

euro-barometre

★ PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



No. 10 JANUARY 1979

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
RUE DE LA LOI 200 • 1049 BRUSSELS

EURO-BAROMETER

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

INITIAL RESULTS

OF A PUBLIC OPINION POLL IN THE NINE COMMUNITY

COUNTRIES ON DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT

No 10 JANUARY 1979

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

RUE DE LA LOI 200 . 1049 BRUSSELS

FOREWORD

EURO-BAROMETER PUBLIC OPINION POLLS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ON **BEHALF OF** THE COMMISSION **OF** THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES EACH SPRING AND AUTUMN SINCE 1973.

AN IDENTICAL SET OF QUESTIONS IS PUT TO REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES - **DIFFERENT** EACH TIME - **OF** THE POPULATION AGED **FIFTEEN** AND OVER IN EACH **OF** THE NINE COUNTRIES. THIS SURVEY WAS CARRIED OUT BY PROFESSIONAL INTERVIEWERS **BETWEEN** 15 AND 21 NOVEMBER 1978 IN THE HOMES **OF** THE 8 702 SELECTED **RESPONDENTS.**

EIGHT NATIONAL INSTITUTES, ALL MEMBERS **OF** THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING THE **POLL.** THE **NAMES OF** THE INSTITUTES AND **FIELD-WORK** SPECIALISTS IN EACH COUNTRY ARE LISTED IN THE ANNEX TOGETHER WITH THE RELEVANT TECHNICAL DETAILS.

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PRACTICE FOR THIS TYPE **OF** SURVEY THE COMMISSION **DISCLAIMS** ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUESTIONS, RESULTS AND **COMMENTARIES.**

CONTENTS

	Page
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	1
<u>I. SOCIO-POLITICAL INDICATORS</u>	2
1. THE LIFE WE LEAD	2
2. THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS	6
3. BASIC ATTITUDES TO SOCIETY	11
<u>II. ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT</u>	15
1. PUBLIC INTEREST IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS	15
2. PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE ELECTION	24
3. ATTITUDES TO THE ELECTION	31
3.1 For or against the election	31
3.2 Is it an important event?	35
3.3 Attitudes to the election: the whys and wherefores	39
4. PROPENSITY TO VOIE	48
5. VOTING INTENTIONS	58
5.1 Allegiance to a political party increases propensity to vote	58
5.2 Are candidates' ideas about Europe more important than their party allegiance?	61
<u>III. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE</u>	62
1. EUROPEAN UNION	62
1.1 General emotional identification with the European cause	62
1.2 Progress towards European Union over the last ten years	66
2. COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP	69
2.1 The Common Market: a good thing or a bad thing: now and in 10-15 years	69
2.2 Understanding between member countries over the last twelve months	74
2.3 Speeding up or slowing down the movement towards European Union	79
2.4 Hopes and fears about the Community	87
2.5 Solidarity: attitude expected from member countries	95
2.6 Benefit derived compared with other countries	102
3. SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY	105

INTRODUCTION

In around five months' time, between 7 and 10 June, some 180 million men and women throughout the Community will for the first time be called upon to elect the new 410-member European Parliament direct. This tenth Euro-Barometer deals largely with the public's views and attitudes concerning that event.

Of course, the election campaign is not yet properly under way, and debate on the subject - though often lively - is still largely confined to what we might call the "political circles" in each country, that is to say government, MPs, party leaders and activists, etc. But it was precisely in order to sound out the opinions of the general public before the campaign opens that the Commission had this survey conducted using a broader set of questions than in previous Euro-Barometers.

The first chapter shows recent trends in the usual socio-political indicators: satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the life we lead and with the way democracy works, and basic attitudes towards society.

Chapter II deals primarily with the public's views on the European elections.

And finally chapter III looks at attitudes to the Common Market and to the prospect of its further expansion.

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We have tried to keep comments to a strict minimum and to pick out the results and analyses which will be of greatest value to everyone who is going to be involved in the campaign for the European Parliament elections, whether as a political leader or simply as a voter. The findings are open to many other interpretations - some of which will be made in the coming weeks. In *any* case, as explained in the Annex, all the data are available for consultation, so that *any* public or private organization, political party or research body interested will be free to make its own analyses, either to test the validity and relevance of our conclusions, or possibly to consider in a different light some of the aspects of social and political life which we have been studying.

I

SOCIO-POLITICAL INDICATORS

Three general indicators were chosen as being particularly relevant¹ :

- satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the life we lead;
- satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the way democracy works;
- basic socio-political options: revolution, reform or defence against all subversive forces.

I. THE LIFE WE LEAD

"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?"

Once again, as Graph 1 shows, there is little change in the levels of satisfaction with life recorded in each of the nine countries, the differences between countries therefore remaining much the same.

Tables 1 and 2, which juxtapose the results for autumn 1977 and autumn 1978, show that this stability is common to all social groups.

¹See Euro-Barometer No 9, July 1978, pp. 1-10.

Graphique n° 1 / Graph 1

LA SATISFACTION DE LA VIE QUE L'ON MENE /

SATISFACTION WITH THE LIFE WE LEAD

Très satis-
fait / Ver
satisfied

Plutôt sa-
tisfait /
fairly sa-
tisfied

Plutôt pas
satisfait/
Not very
satisfied

Pas satis-
fait du
tout / Not
at all sa-
tisfied




Table 1

SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH THE LIFE WE LEAD

1. AUTUMN 1977

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very satisfied	46	53	24	13	42	8	38	44	30	22
Fairly satisfied	44	41	61	60	47	54	51	48	57	57
Not very satisfied	6	5	12	19	6	27	9	5	10	15
Not at all satisfied	3	1	2	7	5	11	1	2	3	5
Don't know	1	.	1	1	.	.	1	1	.	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	3.34	3.45	3.07	2.81	3.26	2.60	3.27	3.35	3.16	2.97
Order of countries	3	1	7	8	5	9	4	2	6	

2. AUTUMN 1978

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very satisfied	46	58	20	11	41	9	34	44	32	22
Fairly satisfied	43	38	65	59	45	54	49	48	55	57
Not very satisfied	8	3	12	23	8	24	13	5	8	15
Not at all satisfied	2	1	1	6	5	13	2	2	4	5
Don't know	1		2	1	1	.	2	1	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	3.34	3.53	3.05	2.76	3.23	2.60	3.17	3.37	3.16	2.96
Order of countries	3	1	7	8	4	9	5	2	6	

¹ Average weighted by respective populations aged 15 and over.

² "Very satisfied" = 4, "fairly satisfied" = 3, "not very satisfied" = 2, "not at all satisfied" = 1; "don't knows" are not included. Percentages expressed to the first decimal place.

Table 2
SATISFACTION WITH LIFE
RELATED TO SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA
AUTUMN 1977 AND AUTUMN 1978

(Community as a whole)

	Autumn 1977			
	Men	Women	Men	Women
<u>Total</u>	2.95	2.99	2.95	2.96
<u>By age</u>				
15-24	2.89	3.00	2.96	3.01
25-39	2.95	3.00	2.93	3.00
40-54	2.90	2.98	2.96	2.94
55 and over	3.01	2.99	2.97	2.92
<hr/>				
<u>By level of education</u> ¹				
Elementary	2.92		2.90	
Intermediate	3.03		3.04	
Advanced	3.00		2.99	
<u>By family income</u> ²				
R- -	2.83		2.82	
R-	2.91		2.84	
R+	2.96		2.98	
R+ +	3.07		3.10	
<u>By area of residence</u>				
Village	3.01		2.98	
Small town	3.00		2.99	
Large town	2.87		2.89	

¹Based on age on completion of full-time education: fifteen years or under, sixteen to nineteen, twenty and over (or still studying).

²The incomes of interviewees in each country are divided approximately into quartiles, to facilitate between-country comparisons.

2. AY DEMC WORKS

"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (in your country)?"

The answers to this question show that attitudes to democracy are less constant than attitudes to life in general. The trend since 1973 is shown in Graph 2, while Tables 3 and 4 give a more detailed breakdown of the results for autumn 1977 and autumn 1978.

Graphique n° 2 / Graph 2

LA SATISFACTION DU FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA DEMOCRATIE /
SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS




Table 3

SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS

1. AUTUMN 1977

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very satisfied	8	10	9	5	12	1	24	9	8	6
Fairly satisfied	43	57	69	44	57	18	44	55	54	48
Not very satisfied	18	24	16	29	16	45	20	26	21	26
Not at all satisfied	10	6	2	11	6	33	4	6	9	13
Don't know	21	3	4	11	9	3	8	4	8	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.62	2.73	1.89	2.48	2.84	1.87	2.95	2.70	2.66	2.51
Order of countries	7	4	2	8	3	9	1	5	6	

2. AUTUMN 1978

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very satisfied	4	10	9	4	10	1	15	9	6	6
Fairly satisfied	38	54	68	36	51	18	48	44	48	43
Not very satisfied	24	24	15	34	18	46	29	35	28	30
Not at all satisfied	13	7	2	17	11	32	3	8	12	14
Don't know	21	5	6	9	10	3	5	4	9	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.40	2.70	1.89	1.31	2.66	1.88	2.79	2.56	2.49	2.42
Order of countries	7	3	1	8	4	9	2	5	6	

¹Weighted average.

²"Very satisfied" = 4; "not at all satisfied" = 1.

Table 4
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY
RELATED TO SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA
AUTUMN 1977 AND AUTUMN 1978

(Community as a whole)

			Autumn 1978	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
<u>Total</u>	2.51	2.52	2.40	2.45
<u>By age</u>				
15-24	2.46	2.43	2.29	2.41
25-39	2.50	2.48	2.42	2.41
40-54	2.55	2.52	2.47	2.44
55 and over	2.51	2.60	2.39	2.51
<hr/>				
<u>By level of education</u>				
Elementary	2.49		2.43	
Average	2.57		2.46	
Advanced	2.47		2.34	
<u>By family income</u>				
R- -	2.45		2.47	
R-	2.46		2.31	
R+	2.51		2.39	
R+ +	2.57		2.53	
<u>By leadership rating¹</u>				
L- -	2.53		2.38	
L-	2.54		2.48	
L+	2.53		2.47	
L+ +	2.39 2.39		2.20 2.20	

¹See overleaf.

(Footnote to Table 4).

The leadership rating is produced by combining the answers to two questions, one on frequency of political discussions and the other on capacity to persuade others. See Euro-Barometer No 7, p. 10. Approximate distribution (in numbers and percentages) of the population interviewed by leadership rating is as follows:

		Aggregate of polls May and Oct/Nov 1975		Aggregate of polls May and Nov 1976		Aggregate of polls April/ May and Oct/ Nov 1977		Aggregate of polls May and Oct/Nov 1978	
		%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number
leaders	++	13	2427	14	2514	13	2361	13	2282
	+	29	5446	29	5228	31	5547	31	5659
	-	31	5892	32	5584	34	6171	33	6080
non-leaders	--	27	4995	25	4519	22	3967	23	4254
Total		100	18_760	100	17_845	100	18_046	100	18_275

3. BASIC ATTITUDES TO SOCIETY

'On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-à-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion.

- The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action.
- Our society must be gradually improved by reforme.
- Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces."

Although this question has sometimes been criticized for oversimplifying things and forcing interviewees to choose one of the options, whereas their real views might lie somewhere in between, the results which it produces have stood up to repeated examination. It is true that respondents are presented with a limited range of options, but if they felt that a choice was being forced on them, one would expect to find a high proportion of "don't knows", which is not the case.

Each of the suggested alternatives corresponds to a particular "personal philosophy" (an amalgam of the individual's system of values, political ideology and reaction to events) and the answers to the question can therefore be considered a useful indicator.

Graph 3 shows the trend in the replies given (combined into an index of attitude) since autumn 1976 and - for some countries - since early 1970.

Tables 5 and 6 give in more detail the results for autumn 1977 and autumn 1978.

Graphique n° 3 / Graph 3

ATTITUDES FONDAMENTALES A L'EGARD DE LA SOCIETE /

BASIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIETY




Table 5

BASIC ATTITUDE TO SOCIAL CHANGE

1. AUTUMN 1977

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
"The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action"	4	3	2	8	7	10	4	4	6	6
"Our society must be gradually improved by reforms"	60	55	41	65	54	61	55	55	55	55
"Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces"	19	40	50	22	26	27	28	37	28	32
Don't know	17	2	7	5	13	2	13	4	11	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ¹	2.17	2.37	2.52	2.14	2.22	2.17	2.28	2.35	2.25	2.28
Order of countries	7	2	1	9	6	7	4	3	5	

2. AUTUMN 1978

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
"The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action"	6	4	2	12	7	9	5	6	5	7
"Our society must be gradually improved by reforms"	61	61	43	70	61	63	65	63	63	59
"Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces"	15	29	44	13	20	24	22	25	25	27
Don't know	18	6	11	5	12	4	8	6	7	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ¹	2.11	2.27	2.47	2.01	2.15	1.15	2.11	2.21	2.21	2.23
Order of countries	8	2	1	9	6	6	5	3	3	

¹The index is worked out by applying the coefficient 1, 2 or 3 to the percentages corresponding to the replies "revolutionary action", "reforms", and "defence against subversion" respectively; "don't knows" are not included. The half-way mark is therefore a score of 2.00, corresponding to the "centrist" option. A lower score indicates a tendency towards the "revolutionary" option and higher scores show a "reactionary" leaning.

Table 6
BASIC ATTITUDE TO SOCIAL CHANGE
RELATED TO SOCIAL, AND DEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA
AUTUMN 1977 AND AUTUMN 1978

(Community as a whole)

	Autumn 1977		Autumn 1978	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
<u>Total</u>	2.26	2.30	2.18	2.25
<u>By age</u>				
15-24	2.14	2.20	2.09	2.10
25-39	2.23	2.22	2.18	2.20
40-54	2.29	2.36	2.21	2.26
55 and over	2.35	2.39	2.22	2.35
<hr/>				
<u>By level of education</u>				
Elementary	2.32		2.27	
Intermediate	2.30		2.20	
Advanced	2.13		2.08	
<u>By family income</u>				
R- -	2.29		2.25	
R-	2.29		2.18	
R+	2.29		2.21	
R+ +	2.26		2.21	
<u>By leadership rating</u>				
L- -	2.32		2.25	
L-	2.32		2.26	
L+	2.27		2.21	
L+ +	2.17		2.04	

II

ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The main areas of investigation at this latest poll were public interest in Community affairs, awareness of the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament, the public's attitude towards the elections and the likely turnout on voting day.

1. PUBLIC INTEREST IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

"Are you personally very interested, a little interested, or not at all interested in the problems of the European Community (the Common Market)?"

As this question has been included in several previous polls, we can see how public interest has developed over the last five years. The overall trend shows a decline in most countries in the proportion of people who consider themselves "very interested" in Community matters.

The proportion taking this view varies from one in four in Italy (24%) to only one in ten in Belgium (10%); the Community average is one in five (19%).

(See Table 7).

On closer examination, the results show that men - particularly the under forties - generally take more of an interest in the Community than women. But far and away the most significant factor determining the level of interest is leadership rating.

(See Table 8).

This prompted us to compare the replies given by leaders and non-leaders at successive polls. The analysis reveals that in almost every country, between 1973 and 1978 the level of interest in Community affairs fell most among opinion leaders. They nevertheless continue to show much greater interest than others. (See Graph 4 and Table 9).

Table 7

PERSONAL INTEREST IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

	Interested:			Don't know	Total
	Very much	A little	Not at all		
Belgium					
Sept. 1973	10%	39%	46%	5%	100%
May 1975	9	39	47	5	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	10	38	49	3	100
Nov. 1976	10	46	41	3	100
Oct./Nov. 1978	10	40	43	7	100
Denmark					
Sept. 1973	<input type="checkbox"/>	51	19	1	100
May 1975	22	50	24	4	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	19	51	28	2	100
Nov. 1976	25	53	20	2	100
Oct./Nov. 1978	19	54	25	2	100
Germany					
Sept. 1973	31	48	16	5	100
May 1975	26	48	22	4	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	23	51	23	3	100
Nov. 1976	23	50	24	3	100
Oct./Nov. 1978	16	53	25	6	100
France					
Sept. 1973	20	45	33	2	100
May 1975	27	53	19	1	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	23	54	22	1	100
Nov. 1976	18	57	24	1	100
Oct./Nov. 1978	14	54	30	2	100
Ireland					
Sept. 1973	27	44	29	.	100
May 1975	24	48	27	1	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	28	46	25	1	100
Nov. 1976	21	48	30	1	100
Oct./Nov. 1978	21	48	30	1	100
Italy					
Sept. 1973	21	44	29	6	100
May 1975	24	46	27	3	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	27	46	22	5	100
Nov. 1976	21	48	29	2	100
Oct./Nov. 1978	24	49	21	6	100

Table 7 (contd)

	Interested:			Don't know	Total
	Very much	A little	Not at all		
Luxembourg					
Sept. 1973	26	54	18	2	100
May 1975	33	45	16	6	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	28	55	13	4	100
Nov. 1976	22	50	24	4	100
Oct./Nov. 1978	17	55	26	2	100
Netherlands					
Sept. 1973	23	47	27	3	100
May 1975	16	45	31	8	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	18	47	27	8	100
Nov. 1976	20	57	21	2	100
Oct./Nov. 1978	21	57	19	3	100
United Kingdom¹					
Sept. 1973	23	43	31	3	100
May 1975	35	42	19	4	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	28	45	25	2	100
Nov. 1976	28	48	23	1	100
Oct./Nov. 1978	19	50	29	2	100
COMMUNITY²					
Sept. 1973	24	45	27	4	100
May 1975	26	47	23	4	100
Oct./Nov. 1975	24	49	24	3	100
Nov. 1976	22	51	25	2	100
Oct./Nov. 1978	19	51	26	4	100

¹Excluding Northern Ireland in 1973.

²Weighted average.

Table 8

PERSONAL INTEREST IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS RELATED TO
SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA
 (Community as a whole, October/November 1978)

	Total	Sex		Men aged:				Women aged:			
			W	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+
Interested:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very much	19	24	13	19	24	26	26	11	14	14	13
A little	51	52	50	54	57	50	48	55	59	51	40
Not at all	26	22	31	24	18	21	24	31	24	30	38
Don't know	4	2	6	3	1	3	2	3	3	5	5
	100	100									
Total			100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base	8791	4220	4571	846	1213	1012	1133	790	1214	1038	1437

Table 8 (contd)

	Total	Area of residence		Level of education				Family income				Leadership rating					
		Village	Small town	Large town	Elementary	Intermediate	Advanced	Still studying	Modest	Below average	Above average	Well off	Non-leaders (-)	(-)	(+)	Leaders (++)	
Interested:		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	Very much	19	18	17	20	13	21	35	16	13	17	19	28	5	14	24	42
	A little	51	50	54	50	48	56	55	54	45	51	56	54	35	55	60	48
	Not at all	26	27	25	27	33	21	10	26	36	28	21	16	50	28	14	9
Don't know	4	5	4	3	6	2	-	4	6	4	4	2	10	3	2	1.	
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Base	8731	2782	3433	2483	4608	2627	1037	461	1466	180	2036	805	1972	2360	2834	965

Graphique n° 4 / Graph 4

S'INTERESSENT "BEAUCOUP"
AUX PROBLEMES DE LA COMMUNAUTE
SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP

ARE "VERY" INTERESTED
IN THE PROBLEMS OF THE COMMUNITY
BY LEADERSHIP INDEX




Table 9

VERY INTERESTED IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS:
CHANGE BY COUNTRY BETWEEN 1973 AND 1978
BY LEADERSHIP RATING

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC
<u>Leaders (++)</u>										
Autumn 1973	38%	54%	63%	46%	52%	47%	(x)	55%	54%	53%
Autumn 1976	34	54	63	40	45	39	36	16	56	48
Autumn 1978	35	53	52	33	46	49	34	36	40	42
<u>Leaders (+)</u>										
Autumn 1973	20	31	38	28	40	28	(x)	30	35	32
Autumn 1976	11	32	29	24	31	29	18	21	41	29
Autumn 1978	15	20	22	14	33	35	21	22	27	24
<u>Non-leaders (-)</u>										
Autumn 1973	6	21	17	15	26	15	(x)	13	20	16
Autumn 1976	8	22	17	13	21	16	18	14	23	17
Autumn 1978	8	11	12	11	15	16	6	10	18	14
<u>Non-leaders (--)</u>										
Autumn 1973	2	12	5	8	9	8	(x)	10	8	7
Autumn 1976	3	5	4	4	9	6	17	6	9	6
Autumn 1978	3	5	3	3	12	9	7	19	5	6

¹Weighted average.

²Not available.

The extent of interest in Community affairs is clearly related to respondents' social and political ideology. But how closely the two are linked, and even whether the correlation is positive or negative differs from country to country.

As can be seen from Table 10, which relates to contacts aged over 18 - those eligible to vote in June - people on the left of the political spectrum are on the whole more interested in Community affairs (and for that matter in other political issues and politics in general). This tendency is particularly evident in Denmark, where the far left is strongly opposed to membership of the European Community. In Ireland and the United Kingdom on the other hand, more interest is expressed in Community affairs by people on the right.

This analysis must however be treated with caution, in view of the size of the samples, the unequal distribution between left and right and also perhaps the different interpretations which are given in the various countries to the terms "left" and "right". Nevertheless, it does at least give a first indication of just how complex people's attitudes to Europe can be: and after all, isn't being interested in something the first essential step towards becoming personally involved in it?

We will find this point cropping up again and again in the comments concerning direct elections.

Table 10
VERY INTERESTED IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
RELATED TO POSITION ON THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM
CONTACTS AGED OVER 18^{1, 2}

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EO
Total	10%	19% 19%	17% 17%	14%	22%	25%	17%	21%	20%	19%
Far left	(13)	[51]	(30)	16	(6)	[29]	(33)	[27]	24	[25]
Left	[20]	28	19	13	15	[30]	19	18	19	20
Centre	8	13	15	13	23	23	21	24	17	17
Right	15	21	17	18	[27]	25	17	24	23	20
Far right	12	28	[29]	(11)	[26]	(21)	(14)	19		17
Average	16.18	5.14	6.08	4.68	6.63	4.17	5.42	5.33	5.84	5.22

'Interviewees were invited to place their views on a scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right). About nine out of ten of those interviewed, though only two out of three Belgians, agreed to answer this question. The table below shows the percentage who answered in each country, together with national averages on the scale:

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC
National average	6.24	5.49	5.94	4.71	6.20	4.33	5.66	5.35	5.63	5.25
Percentage of contacts who agreed to answer	66%	90%	85%	85%	89%	87%	85%	94%	92%	87%

²Figures in brackets indicate samples of less than 50 people for the category. In addition, the results for Luxembourg should be treated with caution, in view of the size of the sample.

2. PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE ELECTION

Questions designed to find out how much the public really knows about the election of the European Parliament were first asked in spring 1977¹ and repeated throughout the Community in October/November 1978.

"Have you recently seen or heard in the papers, or on the radio or TV, anything about the European Parliament? This is the parliamentary assembly of the EEC or Common Market?"

IF YES: "Can you remember what it was that you heard then?"

(DO NOT PRESS OR SUGGEST OR PROMPT)

The answers showed that the level of awareness had changed very little over the eighteen months: approximately half of those interviewed claimed to have seen or heard some item about the European Parliament and of that number just under one in two in 1977 and just over one in two in 1978 was able to recall exactly what issue was being discussed.

All in all a fairly disappointing set of results and on close examination even worse for some countries than for others.

Disregarding Luxembourg in view of the size of the sample, we find that vague and/or definite awareness had increased in only five countries (Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium) between spring 1977 and autumn 1978.

(See Tables 11 and 13)

TABLE 11

INCREASE IN LEVEL OF PUBLIC AWARENESS OF DIRECT ELECTIONS BETWEEN SPRING 1977 AND AUTUMN 1978

	Of every 100 interviewed					
	Had seen or heard "something" about the European Parliament			Remembered that the item was about the election		
	1977	1978	△	1977	1978	△
Germany ²	33%	51%	+18	18%	40%	+22
Denmark	49%	60%	+11	25%	37%	+12
Netherlands	40%	48%	+8	13%	22%	+9
Ireland	47%	48%	+1	17%	28%	+11
Belgium	46%	49%	+3	19%	28%	+9

¹See Euro-Barometer No 7, July 1977, pp. 38-41.

²A EMNID survey conducted in August 1978 (results not published) showed that 70% of interviewees in Germany, when asked a question referring specifically to the election of the European Parliament, stated that they had heard something about it. This question was clearly much more suggestive than the one used in Euro-Barometer.

It is in *Germany* then that the level of awareness has risen most over the last eighteen months despite the fact that all the major political parties are in favour of direct elections, a factor which could have put a damper on the debate. Next behind Germany comes **Denmark**, where, by contrast, direct elections are still a burning issue both between and within the Danish political parties.

There was little change in Italy, while in the United Kingdom and France the general level of awareness dropped:

- (i) in the United Kingdom there was a substantial drop in vague awareness (down 14 points) while definite awareness remained more or less static;
- (ii) in France the percentage of those who had heard something about the Parliament remained unchanged (57%) but the percentage of those who remembered exactly what dropped by 10 points.

(See Tables 12 and 13)

TABLE 12

DECREASE IN LEVEL OF PUBLIC AWARENESS OF DIRECT ELECTIONS BETWEEN SPRING 1977 AND AUTUMN 1978

	Of every 100 interviewed					
	Had seen or heard something about the European Parliament			Remembered that the item was about the election		
	1977	1978	A	1977	1978	A
Italy	52%	49%	- 3	26%	27%	+ 1
United Kingdom	58%	44%	-14	20%	18%	- 2
France ¹	57%	57%	0	37%	27%	-10

¹An IFOP survey conducted in early September 1978 (results not published) showed that 52% of interviewees in France claimed to have seen or heard something on the subject and 22% remembered without prompting that the subject was direct elections.

Table 13

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF DIRECT ELECTIONS

	Had seen or heard 'something' about the European Parliament			Had not seen or heard anything about the European Parliament	No reply	Total
	Total (A+B)	Mentioned direct election: (A)	Did not mention direct elections (B)			
Belgium						
spring 1977	46%	19%	27%	45%	9%	100%
autumn 1978	49	28	21	43	8	100
Denmark						
spring 1977	49	25	24	48	3	100
autumn 1978	60	37	23	37	3	100
Germany						
spring 1977	33	18	15	47	20	100
autumn 1978	51	40	11	32	17	100
France						
spring 1977	57	37	20	40	3	100
September 1978 ¹	52	22	30	46	2	100
Oct./Nov. 1978	57	27	30	41	2	100
Ireland						
spring 1977	47	17	30	49	4	100
autumn 1978	48	28	20	49	3	100
Italy						
spring 1977	52	26	26	44	4	100
autumn 1978	49	27	22	45	6	100
Luxembourg						
spring 1977	62	37	25	29	9	100
autumn 1978	49	30	19	49	2	100
Netherlands						
spring 1977	40	13	27	47	13	100
autumn 1978	48	22	26	48	4	100
United Kingdom						
spring 1977	58	20	38	39	3	100
autumn 1978	44	18	26	53	3	100
COMMUNITY						
spring 1977	49	24	25	43	9	100
autumn 1978	50	28	22	43	7	100

¹Niveau de l'information au sujet des élections au Parlement européen
(Institut Français d'Opinion Publique, 28 September 1978)

It is difficult to explain **why** as polling day approaches and the debate in political circles hots up attracting wide press coverage (particularly true in France and the United Kingdom), public awareness over the last eighteen months should have increased so little in some countries and even dropped in others.

The most plausible hypothesis would seem to be that the direct elections debate in both countries is by its very nature producing a negative rather than a positive effect on the general public as the intricacies of the opposing arguments are not immediately clear. **We** will find the same problem arising in connection with the answers to other questions.

A breakdown of the answers to the question on public awareness of direct elections is given in Tables 14 and 15; these can be compared with Tables 24 and 25 in Euro-Barometer No 7.

In autumn 1978 **as** in spring 1977 **men** turned out to be much better informed than **women** in all countries; similarly, contacts with an advanced education were much more likely to **know** about the elections than those **who** had left school before the **age** of 16. But the most telling factor **was** leadership rating (leadership being a tendency to discuss politics fairly frequently combined with the ability to persuade others). **An** examination of the results for each country by leadership rating can help to show **us** to what extent information about direct elections is reaching the public.

Graph 5 shows five distinct trends in the information awareness pattern:

- (i) in Denmark, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands awareness increased among the public in general and opinion leaders in particular (this is in fact what we would have expected);
- (ii) in Belgium more of the general public knew about the election, but, strangely enough, opinion leaders would seem to have reached saturation point, possibly because they have had other more pressing problems on their minds (downfall of the Tindemans Government, dissolution of Parliament and elections);
- (iii) in the United Kingdom **it** is only the non-leaders **who** have reached saturation point;
- (iv) in Italy the level of awareness remained constant irrespective of leadership rating;
- (v) in France **and** apparently in Luxembourg too there was a decline in the level of awareness of direct elections among leaders and non-leaders alike; a more detailed study would be necessary to find out exactly why.

Table 14

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF DIRECT ELECTIONS
RELATED TO SEX AND AGE¹

	Total	Men					Woman				
		Total	15-24	25-39	40-54	55	Total	15-24	25-39	40-54	55
Belgium	28%	32%	34%	41%	33%	22%	24%	29%	24%	23%	20%
Denmark	37	46	38	43	45	52	28	29	32	30	23
Germany	40	50	39	50	56	50	31	34	31	32	29
France	27	39	25	46	42	37	17	12	16	19	18
Ireland	28	33	25	36	37	35	23	21	28	24	20
Italy	27	37	31	44	35	22	18	22	23	12	15
Luxembourg	30	32	19	43	35	24	28	17	28	36	23
Netherlands	22	31	28	29	25	38	15	19	11	21	10
United Kingdom	18	25	24	19	26	27	11	10	8	17	11
COMMUNITY ²	28	37	30	40	40	37	20	20	20	21	19

¹Percentage of contacts in each category who have heard "something" about the European Parliament and can recall without prompting that the subject was direct elections.

²Weighted average.

Table 15

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF DIRECT ELECTIONS
RELATED TO INCOME, EDUCATION AND LEADERSHIP RATING¹


	Total	Income				Education			Leadership rating			
		R--	R-	R+	R++	Elementary	Intermediate	Advanced	L--	L-	L+	L++
Belgium	28%	21%	28%	25%	39%	15%	28%	52%	14%	24%	43%	44%
Denmark	37	32	37	38	45	32	40	49	20	31	40	67
Germany	40	32	39	48	49	35	45	49	15	37	50	81
France	27	20	22	32	44	20	28	43	10	23	33	49
Ireland	28	22	21	31	44	19	34	41	18	26	38	42
Italy	27	19	29	29	36	18	40	47	8	27	35	45
Luxembourg	30	22	16	36	54	24	31	45	18	24	35	39
Netherlands	22	20	17	20	31	19	22	29	9	17	21	40
United Kingdom	18	11	21	23	19	13	24	28	8	17	24	30
COMMUNITY ²	28	22	28	33	37	22	32	41	11	26	36	49

^{1, 2}See footnotes to Tables 2 and 4.

Graphique n° 5 / Graph 5

L'INFORMATION DU PUBLIC
SUR L'ELECTION EUROPEENNE
SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF
,DIRECTELECTIONS
BY LEADERSHIP RATING



L ++ —————
L + ————
NL - - - - -
NL --

3. ATTITUDES TO THE ELECTION *

3.1 For or against the election

Despite the weak impact that the election would appear to have had on the public ~~as~~ revealed by the rather unsuccessful efforts to elicit a spontaneous reference to the event ~~the~~ vast majority are nevertheless in favour of the basic principle.

"In June of next year the citizens of countries belonging to the European Community, including (your country), will be asked to vote to elect members of the European Parliament. Everybody will be entitled to vote. Are you, yourself, for or against this particular election?"

There was little change here on previous polls with an average of seven in ten in **favour**: 80% or more expressed support in Italy, Luxembourg **and** the Netherlands compared with 54% in Denmark.

Graph 6 shows the trend in attitudes towards direct elections since 1973¹.

Details for each country are given in the Annex (Table 1); Table 16 below summarizes the main points.

¹The index is worked out by applying the coefficients 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively to the replies "completely for", "to some extent for", "to some extent against" and "completely against".

Graphique n° 6 / Graph 6
 INDICE D'ATTITUDE A L'EGARD DE L'ELECTION DU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN /
 INDEX OF ATTITUDE TO DIRECT ELECTIONS




Table 16

FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK ¹	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>"For"</u>										
Autumn 1973	52	36	69	51	45	64	67	62	33	54
Autumn 1975	53	32	73	69	56	78	75	59	41	64
Autumn 1976	69	42	76	69	63	77	77	74	57	69
Autumn 1977	63	54	73	70	74	79	76	77	69	72
Spring 1978	64	54	74	67	71	77	82	80	65	71
Autumn 1978	62	54	70	67	75	80	80	82	63	70
<u>"Against"</u>										
Autumn 1973	14	43	12	18	31	12	12	16	49	23
Autumn 1975	9	43	11	13	23	8	7	11	42	18
Autumn 1976	9	37	10	13	14	8	9	11	22	14
Autumn 1977	12	29	11	14	11	9	14	10	18	13
Spring 1978	14	22	7	12	10	7	11	9	17	11
Autumn 1978	13	22	7	11	7	7	12	8	21	11
<u>"Don't know"</u>										
Autumn 1973	34	21	19	31	24	24	21	22	18	23
Autumn 1975	38	25	16	18	21	14	18	30	17	18
Autumn 1976	22	21	14	18	23	15	14	15	21	17
Autumn 1977	25	17	16	16	15	12	10	13	13	15
Spring 1978	22	24	19	21	19	16	7	11	18	18
Autumn 1978	25	24	23	22	18	13	8	10	16	19

¹Great Britain only in 1973

²Weighted average.

It would appear then that the die is cast. In other words it is highly unlikely that there will be many conversions between now and polling day. The most that can be expected is the odd vacillation between the "completely for" and "to some extent for" camps as the election campaign gains momentum, but little more.

In fact, attitude to the principle of direct elections in most of the countries concerned is affected very little by the traditional ideological clashes. This is confirmed by Table 17, which gives a breakdown in the attitudes of the over-18s on the basis of their position on the political spectrum.

Table 17
FOR OR AGAINST DIRECT ELECTIONS
RELATED TO POSITION ON POLITICAL SPECTRUM OVER 18s'

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC
	%	%	%	%	%	X	%	%	%	%
<u>Extreme left</u>										
For	(57)	35	(85)	55	(57)	72	(67)	73	37	63
Against	(17)	58	(-)	29	(31)	14	(-)	21	50	23
Index	2.89)	2.09	(3.26	2.81	2.71	3.17	3.25)	3.09	2.22	2.92
<u>Left</u>										
For	65	48	53	76	72	83	86	86	66	76
Against	16	38	9	11	14	6	12	4	18	10
Index	3.24	2.64	3.16	3.13	3.21	3.38	3.25	3.50	3.12	3.22
<u>Centre</u>										
For	64	55	74	72	78	84	85	86	66	74
Against	12	19	6	7	7	5	9	5	20	10
Index	3.11	2.97	3.21	3.18	3.38	3.41	3.26	3.47	3.03	3.21
<u>Right</u>										
For	80	70	66	75	81	84	82	84	73	73
Against	13	16	11	9	5	9	14	8	11	11
Index	3.17	3.14	3.05	3.34	3.45	3.31	3.10	3.39	3.25	3.22
<u>Extreme Right</u>										
For	73	72	77	68	82	(93)	(50)	78	69	76
Against	10	12	9	5	2	(-)	(21)	9	26	11
Index	3.18	3.37	3.25	3.19	3.59	3.44	2.80)	3.36	2.97	3.20

↑ See footnote to Table 10.

While basic attitudes for or against the election are unlikely to change very much between now **and** polling day, the same cannot be said of the importance attached to the election, determination to vote **and**, obviously, the actual voting pattern.

Determination to vote **and** voting pattern will be looked at later in the **report**. However, the answers to the following question on the importance attached to the election bear out what **was** said above about the weak impact the event has had on the public.

3.2 Is it **an** important event?

The following question has been asked regularly since **autumn** 1976.

"Which one of these opinions comes closest to your **own** on the future elections to the European Parliament?"

- It is **an** event with important consequences which is certain to make Europe more politically unified,
- It is an unimportant event because the national governments will not be bound **by** the votes in the European Parliament."

For the past two years the percentage of persons questioned throughout the Community who view the election as an event with important consequences **has** been consistently around 50%, while approximately 30% consider it an unimportant event and 20% **are** undecided.

(See Table 18)

Not surprisingly, opinion leaders are generally much more committed and attribute greater importance to the event than the general public.

(See Table 19)

But the most interesting point to emerge is the differing change in attitude in individual countries: only in Denmark has there been **any** significant increase in support for the first option since autumn 1976 (up **by** 11 points). In Luxembourg, the Netherlands **and** France the proportion viewing the election as an important event has fallen since spring 1977 by 11, 10 **and** 8 points respectively.

Table 18

IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>"It is an event with important consequences which is certain to make Europe more politically unified"</u>										
Autumn 1976	53	35	47	46	38	56	53	48	41	48
spring 1977	55	40	41	58	50	62	64	58	51	53
Autumn 1977	49	44	46	49	48	59	52	52	47	50
Spring 1978	46	42	44	46	47	58	54	48	44	48
Autumn 1978	50	46	40	50	52	63	53	48	50	50
<u>"It is an unimportant event because national governments will not be bound by votes in the European Parliament"</u> ²										
Autumn 1976	19	33	35	28	27	19	25	29	31	28
Spring 1977	16	25	37	23	28	22	20	28	29	27
Autumn 1977	20	31	35	27	24	25	28	33	32	30
Spring 1978	24	30	34	30	31	21	31	36	34	30
Autumn 1978	20	24	35	26	26	19	24	32	30	28
<u>Don't know</u>										
Autumn 1976	28	32	18	26	35	25	22	23	28	24
Spring 1977	29	35	22	19	22	16	16	14	20	20
Autumn 1977	31	25	19	24	28	16	20	15	21	20
Spring 1978	30	28	22	24	22	21	15	16	22	22
Autumn 1978	30	30	25	24	22	18	23	20	20	22

¹Weighted average.

²The wording of this question in November 1976 was "Heads of State will not be bound".

Table 19

IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

EUROPEAN LEADERS RATING

(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders		Leaders	
	(--)	(-)	(+)	(++)
	%	%	%	%
<u>Event with important consequences</u>				
Autumn 1976	36	46	55	56
Spring 1977	36	51	61	62
Autumn 1977	36	49	59	56
Spring 1978	35	48	54	56
Autumn 1978	35	49	58	60
<u>Unimportant event</u>				
Autumn 1976	22	30	29	34
Spring 1977	26	29	27	29
Autumn 1977	26	32	29	32
Spring 1978	26	29	32	35
Autumn 1978	27	27	28	31
<u>Dontt know</u>				
Autumn 1976	42	24	16	10
Spring 1977	38	20	12	9
Autumn 1977	38	19	12	12
Spring 1978	39	23	14	9
Autumn 1978	38	24	14	9

The tendency to regard the elections as an important event rises with the level of support,

(See Table 20)

However, there is no significant correlation between the importance interviewees attach to the elections **and** their position on the political spectrum.

(See Table 21)

Table 20
IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO EUROPEAN ELECTIONS
BY THE OVER 18s RELATED TO ATTITUDE TO THE
PRINCIPLE INVOLVED
(Community as a whole)

	For every 100 who are:			
	completely against	to some extent against	to some extent for	completely for
			%	%
Regard elections as:				
An event with important consequences	18	22	54	76
An unimportant event	58	55	30	15
Don't know	24	23	16	9
Total	100	100	100	100
Base	438	567	3469	2679

Table 21

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO DIRECT ELECTIONS
BY THE OVER-18s
RELATED TO POSITION ON POLITICAL SPECTRUM
(Community as a whole)

	Far left	Left	Centre	Right	Far right
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Regard elections as:</u>					
An event with important consequences	45	55	53	49	55
An unimportant event	37	29	27	32	25
Don't know	18	16	20	19	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Base	808	1664	2841	1291	564

¹See footnote to Table 10.

3.3 Attitude to the election: the whys and wherefores

One objective of this pre-election survey was **obviously** to explore the ideas and emotions underlying the overall attitude to direct elections. A number of questions asked in previous opinion polls were repeated with this in mind: some dealt with common arguments for and against the election and others with the attitude expected of European MPs.

3.3.1 Arguments for and against direct elections

"Here are some comments about holding the European Parliamentary elections next year. Please say, for each one, whether you agree with it or not, and how strongly you feel.

- Elections are necessary to give more democratic control over the Community and the officials in Brussels.

- Elections are necessary to decide what kind of Europe we want.
- They would lead to too much power for the European Parliament compared with our own Parliament in (country)."¹

The first point to emerge is that the replies have remained remarkably constant, thus confirming the validity of our conclusions² ■

The most popular argument for holding elections "endorsed by three quarters of the sample" is that they are necessary to decide what kind of Europe we want. The need for increased democratic control over "officials in Brussels" was felt by only 63% of contacts. The negative argument that elections would give too much power to the European Parliament was accepted by 35% and rejected by 43% of those interviewed.

There is little variation between the nine countries. Nevertheless, although "the kind of Europe we want" was more popular than "more control over officials in Brussels" in eight of the nine countries, the Danes gave almost equal backing to the two arguments. The argument for greater control was fairly well supported in the United Kingdom too, but still took second place. Replies to the negative suggestion that a directly-elected European Parliament might encroach on national parliaments showed that this fear was rather more widespread in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom than elsewhere.

(See Table 22)

¹See Euro-Barometer No 7, July 1977, pp. 55-61 ■

²The factor determining the validity of the findings of an opinion poll conducted on representative samples is the size of the sample and not the sampling rate (i.e. the ratio between the number of contacts and the number of persons represented). Repeating a question within a period of time sufficiently short to allow the "time" variable to be disregarded more or less amounts to doubling the size of the sample and hence increasing the validity of the results by $\sqrt{2}$ or just over 40%.

Table 22

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DIRECT ELECTIONS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>European elections are necessary to give more democratic control over the Community and the officials in Brussels</u>										
Strongly agree	19	23	23	15	37	17	17	27	29	22
Agree to some extent	29	34	42	42	41	36	38	36	48	41
Disagree somewhat	11	9	11	11	7	17	21	14	6	11
Disagree totally	9	9	5	5	2	8	8	11	4	6
Don't know	32	25	19	27	13	22	16	12	13	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1978 index ²	2.85	2.95	3.03	2.91	3.29	2.79	2.76	2.90	3.16	2.98
1977 index ²	2.96	3.17	3.06	2.91	3.32	2.76	3.17	2.91	3.19	3.00
<u>European elections are necessary to decide what kind of Europe we want</u>										
Strongly agree	34	22	31	31	46	33	28	34	34	32
Agree to some extent	32	35	42	45	40	43	42	44	45	43
Disagree somewhat	3	9	10	6	6	8	14	9	6	8
Disagree totally	3	10	4	3	2	3	3	5	5	4
Don't know	28	24	13	15	6	13	13	8	10	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1978 index ²	3.33	2.91	3.15	3.21	3.38	3.21	3.09	3.15	3.20	3.19
1977 index ²	3.36	3.09	3.23	3.3	3.39	3.20	3.51	3.28	3.24	3.25
<u>These elections would lead to too much power for the European Parliament compared with our own Parliament (country)</u>										
Strongly agree	14	20	8	13	15	7	12	16	16	11
Agree to some extent	19	22	23	21	31	21	25	22	30	24
Disagree somewhat	21	18	29	24	25	26	30	29	25	26
Disagree totally	12	11	18	13	9	27	13	23	11	17
Don't know	34	29	22	29	20	19	20	10	18	22
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1978 index ²	2.53	2.71	2.27	2.4	2.65	2.08	2.44	2.34	2.63	2.37
1977 index ²	1.47	2.72	2.37	2.43	2.53	2.07	2.36	2.25	2.61	2.37

¹Weighted average.

²"Strongly agree" = 4; "Disagree totally" = 1.

Opinion leaders were more ready than the rest to answer these relatively "tricky" questions. In addition, analysis showed a link between leadership ratings and one of the three arguments: opinion leaders were less afraid than non-leaders that direct elections might result in too much power for the European Parliament.

(See Table 23)

A further point of interest to emerge was that the three arguments did not all weigh equally on attitudes to the principle of direct elections: the second positive argument - "deciding what kind of Europe we want" - had more bearing than the first positive argument - "deciding what kind of Europe we want" - while the negative argument - "could lead to too much power for the European Parliament" - stood somewhere between the two.

(See Table 24)

Table 23

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DIRECT ELECTIONS

BY LEADERSHIP RATING

(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders		Leaders	
	(--)	(-)	(+)	(++)
	%	%	%	%
1. <u>FOR EVERY 100 INTERVIEWED</u>				
<u>To give more democratic control over officials in Brussels</u>				
Agree	47	63	71	68
Don't agree	14	17	18	24
Don't know	39	20	11	8
Total	100	100	100	100
<u>To decide what kind of Europe we want</u>				
Agree	60	78	81	79
Don't agree	11	10	12	17
Don't know	29	12	7	4
Total	100	100	100	100
<u>Could lead to too much power for European Parliament</u>				
Agree	34	36	35	33
Don't agree	25	42	52	59
Don't know	41	22	13	8
Total	100	100	100	100
2. <u>FOR EVERY 100 WHO REPLIED</u>				
<u>To give more democratic control over officials in Brussels</u>				
Agree	77	79	80	74
Don't agree	23	21	20	26
Total	100	100	100	100
<u>To decide what kind of Europe we want</u>				
Agree	86	89	87	82
Don't agree	14	11	13	18
Total	100	100	100	100
<u>Could lead to too much power for European Parliament</u>				
Agree	58	46	40	36
Don't agree	42	54	60	64
Total	100	100	100	100
Base				

Table 24

BEARING OF THE THREE ARGUMENTS
ON ATTITUDE FOR OR AGAINST THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ELECTION

(Community as a whole)

	Attitude to direct elections			
	Completely against	To some extent against	To some extent for	Completely for
	%	%	%	%
<u>To give more democratic control over officials in Brussels</u>				
Strongly agree	15	9	17	39
Agree to some extent	21	34	54	40
Disagree somewhat	13	23	12	10
Disagree totally	30	15	3	5
Don't know	21	19	14	6
Total	100	100	100	100
Index ¹	2.28	2.47	2.99	3.21
<u>To decide what kind of Europe we want</u>				
Strongly agree	11	15	29	56
Agree to some extent	28	42	56	35
Disagree somewhat	14	16	7	4
Disagree totally	28	13	2	2
Don't know	19	14	6	3
Total	100	100	100	100
Index ¹	2.28	2.67	3.19	3.51
<u>Could lead to too much power for European Parliament</u>				
Strongly agree	45	23	8	9
Agree to some extent	17	31	29	20
Disagree somewhat	6	15	33	31
Disagree totally	12	13	14	30
Don't know	20	18	16	10
Total	100	100	100	100
Index ¹	3.20	2.79	2.38	2.08
Base	438	567	3469	2679

¹"Strongly agree" = 4; "Disagree totally" = 1.

3.3.2 Attitude expected of European MPs

"Which of the following attitudes would you expect a member of the European Parliament representing (your country) to have?"

- He should support things that are good for Europe as a whole, even if they are not always good for (your country) at the time.
- He should support the interests of (your country) all the time whether or not they are good for Europe as a whole."

This question, intentionally provocative, is an extremely valuable indicator of public attitude¹ ■

The Dutch were again alone in strongly favouring the "supranational" approach, which was rejected by the majority of Irish, Danish and British contacts. "Supranationalists" also were still more numerous than "nationalists" in Italy, Luxembourg and Germany but did not have an absolute majority, while in Belgium and France the "nationalists" were just ahead.

(See Table 25)

In all countries the "supranational" option found more favour among leaders than non-leaders. However, even leaders proved more "national" than "supranational" in Denmark and Ireland, but not in the United Kingdom ■

These findings are illustrated in Graph 7, where each pair of columns corresponds to a given leadership rating (NL- -, NL-, L+, L++); within each pair the column to the left represents the "supranational" option and the column to the right the "national" option. The lines joining the tops of the left-hand columns and the right-hand columns show whether and to what extent the corresponding option gains or loses support according to leadership rating. The distribution of replies for **Denmark** and Ireland varies significantly from that observed elsewhere, in the Netherlands in particular.

¹ The more a person supports direct elections, the more he/she is likely to expect European MPs to be "supranational" rather than "national" in outlook.

ATTITUDE EXPECTED OF EUROPEAN MPs
RELATED TO ATTITUDE TO DIRECT ELECTIONS
(Community as a whole)

	Attitude to direct elections			
	Completely against %	To some extent against %	To some extent for %	Completely for %
<u>Attitude expected of European MPs :</u>				
Promotion of Community interests	17	23	44	62
Promotion of national interests	69	66	46	33
Don't know	14	11	10	5
Total	100	100	100	100
Base	438	567	3469	2679

Table 25

ATTITUDE EXPECTED OF EUROPEAN MPs:
PROMOTION OF COMMUNITY OR NATIONAL INTERESTS


	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	N	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
"Support things that are good for Europe as a whole, even if they are not always good for (your country) at the time"										
Spring 1977	38	32	41	48	35	46	49	62	41	44
Autumn 1977	38	36	49	48	35	54	48	65	42	48
Spring 1978	38	34	44	45	36	44	46	60	35	43
Autumn 1978	38	26	41	41	29	49	46	64	37	42
"Support the interests of (your country) all the time, whether or not they are good for Europe as a whole"										
Spring 1977	48	46	40	41	56	47	45	29	53	45
Autumn 1977	41	52	36	40	58	39	43	27	52	41
Spring 1978	48	50	33	41	65	43	48	31	57	43
Autumn 1978	41	55	38	48	65	42	41	26	55	45
Don't know										
Spring 1977	16	22	19	11	5	7	6	9	6	11
Autumn 1977	20	12	15	12	7	7	9	8	6	11
Spring 1978	20	16	29	14	5	13	6	9	8	14
Autumn 1978	20	19	21	11	6	9	13	10	8	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹Weighted average.

Graphique n° 7 / Graph 7

L'ATTITUDE ATTENDUE
D'UN PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEEN
SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP¹

ATTITUDE EXPECTED
OF EUROPEAN MPs
BY LEADERSHIP RATING¹



¹ Pour chaque degré de leadership, la colonne de gauche correspond à l'option "supranationale" et la colonne de droite à l'option "nationale" / For each degree of leadership, the column to the left corresponds to the "supranational" option and the column to the right to the "national" option.

4. PROPENSITY TO VOTE

An indicator of the probable turnout on election day is clearly of particular interest. Two questions - one which has been featured regularly since spring 1977, and one new one - dealt with this point:

"How likely is it that you will go and vote? Certainly, probably, probably not or certainly not?"¹

"When the European Parliamentary elections are held, will you be personally interested to know the strengths of the different parties in the new European Parliament?"

In the Community as a whole, more than three-quarters of contacts who will be eligible to vote, i.e. those aged over eighteen, said that they would "certainly" (52%) or "probably" (25%) turn out on polling day.

These percentages have remained much the same since spring 1977. Changes within each country have been minimal²; but there are still two countries where determination to vote is clearly below the Community average: Belgium, where there cannot be much doubt about the turnout, since voting is compulsory; and Germany, where the electorate seems as yet undecided³.

These findings are summarized in Table 26, while Table 27 gives the details.

¹In the two countries where voting is compulsory (Belgium and Luxembourg) the phrase "even if voting were not compulsory..." was added.

²The drop in the percentage of probable voters in the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg this time round may be due to a freak sample. Taking the results of the four consecutive polls would give an average of around 74%.

³According to an EMNID survey (results not published) conducted in August 1978 on a sample of Germans aged fourteen and over, 81% claimed they would vote either "certainly" (3%) or "probably" (43%); without attempting to explain away the discrepancy between these results and ours, it may be pointed out that in each case the percentage of "probable" voters is higher than that of "definite" voters, which would indicate a degree of indecision. Germany was the only Community country where this occurred.

Another poll carried out in October 1978 by the Kehrman-Institute (Hamburg) for the weekly magazine Quick found that 57% of Germans aged over eighteen would vote, as against 20% who would not vote and 23% undecided.

Table 26

CERTAIN OR PROBABLE VOTERS
OVER 18s

	Spring 1977	Autumn 1977	Spring 1978	Autumn 1978
Belgium	58%	58%	61%	56%
Denmark	63	73	70	73
Germany ¹	65	72	74	67
France	78	78	81	83
Ireland	82	85	83	85
Italy	87	88	89	90
Luxembourg	80	75	78	62
Netherlands	83	82	86	84
United Kingdom	75	75	74	73
Great Britain ²	75	75	73	73
Northern Ireland	72	76	74	78
COMMUNITY	75	77	78	77

¹ See footnote 3 on page 48.

² A Gallup poll at the end of July 1978 gave 70% for people aged eighteen and over in Britain: 42% "certain" and 28% "probable".

Table 27

DETERMINATION TO VOTE: IN DIRECT ELECTIONS

CONTACTS AGED EIGHTEEN AND OVER

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Will certainly go and vote</u>										
Spring 1977	38	44	28	52	55	67	45	61	48	48
Autumn 1977	36	55	35	61	57	67	49	64	49	52
Spring 1978	37	50	35	62	53	67	52	70	46	52
Autumn 1978	36	53	31	65	60	69	32	66	46	52
<u>Will probably go and vote</u>										
Spring 1977	20	19	37	26	27	20	35	22	27	27
Autumn 1977	22	18	37	17	28	21	26	18	26	25
Spring 1978	24	20	39	19	30	22	26	16	28	26
Autumn 1978	20	20	36	18	25	21	30	18	27	25
<u>Will probably not vote</u>										
Spring 1977	11	7	11	5	7	5	8	5	11	8
Autumn 1977	9	8	10	4	6	5	9	4	11	8
Spring 1978	8	7	10	3	5	4	9	3	11	7
Autumn 1978	8	7	9	3	6	2	16	4	10	6
<u>Will certainly not vote</u>										
Spring 1977	19	10	5	5	6	2	3	4	8	6
Autumn 1977	21	11	6	9	4	2	7	8	9	7
Spring 1978	20	9	4	6	4	1	7	5	8	6
Autumn 1978	23	8	5	6	3	2	16	5	11	7
<u>Depends</u>										
Spring 1977	6	10	4	6	2	3	6	6	3	4
Autumn 1977	6	5	3	3	3	3	5	4	2	3
Spring 1978	6	7	2	4	6	2	4	5	4	3
Autumn 1978	5	5	2	5	3	4	2	5	2	3
<u>Don't know</u>										
Spring 1977	6	10	15	6	3	3	3	2	3	7
Autumn 1977	6	3	9	6	2	2	4	2	3	5
Spring 1978	5	7	10	6	2	4	2	1	3	6
Autumn 1978	8	7	17	3	3	2	4	2	4	7
Total ²	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹Weighted average.

²Total at each poll.

Before we take a closer look at which sectors of the public are most or least committed to voting (or not voting), it is worth stopping to consider how reliable these results are.

As we pointed out when we first asked this question, the persons interviewed are merely stating an intention, and there is obviously no way of measuring their degree of commitment: it would be rash, for instance, to apply a coefficient of probability to the percentages replying that they would "certainly" or "probably" turn out to vote¹.

In order to throw more light on this aspect, a second question was aimed at discovering indirectly how far respondents felt themselves to be personally involved in the election².

Eight out of ten voters in the Community indicated that they would have some interest at least in the election results, but less than three in ten (28%) would be very interested: the latter figure was the same for most countries, the only significant variations being found in the Netherlands (38%), Germany (21%) and Belgium (19%).

(See Table 28)

¹ See Euro-Barometer No 7, July 1977, pp. 73-74.

² This question is regularly used in the United Kingdom to predict turnout at elections,

Table 28

INTEREST IN RESULTS OF ELECTION
OVER 18s

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very interested	19	34	21	30	33	31	30	38	29	28
Quite interested	26	24	34	33	28	31	34	29	30	32
Only a little interested	16	18	25	19	21	18	21	18	17	20
Not at all interested	29	16	11	14	15	15	11	13	21	15
Don't know	10	8	9	4	3	5	4	2	3	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ²	2.39	2.83	1.71	2.83	2.81	2.80	1.87	2.92	2.70	2.76

¹Weighted average.

²"Very interested" = 4; "not at all interested" = 1.

We can probably produce a more reliable indicator of propensity to vote by collating the replies to both questions - on intention to vote and interest in the results - rather than by considering them separately.

Analysis shows that while the vast majority of those determined to vote will be interested to how the results of the election (72%), a sizeable minority (26%) are not at all or only a little interested in the outcome;

	<u>Will vote</u>	<u>Will not vote</u>
A little or not at all interested	26%	81%
Interested	72	14
Don't know	2	5
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

The index of interest, which as we have seen is 2.76 for the whole sample (over 16s) varies with determination to vote, as shown below:

Will certainly go and vote	3.23
Will probably go and vote	2.55
Depends	2.08
Don't know	1.98
Will probably not vote	1.88
Will certainly not vote	1.42

These findings allow us to place those who replied to both questions (7 500) on a voting scale ranging from "unlikely" (scoring 1) to "certain" (scoring 8):

Attitude to results:	Determination to vote					Don't know	Total
	Certain-ly not	Probab-ly not	Depends	Probab-ly not	Certain-ly		
Not at all interested	1 383	2 172	3 81	4 233	5 289	121	1279
Only a little interested	2 83	3 238	4 87	5 629	6 487	122	1646
Quite interested	3 35	4 85	5 74	6 921	7 1414		
Very interested	4 23	5 11	6 14	7 7208	8 Po&—		2308
Don't know	28	24	22	77	63	216	430
Total	552	530	278	2068	4286	553	8267

For the Community as a whole the percentages of the total electorate corresponding to each score are shown below:

0	9.3	} 21.3% probable abstainers
1	4.6	
2	3.1	
3	4.3	
4	5.2	} 17.3% doubtful voters
5	12.1	
6	17.2	} 61.4% probable voters
7	19.6	
8	24.6	

A tentative breakdown can be given for each country, but purely as a working hypothesis, since allowance **would** have to be made for national electoral laws and voting patterns before risking a firm forecast ■

(See Table 29)

Table 29

HYPOTHETICAL VOTING PATTERN
IN DIRECT ELECTIONS
BY COUNTRY

	B ¹	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L ¹	NL	GB	N.Irl.	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Probable abstainers	41	24	32	15	14	11	30	13	25	21	21
Doubtful voters	17	17	15	18	18	20	17	16	16	27	17
Probable voters	42	59	53	67	68	69	53	71	59	52	62
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹In fact a turnout of close on 100% is guaranteed in Belgium and Luxembourg, where voting is compulsory.

²Weighted average.

This gives us for each country a percentage of "probable voters" which is lower than the total number of contacts who indicated that they would "certainly" or "probably" **go and** vote. With the exception of Belgium and Luxembourg - where voting is compulsory - these percentages are the most reliable estimates that can be produced at present of the actual turnout in June¹.

These projections of the size of the ballot are undeniably **low**. Leaving aside Belgium and Luxembourg where turnout is - of necessity - high (between 90 and 95% of those on the register), the figures for "probable voters" are much lower than the normal averages in the countries concerned: more than 90% in Italy and Germany, just under 90% in Denmark and the Netherlands, nearly 85% in France (second round), more than 75% in Ireland and about the same in the United Kingdom.

X
X X

Both the propensity to vote and interest in the results of the election are dependent on sex, age and - in particular - leadership rating, but seem little affected by political ideology.

(See Tables 30 and 31)

¹A revised estimate will appear in Euro-Barometer No 11, in early April 1979.

Table 30

DETERMINATION TO VOTE IN DIRECT ELECTIONS
RELATED TO SOCIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC AND CULTURAL CRITERIA

(Community as a whole)

	Will vote?					Don't know
	Certainly	Probably	Depends	Probably not	Certainly not	
Total¹	52%	25%	3%	6%	7%	7%
<u>Sex and age</u>						
<u>Men</u>	57	23	3	5	7	5
aged: 18-20	44	27	7	9	6	7
21-24	48	27	4	5	9	7
25-39	56	25	2	5	7	5
40-54	60	22	2	5	7	4
55 and over	62	20	3	5	5	5
<u>Women</u>	47	27	4	7	7	8
aged: 18-20	41	28	5	7	12	7
21-24	41	30	4	8	7	10
25-39	50	30	4	6	5	5
39-54	47	29	3	8	6	7
55 and over	47	21	4	8	8	12
<u>Leadership rating</u>						
L--	33	19	4	15	23	6
L-	42	30	2	11	11	4
L+	51	30	2	5	10	2
L++	69	18	-	5	5	3
<u>Position on the political spectrum</u>						
Far left:	56	17	7	9	7	4
Left	59	26	3	4	4	4
Centre	54	25	3	7	6	5
	47	30	3	6	6	8
Far right	57	25	2	4	6	6

¹Over 18s.

Table 31

INTEREST IN RESULTS OF ELECTION
RELATED TO SOCIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC AND CULTURAL CRITERIA

(Community as a whole)

	Very in- terested	Quite in- terested	Only a little in- terested	Not at all interested	Don't know
Total ¹	28%	32%	20%	15%	5%
<u>Sex and age</u>					
<u>Men</u>	34	33	17	12	4
aged 15-24	25	37	19	14	5
25-39	35	34	17	12	2
40-54	36	32	18	11	3
55 and over	37	29	16	13	5
<u>women</u>	21	31	23	18	7
aged: 15-24	18	30	26	20	6
25-39	24	34	22	14	6
40-54	22	33	23	17	5
55 and over	21	25	22	22	10
<u>Leadership rating</u>					
L--	11	20	25	32	12
L-	22	33	24	16	5
Lt	34	39	16	8	3
L++	60	28	8	4	
<u>Position on the political spectrum</u>					
Far left	39	24	17	16	4
Left	33	37	17	11	2
Centre	26	33	21	15	5
Right	26	35	20	14	5
Far right	38	30	18	11	3

¹ Entire sample.

5. VOTING INTENTIONS

As we have just seen, there is still some uncertainty - and it may well continue until the actual polling day - as to just how many voters will turn out to elect the European Parliament.

One thing which does seem clear is that determination to vote increases with allegiance to a political party, whichever one it happens to be. But on the other hand, a majority of interviewees apparently consider candidates' ideas about Europe to be more important than their political party.

These and other factors help to cloud the picture of actual voting intentions, that is to say the final choice of voters faced with a list of candidates standing for different political parties and - even when bearing the same party tag - for different concepts of Europe.

51 Allegiance to a political party increases determination to vote

"Do you consider yourself to be close to *any* particular party?
If so, do you feel yourself to be very close to this party,
fairly close or merely a sympathizer?"

In the Community as a whole, 36% of those interviewed considered themselves to be close to a political party; 12% "very close" and 24% "fairly close". Party allegiance is particularly strong in Italy (46%), the Netherlands (42%) and in Great Britain (40%); it is noticeably weaker in Northern Ireland (23%) and France (28%).

(See Table 32)

Table 32

ALLEGIANCE TO A POLITICAL PARTY FOR EVERY 100 PERSONS INTERVIEWED

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	GB	N.Irl	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very close	12	14	10	8	12	19	8	14	11	4	12
Fairly close	18	20	21	20	25	27	24	28	29	19	24
Merely a sympathizer	27	28	30	41	20	30	28	43	28	23	32
Close to no particular party	34	35	33	28	36	22	36	13	31	51	28
Don't know	9	3	6	3	7	2	4	2	1	3	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Our findings show that there is a strong correlation between determination to vote and allegiance to a political party.

Earlier on we concluded that the actual turnout in each country (leaving aside Belgium and Luxembourg where voting is compulsory) will lie somewhere between the percentage of those claiming at present that they will "certainly go and vote and the percentage of contacts replying that they will either "certainly" or "probably" turn out to vote. It is therefore of interest to obtain a country-by-country breakdown of these two groups of voters according to their declared political allegiance: the first group representing a fairly safe minimum figure, and the second an upper limit which is unlikely to be reached.

Table 33 shows that there is a closer link between a definite vote and allegiance to a political party in Germany and (to a lesser extent) in Great Britain, than in Denmark or France¹.

¹This can *also* be expressed as the ratio between the respective percentages of definite voters **who** are very close to a political party and those with no particular allegiance.

	Will certainly go and vote		Ratio (b) / (a)
	Very close to a party (a)	Close to no particular party (b)	
Denmark	66%	45%	0.68
France	77	50	0.65
Italy	85	50	0.59
Netherlands	79	45	0.57
Ireland	81	40	0.49
Great Britain	74	25	0.34
Germany	64	18	0.28

Table 33

DETERMINATION TO VOTE IN DIRECT ELECTIONS
BY ALLEGIANCE TO A POLITICAL PARTY

	B	DK	D	F	I ¹ RL	I	L	NL	GB	N.Irl.	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Very close to a particular party:</u>											
- will certainly go and vote	63	66	64	77	81	85	} 55	79	74	} 69	76
- will probably go and vote	14	19	28	10	10	5		9	12		13
Total A	77%	85%	92%	87	91%	90%	(55%)	88%	86%	(69%)	89%
<u>Fairly close to a particular party:</u>											
- will certainly go and vote	47	59	37	68	69	68	} 63	73	56	} 86	58
- will probably go and vote	26	21	42	16	25	22		16	26		26
Total B	73%	80%	79%	84	94%	90%	63%	89%	82%	86%	84%
<u>Merely a sympathizer:</u>											
- will certainly go and vote	36	50	31	68	58	66	} 59	61	45	} 83	53
- will probably go and vote	26	23	40	16	30	22		21	26		25
Total C	62%	73%	71%	84	88%	88%	59%	82%	71%	83%	78%
<u>Close to no particular party:</u>											
- will certainly go and vote	23	45	18	50	40	50	} 66	45	25	} 67	33
- will probably go and vote	17	16	29	22	26	25		18	32		27
Total D	40%	61%	47%	72	66%	75%	66%	63%	57%	67%	60%

¹Weighted average.

5.2 Are candidates' ideas about Europe more important than their party allegiance?

"When the time comes for you to choose your representative in the European Parliament, which of these would be the more important in your choice? Their political party or their ideas about Europe?"

Although we have no way of testing the sincerity of answers to this question and thus of assessing their value in predicting behaviour, our results show that in each of the nine countries the majority view was that candidates' ideas about Europe were more important than their party allegiance.

(See Table 34)

Table 34
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CANDIDATES' IDEAS ABOUT EUROPE

AND THEIR PARTY ALLEGIANCE										
	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. <u>FOR EVERY 100 PERSONS INTERVIEWED</u>										
Party allegiance	17	18	21	18	26	29	10	21	20	22
Ideas about Europe	55	51	51	64	53	57	68	68	68	59
Don't know	28	31	28	18	21	14	22	11	12	19
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2. <u>FOR EVERY 100 WHO REPLIED</u>										
Party allegiance	24	27	29	22	33	34	13	23	23	23
Ideas about Europe	76	73	71	78	67	66	87	77	77	73
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹Weighted average.

III

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

Although Euro-Barometer No 10 was largely devoted to direct elections, a number of questions were also asked to gauge general reactions to European unification **and** the Community itself: some of these appear regularly in the six-monthly European opinion polls and others were geared specifically to issues likely to crop up in the course of the election campaign.

1. EUROPEAN UNION

Two general questions were asked on the unification of Western Europe:

- (a) one very interesting one which enables a comparison to be made of "for" and "against" trends in several countries over more than twenty-five years;
- (b) a new question designed to assess whether the public feels that European unification has made progress or lost ground over the last ten years¹.

1.1 General emotional identification with the European cause

"In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If FOR: are you very much for this, or only to some extent? If AGAINST: are you only to some extent against or very much against?"

In spite of being so general this question is particularly interesting because it is one of the very few for which, in four countries at least, we have answers going back more than twenty-five years.

Graph 8 shows the trend in favourable attitudes for Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain since 1952².


¹See page 82 for the question on short-term trends: "over the last twelve months".

²See Annex (Table 2) for relevant figures. For the trend up to 1975 see the **book** by Ronald Inglehart: The Silent Revolution (Princeton University Press, 1977) pp. 344-348.

Graphique n° 8 / Graph 8

L'ÉVOLUTION SUR LONGUE PÉRIODE DES ATTITUDES FAVORABLES
À L'UNIFICATION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE
(DEUTSCHLAND, FRANCE, ITALIA, GREAT BRITAIN) /

LONG-TERM EVOLUTION OF FAVOURABLE ATTITUDES
TOWARDS THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE
(DEUTSCHLAND, FRANCE, ITALIA, GREAT BRITAIN)



When this question was first asked, support was expressed by 70% of contacts in Germany, 60% in France, 58% in Great Britain and 57% in Italy. Up to 1958 and the birth of the European Economic Community the fluctuations in replies followed a fairly constant pattern in all four countries and were probably determined by events such as the Korean war and the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), the failure of the European Defence Community (1954), the Soviet intervention in Hungary and the Suez crisis (1956) and so on.

But from 1958 the situation changed with public opinion in Great Britain going off at a tangent. The curves for the other three countries meet at the top end of the scale with public support in Italy and France catching up with and even overtaking the level recorded in Germany (around 1970 and 1975 respectively).

By autumn 1978 more than three in four of those interviewed were in favour: 83% in Italy and the Netherlands, 80% in France and 78% in Germany. But elsewhere the picture was less rosy with only 69% in Ireland and Belgium, 63% in the United Kingdom and 48% in Denmark. (See Table 35)

Graph 9, which carries on from where Graph 8 leaves off, shows the results for 1970 to 1978 .

Table 35
FOR OR AGAINST THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very much for	27	15	37	28	24	32	31	37	22	30
To some extent for	42	33	41	52	45	51	43	46	41	45
To some extent against	4	17	4	5	7	4	13	7	12	6
Very much against	2	15	1	2	3	1	5	3	10	4
Don't know	25	20	17	13	21	12	8	7	15	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

'For the exact wording and the relevant figures see Les Européens et l'unification de l'Europe (Brussels, June 1972) pp. 71-72 and Euro-Barometer No 4 (December 1975) pp. 54-56.


²Weighted average.

Graphique n° 9 / Graph9

L'EVOLUTION DEPUIS 1970
DES ATTITUDES FAVORABLES
A L'UNIFICATION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE /

EVOLUTION SINCE 1970

TOWARDS THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE



^I 1973: GREAT BRITAIN.

1.2 Progress towards European Union over the last ten years

"In your opinion, has the unification of Europe made some progress or lost ground over the last ten years? If progressed or lost ground: to a considerable extent or only a little?"

On average six out of ten felt that unification had made progress over the last ten years. This conviction was more widespread in Germany, the Netherlands, and Ireland than elsewhere.

(See Table 36)

There is a direct correlation between the answers to this question and to the previous one: contacts who felt that European unification had made progress over the last ten years were also much more in favour of efforts towards unification and supported direct elections.

(See Table 37)

Table 36

PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Feel that unification has progressed:										
considerably	14	18	21	9	22	14	17	7	8	13
a little	40	34	49	47	44	41	46	61	43	45
Total (a)	54	52	70	56	66	55	63	68	51	58
Feel that unification has lost ground:										
a little	11	8	7	17	7	13	16	10	17	13
considerably	2	9	2	2	3	1	3	3	9	4
Total (b)	13	17	9	19	10	14	19	13	26	17
Don't know	33	31	21	25	24	31	18	19	22	25
Total			100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Difference (a)-(b)	41	35	61	27	56	41	44	55	25	41

¹Weighted average.

Table 37

ATTITUDES TO EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND DIRECT ELECTIONS
RELATED TO FEELINGS AS TO THE PROGRESS OF UNIFICATION
OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS
 (Community as a whole)

	For or against unification of Western Europe							
	Very much for	To some extent for	To some extent against	Very much against	Don't know	Total	Index ¹	Base
For every 100 contacts who felt that the unification of Western Europe has:								
progressed considerably	58%	31%	4%	3%	4%	100	3.51	1177
progressed a little	35	55	4	1	5	100	3.30	3991
lost ground a little	25	45	16	4	10	100	3.01	1106
lost ground considerably	9	27	17	33	14	100	2.14	330
	For or against direct elections							
	Completely for	To some extent for	To some extent against	Completely against	Don't know	Total	Index ¹	Base
For every 100 contacts who felt that the unification of Western Europe has:								
progressed considerably	47%	41%	3%	2%	7%	100%	3.41	1177
progressed a little	36	46	5	3	10	100	3.28	3991
lost ground a little	30	39	12	6	13	100	2.06	1106
lost ground considerably	19	18	17	33	13	100	2.27	330

¹ "Very much for" = 4; "Very much against" = 1.

2. COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

In addition to the usual question on Community membership Euro-Barometer No 10 included a question on understanding between member countries in recent months **and** two questions on future prospects: how will the situation evolve over the next ten or fifteen years and should the movement towards European union be speeded up or slowed down?

Then to round things off a battery of questions designed to investigate the public's hopes and fears with regard to the Community, the feeling of solidarity among Member States and the attitude to enlargement, with particular reference to Spain.

2.1 The Commn Market: "a good thing" or "a bad thing":

now and in ten to fifteen years

"Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the Commn Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"

"And do you think that membership of the Commn Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad thing in the light of (your country's) future in the next ten or fifteen years?"

Everywhere except Luxembourg' support for the Commn Market has increased since spring 1978, but the long-term trend since 1973 (i.e. before the economic crisis) is towards stability rather than change.

Table 38 sums up the trend, which is traced in detail in Graph 10².


	B	DK	3	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK ³	EC ⁴
Autumn 1973	57%	42%	63%	61%	56%	69%	67%	63%	40%	56%
" 1974	60	33	62	63	50	82	73	70	36	60
" 1975	59	41	61	67	67	75	73	67	50	63
" 1976	66	29	57	52	50	68	77	74	39	55
" 1977	60	37	59	57	59	70	73	74	35	56
Spring 1978	53	34	58	54	54	65	73	78	29	53
Autumn 1978	66	36	63	59	63	73	63	83	39	60

Graphique n° 10 / Graph 10

LE MARCHE COMMUN EST UNE BONNE CHOSE /

THE COMMON MARKET IS A 'GOOD THING'

(1973-1978)



As in previous **polls**, introduction of the time element made little difference to the replies, except in the United Kingdom, where the Community **is** viewed more positively **as** a long-term proposition.

(See Table 39).

Table 39

OPINION ON COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
I. As things stand at present²										
"A good thing"										
Autumn 1977	60	37	59	57	59	70	73	74	35	56
Autumn 1978	66	36	63	59	63	73	63	83	39	60
"A bad thing"										
Autumn 1977	5	33	7	9	19	5	3	5	37	14
Autumn 1978	3	25	4	7	12	3	14	2	31	10
Autumn 1977	19	24	24	28	19	18	17	16	23	23
Autumn 1978	17	30	21	26	20	16	15	12	25	22
2. In ten to fifteen years' time²										
"A good thing"										
Autumn 1977	59	34	58	58	64	72	73	75	48	59
Autumn 1978	61	29	60	57	61	68	53	76	45	58
"A bad thing"										
Autumn 1977	5	30	7	6	15	5	4	4	26	11
Autumn 1978	3	20	2	5	8	3	16	2	21	7
"Neither good nor 'bad'"										
Autumn 1977	17	13	21	22	12	16	11	15	14	18
Autumn 1978	17	15	18	1a	13	13	19	15	18	17

¹Weighted average.

²"Don't know" and total (100%) are not shown.

There is a very strong link between the answers to these two questions, particularly the first, and basic attitude to Europe, but what we have termed general emotional identification with European unification' is much more widespread than support for the European Community as such. For every hundred interviewees in the Community as a whole, 75 were in favour of European Union and 60 felt that Community membership was "a good thing".

(See Table 40)

Table 40

ATTITUDES TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND
TO THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE
(Community as a whole)

	Attitude to the unification of Western Europe			
	For	Against	Don't know	Total
Attitude to the European Community:				
"A good thing"	55	2	3	60%
"A bad thing"	3	5	2	10%
Non-committal or don't know	17	3	10	30%
Total	75%	10%	15%	100%

¹See page 62.

The difference between the amount of support for European union (in general terms) and for the Community as such varies considerably from country to country: practically non-existent in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Ireland, it is most marked in the United Kingdom.

(See Table 41)

Table 41

SUPPORT FOR THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE

AND SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

BY COUNTRY

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Support for the unification of Western Europe	69	48	78	79	70	83	74	83	63	75
Support for the European Community	66	36	63	59	63	73	63	83	39	60
Difference	3	12	15	20	7	10	11	0	(24)	15

¹Weighted average.

2.2 Understanding between member countries
over the last twelve months

"Over the last twelve months, would you say, in your opinion, that the understanding between the countries of the European Community (the Common Market) has, generally speaking, progressed, lost ground, or has staged the same?"

This is a typical ~~opinion-testing question~~, the answers to which are largely dependent on the current mood, whether optimistic or pessimistic, created by the media. But this does not make them any less interesting as they could very well have ~~an~~ impact on attitude and behaviour, including electoral turnout and voting pattern.

In this latest poll, as in autumn 1977, around 20% of those interviewed did not reply and nearly 40% could not say whether understanding had progressed or lost ground¹. Of those who opted for one or other alternative, in both 1977 and 1978 more felt that the move ~~was~~ towards progress than towards a loss of ground: 28% against 19% in 1977 and 28% against 12% in 1978. This optimistic view, no doubt reflecting press reports since the early summer of a European monetary system, ~~was~~ particularly prevalent in Ireland and Italy. There ~~was~~ even optimism in the Netherlands, where the pessimists were still on top in 1977. Although the pessimistic view still held sway in Denmark, it had lost a good deal of ground.


(See Graph 11 and Table 42)

¹The wording used in 1977 ~~was~~ "has increased or decreased". The change ~~was~~ intended to make the question clearer but it does not seem to have affected the answers.

Graphique n° 11 / Graph 11

L'EVOLUTION DE L'ENTENTE
ENTRE LES PAYS DE LA COMMUNAUTE /

EVOLUTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE COMMUNITY



"S'est plutôt renforcée / Progressed"

"S'est plutôt affaiblie / Lost ground" — —

Table 42

PATTERN OF CHANGE BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND NATURAL
OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ¹
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Peel that understanding:										
Has progressed										
Autumn 1977	21	19	26	24	42	35	28	14	32	28
Autumn 1978	27	16	33	23	46	33	27	13	27	28
Has lost ground										
Autumn 1977	18	31	24	16	9	18	19	24	17	19
Autumn 1978	8	19	9	11	9	10	10	11	17	12
Has stayed the same										
Autumn 1977	34	40	36	46	38	22	41	48	42	38
Autumn 1978	35	43	37	45	31	25	53	54	43	38
Don't know										
Autumn 1977	27	10	14	14	11	25	12	14	9	15
Autumn 1978	30	22	21	20	14	32	10	22	13	22
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹ Weighted average.

Because this is an opinion-testing question - the answers to it providing a fairly accurate reflection of the mood of the moment - it is a worthwhile exercise to examine the breakdown and pattern of replies with reference to leadership rating.

The following points emerge.

- (i) In 1978 opinion leaders generally were slightly more optimistic than non-leaders, the tendency being particularly marked in Germany and Belgium;
- (ii) Opinion leaders, who tend to be more exposed to the media than the public at large, are generally more sensitive to the mood of the moment and optimism was more clearly evident in autumn 1978 than twelve months before.

(See Table 43)

To sum up, although the answers to this question are conditioned by basic attitudes to Europe, they are also influenced by the psychological and social mood of the moment, i.e. the "climate" created by the press through its coverage of European Affairs. This question is to be repeated in Ehro-Barometer No 11 in April and the answers will provide valuable information in the run-up to direct elections.

Table 43

VIEWS ON PATTERN OF UNDERSTANDING
BY LEADERSHIP RATING

	Non-leaders				Leaders			
	(--)		(-)		(+) (+)		(++)	
	1977	1978	1977	1978	1977	1978	1977	1978
Belgium								
Progressed	124	18	18%	26	27%	35	37%	40
Lost ground	12	6	21	9	21	12	21	6
Denmark								
Progressed	17	9	22	17	19	18	17	19
Lost ground	28	16	30	19	33	18	34	31
Germany								
Progressed	17	14	26	31	30	41	32	49
Lost ground	19	10	20	9	29	10	26	10
France								
Progressed	21	13	23	28	30	23	20	27
Lost ground	10	15	14	9	19	11	26	12
Ireland								
Progressed	34	39	40	46	56	55	44	45
Lost ground	9	6	7	9	9	9	15	20
Italy								
Progressed	23	20	35	31	39	40	46	45
Lost ground	12	8	18	8	18	10	29	18
Luxembourg								
Progressed	23	22	31	28	27	29	30	23
Lost ground	15	2	16	13	19	9	30	13
Netherlands								
Progressed	13	8	13	13	16	14	12	11
Lost ground	25	12	19	8	22	11	37	16
United Kingdom								
Progressed	25	17	30	29	38	32	44	31
Lost ground	15	16	18	19	17	13	20	18
COMMUNITY ²								
Progressed	21	16	28	29	32	33	33	34
Lost ground	14	12	1a	11	22	11	26	15

¹For every 100 interviewed. "Stayed the same" and "don't knows" are not included.

²Weighted average.

23 Speeding up or slowing down
the movement towards European Union

"Some people consider the Common Market as being a first step towards a closer union between the Member States. Personally, do you yourself think the movement towards the unification of Europe should be speeded up, slowed down. or continued as it is at present?"

And, in your opinion, what is the present attitude of (your country's) government towards the unification of Europe?"

For the Community as a whole, there has been little change from previous polls with nearly 40% of interviewees voting in favour of speeding up and slightly less in favour of continuing as at present, while less than one person in ten wishes to see a slowing-down.

A country-by-country analysis reveals that only in Italy is there more support for "speeding up" than for "continuing as at present". By contrast the second option ("continuing as at present") proves the most popular in Denmark, the United Kingdom, Ireland and even in the Netherlands.

(See Graph 12 and Table 44)

Everywhere except Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom opinion leaders are more in favour of speeding up European union than non-leaders and in the Community as a whole, even in the Netherlands, this was the option which gained most of their votes.

(See Graph 13)

Graphique n° 12 / Graph 12

ACCELERER, CONTINUER COMME MAINTENANT
OU RALENTIR LE MOUVEMENT D'UNIFICATION
DE L'EUROPE /

SPEED UP, CONTINUE AS AT PRESENT
OR SLOW DOWN THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS
EUROPEAN UNIFICATION




Table 4

SHOULD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION BE SPEEDED UP,
CONTINUED AS AT PRESENT OR SLOWED DOWN

		Speeded up	Continued as at present	Slowed down	Don't know	Total
Belgium						
Autumn	1973	33%	43%	3%	21%	100%
Autumn	1975	39	28	3	30	100
Spring	1976	40	32	5	23	100
Autumn	"	40	37	5	18	100
Spring	1977	38	41	5	16	100
Autumn	1978	37	35	2	26	100
Denmark						
Autumn	1973	12	44	36	8	100
Autumn	1975	13	33	37	17	100
Spring	1976	13	33	32	22	100
Autumn	"	14	38	30	18	100
Spring	1977	12	39	30	19	100
Autumn	1978	12	41	27	20	100
Germany						
Autumn	1973	49	34	4	13	100
Autumn	1975	47	36	6	11	100
Spring	1976	39	34	10	17	100
Autumn	"	41	37	9	13	100
Spring	1977	38	35	9	18	100
Autumn	1978	38	34	7	21	100
France						
Autumn	1973	36	40	3	21	100
Autumn	1975	45	36	6	13	100
Spring	1976	43	37	7	13	100
Autumn	"	42	35	10	13	100
Spring	1977	45	37	7	11	100
Autumn	1978	40	37	5	18	100
Ireland						
Autumn	1973	25	45	12	18	100
Autumn	1975	35	40	12	13	100
Spring	1976	31	40	14	15	100
Autumn	"	33	40	10	17	100
Spring	1977	33	44	14	9	100
Autumn	1978	29	47	8	16	100

Table 44 (contd)

		Speeded up	Continued as at present	Slowed down	Don' t know	Total
Italy						
Autumn	1973	55%	18%	2%	25%	100%
Autumn	1975	61	17	4	18	100
Spring	1976	58	16	4	22	100
Autumn	"	65	14	5	16	100
Spring	1977	66	17	5	12	100
Autumn	1978	59	20	3	18	100
Luxembourg						
Autumn	1973	56	29	1	14	100
Autumn	1975	52	33	4	11	100
Spring	1976	55	20	9	16	100
Autumn	"	55	26	6	13	100
Spring	1977	60	22	7	11	100
Autumn	1978	40	39	13	8	100
Netherlands						
Autumn	1973	32	47	6	15	100
Autumn	1975	33	38	4	25	100
Spring	1976	43	37	7	13	100
Autumn	"	41	42	6	11	100
Spring	1977	37	51	4	8	100
Autumn	1978	37	46	4	13	100
United Kingdom						
Autumn	1973 ¹	17	40	24	19	100
Autumn	1975	24	45	17	14	100
Spring	1976	23	42	24	11	100
Autumn	"	26	46	17	11	100
Spring	1977	24	43	23	10	100
Autumn	1978	23	52	15	10	100
COMMUNITY²						
Autumn	1973	38	34	9	19	100
Autumn	1975	43	34	8	15	100
Spring	1976	40	33	11	16	100
Autumn	"	42	34	11	13	100
Spring	1977	42	34	11	13	100
Autumn	1978	39	36	8	17	100


¹Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.

²Weighted average ■

Graphique n° 13 / Graph 13

ACCELERER, CONTINUER COMME MAINTENANT
OU RALENTIR LE MOUVEMENT D'UNIFICATION
DE L'EUROPE SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP /

SPEED UP, CONTINUE AS AT PRESENT
OR SLOW DOWN THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS EUROPEAN
UNIFICATION BY LEADERSHIP RATING



Accélérer /
To be speeded up ———

Continuer /
To be continued - - -

The second part of the question required contacts to state what they considered their government's position to be,

The majority view of those answering in Luxembourg, Italy, Germany and Belgium was that their governments were in favour of speeding up the movement towards European unification. The French were divided into two equal camps, The majority in the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom felt that their governments wanted the movement to "continue as at present" ■

The results are given in Table 45, alongside those for autumn 1976. The only significant change was in Italy and the Netherlands:

- in Italy there was a 9-point increase in the number of contacts who considered the government to be in favour of speeding up the movement;
- in the Netherlands support for this view fell by 10 points, while there was an increase in the number of contacts who were undecided (or indifferent),

It is worth noting that in both polls, despite the two-year gap, the proportion of Frenchmen who consider that their government wishes to speed up the movement exactly matched those who consider that it wishes to continue as at present ,

In a question such as this, to which on average nearly 30% of contacts could not or would not reply, it is of particular interest to analyse the answers of the opinion leaders.

Nearly everywhere, except the United Kingdom, opinion leaders were more inclined than the general public to hold the view that their government wishes to speed up the movement towards European unification.

(See Table 46)

Table 45

POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

		B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC'
<u>Autumn 1976</u>											
Speed up	(a)	36	23	44	35	23	27	47	37	21	32
Continue as at present	(b)	25	35	37	35	34	26	25	28	39	34
slow down	(c)	4	21	5	7	8	10	6	5	12	8
Don't know		35	22	14	23	35	37	22	30	28	26
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Difference (a)-(b)		11	-12	7	0	-11	1	22	9	-18	-2
<u>Autumn 1978</u>											
Speed up	(a)	30	26	40	33	24	36	45	27	18	31
Continue as at present	(b)	23	39	31	33	38	24	31	30	43	33
slow down	(c)	5	8	4	7	7	6	9	5	12	7
Don't know		42	27	25	27	31	34	15	38	27	29
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Difference (a)-(b)		7	-13	9	0	-14	12	14	-3	-25	-2

'Weight ed average•

Table 47

POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
BY OPINION LEADERS¹

		B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ²
<u>Autumn 1976</u>		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Speed up	(a)	56	31	48	47	36	34	62	50	27	40
Continue as at present	(b)	21	37	35	33	34	28	16	29	41	33
Slow down	(c)	5	25	10	13	13	14	7	7	17	13
Don't know		18	7	7	7	17	24	15	14	15	14
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Difference (a)-(b)		35	-6	13	14	2	6	46	21	14	7
Base		111	145	130	225	91	192	69	143	163	356
<u>Autumn 1978</u>											
Speed up	(a)	48	44	60	38	27	45	(48)	37	15	40
Continue as at present	(b)	20	36	30	35	42	33	(32)	8	44	34
Slow down	(c)	5	11	3	10	6	11	(14)	29	20	10
Don't know		27	9	7	17	25	11	(7)	26	21	16
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Difference (a)-(b)		28	8	30	3	-15	12	16	29	-29	14
Base		79	135	67	178	69	132	(44)	182	117	165

¹Leaders ++.

²Weighted average.

2.4 Hopes and fears about the Community

"Here are some things that are sometimes said about the membership of (your country) in the European Community (the Common Market). Could you tell me, in each case, if you personally agree completely, agree to some extent, disagree to some extent, or disagree completely with the statement?"

- The fact that we are part of the Common Market is the best guarantee for (our country) of political and economic stability
- In the European Community (the Common Market), a country like ours runs a risk of losing its own culture and individuality
- The member countries of the European Community including (ours), should go much further than they have so far towards economic and political union in Europe
- Whatever agreements or alliances that (our country) has with other countries, national independence should be the over-riding consideration."

The complexity and ambiguity of attitudes towards the Community show up in the replies to these questions.

A majority in all countries:

- feels that national independence should be the over-riding consideration,
- (except in Denmark) wishes to see member countries go much further towards economic and political union in Europe, and
- considers that membership of the Community is the best guarantee of political and economic stability.

Opinion is more divided on the risk of losing national culture and individuality: this suggestion is firmly rejected in Italy, Belgium, France and Germany, as it is " though only just " in Luxembourg; whereas it meets with general agreement in the three new member countries, where nevertheless one in three takes the opposite view.

(See Table 47)

a

Table 47

HOPES AND FEARS ABOUT THE COMMUNITY

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>The fact that we are part of the Common Market is the best guarantee of political and economic stability</u>										
Agree completely	26	17	25	17	32	28	30	27	16	22
Agree to some extent	34	29	42	45	40	48	48	36	36	42
Disagree to some extent	7	17	12	13	12	9	12	15	21	14
Disagree completely	3	19	6	6	5	4	1	8	18	8
Don't know	30	18	15	19	11	11	9	14	9	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ¹	1.18	.53	3.01	1.89	3.13	3.11	3.17	2.95	2.56	2.90
<u>In the Common Market, a country like ours runs a risk of losing its own culture and individuality</u>										
Agree completely	7	28	7	6	23	4	11	15	27	12
Agree to some extent	17	26	20	16	37	13	34	19	30	19
Disagree to some extent	24	16	32	30	23	23	23	28	18	26
Disagree completely	24	15	26	36	10	47	19	31	18	31
Don't know	28	15	15	12	7	13	13	7	7	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	.83	.78	2.09	.91	2.79	.70	2.43	2.19	2.71	2.14
<u>The member countries of the EEC should go much further than they have so far towards economic and political union in Europe</u>										
Agree completely	26	9	32	21	25	35	24	30	18	26
Agree to some extent	30	16	38	37	31	42	46	29	35	37
Disagree to some extent	8	17	10	13	18	7	13	16	16	12
Disagree completely	4	28	5	5	4	3	2	14	13	7
Don't know	32	30	15	24	22	13	15	11	18	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index	.15	.02	1.16	.98	3.00	.25	3.02	2.85	2.70	3.01

Whatever agreements or alliances (...) with other countries, national independence should be the over-riding consideration

Agree completely
Agree to some extent
Disagree to some extent
Disagree completely
Don't know

Total

Index²

r	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	ECI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
40	51	23	44	48	33	32	56	43	37
24	19	34	27	33	29	30	18	28	29
8	7	19	11	6	17	22	12	12	14
4	4	10	4	3	10	4	9	6	7
24	19	14	14	10	11	12	5	11	13
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
3.31	3.4	2.8	3.28	3.41	2.97	3.01	3.28	3.22	3.10

¹Weighted average.

²"Agree completely" = 4; "disagree completely" = 1.

Nationality is clearly a very powerful determining factor. But leadership rating can also play a part:









1. Support for the view that membership of the Common Market is the best guarantee of stability tends to fall in Denmark as leadership rating increases; the opposite is true in Germany.
2. In Denmark there is also an inverse relationship between leadership rating and the feeling that member countries should go much further towards European economic and political union; the opposite applies in Belgium, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg.
3. The fear of losing national culture and individuality is on the whole less common *among* opinion leaders: this emerges most clearly in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium, while the tendency is rather the opposite in Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom.
4. And finally, the conviction that national independence should be the over-riding consideration "whatever agreements or alliances exist" tends to be more popular *among* non-leaders, particularly in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium and France.

These findings are illustrated in Graph 14, drawn on the basis of an index of agreement/disagreement corresponding to each leadership rating.

Graphique n° 14 / Graph .14

ESPOIRS ET CRAINTES
AU SUJET DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE
SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP

HOPES AND FEARS
CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
BY LEADERSHIP RATING



NL-- NL- L+ L++

Stabilité plus grande /
Greater stability










Union économique et politique /
Economic and political union

Graphique n° 14 (suite)

Graph 14 (continued)

ESPOIRS ET CRAINTES
AU SUJET DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE
SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP

HOPES AND FEARS
CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
BY LEADERSHIP RATING



NL-- NL- L+ L++

Risque de perdre sa culture /
Risk of losing its culture

Priorité absolue à l'indépendance nationale /
Over-riding consideration of national
independence

There is by no means a uniform correlation between reactions to these four propositions and basic attitudes towards Europe. Take opinions on the election of the European Parliament, for instance: it is most closely related to the response to the first proposition: as we might expect, those who are in favour of the election are more likely to feel that the Common Market is a guarantee of stability. On the other hand, the link between views on the election and on the importance of national independence is more tenuous: 80% of those who are completely against the election would give precedence to national independence, but this opinion also finds currency among 66% of those who are completely in favour of the election'.

(See Table 4.8)

'These results can be compared with those presented earlier, pp. 39-44.

Table 48

THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF HOPES AND FEARS

ON BASIC ATTITUDES FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION

(Community as a whole)

	Basic attitude to the election			
	completely against	To some extent against	To some extent for	Completely for
	%	%	%	%
<u>Membership of the Common Market is the best guarantee of political and economic stability:</u>				
Agree completely	7	6	19	41
Agree to some extent	14	29	55	40
Disagree to some extent	16	29	13	10
Disagree completely	49	22	5	4
Don't know	14	14	8	5
Total	100	100	100	100
Index ¹	1.76	2.22	2.96	3.23
<u>A country like ours runs a risk of losing its own culture and individuality:</u>				
Agree completely	48	23	8	9
Agree to some extent	17	33	21	15
Disagree to some extent	11	19	34	23
Disagree completely	16	16	29	49
Don't know	8	9	8	4

Table 48 (contd)

		Basic attitude to the election			
		Completely against	To some extent against	To some extent for	Completely for
		% 100	% 100	% 100	% 100
Total		3.06	2.70	2.10	1.85
Index ¹					
<u>The member countries of the EEC should go much further (...) towards economic and political union in Europe:</u>					
Agree completely	12	12	23	47	
Agree to some extent	19	26	48	34	
Disagree to some extent	12	26	13	8	
Disagree completely	36	20	4	4	
Don't know	21	16	12	7	
Total		100	100	100	100
Index ¹		2.10	2.36	3.01	3.33
<u>National independence should be the over-riding consideration:</u>					
Agree completely		45	35	39	
Agree to some extent		27	34	27	
Disagree to some extent		11	17	18	
Disagree completely		7	6	12	
Don't know		10	8	4	
Total		100	100	100	
Index ¹		3.57	3.23	3.06	2.98
Base		438	567	3469	2679

¹"Agree completely" = 4; "disagree completely" = 1.

2.5 Solidarity: attitude expected from member countries

"If one of the countries of the Common Market (European Community) finds itself in major economic difficulties, do you feel that the other countries, including (your country), should help it or not?"

"Are YOU personally, prepared or not to make some personal sacrifice, for example paying a little more taxes, to help another country in the European Community experiencing economic difficulties?"

The first of these questions has been asked at various polls since autumn 1973. More than three quarters of those interviewed are in favour of solidarity, but interesting variations occur both between countries and between successive sets of results:

- the Italians continue to be the strongest advocates of helping countries in difficulty: 88% in favour in 1973 and 94% in 1978. No doubt they¹ are well aware that Community assistance works to their benefit.
- Between 1973 and 1978 support for solidarity increased most in the United Kingdom (+ 11 points) and the Netherlands (+ 9); Germany, on the other hand, registered a drop of 14 points, from 77% down to only 63%.

(See Table 49)

¹ At an earlier poll more than 7 in 10 Italians replied that Community solidarity had worked to the benefit of their country. See Euro-Barometer No 6, January 1977, p. 33.

Table 49

SOLIDARITY BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

		In the event of one of the member countries being in major economic difficulties, the others:	Don't know	Total
		Should not help		
<u>Belgium</u>				
Autumn	1973	9%	13%	100%
"	1976	8	10	100
"	1977	11	15	100
"	1978	9	15	100
<u>Denmark</u>				
Autumn	1973	25	13	100
"	1976	18	14	100
"	1977	16	9	100
"	1978	17	18	100
<u>Germany</u>				
Autumn	1973	7	16	100
"	1976	12	14	100
"	1977	10	18	100
"	1978	12	25	100
<u>France</u>				
Autumn	1973	9	13	100
"	1976	15	10	100
"	1977	12	12	100
"	1978	10	12	100
<u>Ireland</u>				
Autumn	1973	10	10	100
"	1976	10	7	100
"	1977	10	7	100
"	1978	7	8	100
<u>Italy</u>				
Autumn	1973	88	10	100
"	1976	95	4	100
"	1977	92	5	100
"	1978	94	4	100
<u>Luxembourg</u>				
Autumn	1973	8	5	100
"	1976	4	10	100
"	1977	10	7	100
"	1978	17	8	100

Table 49 (contd)

			In the event of one of the member countries being in major economic difficulties, the others		Don't know	Total
			Should	Should not help		
Netherlands						
	Autumn	1973	79%	9%	12%	100%
	"	1976	84	8	8	100
	"	1977	85	6	9	100
	"	1978	88	6	6	100
United Kingdom						
	Autumn	1973 ¹	59	28	13	100
	"	1976	77	16	7	100
	"	1977	75	17	8	100
	"	1978	70	21	9	100
COMMUNITY ²						
	Autumn	1973	76	11	13	100
	"	1976	80	11	9	100
	"	1977	79	10	11	100
	"	1978	76	11	13	100

¹ Northern Ireland was not included in 1973.

² Weighted average.

On analysing the results for each country by leadership rating, we find that they fall into two main categories of relationship, which have developed in one of three ways:

- the differences in viewpoint between leaders and non-leaders may be pronounced (as in Germany and Belgium) or slight (as in Italy and Ireland);
- these differences may have diminished, increased or remained constant in the medium or long term; our conclusions, which must be tentative as they are based on only four sets of results spread over five years, are that the gap between leaders and non-leaders seems to have stayed more or less the same in the United Kingdom and in Ireland, is tending to widen (after narrowing between 1973 and 1976) in Germany and France, and is diminishing in Denmark and Italy¹.


The findings for each country between 1973 and 1978, related to leadership rating, are shown in Graph 15.

¹ We have not considered the position in Luxembourg, in view of the size of the samples.

m i a u e n° 15 / Graph No 15

LA SOLIDARITE SOUHAITEE
ENTRE LES PAYS MEMBRES
SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP

SOLIDARITY DESIRED
BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES
BY LEADERSHIP RATING



L++ —————
L+ - - - - -
L- - . - . -
L-

There is no doubt that the above question tends to induce a "conformist" response (although a third of the Danes and Germans chose the negative reply or didn't know); a supplementary question was therefore included to see how far each person interviewed was prepared to make some personal sacrifice to help another country in difficulties.

As might be expected, support for solidarity is much lower when seen in these terms: only one person in four would be prepared to make sacrifices. But here again there are significant variations from country to country: more than six in ten of the Dutch and the Italians adopt the unselfish attitude; but this is flatly rejected by an absolute majority of Belgians, British and French.

(See Table 50)

On comparing both sets of replies to the questions on Community solidarity, we find that attitudes are most consistent in the Netherlands, Italy and Denmark, and least consistent in Belgium.

(See Table 51)

Table 50

WILLINGNESS TO MAKE SOME PERSONAL SACRIFICE TO HELP ANOTHER MEMBER COUNTRY

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes - prepared to (a)	28	42	26	37	39	64	34	60	35	41
No - not prepared (b)	53	40	47	52	48	24	14	28	53	43
Don't know	19	18	27	11	13	12	19	12	12	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Difference (a)-(b)	-25	2	-21	-15	-9	40	-13	32	-18	-2

Table 51

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ¹
Feel that other countries should help (a)	76%	65%	63%	78%	85%	94%	75%	88%	70%	76%
Prepared to make personal sacrifices (b)	28	42	26	37	39	64	34	60	35	41
Ratio (b) / (a) ²	37.3	64.9	41.3	48.0	46.7	67.7	45.2	68.6	49.5	53.2

¹Weighted average.

²Calculated on the basis of percentages to the first decimal place.

Opinion leaders in all countries profess greater readiness than others to **make** personal sacrifices. They are also more consistent than non-leaders in their replies to both questions. In the Community as a whole, 58% of opinion leaders claimed that they would be prepared to make personal sacrifices to help another country in difficulties.

(See Table 52 and Graph 16)

Table 52


SUPPORT FOR SOLIDARITY BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES
AND READINESS TO MAKE PERSONAL SACRIFICES
BY LEADERSHIP RATING
(Community as a whole)

	Non-leaders		Leaders	
	(--)	(-)	(+)	(++)
Feel that other countries should help (a)	62%	78%	81%	86%
Prepared to make personal sacrifices (b)	24	40	47	58
Ratio (b)/(a)	39.2	51.1	57.7	67.2

Graphique n° 16 / Graph 16

ASPIRATION A LA SOLIDARITE
ENTRE LES PAYS MEMBRES
ET DISPOSITION A FAIRE
DES SACRIFICES PERSONNELS
SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP

ASPIRATION FOR SOLIDARITY
BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES
AND WILLINGNESS TO MAKE
PERSONAL SACRIFICES
BY LEADERSHIP RATING



Aide aux pays en difficulté /
Help countries in difficulties
Accepterait des sacrifices / --
Would accept to make sacrifices

2.6 Benefit derived compared with other countries

"Taking everything into consideration, would You say that (your country) has benefited more than, or benefited less than, other countries of the Market by its membership of the European Community (....)?"¹

This proved to be another difficult question, with approximately one in two of all those interviewed being unable to make a clear decision.

In most countries, and particularly in the United Kingdom, the majority of those who did choose one or other option took the view that their country had benefited less than others. **Only** in Ireland, Belgium and Italy did the opposite view prevail.

(See Table 53)

Probably because they found this an easier question to answer, opinion leaders were more likely than non-leaders to opt for the positive view, the negative view, or the neutral view, depending on nationality.

The findings are described in Table 54, and illustrated in Graph 17. Only in the United Kingdom is the majority viewpoint plainly negative, irrespective of respondents' leadership rating.

Table 53

MORE BENEFIT OR LESS BENEFIT FOR OWN COUNTRY COMPARED WITH OTHER COMMUNITY COUNTRIES

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Feel that their country;										
- has benefited more (a)	20	17	20	13	39	27	18	15	14	19
- has benefited less (b)	13	26	31	22	28	21	16	24	<u>49</u>	30
Neither ³	32	34	32	30	14	24	51	33	17	26
Don't know	35	23	17	35	19	28	15	28	20	25
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Difference (a) - (b)	7	-9	-11	-9	<u>-11</u>	6	2	-9	-35	-11

¹The question specified, as appropriate, "since 1958" or "since 1973".

²Weighted average.

³Volunteered.

Table 54

MORE BENEFIT OR LESS BENEFIT FOR OWN COUNTRY COMPARED WITH OTHER
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES BY LEADERSHIP RATING¹

	B	DK	D	F	RL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ²
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Feel that their count has benefited more:	Y									
Non-leaders (--)	8	12	10	5	34	23	(9)	14	7	12
(-)	23	11	21	13	38	25	(17)	12	13	18
(+)	27	21	23	15	43	31	(21)	14	20	22
Leaders (++)	33	26	24	23	41	30	(23)	25	17	25
Feel that their count has benefited less:	Y									
Non-leaders (--)	10	17	30	21	21	14	(7)	21	49	27
(-)	11	28	29	22	31	18	(13)	20	48	29
(+)	17	27	33	23	26	21	(18)	26	49	30
Leaders (++)	19	30	37	21	46	39	(23)	26	59	35


¹Those replying "neither" or "don't know" are not included in the Table.

²Weighted average.

Graphique n° 17 / Graph 17

AVANTAGE OU DESAVANTAGE
ATTRIBUE A SON PROPRE PAYS
PAR RAPPORT AUX AUTRES PAYS
SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP

MORE BENEFIT OR LESS BENEFIT
ATTRIBUTED TO HIS OWN COUNTRY
COMPARED WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES
BY LEADERSHIP RATING



Avantage /
More benefit ———
Désavantage /
Less benefit - - - -

3. ATTITUDE TO SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY

"Three countries from Southern Europe, among which Spain, have recently asked to join the European Community (Common Market). In your opinion, would the entry of Spain in the European Community be a good thing, a bad thing or neither a good nor a bad thing for (your country)?"

"And for Spain itself, would it be a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad?"

Approximately one in three (31%) in the Community as a whole felt that Spanish membership would be a good thing for his own country and seven in ten (70%) thought that it would be a good thing for Spain.

A comparison of the answers to the first question in autumn 1978 with those given in autumn 1977 reveals that the neutral response ("neither good nor bad") is gaining ground, a common occurrence as debate makes an event more familiar to the general public.

The Italians, the Irish and the Germans are again most in favour of Spain joining the Community; but a clear majority in the Community as a whole feels that it would be a good thing for Spain.

(See Table 55)

Support for Spanish membership was more widespread among opinion leaders than among non-leaders in all the countries, but had fallen slightly between autumn 1977 and autumn 1978.

(See Table 56 and Graph 18)

Table 55

ATTITUDE TO SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ¹
<u>For own country:</u>	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>(Autumn 1977):</u>										
- a good thing	33	22	48	33	42	43	35	35	31	39
- a bad thing	15	26	8	20	14	14	13	24	22	16
- neither good nor bad	18	28	27	27	20	24	27	22	27	25
Don't know	34	24	17	20	24	19	35	19	20	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>For own country:</u>										
<u>(Autumn 1978):</u>										
- a good thing	32	13	37	26	39	39	20	26	24	31
- a bad thing	12	20	12	20	13	13	25	26	16	16
- neither good nor bad	26	37	32	36	23	28	36	26	41	33
Don't know	30	30	19	18	25	20	19	22	19	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>For Spain:</u>										
<u>(Autumn 1978):</u>										
- a good thing	65	62	72	74	64	74	65	83	61	70
- a bad thing	3	4	2	2	7	2	5	3	7	3
- neither good nor bad	6	6	10	8	8	6	11	3	11	9
Don't know	26	28	16	16	21	18	19	11	21	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

¹Weighted average.

Table 56

ATTITUDE TO SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY

		BY LEADERSHIP RATING									
		B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ¹
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>A good thing for own country (1977)</u>											
Non-leaders	(- -)	16	17	31	24	34	33	(28)	28	23	27
	(-)	35	22	49	31	46	43	(28)	35	31	38
	(+)	39	24	53	40	45	48	(41)	35	38	44
Leadere	(+ +)	58	27	58	40	52	52	(43)	41	37	47
<u>A good thing for own country (1978)</u>											
Non-leaders	(- -)	21	7	26	20	36	35	(11)	27	19	25
	(-)	36	12	36	24	36	37	(16)	19	21	29
	(+)	37	15	43	28	44	41	(26)	24	30	35
Leadere	(++)	47	20	52	35	45	47	(21)	38	31	40
<u>A good thing for Spain (1978)</u>											
Non-leaders	(- -)	44	36	60	56	58	61	(51)	72	44	55
	(-)	64	53	72	74	65	70	(66)	71	63	69
	(+)	83	68	77	80	72	84	(70)	87	69	78
Leadere	(+ +)	83	68	81	86	62	85	(56)	91	70	82

¹Weighted average.


Graphique n° 18 / Graph 18

L'ENTREE DE L'ESPAGNE DANS LA COMMUNAUTE
ST UNE BONNE CHOSE

SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP /

SPANISH MEMBERSHIP A GOOD THING

BY LEADERSHIP RATING



1977 ———

1978 - - -

There is a correlation between views on Spanish entry and general attitudes towards European unification: the more contacts favoured unification, the more likely they were to feel that Spanish membership would be a good thing. This correlation was even more marked when interviewees were asked to consider the effects on their own country.

(See Table 57)

Generally speaking, contacts who considered themselves to be on the far right were more inclined than others to feel that it would be a good thing for their country if Spain joined the Community. Conversely, the view that membership would be good for Spain itself was more popular among those on the left (but not the far left, of the political spectrum.

(See Table 58)

Table 57

ATTITUDE TO SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY

RELATED TO GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

(Community as a whole)

	For own country				For Spain				Base
	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing	Don't know	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing	Don't know	
For every 100 whose attitude to European unification was:									
For - very much	47%	29%	14%	10%	85%	5%	2%	8%	2623
For - to some extent	30	38	14	18	74	9	2	15	3995
Against - to some extent	13	36	35	16	57	16	11	16	545
Against - very much	13	37	32	18	52	8	14	26	342

Table 58

SPANISH MEMBERSHIP A GOOD THING

RELATED TO POSITION ON THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	EC ¹
--	---	----	---	---	-----	---	---	----	----	-----------------

A good thing for own country:

Far Left	(33%)	10%	(55%)	21%	(32%)	39%	(17%)	26%	28%	33%
Left	36	14	41	27	44	36	(24)	27	26	32
Centre	34	13	35	28	36	42	(24)	24	22	31
Right	35	15	32	36	44	35	(23)	30	27	31
Far Right	38	20	58	29	48	(56)	(7)	28	29	43

A good thing for Spain:

Far Left	(55)	49	(76)	67	50	77	(83)	80	48	69
Left	85	72	85	63	69	78	(79)	84	63	79
Centre	70	63	73	76	66	76	(75)	85	61	71
Right	74	73	75	79	68	65	(57)	86	74	75
Far right	75	68	67	78	68	(81)	(50)	77	65	70

¹Weighted average,

Political leaders in some countries are clearly divided on the question of Spain joining the Community. In France notably, this issue will probably be featured by two of the main parties - the Communist Party and the Rassemblement pour la République - in the campaign for the European elections. We have, therefore, purely as a pointer, analysed the views on Spanish accession of those contacts who stated which political party they would vote for if there were an immediate national election.

It was confined to Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain; the findings are shown in Table 59.

There is very little variation in the views of German voters, although SPD supporters are slightly more in favour than CDU/CSU supporters. There is a greater divergence of attitude in France and Italy, and more particularly in Great Britain:

- in France, UDF (and especially Republican Party) supporters are most positive about Spanish entry ("a good thing" for France); the negative view ("a bad thing" for France) has more currency amongst RPR and - even more so - Communist Party voters;
- in Italy, positive attitudes dominated among supporters of the right and centre right, while negative attitudes were more common on the far left (and, unexpectedly, also with Republican Party supporters); the position of Communist Party sympathizers was very close to the national norm¹;
- in Great Britain, the voters most in favour were the Liberals, followed by Conservatives, Labour and Nationalists.

¹ In France and Italy, seven in ten Communist voters think that Spanish membership would be a good thing for Spain; the Spanish Communist Party has in fact come out in favour of membership. But supporters of the two largest Communist Parties in the Common Market hold widely differing views on the relative advantage for their own countries:

	<u>Replies of Communist Voters</u>	
	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
<u>For their country:</u>		
- a good thing	26%	41%
- a bad thing	32	16
<u>For Spain:</u>		
- a good thing	71%	7%
- a bad thing	6	2

Table 59

ATTITUDE TO SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY
RELATED TO VOTING INTENTIONS IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS

	For own country				For Spain				Base
	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing	Don't know	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing	DON'T KNOW	
<u>DEUTSCHLAND</u>									
Sozialdemokratische Partei (SPD)	43%	31%	13%	13%	79%	10%	2%	9%	358
Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)	40	31	13	16	70	10	3	17	70
Christlich-Demokratische Union / Christlich Soziale Union (CDU/CSU)	36	34	12	18	71	10	3	16	384
<u>FRANCE</u>									
Parti-socialiste uni-fié / Far left	(18)	(42)	(19)	(21)	(80)	(12)	(2)	(5)	(48)
Parti communiste (P.C.F.)	26	28	32	14	71	12	6	11	118
Parti socialiste (P.S. et Radicaux de Gauche (R.G.)	27	39	20	14	78	8	2	12	385
Ecologistes	29	42	11	18	78	4	-	18	56
Parti Républicain (U.D.F.)	38	36	12	14	87	5	-	8	133
Démocrates sociaux (U.D.F.)	(40)	(30)	(16)	(14)	(69)	(7)	(9)	(15)	(38)
Radicaux (U.D.F.)	(21)	(48)	(11)	(20)	(83)	(7)	(-)	(10)	(27)
Rassemblement pour la République (R.P.R.)	28	35	23	14	72	7	3	18	132
<u>ITALIA</u>									
Democrazia proletaria	(33)	(38)	(25)	(4)	(83)	(13)	(4)	(-)	(24)
Partito comunista (P.C.I.)	41	24	16	19	72	8	2	18	165
Partito radicali (P.R.)	(42)	(37)	(17)	(4)	(79)	(13)	(8)	(-)	(24)
Partitosocialista (P.S.I.)	41	27	17	15	79	7	5	9	150
Partito Socialista Democratico (P.S.D.I.)	(38)	48)	(5)	(9)	86)	(9)	(-)	(5)	(21)

Table 59 (contd)

	For own country				For Spain			Don't know	Base ¹
	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing	Don't know	A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing		
Partito repubblicano (P.R.I.)	(41)	(21)	(31)	(77)	(97)	(3)	(-)	(-)	(29)
Democrazia cristiana (D.C.)	45	24	9	22	74	3	1	22	278
Partito liberale (P.L.I.)	(20)	(48)	(16)	(16)	(84)	(-)	(4)	(12)	(25)
Democrazia nazionale (D.N.)	(50)	(24)	(10)	(16)	(82)	(-)	(5)	(13)	(38)
<u>GREAT BRITAIN</u>									
Labour Party	23	39	19	19	56	12	8	24	407
Liberal Party	32	40	3	25	71	6	8	15	51
Nationalists (SNP Plaid Cymru, etc..)	(16)	(58)	(19)	(7)	(56)	(27)	(14)	(3)	(18)
Conservative Party	28	43	15	14	71	9	5	15	381

¹Figures in brackets indicate less than 50 replies.

ANNEXES ET TABLEAUX DETAILLES / APPENDIX AND DETAILED TABLES

1. INSTITUTS CHARGES DU SONDAGE ET SPECIALISTES RESPONSABLES /INSTITUTES WHICH CARRIED OUT THE SURVEY AND EXPERTS IN CHARGE

Belgique/België	(B)	DIMARSO/INRA	Patrick DAVIES
Danmark	(DK)	GALLUP MARKEDSANALYSE	Rolf RANDRUP
Deutschland	(D)	EMNID-INSTITUT	Günther BIERBAUM
France	(F)	INSTITUT FRANCAIS D'OPINION PUBLIQUE (x)	Hélène RIFFAULT
Ireland	(IRL)	IRISH MARKETING SURVEYS	John MEAGHER
Italia	(I)	ISTITUTO PER LE RICERCHE STA- TISTICHE E L'ANALISI DELL'OPI- NIONE PUBBLICA (DOXA)	Ennio SALAMON
Luxembourg	(L)	DIMARSO/INRA	Patrick DAVIES
Nederland	(N)	NEDERLANDS INSTITUUT VOOR DE PUBLIEKE OPINIE (NIPO)	Jan STAPEL
United Kingdom	(UK)	SOCIAL SURVEYS (GALLUP POLL) (xx+)	Norman WEBB

x
x x

Toutes les données relatives aux Euro-Baromètres sont déposées aux "Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences", (1 Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve). Elles sont tenues à la disposition des organismes membres du European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), du Inter-university Consortium for Political Research (Michigan) et des chercheurs justifiant d'un intérêt de recherche. Pour tous renseignements sur les études d'opinion publique faites à l'initiative de la Commission des Communautés européennes, écrire à J.-R. RABIER, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Bruxelles.

All Euro-Barometre data are stored at the Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences (1, Place Montesquieu, B-1248 Louvain-la-Neuve). They are at the disposal of all institutes members of the European Consortium for Political Research (Essex), of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (Michigan) and of all those interested in social science research. For all information regarding opinion polls carried out for the Commission of the European Communities, please write to J.-R. RABIER, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels.

(x) Chargé en outre de la coordination internationale et de l'analyse des résultats / Also responsible for international coordination and analysis of the results.

(xx) Le sondage en Northern Ireland est fait en collaboration par le Irish Marketing Surveys et le Gallup Poll / The Northern Ireland survey is conducted jointly by Irish Marketing Surveys and the Social Surveys (Gallup Poll).

2. ECHANTILLONNAGE / SAMPLING

L'objectif de la méthode d'échantillonnage est de couvrir de façon représentative la totalité de la population des neuf pays de la Communauté âgée de 15 ans et plus.

L'échantillon de chaque pays est constitué à deux niveaux:

1° Régions et localités d'enquête.

Les statistiques de la Communauté européenne divisent l'espace européen en 120 régions (voir liste ci-jointe). L'enquête a lieu dans 117 régions (Corse, Groenland et Val d'Aoste exceptés).

Chaque pays a constitué aléatoirement un échantillon-maître de localités d'enquête de telle sorte que toutes les catégories d'habitat soient représentées proportionnellement à leurs populations respectives.

Au total, les interviews de l'enquête Omnibus Européenne ont lieu dans pas moins de 1 100 points d'enquête couvrant les 117 régions de la Communauté.

2° Choix des personnes interrogées.

Les personnes interrogées sont toujours différentes d'une enquête à l'autre. L'échantillon-maître aléatoire évoqué ci-dessus indique le nombre de personnes à interroger à chaque point d'enquête. Au stade suivant, les personnes à interroger sont désignées:

- soit par un tirage au sort sur liste dans les pays où on peut avoir accès à des listes exhaustives d'individus ou de foyers: Belgique, Pays-Bas, Danemark, Luxembourg.
- soit par échantillonnage stratifié sur la base des statistiques de recensement, l'échantillon étant construit à partir des critères de sexe, âge et profession: France, Italie, Royaume-Uni, Irlande, Allemagne.

The sample has been designed to be representative of the total population aged 15 years and over of the nine countries of the Community.

In each country a two stage sampling method is used:

1° Geographical distribution.

For statistical purposes the European Community divides Europe into 120 regions (see attached list). The survey takes place in 117 of these regions (Corsica, Groenland and Val d'Aoste excluded).

In each country a random selection of sampling points is made in such a way that all types of area (urban, rural, etc.) are represented in proportion to their populations.

The interviews are distributed in more than 1 100 sampling points in the 117 regions of the Community.

2° Choice of respondents.

For each survey different individuals are interviewed in the master sample of sampling points described above. Within these sampling points the individuals to be interviewed are chosen:

- either at random from the population or electoral lists in those countries where access to suitable lists of individuals or households is possible: Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg.
- or by quota sampling. In these cases the quotas are established by sex, age and profession on the basis of census data: this system is used in France, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany.

BELGIQUE/BELGIE

AN : Antwerpen
 W.V. : West-Vlaanderen
 O.V. : Oost-Vlaanderen
 BR : Brabant
 LI : Limburg
 LIE : Liège
 HAI : Hainaut
 NA : Namur
 LX : Luxembourg

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

S.H. : Schleswig-Holstein
 STA : Stade
 AUR : Aurich
 OLD : Oldenburg
 B : Bremen
 LUN : Luneburg
 BR : Braunschweig
 OSN : Osnabrück
 HAN : Hannover
 MUN : Münster
 DET : Detmold
 HIL : Hildesheim
 DUS : Düsseldorf
 ARN : Arnsberg
 KAS : Kassel
 AA : Aachen
 KOL : Köln
 TRI : Trier
 KO5 : Koblenz
 DA.WI. : Darmstadt-Wiesbaden
 U.F. : Unterfranken
 O.F. : Oberfranken
 SAA : Saarland
 RH.PF. : Rheinhessen-Pfalz
 N.B. : Nordbaden
 N.W. : Nordwürttemberg
 M.F. : Mittelfranken
 O.PF. : Oberpfalz
 N.BAY. : Niederbayern
 S.B. : Südbaden
 S.W. : Südwürttemberg
 SCH : Schwaben
 O.BAY. : Oberbayern
 BER : Berlin

DANMARK

JYLL : Jylland
 SJÆ : Sjælland
 FYN : Fyn
 GRØ : Grønland

FRANCE

NORD : Nord
 PIC : Picardie
 H.N. : Haute-Normandie
 R.P. : Région Parisienne
 CHA : Champagne
 LOR : Lorraine

AL : Alsace
 B.N. : Basse-Normandie
 BRE : Bretagne
 P.LOI : Pays de la Loire
 CEN : Centre
 BOU : Bourgogne
 F.C. : Franche-Comté
 P.CH : Poitou-Charentes
 LIM : Limousin
 AUV : Auvergne
 R-A : Rhône-Alpes
 AQU : Aquitaine
 M.P. : Midi-Pyrénées
 LAN : Languedoc
 P.CDA : Provence-Côte d'Azur
 COR : Corse

IRELAND

DON : Donegal
 N.W. : North West
 N.E. : North East
 W. : West
 M. : Midlands
 E. : East
 M.W. : Mid West
 S.E. : South East
 S.W. : South West

ITALIA

V.D.A. : Valle d'Aosta
 PIE : Piemonte
 LOM : Lombardia
 T.AA : Trentino-Alto Adige
 VEN : Veneto
 F.V.G. : Friuli-Venezia Giulia
 LIG : Liguria
 E-R : Emilia-Romagna
 TOS : Toscana
 UMB : Umbria
 MAR : Marche
 LAZ : Lazio
 ABR : Abruzz
 MOL : Molise
 CAM : Campania
 PUG : Puglia
 BAS : Basilicata
 CAL : Calabria
 SIC : Sicilia
 SAR : Sardegna

LUXEMBOURG

LX : G.D. du Luxembourg

ZH : Zuid-Holland
 UT : Utrecht
 ZE : Zeeland
 N.B. : Noord-Brabant
 LI : Limburg

UNITED KINGDOM

SCOTL : Scotland
 N. : North
 N.I. : Northern Ireland
 N.W. : North West
 Y.H. : Yorkshire and Humberside
 WALES : Wales
 W.M. : West Midlands
 E.M. : East Midlands
 E.A. : East Anglia
 S.W. : South West
 S.E. : South East

NEDERLAND

GR : Groningen
 FR : Friesland
 DR : Drenthe
 OV : Overijssel
 NH : Noord-Holland
 GEL : Gelderland

3. POPULATION ETUDIEE, TAILLE DES ECHANTILLONS, DATES DU TRAVAIL /
SURVEYD POPULATION, SIZE OF THE SAMPLES, DATES OF FIELDWORK

	Population (1)		Echantillons / samples (Baro 10)	Dates (Baro 10)
	milliers / thousands	%		
B	7 653	3.84	1008	30/X-15/XI/1978
DK	3 925	1.98	1002	21 - 29/X
D	48 561	24.42	1006	20 - 30/X
F	40 272	20.25	1194 (2)	16 - 30/X
IRL	2 167	1.09	1005	23/X - 3/XI
I	42 611	21.42	1030	15/X - 4/XI
L	285	0.14	291	30/X - 21/XI
N	10 292	5.18	913	24/X - 2/XI
UK	43 108	21.68	1339	26/X - 4/XI
CE/EC	98 874	100.0	8788	

4. RECOMMANDATION AU LECTEUR

/ ADVICE TO READERS

Il est rappelé que, dans les enquêtes par sondage, on doit tenir compte d'une certaine marge pour erreur d'échantillonnage. Avec des échantillons de l'ordre de 1000 personnes interrogées, les différences de pourcentages inférieures à 5% ne devraient pas être normalement considérées comme statistiquement significatives.

Readers are reminded that in survey research, one should allow a certain margin for sampling error. With a sample of 1 000 cases, percentage differences of less than 5 points would not normally be regarded as statistically significant.

(1) 15 ans et plus / 15 years and over.

(2) Y compris surreprésentation de 151 ruraux / Including oversampling of 151 country-people.

Tableau 1 / Table 1

POUR OU CONTRE L'ELECTION DU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN AU SUFFRAGE UNIVERSEL DIRECT /

FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE (1)

	BELGIQUE / BELGIE									
	IX/73 IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	23	23	26	31	37	33	33	31	27	
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	29	32	33	28	32	31	30	33	35	
Total "pour" / Total "for"	52	55	53	59	69	64	63	64	62	
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	8	6	5	7	5	7	8	8	6	
- Tout à fait contre / completely against	6	3	4	4	4	6	4	6	7	
Total "contre" / Total "against"	14	9	9	11	9	13	12	14	13	
Sans réponse / No answer	34	36	38	30	22	23	25	22	25	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1266	1507	1000	963	1077	988	1006	1013	1008	

	DEUTSCHLAND										
	IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	29	28	23	25	27	23	28	28	22		
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	40	48	50	42	49	46	45	46	48		
Total "pour" / Total "for"	69	76	73	67	76	69	73	74	70		
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	9	6	9	10	7	6	8	6	5		
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against	3	2	2	5	3	2	3	1	2		
Total "contre" / Total "against"	12	8	11	15	10	8	11	7	7		
- Sans réponse / No reply	19	16	16	18	14	23	16	19	23		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1957	1039	1002	1004	1007	1005	999	996	1006		

FRANCE									
IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/78	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
22	33	28	28	27	28	30	31	25	
29	35	48	30	02	46	30	36	42	
51	88	09	06	09	70	70	67	07	
11	08	08	10	08	9	0	7	7	
7	0	0	1	0	3	0	5	4	
18	15	13	17	13	12	14	12	11	
31	17	18	17	18	14	16	21	22	
100	00	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
2227	1156	1278	1201	1358	258	149	1270	1194	
Total									
N									

- Tout à fait pour / Completely for
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for
Total "pour" / Total "for"
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against
Total "contre" / Total "against"
- Sans réponse / No reply
Total
N

	ITALIA										
	IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	34	31	38	42	40	43	45	45	38		
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	30	40	40	32	37	37	34	32	41		
Total "pour" / Total "for"	64	77	78	74	17	80	79	77	79		
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	8	6	5	6	5	7	7	5	5		
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against	4	2	3	2	3	3	2	2	2		
Total "contre" / Total "against"	12	8	8	8	8	10	9	7	7		
- Sans réponse / No reply	24	15	14	18	15	10	12	16	14		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
N	1909	1043	1110	923	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030		

NEDERLAND

IX/75	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
32	28	21	43	38	52	44	50	46
30	29	32	31	36	30	33	30	36
62	57	59	74	74	82	77	80	82
11	7	6	8	6	6	6	5	5
5	7	5	6	5	3	4	4	3
16	14	11	14	11	9	10	9	8
22	29	30	12	15	9	13	11	10
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1464	1093	1006	804	1123	1032	943	1131	913

- Tout à fait pour / Completely for
 - Plutôt pour / To some extent for

Total "pour" / Total "for"

- Plutôt contre / To some extent against
 - Tout à fait contre / Completely against

Total "contre" / Total "against"

Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

DÉTAIL DES DONNÉES											
IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78			
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
20	15	13	10	22	22	27	32	27			
16	20	19	22	20	22	27	22	27			
36	35	32	40	42	44	54	54	54			
18	12	18	17	16	12	14	8	10			
25	21	25	25	21	15	15	14	12			
43	33	43	42	37	27	29	22	22			
21	32	25	18	21	29	17	24	24			
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
1199	1073	1023	977	962	1010	992	983	1002			

- Tout à fait pour / Completel for
- Plus ou moins / To some extent

Total "pour" / Total "for"

- Plus ou moins / To some extent
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against

- Tout à fait contre / Completely against

Total "contre" / Total "against"

So a réponse / No reply

Total

N

	IRELAND									
	IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
- Tout à fait pour / Completely for	15	20	19	24	29	46	49	41	42	
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for	30	35	37	33	34	30	25	30	33	
Total "pour" / Total "for"	45	55	56	57	63	76	74	71	75	
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	17	13	15	17	9	6	6	5	4	
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against	14	9	8	8	5	6	5	5	3	
Total "contre" / Total "against"	31	22	23	25	14	12	11	10	7	
Sans réponse / No reply	24	23	21	18	23	12	15	19	18	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	1199	1000	998	1007	981	1008	997	1005	1005	

UNITED KINGDOM											
IX/73 (2)	V/75	XI/75	I/76 (3)	II/76 (3)	V/76	VI/76	XI/76	V/77	VI/77 (3)	XI/77	V/78
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
11	16	13	15	13	14	13	30	42	16	42	40
22	25	28	29	28	26	28	27	25	30	27	25
33	41	41	44	41	40	41	57	67	46	69	65
19	16	18	15	15	19	17	8	10	16	9	8
30	27	24	19	20	29	19	14	12	19	9	9
49	43	42	34	35	48	36	22	22	35	18	17
18	16	17	22	24	12	23	21	11	19	13	18
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1933	1328	1438	1077	992	1340	1038	1351	1417	945	1351	1426

- Tout à fait pour / Completely for
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for
Total "pour" / Total "for"
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against
Total "contre" / Total "against"
Sans réponse / No reply
Total
N

- Tout à fait pour / Completely for
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for

Total "pour" / Total "for"

- "Luttre contre" / To some extent
- Tout à fait contre / Completely
- "Luttre contre" / To some extent

Total "contre" / Total "against"

Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

(2) Great Britain.

(3) Great Britain, 8 years and more.

UNITED KINGDOM (suite / continued)										
										X/78
										%
										34
										29
										63
										9
										12
										Z
										16
										100
										1339

EURO 6

	XI/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
- Tout à fait pour / completely for	28	31	28	34	32	33	36	35	29	
- Plutôt pour / To some extent, in favor	33	40	43	36	42	41	38	38	43	
Total "pour" / Total "for"	61	71	71	70	74	74	74	73	72	
- Plutôt contre / To some extent against	9	7	8	8	7	7	8	6	6	
- Tout à fait contre / completely against	5	4	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	
Total "contre" / Total "against"	14	11	11	12	10	10	11	9	9	
Sans réponse / No reply	25	18	13	13	15	16	15	13	19	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	153	6149	5691	5202	5906	5609	5595	5322	5442	

COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

IX/73	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
24	27	25	28	31	34	37	36	30
30	36	39	34	38	38	35	35	40
54	63	64	62	69	72	72	71	70
12	9	10	11	8	8	8	7	6
11	9	8	10	6	5	5	4	5
23	18	18	21	14	13	13	11	11
23	19	18	17	17	15	15	18	19
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
13 484	9550	9150	8624	9210	9044	8986	9827	9451

- Tout fait pour / Completely for
- Plutôt pour / To some extent for

Total "pour" / Total "for"

- Plutôt contre / To some extent against
- Tout à fait contre / Completely against

Total "contre" / Total "against"

Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

Tableau 2

POUR OU CONTRE L'UNIFICATION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE :
EVOLUTION DES ATTITUDES EN ALLEMAGNE, EN FRANCE, EN ITALIE ET
EN GRANDE-BRETAGNE DE 1952 A 1978

Table 2

FOR OR AGAINST THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE :
EVOLUTION OF ATTITUDES IN GERMANY, FRANCE, ITALY AND
GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1952 TO 1978

	1952 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 V-VI	1967 V	1970 II-III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 X-XI	1978 X-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>DEUTSCHLAND</u>																
Pour/ For	70	82	73	69	79	82	75	78	78	82	87	76	78	77	74	78
Contre/ Against	10	4	7	6	6	5	7	3	5	3	2	5	6	3	5	5
Sans réponse/no reply	20	14	20	25	15	13	18	19	17	15	11	19	16	20	21	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1591	836	820	813	863	1159	1299	1234	1202	1255	1000	2021	1957	1039	1002	1006
<u>FRANCE</u>																
Pour/ For	60	63	49	45	53	67	55	70	80	74	72	70	68	78	77	79
Contre/ Against	16	9	15	12	14	7	9	8	5	5	7	8	4	5	4	7
Sans réponse/no reply	24	28	36	43	33	26	36	22	15	21	21	22	28	17	19	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1345	847	900	805	800	1226	1200	1307	1215	1228	1961	2046	2227	1156	1276	1194

Tableau 2 (suite)

Table 2 (continued)

	1952 IX	1954 X	1955 II	1955 XII	1956 IV	1956 XI	1957 V	1962 VI	1964 II	1965 V-VI	1967 V	1970 II-III	1973 IX	1975 V	1975 X-XI	1978 X-XI
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>ITALIA</u>																
Pour/For	57	63	55	55	66		59	67	78	65	68	78	80	77	77	83
Contre/ Against	14	9	11	13	7		7	6	3	4	4	5	3	3	4	5
Sans réponse/no reply	29	28	34	32	27		34	27	19	31	28	17	27	20	19	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1505	808	814	803	911		1269	1344	1175	1166	1023	1822	1909	1043	1110	1030
<u>GREAT BRITAIN (2)</u>																
Pour/For	58	78	67	66	65	70	64	47	59	69	63		37	50	51	63
Contre/ Against	15	4	10	14	16	10	12	22	18	11	15		30	22	23	22
Sans réponse/no reply	27	18	23	20	19	20	24	31	23	20	22		33	28	26	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100
N	1503	832	805	814	806	1210	1232	1261	1178	1179	992		1933	1328	1438	1339

(1) Données provenant, pour les années 1952 - 1967, des sondages commandités par la U.S. Information Agency et, pour les années suivantes, des sondages commandités par la Commission des Communautés européennes; toutefois, pour l'année 1970, les données britanniques ont été estimées par Ronald INGLEHART, Cf. "The Silent Revolution", Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 344-346. Nonobstant quelques différences de formulation, la question **était** initialement: "Etes-vous en **général** pour ou contre les efforts qui sont faits en vue d'unifier l'Europe occidentale?"; en Grande-Bretagne (de 1955 à 1967), en Allemagne (de février 1955 à avril 1956, ainsi qu'en juin 1962), en Italie (en 1955 et 1962), la question précisait "... l'Europe occidentale, y compris la Grande-Bretagne". En 1970, 1973 et 1975, **il** était demandé aux individus interrogés **s'ils étaient** favorables, indifférents, ou défavorables à l'unification européenne; Cf. "Les Européens et l'unification de l'Europe", Bruxelles juin 1972, pp. 71-72 et Euro-Barometre n° 4, décembre 1975, pp. 54-56.

(2) Royaume-Uni (y compris Northern Ireland) à partir de 1975 /

(1) The data for 1952-1967 are from surveys financed by the U.S. Information Agency and, for the following years, from surveys financed by the Commission of the European Communities; however, for 1970, the British data have been estimated by Ronald INGLEHART, Cf. "The Silent Revolution", Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 344-346. Notwithstanding some differences in the wording, the question was, initially, as follows: "Are you in general for or against making efforts towards uniting Western Europe?". In Great Britain (from 1955 to 1967), in Germany (from February 1955 to April 1956, as well as in June 1962) and in Italy (in 1955 and 1962), the question specified: "... Western Europe, including Great Britain". In 1970, 1973 and 1975, the interviewed individuals were asked whether they were in favour, indifferent or not in favour of the European unification; Cf. "Les Européens et l'unification de l'Europe", Brussels, June 1972, pp. 71-72 and Euro-Barometre Nr. 4, December 1975, pp. 54-56.

(2) United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland) as from 1975.

Tableau 3 / Table 3

JULGEMENT PORTE SUR L'APPARTENANCE A LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE /

ATTITUDE TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET (1)

BELGIQUE / BELGIE												
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78		
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
57	68	60	57	59	62	66	69	60	58	66		
5	3	6	3	3	5	3	4	5	6	3		
19	15	18	21	21	17	19	17	19	21	17		
19	14	16	19	17	16	12	10	16	15	14		
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
1266	1017	1505	1507	1000	963	1077	988	1006	1013	1008		
N												
- Bonne chose / Good thing												
- Mauvaise chose - Bad thing												
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise - Neither good nor bad												
- Sans réponse / No reply												
Total												
N												
DEUTSCHLAND												
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78		
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
63	59	62	56	61	48	57	54	59	58	63		
4	8	10	8	6	12	5	8	7	3	4		
22	26	20	28	27	30	31	23	24	24	21		
11	7	8	8	6	10	7	15	10	15	12		
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
1957	1060	1042	1039	1002	1004	1007	1005	999	996	1006		
Total												
N												
- Bonne chose / Good thing												
- Mauvaise chose - Bad thing												
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise - Neither good nor bad												
- Sans réponse / no reply												

(1) "D'une façon générale, pensez-vous que le fait (pour votre pays) de faire partie de la Communauté européenne (Marché commun) est une bonne chose, une mauvaise chose, ou une chose ni bonne ni mauvaise?" / "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"

FRANCE

IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
61	68	63	64	67	57	52	64	57	54	59
5	5	6	4	4	7	7	6	9	9	7
22	20	22	25	24	30	35	24	28	27	26
12	7	9	7	5	6	6	6	6	10	8
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2227	1308	1237	156	1276	121	1356	1256	149	1276	131

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

ITALIA

IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
69	77	82	71	75	63	68	71	70	65	73
2	5	3	3	4	6	5	5	5	5	3
15	9	11	21	16	20	16	18	18	18	16
14	9	4	5	5	11	11	6	7	12	8
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1909	1030	1021	1043	1110	923	1052	1025	1155	1175	1030

- Buona chose / Good thing
- Mala chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

LUXEMBOURG

IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
67	79	73	65	78	66	77	84	73	73	63
3	4	3	7	4	5	2	2	3	5	14
22	12	13	19	12	21	17	11	17	16	15
8	5	11	9	6	8	4	3	7	6	8
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
330	306	231	311	297	260	301	302	344	322	231

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78			
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
63	66	70	64	67	75	74	80	74	78	83			
4	4	6	3	3	4	4	3	5	5	2			
20	14	15	18	12	15	14	13	16	14	12			
13	16	9	15	18	6	8	4	5	3	3			
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
1464	1000	1012	1093	1006	904	1123	1033	943	1131	913			

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78			
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
42	35	33	36	41	36	29	30	37	34	36			
30	31	35	25	27	29	34	30	33	31	25			
19	24	25	28	24	22	28	30	24	27	30			
9	10	7	11	8	13	9	10	6	8	9			
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
1199	1168	1100	1073	1023	977	962	1010	932	983	1002			

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78			
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
56	48	50	50	67	50	50	57	59	54	63			
15	25	24	20	12	16	22	17	19	17	12			
21	19	22	25	17	18	22	22	19	23	20			
8	8	4	5	4	6	6	4	3	6	5			
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
1199	1000	1000	1000	998	1007	981	1008	997	1005	1005			

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM

X/72 (1)	IX/73 (2)	V/74 (2)	XI/74 (2)	V/75 (2)	XI/75 (2)	I/76 (1)	II/76 (1)	V/76 (2)	VII/76 (1)	IX/76 (1)	XI/76 (2)	I/77 (3)	IV-V 77 (2)
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
40	31	33	36	47	50	50	49	39	39	33	39	35	35
21	34	39	35	21	24	24	26	35	31	37	34	41	40
22	22	19	20	19	18	17	17	18	21	19	21	} 24	22
17	13	9	9	13	8	9	8	8	9	11	6		3
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1028	1933	1031	1039	1328	1438	1077	992	1340	1038	976	1351	1697	1417

Suite / contd.

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

VI/77 (1)	X/77 (1)	XI/77 (2)	V/78 (2)	VI/78 (1)	X/78 (2)								
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%					
33	37	35	29	25	39								
42	33	37	38	48	31								
18	22	23	28	20	25								
7	8	5	5	7	5								
100	100	100	100	100	100								
945	954	1351	1426	981	1339								

- (1) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). Population of 18 years and more, only Great Britain. / Population de 18 ans et au-delà, seulement Grande-Bretagne.
- (2) European Omnibus Survey. Population of 15 years and more. Great Britain from 1973 to 1974; United Kingdom as from 1975 / Population de 15 ans et au-delà. Grande-Bretagne de 1973 à 1974; Royaume-Uni depuis 1975.
- (3) NOP Market Research. Population of 18 years and more. Only Great Britain. / Population de 18 ans et au-delà, seulement Grande-Bretagne.

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N

EURO 6													
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78			
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
63	67	69	63	67	57	61	64	63	60	66			
4	6	6	5	4	8	5	6	7	6	4			
19	18	17	24	22	26	26	21	22	22	20			
14	9	8	8	7	9	8	9	8	12	10			
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
9153	5723	6114	6149	5691	5303	5916	5609	5596	5913	5442			
COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY													
IX/73	V/74	XI/74	V/75	XI/75	V/76	XI/76	V/77	XI/77	V/78	X/78			
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
56	59	60	59	63	53	55	57	56	53	60			
11	14	14	9	9	14	13	14	14	13	10			
20	18	18	23	21	24	25	21	23	24	22			
13	9	8	9	7	9	7	8	7	10	8			
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
13 484	8922	9253	9550	9150	8627	9210	9044	8936	9327	8791			

- Bonne chose / Good thing
- Mauvaise chose / Bad thing
- Chose ni bonne ni mauvaise / Neither good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No reply

Total

N