68	64	59	
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	44	16	16	16	16	15	13	12	17	18	
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	11	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	4	5	
Sans réponse / No reply	1	2	4	4	5	6	5	6	6	7	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1957	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003	1005	1008	962	

**TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)**

	FRANCE										
	1973 I X	1976 x - XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Trbs satisfait / Very satisfied	4	4	7	5	5	4	4	3	3	5	
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	37	38	38	44	44	36	37	38	33	48	
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	30	31	29	29	27	34	30	32	34	27	
Fas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	16	15	16	11	13	17	17	15	18	7	
Sans reponse / No reply	13	12	10	11	11	9	12	12	12	13	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	2227	1356	1256	1149	1276	1194	1152	986	986	1006	

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	IRELAND										
	1973 I X	1976 X-X II	1977 IV - v	1977 X-X II	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
<b>Très satisfait /</b> <b>Very satisfied</b>	9	7	10	12	13	10	5	11	7	13	
<b>Plutôt satisfait /</b> <b>Fairly satisfied</b>	46	52	52	57	58	51	42	46	41	46	
<b>Plutôt pas satisfait /</b> <b>Not very satisfied</b>	27	25	23	16	15	18	30	22	30	22	
<b>Pas satisfait du tout /</b> <b>Not at all satisfied</b>	16	10	10	6	7	11	13	15	16	9	
<b>Sans réponse /</b> <b>No reply</b>	2	6	5	9	7	10	10	6	6	10	
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>N</b>	1199	981	1008	997	1005	1005	997	1006	1007	985	

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	ITALIA										
	1973 I X	1976 X-X ■	1977 IV- v	1977 X-XI	1978 v- VI	1978 x- XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Tres satisfait / Very satisfied	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	4	
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	25	13	11	18	24	18	14	19	18	16	
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	42	43	47	45	44	46	46	41	45	43	
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	30	40	39	33	28	32	36	36	32	34	
Sans réponse / No reply	1	3	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1909	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030	1178	1170	1108	1070	



**TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)**

	LUXEMBOURG										
	1973 I X	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-v	1977 x- XI	1978 V-VI	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	16	13	15	24	24	15	17	23	18	16	
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	36	41	56	44	43	48	44	50	59	59	
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	28	4	22	20	24	29	29	23	17	18	
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	9	8	2	4	2	3	4	2	5	4	
Sans réponse / No reply	11	17	5	8	7	5	6	2	1	3	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	330	301	302	344	322	291	299	298	300	500	

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	NEDERLAND										
	1973	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980	1981	
	I X	X-X ■	■V-V	X-X ■	v- VI	x- XI	IV	X	X	X	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
<b>Très satisfait /</b> <b>Very satisfied</b>	8	12	10	9	8	9	9	7	9	6	
<b>Plutôt satisfait /</b> <b>Fairly satisfied</b>	44	55	57	55	61	44	55	54	42	53	
<b>Plutôt pas satisfait /</b> <b>Not very satisfied</b>	28	26	24	26	22	35	25	27	34	27	
<b>Pas satisfait du tout /</b> <b>Not at all satisfied</b>	10	6	5	6	5	8	6	7	11	9	
<b>Sans reponse /</b> <b>No reply</b>	10	1	4	4	4	4	5	5	4	5	
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>N</b>	1464	1123	1033	943	1131	913	974	1092	1114	1011	

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN (1973) and UNITED KINGDOM									
	1973 I X	1976 X-X ■	1977 IV - v	1977 X-X ■	1978 V-VI	1978 X-X ■	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>Très satisfait /</b> <b>Very satisfied</b>	7	7	10	8	9	6	7	7	9	6
<b>Plutôt satisfait /</b> <b>Fairly satisfied</b>	37	44	49	54	53	45	46	45	42	42
<b>Plutôt pas satisfait /</b> <b>Not very satisfied</b>	34	30	24	21	23	28	27	28	27	29
<b>Pas satisfait du tout /</b> <b>Not at all satisfied</b>	20	13	12	9	8	12	13	13	16	13
<b>Sans réponse /</b> <b>No reply</b>	2	6	5	8	7	9	7	7	6	10
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>N</b>	1933	1351	1414	1351	1426	1339	1317	1403	1432	1395

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	ELLAS											
	1980 X	1981 X										
Très satisfait/ Very satisfied	20	24										
Plutôt satisfait/ Fairly satisfied	33	28										
Plutôt pas satisfait/ Not very satisfied	23	18										
Pas satisfait du tout/ Not at all satisfied	22	23										
Sans réponse/ No reply	2	7										
Total	100	100										
N	1000	1000										

TABLEAU 4 (suite) / TABLE 4 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)									
	1973 I X	1976 X-XI	1977 IV-V	1977 x-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x-XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 X	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très satisfait / Very satisfied	8	7	7	6	6	6	6	7	7	8
Plutôt satisfait / Fairly satisfied	40	42	44	48	49	43	43	44	40	42
Plutôt pas satisfait / Not very satisfied	33	29	28	26	27	30	28	27	30	28
Pas satisfait du tout / Not at all satisfied	13	16	16	13	12	14	16	15	17	14
Sans réponse / No reply	6	6	5	7	6	7	7	7	6	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	13484	9210	9044	8936	9327	8788	8976	9021	9001	9911

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'octobre 1980 / Including Greece from October 1980.

TABLEAU 5 / TABLE 5

L'ATTITUDE FONDAMENTALE A L'EGARD DE LA SOCIETE / BASIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOCIETY (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIË											
	970 I-III	1976 x - XI	1977 IV - v	1977 (-XI)	1978 I-VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	3	5	6	4	4	6	5	7	9	6	7	8
Réformes / Reforms (2)	69	65	66	60	63	61	64	55	60	57	57	60
Défense contre la subversion Defence against subversion	14	19	18	19	21	15	16	21	18	20	19	18
Sans réponse / No reply	14	11	10	17	12	18	15	17	13	17	17	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	298	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983	1032	1009	1022	949	973

(1) "Sur cette carte (MONTRER CARTE) se trouvent trois attitudes fondamentales vis-a-vis de la société dans laquelle nous vivons. Voulez-vous choisir l'attitude qui correspond le mieux à vos idées personnelles? (UNE SEULE REPONSE). 1. Il faut changer radicalement toute l'organisation de notre société par une action révolutionnaire. 2. Il faut améliorer petit à petit notre société par des réformes. 3. Il faut défendre courageusement notre société actuelle contre toutes les forces subversives." / "On this card (SHOW CARD) are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-a-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. 1. The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action. 2. Our society must be gradually improved by reforms. 3. Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces."

(2) En 1970 : "par des réformes intelligentes". / In 1970 : "by intelligent reforms".

**TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)**

	DANMARK											
	1970 I-III	1976 x - XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	4	3	3	3	4	2	2	3	1	2	2
	Réformes / Reforms	51	52	55	51	61	61	55	54	52	56	55
	Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	38	39	40	42	29	31	38	36	43	38	38
	Sans réponse / No reply	7	6	2	4	6	6	5	7	4	4	5
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		962	1010	992	983	1002	1073	1025	994	1024	1006	1009

**TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)**

	DEUTSCHLAND												
	1970 <u>I-III</u>	1976 <u>x - XI</u>	1977 <u>IV-V</u>	1977 <u>x - XI</u>	1978 <u>v-VI</u>	1978 <u>X-XI</u>	1979 <u>IV</u>	1979 <u>X</u>	1980 <u>I V</u>	1980 <u>X</u>	1981 <u>I V</u>	1981 <u>X</u>	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	3	4	4	3	4
	Réformes / Reforms (2)	70	52	43	41	41	43	52	50	47	46	41	49
	Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	20	39	48	50	50	44	39	38	37	43	43	36
Sans réponse / No reply	8	7	7	7	8	11	7	9	12	7	13	11	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	2021	1007	1005	999	996	1006	1003	1005	1009	1008	1004	962	



TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	FRANCE												
	1970 [I-III]	1976 XI	1977 IV-V	1977 X-XI	1978 v-VI	1978 x - XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	5	13	14	8	8	12	9	10	11	9	9	5
	Réformes / Reforms (2)	78	64	62	65	66	70	68	63	60	64	65	65
	Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	12	18	19	22	20	13	16	19	24	20	20	26
	Sans réponse / No reply	5	5	5	5	6	5	7	8	5	7	6	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	2046	1356	1256	1149	1276	1194	1152	986	993	986	991	1006	

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	IRELAND											
	1970 I-I	1976 x - XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	7	5	7	6	7	6	7	7	7	6	4
	Réformes / Reforms	60	61	64	59	61	64	58	61	65	63	59
	Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	23	26	26	24	20	16	28	20	20	22	27
Sans réponse / No reply	10	8	13	11	12	4	7	12	8	9	10	
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		981	1008	997	1005	1005	997	1006	1008	1007	1005	985

**TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)**

	ITALIA											
	1970 I-III	1976 x - XI	1977 IV - v	1977 K - XI	1978 I-v ■	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	7	13	11	10	8	9	7	9	6	6	8	6
Réformes / Reforms (2)	73	66	58	61	58	63	63	60	58	61	61	61
Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	11	18	28	27	31	24	26	27	32	29	29	29
Sans réponse / No reply	9	3	3	2	3	4	4	4	4	4	2	4
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>N</b>	1822	1052	1025	1155	175	1030	1178	1170	1116	1108	1183	1070'

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG											
	1970	1976	1977	1977	1978	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981
	T I - I I	I I - X I	I V - v	x - X I	v - V I	x - X I	I V	X	I V	X	I V	X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	1	2	3	4	3	5	4	2	8	5	6	4
Réformes / Reforms (2)	65	49	56	55	59	65	71	70	62	64	66	67
Defense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	27	32	32	28	30	22	19	25	25	25	23	25
Sans réponse / No reply	7	17	9	13	8	8	6	3	5	6	5	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	335	301	302	344	322	291	299	298	300	300	300	500

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	NEDERLAND											
	1970 I-III	1976 x- XI	1977 IV-V	1978 X-XI	1978 IV- v	1978 X-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	6	5	5	4	5	6	4	6	6	4	7	6
Reformes / Reforms (2)	75	56	58	55	56	63	66	54	53	58	54	52
Defense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	15	32	32	37	35	25	23	34	37	33	35	32
Sans réponse / No reply	4	7	5	4	4	6	7	6	4	5	4	10
Tota 1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1230	1123	1033	943	1131	913	974	1092	999	1114	1091	1011

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM											
	1970 I-III	1976 x- XI	1977 IV- v	1977 x- XI	1978 v- VI	1978 x- XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 I V	1980 X	1981 I V	1981 X
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	7	8	6	6	5	3	7	6	6	9	9
	Réformes / Reforms	60	59	55	54	63	67	59	56	58	54	57
	Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	25	26	28	31	25	21	28	32	29	31	25
Sans reponse / No reply	8	7	11	9	7	9	6	6	7	6	9	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1351	1414	1351	1426	1339	1317	1403	1454	1432	1369	1395	

TABLEAU 5 (suite) . TABLE 5 (continued)

	ELLAS											
	1980	1981	1981									
	X	IV	X									
	%	%	%									
Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action	9	10	8									
Reformes / Reforms	58	55	59									
Defense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion	28	28	22									
Sans reponse / No reply	5	7	1									
Total	100	100	100									
N	1000	1000	1000									

TABLEAU 5 (suite) / TABLE 5 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)										
	1976 XI	1977 IV - v	1977 x - XI	1978 v - VI	1978 x - XI	1979 I V	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>Action révolutionnaire / Revolutionary action</b>	8	8	6	5	7	5	7	6	6	7	6
<b>Reformes / Reforms</b>	60	55	55	55	59	62	57	55	57	55	57
<b>Défense contre la subversion / Defence against subversion</b>	26	31	32	33	27	26	29	31	30	31	29
<b>Sans réponse / No reply</b>	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	8	7	7	8
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>N</b>	9210	9044	8936	9327	8788	8976	9021	8882	10001	9898	9911

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis octobre 1980 / Including Greece from October 1980.



TABLEAU 6 / TABLE 6

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

" Il faudrait faire des efforts pour réduire les inégalités de revenus /  
 Greater effort should be made to reduce inequality of income."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord Agree strongly	56	55		33	21		31	28		68	64		34	36		60	49	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	26	28		40	38		45	42		25	28		51	46		31	33	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	7	7		14	21		14	15		2	5		6	10		4	9	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	3	5		5	10		4	7		2	1		1	1		2	6	
Sans réponse/No reply	8	5		8	10		6	8		3	2		8	7		3	3	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	983	973		1073	1009		003	962		1152	1006		997	985		1178	1070	

TABLEAU 6 (suite) / TABLE 6 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY <sup>(1)</sup>		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X			1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%			%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	65	56		49	40		25	20			77		46		
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	25	20		28	28		40	45			9		35		
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	6	11		15	10		17	22			2		10		
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	1	9		6	11		10	5			3		4		
Sans réponse/No reply	3	4		2	11		8	8			9		5		
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100			100		100	100	
N	299	500		974	1011		1317	1395			1000		8976	9911	

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir de 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.

TABLEAU 6a/ TABLE 6a

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"Il faudrait développer l'énergie nucléaire pour répondre aux besoins d'énergie dans l'avenir /  
Nuclear energy should be developed to meet future energy needs."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	19	15		14	13		22	26		22	27		12	10		16	31	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	25	26		18	18		33	35		30	34		27	27		27	28	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	20	17		23	26		17	17		18	18		18	28		18	15	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	19	25		29	30		17	10		16	12		24	21		24	17	
Sans réponse/No reply	17	17		16	13		11	12		14	9		15	14		15	9	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	983	973		1073	1009		1003	962		1152	1006		997	985		1178	070	

TABLEAU 6a (suite) / TABLE 6a (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG		NEDERLAND		UNITED KINGDOM		ELLAS		COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY (1)	
	1979 IV	1981 X	1979 IV	1981 X	1979 IV	1981 X		1981 X	1979 IV	1981 X
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	25	21	13	13	23	17		32	20	24
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	23	24	23	5	40	46		11	32	34
Plutôt pas d'accord/Disagree	19	20	22	8	12	14		6	17	16
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	27	30	37	33	9	11		28	18	15
Sans réponse/No reply	6	5	5	11	16	12		23	13	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100
N	299	500	974	1011	1317	1395		1000	8976	9911

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir de 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.

TABLEAU 6b/ TABLE 6b

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"Il faudrait des peines plus sévères pour les actes de terrorisme /  
More severe penalties should be introduced for acts of terrorism."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X					1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 Y		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	75	69		63	64		58	52		67	71		62	52		76	68	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	13	17		22	22		28	33		18	17		27	37		13	16	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	4	5		6	5		7	6		5	6		3	5		6	7	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	1	2		1	2		4	3		3	3		2	1		4	7	
Sans réponse/No reply	7	7		8	7		3	6		7	3		6	5		1	2	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
	100	100																
N	983	973		1073	1009		1003	962		1152	1006		997	985		1178	1070	

**TABLEAU 6b (suite) / TABLE 6b (continued)**

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY (1)		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X			1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%			%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	80	83		78	72		73	70			63		69	65	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	12	8		13	12		17	20			15		19	21	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	2	5		5	5		4	5			3		5	6	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	3	2		2	1		2	1			6		3	3	
Sans réponse/No reply	3	2		2	10		4	4			13		4	5	
<b>Total</b>	100	100		100	100		100	100			100		100	100	
<b>N</b>	299	500		974	1011		1317	1395			1000		976	9911	

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.

TABLEAU 6c/ TABLE 6c

OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES QUE ANTS /  
 ENT OR A .IH SOME IMORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"Il faudrait que davantage d'industries privées soient nationalisées /  
 Public ownership of private industries should be expanded."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË		DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
			1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	20	10	6	6		10	11		21	16		18	13		15	14	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	22	17	12	11		24	19		20	23		35	37		18	16	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	18	16	29	29		26	28		18	24		18	25		20	19	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	16	31	39	38		21	21		20	20		6	6		31	39	
Sans réponse/No reply	24	26	14	16		19	21		21	17		23	19		16	12	
Total	100 100	100 100	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	983 983	973 973	1073	1009		1003	962		1152	1006		997	985		1178	1070	

TABLEAU 6c (suite) / TABLE 6c (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X			1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	(1)
	%	%		%	%		%	%			%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	13	15		13	12		10	12			58		14	14	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	19	14		21	14		20	31			11		21	21	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	25	24		23	22		27	22			3		23	22	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	32	39		34	38		29	20			11		25	26	
Sans réponse/No reply	11	8		9	14		14	15			17		17	17	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100			100		100	100	
N	295	500		974	1011		1317	1395			1000		8976	9111	

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.



TABLEAU 6d/ TABLE 6d

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

" L'Europe de l'Ouest devrait faire plus d'efforts pour s'assurer une défense militaire suffisante /  
Western Europe should make a stronger effort to provide adequate military defence."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	15	15		8	13		17	17		9	17		17	12		9	18	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	20	24		17	21		37	37		24	36		41	44		21	27	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	21	20		30	25		22	19		21	16		14	17		22	19	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	19	18		26	20		8	11		17	11		4	5		30	22	
Sans réponse/No reply	25	23		19	21		16	16		29	20		24	22		18	14	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	983	973		1073	1009		1003	962		1152	1006		997	985		1178	1070	

TABLEAU 6d (suite) / TABLE 6d (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE / COMMUNITY <sup>(1)</sup>		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X			1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%			%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	30	26		20	20		23	16			46		15	18	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	35	26		30	26		42	46			15		31	35	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	11	19		21	19		14	16			6		20	18	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	13	22		19	22		4	7			10		15	13	
Sans réponse/No reply	11	7		10	13		17	15			23		19	16	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100			100		100	100	
N	299	500		974	1011		1317	1395			1000		8976	9911	

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.

TABLEAU 6e/ TABLE 6e

ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"Le gouvernement devrait intervenir davantage dans la direction de l'économie /  
Government should play a greater role in the management of the economy."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK						FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	38	23		13	13		13	16		22	29		32	31		35	39	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	28	32		26	29		32	30		34	41		47	47		37	34	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	11	11		27	23		23	22		15	12		10	10		10	9	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	5	14		15	13		17	17		7	7		3	3		6	8	
Sans réponse/No reply	18	20		19	22		15	15		22	11		8	9		12	10	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	983	973		1073	1009		1003	962		1152	1006		997	985		1178	1070	

TABLEAU 6e (suite) / TABLE 6e (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY (1)		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X			1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%			%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	25	31		33	32		11	13			71		21	26	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	33	30		36	33		33	45			10		34	36	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	19	18		14	14		22	19			2		17	15	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	10	12		8	10		14	8			3		11	10	
Sans réponse/No reply	13	9		9	11		20	15			14		17	13	
Total	100 100	100 100		100	100		100	100			100		100	100	
N	299	500		974	1011		1317	1395			1000		8976	9911	

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.

TABLEAU 6f / TABLE 6f

ACCORD ON DESACCORD ≤ DES OBL MES SOCIO-POLIT MITE.S MPOUTMANS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"L'aide économique aux pays du tiers-monde devrait être augmentée.  
Economic aid to third world countries should be increased."

	BELGIQUE BELGIE			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND				
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X			
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	23	17	%	14	14	%	17	8	%	23	29	%	20	19	%	36	39
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	28	25	%	27	32	%	20	31	%	30	39	%	51	49	%	36	31
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	18	20	%	26	28	%	29	29	%	19	16	%	7	9	%	11	14
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	18	26	%	15	12	%	14	19	%	14	10	%	3	5	%	6	11
Sans réponse/No reply	13	12	%	18	14	%	17	13	%	14	6	%	9	8	%	11	5
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100
N	883	973		1078	1008		1003	962		1152	1006		987	985		1 178	1070

TABLEAU 6f (suite) / TABLE 6f (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNIT <sup>Y</sup> (1)		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X			1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%			%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	34	43		34	28		9	13			13		20	23	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	35	28		30	31		27	34			34		30	33	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	15	16		19	15		28	29			29		22	21	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	12	10		10	15		19	16			16		13	14	
Sans réponse/No reply	4	3		7	11		17	8			8		15	9	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100			100		100	100	
N	299	500		974	1011		1317	1395			1000		8976	9911	

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.

TABLEAU 6g / TABLE 6g

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"On devrait prendre des mesures plus fermes pour protéger l'environnement et lutter contre la pollution.  
Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment against pollution."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	70	61		58	55		48	48		69	68		50	42		75	74	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	19	28		32	33		40	41		25	28		46	51		22	22	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	3	4		4	5		7	5		1	2		1	3		1	1	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly		2		1	2		2	1		1	1			1				
Sans réponse/No reply	8	5		5	5		3	5		4	1		3	3		2	3	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
N	983	973		1073	1009		1003	962		1152	1006		997	985		1178	1070	

TABLEAU 6g (suite) / TABLE 6g (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY <sup>(1)</sup>		
	1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X			1981 X		1979 IV	1981 X	
	%	%		%	%		%	%			%		%	%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	79	81		76	70		58	45			94		63	60	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	17	15		19	19		36	47			1		30	33	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	2	3		2	4		2	4					3	3	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	1	1		1	1			1					1	1	
Sans réponse/No reply	1			2	6		4	3			5		3	3	
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100			100		100	100	
N	299	500		974	1011		1317	1395			1000		8976	9911	

(1) Y compris la Grèce depuis 1981 / Including Greece from 1981.



TABLEAU 6h/ TABLE 6h

## ACCORD OU DESACCORD SUR DES PROBLEMES SOCIO-POLITIQUES IMPORTANTS /

## AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

"Il faudrait donner plus d'autonomie de décision aux régions de (notre pays) /  
Regions of (our country) should be given more freedom to handle her own affairs."

	BELGIQUE BELGIË			DANMARK			DEUTSCHLAND			FRANCE			IRELAND			ITALIA		
	1981 X			1981 X			1981 X			1981 X			1981 X			1981 X		
	%			%						%			%			%		
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly	25			32						40			20			30		
Plutôt d'accord/Agree	31			38			38			38			50			31		
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree	11			11			20			8			11			11		
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly	6			3						2			3			12		
Sans réponse/No reply	27			16			18			12			16			16		
Total	100			100			100			100			100			100		
N	973			1009			962			1006			985			1070		

TABLEAU 6h (suite) / TABLE 6h (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG			NEDERLAND			UNITED KINGDOM			ELLAS			COMMUNAUTE/ COMMUNITY		
		1981 X			1981 X			1981 X			1981 X			1981 X	
		%			%			%			%			%	
Tout à fait d'accord/ Agree strongly		37			43			19			74			29	
Plutôt d'accord/Agree		28			32			50			10			37	
Plutôt pas d'accord/ Disagree		18			9			16			1			13	
Pas du tout d'accord/ Disagree strongly		8			7			6			3			7	
Sans réponse/No reply		9			9			9			12			14	
Total		100			100			100			100			100	
N		500			1011			1395			1000			9911	

TABLEAU 7 / TABLE 7

ATTITUDE A L'EGARD DE L'UNIFICATION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE / ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE (1) (2)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIË																		
	1962 II	1970 VII	1973 IX	1975	1975	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X							
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	31	31	22	23	21	27	27	23	20	25	18	27							
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	34	35	38	32	36	42	44	46	47	40	42	43							
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	4	4	3	2	3	4	6	6	5	8	6	5							
Très contre / Against -very much	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	3	2							
Sans réponse / No reply	30	29	35	42	39	25	22	23	26	25	31	23							
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	770	298	1266	507	1000	008	983	1032	009	022	949	973							

(1) (2) Voir page A 77.

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	DANMARK																		
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980	1980	1981 IV	1981 X									
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	17	17	15	15	14	13	12	16	17	12									
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	28	24	27	33	35	33	27	31	29	31									
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	14	13	16	17	18	18	19	19	16	22									
Très contre / Against -very much	18	17	18	15	13	20	21	14	18	17									
Sans réponse / No reply	23	29	24	20	20	16	21	20	20	18									
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1073	1023	1002	1073	1029	994	1024	1006	1009									

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND																			
	1953 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 III	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 V-VI	1967 V	1970 III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 R-XI	1978 I-XI	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	70	82	73	69	79	82	75	50	78	78	82	87	39	49	43	37	37	36	37	36
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent								31					37	29	34	37	41	46	44	44
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent								3					4	4	2	3	4	6	6	6
Très contre / Against -very much	10	4	7	6	6	5	7	1	3	5	3	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1
Sans réponse / No reply	20	14	20	25	15	13	18	15	19	17	15	11	19	16	20	21	17	11	12	13
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1591	836	820	813	863	1159	1299	1523	1234	1202	1255	000	1021	1957	039	1002	1006	003	005	009

TABLEAU 7 (suite)/ TABLE 7 (continued)

	DEUTSCHLAND																	
	1980	198	1981															
	X	IV	X															
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	38	3	31															
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	40	3'	3'															
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	1		1															
Très contre / Against -very much	2																	
Sans réponse / No reply	1:	1	1.															
TOTAL	100	10	101	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	10	100	100	100	101	100
N	1001	100	96															

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	FRANCE																			
	1952 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1951 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 1/11	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 v-VI	1967 V	1970 I-III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	60	63	49	41	53	67	55	28	70	80	74	72	24	23	35	26	28	25	24	19
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent								44					46	45	43	51	52	47	51	56
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent								6	8	5	5	7	6	3	4	3	5	8	7	9
Très contre / Against -very much	16	9	15	11	14	7	9	2					2	1	1	1	2	2	3	2
Sans réponse / No reply	24	28	36	41	33	26	36	20	22	15	21	21	22	28	17	19	13	18	15	14
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1345	847	900	801	800	1226	1200	1518	1307	1215	1228	1961	2046	2227	1156	1276	1194	1152	986	993





TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	IRELAND																		
	1973	1975	1971	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981									
	IX	V	XI	1978	1979	1979	1980	1980	1981	1981									
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	21	23	21	24	19	25	19	19	20	21									
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	31	34	30	45	45	43	41	39	39	41									
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	8	5	8	7	9	9	10	12	15	11									
Très contre / Against -very much	4	4	4	3	2	5	2	7	8	5									
Sans réponse / No reply	36	28	3	21	25	18	28	25	18	22									
TOTAL	100	100	100				100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1199	1000	998				1008	1007	1005	985									

**TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)**

	ITALIA																			
	1952 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 II	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 v-VI	1967 V	1970 I-III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 x-XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much								36					40	34	39	38	32	39	40	35
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	57	63	55	55	66		59	24	67	78	65	68	38	36	38	39	51	48	45	48
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent								3					4	2	2	2	4	3	4	4
Très contre / Against -very much	14	9	11	13	7		7	1	6	3	4	4	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Sans réponse / No reply	29	28	34	32	27		34	36	27	19	31	28	17	27	20	19	12	9	10	12
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1505	808	814	803	911		1269	1562	1344	1175	1166	1023	1822	1909	1043	1110	1030	1178	1170	116

**TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)**

	ITALIA																	
	1980	1981	1981															
	X	IV	X															
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	39	36	40															
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	42	46	42															
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	6	e	5															
Très contre / Against -very much	1	-	2															
Sans réponse / No reply	12	,	11															
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1108	1183	1070															

**TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)**

	LUXEMBOURG																			
	1970 II-III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X									
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	52	47	48	47	31	47	48	48	46	45	45									
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	24	33	31	39	43	42	40	38	39	42	38									
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	2	1	2	1	13	5	7	6	9	6	11									
Très contre / Against -very much	2	-	1	-	5	2	1	3	1	1	3									
Sans réponse / No reply	2c	19	18	13	8	4	4	5	5	6	3									
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	335	330	311	297	291	299	298	300	300	300	500									

**TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)**

	NEDERLAND																			
								1979	1980	1980	1981	1981								
								X	IV	X	IV	X								
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	62	30	34	37	33	37	37	34	28	35	3c	28								
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	25	44	39	29	31	46	47	48	48	44	50	46								
Plutôt contre / Against. -to some extent	3	7	8	3	4	7	5	8	10	8	8	10								
Très contre / Against -very much	1	3	7	5	3	3	3	3	4	3	5	7								
Sans réponse / No reply	9	16	12	26	29	7	8	7	10	10	7	9								
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	779	1230	1464	1093	1006	913	974	1092	999	1114	1091	1011								

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN AND UNITED KINGDOM																			
	1952 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1951 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 V-VI	1967 V	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 I-XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	58	78	67	61	65	70	64	47	59	69	63	14	28	23	22	21	20	21	23	17
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent												23	22	28	41	40	41	38	40	35
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	15	4	10	14	16	10	12	22	18	11	15	15	11	11	12	14	15	16	14	14
Très contre / Against -very much												15	11	12	10	6	8	10	8	15
Sans réponse / No reply	27	18	23	20	19	20	24	31	23	20	22	33	28	26	15	19	16	15	15	19
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1503	832	805	814	806	1210	1232	1261	1178	1179	992	1933	1328	1438	339	1317	1403	454	1432	369

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN AND UNITED KINGDOM																		
	1981																		
	X																		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	20																		
Très pour / For -very much																			
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	44																		
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	13																		
Très contre / Against -very much	8																		
Sans réponse / No reply	15																		
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N																			

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7(continued)

	ELLAS																	
	1980	1981	1981															
	X	IV	X															
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	33	30	36															
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	26	30	29															
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	12	12	7															
Très contre / Against -very much	11	13	8															
Sans réponse / No reply	18	15	20															
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1000	1000	1000															



TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	EURO 6																		
	1962 I-II	1970 III	1973 IX	1975	1975	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X							
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Très pour / For -very much	40	34	35	39	33	33	34	34	30	32	27	34							
Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	32	40	36	37	41	47	47	46	49	44	47	44							
Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	4	4	3	3	2	4	6	6	6	7	9	8							
Très contre / Against -very much	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	3	2							
Sans réponse / No reply	23	20	24	20	22	14	12	12	13	15	14	12							
<b>TOTAL</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>N</b>	6334	3752	9153	6149	5691	1442	5589	1583	5426	1538	5518	1522							

TABLEAU 7 (suite) / TABLE 7 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (3)																		
	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 XI	1978 X	1979 IV	1979 X	1980 IV	1980 X	1981 IV	1981 X									
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	Très pour / For -very much	30	35	31	30	30	30	27	29	26	31								
	Plutôt pour / For -to some extent	33	34	38	45	45	45	46	43	43	43								
	Plutôt contre / Against -to some extent	6	5	5	8	6	8	9	9	10	9								
Très contre / Against -very much	5	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	6	4									
Sans réponse / No reply	26	22	22	14	15	13	14	15	15	13									
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	3484	9550	9150	3788	8976	9021	3882	9001	3878	9911									

(3) Voir page A 77.

- (1) "D'une façon générale, êtes-vous pour ou contre les efforts qui sont faits pour unifier l'Europe occidentale ?

SI POUR, êtes-vous très pour ou plutôt pour ?

SI CONTRE, êtes-vous plutôt contre ou très contre ?" /

"In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe ?

IF FOR, are you very much for this, or only to some extent ?

IF AGAINST, are you only to some extent against or very much against ?"

- (2) Données provenant pour les années 1952 - 1967, y compris juin 1952, des sondages commandités par la U.S. Information Agency et, pour les années suivantes, ainsi que pour février - mars 1952, des sondages commandités par la Commission des Communautés européennes.

Nonobstant quelques différences de formulation, la question était initialement : "Êtes-vous en général pour ou contre les efforts qui sont faits en vue d'unifier l'Europe occidentale ?". En Grande-Bretagne (de 1955 à 1967, en Allemagne (de février 1955 à avril 1956, ainsi qu'en juin 1962), en Italie (en 1955 et 1962), la question précisait : "... L'Europe occidentale, y compris la Grande-Bretagne". En 1970, 1973 et 1975, il était demandé aux individus interrogés s'ils étaient favorables, indifférents, ou défavorables à l'unification européenne. Cf. : "L'Opinion publique et l'Europe des Six" ; Sondages, Paris, n° 1 - 1963, p. 46 ; "Les Européens et l'unification de l'Europe", Bruxelles, juin 1972, pp. 71 - 72 ; Euro-Barometre n° 4, décembre 1975, pp. 54 - 56.

Royaume-Uni (y compris Northern Ireland) à partir de 1975. /

- (2) The data for 1952 - 1967, including June 1952, are from surveys financed by the U.S. Information Agency and, for the following years, as well as February - March 1952, from surveys financed by the Commission of the European Communities. Notwithstanding some differences in the wording, the question was, initially, as follows : "Are you in general for or against making efforts towards uniting Western Europe ?". In Great-Britain (from 1955 to 1967, in Germany (from February 1955 to April 1956, as well as in June 1962), the question specified : "... Western Europe, including Great-Britain". In 1970, 1973 and 1975, the interviewed individuals were asked whether they were in favour, indifferent or not in favour of the European unification. Cf. : "L'Opinion publique et l'Europe des Six" ; Sondages, Paris, n° 1 - 1963, p. 46 ; "Europeans and European unification", Brussels, June 1972, pp. 71 - 72 ; Euro-Barometre n° 4, December 1975, pp. 54 - 56.

- (3) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'octobre 1980 /  
Including Greece from October 1980.

TABLEAU 8 / TABLE 8

L'ENTENTE ENTRE LES PAYS DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE AU COURS DES DOUZE DERNIERS MOIS /

THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS

"Au cours des 12 derniers mois, à votre avis, l'entente entre les pays de la Communauté Européenne (Marché Commun) a-t-elle, dans l'ensemble, plutôt progressé, plutôt régressé, ou est-elle restée à peu près sans changement ?

In your opinion, over the last 12 months, has the understanding between the countries of the European Community (Common Market) in general increased, decreased or stayed about the same ?"

	BELGIQUE/BELGIË							DANMARK						
	1977	1978	1981	1981				1977	1978	1981	1981			
	X-XI	X-XI	IV	X				X-XI	X-XI	IV	X			
	%	%	%	%				%	%	%	%			
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	21	27	10	11				19	16	11	9			
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	18	8	30	31				31	19	35	36			
A peu près sans changement/About the same	34	35	32	37				40	43	35	40			
Sans réponse/No reply	27	30	28	21				10	22	19	15			
Total	100	100	100	100				100	100	100	100			
N	1006	1008	949	973				992	1002	1006	1009			

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

		Plutôt progressé/Increased in general Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general A peu près sans changement/About the same Sans réponse/No reply												Total		N	
DEUTSCHLAND		1977	X-XI	26	33	17	28	24	9	36	21	19	14	100	100	999	1000
		1981	IV	%	%	%	%	28	17	36	21	37	19	14	100	100	996
FRANCE		1978	X-XI	24	23	16	46	14						100	100	1149	1194
		1981	AI	%	%	%	%	16	20	21	52	11			100	100	990

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	IRELAND						ITALIA					
	1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI:	1981 IV	1981 X			1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X		
	%	%	%	%			%	%	%	%		
	42	46	23	26			35	33	19	21		
	9	9	22	14			18	10	24	26		
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general												
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general												
A peu près sans changement/About the same	38	31	44	46			22	25	41	35		
Sans réponse/No reply	11	14	11	14			25	32	16	18		
Total	100	100	100	100			100	100	100	100		
N	997	1005	1005	985			1155	1030	1183	1070		

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG						NEDERLAND					
	1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X			1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X		
	%	%	%	%			%	%	%	%		
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	28	27	19	23			14	13	10	10		
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	19	10	26	31			24	11	34	32		
A peu près sans changement/About the same	41	53	45	42			48	54	46	47		
Sans réponse/No reply	12	10	10	4			14	22	10	11		
Total	100	100	100	100			100	100	100	100		
N	344	291	300	500			943	913	1091	1011		

TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	UNITED KINGDOM						ELLAS					
	1977 X-XI	1978 I-XI	1981 IV	1981 X			1977 X-XI	1978 X-XI	1981 IV	1981 X		
	%	%	%	%			%	%	%	%		
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	32	27	11	15					23	27		
Plutôt progressé/Decreased in general	17	17	51	34					9	11		
A peu près sans changement/About the same	42	43	30	42					31	32		
Sans réponse/No reply	9	13	8	9					37	30		
Total	100	100	100	100					100	100		
N	1351	1403	1369	1395					1000	1000		



TABLEAU 8 (suite) / TABLE 8 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE/ EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)					
	1977 x-XI	1978 x-XI	1981 IV	1981 X		
	%	%	%	%		
Plutôt progressé/Increased in general	28	28	15	19		
Plutôt régressé/Decreased in general	19	12	33	26		
A peu près sans changement/About the same	38	38	36	41		
Sans réponse/No reply	15	22	16	14		
Total	100	100	100	100		
N	8936	8788	3898	3911		

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'avril 1981 / Including Greece from April 1981.

TABLEAU 9 / TABLE 9

## JUGEMENT PORTE SUR L'APPARTENANCE A LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE /

## ATTITUDE TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1) (2)

	X/73	V/74	XI174	VI75	XI175	V/76	XI176	VI77	XI177	V/78	X/78	IV/79	VI/79	X/79
Bonne chose / Good thing	57	68	60	57	59	62	66	69	60	58	66	65	51	56
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	5	3	6	3	3	5	3	4	5	6	3	2	3	3
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	19	15	18	21	21	17	19	17	19	21	17	20	25	25
Sans réponse / No reply	19	14	16	19	17	16	12	10	16	15	14	13	21	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	266	1017	1505	1507	1000	963	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	983	965	1032
(suite / continued)														
	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81										
	%	%	%	%										
Bonne chose ■ Good thing	57	54	49	55										
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	2	4	6	5										
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad	25	24	27	26										
Sans réponse / No reply	16	18	12	14										
Total	100	100	100	100										
N	1009	1022	949	973										

(1) "D'une façon générale, pensez-vous que Le fait (pour votre pays) de faire partie de la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) est une bonne chose, une mauvaise chose, ou une chose ni bonne ni mauvaise ?" / "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad ?".

(2) VI/1979. Source : International Institute of Communications (London).

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply  Total  N	DANMARK													
	IX/73	V/74	XI174	V/75	XI175	V/76	XI176	V/77	XI177	V/78	X/78	IV179	VI/79	X/79
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	42	35	33	36	41	36	29	30	37	34	36	37	38	39
	30	31	35	25	27	29	34	30	33	31	25	25	28	27
	19	24	25	28	24	22	28	30	24	27	30	26	20	24
	9	10	7	11	8	13	9	10	6	8	9	12	14	10
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
1199	1168	1100	1073	1023	977	962	1010	992	983	1002	1073	1018	1029	

Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply  Total  N	(suite / continued)				
	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	
	%	%	%	%	
	33	32	30	31	
	29	29	31	29	
	28	30	30	29	
	10	9	9	11	
100	100	100	100		
994	1024	1006	1009		

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

DEUTSCHLAND													
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79	VI/79	X/79
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
63	59	62	56	161	848	57	54	59	58	63	66	59	2
4	8	10	8	6 6	212	5	8	7	3	4	5	6	6 C
22	26	20	28	727	030	31	23	24	24	21	20	34	25
11	7	8	8	6 6	010	7	15	10	15	12	9	1	8
100	100	100	100	1 000	000	00	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1957	1060	1042	1039	01002	1004	07	1005	999	996	1006	1003	807	1005
Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply Total N													
IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81										
%	%	%	%										
65	62	69	58										
6	6	9	6										
18	24	28	26										
11	10	14	10										
100	100	100	100										
1009	1008	1004	962										
Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply Total N													

Bonne chose / Good thing  
 Mauvaise chose / Bad thing  
 Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /  
 Neither good nor bad  
 Sans réponse / No reply

Total  
 N

Bonne chose / Good thing  
 Mauvaise chose / Bad thing  
 Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /  
 Neither good nor bad  
 Sans réponse / No reply

Total  
 N

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	FRANCE													
	X/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79	VI/79	X/79
Bonne chose / Good thing	% 61	% 68	% 63	% 64	% 67	% 57	% 52	% 64	% 57	% 54	% 59	% 58	% 49	% 58
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	5	5	6	4	4	7	7	6	9	9	7	56	9	6
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /														
Neither good nor bad	22	20	22	25	24	30	35	24	28	27	26	28	31	26
Sans reponse / No reply	12	7	9	7	5	6	6	6	6	10	8	8	11	10
Total	100	300	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	-100	100
N	2227	1308	1237	1156	1276	1241	1356	1256	1149	1276	1194	1152	1002	986

	V/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81	
	%	%	%	%	
Bonne chose / Good thing	51	48	50	53	
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	9	10			
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /					
Neither good nor bad	32	31	32		
Sans réponse / No reply	8	11			
Total	100	100	100	100	
N	993	986	991	1006	



TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply  Total  N	ITALIA													
	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79	VI/79	X/79
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	69	77	82	71	75	63	68	71	70	65	73	78	75	75
	2	5	3	3	4	6	5	5	5	5	3	2	4	2
	15	9	11	21	16	20	16	18	18	18	16	14	13	17
	14	9	4	5	5	11	11	6	7	12	8	6	8	6
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	1909	1030	1021	1043	1110	923	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030	1178	985	1170
Bonne chose / Good thing Mauvaise chose / Bad thing Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad Sans réponse / No reply  Total  N	(suite / continued)													
	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81										
	%	%	%	%										
	74	71	73	70										
	3	5	5	5										
	16	17	19	20										
	7	7	3	5										
	100	100	100	100										
	1116	1108	1183	1070										

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

<b>Bonne chose / Good thing</b> <b>Yauvaise chose / Bad thing</b> <b>Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /</b> <b>Neither good nor bad</b> <b>Sans réponse / No reply</b>  <b>Total</b>  <b>N</b>														
	<b>IX/73</b>	<b>V/74</b>	<b>XI/74</b>	<b>V/75</b>	<b>XI/75</b>	<b>V/76</b>	<b>XI/76</b>	<b>V/77</b>	<b>XI/77</b>	<b>V/78</b>	<b>X/78</b>	<b>IV/79</b>	<b>VI/79</b>	<b>X/79</b>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	67	79	73	65	78	66	77	64	73	73	63	83		86
	3	4	3	7	4	5	2	2	3	5	14	3		3
	22	12	13	19	12	21	17	11	17	16	15	12		10
	2	5	11	9	6	8	4	3	7	6	2	2		1
<b>Bonne chose / Good thing</b> <b>Yauvaise chose / Bad thing</b> <b>Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /</b> <b>Neither good nor bad</b> <b>Sans reponse / No reply</b>  <b>Total</b>  <b>N</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100
	330	308	297	311	297	268	301	302	344	322	291	299		298
	<b>IV/80</b>	<b>X/80</b>	<b>IV/81</b>	<b>X/81</b>										
	%	%	%	%										
<b>Bonne chose / Good thing</b> <b>Yauvaise chose / Bad thing</b> <b>Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /</b> <b>Neither good nor bad</b> <b>Sans reponse / No reply</b>  <b>Total</b>  <b>N</b>	84	73	79	76										
	3	3	3	5										
	10	22	15	17										
	3	2	3	2										
<b>Total</b>  <b>N</b>	100	100	100	100										
	300	300	300	500										



TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

NEDERLAND														
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79	VI/79	X/79	
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
63 4	66 4	70 6	64 3	67 3	73 4	74 4	80 8	74 5	78 5	83 2	84 2	52 6	78 3	
20 13	14 16	15 9	18 15	12 18	15 6	14 8	13 4	16 5	14 3	12 3	10 4	16 26	15 4	
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
1464	1000	1012	1093	1006	1004	1128	1033	943	1131	913	974	1159	1092	
(suite continue)														
IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81											
%	%	%	%											
75 3	75 5	76 6	75 3											
16 6	14 6	14 4	15 7											
100	100	100	100											
999	1114	1091	1011											

Bonne chose / Good thing	
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	
Neither good nor bad	
Sans réponse / No reply	
Total	
N	

Bonne chose / Good thing	
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /	
Neither good nor bad	
Sans réponse / No reply	
Total	
N	

Bonne chose / Good thing  
 Mauvaise chose / Bad thing  
 Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /  
 Neither good nor bad  
 Sans réponse / No reply

Total  
 N

Bonne chose / Good thing  
 Mauvaise chose / Bad thing  
 Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /  
 Neither good nor bad  
 Sans réponse / No reply

Total  
 N

A 92

A 92

- (1) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more, only Great Britain. / Population de 18 ans et au-delà, seulement Grande-Bretagne.
- (2) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Great Britain from 1973 to 1974; United Kingdom as from 1975 / Population de 15 ans et au-delà. Grande-Bretagne de 1973 à 1974; Royaume-Uni depuis 1975.
- (3) NOP Market Research. Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain. / Population de 18 ans et au-delà, seulement Grande-Bretagne.
- (4) International Institute of Communications (London).

**TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)**

<b>Bonne chose / Good thing</b> <b>Mauvaise chose / Bad thing</b> <b>Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /</b> <b>Neither good nor bad</b> <b>Sans réponse / No reply</b>  <b>Total</b> <b>N</b>			
	<b>IV/81</b>	<b>X/81</b>	
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	
	42	38	
	22	21	
	26	26	
	10	15	
	100	100	
	1000	1000	

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

EURO 6												
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV/79	VI/79	X/79	IV/80
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
63	67	69	63	67	57	64	60	66	68	60	66	64
4	6	6	5	4	8	6	6	4	4	6	4	5
19	18	17	24	22	26	21	22	20	20	26	22	22
14	9	8	8	7	9	9	12	10	8	8	8	9
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
9153	5723	6114	6149	5691	5303	609	5913	5442	5589	5918	5583	5426
(suite / continued)												
X/80	IV/81	X/81										
%	%	%										
67	50	61										
0	3	6										
25	25	26										
10	9	7										
100	100	100										
Total												
N												
5538	5518	5522										

TABLEAU 9 (suite) / TABLE 9 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)													
	IX173	V/74	XI174	V/75	XI175	V/76	XI176	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	IV179	VI/79	X/79
Bonne chose / Good thing	56	59	60	59	63	53	55	57	56	53	60	59	54	58
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	11	14	14	9	9	14	13	14	14	13	10	12	14	12
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /														
Neither good nor bad	20	18	18	23	21	24	25	21	23	24	22	21	25	23
Sans réponse / No reply	13	9	8	9	7	9	7	8	7	10	8	8	8	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	13 484	8922	9253	9550	9150	8627	9210	9044	8936	9327	8788	8976	8126	9021
(suite / continued)														
	IV/80	X/80	IV/81	X/81										
Bonne chose / Good thing	55	53	50	53										
Mauvaise chose / Bad thing	15	16	17	14										
Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise /														
Neither good nor bad	22	23	25	26										
Sans reponse / No reply	8	8	8	7										
Total	100	100	100	100										
N	8882	9001	9898	9911										

(1) Y compris la Grèce à partir d'avril 1981 / Including Greece from April 1981.

TABLEAU 10 / TABLE 10

L'ATTITUDE EN CAS D'ABANDON DU MARCHÉ COMMUN /  
 ATTITUDE IF THE COMMON MARKET HAD BEEN SCRAPPED (1)

		BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
		I/71	X/73	V/74	I/74	V/75	XI/75	I/77	IV/81	X/81	
Eprouveraient / Would be		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
- De grands regrets / Very sorry		25	39	48	42	39	42	44	23	28	
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent		53	44	30	33	33	34	34	53	50	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved		4	3	2	4	2	2	5	4	3	
- Sans réponse / No reply		18	14	20	21	26	22	17	20	19	
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N		1364	1266	1017	1505	1507	1000	1006	949	973	

(1) De 1971 à 1973 : " Si l'on vous annonçait demain que le Marché commun est abandonné...". En 1974 et mai 1975 : "Si l'on vous annonçait demain que (votre pays) quitte la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) ...". A partir de novembre 1975 : " Si l'on vous annonçait demain que la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) est abandonnée...". / From 1971 to 1973 : "If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped...". In 1974 and May 1975 : "If you were to be told tomorrow that (your country) was leaving the Common market...". As from November 1975 : "If you were to be told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped...".

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	DANMARK								
		X/73	V/74	I/74	V/75	I/75	11/77	V/81	X/81
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient / Would be									
- De grands regrets /									
Very sorry		30	27	27	33	33	30	25	25
- De l'indifférence /									
Indifferent		29	27	24	22	26	25	31	31
- Un vif soulagement /									
Relieved		29	31	35	26	26	34	31	24
- Sans réponse /									
No reply		12	15	14	19	15	11	13	20
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		199	168	1100	073	1023	992	1006	1009

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

Eprouveraient / Would be : - De grands regrets / Very sorry - De l'indifférence / Indifferent - Un vif soulagement / Relieved - Sans réponse / No reply  Total	DEUTSCHLAND									
	VII/71	IX/73	I/74	II/74	V/75	I/75	II/77	IV/81	X/81	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	52	57	53	55	55	53	53	42	51	
	29	24	28	27	27	31	25	31	30	
	7	4	5	6	5	4	5	8	5	
	12	15	14	12	13	12	17	19	14	
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
	2000	1957	1060	1042	1039	1002	999	1004	962	



TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	FRANCE									
	VII/71	X/73	V/74	II/74	V/75	XI/75	II/77	V/81	X/81	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Eprouveraient / Would be :										
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	31	42	56	50	56	50	45	34	37	
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	52	43	30	33	31	37	39	44	48	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	5	2	3	4	4	3	6	8	4	
- Sans réponse / No reply	12	13	11	13	9	10	11	14	11	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1806	2227	1308	1237	1156	1276	1149	991	1006	

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	IRELAND								
		X/73	V/74	YI/74	V/75	XI/75	I/77	V/81	X/81
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient / Would be :									
- De grands regrets /									
Very sorry		37	38	48	46	51	47	33	35
- De l'indifférence /									
Indifferent		40	27	22	32	30	30	43	35
- Un vif soulagement /									
Relieved		17	28	24	19	14	18	17	16
- Sans réponse /									
No reply		16	7	6	3	5	5	7	14
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		1999	1000	1000	1000	998	997	1005	985

**TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)**

	ITALIA									
	VII/71	IX/73	V/74	II/74	V/75	XI/75	II/77	IV/81	X/81	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Eprouveraient / Would be :										
- De grands regrets /										
Very sorry	35	41	60	65	52	45	48	50	45	
- De l'indifférence /										
Indifferent	38	44	22	23	35	38	38	39	41	
- Un vif soulagement /										
Relieved	3	1	4	2	3	3	4	4	3	
- Sans réponse /										
No reply	24	14	14	10	10	14	10	7	11	
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>N</b>	2000	1909	1030	1021	1043	1110	1155	1183	1070	

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	LUXEMBOURG									
	VII/71	X/73	V/74	I/74	V/75	I/75	I/77	V/81	I/81	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Eprouveraient / Would be :										
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	36	51	73	70	58	60	64	59	60	
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	42	35	17	16	22	24	25	33	31	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	6	3	3	2	7	2	2	3	5	
- Sans réponse / No reply	16	11	7	12	13	14	9	5	4	
Tota1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	inn	100	
N	302	330	308	297	311	297	344	300	500	

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	NEDERLAND									
	VII/71	X/73	V/74	CI/74	V/75	XI/75	CI/77	IV/81	X/81	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Eprouveraient / Would be :										
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	40	46	54	56	50	50	59	51	46	
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	35	37	20	25	27	28	29	34	33	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	10	4	4	5	3	2	4	7	3	
- Sans réponse / No reply	15	13	22	14	20	20	8	8	18	
Tota 1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1198	1464	1000	1012	1093	1006	943	1058	1011	

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

		GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM														
		X/72 (1)	I/73 (1)	II-III 13 (1)	IV-V 13 (1)	VI/73 (1)	VIII 73 (1)	X/73 (1)	IX/73 (2)	X/73 (1)	XI/73 (1)	I-II 74 (1)	III-IV 74 (1)	IV/74 (1)	IV/74 (2)	I/74 (1)
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eprouveraient / Would be	- De grands regrets/ Very sorry	26	27	28	21	26	20	21	20	21	23	19	27	24	24	25
	- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	33	28	27	26	24	22	24	33	26	24	26	23	21	28	33
	- Un vif soulagement Relieved	35	31	36	41	41	48	46	37	44	42	48	43	43	40	44
	- Sans réponse / No reply	6	14	9	12	9	10	9	10	9	11	7	7	12	8	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
y		1028	924	1013	873	885	998	18	1933	902	906	1054	1055	1007	1031	9a5
Eprouveraient / Would be	- De grands regrets / Very sorry	11/74 (1)	111/ 74 (1)	X/74 (1)	XI/74 (2)	I/75 (1)	V/75 (2)	I/75 (2)	I/76 (1)	II/76 (1)	III / 16 (1)	IX/76 (1)	II/77 (1)	X /77 (1)	XI/77 (2)	II/79 (1)
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	- De grands regrets / Very sorry	28	24	26	31	24	41	40	37	34	28	15	26	28	31	16
	- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	21	22	24	22	24	27	28	30	30	30	33	24	30	31	28
	- Un vif soulagement Relieved	44	47	38	38	40	23	26	24	28	35	34	42	32	32	50
- Sans réponse / No reply	7	7	12	9	12	9	6	9	8	7	11	8	10	6	6	
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		908	817	1006	1039	988	1328	438	1077	992	1038	976	945	954	1351	1009

(1) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain. Slight difference in the wording of the question: in 1972, "very sorry, indifferent, pleased"; from V/75: "very sorry, indifferent, relieved".

(2) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Only Great Britain from 1973 to 1974; United Kingdom from 1975.

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM									
	XI/79 (1)	IV/80 (1)	V/80 (1)	VI/80 (1)	X/80 (1)	VII/81 (1)	VIII/81 (2)	V/81 (1)	X/81 (2)	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Eprouveraient /Would b										
- De grands regrets /										
Very sorry	16	14	17	16	18	18	21	16	21	
- De l'indifférence /										
Indifferent	26	27	25	25	30	29	29	28	34	
- Un vif soulagement /										
Relieved	51	51	51	53	47	49	46	50	39	
- Sans réponse /										
No reply	7	8	7	6	5	4	4	6	6	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	948	943	1015	1046	921	923	1369	972	1395	

- (1) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain. Slight difference in the wording of the question : in 1972 : "very sorry, indifferent, pleased" ; from V/75 : "very sorry, indifferent, relieved".
- (2) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Only Great Britain from 1973 to 1974 ; United Kingdom from 1975.

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

Eprouveraient / Would be :	ELLAS		
	IV/81	X/81	
	%	%	
- De grands regrets / Very sorry	30	17	
- De l'indifférence / Indifferent	43	49	
- un vif soulagement / Relieved	18	17	
- Sans réponse / No reply	9	17	
Total	100	100	
N	1000	1000	



TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	EURO 6									
	VII/71	IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	XI/77	V/81	X/81	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	40	41	56	56	53	49	50	42	44	
	40	36	26	27	31	35	33	38	39	
- Un vif soulagement / Relieved	5	10	4	4	4	3	5	6	4	
- Sans reponse / No reply	15	13	14	14	12	13	12	14	13	
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>N</b>	8670	9153	5723	6114	5149	5691	5596	5518	5522	

TABLEAU 10 (suite) / TABLE 10 (continued)

	COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1)								
		X/73	Vi74	I/74	V/75	Xi/75	I/77	V/81	X/81
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Eproiiveraient / Would be :									
- De grands regrets /									
Very sorry		41	48	49	50	47	45	37	38
- De l'indifférence /									
Indifferent		36	27	26	30	33	32	36	38
- Un vif soulagement /									
Relieved		10	13	13	9	9	12	16	12
- Sans reponse /									
No reply		13	12	12	11	11	11	11	12
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		3484	8922	9253	9550	9150	8936	9898	9911

(1) Y compris la Grèce a partir d'avril 1981 / Including Greece from April 1981.