

# EUROBAROMETER 2003.4

## PUBLIC OPINION IN THE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES

Fieldwork: October - November 2003

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# FULL REPORT

This survey was requested and coordinated by the Directorate General Press and Communication

This document does not represent the point of view of the European Commission.  
The interpretations and opinions contained in it are solely those of the authors.

## Introduction

The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CC-EB), gathers information from the societies that are to become members of the European Union in a way that is fully comparable with the Standard Eurobarometer. The CC-EB continuously tracks support for EU membership in each country, and records attitudes related to European issues.

This report covers the results of the wave of survey conducted in October 2003, in the 13 candidate countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey.

An identical set of questions was asked of representative samples of the population aged 15 years and older in each candidate country. The sample size in Candidate Countries Eurobarometer surveys is at least 1000 people per country, except for Cyprus and Malta, in which the sample size is 500 respondents each. The achieved sample sizes of the 2003.4 wave are:

Bulgaria	1000	Latvia	1001	Slovakia	1061
Cyprus	500	Lithuania	1015	Slovenia	1000
Czech Rep	1000	Malta	500	Turkey	1000
Estonia	1014	Poland	1000		
Hungary	1017	Romania	1047	Total	12165

The survey is carried out by national institutes associated with and coordinated by The Gallup Organization, Hungary, in each of the 13 candidate countries. This network of institutes was selected by tender. All institutes are members of the "European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research" (ESOMAR) or comply with its standards.

The figures shown in this report are weighted by sex, age, region, community size, education level and marital status. The figures given for the candidate region (CC-13) as a whole and for the 2004 Member States (MS 2004) are weighted on the basis of the adult population in each country.

Due to the rounding of figures in certain cases, the total percentage in a table does not always add exactly to 100%, but to a number very close to it (e.g., 99% or 101%). When questions allow for several responses, percentages often add to more than 100%. Percentages shown in the graphics may display a difference of one percentage point in comparison to the tables because of the way previously rounded percentages are added.

### Types of surveys in the Eurobarometer series

The European Commission (Directorate-General Press and Communication) organizes general public opinion, specific target group, as well as qualitative (group discussion, in-depth interview) surveys in all member states and, occasionally, in third countries. There are four different types of polls available:

- Traditional standard Eurobarometer surveys with reports published twice a year
- Telephone Flash EB, also used for special target group surveys (e.g., Top Decision Makers)
- Qualitative research ("focus groups"; in-depth interviews)
- Candidate Countries Eurobarometer

The face-to-face general public standard Eurobarometer surveys and the EB Applicant Countries surveys, the telephone Flash EB polls and qualitative research serve primarily to carry out surveys for the different Directorates General and comparable special services of the Commission on their behalf and on their account.

**The Eurobarometer Web site address is:**  
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/public\\_opinion](http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion)

## Table of contents

Introduction .....	1
Table of contents .....	3
Key findings .....	7
1. Life in the candidate countries .....	8
1.1 Life Satisfaction .....	8
Current life satisfaction .....	8
Life satisfaction compared with five years ago .....	11
Life satisfaction over the next five years .....	13
Dynamics of change in subjective well-being .....	15
1.2 People's expectations for the year 2004 .....	17
Life in General .....	18
Economic situation in the country .....	19
Financial situation of the household .....	21
Employment situation in the country .....	22
Personal job situation .....	23
1.3 Trust in institutions .....	24
Trust in political institutions .....	24
Satisfaction with how democracy works .....	27
Satisfaction with how democracy works in European Union .....	28
Mixed views on national democracy and on how democracy works in the EU .....	30
Trust in other social institutions .....	31
Problems facing the nations .....	34
Attitudes the European Union towards the most important problems .....	37
1.4 Media use .....	39
Television news viewership .....	39
News readership of daily newspapers .....	40
Listening to radio news broadcasting .....	41
Trust in the media .....	41
Trust in the opinion polls .....	43
1.5 Citizens fear international terrorism and organised crime the most .....	46
1.6 Geopolitical orientation in the candidate region .....	50

2. Knowledge and information about the EU.....	55
2.1 Actual knowledge of the European Union.....	55
2.2 Self-perceived knowledge about the European Union .....	57
2.3 Providing information about the European Union.....	60
2.4 Sources of information about the European Union.....	62
Preferred topics .....	62
Preferred methods for receiving information about the European Union .....	65
Preference for national versus EU-originated information.....	67
Interest in European Union news .....	68
Desired television programmes about the European Union.....	70
3. Attitudes towards the European Union.....	71
3.1 Feeling European.....	71
Most people have a European component to their identity .....	71
National pride.....	73
European pride .....	73
Attachment to Europe .....	75
3.2 Support for European Union membership .....	78
Membership: a “good thing” or a “bad thing”? .....	78
Many citizens would now vote differently on the referendum.....	88
3.3 Perceived benefits of European Union membership .....	90
Personal benefits.....	90
Benefits for the country.....	94
3.4 Image of the European Union .....	105
Spontaneous image of the EU.....	107
Emotions related to the European Union.....	110
Feelings if the European Union were to be scrapped .....	112
3.5 Meaning of European Union .....	113
What EU membership will have brought for its citizens 10 years from now.....	113
Meaning of the European Union.....	115
What it means to be a citizen of the European Union .....	117
Fears related to the building of Europe .....	119
3.6 Role expected and desired for the European Union in five years' time.....	122
3.7 Priority of key issues .....	125
3.8 Support for key initiatives.....	128
Stable support for the euro .....	130

4. Common foreign and security policy .....	131
4.1. Support for a common foreign policy .....	131
Support for joint EU decision-making in foreign affairs .....	132
Support for a European Foreign Minister .....	135
4.2. Support for a common defence and security policy .....	136
Support for joint EU decision-making about defence policy .....	137
Citizens support the creation of a European rapid military reaction force .....	140
4.3. Measures related to Common Foreign and Security Policy .....	142
4.4. Who should make decisions on European defence policy? .....	144
A tendency for keeping decision-making in defence issues at home .....	144
5. Attitudes and knowledge about enlargement and the accession process .....	147
5.1 Attitudes toward enlargement and accession .....	147
Opinions about specific statements regarding to the enlargement of the European Union .....	148
A growing concern if acceding countries are welcomed in the Union .....	151
5.2 Time frame of the EU accession .....	153
5.3 Feeling informed about enlargement and the accession process .....	155
Enlargement .....	155
Accession .....	157
Pre-accession funds .....	159
5.4 Mutual support of membership in the candidate region .....	161
6. The EU democracy and institutions .....	164
6.1 The European Union among other supranational institutions .....	164
6.2 Citizens demand more influence in EU decision-making .....	167
6.3 The way the European Union works .....	171
6.4 European Union institutions and bodies .....	173
Awareness of the European Union institutions and bodies .....	173
Role of the European Union institutions and bodies .....	175
Trust levels in European Union institutions and bodies .....	176
Trust in the European Parliament .....	178
Trust in the European Commission .....	179

7. The future of Europe in the eyes of its future citizens .....	180
7.1 The majority want a Constitution.....	180
7.2 The Commission and the Commissioners .....	182
The EP should have the right to withdraw confidence from the EC .....	182
Citizens have no desire to directly elect the President of the Commission.....	183
Citizens want to have a commissioner for their country, and are not at all concerned that it would diminish the efficiency of the executive body. ....	185
7.3 European tax.....	187
7.4 The Presidency .....	188
7.5 A Government instead of the Commission? .....	190
7.6 Decision making.....	191
The right to veto? It depends.....	191
Support for joint decision-making .....	193
7.7. European Parliament election.....	197
Participation in EP elections .....	197
How to increase willingness to vote.....	198
The hot topics of the EP campaigns.....	200

## Key findings

This Candidate Countries Eurobarometer measures public opinion in the 10 acceding countries and the 3 candidate countries on European Union matters.

12,165 people were interviewed face-to-face between October 11 and November 9, 2003.

This wave reveals that:

- There is a great deal of pessimism in the countries that will join the European Union next May about what 2004 will bring for citizens. As many people expect their life in general to become worse in 2004 as expect it to remain the same. With almost half of the citizens expecting negative economic changes in their country the outlook is quite gloomy for the accession year. As a result, in the acceding countries the confidence in political institutions (parliaments, governments) dropped in historic lows.
- Support for the European Union membership, though it remains high in the acceding countries, dropped 6 percentage points since spring 2003. This unfavourable change can be attributed to the generally gloomier mood measured in economic pessimism throughout the region, as well as to the fading away of the direct effects of the mobilisation campaigns that preceded EU referenda in the acceding countries. In addition, as citizens acquire a more realistic picture of the costs accompanying a common currency, support for the euro has fallen as well.
- Finally, candidate and acceding citizens continue to favour the creation of a European Union Constitution as well as a more articulated European presence in settling international conflicts. All measures of the Common Foreign and Security Policy meet with strong approval among those who will become European citizens in May 2004, including the creation of a common Foreign Minister and effective European army.

(CC-13 stands for the whole candidate region, 2004 members are those countries that are to join the Union next May, and CC-3 is the group of countries that will remain candidates after the 2004 enlargement as well: Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.)

*The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer surveys are conducted twice a year.*

*Key indicators arising out of each wave are published soon after the completion of the fieldwork, followed within a few months by the complete set of results.*

# 1. Life in the candidate countries

In this chapter, we will take a closer look at some particular aspects of life in the candidate countries. First we will focus on overall satisfaction levels among the citizens — how people feel about their present personal situation compared to five years ago, and how they think their situation will evolve over the next five years. Later in this chapter we will examine trust in political and social institutions in the candidate countries — including how satisfied people are with their national democracies, and what they consider to be the most important issues facing their nations. We will also take a look at media use and trust in media and the fears of citizens in the candidate countries. Finally we present the political orientation of candidate countries toward the European Union and USA.

## 1.1 Life Satisfaction

The life satisfaction question is a summary measure in the Eurobarometer series of how people feel about things related to their lives. This indicator of subjective well-being is regularly asked in the 15 EU member states and the 13 candidate countries.

### Current life satisfaction

In autumn 2003, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer found a very significant, but somewhat narrowing, gap between the life satisfaction levels in the candidate countries and those in the European Union. This remains probably the most significant difference we find between current and future member states. While less than two in three people in the candidate countries (60%) say they are very or fairly satisfied with the lives they lead, life satisfaction in the member states has stabilized at about 79%, which is exactly where it is now. (FIGURE 1.1a)



Eurobarometer continue to confirm the existence of a clear connection between life satisfaction in the candidate countries and national income. There is no doubt that those in richer countries are more likely to be satisfied than are those living in low-income countries. The average per capita GDP in



Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) of the 13 candidate countries is about one-third that of the EU-15 region. In some countries however (most notably in Turkey, but to some extent also in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland), people are more satisfied than the country's economic output alone can explain.


**Table 1.1a Life satisfaction**

	% Satisfied + very satisfied	change from spring 2003
<b>EU-15</b>	<b>79</b>	
<b>CC-13</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>(0)</b>
SLOVENIA	85	(+ 2)
MALTA	83	(+ 1)
CYPRUS	82	(-2)
TURKEY	69	(+ 4)
CZECH REPUBLIC	67	(-5)
POLAND	63	(-2)
LITHUANIA	56	(+ 3)
LATVIA	55	(+ 4)
SLOVAKIA	54	(- 8)
HUNGARY	54	(- 2)
ESTONIA	53	(0)
ROMANIA	40	(+ 2)
BULGARIA	31	(+ 1)

Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus are the only candidate region countries with a subjective well-being level higher than the EU-15 average. If we compare EU-15 and CC-13 rankings, we find that the lowest life satisfaction measured within the Union (Greece, with 62%) would rank 7th on the list of candidate countries.

Among the least satisfied we find Romania where 40% of the 15-year-old and older population are satisfied with their lives. Then, least satisfied of all, is Bulgaria where only three in 10 people say they are to some extent satisfied with the life they lead (31%).


Accordingly, quite a few of the candidate countries' citizens tell us that they are more or less unsatisfied with their lives (39%). While a mere four percent of the EU citizens say they are "not at all satisfied" with their lives as much as 13% of the candidate region will admit to this unfortunate circumstance. (FIGURE 1.1b) Specifically, in Bulgaria almost one-third (29%), and in Romania a fifth (20%) of the population is not at all satisfied, while hardly a few of Slovenian, Cypriots, and Maltese share this opinion.



On the CC-13 level life satisfaction (as measured by the proportion of very satisfied and satisfied citizens combined) is unchanged in the most recent study period. In the majority of countries (in seven out of the 13) a positive change has been recorded since spring 2003, only Estonia has seen no change, and we have recorded a negative shift in five countries. People are less satisfied now in Slovakia (-8), the Czech Republic (-5), Hungary, Poland, and Cyprus (-2). Satisfaction increased as much as 4 percentage points over the past half-year in Latvia and Turkey. (ANNEX TABLE 1.1a)

Demographic analyses show significant differences between men (12% very satisfied) and women (10%) as to "life satisfaction," and we find that the proportion of very satisfied people is significantly higher in the youngest segment (21%) than it is for the other age groups. Large variations are found among occupational groups in the population, with satisfaction levels (very satisfied and satisfied) ranging from 43% among unemployed people to 79% among managers. Students (83%) and people who stayed in school until the age of 20 or older (68%) have significantly higher levels of subjective well-being than do people who left school when they were aged 15 or younger (56%) or aged 16 to 19 (55%).<sup>1</sup> (ANNEX TABLE 1.1b)

<sup>1</sup> Appendix C.4 provides details about demographic and other constructed analysis variables.



The life satisfaction of candidate countries' citizens hardly changed over the six surveys except in 2001. The proportion of satisfied people fluctuated between 56 and 61%, and unsatisfied people between 38 and 43% at the time of surveys from 1999 to 2003.


### Life satisfaction compared with five years ago

FIGURE 1.1c shows that the past dynamics of self-perceived life satisfaction, or quality of life, of the candidate countries was not favourable. Thirty percent of candidate countries' citizens feel that their present situation has improved compared to five years ago; 34% feel it has stayed about the same; and the small majority of respondents (35%) feel it has gotten worse.

The CC-13 citizens feel that they have experienced many changes in their lives, even in the last five years, which can certainly affect satisfaction. Still a relatively small fraction in these societies thought the quality of their lives had remained stable over the past five years.

Obviously, there are large differences among the populations of the 13 candidate countries. While most of them report stable or improving conditions over the past five years, Bulgarians have been experiencing deteriorating conditions in dramatic proportions, and perceptions in Poland, Slovakia, and Romania are at best mixed in this respect. (FIGURE 1.1c)

The Turks and Cypriots are most likely (46%-42%) to feel that their present situation has improved. One third of Slovenians share this view (33%). In Estonia and Malta nearly one-third (both 32%), and in Latvia (28%), Lithuania (26%) Hungary (25%) and the Czech Republic (23%), more than, or nearly one-fourth feel their situation has improved during the past five years. The countries well below average are Romania and Poland (both 21%), Slovakia (18%), and Bulgaria (with only 13%).



The Latvians are the most likely to feel that their situation is the same as it was five years ago (45%), followed by Czech, Maltese and Slovenians respondents (each of them 40%). At 53%, people in Slovakia are the most likely to say that their situation has become worse during the past five years. The percentages for Bulgarians (50%), Poles (45%) and Romanians (40%) are right behind those for Slovaks. The Turks (24%) are the least likely to think that their situation has deteriorated over the past half decade, and in Turkey there has been the largest decrease in negative judgment of their situation over the past 5 years (-13%) since spring 2003. (ANNEX TABLE 1.2a)

The next table shows a mixed association between life satisfaction and the way people feel about their present situation compared to five years ago. We can clearly see that those who are currently not satisfied with their lives tend to think their situation has worsened in the past five years. Nevertheless, less than a quarter of those who are currently satisfied with their lives also claimed a decrease in their quality of life during the past five years. This group is a bit more likely to think that their situation did not change in the recent past than are those who are currently not satisfied with their lives.

**Table 1.1b Relationship between life satisfaction and views about one's present situation compared with five years ago, CC-13**

	Views about life in general:	
	Satisfied %	Not satisfied %
Improved	43	11
Stayed about the same	37	30
Got worse	20	59
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


The demographic breakdowns show that managers (45%) and young people (51%) are the most likely to feel that, compared with five years ago, their present situation has improved. The data indicate that the older cohorts are most likely to feel their present situation has gotten worse. Interestingly, those who are about to finish their careers are more likely to report worsening conditions than are the elderly (40-54 years: 45%, versus 47% for those 55 years and older), the retired (49%), or the unemployed (48%).

Finally, attitudinal analyses show that people who see their country's membership in the EU as a good thing are significantly more likely to feel that their present situation, compared to five years ago, has improved (35%) than are those who regard their country's membership as a bad thing (20%). Among the latter group, 56% feel their present situation has gotten worse, compared to only 29% of people who view their country's membership in the EU as a good thing. (ANNEX TABLE 1.2b)

## Life satisfaction over the next five years

Within the candidate countries 43%, and more than one-third (36%) of the 2004 member states citizens, forecast that their personal situations will improve in the next five years. Only two citizens out of 10 feel they will get worse (17% of CC-13 countries and 20% of 2004 members). Thirty percent in the candidate region and 31% of 2004 members feel their personal situation will stay about the same.

These data suggest that people in the candidate region generally feel positively about the development of their personal situations over the next five years.



In previous surveys, we used to find that in countries where general satisfaction is relatively high and the past dynamics have also been satisfactory, people are more likely to be optimistic about the future. Now, the countries that have the highest hopes for the next five years – Turkey and Cyprus — are also the ones that most felt things improved over the last five years. In contrast, present life satisfaction of the Romanians is among the lowest, but the hope of citizens is among the most hopeful.

We find that the Turks are the most likely to feel their situation will improve (51%), and Slovenians are the most likely to feel they will stay about the same (44%). People in Slovakia are the most likely to feel their situation will get worse (32%). About one in 6 respondents in Romania and Latvia (both 17%), Cyprus, Malta and Lithuania (15% for each) did not know what to expect regarding their future. (ANNEX TABLE 1.3a)

The proportion of those who believe their life satisfaction will improve has increased in Romania and Bulgaria in the highest degree (9 and 7 percentage points respectively) and has decreased in Malta and Hungary in the highest degree (9 and 8 percentage points respectively).

The demographic analyses show that pessimism is primarily found among elderly people in the candidate countries. The age group with the worst expectations for the next five years, after the oldest ones (27% pessimistic), is the middle-aged group in the candidate region (40-54 years — 20% pessimistic). Students and young people (between 15 and 24 years; 72% and 68%, respectively) are most likely to be optimistic. (ANNEX TABLE 1.3b)

Again we find that people who regard their country's future membership in the EU as a good thing are significantly more likely to feel that their situation will improve (53%) than are people who regard their country's membership as a bad thing (24%).

The following table shows that people who are satisfied with the life they lead are more likely to feel their personal situation will improve than are those who are not satisfied. There are about as many people in the latter group who think their situation will get even worse as there are people who are optimistic about their mid-term future. (TABLE 1.1c)

<b>Table 1.1c Relationship between life satisfaction and expectations of one's personal situation in five years</b>		
	<b>Views about life in general:</b>	
	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>Not satisfied</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
Improve	54	29
Stay about the same	29	32
Get worse	10	26
(DK / no answer)	7	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

## Dynamics of change in subjective well-being

Satisfaction is always relative. The recent past and expectations regarding the near future together determine to what extent people think they have a chance to improve their quality of life. In the paragraphs below, we will profile certain patterns we found in each candidate country in this respect.

In the candidate region, we find that a consistent positive change over this one-decade period is perceived by a bit more than a third of citizens (39%), fewer than two out of 10 (15%) report no change, and 25% expected — or experienced — negative change. (Twenty-one percent reported mixed directionality in the past and future change of their subjective well-being.) Thirty-one percent of the 2004 members hope for improvement in their life and almost the same proportion (30%) expect deterioration of their life, and only 15% of respondents suggest the stable life.

<b>Table 1.1d Subjective well-being, perceptions of change over time</b> in %, by country					
	<b>CURRENT LEVELS OF SATISFACTION</b>	<b>IMPROVING<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>STABLE<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>DETERIO- RATING<sup>4</sup></b>	<b>NET DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS OF IMPROVEMENT AND DETERIORATION</b>
<b>CC-13</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>(+ 14)</b>
<b>2004 MEMBERS</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>(+ 1)</b>
SLOVENIA	85	38	24	24	(+ 14)
MALTA	83	43	14	21	(+ 22)
CYPRUS	82	45	10	21	(+ 23)
TURKEY	69	52	17	18	(+ 34)
CZECH REP.	67	28	20	33	(- 5)
POLAND	63	30	12	30	(0)
LITHUANIA	56	34	17	24	(+ 10)
LATVIA	55	38	20	19	(+ 19)
SLOVAKIA	54	25	11	41	(- 16)
HUNGARY	54	35	18	29	(+ 6)
ESTONIA	53	37	16	24	(+ 13)
ROMANIA	40	38	10	19	(+ 19)
BULGARIA	31	27	15	37	(- 10)


In most candidate countries (9/13), the net balance of the consistent directionalities of change points to the positive direction as far as subjective well-being is concerned. In the Czech Republic this is not the case: deterioration marginally outweighs improvement, and positive and negative reports sum up to -5 percentage points each. In Bulgaria life satisfaction is the lowest, and 10% more people expect deteriorating circumstances in their life rather than improvement. Slovakia has not nearly hit rock bottom, but with a negative balance of 16 percentage points people definitely expect further deterioration of their situation.

<sup>2</sup> Those who believe their satisfaction levels were not higher five years ago than they are today, and expect positive change in the future; and those who experienced improvement in the past five years and do not expect deterioration in the near future

<sup>3</sup> Those who did not experience change in the recent past, and expect none in the future either

<sup>4</sup> Those who believe that their satisfaction levels were better five years ago than today, and who do not expect positive change in the future; combined with those who experienced stability over the past five years but expect deterioration in the near future

The highest level of positive change can be observed in Turkey, Cyprus and Malta (+34, 24 and 22% respectively), which are among the top-ranked countries in subjective well-being in the CC-13 region. Among the countries in which current quality of life is reported to be relatively low, we found clearly positive tendencies almost everywhere, most notably in Romania, Latvia (both +19) and Estonia (13 percentage points). Lithuania and Hungary also have a positive balance of improvement and decline (+10, +6 percentage points, respectively).



The people's judgment concerning past personal situations in candidate countries has cautiously, but continually improved (*FIGURE 1.1f*). Namely, in autumn 2001 26% of people said their circumstances had improved; now in October 2003 this proportion is 34%. Since 2001 citizens have been expecting more and more improvement in their future for the next five years. In 2001 hardly more than third of people expected improvement, and now more than 40% of citizens do.




## 1.2 People's expectations for the year 2004

Respondents were also asked about their expectations for the year to come. Among the CC-13 35% believe their life in general will be better in 2004 and 23% feel it will be worse. In 2004 member countries 27% percent of respondents think their life in general will be better in 2004 and 26% feel it will be worse.

Of member states 33% expect a better life in 2004, and only 12% wait for a worse life in general over the next year. Of those expecting stability, 51% in the member states and 36% in the candidate countries do not forecast any change for the upcoming year. In autumn of 2003 there were twice as many people in the candidate region being generally pessimistic about their coming year than there were in the member states.

Candidate countries' citizens are still highly concerned about their national economies: 37% think that their economy will perform worse in 2004 and 28% hope for a better economic situation in the coming year. The 2004 members' citizens believe the same, but the proportion of optimists is lower (18%) and the pessimists are greater than in the candidate region (48%). In present member states only 16% of people expect the better future in their country's economic situation, but 46% of the people are pessimistic.



In the candidate region 27% expect that the financial situation of their household will be better in 2004, whereas a bit more (28%) expect it to be worse. Meanwhile among the 2004 members 19% expect improvement and 35% deterioration. In member states the citizens look forward to similar years, only 23 % of them hope the better future, and a fifth of inhabitants (20%) expect a worsening, while more than half expect an unchanged situation.

Regarding employment opportunities in their country, 38% in the candidate countries expect that there will be fewer employment opportunities. Only 23% of candidate citizens believe there will be a better employment situation in their country. Citizens of candidate countries feel relatively secure at their present workplace. Among the future members 17% expect a better employment situation in their country and 46% are afraid that the situation will be worse. Among current Union members less than

two out of ten hope for improvement (16%) and many more respondents expect that the employment situation will be worse (47%) in their country.

Expectations for changes in personal employment are more negative in candidate countries than in present member countries; 24 % of candidate respondents expect better and 19% a worse situation for the next years. Member states, however, have less than half the pessimism of the candidates (9%). (In the 2004 accessing countries 16% of people are optimistic and 21% pessimistic.)

As *TABLE 1.2* shows, we have not observed dramatic changes over the past year on the CC-13 level in immediate future expectations in any of the investigated domains of life.

When looking at short-term expectations in the candidate region we see that the proportion of people with expectations of an improved future has increased since 2002 in all categories. The number of people who expect worse for 2004 has decreased in regards nearly all the mentioned situations in their country. Yet there is no change the amount of people who expect worsening personal job situation. (*ANNEX TABLES 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8*).

<b>Table 1.2 Expectations for the year to come, change from past year</b>								
	CC-13				MS-2004			
	Will be better		Will be worse		Will be better		Will be worse	
	2002 AUTUMN	2003 AUTUMN	2002 AUTUMN	2003 AUTUMN	2002 AUTUMN	2003 AUTUMN	2002 AUTUMN	2003 AUTUMN
Life in general	32	35	24	23	30	27	19	26
Economic conditions in (COUNTRY)	21	28	42	37	18	18	38	48
Financial situation of household	24	27	29	28	20	19	26	35
Employment situation in (COUNTRY)	17	23	44	38	13	17	44	46
Personal job situation	17	24	19	19	15	16	16	21

Nevertheless, compared to their past predictions for 2003, citizens in the 10 acceding countries report a gloomier personal outlook for 2004. Now over a quarter of all teenagers and adults in the candidate countries — about 15 million people — expect their life to change for the worse in 2004, which is significantly more than the 19% expressing pessimism last Autumn.

Overall the proportion of those expressing optimism in the various tested domains did not change dramatically. Yet, in the acceding countries, the proportion of those expecting negative changes within the economic situation of their country, the financial situation of their household, and their personal job situation increased significantly. Additionally, the public remains very sceptical about short-term dynamics of employment in their own country: almost half of all citizens expect deterioration in the employment situation in their country (46%). Nevertheless, on the positive side, we find hopefulness for an improved employment situation to be reported in a slightly higher proportion than last year.

In the following paragraphs we present the results for each domain.

### Life in General


Country results show that people in Turkey, Cyprus and Romania (46%, 43% and 39% respectively) are most likely to believe that 2004 in general will be better. People in the Slovakia (42%), Poland (29%) and Hungary (27%) are most likely to feel that their life in general will get worse in 2004. The largest proportions of those expecting no change for 2004 are in the Czech Republic (55%), Bulgaria (50%), Slovenia (49%). (*FIGURE 1.2b*)

In candidate countries the proportions of optimists have increased (+3), those who expect an unchanged life in general and pessimists have decreased (-2, -1 respectively) since autumn 2002. In countries of 2004 members we have seen a decrease in the number of optimists (-3), and at the same time the proportion of the pessimists has increased (+7).

In Turkey we see a very high large number of optimists. We found a 13 percent increase among citizens (46%) who felt next year would be better for them, and the pessimists shrunk 15 percentage points from last year (18%).


Though not as much as the Turkish, people in Lithuania (+10), Cyprus (+8), Romania (+2), and Bulgaria (+1) are now more likely to believe the year to come will be better than the previous year. However, there are several countries where the mood is clearly more depressed. In the Slovakia, people are now more likely to be pessimistic, because the proportion of worse general life expectation increased 17 percentage points respectively. The same situation is found in Hungary (+16%), where the ratio of pessimists increased extensively.

In other countries the proportion expecting no change for 2004 increased, such as in Turkey (+5) Bulgaria (+4), Slovenia and Latvia (both +1) while in the other 9 candidate countries the proportion of people believing that general life will be the same as present in the year of European accession, has decreased. The largest decrease was seen in the Lithuania and Slovakia (both -12.) (ANNEX TABLE 1.4)



## Economic situation in the country

The same end-of-the-year question was used to measure people's expectations for their country's economy in the year to come. We find mixed tendencies to prevail in the region, with the acceding countries being much more pessimistic, while those who remain candidates expect an improvement for the national economy in 2004. The proportion of respondents who feel that the economic situation in their country will be better in 2004 ranges from only 11% (both in the Czech Republic and Slovakia) to 41% (in Turkey). Sixty-five percent of Slovaks and 52% in Poland are most likely to think that the economic situation in their country will get worse in 2004. The smallest proportion of those expecting a worse economic situation is found in Latvia and Lithuania (22% and 24% respectively). The largest proportions of those who expect no change in the economic situation for 2004 are in the Bulgaria (44%) and Slovenia (36%) while the smallest percent expecting no change is found in Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia (each 18%). (FIGURE 1.2c) (ANNEX TABLE 1.5)




Regarding the economic situation, the proportion of optimists in candidate countries overall has increased since autumn 2002 (+7) and pessimists have seen the same decline (-5). Comparing the current results with those from one year ago, a series of countries show a higher level of economic confidence for the coming year. Among those we find Turkey, where many more people are optimistic (+20 percentage points), and pessimism has decreased even more sharply (-28). Similar patterns prevail in Bulgaria (+5, -14), Cyprus (+8, -7), Lithuania (+10, -4) and Slovenia (+4, -4). Reverse tendencies — shrinking optimism and growing pessimism — were found in Hungary (-8, +22), Slovakia (-6, +23), Estonia (-5, +10), Romania (-3, +6) Malta (0, -7), Czech Republic and Poland (both +2, +7) and Latvia (+1, +4).

## Financial situation of the household

The survey also measured what people expect to happen to their household's financial situation in the year to come. In the candidate region 27% believe their household's financial situation will improve, and 28% believe it will get worse. As TABLE 1.2a above shows, this is very similar to the forecast respondents made at the end of the year 2002 on CC-13 level, but considerably worse if we look at the acceding countries.

Turkish citizens are most likely to think that their household's financial situation will improve in 2004 (39%). We found relatively high levels of optimism regarding household finances in Romania (28%), Lithuania and Cyprus (both 27%).


The lowest levels of optimism were found in Slovakia (11%), Czech Republic (12%) and Bulgaria (15%). Levels of pessimism were relatively high in Slovakia (59%), Czech Republic (39%) and Hungary (36%). Maltese and Slovenian respondents are the most likely to expect their financial situation to remain the same next year (56% and 54% respectively). (ANNEX TABLE 1.6)



Comparing the current results with those from a year ago, only in four countries has the survey found a higher level of optimism regarding household finances (Turkey, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Cyprus). The most outstanding of these is Turkey, where optimism has increased 14 percentage points and pessimism has decreased enormously as well (16). Similar patterns in a much milder form can be observed in Lithuania (+7, -3) and Bulgaria (+0, -10). Reverse tendencies - shrinking optimism and growing pessimism — is markedly prevalent in Slovakia (-5, +25) Hungary (-8, +19) and Czech Republic (-3, +14).

## Employment situation in the country

People in Turkey (34%), Lithuania, and Malta (25% both) are the most relatively optimistic regarding labour market changes for 2004. They are above the average of candidate countries (23%) as this aspect. People in Poland (52%), Cyprus (45%), and Slovakia (44%) are overwhelmingly pessimistic; they believe the employment situation will become worse in 2004. The Bulgarian (41%), Latvian and Slovenian (both 37%) people expect an unchanged employment situation most of all. (ANNEX TABLE 1.7).




A comparison of the forecast for the year 2004 with last year's forecast for 2003 indicates the countries that are typically optimistic or rather pessimistic. Optimist countries are Turkey (optimism +16, pessimism -20), Lithuania (+11, -14), and Bulgaria (+5, -16). The average mood change leans towards optimism in the candidate countries as well (+6, -6). However, in Hungary (-4, +21), Estonia (-4, +9), and Romania (-6, +7) the pessimistic mood has risen significantly.

## Personal job situation

When asked about their expectations regarding personal job situations, most citizens of the candidate countries expect no significant change for 2004 (40%), and the general mood is rather neutral. On the CC-13 level, about as many people expect their personal job situation to deteriorate (19%) as count on improvement (24%). (FIGURE 1.2f)

Expectations vary considerably from country to country. People in Turkey are the most likely to feel that their personal job situation will get better in 2004 (39%), followed by people in Lithuania (21%), Slovenia (19%), Poland and Cyprus (18% both). People in Lithuania (24%), Hungary and Poland (both 23%) are the most likely to feel that their personal job situation will get worse. In nearly all countries, the prevailing attitude is that things will stay the same – except for Malta and Romania, where most people can't predict the future in this aspect. The proportion of hesitant respondents in these two states is 61% and 45% respectively. (ANNEX TABLE 1.8)



Comparing the current results with those from one year ago, a series of countries show a higher level of expected personal job situation for the coming year. Among these we find Turkey, where many more people are optimistic (+17), and pessimism has decreased dramatically, too (-11). Similar patterns dominate in Lithuania (will be better: + 8, will be worse: - 8), Bulgaria (+5, -5), and Cyprus (+5, +2). Reverse tendencies — shrinking or no optimism at all and growing pessimism — were found in Slovakia (will be better: -4, will be worse: 10), Hungary (-2, +11), Malta (-7, +1), Latvia (-5, +2).

## 1.3 Trust in institutions

### Trust in political institutions

Next we look at the public's trust in four political institutions: the candidate countries' national governments, their national parliaments, their civil service, and political parties. As it has before, the Eurobarometer shows that the CC-13 states trust national governments, and national parliaments at about the same level.

**Table 1.3a Trust in political institutions**  
(Average trust level of four institutions)

Country	%	Country	%
CYPRUS	56	SLOVENIA	28
MALTA	44	LITHUANIA	26
TURKEY	41	CZECH REPUBLIC	23
ESTONIA	38	SLOVAKIA	22
HUNGARY	32	<b>2004 MEMBERS</b>	<b>21</b>
ROMANIA	30	BULGARIA	19
LATVIA	30	POLAND	15
<b>CC-13</b>	<b>29</b>		

Citizens of Cyprus trust the political institutions most of all (56%) and Poland is at the other end of the line, trusting these institutions least of all (15%). Generally the Cypriots, Maltese, Turks and Estonians trust their political institutes more than do other nations.


The most generally sceptical countries are Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia. Slovakian political institutions are only trusted by 22% of Slovaks, and only 19% of Bulgarians trust their political institutions. Poles are the least trusting — 15%.

The most trusted political institution in the candidate region is the national government (40%), followed by the national parliament (38%) and civil services (26%). Political parties are trusted by only 14% of the region's population. European Union citizens trust their national parliament (42%) and their national government (39%) the most, followed by political parties (18%), almost the same as in the future new member countries.<sup>5</sup> (FIGURE 1.3a)

Focusing on the acceding countries only, we see an enormous erosion of confidence in national political institutions over the past year. Among the least trusted institutions, national governments and parliaments suffered a huge drop in confidence in the 10 accession countries. Since last autumn, level of trust in governments and national parliaments fell 11 points (to 23%) and 20 points (to 20%), respectively. In a sense, this change is very significant: currently not only trade unions (who had been traditionally suffering from a serious trust-deficit in the post-communist countries of the region, and were among the least trusted social institutions in the past decade), but even big companies attain higher levels of trust than the national government and parliament of the 2004 member countries. (see later in this chapter)


<sup>5</sup> Trust in civil service was not asked from the EU-15 respondents





Considering each political institution in each country, the Maltese and the Cypriots trust their political parties above all (29%, 27% respectively), and Poles (8%) and Bulgarians (9%) trust them least of all. (FIGURE 1.3b) A majority of Cypriots trust their civil services (54%) but Turks are the most doubtful about them (18%). In Cyprus, reliable government and parliament and the stable economic situation brought about high trust the government and the parliament (71%, 73%, respectively); now Cyprus ranks among the most trusting of political leadership. Turks are the second in the line, they held equal trust with Cyprus towards these institutions in spring 2003, but it seems trust has wavered from spring (63% (-10) trust government, 66% (-6) trust parliament). Poles are the most suspicious of national government (14 %) and parliament as well (13%). (ANNEX TABLES 1.9a-1.12a).

Demographically, we can see those who left school at 15 and self-employed trust mainly in political parties (18%, 17% respectively). Other white-collar workers trust political parties least of all (84%). House-persons and those who left school at 15 trust the government above all (53% and 51%). More educated respondents, who left school between 16-19 years (63%) trust the government least of all. People who trust parliament in the highest degree are the house-persons (56%), those who left school at below 15 and self-employed (both 50%). The proportion of distrust towards parliament is the greatest between those who left school between 16 and 19 years (65%) and retired people (63%). (ANNEX TABLES 1.9b-1.12b).




In autumn of 2003 only 14% of people in the candidate region tended to trust in political parties (this rate was 16% in spring 2003). The trend analyses show an increase in trust of **political parties** since spring 2003 in Slovenia (+5), Romania (+3), Bulgaria, Poland (+2 in each) and Slovakia (+1). Trust of political parties decreased in Turkey (-8), Malta (-7), Hungary (-5), Estonia (-4), Latvia, Cyprus (both -2), Lithuania (-1).

As we mentioned, in autumn 2003, 26% of people in the candidate region tended to trust in **civil services**, which is decreased from spring 2003 (-4). The trend analyses show an increase in trusting of civil services since spring 2003 in Bulgaria (+6) and Romania (+4) and Cyprus (+3). In Turkey (-9), Malta (-8) and Poland (-6) trust in civil service has decreased.

There has been a significant change in how much people trust their **governments**. Individual country results show in Bulgaria (+6), Romania and Slovenia (+3 both) citizens trust their government more than they used to five months ago, while trust has decreased significantly in Hungary (-16 percentage points) and Turkey (-10).

We see a similar picture as we focus on national **parliaments**. Almost the same countries as before are the most likely to have increased their trust in their legislative bodies: Romania (+6), Slovenia (+5), Lithuania (+4), and Bulgaria (+2). Trust in national parliament decreased in Hungary and Malta (-12 both), Latvia (-9), Estonia (-7) and Turkey (-6).




Trust in government or parliament among the candidate countries has always remained stronger than distrust of these institutions, since 2001.

### Satisfaction with how democracy works

In the candidate countries, less than one-third (29% in both 2004 members and in the region as a whole), are very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. While the differences concerning the confidence in political institutions are not particularly significant between the two parts of Europe, levels of satisfaction are generally higher (54% satisfied overall) in the current member states.

Cypriots are the most satisfied with the way democracy works in their country – with more than 7 in 10 pledging satisfaction (73%). In Malta (60%) and Slovenia (50%) the majority give their country's democracy a positive assessment. In all other countries people who are not satisfied with the way democracy works in their country outnumber those who are satisfied, particularly in Slovakia (79% unsatisfied), Romania (77%), Bulgaria (75%), and Poland (72%) (ANNEX TABLE 1.13a).

Demographic analyses do not show significant variance between the different social groups. Other white collars and the young are, however, slightly more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. Other white collars, students and house-persons (37% each) are most likely to feel satisfied, while the retired (23%) and unemployed (17%) are the least satisfied groups. Attitudinal analyses show significant difference in satisfaction levels between people who see their country's membership in the European Union as a good thing, and those who regard it as a bad thing (33%, 20% respectively). (ANNEX TABLE 1.13b)




We have witnessed a decrease in satisfaction with how democracy works in the entire candidate region (satisfied -3 percentage points, unsatisfied +3), and citizens in the 2004 member states report the same low satisfaction with their democracies compared to the spring of 2003 (satisfied -2 percentage points, unsatisfied +1).

Increases of satisfaction were stronger in Bulgaria (+7) and in Latvia (+3). Satisfaction levels regarding national democracy decreased in Hungary (change: -9), and in Slovakia (-6) over the past five or six months in the highest degree.

### Satisfaction with how democracy works in European Union

In the candidate countries four in 10 people (43% in 2004 member citizens and 38% in the region as a whole), are very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union. We have to mention that people in the candidate region more satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union than in own country. The situation in member states is similar to candidate countries: levels of satisfaction are 42% satisfied and the proportion of unsatisfied is a little bit less (39%).

In every country the ratio of satisfaction is higher than dissatisfaction, except in Turkey. In Turkey the unsatisfied form the majority of inhabitants. Romanians and Cypriots are the most satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union (both 52%) – although the individual country examination shows that Cypriots are less, and Romanians more, satisfied with how democracy works in the EU than in their country. The people in Turkey are the least satisfied with how democracy works in the European Union (satisfied: 25%, unsatisfied: 54%). The least unsatisfied are found in Cyprus (13% unsatisfied), Bulgaria (15%) and Latvia (16%). (ANNEX TABLE 1.14a)




Managers (51%) and the students (50%) highest qualified people are the most satisfied with the way democracy works in European Union (51%, both), while low qualified (finished their education under 15 years) are the least satisfied groups (26%)(ANNEX TABLE 1.14b)

## Mixed views on national democracy and on how democracy works in the EU

Looking at the candidate countries level, the population is more satisfied (very satisfied and satisfied) with how democracy works in the European Union than with their national democracy (38% vs. 29%).

Comparing the assessment of European democracy to the perceived quality of national democracy, we find only five countries of CC-13 where the population is more satisfied with their national democracy. The highest preference towards own democracy we find in Cyprus: where 73% of the population is satisfied with the national democracy, versus the 52% who feel the similarly regarding how democracy works in the European Union. There is also a big difference in Malta (60% satisfied with national, 49% satisfied with European democracy) as well as in Turkey (34% satisfied with national, and 25% satisfied with European democracy). The Czech and the Slovenians are the only “new democracies” where satisfaction with national institutions come close to that regarding the European Union, in these countries there is even a slight positive difference, favouring their national democracy.

In all other countries the population is more satisfied with how — they think — the democracy works in the European Union (about the perceived level of information about how the EU works see chapter 2.2), compared to their national democracy. Such attitude is the more characteristic for Romania, where we find an enormous 31 percentage points difference favouring EU democracy, 52% are satisfied with how democracy works in European Union, and just 21% has favourable opinion about the Romanian democracy. The Slovaks and the Poles are as well quite disappointed, displaying a 22 percentage points difference at the expense of their national democracies. (FIGURE 1.3d)



## Trust in other social institutions

Next we look at trust in the following institutions:

- *Justice*
- *The police*
- *The army*
- *Religious institutions*
- *Trade unions*
- *Big companies*
- *The European Union*
- *The United Nations*
- *Non-governmental organizations*
- *Charitable or voluntary organizations*

The next graph shows that CC citizens are most likely to trust the army (67%), religious institutions (56%), the police (51%), the EU (51%), charitable or voluntary organizations (48%), and the United Nations (48%). People living in the candidate region have significantly more confidence in the European Union than European citizens do (41%). A wider gap (at least 5 percentage points) can be observed in trust of charitable or voluntary organizations (CC-13, 48%; EU, 59%) and the police (CC-13, 51%; EU, 64%), Trade unions (CC-13, 27%; EU, 35%) and justice (CC-13, 42%; EU, 47%). Citizens in the candidate countries have less confidence in the legal systems (42%) than current EU citizens do (47%). Within the candidate regions, citizens say that they have confidence in religious institutions (+14), the European Union (+10), the army and non-governmental organizations (both +3) more than do people in the current member states.

The least trusted institutions in the 13 countries are big businesses (26%), with less credibility than trade unions (27%).




TABLE 1.3b shows the three institutions that are most widely trusted in each candidate country.

**Table 1.3b Top three most widely trusted institutions (% , by country)**

<b>Bulgaria</b>		<b>Malta</b>	
The European Union	64	Charitable or voluntary organizations	83
The army	62	The army	69
The United Nations	55	The police	68
<b>Cyprus</b>		<b>Poland</b>	
The army	87	Charitable or voluntary organizations	59
The police	70	The army	59
Justice / the [COUNTRY] legal system	67	The United Nations	54
<b>Czech Republic</b>		<b>Romania</b>	
The United Nations	47	The religious institutions	82
Charitable or voluntary organizations	46	The army	75
The European Union	43	The European Union	67
<b>Estonia</b>		<b>Slovakia</b>	
The army	61	The army	62
The police	51	The European Union	51
Justice / the [COUNTRY] legal system	46	Charitable or voluntary organizations	50
<b>Hungary</b>		<b>Slovenia</b>	
The United Nations	56	The European Union	45
The European Union	56	The army	44
The police	48	The United Nations	43
<b>Latvia</b>		<b>Turkey</b>	
The army	49	The army	82
The United Nations	48	The police	69
Charitable or voluntary organizations	46	Justice / the [COUNTRY] legal system	65
<b>Lithuania</b>			
The army	47		
The European Union	47		
The religious institutions	45		

The **army** tops the list in six of the 13 candidate countries, and comes in second place in five countries. Hungary and the Czech Republic are the only two countries where the Army is not included in the top three. The **European Union** tops the list in two candidate countries, and is in second or third place in five others. The **United Nations** is in the top three of six countries, while in two countries it comes in first, and in the remaining four it is in the second or third place. **Charitable organizations** are in first place in two countries and in another three are placed second or third. The **police** regularly make the top three of five countries, as well. **Justice** is among the three most trusted institutions in three countries, and **Religious institutions** are found the top three in two states (in Romania it is first). None of the other institutions makes it to one of the top three slots. (see also ANNEX TABLES 1.15-1.24)



Eurobarometer included the United Nations and the European Union in the list of national institutions, for measuring trust. Here we take a look at how these two organizations compare to national institutions and to each other.

As TABLE 1.3c shows below, on the CC-13 level, the European Union is more trusted than the United Nations, the two organizations being the fourth and sixth most trusted institutions, respectively.

In 7 of the 13 candidate countries, the European Union attains more trust than the United Nations. Also in 7 countries trust in the EU is high enough to find its way into one of the top three most trusted institutions. In Bulgaria and Slovenia the EU is the most trusted among the 10 listed institutions. Hungary is the only country in which trust of the European Union and trust of the United Nations has reversed direction since the last CCEB survey, but the difference comes at under 1%.

<b>Table 1.3c Rank of the European Union and the United Nations among institutions according to expressed trust levels</b> (rank among 10 entries, by country)				
	2003 spring		2003 autumn	
	rank of EU	rank of UN	rank of EU	rank of UN
<b>CC-13</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>
MS-2004	4	2	5	3
<b>BULGARIA</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>CYPRUS</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>
CZECH REPUBLIC	4	2	3	1
ESTONIA	6	3	6	4
HUNGARY	1	2	2	1
LATVIA	5	3	4	2
<b>LITHUANIA</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>
MALTA	7	5	7	5
POLAND	4	3	7	3
<b>ROMANIA</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>SLOVAKIA</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>SLOVENIA</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>TURKEY</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>


A group of the candidate countries expressed higher trust levels towards the United Nations than towards the EU. The most marked difference we have found is in Poland, where the United Nations is the third most trusted among all institutions, while the European Union comes in only seventh. People in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, and Hungary, all put more trust the UN than the European Union. Consequently, the UN attains a higher confidence in the 10 acceding countries than the European Union.

## Problems facing the nations

Next we look at important issues currently facing European nations. Our respondents were asked to choose, from the following list, the two issues they consider to be the most pressing for their country today:

- *Crime*
- *Public transport*
- *Economic situation*
- *Rising prices/inflation*
- *Taxation*
- *Unemployment*
- *Terrorism*
- *Defence/Foreign affairs*
- *Housing*
- *Immigration*
- *Health care system*
- *The educational system*
- *Pensions*
- *Protecting the environment*

The next graph shows that candidate countries' citizens are most likely to mention unemployment (56%), followed by the economic situation (25%) and crime (24%) as the most important problems facing their nation. CC citizens are significantly less likely than EU citizens to see terrorism (CC-13, 5%; EU, 12%) and immigration (CC-13, 3%; EU, 14%) as significant problems. On the other hand, the candidate countries have more, but not significantly more, problems with rising prices/inflation (CC-13, 23%; EU-15, 19%) and the health care system (CC-13, 17%; EU, 16%) than the member states.



CC-13 residents aren't likely to consider immigration (3%), public transport (3%), protecting the environment (3%), or defence and foreign affairs (2%) to be significant problems.

**Table 1.3d Top three most important problems facing nations**  
(%, by country)

Bulgaria		Malta	
Unemployment	57	Economic Situation	44
Crime	40	Unemployment	42
Economic Situation	39	Pensions	34
Cyprus		Poland	
Crime	45	Unemployment	72
Rising prices/inflation	40	Economic Situation	32
Economic Situation	27	Crime	28
Czech Republic		Romania	
Unemployment	36	Economic Situation	38
Crime	34	Rising prices/inflation	38
Economic Situation	29	Unemployment	33
Estonia		Slovakia	
Unemployment	44	Unemployment	49
Crime	37	Economic Situation	38
Rising prices/inflation	32	Rising prices/inflation	30
Hungary		Slovenia	
Unemployment	41	Unemployment	47
Economic Situation	33	Economic Situation	34
Crime	30	Crime	25
Latvia		Turkey	
Unemployment	42	Unemployment	62
Economic Situation	37	Economic Situation	55
Pensions	26	Rising prices/inflation	30
Lithuania			
Unemployment	56		
Crime	36		
Taxation	29		

TABLE 1.3d shows the three most important problems facing each candidate country. **Unemployment** tops the list in ten of the 13 candidate countries, and comes in second and third in one. Cyprus is the only country in which unemployment is not included in the top three. The **economic situation** makes the top three in 11 candidate countries; only in Estonia and Lithuania is it not in the top three. The economic situation tops the list in two of the 13 candidate countries (Malta and Romania), comes in second place in six countries, and third place in another three. Crime is in the top three in eight of the 13 candidate countries, and in Cyprus crime is seen as the most significant problem.

Also among the top three were **raising prices/inflation** (in five countries) and **pensions** and **taxation** (in one country). None of the other problems has made a list of top three significant state problems. (see also *ANNEX TABLE 1.25*)


The perception of problems facing each nation has changed only insignificantly from spring 2003. Looking at changes over time, we see clear signs that after the cooling off of the Iraqi conflict and 9/11 becoming less of an issue, citizens are less likely to consider the fight against terrorism as well as defence and foreign policy in general to be the top priorities that face their nation. On the other hand, they increasingly feel that inflation, the economic situation, and pensions require attention. The problem of rising prices has increased by 3 percentage points and unemployment decreased by 4 percentage points in candidate countries. In countries of 2004 members we find the same situation: the problem of inflation increased 5 percentage points (it represented the greatest change) and unemployment and crime problems decreased 5 percentage points.

## Attitudes the European Union towards the most important problems

We asked whether they think the European Union tends to play a positive or a negative role in each of these areas:

- *Crime*
- *Public transport*
- *Economic situation*
- *Rising prices / inflation*
- *Taxation*
- *Unemployment*
- *Terrorism*
- *Defence / foreign affairs*
- *Housing*
- *Immigration*
- *Healthcare system*
- *The educational system*
- *Pensions*
- *Protecting the environment*

As FIGURE 1.3i shows below, the candidate countries citizens declare that the EU plays a positive role in: first, influencing the economic situation (54%), second, protection of the environment (51%), and third, in the education system (50%). In candidate countries people think the role of the EU in inflation is more negative than positive (34% vs. 29%), but in all other areas the people are inclined to attribute a more positive than negative role to the EU.



It is interesting that in 2004 member countries protection of environment fell into first place in the list of positive roles for the EU (54%). In second and third place we see the educational system and defence/foreign affairs, each measured equally at 47%. Falling just behind these lays the economic situation, with 46% claiming the EU plays a positive role.

Turks are the most likely (62%), and Czechs the least likely (36%) to believe that the EU plays a positive role in **the economic situation**. In every country the ratio of positive votes for the EU's role in the economic situation is higher than that of negative. Overall in this regard, the Cypriots assign the most negative role to EU (33%), while Bulgaria and Romania are the least likely (6% both) to assign the EU a negative role.

The most confident country about assigning a positive role **in protecting of environment of EU** is Malta (78%). Lithuania shares this view in the smallest degree (34%). The Turks (19%) are most likely to consider the EU's role in protecting the environment to be negative, and Bulgaria and Romania are the least likely to assign the EU a negative role in this respect (4% both).

The candidate countries are third most likely to say that the EU plays a positive role **in the education system**. Cypriots support this opinion the most (67%), and Bulgaria supports it the least (27%). Turkey attaches the most negative role for the EU in education systems (15%), and Romania is the most unlikely to assign a negative role in this respect (4%). (ANNEX TABLE 1.26).

Foreign affairs are also recorded among the first three positively regarded roles for the EU among the 2004 member countries. Cyprus and Malta assign a positive role of the EU to defence or foreign affairs in the highest degree (65% and 54% respectively) and Lithuania and Turkey in the smallest degree (both 39%). The Romanians (4%) ascribe the least negative role of the EU in defence affairs, and Turkey is most likely to insist it plays a negative role (25%).

## 1.4 Media use


This section of the chapter reports on how frequently citizens of the candidate countries watch news on television, read it in daily newspapers, and listen to it on the radio. After reporting on people's trust in the media within the candidate region, we show the extent to which citizens have access to modern information technology.

### Television news viewership

As *FIGURE 1.4a* shows, 61% of respondents watch news programs on television on a daily basis, and another 22% watch them several times a week. These ratios are virtually the same in 2004 member countries (62% and 23 % respectively). Only 3% of people in candidate region and 1% of 2004 members never watch television news programs.

Slovenes (48%) and Czechs (51%) are the least likely, and Hungarians the most likely (72%), to watch television news on a daily basis. (*ANNEX TABLE 1.27*). If we consider people who watch news programs on television most frequently, several times a week and every day together, the Baltic countries (Latvia (88%), Lithuania and Estonia (87% for both)) and Poland (87%) top the list. Among the Bulgarians and Romanians we find the most people who report never watching news on television (6% and 5% respectively).

The proportion of respondents who watch TV news every day in the candidate countries has remained stable since spring 2003 (63% to 61%), but the proportion decreased continuously from 2002 autumn.




## News readership of daily newspapers

In the candidate countries, 2 in 10 respondents read the news in daily newspapers every day (21%) or several times a week (20%). The 2004 member countries' respondents use this source of information slightly more often — 23% read the news every day or several times a week (22%). More respondents of the CC-13 (22%) mentioned never reading a newspaper than in 2004 member countries (14%).

Hungarians (43%) and Estonians (32%) most frequently read newspapers everyday, whilst fewer than one in five Bulgarians, Romanians and Poles read news every day (15%, 17% and 18% respectively). The most frequent readers of daily paper (every day or several times a week) are the Hungarian people (56%). The Maltese, on the other hand, report in the greatest number that they never read newspapers at all (34%).

In candidate region the number of newspaper readers (every day or several days a week) has increased +5 percentage points since spring 2003, and we can see +4 percentage points increasing in 2004 members countries. (ANNEX TABLE 1.28)






## Listening to radio news broadcasting

A third of the citizens (32%) listen to radio news either every day or several times a week (17%) in the candidate countries. More 2004 members listen to the radio every day (46%) or several times a week (20%), representing a significantly higher listenership than that of the candidate countries (in addition to higher newspaper readership). Less 2004 members (9%) than within the candidate region (21%) report that they never listen to radio news.


The radio plays an important role in providing news on a daily basis for Estonians, Hungarians (55% both), Poles and Latvians (49% both), while fewer than one in seven Turks listen to radio news every day (15%). In Turkey a third of the people never listen to radio news (35%). (ANNEX TABLE 1.29)

The proportion of most frequent (every day) radio news listenership has decreased a few percents (-2 percentage points) since May 2003.



## Trust in the media

Eurobarometer also measured levels of trust in the printed press and in electronic media. Trust in the media is similar in the candidate region and the European Union. Television remains the most trusted source of information in the candidate countries — 60% of respondents say they tend to trust television (EU-15: 54%); 45% say they tend to trust the press (EU-15: 44%) and 56% say they tend to trust the radio (EU-15: 62%). In 2004 member countries show more trust in these media than the candidate region as a whole: 64% of people trust television, 56% trust the press, and 66% trust the radio.



Trust levels for the **press** are highest in Lithuania (72%), Latvia (62%) and the Czech Republic (61%). They are lowest in Malta (33%) and Turkey (32%), which show very little confidence in all three media.

Trust levels for **television** are highest in the three Baltic States: Lithuania (84%), Latvia and Estonia (81% in each), and lowest in Malta (57%) and Turkey (49%).


The country-by-country analyses show that the same pattern is followed everywhere, but actual levels of trust vary on a wide range. Confidence in **radio** is highest in Lithuania (79%), Estonia (77%), and Slovakia (75%), and lowest in Turkey (39%) and Malta (50%). (ANNEX TABLES 1.30-1.32)

The trust in media has slightly increased in the candidate region since May 2003: trust in press +3 percentage points, trust in radio +1 percentage points, trust in television has remained stable.

## Trust in the opinion polls

In candidate countries 66% of respondents say they tend to trust opinion polls and 22% of citizens do not have confidence in survey research; in 2004 member countries trust in polls is less, 60% of people trust in polls, and 25% of citizens tend not to trust them in general. With this, polls are generally more trusted than the written press in which they are most likely to appear.

Romanians have the highest confidence (74%) in opinion polls. People in Turkey (70%) and Cyprus (67%) are a bit less likely to trust the polls. The most sceptical country is Malta where 45% of respondents trust opinion research and almost the same proportion do not trust surveys.




Obviously, people have different confidence in surveys sponsored by different organisations. The high percentage of “don’t know” responses in candidate and 2004 member countries (15-19%, respectively) shows that a lot of people do not know which organizations they can trust for opinion polls more than in others, or, in other words, they trust all polls about equally.

Citizens in the candidate countries trust opinion polls paid for by the government (15%) most of all, and secondly those sponsored by the TV stations (13%). The European Union and national businesses (both 12%) follow. In 2004 member countries the order of those citizens trust as sponsors of opinion polls is different from that of candidate countries. 2004 members mostly trust TV-stations (15%), secondly the European Union (12%), and third, non-governmental organizations (11%)(ANNEX TABLE 1.33).


The citizens trust opinion polls paid for by political parties and “other written press” the least (not the daily press but magazines, etc) (1-1%). We could see this in the previous subchapter: in the candidate region confidence in political parties is very low (14%), in fact the lowest of all listed institutions. Among 2004 members trust in political parties is even lower than in the candidate region (11%) and trust in opinion polls paid for by political parties is still lower, under 1%. However, trust in polls paid for by magazines is slightly higher (2%).

We find 7 percent in the candidate countries (10% in the acceding countries) who say no polls can be trusted, independently of the sponsorship.



Turks (30%) are the most likely to trust opinion polls paid for by governments, followed by people in Cyprus (27%) and Malta (21%). Citizens of Slovenia (22%), Poland (18%) and Romania (16%) are the most likely to believe opinion polls paid for by TV stations. Polls paid for by the European Union are trusted in Romania (20%) and Bulgaria (19%) more than elsewhere (ANNEX TABLE 1.34).

Not just the sponsors, but the media, or form of publication seems to matter as well. Trust of opinion polls depends on where and how they get published. Confidence is highest when they are broadcasted in the television (18%), followed by publications of the national government (14%) and the European Union (12%). Fourteen percents of respondents in the candidate region have no idea in which institution they should trust as far as the publication of poll results are concerned.



The Romanians, Bulgarians (both 28%), Slovenes (27%) and Latvians (26%) are the most likely to trust in opinion polls published by TV channels. Mainly the Turks, Cypriots and Maltese trust the publications of government (29%, 23% and 19% respectively, and the same is true for government sponsored polls. Eighteen percents of Romanians, 16% of Cypriots and 13% of Bulgarians trust polls published by the European Union most of all (ANNEX TABLE 1.35).


The overall indication is that neither the sponsorship nor the publication by any particular institute attains significantly more trust in opinion polls in the candidate region. Instead, people are fairly divided in their trust for each of the discussed institutes. The European Union is seen as one of the most trusted sources of opinion poll information.

## 1.5 Citizens fear international terrorism and organised crime the most

While doing the fieldwork for this survey, the citizens of the world became worried of strengthening terrorist attacks all over the world, and the post-war situation in Iraq. At the same time, with the disappearance of SARS, and with the ousting of Mr. Hussein from power, fears related to epidemics and to the spread of weapons of mass destruction has decreased significantly. So we now look at 10 things with potentially disastrous effects for the world that people in the candidate and member countries were afraid of in autumn 2003:

- A world war
- A nuclear conflict in Europe
- A conventional war in Europe (not nuclear, bacteriological or chemical)
- The accidental launch of a nuclear missile
- An accident in a nuclear power station
- Spread of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction
- Ethnic conflicts in Europe
- International terrorism
- Organized crime
- Epidemics

FIGURE 1.5 shows that candidate countries' citizens are most likely to fear organized crime, international terrorism (76% both), epidemics and a nuclear power station accident (both 71%). In 2004 member countries the order is same as candidate countries in the first two places (with 70% and 68% respectively), but the third and fourth fears are reversed (an accident in a nuclear power station, 61%; epidemics, 55%). It is very apparent that the general level of security (at least on the level of the listed potential humanitarian catastrophes) is higher in the acceding 10 countries, being much less afraid from each of those events we investigated.



The CC-13 region is the least afraid of a conventional (not nuclear, bacteriological or chemical) war in Europe and ethnic conflicts in Europe (57% both). In the countries of 2004 members people are also

least afraid of these, but the proportion of fearful people is again much less: a conventional — not nuclear, bacteriological or chemical — war in Europe at 40% and ethnic conflicts in Europe at 42%.

Compared to the whole candidate region, the 10 acceding countries are significantly less afraid of nuclear conflict in Europe with a difference of 16 percentage points. They are about equally less afraid of a conventional war in Europe, with a difference of 17 percentage points. A smallest gap can be observed in fear of organized crime (76% in the candidate region versus 70% in the 2004 member countries).

Looking at developments over time, it should be noted that the changes we measure have the same direction both on CC-13 level and in the acceding group, but again, they are of different extent in the acceding countries compared to the average of the whole region.

With SARS not being considered a threat anymore the fear from **epidemics** dropped the most both in the acceding countries (-14) and on CC-13 level too (-9). No other threat is considered to be now less important by more than 4 percentage points compared to spring 2003.

With the cooling off of the Iraqi conflict and the ousting of Saddam Hussein from power, people are now less afraid of **spread of weapons of mass destruction** (MS-2004: -4, CC-13: -2) and of a possible **world war** (MS-2004: -4, CC-13: -1). It's noteworthy that while in the 2004 member countries there is no change at all in **fear of international terrorism**, due to the increased of insecurity of the Turks, on CC-13 level there has been a +2 percentage points increase in fear of terrorism from spring 2003.

In some other aspects people's fear has grown as well in the past six months, most notably more citizens are afraid of **ethnic conflicts in Europe** (+7 percentage points both on CC13 and MS-2004 level). More citizens fear a **nuclear power station accident** (+3 in the acceding countries and in the whole region alike) as well as a **conventional war in Europe** (MS-2004: +2, CC-13: +3), and on CC-13 level there has been a slight increase in fears from **organized crime** (MS-2004: +1, CC-13: +3).

TABLE 1.5a shows the top three fears of citizens in each applicant country. Organized crime tops the list in four of the 13 candidate countries, comes in second in six countries, and is third in two countries. Organized crime is included in every country's top three list, except for Turkey.

**Epidemics** is in the top three in nine candidate countries, first most widely shared fear in four, second in three, and third in two countries. **International terrorism** makes the top three in eleven countries, tops the list in three, is in second place in another three, and places third in five countries. **An accident in a nuclear power station** is the greatest fear in Lithuania and Hungary (81% and 79% respectively). Four other countries in the region hold this fear among their top three. It is noteworthy that a world war is the second-most-widely held fear for Turks. None of the other issues make the top three lists among any country. (see also ANNEX TABLE 1.36a-c)

**Table 1.5a Top three most prevalent fears (% , by country)**

<b>Bulgaria</b>		<b>Malta</b>	
Organised crime	77	International terrorism	89
International terrorism	69	Epidemics	83
Epidemics	69	Organised crime	83
<b>Cyprus</b>		<b>Poland</b>	
Epidemics	86	International terrorism	72
Organised crime	81	Organised crime	70
International terrorism	75	An accident in a nuclear power station	57
<b>Czech Republic</b>		<b>Romania</b>	
International terrorism	64	Epidemics	74
Organised crime	61	Organised crime	73
An accident in a nuclear power station	48	International terrorism	73
<b>Estonia</b>		<b>Slovakia</b>	
Organised crime	75	Organised crime	76
Epidemics	70	International terrorism	75
An accident in a nuclear power station	69	An accident in a nuclear power station	64
<b>Hungary</b>		<b>Slovenia</b>	
An accident in a nuclear power station	79	Organised crime	70
Organised crime	69	International terrorism	70
International terrorism	56	Epidemics	66
<b>Latvia</b>		<b>Turkey</b>	
Epidemics	76	Epidemics	92
Organised crime	72	A world war	90
International terrorism	70	International terrorism	88
<b>Lithuania</b>			
An accident in a nuclear power station	81		
Epidemics	75		
Organised crime	75		

As TABLE 1.5b below shows, on the CC-13 level, the average fear percentage is highest in Turkey (86%) and Malta (77%). This means the Maltese and Turks worry about each possible fear to the highest degree, relative to the other states studied. Turkey's general fear level has increased since spring 2003 by +7 points, probably due to the war at their Southern borders, and the terrorist activities that threatened Turkey already at the time of the survey (although the infamous suicide bombings in Istanbul came later November).



On average, the Czech Republic is the “calmest” among the candidate countries. Less than half of Czechs are afraid of each of the discussed fears (41%).

<b>Table 1.5b Levels of insecurity</b> (% ‘currently afraid of’, mean for the ten items, by country	
TURKEY	86
MALTA	77
LITHUANIA	69
<b>CC-13</b>	<b>67</b>
ROMANIA	64
CYPRUS	63
LATVIA	63
SLOVENIA	62
SLOVAKIA	59
ESTONIA	58
BULGARIA	58
POLAND	54
<b>2004 MEMBERS</b>	<b>54</b>
HUNGARY	52
CZECH REPUBLIC	41

Regarding the demographic distributions, we can see females feel significantly more fear than males about each of things on the list. Men’s fear averages are about 5 points lower than women’s. Older people are less afraid than their juniors — 65% for those 55 years or older, and 69% for 15- to 24-year-olds.

Demographic analyses show significant variance among occupational groups. Managers and other white-collar workers (57% both) are less afraid of things than are house-persons (82%) and people who left school earliest (77%).

Attitudinal analyses show no difference in fear levels between people who see their country’s membership in the European Union as a good thing and those who regard it as a bad thing (both 67%).

The top two fears are the same in every demographic group as they are in the candidate countries’ total, namely organized crime and international terrorism, except house-persons and those with least education. House-persons are more afraid of world war than organized crime and those with the least education are afraid of world war and epidemics, for the most part. (ANNEX TABLE 1.36b)

## 1.6 Geopolitical orientation in the candidate region


It seems that the devastating effect that the Iraqi intervention had on European's image of the U.S. has started to fade — people are becoming slightly more believing that the U.S. plays a positive role as far as peace in the world is concerned. Though, this positive change did not affect the quite modest enthusiasm people feel towards the U.S. in matters like world poverty or environmental issues. At the same time, the image of the European Union is held even more favourably. In all aspects, compared to the spring of 2003, the Union is now more strongly believed to play a positive role.

Candidate Countries Eurobarometer tested people's disposition toward the United States and the European Union in five areas: peace in the world, fighting against terrorism, growth of the world economy, fighting world poverty, and protection of the environment. We asked whether the United States and the European Union tend to play a positive or a negative role in each of these areas.

The high percentages of neutral, "don't know," and "refused" answers in each respondent country (6% to 21%) shows that average people have rather limited knowledge about what exactly these two entities are doing relative to each of these areas. So we should consider this question as a general indication of the current image conjured by the United States and the European Union. Clearly, the European Union has an advantage over the United States in each area and in each of the candidate countries.

Looking at *FIGURE 1.6a* and *1.6b*, it is noteworthy that even in the areas where the United States is traditionally considered positively, such as in the fight against terrorism and in the growth of the world economy, the European Union receives better ratings from the citizens in the candidate countries. More people think the United States tends to play a negative rather than a positive role in keeping peace in the world (negative role (N): 46%; positive role (P): 33%). Slightly more citizens attribute a negative role to the United States in fighting world poverty (N: 39%, P: 32%), and protection of the environment (N: 38%, P: 34%). Yet more people believe that the United States plays a more positive than negative role in the fight against terrorism (P: 44%, N: 39%) and in accelerating global economic growth (P: 43%, N: 32%).

In European Union countries, most people think the United States tends to play a negative rather than a positive role in keeping peace in the world (Negative: 53%, Positive: 27%), fighting world poverty (N: 52%, P: 17%), protecting the environment (N: 58%, P: 14%), and accelerating global economic growth (N: 36%, P: 34%). Slightly more citizens attribute a positive role to the United States in fighting against terrorism (P: 43%, N: 37%). As *FIGURE 1.6a* shows, people's attitudes toward the United States are significantly more negative in EU countries on individual questions than in candidate countries. (see also *ANNEX TABLES 1.37a* and *1.38a*)



The 2004 member countries hold a positive role for the U.S. in the same areas as does the CC-13 population: in the fight against terrorism (57%), and in the growth of the world economy (52%). However, they assign a positive role for the U.S. with the third highest rate in maintaining peace in the world and protection of the environment (both 37%). The 2004 member countries think the U.S. primarily has a negative role in maintaining peace in the world.


In general, the population of the 2004 member countries considers the role of the U.S. positive in each area (except the environmental one) in a higher rate than the CC-13 population, and holds the role of the U.S. negative less often in each area than the CC-13 population.

As in our previous measure, while the "best" U.S. attribute (fight against terrorism) attained a 39% negative assessment, the worst EU attributes (fight against world poverty) was evaluated negatively by just 14% in the candidate region.

Within the candidate countries 66% believe that the European Union tends to play a positive role in **preserving peace** in the world; 33% percent believe that about the United States. Similarly, 65% believe the European Union plays a positive role in **protecting the environment**, while only 34% believe the same of the United States.

The United States has a positive image in the **fight against terrorism** according to less than half (44%) of the citizens in the CC-13 countries, while 62% judge positively the role the European Union plays.

Regarding **the growth of the world economy** 63% believe the European Union plays a positive role, and 57% believe that the EU has a positive role in the **fight against world poverty**, versus 43% and 32%, respectively, who believe the same of the United States.



Comparing the data on these questions in our four measures (in April 2003, in May 2003 (i.e. the "spring wave"), in June 2003, and now in autumn 2003) we do not see any serious changes in either positive or negative directions, towards the U.S. The only aspect where we detected positive change is the role the U.S. is playing in preserving peace in the world. In June, the image of the U.S. was temporarily more favourable. Looking at the data on the attitudes regarding the European Union, we find an increasingly favourable trend in all aspects since the beginning of the year that peaked in summer too. (see also ANNEX TABLES 1.37c-1.38c)

**Table 1.6 Change of attitudes towards the United States and the European Union during 2003**  
(%, CC-13)

#### The United States

	2003 October		2003 June-July		2003 May		2003 March-April	
	Positive role	Negative role	Positive role	Negative role	Positive role	Negative role	Positive role	Negative role
peace in the world	33	46	34	43	34	45	27	52
fight against terrorism	44	39	48	34	48	35	43	39
growth of the world economy	43	32	46	29	42	32	44	32
fight against poverty in the world	32	39	36	35	32	38	33	39
protection of the environment	34	38	39	33	34	36	35	37

#### The European Union


	2003 October		2003 June-July		2003 May		2003 March-April	
	Positive role	Negative role	Positive role	Negative role	Positive role	Negative role	Positive role	Negative role
peace in the world	66	12	67	12	65	13	61	17
fight against terrorism	62	13	62	14	61	14	57	18
growth of the world economy	63	11	65	11	63	12	60	15
fight against poverty in the world	57	14	59	14	55	15	53	18
protection of the environment	65	11	69	10	65	12	63	14

The most crucial item to consider, which presumably drives the negative image in the other issues, *FIGURE 1.6c* has the country-by-country evaluation of the United States versus the European Union in maintaining peace in the world. In the candidate countries 66% believe that the European Union tends to play a positive role in preserving peace across the globe, while only one-third (33%) claim the same about the United States. In the 2004 member countries these rates are higher: 69% believe that the European Union tends to play a positive role in preserving peace across the globe, while 37% claim the same about the United States. This is a clear indication of the stance against the recently evolving interventionist doctrine of the U.S. among the candidate countries' public. The same conviction can be seen in member states where 27% tend attribute a positive role to United states in preserving peace and 60% to European Union.

There is only one country among the candidates (Romania) in which the majority believes the United States plays a positive role in maintaining peace.

Cyprus — where the Greek community already manifested a degree of mistrust against U.S. military interventions during its air strikes against Serbia — is the most EU-oriented in peace matters (and in other matters, too). Eighty-two percent (80% in June 2003) trust the European Union and only 11% (9% in June 2003) trust the United States, a striking difference of 71 percentage points. The next largest differentials between the U.S. and EU are found in Bulgaria (49 percentage points), Slovakia (48 percentage points), and Hungary (44 percentage points).

On the other end of the scale we find Romania, where 83% of the population think the EU has a positive role, and 61% think the U.S. has a positive role in maintaining peace in the world (22 percentage points difference now, and 20 percentage points in June 2003). The next smallest differences are found in Lithuania (23 percentage points), the Czech Republic (26 percentage points), and Poland (27 percentage points).



Comparing demographic variables, manual workers say (in the highest proportion) that the U.S. has a positive role in *maintaining peace in the world* (40%), and managers think (in the highest proportion) the EU has a positive role in this area (76%). On the other hand, the self-employed believe that both the U.S. (62%) and EU (19%) have a negative role in maintaining world peace.

*Fight against terrorism* – those who finished school in their 20's (54%), people who finished their education between 16 and 19 years, the unemployed, and manual workers (each 53%) say in highest proportion that the U.S. has a positive role in fighting terrorism. The unemployed are also the most likely to believe that the EU has a positive role in this area (70%). Further, the self-employed are the most likely to think the U.S. has a negative role (57%) in the fight against terrorism and both the self-employed and house-persons are most likely to believe the EU has a negative role (20%).

*Growth of the world economy* - in this area the other white collar workers and those who finished their education at or above 20 years of age say, in the highest rate, that the U.S. has a positive role (both 53%). Those who are still studying (74%) are the most likely to say that the EU has a positive role.


*Fight against world poverty* - in highest proportion manual workers and unemployed (both 39%) believe the U.S. plays a positive role in the fight against world poverty and 66% of students say the EU plays a positive role in this area.

*Protection of the environment* - in highest proportion, the unemployed and manual workers think the U.S. has a positive role in protecting the environment (both 41%), and managers say, in highest proportion, that the EU (77%) has a positive role. See ANNEX TABLES 1.37b-1.38b.

## 2. Knowledge and information about the EU

### 2.1 Actual knowledge of the European Union

The citizens of the candidate countries are increasingly, but still surprisingly poorly informed about some very basic facts of the European Union. The most widely known trivia-fact is how the European flag looks like; 69% can recognize it (compared to 66% in May of 2003). This rate is much higher in the acceding countries, where 87% of respondents know that the European flag is blue with yellow stars (the same results as in May of 2003).



In six from among the 9 trivia facts, knowledge has further increased since this spring. An indication of the increased confidence in EU matters could be that respondents, with a lesser likeliness to confess they don't know, scored worse in all of the trick questions, where the correct answer would have been "false". (ANNEX TABLE 2.1a-c)

Two-thirds of the respondents from candidate countries know that the European Union is made of 15 states (64%, +5 percentage points since spring). This percentage is much higher in 2004 member countries (78%, +1). More than half in the CC-13 (55%, +2) and more than two-thirds in the 2004 countries (70%, +1) know that the headquarters of the European Union are in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxemburg. Half of the respondents from candidate countries (50%, +1) and almost two-thirds of the 2004 members' populations (65%, +2) said correctly that there are no borders between the countries in the European Union.

More than a third of respondents in the CC-13 (38%, +5) and almost half of the people from 2004 member countries (48%, +5) were correct when questioned about the European Union anthem. These question topics represent those which the candidate countries knew best. On all other facts related to European Union a smaller percentage of candidate countries were able to respond correctly.

For example, 34% of CC-13 citizens and 41% of the 2004 member countries population know that the members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the European Union (in spring these rates were lower: 31% and 35%, respectively).

From those countries which will take part in the European Parliament elections in 2004, the Estonians and the Czech have the least knowledge that the members of the EP are elected directly (27% and


28%, respectively) and the Maltese are the most well informed on this question (54%). (ANNEX TABLE 2.1a)

When hearing the statement: "there is a President of the EU directly elected by all the citizens" 27% of the CC-13 population and 40% of the 2004 member countries' citizens correctly replied that the statement is false (in May 2003 these rates are 29% and 43%, respectively).

The question to receive the lowest rate of correct responses inquired about the number of stars on the European Union flag. Only 10% and 13%, respectively, of the respondents from CC-13 and the 10 acceding countries were able to identify the following statement as false: "there are 15 stars on the European flag." (In May 2003 these rates were 11% and 17%, respectively). It is likely that more respondents make this mistake because they are more likely to know that there are 15 member states.

It is further worth noting that the percentages of "don't know" and "no answer" responses is very high — almost 50% — in four questions regarding the EC after World War One (52%), MEPs directly elected (51%), directly elected president (49%), and the anthem (45%).

As FIGURE 2.1b shows below, the CC-13 population, on average, gives 3.71 (3.56 in May 2003) correct answers to the nine statements, and respondents from the 2004 member countries give a significantly higher average of 4.74 (4.68 in May 2003) correct answers. The Turkish citizens remain the least informed about EU trivia having the lowest score with barely three correct answers (2.68, 2.59 in May 2003). The best informed are the Poles (5.12, in May 2003 it was 5.05) and the Maltese (4.96, in May 2003 it was 5.32)



Twenty nine percent of Turkish, 20% of the Romanians and 12% of Bulgarians cannot give a correct answer to any statement. Meanwhile there is not one respondent from Malta who could not provide at least a single correct answer on the factual questions regarding the European Union.



## 2.2 Self-perceived knowledge about the European Union


A standard feature of the Eurobarometer is a question that asks respondents how much they feel they know about the European Union. The comparative results presented in the table below show that a quarter of the candidate country citizens feel they know “quite a lot” to “a great deal” (i.e., those choosing the numbers 6 through 10 on the scale) about the European Union (24%). This is greatly unchanged from half a year ago (25%). The perceived knowledge of the 2004 member states is higher than the CC-13, 27% of the population know quite a lot to a great deal about the European Union (27% in May 2003)<sup>6</sup>.

This difference in citizens’ perceived levels of EU-related knowledge is also reflected in the averages we measured on the 10-point scale, all of which fell below the midpoint of the scale. People in the candidate countries scored at about 4.17 (4.21 in May 2003), lower than the 2004 member states population (4.52, and 4.69 in May 2003) and lower than their European fellows—who also evaluate their knowledge as below the midpoint (4.36)<sup>1</sup>. It is noteworthy that the acceding countries, despite this recent drop, report a higher level of information than current member states. We have seen similar effects earlier, (at least the perceived) the level of information increases before a country accedes to the European Union, especially if there is a referendum about the issue, which is most often the case.

Table 2.2a Self-perceived knowledge of EU affairs					
	CC-13 Autumn 2001	CC-13 Autumn 2002	CC-13 Spring 2003	CC-13 Autumn 2003	EU-15 Autumn 2003
Scale	%	%	%		%
1 (knows nothing at all)	14	14	14	11	7
2	14	14	11	13	11
3	16	16	14	17	18
4	14	14	13	14	17
5	20	17	19	19	19
6	9	9	10	10	13
7	6	6	7	7	8
8	4	4	4	4	4
9	1	2	2	2	1
10 (knows a great deal)	2	2	2	1	1
Don' know / No answer	2	2	3	2	2
<b>Average</b>	<b>3.99</b>	<b>4.05</b>	<b>4.21</b>	<b>4.17</b>	<b>4.36</b>

<sup>6</sup> EB60.1,

The following graph depicts the average scores for each of the 13 candidate countries and the EU-15 average. It shows that self-perceived knowledge levels vary significantly from one country to the next, and indeed, the acceding countries' citizens assume they have a higher level of information than those in the three countries not included in the current enlargement.



Comparing data from spring to autumn of 2003, it should be noticed that there is a stability with a slight rearrangement of the first three most "informed" countries. While in May of 2003 the Maltese had the highest level of perceived knowledge about the European Union, followed by Slovenians and Cypriots (their relative means being 5.33, 5.27 and 5.10), in autumn 2003 the Slovenians reached the highest average knowledge level (5.09), followed by Cypriots (4.90) and Maltese (4.87). All these actual means are considerably lower compared to spring of 2003.

Some difference can also be seen at the end of the scale. While in May of 2003 the Turkish (3.77), the Bulgarians (3.79) and the Hungarians (4.04) were the "file-closers," now we find at the end those countries which will not yet be members of the European Union in 2004 - the Bulgarians, with the lowest level of knowledge (3.83), the Romanians (3.87) and Turkish (3.89). Hungarians remain the least informed among the acceding group.

The responses show that 41% of the Maltese (-6 percentage points since spring), 38% of the Slovenians (-5) and 36% of Cypriots (-5) feel they know "quite a lot" to "a great deal" (i.e., score 6 and higher on the scale) about the European Union.

On the other hand, the Hungarians (17%, -5), the Estonians (18%, -1) and the Romanians (20%, -4) answered in the lowest number that they know "quite a lot" to "great deal" about the European Union. (ANNEX TABLE 2.2a)

The following table shows the average self-perceived EU knowledge scores for various socio-demographic groups in the candidate region.

Just like in spring, we find that managers, people who score high on the Opinion Leadership Index<sup>7</sup>, people who stayed in full-time education the longest, and the most frequent users of the media are the groups that rate themselves the highest on the knowledge scale. At the bottom of the table we find people who score lowest on the Media Use Index, i.e., those who do not watch, read or listen to news at all, and house persons. Men consider themselves to be better informed than women do. (ANNEX TABLE 2.2b)

<b>Table 2.2b Average scores on perceived knowledge scale for various groups at the CC-13 level</b>	
<b>Group</b>	<b>Score</b>
Managers	5.52
Opinion Leadership Index ++ high	5.31
EDU: 20+ years	5.29
Media Use Index +++	5.03
Other white collars	4.81
EDU: still studying	4.77
Opinion Leadership Index +	4.70
Males	4.63
2004 MEMBERS	4.52
EU support: a good thing	4.51
EDU: 16-19 years	4.48
Manual workers	4.45
15-24 years age	4.34
40-54 years age	4.33
25-39 years age	4.28
Media Use Index ++	4.28
CC-13	4.17
Opinion Leadership Index -	4.17
Self-employed	4.14
Unemployed	4.09
Retired	3.89
EU support: a bad thing	3.80
55+ years age	3.76
EU support: neither good nor bad	3.76
Females	3.73
Media Use Index —	3.69
Opinion Leadership Index - - low	3.38
EDU: up to 15 years	3.30
House Persons	3.18
Media Use Index —	3.18


<sup>7</sup> See Appendix C4 for a definition of the constructed variables shown in the table

## 2.3 Providing information about the European Union

Spreading information normally starts in the schools. The survey measures public opinion towards some key EU issues, among them whether or not school children should be taught about the way the EU institutions work. The same question we asked during the summer of 2003, therefore we compare our present numbers to those from June-July, 2003, when Euro-optimism peaked in the candidate region.


An overwhelming majority, almost three quarters in CC-13 (73%, and 82% in Summer 2003) and 77% in the 2004 member countries (85% in Summer 2003) say children should learn about the European Union in school. The rather keen decrease in the number of those who support this item indicates the general deterioration of Euro-enthusiasm rather than an actual shrinking perceived importance of this issue. The change in the negative side is more indicative, while 8% were against such EU education in the summer of 2003, either in CC-13 or in 2004 members, now just a bit more, 11% of the CC-13 population and 10% from 2004 member countries population are opposed. (Just for the sake of comparison, we note that an even higher percentage (81%) supports this issue in the current EU countries.)

Looking at the individual country level, Cypriots are the most likely to want their children taught about the way EU institutions work (87%), and the Turkish are the least likely (63%), followed at the end, by the Czech respondents (66%). For more detailed data see also *ANNEX TABLES 2.3a-c* and Chapter 3.8 for the support towards other key European Union issues.



Looking at the socio-demographic variables of those who are in favour of their children being taught about the European Union, we see that 83% of those who said that country membership is a good thing, 83% who are still studying, 82% of those who left school at 20 years age, 79% of manual workers, and 79% of managers all support children's education of the EU. On the other hand, only 38% of those who consider the country membership a bad thing, 56% whose media use index is the lowest, and 60% of house persons support EU education for children. For more detailed data see also *ANNEX TABLE 2.3b*.


Over the half of the citizens in the candidate countries say the European Union should consider it a priority **to get closer to European citizens by informing them more about itself its policies and its institutions** (52%, and 66% in Summer 2003), and 28% (23% in Summer 2003) said this should not be a priority (for other priorities refer to Chapter 3.7). *FIGURE 2.3b* below indicates that at the time of the enlargement referenda there has been a higher demand for EU-related information that seems to normalise, being back at the level where it was a year ago.



People in the 2004 countries feel roughly the same way: 53% of them think giving people more information is a priority, and a little bit more than in CC-13, 33%, do not think so (in summer 2003 the percentages were 67% and 24%, respectively).

The Slovaks (78%) and Cypriots (76%) are most likely to consider information about the EU a priority, and the Poles (44%) and Turks (45%) are the least likely to agree. Meanwhile there has been a dramatic decrease in Slovenia. While in summer 2003 76% of the Slovenian population thought it was a priority to give people more information, today only 51% have this opinion. For more detailed data see also *ANNEX TABLES 2.4a-c*.

## Giving people more information about the EU should be...



Giving people more information is most likely to be considered a priority by students (64%), by white collar workers (61%), and by those who left the school at the age of 20 or older (60%). Those who do not hold EU information dispersal as a priority are house persons (36%), those with very low media use index (41%), and those with few years of education (42%).

For more detailed data see also *ANNEX TABLE 2.4b*.

## 2.4 Sources of information about the European Union

### Preferred topics

When asked what EU-related information they would like to have the CC-13's top three choices were, first, the institutions of the European Union (47%), second, EU education policy (43%), and lastly EU youth policy (42%). There were also high requests for information on EU economy in general, social policy, and European citizenship (42% for all). The least popular topics included EU research and development policy (25%) and "other" (not currency and not budget) financial/economical topics (28%).

The acceding 10 countries mostly want more information on social policy in the EU (53%), followed by EU economy in general (49%), and regional policy (42%). The 2004 and CC-13 countries completely agree on the least interesting topics, the 2004 member population mentioning R&D policy at 22%, and other economical/financial topics at 25% as the least interesting. In 2004 member countries chose social policy, youth policy, and EU economy as the topics most favoured, while "other" topics, R&D policy, and pre-accession funds were the least favoured.




TABLE 2.4a on the next page shows the three most frequently mentioned topics in each country. As in all our previous measures, the distribution of the topics show a very diverse picture with rather few common characteristics.

**Social policy topics** came in first in 8 of the 13 countries, and information on **institutions from Europe** was also mentioned in 7 countries (mostly in second and third places). **Educational policy** is ranked in the top three among 5 countries, **European citizenship**, and **consumer protection** in three and the **EU economy in general** in four countries. **Information on the Euro** is desired by Romanians (in the first place) and by Slovenians (in the third place), information on **youth policy** by Bulgarians, and **European budget** by Lithuanians.

All other topics are mentioned only in one country among the top three topics: the Maltese mentioned the **environment** on the first place, the Polish mentioned the **regional policy** and finally, the Turkish want information on **cultural policies**. (ANNEX TABLE 2.5)

**Table 2.4a. Three most frequently mentioned topics the candidate countries' citizens want to know more about**  
(% of mentions, by country)

<b>Bulgaria</b>		<b>Malta</b>	
Social Policy	54	Environment	56
Youth	53	Education	53
EU economy in general	44	Consumer protection	52
<b>Cyprus</b>		<b>Poland</b>	
Education	68	Social Policy	46
Consumer protection	68	EU economy in general	44
Institutions of EU	67	Regional policy	41
<b>Czech Republic</b>		<b>Romania</b>	
Social Policy	57	The Euro	47
Consumer protection	54	Institutions of EU	45
Institutions of EU	53	European citizenship	42
<b>Estonia</b>		<b>Slovakia</b>	
Social Policy	59	Social Policy	64
Institutions of EU	56	Institutions of EU	58
European citizenship	54	The Euro	55
<b>Hungary</b>		<b>Slovenia</b>	
Social Policy	48	Social Policy	53
European citizenship	45	The Euro	52
Educational	44	EU economy in general	52
<b>Latvia</b>		<b>Turkey</b>	
Social Policy	50	Institutions of EU	55
EU economy in general	45	Education	53
Education	44	Culture	46
<b>Lithuania</b>			
Institutions of EU	46		
EU economy in general	43		
European budget	42		



## Preferred methods for receiving information about the European Union

The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer asked respondents to indicate, from a list of 11 pre-defined sources, their preferred method or methods of receiving information about the European Union. Not surprisingly, people's preferences are for the three mass media sources they are most likely to use anyway (see Chapter 1.4 for in depth analysis).


Seventy-seven percent of all CC-13 and 75% of 2004 country respondents say they would choose television (79% and 77%, respectively, in May 2003). Daily newspapers and the radio are mentioned in second and third place within both the CC-13 and 2004 member countries (2004 members: daily newspapers 48% and radio 51%; CC-13: daily newspapers 45% and radio 45%).

In May 2003 the same three methods were mentioned in the first three places both in CC-13 and 2004 members. These methods are less popular in the current EU population (TV: 60%, daily newspapers: 39%, radio: 28%).

Detailed brochures and short leaflets are more favourable than some other methods of information dispersal. These forms of publication were mentioned 23% (both brochures and leaflets) of the time within the CC-13 and 25% and 24%, respectively, within the 2004 member countries.

CD-rooms, video tapes and the Internet are least likely to be preferred by CC-13 population. The 2004 members are least interested in information by CD-rooms, video tapes, or books with complete descriptions. We noticed the same trends in May of 2003. However, the second least preferred source of information half year ago, the computer terminal, was not offered in the Autumn 2003 survey.

Seven percent of the respondents from CC-13 and 8% of the respondents from the 2004 member states (7% and 6%, respectively, in May 2003), mentioned they are not interested at all in news on the European Union. Only 2% from EU countries said the same. Additionally, 1% and 2% in both areas would not prefer information in any of the methods we listed. (ANNEX TABLE 2.6)



At the individual country level (TABLE 2.4b), it should be emphasized that **television** has the first place in every country — with the highest rate in Turkey (83%) and in Hungary: (82%). The **daily paper** as a source of EU news is among the top three mentions in every country, as is **radio**.

**Table 2.4b. Preferred method for receiving information on EU**  
(% of mentions, by country)

<b>Bulgaria</b>		<b>Malta</b>	
television	73	television	62
radio	46	radio	31
daily newspapers	46	daily newspapers	24
<b>Cyprus</b>		<b>Poland</b>	
television	81	television	74
radio	41	radio	49
daily newspapers	36	daily newspapers	45
<b>Czech Republic</b>		<b>Romania</b>	
television	71	television	71
daily newspapers	56	radio	44
radio	47	daily newspapers	33
<b>Estonia</b>		<b>Slovakia</b>	
television	61	television	78
radio	44	radio	55
daily newspapers	31	daily newspapers	51
<b>Hungary</b>		<b>Slovenia</b>	
television	82	television	75
radio	59	radio	59
daily newspapers	53	daily newspapers	53
<b>Latvia</b>		<b>Turkey</b>	
television	81	television	83
radio	52	daily newspapers	47
daily newspapers	48	radio	39
<b>Lithuania</b>			
television	66		
radio	47		
daily newspapers	41		


## Preference for national versus EU-originated information

We asked people if they preferred to receive EU-related information from their national government or rather from EU institutions or information centres. Exactly as in May 2003, about one-third in the CC-13 could not choose between the two, and either spontaneously said that they would like to receive information from both sides (17%, and 16% in May 2003), simply could not choose (10%, and 9% in May 2003), or refused to answer (3%, and 4% in May 2003) this question.

Those who had a preference more often chose their national government (41%, and 45% in May 2003) than the European Union (28%, and 26% in May 2003) to interpret the information. At the same time, in 2004 member countries there are more respondents who cannot decide on the question (35%), but also more respondents chose the EU's information (35%, and 34% in May 2003) than chose the national government's (30%, the same percentage as half a year ago).

In seven of the CC-13 countries<sup>8</sup> more people would trust the European Union in informing them on key issues than their own political leadership (in Slovakia 47% vs. 27%, in Latvia 39% vs. 27%, in Poland 38% vs. 30%, in Slovenia 39% vs. 35%, in Estonia 35% vs. 33%, in the Czech Republic 26% vs. 24%, and in Romania 27% vs. 26%).

All other six countries that form the 13 much prefer their government's information to that of EU institutions, especially in Turkey (63% vs. 21%) and Cyprus (55% vs. 22%). (ANNEX TABLE 2.7)




<sup>8</sup> In May 2003 there were only 4 countries of CC-13 (Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Malta) where the proportion of those who preferred information from the EU institutions exceed the numbers of those who wanted them from their national governments.

## Interest in European Union news

We also look at the results of a question that compared interest in EU news to interest in other topics. We asked respondents whether they pay a lot of attention, a little attention, or no attention at all to news in nine areas, one of them being the European Union.

As FIGURE 2.4d shows below, four-fifths (81%, and 82% in May 2003) in the candidate countries say they pay at least some attention to news about the European Union. Among the 2004 member countries 84% agreed, which is a lower percentage than in May of 2003 (88%).



Looking at the extent to which interest in news about the European Union varies from country to country, we find that in nine of the CC-13 countries more than 8 in 10 people pay at least some attention to such news: Slovenia 88%, Cyprus 86%, Poland, Slovakia and Latvia 85% each, Hungary 84%, Estonia and Romania 81% both, and finally the Czech Republic at 80%.

As we already mentioned, the candidate region has shown a 4 percent decrease in "a lot of" interest in EU-related news (from 40% to 36%). Compared to data from May 2003, interest increased in Estonia (+7 percentage points) in Slovenia (+3) and in Romania (+2), but decreased in majority of the other countries: in Malta (-12), Lithuania (-10), Hungary (-9), Cyprus (-8), Poland and Slovakia (-7), Bulgaria (-5), Turkey (-3), and to some extent in the Czech Republic as well (-2). (ANNEX TABLES 2.8a-c)


Those who score very high on the opinion leadership index are more likely to pay a lot of attention to European Union news (76%), followed by managers (53%), and those with "just" high opinion leadership index (53%). Least likely do so are people with very low media use index (11%), those with very low opinion leadership index (24%), the house persons (24%), and women (28%). (ANNEX TABLE 2.8b)

Similar to interest in European Union news, the Eurobarometer was also interested in how much attention the population pays to other topics such as social issues, national political news, or news on economy, foreign policy, local politics, culture, sport, and environment.

In the candidate countries, **social issues** claim the greatest interest — 59% pay a lot of attention while 31% pay "a little" attention to them (63% and 29%, respectively, in May 2003 ). **National political**


**news** is also interesting – with 46% paying a lot of attention and 39% paying a little attention (in Spring 2003 these percentages are 47% and 36%, respectively). **News on the economy** comes in third, as it did half a year ago: 43% pay a lot of attention and 41% pay a little attention, to economic news (43% and 39%, respectively, half a year ago).

Compared to other issues, **news related to the European Union** is the fourth-most attractive to respondents (36% "a lot," 45% "a little"). It is more appealing than news about culture (34% a lot, 46% a little), local politics (34% a lot, 46% a little), sport (34% a lot, 32% a little), the environment (33% a lot, 46% a little) and foreign policy (30% a lot, 44% a little).



## Desired television programmes about the European Union

Daily news programmes evidently top the list as the ones most people would like to hear about the European Union from. Within the candidate countries 63% and 56% in 2004 member states would like to get EU-related information from news. Special programs on the EU are would be seen as more instructive among the 2004 members states (63%) than in candidate countries (54%).



In third place, in both regions, are debates (CC: 45%, 2004 MS-2004: 44%). Continued documentaries (29%) and cultural programmes (26%) make it on the candidate states list. The proportion of respondents that mentioned documentaries is lower in the candidate region than in 2004 member countries, where 33% of respondents would like EU information from documentaries. These five types are more popular for getting such information than talk-shows, reality TV, films, games and series. In CC-13 countries less than two out of ten would prefer these TV programmes as EU information sources — generally, people do not prefer the below-the-line channels for hearing about the European Union, they rather prefer that dedicated programmes cover the issue.

Turks are the most likely to want their information to come from **news** (70%), followed by Romanians (68%), Hungarians (67%) and Czechs (66%). (see ANNEX TABLE 2.9) **Special programs on the EU** are citizen's second most desired programme sources. Slovaks and Poles mentioned this the most, both 69%, and Romanians and Estonians are least fond of getting EU news in special EU programmes, with only 43% selecting this choice.

**Debates** are also considered an important source of information for the people. Slovaks (63%), Turks (52%) and Czechs (51%) like to hear information from debates. There is less interest in Bulgaria for debates (27%). Among candidate countries 29% mentioned **documentaries** as a desired EU-related programme. Of all people, Bulgarians (44%) and Latvians (42%) most like to watch documentaries with news on the EU, while Estonians (25%) and Turks (23%) are least interested in them.

**Cultural programs** for receiving EU information are the fifth most popular among the candidate countries. Cultural programs are most popular in Turkey (35%), while Estonians and Lithuanians don't consider them a good information source about the EU (11% and 12 % respectively).

## 3. Attitudes towards the European Union

This chapter introduces the reader to the general sentiments and attitudes of the candidate countries towards the EU and being European. First we will focus on how much people in the candidate countries feel European, and what would make them feel more so. Later, we will look at the main trend-indicators of support for the European Union in the Candidate Countries. We will report on the image of the EU and the people's feelings towards the European Union; does it conjure up a positive or negative image for those who live in the candidate region? Levels of support for European Union membership are discussed here, along with the perceived benefit of EU membership. The chapter also analyses people's trust in the European Union, and in nine of its institutions and bodies. It reports on support for joint EU decision-making, and the expected and desired future role of the European Union in these countries.

### 3.1 Feeling European

#### Most people have a European component to their identity

The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer asks respondents to choose if they see themselves in the near future as 1) nationality only, 2) nationality and European, 3) European and nationality, or 4) European only.

The majority of respondents from candidate countries and also from 2004 member countries consider their identity formed by "nationality and European" (46% and 47%, respectively), but there are also high percentages of those considering themselves in the near future identified by nationality alone (39% in CC-13 and 36% in 2004 member countries). In low numbers, only 7% of the CC-13 population and 8% of the 2004 member countries answered that they see themselves "European and nationality," and only 3% responded with only European.


The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer found in the autumn of 2003 that in each candidate country excluding Hungary people identified themselves, to some extent, as European rather than just their own nationality. This means that the percentage of those respondents who answered that they identify themselves as "own nationality and European", "European and own nationality", and "European only" exceeds the percentage of those who responded that they identify themselves by their nationality alone.

This is most common in Slovenia (65% vs. 31%), Slovakia (65% vs. 29%), Poland (64% vs. 32%) and Romania (62% vs. 30%). By comparison, in May of 2003, the Cypriots, Slovaks, and Maltese considered themselves somewhat European (as opposed to nationality alone) in the highest number. Those countries where citizens are least likely to identify as somewhat European are Bulgaria (46%), Lithuania (46%), and Hungary (48%).

In Hungary we find an increase in the percent of those who consider themselves more Hungarian than somewhat European: 51% called identify with nationality only and 48% identify as European to some extent, but traditionally, this goes along with a very high level of European pride as we show below<sup>9</sup>. The Turkish (45%), the Bulgarians (42%) and the Lithuanians (41%) also identify with their nationality alone in high numbers.

There are very few respondents in candidate countries who regard themselves as exclusively European (from 1% in Hungary and Bulgaria to 5% in Slovakia and Romania). (ANNEX TABLE 3.1a)

<sup>9</sup> see Figure 3.1c, as well: the Hungarians answered in highest number they are very and fairly proud to be European (90%).



Fifty-seven percent of EU citizens associate their identity to some extent with being European. Still, there are five countries among the current member states in which national attachment exclusively determines the identity of the majority of the people: UK, Finland, Greece, Portugal and Ireland.

The demographic analyses show that students (76%), managers (76%), and those who left school at 20 years age or older (75%), are most likely to feel European to some extent. The house persons (51%), people who left school before the age of 15 (50%), and persons older than 55 (48%) are most likely to identify with their own nationality alone. ( ANNEX TABLE 3.1b)

Considering the attitudes of the country's membership to the European Union, the analysis shows that 69% (73% in May 2003) of people who regard their country's membership to the European Union as a good thing feel European to some extent (compared to 24% of those who told us their country's membership will be a bad thing). On the other hand, in mirror image, we find that 69% (61% in May 2003) of people who regard their country's membership as a bad thing identify with their own nationality alone (compared to 27% of those who told us their country's membership will be a good thing). (TABLE 3.1a)


Table 3.1a Support of the EU membership and European identity %, CC-13			
FEELS...	THE COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP WOULD BE ...		
	A good thing	a bad thing	neither good nor bad
[NATIONALITY] only	27	69	55
[NATIONALITY] and European	56	20	34
European and [NATIONALITY]	9	2	4
European only	4	2	2



## National pride

The following graph shows that the extent to which people are proud of their nationality varies greatly from between countries. We see a higher level of national pride between in the CC-13 (88%) and the 2004 member countries as well (86%) than in the current EU member states. In the European Union countries 85% of respondents are fairly or very proud to be their nationality.

People in Malta (97%), Cyprus (95%), and Slovenia (95%) are most likely to feel national pride, and levels of national pride are also high in Hungary (93%), Poland (91%), Turkey (91%), and Romania (88%). People in the Baltic region (Lithuania 61% and Estonia 68%) are least likely to share this view. (ANNEX TABLE 3.2a)




Looking at the socio-demographic variables, those with high media use index (90%), the people older than 55 year (90%), and those with ended education by the age of 15 (89%) are more likely to answer that they are very or fairly proud to be their nationality. Those with low media use index (79%), the unemployed (83%), the 25-39 years old generation (85%), and those with very low opinion leadership index (85%) responded this way in the lowest percentage. For detailed data see also ANNEX TABLE 3.2b.

## European pride

As in the case of national pride, when asked about how proud people respondents are to be European, the levels of pride<sup>10</sup> vary considerably across the candidate region. The average pride of being European in the candidate region is 67% (up from the 64% in May 2003), which is higher than we see among the member states (61%). Citizens in the 2004 member countries have a very strong European element to their personal identity, with 77% (79% in May 2003) proud of being European.

<sup>10</sup> This is the sum of percentages of those who answered they are very proud and fairly proud to be European.



Those who are proud to be European are most likely to be found in Hungary (90%), followed by Romania (86%), Slovenia (84%), and Poland (82%). It is worth noting that the Hungarians are also those who identify with their nationality alone more often than being to some extent European (see *FIGURE 3.1a*).

Levels of pride for being European are lowest in Lithuania (45%), in Estonia (47%), and in Turkey (48%). (In May 2003 the Turkish held the lowest level of pride, 41%, followed by Estonians with 47%). Yet in each of 13 candidate countries the percentages of people who are proud to be European outnumber those who do not. It is interesting to note that 17% from Bulgaria, 12% from Cyprus, 10% from both Lithuania and Estonia, and 9% from Latvia voluntarily answered that they do not consider themselves European. (*ANNEX TABLE 3.3a*)


Demographic analyses show some interesting differences between the socio-demographic groups. Education and occupation seem to be important determinants of people's pride in being European. The managers (78%), those who terminate their education at 20 years age and above (76%), people with very high media use index (75%), those who left the school at their 16-19 years age (73%), and white collar workers (73%), feel very and fairly proud to be European. The house persons (54%), people with very low and low media use index (55 and 61%, respectively), those who left school before they reached the age of 15 (56%), and the self-employed (61%) are the groups least likely to feel proud of being European.

Those who think that their country's EU membership is a bad thing are very unlikely to be proud of being European (39%) as well, especially when compared to those who consider it a good thing (76%). (*ANNEX TABLE 3.3b*)

## Attachment to Europe

A social survey classic, but a new question in the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer asked respondents how attached they feel to their city/town/village, to their region, to their country, and finally to Europe: very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, or not at all attached?


In the highest percentage the population of both candidate countries and 2004 member countries feel **very attached** to their country (63% in CC-13 and 59% in 2004 members). Attachment to one's settlement comes second to the country, with 60% in CC-13 and 55% in 2004 members claiming to be very attached. Fifty-four percent of the CC-13 and 48% of the 2004 member countries feel very attached to their region. The smallest number of respondents claimed to be very attached to Europe — 32% in the candidate countries and 35% among the acceding countries.



The populations of the current member countries feel **very and fairly attached** to Europe in higher proportion (58%) than the candidate countries or 2004 member countries. Generally, attachment to one's broader environment is higher in the current EU with a higher number of citizens who feel attached to their country (91%), feel attached to their region (87%), and finally, feel attached to their settlement (89%).

While 34% of the CC-13 population mentioned they are not very or not at all attached to Europe, less, 23% of the 10 acceding countries' citizens feel this way. There are very few people in the candidate region who feel not very and not at all attached to their settlements (10% from CC-13 and 11% from 2004 members), to their region (11% from CC-13 and 13% from 2004 members) or to their country (8% from both CC-13 and 2004 members). (ANNEX TABLE 3.4a)

An individual country level analysis shows that the population's attachment to Europe is very diverse between countries. The Hungarians feel, in the highest number, very attached to Europe (59%), followed by Romanians (57%) and Polish (40%), but Lithuanians (6%), Estonians (10%) and Cypriots (12%) feel so in lowest number. The Cypriots (60%), the Lithuanians (60%) and the Turkish (57%) feel, in highest number, not very and not at all attached to Europe. At the very end of the scale, feeling the least attached to Europe is Turkey with 31% and Cyprus with 22%.



As *TABLE 3.1b* on the next page shows, those with very high and high opinion leadership index, with very high media use index, and those who left school at an older age, are most likely to feel very attached to Europe. Conversely, those with very low media use index, the self-employed, and house persons are least likely to feel so.

In comparison, looking at the percentages of those who feel not very and not at all attached to Europe we find in highest number the house persons, the self-employed, and those who left the school by the age of 15, and in lowest number those who continued education until the age of 20 or more. (see also *ANNEX TABLE 3.4b*)

<b>Table 3.1b Feeling attached to Europe</b> (% at the CC-13 level)		
<b>Group</b>	very attached	not very and not at all attached
Opinion Leadership Index ++ high	45	34
Media Use Index +++	39	24
Opinion Leadership Index +	38	30
EDU: 20+ years	38	23
Other white collars	37	24
55+ years age	36	28
Retired	36	26
<b>2004 MEMBERS</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>23</b>
small or middle sized town	34	28
Unemployed	34	26
EDU: 16-19 years	34	29
Manual workers	33	32
Media Use Index ++	32	33
large town	32	34
Female	32	33
<b>CC-13</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>34</b>
Male	32	34
40-54 years age	32	33
Opinion Leadership Index -	31	33
25-39 years age	31	35
rural area or village	31	37
Opinion Leadership Index - - low	30	34
Media Use Index —	30	39
Managers	30	26
EDU: still studying	30	34
15-24 years age	29	38
EDU: up to 15 years	29	43
House Persons	27	49
Self-employed	25	44
Media Use Index —	21	42

## 3.2 Support for European Union membership


In this subchapter, we look at developments in some of the standard indicators of support for the European Union in each of the candidate countries.

### Membership: a “good thing” or a “bad thing”?

Sixty-two percent of the population from the candidate region regards their country's future membership to the European Union as a “good thing” (compared to 64% in May 2003). The proportion of people in the region who regard country's coming membership as a bad thing increased a little bit: 10%, versus 8% in May 2003. Also, the percentage of undecided responses increased from 19% in spring 2003 to 22% in autumn 2003.


In 2004 member countries even more people regard membership is a bad thing: 12%, which is up 4 percentage points since spring. Yet, the majority of the acceding 10 countries' population says the countries' European Union membership will be a good thing (52%, -6).

Support for future membership in the whole CC region is higher compared to support measured among present members (48%) or among 2004 member countries (52%). (ANNEX TABLE 3.5a)



The graph above shows that in all but three countries (Estonia, the Czech Republic and Latvia) at least half of the respondents consider their country's coming or future membership to be a good thing. Those who are most likely to feel this way are those not included in the 2004 round of enlargement: Romanians (81%), Bulgarians (73%), and Turkish (67%). The lowest levels of support were recorded in Estonia (38%), the Czech Republic (44%) and Latvia (46%) — these three countries were also the least supportive of membership in spring 2003.

Opposition to European Union membership ranges from 2% in Romania to 17% in Malta, and similarly to the latest results of the Standard Eurobarometer, there is no country in the candidate region in which those who would regard EU membership as a bad thing outnumber those who see it as a good thing. Yet there are very close numbers in Estonia saying “good” and “neither good nor bad” for membership (38% and 37%).



Until spring 2003 one can see a slowly accelerating growth in the 2004 member countries, and a stabilised high support for EU membership in the whole candidate region. But the new data from autumn 2003 shows an opposite tendency. The recent 6 percentage points decrease of support in the countries that are invited to join the EU as of May 2004 should be pointed out. Still, in comparing the results to data measured one year before, we see no real change — we might attribute the spring peak in support to the temporary effects of the campaigns that surrounded EU referenda in nine of the 10 acceding countries. (FIGURE 3.2b)

The trend analyses show an increase in support since May 2003 in Latvia (+9), Estonia (+7), Romania (+7), Malta (+4), and Bulgaria (+3), and no change in Turkey. But the data shows a decrease in rest of the countries: from significant drops in Cyprus (-13), Lithuania (-10), Poland (-9), Slovenia and Hungary (-7 both), to rather modest declines in the Czech Republic (-2), and Slovakia (-1). (See also individual country graphs, FIGURES 3.2c - 3.2o)

It appears that men and women have different feelings about a unified Europe. The demographic analysis shows that men are more likely than women to regard their country's future membership as a good thing (67% vs. 58%). (TABLE 3.2a.) Education also continues to prove to be a powerful explanatory variable for attitudes toward membership in the European Union. Support levels for the European Union is lowest among people who left school at age 15 or younger (59%), followed by those with 16-19 terminal years in education (60%), and highest is among current students (70%), and those who left school at the age of 20 or older (71%). Support levels also linearly decrease by age, with those aged 15 to 24 being significantly more likely to support their country's membership (70%), followed by aged 25-39 (67%), aged 40-54 (61%), and finally by those aged 55 and over (52%).

Analyses of the economic activity scale show a gap of 23 percentage points in support levels between managers (75%) on the one hand and retired people (52%) on the other. Those with high and very high opinion leadership index (68-68%) are more likely to support the country membership as those with low (67%) and very low opinion leadership index (57%). We see the same linear trend within media use index: those who are very high (66%) and high (63%) on this index, support more the membership than those who are low (62%) or very low (52%) on it. (ANNEX TABLE 3.5b)

<b>Table 3.2a Support of membership</b> (% at the CC-13 level)		
<b>Group</b>	<b>a good thing %</b>	<b>a bad thing %</b>
Managers	75	8
EDU: 20+ years	71	8
Other white collars	70	7
EDU: still studying	70	6
15-24 years age	70	7
Opinion Leadership Index +	68	11
Opinion Leadership Index ++ high	68	17
Male	67	10
25-39 years age	67	8
Opinion Leadership Index -	67	9
large town	67	9
Media Use Index +++	66	9
Self-employed	65	14
Unemployed	64	8
Media Use Index ++	63	9
House Persons	63	9
CC - 13	62	10
Manual workers	62	8
Media Use Index —	62	11
small or middle sized town	62	9
40-54 years age	61	10
EDU: 16-19 years	60	10
rural area or village	60	11
EDU: up to 15 years	59	11
Female	58	10
Opinion Leadership Index - - low	57	9
55+ years age	52	13
2004 MEMBERS	52	12
Retired	52	12
Media Use Index —	52	10



## Support for European Union membership (Bulgaria) 2000-2003




Fig.3.2c

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union would be...? (READ OUT)

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4  
October 2003

% 'don't know' and 'no answer' not shown

GALLUP

## Support for European Union membership (Cyprus) 2000-2003






Fig.3.2d

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union would be...? (READ OUT)


Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4  
October 2003

% 'don't know' and 'no answer' not shown


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



## Support for European Union membership (Hungary) 2000-2003



## Support for European Union membership (Latvia) 2000-2003





### Support for European Union membership (Poland) 2000-2003




Fig.3.2k

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union would be...? (READ OUT)

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4  
October 2003

% 'don't know' and 'no answer' not shown

GALLUP

### Support for European Union membership (Romania) 2000-2003






Fig.3.2l


Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union would be...? (READ OUT)

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4  
October 2003

% 'don't know' and 'no answer' not shown

GALLUP





## Many citizens would now vote differently on the referendum

In those candidate countries that held a referendum about the country membership (each CC-13 except Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), the Eurobarometer probed if people have changed their minds since spring<sup>11</sup>:

- How **did you** vote at the referendum on the question of (COUNTRY)'s membership to the European Union? (for / against)
- And, if that referendum took place today, how **would you** vote on the question of (country)'s membership to the European Union? (for / against / I wouldn't go to vote)

Looking at the current data, 55% of the nine countries population answered they voted for the membership at the referendum; 14% of the respondents voted against and only 27% confessed they did not vote. (ANNEX TABLE 3.6) If we look at the proportion of those over 18 years of age, we can observe respondents memory of the referendum.

If we compare what citizens told us about their stance at the referendum in each accessing country with the real outcome of those referenda we find some interesting discrepancies. Such differences are usually do not indicate a worse memory for one nation than to the other, but shows the direction in how thinking has changed since the actual events. We should also not forget, that many people who answered this question did actually not take part on the referendum. However, the highest difference between these was found in Malta<sup>12</sup> where the "yes" barely passed, right now we find people remembering voted yes in significantly higher proportions (+12 percentage points). We find the same to a lesser extent in Latvia (+5), and the reverse in Lithuania (-5) and Estonia (-4). Hungarians being a bit more positive and Slovaks as well as Czech citizens reporting slightly less support, remember more correctly (+/-3), and the reality and memories were most closely aligned in Poland (+2) and Slovenia (-2). (TABLE 3.2b)

The countries where the memory of the respondents is now more positive towards membership than the reality are Malta and Latvia, and those where respondents memory worked in reverse are Lithuania, Estonia. In the other five countries memories are more or less close to the actual results.

	Results of referendum <sup>13</sup>			Survey data <sup>14</sup>	
	(turnout)	for	against	for	against
SLOVAKIA	(52.2)	92	6	89	11
SLOVENIA	(60.3)	90	10	88	12
HUNGARY	(45.6)	84	16	87	13
LITHUANIA	(63.3)	90	9	85	15
POLAND	(58.9)	77	23	79	21
CZECH REPUBLIC	(55.2)	77	23	74	26
LATVIA	(72.5)	67	32	72	28
MALTA	(91.0)	53	46	65	35
ESTONIA	(64.0)	67	33	63	37

<sup>11</sup> Until May 2003 the candidate Countries Eurobarometer asked the respondents, "If there were to be a referendum on the question (COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union, would you personally vote for or against?"

<sup>12</sup> The highest participation rate was found in Malta with 91%.

<sup>13</sup> See also Gallup's Enlargement Poll Monitor website for referenda results, third party polls and analyses ([www.gallup-europe.be/epm](http://www.gallup-europe.be/epm))

<sup>14</sup> Respondents ages 18+ who answered "for" or "against" when asked "How did you vote at the referendum of the question (COUNTRY)'s membership to the European Union".



Focusing on present intentions, currently, 59% of the nine countries' citizens would vote for membership, 18% would vote against, and 16% would not vote. (ANNEX TABLE 3.7)

What is really interesting, is to see how individuals changed their stance towards the EU membership compared to how they remember they voted on the referendum. In TABLE 3.2c we show the proportion of citizens whose opinion has changed since the referendum either positively or negatively. (We consider it to be a positive change if the respondent answered that he or she has voted against the referendum or has not voted and today would vote "for" membership, and the negative change is if the he or she has voted "for" to the membership earlier, but tomorrow he or she would not go, or would vote "against"). Overall, in the average of the nine countries, as many as 14% would vote differently today than they voted — or behaved — on the referendum. In Estonia, where the referendum was the most recently, almost every fifth respondent changed their minds about their vote. Except for this country, where an equal proportion changed their stance negatively and positively, in all other countries the dominant direction of the change was the positive one. It is reflected in the average of the nine countries: 8% changed their stance positively, and 6% negatively. (Interesting, that the Maltese, whose aggregated memories are the least reflective of the actual result of the referendum, are the least likely to have changed their minds ever since — indicating that they already remember as they wish they have voted on the referendum.)

<b>Table 3.2c Change in voting intentions, EU referendum</b>			
	% changed positively	% changed negatively	total % who changed their minds
MALTA	3,7	2,6	6,3
SLOVAKIA	9,0	2,0	11,0
LITHUANIA	8,4	3,1	11,5
CZECH REPUBLIC	8,2	4,1	12,3
HUNGARY	9,3	4,5	13,8
<b>9 COUNTRIES</b>	<b>8,3</b>	<b>5,6</b>	<b>13,9</b>
SLOVENIA	8,5	3,9	14,4
POLAND	8,0	7,0	15,0
LATVIA	9,9	7,8	17,7
ESTONIA	9,0	9,5	18,5

### 3.3 Perceived benefits of European Union membership


This section will examine the personal and national advantages the candidate countries and the citizens hope to gain with membership in the European Union. We will look at opinions regarding who will win and who will lose through EU integration.

#### Personal benefits

Citizens are divided in their expectations for personal benefits derived from future membership in the EU. When asked by the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, 53% percent of the CC-13 responded that they would personally benefit from EU accession while 31% do not think they will benefit. We found the same percentage of optimists in the spring of 2003 whereas those not expecting personal benefits have grown from 29% over this time period. Alternatively, when considering the ten 2004 members alone we see an equal split — 40% believing they could benefit from EU membership and 40% saying they will not. These results show a 4% rise in pessimism and 4% fall of optimism since the spring of 2003. The cause of differentiation between the CC-13 and 2004 member results might be explained by solid Turkish optimism were 70% believe they would derive personal benefits from EU membership. Romania, Bulgaria and Malta were the only other countries where at least half of the citizens expect advantages from their country's future membership to the European Union (52%, 52%, and 50% respectively).

In Estonia we registered extremely low optimism regarding expected personal advantages from future EU membership. Only 3 in 10 Estonians think they would personally benefit from accession, making Estonians the least optimistic among the 13 candidate countries (30%). Further, in Estonia we find the largest number of citizens who are pessimistic about their personal future after accession and say they will not benefit from the accession (46%), followed by Czechs (44%), and Hungarians (44%). Estonia, Czech Republic and Hungary are those countries among the CC-13 where the ratio of the negative response is higher than the positive. As for the Latvians and Poles, they are the most divided in respect of this question, showing the smallest difference between the negative and positive responses.

We find Lithuanians to have the highest proportion of citizens who are left in the dark whether they can count on personal benefits or not — 28% have no opinion about the personal benefits that may come with Lithuania's EU membership (changed from 30% in the spring of 2003). Similarly, 23% of Latvians and twenty-two percent of Romanians are unable to decide whether their lives would be positively affected by the accession, or not. (see ANNEX TABLE 3.8)



When comparing the data to spring 2003 the trend analyses show an increase in **expected personal benefits** results in Romania (+7), Latvia (+6), Bulgaria (+5), but also in Slovenia and Turkey (+3 percentage points for each), and Estonia (+2), too. At CC-13 level there is no change at all in, but fewer people from the acceding countries' say they would personally benefit than in spring 2003 (-4).

A sharp decrease in positive expectations was recorded in Hungary (-9), in Cyprus (-7) and Lithuania (-6), and a slight deterioration in the Czech Republic (-4), and in Poland (-3).

Comparing the autumn 2003 data to results from 2003 spring we find that the proportion of those who now believe they **would personally not benefit** from the country's EU membership has increased in the majority of the countries: in Cyprus, Lithuania and Hungary (+7 percentage points each), in Slovakia (+5), in Poland (+4), in Malta (+3), in the Czech Republic (+2), and in Bulgaria and Turkey (-1 each), too.


The following question was used to measure the balance of expected personal advantages and disadvantages. This question also adds to the discussion of whether or not people regard their country's future membership as beneficial.

*Do you think that (COUNTRY) becoming a member of the European Union would bring you personally...?*

On the CC-13 level, the breakdown of responses is as follows:

	2003 autumn	2003 spring	2002 autumn	2001 autumn
Many more advantages	18%	15%	14%	12%
More advantages	28%	33%	33%	30%
As many advantages as disadvantages	24%	20%	22%	23%
More disadvantages	10%	10%	9%	10%
Many more disadvantages	5%	4%	5%	4%
(Don't know / No opinion)	15%	19%	17%	21%

The proportion of those who think that the accession would bring many more advantages has been increasing over the past two years. In the autumn of 2003 we saw almost every fifth citizen, 18% expecting "many more advantages." However, the proportion of those who think accession will bring "more advantages" have slightly decreased. Altogether the percentage of those who think accession will bring more and many more advantages is 4 percentage points higher in 2003 autumn than in 2001 autumn, but 2 and 3 percentage points lower than in 2003 spring and 2002 autumn. According to 10% and 5% percent of the population, accession would bring more and many more disadvantages. This proportion is basically unchanged from 2001 and 2002 autumn, and 2003 spring.



On CC-13 average there are three times as many respondents who expect more or many more advantages than those who expect more and many more disadvantages (46% v. 15%). The proportion of those who could foresee neither a positive nor a negative the balance of the expected advantages and disadvantages is 24%.

The country-by-country analyses show that Turkey is the only country where more than half of the population (59%) feels that EU membership would give them more advantages than disadvantages. In Slovenia (46%), in Hungary and in Slovakia (both 32%) a large number think their personal advantages and disadvantages will be balanced.

Only in Estonia does the proportion of people who feel membership will bring mostly disadvantages outweigh the proportion of people who feel membership will bring more advantages (28% versus 30%).

The proportion of respondents who weren't able or who didn't want to give an opinion is generally high; it ranges from 9% in Slovenia and Slovakia to 28% in Romania. (see ANNEX TABLE 3.9a)

<b>Table 3.3a Expected personal benefits from future EU membership, net results</b> differences between % more + many more advantages and % more + many more disadvantages are shown, by demographics			
<b>Group</b>	<b>Net benefit</b>	<b>Group</b>	<b>Net benefit</b>
EDU: still studying	56	Opinion Leadership Index -	39
EU Knowledge Scale: +	49	Manual workers	34
Managers	48	Media Use Index —	30
15-24 years olds	52	small or middle sized town	28
Accession: very + well informed	47	Other white collars	38
large town	37	EDU: up to 15 years	26
EU Knowledge Scale: +/-	40	40-54 years olds	22
EDU: 20+ years	36	female	24
Opinion Leadership Index +	40	rural area or village	28
25-39 years olds	40	EDU: 16-19 years	25
Media Use Index +++	25	Accession: not + not at all informed	25
Opinion Leadership Index ++ high	25	Media Use Index —	20
male	37	Opinion Leadership Index - - low	22
Unemployed	34	<b>2004 MEMBERS</b>	<b>15</b>
House Persons	32	EU Knowledge Scale: -	17
Self-employed	35	55+ years olds	8
Media Use Index ++	31	Retired	7
<b>CC-13</b>	<b>31</b>		


As shown in TABLE 3.3a above, various social groups widely disagree in their evaluation of the balance of personal benefits derived from European integration. Students, the young, and those who think they know a lot about the EU and the accession of their country, as well as managers, see the most favourable personal balance of advantage and disadvantage. The retired, elderly, those who score low on knowledge and opinion leadership indexes and on media use index, as well as those who are uninformed about their country' EU accession envision the advantage for them personally as being much less favourable, but still positive at the balance (see ANNEX TABLE 3.9b).

## Benefits for the country

The divergence in opinion regarding perceived costs and benefits to one's country is less pronounced. Predominantly, the citizens of candidate countries anticipate a more positive balance of advantages and disadvantages on a national scale.

<b>Table 3.3b Expected benefits for the country and for the respondent</b>					
	Country benefits	Respondent benefits		Country benefits	Respondent benefits
ROMANIA	82	52	HUNGARY	62	38
BULGARIA	79	52	MALTA	60	50
TURKEY	75	70	LATVIA	58	40
SLOVENIA	72	47	<b>2004 MEMBERS</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>40</b>
CYPRUS	71	47	POLAND	56	42
<b>CC - 13</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>53</b>	CZECH REP.	49	33
SLOVAKIA	65	45	ESTONIA	45	30
LITHUANIA	63	48			

Almost two-thirds (68%) of the people living in the candidate countries expect that their country would benefit from membership to the European Union (compared to 53% who expect to benefit personally). Only 18% do not share this expectation; consequently, 14% are unable to formulate a positive or negative opinion on this question. The widest gap between country's and respondent's benefit can be found in Romania, mostly due to the wide national consensus that the European Union membership would be beneficial for the country.





In every candidate country, even in those where support for membership is far from being enthusiastic (see Chapter 3.2) most people think that accession would bring national advantages. Eighty-two percent share this opinion in Romania, 79% in Bulgaria, 75% in Turkey and 72% in Slovenia. Fewer

than half, but a clear majority among the Estonians (45%) and Czechs (49%) agree that their country would benefit from European Union membership.

The proportion of people who lack an opinion ranges from 10% in Turkey to 23% in Lithuania. (ANNEX TABLE 3.10)



There is a slight increase in the number of people who do not think their country will benefit from membership in the 2004 member countries. Among the 10 acceding countries the increase in negative opinions is +6 percentage points, higher than in CC-13 region (+3).







Countries that drive the increase are most notably Latvia (+11 percentage points), Romania (+5), Estonia (+3), Malta (+2). A decrease in positive expectations was recorded in Cyprus (-16 percentage points), Poland and Hungary (both -10), Lithuania (-6) and Slovenia (-3). Slovakia and Turkey saw no change.



On the following pages, FIGURES 3.3e - 3.3r present the trends for each candidate country.







### Benefit from European Union membership, for the country (Lithuania) 2000-2003




Fig. 3.3l



Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4  
October 2003

Question: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (COUNTRY) could get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union?

% 'don't know' and 'no answer' not shown

GALLUP

### Benefit from European Union membership, for the country (Malta) 2000-2003




Fig. 3.3m



Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4  
October 2003

Question: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (COUNTRY) could get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union?

% 'don't know' and 'no answer' not shown

GALLUP

### Benefit from European Union membership, for the country (Poland) 2000-2003




Fig.3.3n



Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4  
October 2003

Question: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (COUNTRY) could get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union?

% 'don't know' and 'no answer' not shown

GALLUP

### Benefit from European Union membership, for the country (Romania) 2000-2003




Fig.3.3o



Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4  
October 2003

Question: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (COUNTRY) could get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union?

% 'don't know' and 'no answer' not shown

GALLUP

### Benefit from European Union membership, for the country (Slovakia) 2000-2003




Fig. 3.3p



Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4  
October 2003

Question: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (COUNTRY) could get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union?

% 'don't know' and 'no answer' not shown

GALLUP

### Benefit from European Union membership, for the country (Slovenia) 2000-2003




Fig. 3.3q




Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4  
October 2003

Question: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (COUNTRY) could get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union?

% 'don't know' and 'no answer' not shown

GALLUP




We have used the five-scale measure too, to determine the **net balance** of expected advantages and disadvantages at the country level. At the CC-13 level, the breakdown of responses for the following question has been as follows:

*Do you think that becoming a member of the European Union would bring (COUNTRY) ... ?*

	2003 autumn	2003 spring	2002 autumn	2001 autumn
Many more advantages	21%	19%	20%	18%
More advantages	32%	39%	36%	36%
As many advantages as disadvantages	23%	19%	20%	20%
More disadvantages	9%	9%	9%	10%
Many more disadvantages	5%	4%	5%	4%
(Don't know / No opinion)	10%	11%	10%	12%

In the candidate countries 23% say the advantages and disadvantages their country will experience will be balanced once they have joined the European Union. At the same time, a larger percentage believes that advantages will outweigh disadvantages than believes the reverse. The proportion of those who would expect more and many more disadvantages in 2004 member countries is 9% higher than respondents living in candidate countries.



Looking at individual country results, we find very apparent differences: 67% percent of Bulgarians, 62% of Romanians, 61% of Turks currently share the opinion that their country would gain more or much more advantage than disadvantage from becoming a member of the European Union.

Showing the least optimism are the Czechs (26%), Estonians (22%) and Latvians (22%). However, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer did not find any country in the region where the ratio of pessimists exceeded that of optimists, or exceeded a third of the population. (ANNEX TABLE 3.11)



### 3.4 Image of the European Union


The following question provides an indication of people's emotive stance towards the European Union:

*In general, do you have a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative, or very negative image of the European Union?*

On average, 55% of candidate country citizens have a positive image of the European Union (of whom 18% view it very positively). This is 10 percentage points higher than the level Eurobarometer found within the European Union (44%). While 32% view the EU in a neutral way, only 19% say that the EU conjures up a negative image, of which only 5% feel very negatively.

Regarding the 2004 member country citizens, 46% have a positive image of the European Union. Of these, 7% have very positive feelings, which is 11% less than seen in CC-13 countries. The percentage of those with a negative image of the EU is similar in both the CC-13 region (17%) and the 2004 member country citizens (20%), and in each group 5% holds a very negative image.

In CC-13 region, the proportion of answers "fairly positive" and "very positive" has increased 1% since the spring of 2003 while "fairly negative" and "very negative" answers have decreased by 1%. Among 2004 member countries we have experienced the opposite trend: the ratio of "fairly" and "very negative" emotions has increased by 7%, and there is a 6% decrease among those who have "fairly positive" or "very positive" image of the European Union.



As the graph above shows, three quarters of people in Romania (75%), almost three quarters in Bulgaria (71%), more than half in Cyprus (54%), Turkey (54%), and Slovakia (51%), and exactly half in Slovenia (50%) and Lithuania (50%) have a very or fairly positive image of the EU. The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer did not find any country in which the majority view of the EU is negative (although in Estonia only 31% were positive and 23% negative, which is notably close). The worst image of the EU is found in The Czech Republic, where the population is split with 41% feeling positive, 29% neutral, and more than a quarter (26%) negative.

The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer found the highest proportion of EU neutrality in Estonia (42%), followed by Hungary (35%) and Latvia (33%). Accordingly, these countries do not score high

on the positive side (31%, 45%, 44%, respectively), although the number of those who view the EU positively outscores those who view it negatively. (ANNEX TABLE 3.12a-c)

A demographic analysis of the population shows a positive EU image in 65% of those who are still studying, 69% of managers, 62% of the youngest age group, and 63% of those who finished their education at 20 or older.

At 46%, people 55 or older are the least likely to have a positive view of the EU. Additionally, less than 50% of the following groups have a positive view of the EU: retired persons (46%), those who left school at 15 or younger (48%), and house persons (48%).

Furthermore, as one would expect, most people who support their country's EU membership have a positive image (77%) of the EU. Conversely, 77% of people who regard their country's membership as a bad thing have a negative image. (ANNEX TABLE 3.12b)

## Spontaneous image of the EU

In this subchapter, we examine the context under which the European Union is interpreted in the candidate countries, i.e. what membership in the European Union means for the people of the candidate region. Here we will look at the unaided responses — what comes to mind when people think of the European Union. Then we look at how these thoughts add up; whether people have a positive or a negative image of the European Union as a whole. We will also investigate how people see certain aspects of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer asked the respondents to give us their first thoughts when they had to say something about the European Union. We left this question open-ended to better explore the underlying structure of opinions about the EU. We collected almost 20,000 verbatim statements from the 13 countries, and grouped these into 20 substantive answer categories, as follows:

**Table 3.4a Categories applied in the analysis of open-ended questions**


Positive categories	Negative categories	Neutral categories
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Integration helps</li> <li>Economically positive</li> <li>Unspecified positive statements based on emotions or general image perception ("General positive")</li> <li>"Bright future"</li> <li>Enhanced (military) security</li> <li>Travelling, visa, movement of labour</li> <li>Issues, policies – positive</li> <li>Other, positive</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Economically negative, protectionism, unspecified negative emotions, hostile statements</li> <li>Hate speech, unspecified negative statement</li> <li>Loss of political independence</li> <li>"Colonization"</li> <li>Issues, policies - negative</li> <li>Identity issues, nationalistic or xenophobic attitudes</li> <li>Sceptical about accession</li> <li>Sceptical about benefits</li> <li>Other, negative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Factual or neutral statements</li> <li>Country-specific issues</li> <li>Other, undecided (statements that can hold both positive or negative meanings)</li> </ul>

The relative majority (more than one in four, 27%) of people in the candidate countries have a positive image of the Union, mainly for economic reasons. The Union is seen as the source of prosperity and the guarantor of richness. The three most frequent answer categories are positive or neutral. The most frequent negative answer category ("Economy negative, protectionism") was mentioned by only 6% of the respondents.

More than half of all collected responses (52%) were positive, on average, in all 13 countries. Nineteen percent were negative statements.

There is a lower proportion of positive answers in the 2004 member countries (39%), and a higher proportion of negative answers (30%), in comparison to the proportions of both in the CC-13.

The Romanians are the most likely to react positively when asked to think about the EU (67% of all responses are positive), followed by the Turks (63%) and the Bulgarians (57%). We find the highest number of negative responses in Estonia (42%), Latvia (42%) and the Czech Republic (36%). In Estonia and in the Czech Republic, the negative answers are in the majority (42% negative vs. 31% positive, 36% vs. 32%), and in Latvia the proportion of the positive answers are only 1% higher than the proportion of the negative answers (42% vs. 41%).



The next table shows the three categories that Candidate Countries Eurobarometer used to classify the verbatim responses, as well as the most-mentioned responses in each candidate country.

The **Economy, positive** category tops the list in six of the 13 Candidate Countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Turkey), and takes second place in three other countries (Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia). The economy takes third place in one country.

The **Factual, neutral** category tops the list in three candidate countries (in Poland, in Slovenia and in the Czech Republic), and comes in second or third place in five countries. It does not make the top three in Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta and Turkey.

**Economy negative, protectionism** tops the list in Cyprus and in Estonia, and ranks second or third in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. It is not among the top three in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey.

We find the issue of “**travelling**” (first place in Slovakia, second or third place in three countries) among the top three in four countries.

Malta, Romania and Turkey are the only countries where “**emotional and image positivism**” —the expression of “love” towards the EU — ranks in the top three.


**Table 3.4b Three most frequent top-of-mind thoughts about the European Union**  
(% of , by country)

<b>Bulgaria</b>		<b>Malta</b>	
Economy, positive	28	Economy, positive	25
Factual or neutral	17	Economy, negative	18
Unspecified, negative	8	Emotional or image positivism	10
<b>Cyprus</b>		<b>Poland</b>	
Economy, negative	16	Factual or neutral	16
Issues, policies positive	15	Unspecified, negative	13
Enhanced security	15	Economy, positive	13
<b>Czech Republic</b>		<b>Romania</b>	
Factual or neutral	23	Economy, positive	33
Economy, negative	18	Emotional or image positivism	20
Traveling, visa, movement of labor	13	Factual or neutral	9
<b>Estonia</b>		<b>Slovakia</b>	
Economy, negative	24	Traveling, visa, movement of labor	15
Factual or neutral	15	Economy, positive	15
Issues, policies-negative	13	Factual or neutral	14
<b>Hungary</b>		<b>Slovenia</b>	
Economy, positive	17	Factual or neutral	19
Factual or neutral	14	Economy, positive	17
Skeptical about benefits	12	Traveling, visa, movement of labor	13
<b>Latvia</b>		<b>Turkey</b>	
Other negative	16	Economy, positive	43
Economy, positive	12	Issues, policies- positive	7
Economy, negative	12	Emotional or image positivism	6
<b>Lithuania</b>			
Economy, positive	20		
Traveling, visa, movement of labor	15		
Economy, negative	13		

## Emotions related to the European Union

When we asked the candidate countries: “Does the European Union give you personally the feeling of.....*enthusiasm, hope, trust, indifference, anxiety, mistrust, or rejection*,” “hope” and “trust” were most often the first two feelings respondents mentioned. Of these, 61% feel's that the European Union gives the feeling of *hope*. All the other categories were chosen by less than 50% of the respondents. *Indifference* and *rejection* (both 15%) are the feelings found to be least associated with the European Union.

Comparing CC-13 data with the 2004 member countries, the first and last feeling evoked by the EU remains the same. Among the acceding countries *hope* is found in first place with a 60% response rate, and again, just as in CC-13 countries, *rejection* is at the bottom with 8% (which is lower than in CC-13 countries' data). (ANNEX TABLE 3.13)



The following table shows that hope is the feeling most strongly associated with the European Union in all the 13 candidate countries. Trust falls in the top three among 12 candidate countries—the exceptions being Estonia. Of negative emotions, anxiety is found in 6 countries (Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland) and mistrust in 4 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia).

**Table 3.4c Three most prevalent emotions related to the European Union**  
(%, by country)


<b>Bulgaria</b>		<b>Malta</b>	
Hope	75	Hope	50
Trust	57	Trust	47
Enthusiasm	26	Enthusiasm	22
<b>Cyprus</b>		<b>Poland</b>	
Hope	68	Hope	60
Trust	45	Anxiety	42
Anxiety	39	Trust	26
<b>Czech Republic</b>		<b>Romania</b>	
Hope	51	Hope	74
Trust	35	Trust	60
Mistrust	32	Enthusiasm	25
<b>Estonia</b>		<b>Slovakia</b>	
Hope	48	Hope	69
Anxiety	36	Trust	47
Mistrust	26	Mistrust	25
<b>Hungary</b>		<b>Slovenia</b>	
Hope	65	Hope	60
Trust	46	Trust	25
Anxiety	27	Mistrust	19
<b>Latvia</b>		<b>Turkey</b>	
Hope	65	Hope	55
Anxiety	45	Trust	43
Trust	30	Rejection	29
<b>Lithuania</b>			
Hope	62		
Anxiety	40		
Trust	36		

## Feelings if the European Union were to be scrapped

Rather yes. In the CC-13 region almost the same proportion would feel sorry as indifferent (39%, 38% respectively), while 9% claim they would be very relieved. In comparison, in 2001 among the current member countries there were less people who responded that they would be very sorry if the EU had been scrapped (31%), and almost half of them (44%) claimed that they would feel indifferent.

More than, or exactly half of the respondents in four countries among the CC-13 would be very sorry if the EU would be scrapped. Romanians would be the sorriest if the European Union was scrapped (64%) and would be the least relieved (1%). Romania is followed by the Bulgarians, Maltese and Cypriots where “very sorry” response percentage exceeds 50% (52%, 52%, 50% respectively). The only country in addition to these where a majority would be very sorry for the loss of the European Union is Slovakia. Estonia, Latvia and Poland would feel the least sorry for the EU (40%, 41%, 47% respectively).

Seven of thirteen CC-13 countries show that in the case that the EU was scrapped a majority would feel indifferent. In Slovenia 50% feel indifferent about this question and the percentage is also very high in Poland and Hungary (44% and 47%, respectively). In Turkey the proportion of those who would be very sorry for the EU is the same as the proportion of indifference (37%)(ANNEX TABLE 3.14).






## 3.5 Meaning of European Union

### What EU membership will have brought for its citizens 10 years from now

When presented with a list of issues that EU membership may bring over the next 10 years, people in the candidate countries agree that the quality of life will be better for most people (63%), it will be much easier to move around the member states for any purpose (61%), and there will be a single currency, the euro (55%). The 2004 members mentioned the same things in a different order, as they are much more likely to expect freedom of movement (67%), the introduction of the euro (61%), and a better quality of life (52%).

Among candidate countries a bit less than half agree that EU membership will have brought more job opportunities (49%), about four in 10 counts on less discrimination (39%) and more equality between men and women (37%) over the next 10 years. Less than one third of the CC-13 think there will be more difficulty in making decisions (29%), more social problems (24%), and higher unemployment (23%) in 10 years. Only a very small minority believes that the EU will be scrapped in a decade (2%). (ANNEX TABLE 3.15)



We can see a pattern of changing expectations since the spring of 2003. Both within the CC-13 average and the 2004 members average, negative expectations have increased while positive expectations have somewhat decreased.

Taking a closer look within the countries results we can see substantial variation. A majority of the Bulgarians and Turks expect to “have a better quality of life in ten years” time (both 72%), which is also high in Romania (71%). Yet this issue was mentioned only by 30% of the Estonians.

It will be easier to travel, study, work and live anywhere in the European Union according to 81% of the Slovaks, which is the highest level among the candidate countries. On the other end of the scale only 49% of Estonians agree.

Regarding finding more opportunities to work, 58% of the Turks and more than half of the Slovaks (57%) are looking forward to this outcome. Estonian respondents are very sceptical of not only this but also regarding the two previously mentioned issues—only 25% of them expect more opportunities within 10 years.

Czechs and Slovaks (both 42%) feel that there will be more difficulties in making decisions in 10 years' time within the EU, while the Lithuanians are more optimistic (only 16% agree).

While 45% of the Cypriots expect more social problems in the EU in ten years' time, Romanians are more optimistic and only 14% expect the same increase in social problems.


Bulgarians are hardly afraid of higher unemployment in ten years' time within the EU (10%), while half of the Cypriots mentioned this issue (50%).

## Meaning of the European Union

We are also interested in what the European Union means to respondents personally. Each respondent was asked to select from 14 possible “meanings” shown to him/her on a card.

For the candidate countries’ population the European Union means, first of all, free movement within the EU (58%), economic prosperity (52%), and peace (47%). For less than one-fifth it means loss of cultural identity (18%), more crime (17%) waste of money (15%), and not enough control at external frontiers (15%).

The 2004 member countries set up a different ranking of the items than the CC-13, but in first place they choose free movement within the EU (64%) and in third place they selected peace (43%), just as the candidate countries have done. Among the 2004 members the European Union is more likely to mean the EURO (47%), which for the CC-13 takes fifth place with 42%. Loss of cultural identity was the least selected possibility among the 2004 member countries’ (13%). Not enough control at the external frontiers (15%) and waste of money (18%) were other “aspects” or “elements” that the European Union does not mean for them. (ANNEX TABLES 3.16a-c)



Looking at the individual countries’ data from the TABLE 3.5a, we should note that among the meaning of the European Union *freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU* is mentioned among the first three places in all countries. This item is mentioned in the first place in 9 of 13 countries, second in 3 countries, and third in one.

European Union means *economic prosperity* for seven candidate countries, mentioned by them in one of the first three places. In both Bulgaria and Turkey this is selected most often (with 66% and 65%).

*Euro* is mentioned in either the second or third place in seven candidate countries – in Slovenia in first place, in five countries in second place, and in Hungary in third place. *Social protection* is selected for second or third place in only three candidate countries, *stronger say in the world* in one country (Malta) and finally, *bureaucracy* in only one as well (Estonia).

The country by country analysis shows that *peace* as an attribute of the European Union is mentioned on one of the first three places in seven of 13 candidate countries – the Romanians mentioned it in

first place (65%), Cypriots on the second place (71%), and in five countries it was mentioned in the third place.

**Table 3.5a Primary meanings of the European Union**  
(% of mentions, by country)

<b>Bulgaria</b>		<b>Malta</b>	
economic prosperity	66	freedom of movement within the EU	60
freedom of movement within the EU	65	stronger say in the world	49
peace	60	economic prosperity	47
<b>Cyprus</b>		<b>Poland</b>	
freedom of movement within the EU	73	freedom of movement within the EU	64
peace	71	euro	41
social protection	43	peace	39
<b>Czech Republic</b>		<b>Romania</b>	
freedom of movement within the EU	70	peace	65
euro	57	freedom of movement within the EU	62
peace	45	economic prosperity	61
<b>Estonia</b>		<b>Slovakia</b>	
freedom of movement within the EU	48	freedom of movement within the EU	77
euro	30	euro	64
bureaucracy	24	economic prosperity	58
<b>Hungary</b>		<b>Slovenia</b>	
freedom of movement within the EU	55	euro	56
peace	51	freedom of movement within the EU	53
euro	48	peace	44
<b>Latvia</b>		<b>Turkey</b>	
freedom of movement within the EU	53	economic prosperity	65
social protection	46	social protection	58
economic prosperity	41	freedom of movement within the EU	48
<b>Lithuania</b>			
freedom of movement within the EU	71		
euro	56		
economic prosperity	49		

## What it means to be a citizen of the European Union

Being able to study in member states is a very common answer: 60% in the CC-13 and 63% in the 2004 member states. Freedom of movement is also a popular response and the second most widely known liberty available to the European citizen (with 64% mentioning it in the candidate countries and also 64% in the 2004 member countries). Yet above all, the right to work in any country in the European Union is mentioned first in both the CC-13 (71%) and 2004 member countries (73%).

Fifty-four percent of people living in the candidate region named the right of access to healthcare and social care in any of the member states. One-third of the respondents are aware that EU citizens can vote in elections (local, national, or European) wherever they permanently reside (29%).




TABLE 3.5b on the next page shows the three most frequently mentioned rights of European citizens in each country.

**The right to work in any country in the EU** tops the list in 11 of the 13 candidate countries, and comes in second in the remaining two countries. This means that it ranks within the top three responses in each country.

**The right to study anywhere within the Union** comes in second place in eight countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia) and comes in third in four (Turkey, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Poland).

**The right to move permanently** can be found within the top three items in 10 countries, and tops the list in Cyprus (83%) and in Turkey (68%). Access to healthcare and social welfare anywhere in the European Union is emphasized in second place in Bulgaria (61%) and in Slovenia (55%), and comes in third with the same ratio (55%) in Latvia. (ANNEX TABLE 3.17)


**Table 3.5b. Meaning of being a citizen of the EU**  
(% of mentions, by country)

<b>Bulgaria</b>		<b>Malta</b>	
The right to work in the EU	74	The right to work in the EU	71
Access to healthcare and social welfare	61	Being able to study in any EU country	68
Being able to study in any EU country	58	The right to move permanently	66
<b>Cyprus</b>		<b>Poland</b>	
The right to move permanently	83	The right to work in the EU	73
The right to work in the EU	79	The right to move permanently	65
Being able to study in any EU country	78	Being able to study in any EU country	59
<b>Czech Republic</b>		<b>Romania</b>	
The right to work in the EU	73	The right to work in the EU	72
Being able to study in any EU country	67	Being able to study in any EU country	61
The right to move permanently	64	The right to move permanently	59
<b>Estonia</b>		<b>Slovakia</b>	
The right to work in the EU	63	The right to work in the EU	84
Being able to study in any EU country	49	Being able to study in any EU country	80
The right to move permanently	44	The right to move permanently	62
<b>Hungary</b>		<b>Slovenia</b>	
The right to work in the EU	75	The right to work in the EU	57
Being able to study in any EU country	66	Access to healthcare and social welfare	55
The right to move permanently	66	Being able to study in any EU country	54
<b>Latvia</b>		<b>Turkey</b>	
The right to work in the EU	71	The right to move permanently	68
Being able to study in any EU country	65	The right to work in the EU	67
Access to healthcare and social welfare	55	Being able to study in any EU country	55
<b>Lithuania</b>			
The right to work in the EU	75		
Being able to study in any EU country	70		
The right to move permanently	64		

## Fears related to the building of Europe

In another set of questions the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer tested the prevalence of several common fears related to the building of the European Union. In order to measure the extent to which the public is concerned about the ongoing process of European integration, respondents were asked the following question:

*Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you - personally - are currently afraid of it, or not?*



People in the candidate countries are most likely to fear that the building of Europe will lead to increased drug trafficking and international organized crime (51% in the CC-13 and 56% among 2004 members). Almost every second citizen is currently afraid that the accession will cost their country too much money (50% in the CC-13 and 61% in the 2004 states) and will mean more difficulties for farmers (48% in the CC-13 and 61% among 2004 members).

Forty-four percent of the CC-13 population and 47% of 2004 members are afraid of the loss of their national currency.

One-third of the candidate countries’ population mentioned the transfer of jobs to countries that have lower production costs (37% in the CC-13, 46% in 2004 states), the usage of their languages less and less (35% in the CC-13, 28% in acceding countries), the loss of power for smaller member states (36% in the CC-13, 39% in the 2004 members), and the loss of national identity and culture (32% in the CC-13, 25% in the 2004 countries). One in five respondents mentions the loss of social benefits (31% in the CC-13, 32% in the acceding countries), and the fear that the richer countries will pay more than others (23% in the CC-13, 24% in the 2004 member states).

The following table shows the three most widespread fears in each country.

**Table 3.5c Three most widespread fears connected to the building of Europe, %**

<b>Bulgaria</b>		<b>Malta</b>	
Accession expensive	47	Transferred jobs	58
Increase in organized crime	42	A loss of power	50
Problems for farmers	34	Increase in organized crime	48
<b>Cyprus</b>		<b>Poland</b>	
Increase in organized crime	80	Accession expensive	60
Transferred jobs	55	Problems for farmers	59
Accession expensive	49	Increase in organized crime	52
<b>Czech Republic</b>		<b>Romania</b>	
Problems for farmers	68	Increase in organized crime	43
Accession expensive	67	Accession expensive	34
Increase in organized crime	63	Problems for farmers	25
<b>Estonia</b>		<b>Slovakia</b>	
Increase in organized crime	70	Increase in organized crime	64
End of natl. currency	60	Accession expensive	62
Accession expensive	57	Problems for farmers	60
<b>Hungary</b>		<b>Slovenia</b>	
Problems for farmers	70	Increase in organized crime	56
Accession expensive	68	Problems for farmers	54
Transferred jobs	62	Accession expensive	47
<b>Latvia</b>		<b>Turkey</b>	
Increase in organized crime	64	Abandoning language	53
Problems for farmers	57	Loss of identity, culture	51
Accession expensive	52	End of natl. currency	50
<b>Lithuania</b>			
Increase in organized crime	58		
Accession expensive	55		
Problems for farmers	52		

The increase in drug trafficking and international organized crime is the most widespread fear in 7 candidate countries. Only in Turkey and in Hungary is it not within the top three. The fear that **farmers will have more difficulties** is among the most widespread fears in nine countries, in Hungary and in the Czech Republic it stands in first place. Although, it does not make the top three in the Cyprus, Malta, Estonia and Turkey. **High costs of the accession** are among the most widespread fears in 11 countries and most strongly felt in Bulgaria and Poland, though not in Malta and Turkey. The **end of national currency** appears as the third greatest fear in Turkey and the second in Estonia. The **transfer of jobs** appears as a fear in three countries, stands in first place in Malta (58%), in second place in Cyprus (55%), and comes in at third place in Hungary (62%). (ANNEX TABLE 3.18a-c)




Finally, we will take a look at the “average fear level” in each candidate country. As the following table shows, the average percentage of respondents saying they are currently afraid of things related to building Europe is the highest in the Czech republic (50%) and Estonia (48%), and by far the lowest in Bulgaria (26%) and Romania (22%).

<b>Table 3.5d Fear in the building of Europe</b> (Average score for ‘% currently afraid’ responses for 10 items, by country)	
Country	% average
CZECH REP.	50
ESTONIA	48
HUNGARY	45
CYPRUS	44
SLOVAKIA	43
TURKEY	43
<b>2004 MEMBERS</b>	<b>42</b>
MALTA	42
SLOVENIA	40
LITHUANIA	40
LATVIA	40
POLAND	39
<b>CC - 13</b>	<b>39</b>
BULGARIA	26
ROMANIA	22

### 3.6 Role expected and desired for the European Union in five years' time

As to the expected role of the European Union: Forty-nine percent of people living in the candidate region believe that in five years' time, the European Union will play a more important role in their daily life, 28% believe it will play the same role, and only 11% believe it will play a less important role than it does now. We should note that there is a small difference between the expectations of the 2004 member countries (who know they will be members of the Union) and the other countries for which accession is a more remote possibility.

There is a five percentage point difference between the number of 2004 members and the number of EU citizens who think the role of the EU will not change — the 2004 members are somewhat more expectant. The majority of respondents over the age of 15 in Romania, Turkey and Bulgaria think the importance of the EU will increase in 5 years' time.



Country-by-country analyses reveal that there are opposite dynamics behind this steady regional average. Respondents in six of the 13 candidate countries expect, in numbers above the candidate countries' average, the European Union to have a greater role in their lives for the next five years. The six are Cyprus (63%), Romania (58%), Malta (52%), Slovakia (51%), Turkey (50%) and Slovenia (49%). Czechs and Lithuanians are the last in line — only 41% of them expect the EU to have a more important role in their daily lives in five years' time.

In most of the candidate countries, more people say the EU will play a more important role in their daily lives than the proportion of people who feel the EU will play the same or a less important role. The greatest differences in this respect are in Cyprus (more important role: 63% versus the percentage saying the same plus the percentage saying a less important role: 25%), Romania (58% versus 28%), followed by Malta (52% versus 34%).

In only two countries do we find more respondents saying the EU will play a less important or the same role in their lives than people saying they expect a more important role for the EU — Hungary (43 vs. 46%) and Lithuania (41 vs. 46%). (TABLE 1.3a and ANNEX TABLE 3.19a)

Table 3.6a Expected role of the EU in 5 years' time				
	More important	Less important	Same role	Difference between more and less or same
CYPRUS	63	8	17	38
ROMANIA	58	4	24	29
MALTA	52	9	25	17
SLOVAKIA	51	8	29	15
BULGARIA	47	3	29	15
<b>CC-13</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>9</b>
POLAND	48	6	33	9
TURKEY	50	20	24	6
<b>2004 MEMBERS</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>6</b>
ESTONIA	45	6	32	6
SLOVENIA	49	7	38	5
LATVIA	44	4	37	2
CZECH REP.	41	6	34	0
HUNGARY	43	17	29	-3
LITHUANIA	41	6	40	-6

Please note that rounded differences between unrounded figures are presented, therefore they might appear to be inaccurate

The proportion of those who think that the EU will play a less important role in their daily lives in five years is the highest in Turkey and in Hungary (20% and 17%, respectively).

On the CC-13 level, the expectation for a greater EU role in daily life has decreased by 2 percentage points — 3 percentage points among the 2004 members — since spring 2003. A negative change has been recorded in the majority of countries, but we have recorded a positive change in the EU's expected role in three countries: Romania (+8 percentage points), Latvia (+4 percentage points) and Bulgaria (+3 percentage points). (ANNEX TABLE 3.19c)

When we look at the role that the CC-13 citizens *would like* the European Union to play in their daily lives in five years' time, we find that 55% desire a more important role, 22% desire the same role, while 13% desire a less important role. According to the 2004 members, 50% desire a more important role, 26% of them would like the EU play the same role, and 11% want a less important role.

Most importantly, on the CC-13 level, the desire for the European Union to play a more important role in people's daily lives has decreased by 11 percentage points. In the 2004 countries, that desire has decreased by as much as 15 percentage points since spring 2003. In all candidate countries, a negative change has been recorded; the largest changes have been in Poland and Hungary (-20 and -19 percentage points, respectively), and the smallest changes have been in Bulgaria and Latvia (-2 and -1 percentage points respectively) since spring 2003. (ANNEX TABLE 3.20a-c)

### The desired role of the EU in people's daily life in five years




Fig. 3.6b



Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4  
October 2003

Question: 'And in five years' time, would you like the European Union to play a more important, a less important or the same role in your daily life?

(% "Don't know" and "No answer" not shown)

GALLUP

The citizens of Romania (75%) and Bulgaria (69%) are by far the most likely to wish the EU to play a more important role in their daily lives, and more than six in 10 Cypriots (67%) share this view. More than half of the population in six of the remaining countries would like the EU to play a more important role in their lives. In Hungary and in Latvia, nearly half of the people want the EU to play a more important role (48% and 47%, respectively).

Estonia is the only country in the candidate region where those who want the EU to play a less important role outnumber those who desire the same or a more important role for the EU.

Table 3.6b Desired role of the EU


	More important	Less important	Same role	Difference between more and less or same
ROMANIA	75	3	12	60
BULGARIA	69	4	14	51
CYPRUS	67	9	12	46
SLOVAKIA	54	11	22	21
CC - 13	55	13	22	20
POLAND	52	9	25	18
MALTA	52	13	25	14
2004 MEMBERS	50	11	26	13
TURKEY	52	21	21	10
SLOVENIA	51	12	30	10
HUNGARY	48	15	26	8
LATVIA	47	13	29	6
LITHUANIA	44	6	35	4
CZECH REP.	43	15	26	3
ESTONIA	34	14	36	-17

Please note that rounded differences between unrounded figures are presented, therefore they might appear to be inaccurate

### 3.7 Priority of key issues

The first priority of the European Union, according to 79% of CC-13 citizens, is the fight against unemployment (which has decreased its importance with some 4 percentage points since 2003 Spring)<sup>1</sup>. The CC-13 and 2004 countries' results run in tandem. On average, the majority of 2004 members consider it important to give priority to fighting against unemployment (84%), but we see a decrease when comparing this data to the results of 2003 spring. More than three in four persons in the candidate region say fighting poverty (76%), fighting terrorism (71%), maintaining peace in Europe (69%), and fighting organised crime (67%) are priorities. Environmental protection (62%), guaranteeing the quality of products (60%) and preserving principles of democracy (57%) and are also relatively important issues to them with almost three quarters listing it among key priorities of the EU. (see also ANNEX TABLES 3.21a-c).

The issues of "peace and security in Europe" and "protecting the environment" present the widest gap between the countries of CC-13 and 2004 member countries. While for 69% of the respondents in CC-13 countries peace and security in Europe is important, 75% in the 2004 member countries say so. Similarly, 62% of respondents in CC-13 countries feel the protection of environment is important, as compared to 67% of 2004 member country respondents.



It is interesting to note the difference between the CC-13 and 2004 members on the issue of "successful enlargement of the EU to include new member countries." The candidate region as a whole considers this more important (55%) than the 2004 members (50%), who are actually taking part in the imminent enlargement. The least important issue throughout candidate countries is the institutional reform of the EU. Few respondents in the CC-13 (37%) and 2004 countries (36%) would give priority to this matter.

EU-15 countries are very sensitive about the subject of "Fighting illegal immigration," with 83% calling this an EU priority. Almost nine in ten list the key issues of "fighting unemployment" (90%), "fighting poverty" (88%), "fighting terrorism" (89%), "peace and security in Europe" (89%) and "fighting

<sup>1</sup> CCEB 2003.2 Survey, fielded in May 2003

organize crime” (88%). The least accepted issue is the “enlargement,” of which only 27% in the EU-15 consider of key importance.

Analysing our results country by country and group by group we see that the Maltese (92%), Slovaks (92%), Lithuanians (88%), Poles (84%), Romanians (83%), Latvians (82%) and Turks (70%) say **fighting against unemployment is a priority**. The younger generation is most interested in this question (84%), as are those who are still studying or continued education past 20 years (88% and 84%, respectively) (see also *ANNEX TABLES 3.22a-b*).

According to the large proportion who called it a priority, people are interested in **fighting poverty and social exclusion**. This is especially true of Cypriots (94%), Maltese (89%), Lithuanians (88%) and Bulgarians (85%). As for demographic distribution, managers and other white collars (82%, 81% respectively), and 15-24 and 55+ years old respondents (77%, 78% respectively) give priority to this issue (see also *ANNEX TABLES 3.23a-b*).

**Fighting against terrorism** is a particular priority in Cyprus (94%), Slovakia 90%, Malta, Bulgaria (both 84%), and in Czech Republic (84%). Poles (68%) and Turks (63%) are the least likely to call it a priority. Young people under the age of 25 (75%), managers (71%), and males (63%), above all, call fighting terrorism a priority. (see also *ANNEX TABLES 3.24a-c*).

**Peace and security maintenance** is a priority to a very high proportion of Cypriots (95%), Slovaks (92%), Maltese (88%), Hungarians (85%), Romanians (83%), men (71%), manual workers (80%), and those who are still studying at the age of 16 or older (77%). (see *ANNEX TABLES 3.25a-b*).

An important topic of today, **environmental protection**, can be found among the top three only in Malta (91%). As for demographic criteria, managers (75%) and those who are still studying (74%) also see environmental protection as important. (see *ANNEX TABLES 3.26a-b*).


Sorting the issues into the top three, we can say that the most important for respondents are fighting unemployment (top three in eleven countries), fighting poverty and social exclusion (in 10 countries), fighting organized crime (in five countries), fighting terrorism (in five countries) and maintaining peace (in seven countries). No other key issues are found among the top three priorities in the candidate countries.

**Table 3.7 Priority of key issues**  
(% of mentions, by country, three most frequent responses shown)

<b>Bulgaria</b>		<b>Malta</b>	
Fighting poverty	85	Fighting unemployment	92
Fighting unemployment	85	Protecting the environment	91
Fighting terrorism	84	Fighting poverty	89
<b>Cyprus</b>		<b>Poland</b>	
Peace and security in Europe	95	Fighting unemployment	84
Fighting poverty	94	Fighting poverty	80
Fighting terrorism	94	Fighting terrorism	68
<b>Czech Republic</b>		<b>Romania</b>	
Fighting terrorism	83	Fighting poverty	84
Peace and security in Europe	82	Peace and security in Europe	83
Fighting organized crime	82	Fighting unemployment	83
<b>Estonia</b>		<b>Slovakia</b>	
Fighting organized crime	90	Fighting unemployment	92
Fighting unemployment	89	Peace and security in Europe	92
Fighting poverty	87	Fighting organized crime	90
<b>Hungary</b>		<b>Slovenia</b>	
Peace and security in Europe	85	Fighting poverty	82
Fighting unemployment	83	Fighting unemployment	80
Fighting organized crime	79	Peace and security in Europe	77
<b>Latvia</b>		<b>Turkey</b>	
Fighting unemployment	82	Fighting unemployment	70
Peace and security in Europe	79	Fighting poverty	65
Fighting poverty	79	Fighting terrorism	63
<b>Lithuania</b>			
Fighting unemployment	88		
Fighting poverty	88		
Fighting organized crime	80		

### 3.8 Support for key initiatives

The survey measures public opinion toward a certain number of key EU issues. Some of these issues are clearly strategic questions, while others relate to democratic processes, the fundamental principle of subsidiarity, and the education of future citizens about EU matters.



An analysis of the four items on current strategic matters (that will be analyzed, one-by-one, in more detail in the following chapters) shows that (see also *ANNEX TABLE 3.27a-c*):

- 69% of both candidate citizens and EU-15 countries, and 76% of the 2004 members are in favour of **a common defence and security policy among the EU member states**. Support is most widespread in Cyprus (87%) and Slovakia (83%), while opposition is greatest in Turkey (19%) and Malta (16%).
- 63% of candidate citizens and EU-15 countries — and 65% among the 2004 members — support **a common foreign policy toward other countries**. Support is greatest in Cyprus (81%), Slovakia (76%), and Slovenia (74%). Opposition is greatest in the Czech Republic (25%) and Estonia (24%).
- Well ahead of the actual introduction of euro currency in their countries, 57% of the people in the candidate region, and 58% of the 2004 members, are in favour of **a European Monetary Union with one single currency**. The highest support for EMU and the euro registers in Slovenia (81%), Romania (77%), and Bulgaria (71%), while resistance is strongest in Estonia (42%), in Malta and Turkey (both 38%).
- Almost seven in 10 future EU citizens (69%) are in favour of **the enlargement of the European Union to include new countries**; the proportion is 71% among the 2004 members and altogether 47% in EU-15 countries. The most widespread support is found among Romanians (83%), Bulgarians (80%) and Slovaks (79%). Opposition is greatest in Estonia (18%) and Turkey (17%).




Looking at the other items in the question, it can be seen that:

- On the CC-13 level (73%), 77% in the 2004 member states and more than three-quarters in EU-15 countries (81%) are in favour of **teaching schoolchildren about the way European Union institutions work**. Support levels range from 63% in Turkey to 87% in Cyprus. Opposition is strongest in Turkey (17%) and in the Czech Republic (14%). On the CC-13 level this proposition decreased -9 points in support since the summer of 2002. The highest decrease is found in Turkey with 13 percentage points, and the least negative change was 1 percentage point in Latvia.
- More than half of the candidate citizens (55%) think that **the President of the European Commission and the European Commissioners should resign if they do not have the support of the majority in the European Parliament**. A little higher proportion, 61%, of the 2004 member countries support this idea. Country-by-country support ranges from 46% in Bulgaria to 78% in Malta. People are now less likely to think that the position of the President should be dependent on the EP's majority support. Since the summer of 2003 we have detected a -13 percent change on the CC-13 level and as much as -12 drop in the 2004 member countries. Turks display the most extreme drop (-16), while Malta is the only state that displays an increase in believing that the position of the President should be dependent on EP support (+4).
- Fifty-five percent of candidate citizens are in favour of the **European Union being responsible for matters that cannot be effectively handled by national, regional and local governments**. The levels of support range from 53% in Bulgaria to 73% in Cyprus. Sixty percent of the 2004 members support elevating responsibility to the EU level in certain areas. We have found the greatest decreases in Turkey (-14) and Slovenia (-13), and the smallest decrease can be found in Slovakia (-1) and in Estonia (-2).

## Stable support for the euro

On average, 57% of respondents from the 13 candidate countries now favour using the euro — the European single currency — in their countries. Support is somewhat higher in the 2004 member countries, where introduction of the euro is a not far off reality: 58% of 2004 member respondents support the idea of replacing their national currencies with the euro. Comparing current numbers with the data gathered in the summer of 2003, we can see that at that time 68% of the CC-13 and 72% in the future member countries were in favour of replacing their currency with the euro. This means a decrease of 11 percentage points in the entire region and 14 percentage points in the 2004 member states. (see also *ANNEX TABLE 3.28-3.29*)



Even with this drop, the euro is attractive to the majority of citizens across the candidate region. We found the highest support levels (81%) for the euro in Slovenia (-8 percentage points change from summer 2003). Opposition is strongest in Estonia (42%, increased by 3 percentage points), Malta, and Turkey (both 38%, +1 percentage point increase in Malta and -11 percentage point decrease in Turkey).

We detected the biggest decrease in support for the common currency in Poland and Hungary (-17 and -15 percentage points, respectively). The most significant increase in opposition was recorded in the aforementioned Malta (+1 percentage points). The proportion of opponents has increased the most in Lithuania and in Poland (9 and 7 percentage points respectively).

If we consider the demographic tables, it seems that especially managers (67%) and highly qualified people with above 20 years of education, and those who are still studying (both 67%) are most likely to vote for the single currency. (*ANNEX TABLE 3.28b*)

Respondents were asked about the euro in an independent question, emphasizing replacement of the national currency with the euro. The results are interesting. When respondents are asked concretely about replacing their national currency with the euro, then the CC-13 average level of euro support falls by 1 percentage point and opposition grows by 4 percent. In Cyprus, when specifically mentioning currency replacement, we see a 13 percent decrease among those respondents who expressed that they are very much for the European currency in all member states.


## 4. Common foreign and security policy

In this chapter we analyse support for a common foreign and defence policy in the candidate countries, including who citizens think should make the decisions about European defence matters.

### 4.1. Support for a common foreign policy

The majority in the candidate region stands for a common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union. Nearly two-thirds (63%) are in support while only 17% oppose. Hardly one in five (19%) could not, or would not answer this question. We find a similar level of support in the 2004 member states (65% for and 18% against).

Recent developments have resulted in weaker approval of foreign policy making at the EU level in the candidate countries. Since the last survey the support in the candidate region has decreased by 9 percentage points, with the 2004 member countries displaying the same negative difference (-9) while the proportion of those who are opposed has increased by 2 percent in both region groups. Looking at these results as compared to support among the current member states we find a similar proportion of support. The EU-15 average falls between the CC-13 and the 2004 Members averages (2004 Members: 65%, EU-15: 64%, CC-13: 63%). It is interesting however that there are about as many people in the EU-15 countries who support a common foreign policy as there are in the candidate countries. On the other hand there are more people in the present member countries who are against such a common foreign policy (22% in members vs. 17% in the CC-13 and 18% in the 2004 members).



The country where the Eurobarometer detected the largest decrease in support of the common foreign policy is Lithuania with negative 13 percentage points. In Latvia and Slovakia enthusiasm for a common European foreign policy has remained virtually unchanged. No country reported a higher level of support than was found in the summer survey<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> CCEB 2003.3, Fieldwork: June-July

Cypriots are the most likely to support a common foreign policy (81%), followed by Slovaks (76%), and Slovenians (74%). In fourth place we find the Romanians with 72% in support. Among the Bulgarians (69%), Latvians (68%), and Poles (66%) respondents we find a higher number of people supporting a common foreign policy than the average among 2004 members (65%).

At the bottom of the list we find the Czech Republic, Turkey (57% both), and Malta (45%) to be the least supportive of a common foreign policy. The greatest numbers of people expressly opposed can be found in the Czech Republic and Estonia (25% and 24%, respectively). (ANNEX TABLE 4.1a)


A socio-economic analysis shows that men (68%) are more likely to support one common foreign policy than women (59%), and this proportion has not changed since the last survey conducted (CCEB 2003.3) when 70% of men and 60% of women gave support. Respondents under the age of 55 support one common foreign policy in higher proportion than respondents over 55 (age group 15-24: 65%, 25-39 and 40-54: 66%, 55+: 56%). More white collar workers (72%) and managers (71%) would vote in support than would house persons (51%). Additionally, supporting a common foreign policy is much more likely among the more educated demographic group, where 73% of those who left school at age 20 or later are in support and only 54% of those who left school at age 15 hold this same opinion. Overall, common foreign policy is more agreeable to those who think membership is a good thing (76%) than those who think it is neither good nor bad (53%), and those who think that membership is definitely a bad (27%). (see ANNEX TABLE 4.1b)

### Support for joint EU decision-making in foreign affairs


We now continue discussing the results of a question that asks whether decisions about foreign policy should be made at the national or the EU level after the accession of the candidate countries.

Almost two thirds, 64% of the people interviewed in the candidate region would prefer joint decision-making about foreign policy, while 23% instead favour individual country decision making. At the time of the last survey 59% preferred joint decision making and 33% favoured single country decisions. Thus, among the CC-13 we see an increase in the number of people who support joint state-EU decision making about foreign policy. Respondents in the acceding countries are even more likely to prefer decision-making jointly with the EU: 66% have said that decisions on foreign policy should be made at the EU level, and 23% say foreign policy is purely national business. In the present member states a much higher proportion (72%) of the citizens support joint decision-making while only 20% are opposed.

Considering individual country results we see that joint EU decision making on foreign policy received the highest level of support in Slovenia (84%), Cyprus (80%), and Slovakia (79%) where it is favoured by about four-fifths of the respondents. Citizens in Romania and Latvia also prefer joint decision-making at a level far above the 2004 member's average. Two-thirds of the respondents in the Czech Republic, Malta, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia also hold this opinion. With the weakest support for joint decision making we find Hungary and Turkey, where support for shared decisions reaches only 56% and 55%. Further, Hungarian and Turkish citizens are the most divided about this question. In these states we find the highest numbers of respondents preferring national foreign policy decisions than joint ones (32% and 29%, compared to the CC-13 level and to the acceding countries' average – both 23%). (see ANNEX TABLE 4.2a)



Support for joint European decision making in foreign policy has increased by five percentage points since the summer of 2003 (from 59% to 64% in autumn). This represents the highest level of support within the candidate region seen so far (since winter of 1999).



It should be also be noted that the proportion of citizens opposed to giving up sovereign policy making has decreased by 10 percentage points, reaching its lowest level since measurement began (23%). The percentage of those with no opinion on this question at this time is 13%.

Country by country trend analysis shows that since the last survey in the summer of 2003 this support has increased in six of the 13 candidate states, noticeably strongly in Turkey (+14), Malta (+14) and Latvia (+5). Only Cyprus shows a drop in preference for joint European decision making in foreign policy.

<b>Table 4.1 Support for joint decision-making – foreign policy</b> Changes over the past one year					
Country	2002 Autumn	2003 Spring	2003 Summer	2003 Autumn	Difference since 2003 Summer
TURKEY	47	45	41	55	+14
MALTA	58	58	53	67	+14
LATVIA	71	71	67	72	+5
<b>CC-13</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>+5</b>
HUNGARY	57	56	53	56	+3
ROMANIA	68	69	74	76	+2
ESTONIA	67	63	65	66	+1
SLOVAKIA	76	79	79	79	0
SLOVENIA	79	77	84	84	0
CZECH REP.	60	65	69	68	-1
BULGARIA	62	66	65	64	-1
LITHUANIA	59	64	68	67	-1
<b>MS-2004</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>-2</b>
POLAND	66	68	69	66	-3
CYPRUS	77	81	87	80	-7

The rate of support remains largely unchanged in Romania (+2), Estonia (+1), the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Lithuania (-1 point each), Poland (-3) and no considerable change in Slovakia and Slovenia. Overall, in the acceding ten countries, support for foreign policy suffered a small set-back after the temporary mid-year growth (-2 percentage points since summer). The average rate of "don't know" answers on the CC-13 level is 13%, but represents a relatively wide range of responses, from 7% in Slovenia, to 14% in Lithuania.

Demographic analysis shows that younger respondents (between the ages of 15 and 24) (67%), managers (73%) and people who left full-time education between the ages of 16 and 19 (69%) are most likely to say they are in favour of a common foreign policy. In contrast, respondents in the oldest age group (55 years old and above) (58%), house persons (53%) and people who left full-time education before the age of 16 (57%) are the least likely to adopt this point of view.

Attitudinal analysis shows that 73% of those who say their country's EU membership is a good thing support joint decision-making about foreign policy, as do only 32% of those who regard their country's membership as a bad thing. Of those who regard membership as a bad thing 49% have believe decision-making about foreign policy should stay within the individual country level. (see ANNEX TABLE 4.2b)

## Support for a European Foreign Minister


In connection with European foreign policy Eurobarometer also investigated opinions about the existence and role of a European Foreign Minister. In the candidate regions still the absolute (but decreasing) majority of respondents would support a spokesperson for a common EU position on foreign affairs. Support for a European Foreign Minister has decreased 8 percentage points in candidate countries and 7 percentage points in countries of 2004 members since summer of 2003. However, about two-thirds of citizens in these countries continue to support this idea.

Currently 58% of the CC-13 citizens tend to agree that the EU should have its own Foreign Minister, while 14% tend to disagree. Results within the 2004 member states are similar — 63% agree while 14% disagree. On average 28% of citizens in the candidate region and 22% in the 2004 Member countries either could not or would not answer, instead choosing “do not know.” Respondents in the current member states support this idea at the same rate as the 2004 Member countries: 63% support an EU foreign minister while 18% are against such an idea, and 19% were unable to decide.

Cypriots and Slovenians were the most supportive of a European Foreign Minister (73% in both), and it is a popular proposition in Latvia (69%) as well. Poland and Slovakia come in just above the 2004 member's average with 66% and 64% tending to agree. The lowest support to be found at this time is in Turkey (49%).

The highest percentage of “tend to disagree” answers are in Estonia (22%), followed by the Czech Republic (20%). It is worth mentioning that the proportion of “do not know” or “no opinion” responses is very high in Bulgaria (37%), Turkey (33%), Romania (31%), and Lithuania (30%). (ANNEX TABLE 4.3a)

Since the summer of 2003 we found the highest decrease of support for a European foreign minister in Malta and Turkey (both -14% points), and a smaller decrease is found in the Czech Republic and Latvia (-1% points at both). There was no country where the idea of a common foreign minister would be more popular than in the summer.




The idea of a European Foreign Minister is welcomed most by men (62% tend to agree, as compared to 53% of women), and by younger generations (15-24 age group, 62%; 40-54 age group, 60%). Managers, manual workers (both 67%) and other white collars (66%) tend to agree, more than house persons (43%) and retired people (53%) do. Those who stayed in school until they were 20 (68%) like

the notion of a common foreign minister more than people who left school by the time they were 16 (47%).

The attitudinal analysis shows that those who think membership is a good thing are much more likely to want a European Foreign Minister (67%) than those who think EU membership is a bad thing (31%). Fifty percent of those who are neutral on this point tend to agree that there should be a common foreign minister. (ANNEX TABLE 4.3b)

## 4.2. Support for a common defence and security policy

In general, we can say that the absolute majority of people in the candidate countries still stand for a common European Union defence policy, but not as strongly as they did during the previous survey in the summer.



Over two-thirds (69%) of citizens in the candidate countries support a common defence policy and 13% of them are opposed. This level of support is ten percentage points lower than it was during the previous survey and has now reached the lowest rate this year. A full 18% in the candidate region could not or did not want to answer this question. The 2004 member states show a somewhat higher level of support: 11% are opposed and 76% are in support (support having decreased by 8%).

Citizens of the present EU member states and those of CC-13 states hold a near equal level of support for a common defence policy (70% and 69%, respectively). Though when we consider respondents who are definitely opposed to common defence we see a much higher ratio within the current members (19%) as compared to the CC-13 (13%).

A common EU level security initiative is now less supported by Turks where approval decreased 12%. The level of Turkish opposition has increased 5%, reaching a full 19% - which is the highest rate of rejection we have seen. However, support in Poland is above the CC-13 average. Still, as in Turkey we see that the approval rate in Poland has decreased by 11 percent while the number of those in opposition has increased by 4% since the last wave of survey data collected in the summer of 2003.

Nine out of ten Cypriots say they are in favour of this policy (87%), followed by Slovaks (83%), Latvians (80%), Hungarians, and Czechs (both 79%). In Slovenia, Romania, Estonia, and Lithuania



about three-quarters of the citizens say there should be a common security and defence policy on the EU level.

Turkey (58%) and Malta (51%) are at the bottom of the list of policy proponents, and top the list of opponents (19% and 16%, respectively). However, notably, the Turkish and Maltese citizens who support a common defence policy are still in the majority. (see *ANNEX TABLE 4.4a*)

The socio-economical analysis shows that men (74%) are more likely to support a common defence policy than are women (65%). The youngest age group (15-24 years old) and respondents between 40 and 54 years old are more supportive (73% at both group) than respondents over 55 (63%). Managers (81%) and manual workers (78%) like the idea more than house persons do (51%).


A common defence and security policy finds much higher support among those who think membership is a good thing (81%) than those who think it is neither good nor bad (62%), or who think that EU membership is definitely bad (34%). (see *ANNEX TABLE 4.4b*)

### Support for joint EU decision-making about defence policy

We will continue examining opinions regarding whether decisions about defence policy, after the accession of the candidate countries, should be made at the national or EU level. Defence has always been among the policy areas where joint decision making was not very popular in the candidate countries.

Since the summer support for joint decision making in defence matters has increased by 3 percentage points to 52%, which is the highest rate of support until now and indicates that the majority of candidate countries' citizens prefer joint decision-making in defence policy issues. At the same time this shows up that there has been a 7% decrease in the proportion of those who believe that defence should remain the country's own business, reaching a historic low of 39%.

Respondents in the acceding countries are much supportive of joint decisions – two thirds (65%) say that decisions on defence policy should be made on the EU level, and 28% say defence is each country's own business. Comparing the responses of the candidate region to the opinion of the current member states, it is interesting that in the present EU countries citizens are much more divided about this question: 50% of the people are in favour, and 45% against the joint decision making process.




Taking a closer look at the candidate region we can establish that with the exception of Turkish respondents, in every country in the candidate region the citizens tend to support a joint decision making process about defence policy. In Turkey we can see the opposite trend in this topic. Only 28% of the Turks are for joint decision making, while 61% would like to keep such decisions on the individual country level.

Support for joint EU decision-making is the highest in Slovenia (79%) and Slovakia (78%), where about four-fifth favour it. In third place there is Latvia with 77% supporting the joint EU decision-making. Citizens in the Czech Republic (73%), Cyprus (71%), Romania (70%), and Estonia (69%) are well above the average of 2004 members (65%). Poland lies at only one percentage point below this average. Meanwhile Malta (57%), Lithuania (55%) and Hungary are just above or on the average support level of the candidate countries (52%). We can find lower support than average in Bulgaria (51%), and – at the bottom of the list – Turkey (28%), as mentioned before.

Apart from the Turks, Hungarian and Bulgarian citizens are the most divided about this question; in Hungary 40% would prefer that individual countries decide about defence policy and 52% prefer joint decision-making with the EU. In Bulgaria we see almost the same percentages (38% vs. 51%). Turkish responses are also divided; almost two-thirds (61%) want the control of defence policy to remain with their own government, and 28% think it should be exercised jointly with the EU.

Support for joint decision-making about European defence policy has increased by 3 percentage points since the summer of 2003, reaching 52% in autumn of 2003. The level of support for joint decision-making on European defence policy in the candidate region has shown little fluctuation (between 43% and 52%) since the winter of 1999 when it registered at 50%. It's also noteworthy that since the last measure, taken in the summer of 2003, the proportion of citizens who would like to keep decision-making question on national level rather than jointly with the European Union decreased (by - 7 percentage points) to reach its lowest level since measures began (39%).



The analysis of trends shows the support of joint decision-making process has increased in 9 of the 13 candidate countries, particularly in Malta (+16 percentage points), Turkey (+9), Latvia (+7) and Slovenia (+6). The highest drop in support for a common defence policy has been in Lithuania (-5), and Bulgaria (-4). (see ANNEX TABLE 4.5a)

Table 4.2 Support for joint decision-making in defense policy					
Country	2002 Autumn	Spring 2003	Summer 2003	Autumn 2003	Difference since Summer 2003
MALTA	44	47	41	57	+16
TURKEY	21	27	19	28	+9
LATVIA	75	75	70	77	+7
SLOVENIA	73	71	73	79	+6
CYPRUS	62	68	66	71	+5
CZECH REP.	68	69	70	73	+3
<b>CC-13</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>+3</b>
ROMANIA	57	61	68	70	+2
ESTONIA	65	66	67	69	+2
SLOVAKIA	75	78	76	78	+2
<b>2004 MEMBERS</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>0</b>
POLAND	61	69	65	64	-1
HUNGARY	59	50	54	52	-2
BULGARIA	43	51	55	51	-4
LITHUANIA	49	52	60	55	-5

The rate of support for joint decision-making remains nearly unchanged since summer 2003 in Poland (-1), Hungary (-2), Estonia, Slovakia (each +2 percentage points, just like in Romania) — and as a result we see absolutely no change in the average support for joint decision making in the acceding


countries. The average rate of "don't know" responses at this time on the CC-13 level is 9%, which is 2 percentage points lower than during the last survey. The rate of "don't know" responses shows relatively wide diversity among the candidate countries, from 4% in Slovakia and Latvia to 13% in Lithuania.

Demographic analysis shows that managers (72%) and people who left school at 20 or older (65%) are most likely to say they are in favour of a common defence policy. In contrast, house persons (30%), and people who left school before the age of 16 (38%) are the least likely to adopt this point of view.

Attitudinal analysis shows that 60% of people who regard their country's membership in the European Union as a good thing support a common defence policy, which is true for only 25% of those who regard their country's membership as a bad thing. Those who think that membership is neither good nor bad are the most divided about this question. Exactly as many citizens in this group said that they support joint decision-making about defence matters as would keep it on national or country level (45-45%), and 10% chose the "don't know" option. (see ANNEX TABLE 4.5b)

### Citizens support the creation of a European rapid military reaction force

Along with European defence policy, Eurobarometer investigated opinions about the existence and role of a European military force – specifically a rapid military reaction force that could be sent quickly to trouble spots when an international crisis occurs. Setting up such a European army is a popular idea with almost 7 out of 10 candidate citizens (69%) expressing an affirmative response. Those who do not agree with this idea make up 12% on CC-13 level. In comparison, among the current member states support for the creation of this type of military force is precisely the same (69%), but those who are expressly opposed are reported at 7% higher (19% vs. 12%) than the CC-13. This means that less people among current member states were unable to formulate an opinion than in the candidate countries.




Significantly more respondents in the acceding countries than in the whole CC-13 region support setting up such a European military force; 74% of them agree while only 12% disagree with the concept.

European army is most popular in Cyprus (87%), but also highly favoured in Poland (78%), Slovenia (77%) and Latvia (74%), as they are far above the CC-13 average (69%). It is less supported than the CC-13 average in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic (both 67%), Lithuania (64%), and Turkey (61%). An EU army receives the least support in Malta where citizens tend to agree with the idea the least often, only 45% of the time, and 36% say they tend to disagree. (see ANNEX TABLE 4.6a)

The idea of setting up a European rapid military reaction force is most appealing to men (74% compared to 64% of women), and the younger generation (15-24 age group, 76%; 55+ age group, 61%). Manual workers (76%) like the idea more than house persons (54%), and those who were educated until they were at least 20 (76%) and students (78%) agree that there should be an army more than do those who left school before the age of 16 (58%).

The attitudinal analysis shows that those who think membership is a good thing are much more likely to support a European rapid military reaction force (77%) than do those who think that membership is a bad thing (41%). 63% of the EU-neutral tend to agree with the idea of a European military force as well. (see ANNEX TABLE 4.6b)



It is noteworthy that support for setting up a common European rapid military reaction force has decreased significantly since the last survey (summer 2003) falling 9 percentage points in the entire candidate region, and 6 among the 2004 member states. (see ANNEX TABLE 4.6a)

### 4.3. Measures related to Common Foreign and Security Policy

Overall, since Summer 2003 there has been a marked fall in support regarding each of the various elements of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (CFSP). From summer to autumn the greatest decrease was found in agreement with the proposition that accessing countries should already be involved in shaping EU foreign policy and that the EU should work to guarantee human rights around the world (-11 percentage points by both statements). Yet there was nearly as large a drop in approval for the European Union guaranteeing human rights inside Europe (-10), and the independency of EU foreign policy from United States foreign policy (-10) as well. As *TABLE 4.3* below illustrates, all measures related to CFSP gained a lower approval in autumn compared to summer.

<b>Table 4.3 Elements of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) change in evaluation over time</b>						
	<b>CC-13</b>			<b>MS-2004</b>		
	<b>Summer 2003</b>	<b>Autumn 2003</b>	<b>Diff.</b>	<b>Summer 2003</b>	<b>Autumn 2003</b>	<b>Diff.</b>
When an international crisis occurs, EU member states should agree a common position	82	74	-8	87	84	-3
The EU should guarantee human rights in each member state	79	69	-10	82	74	-8
The EU should have a rapid military reaction force	78	69	-9	80	74	-6
EU foreign policy should be independent of United States foreign policy	75	65	-10	79	76	-3
The EU should have a common asylum policy towards asylum seekers	72	63	-9	74	67	-7
The EU should work to guarantee human rights around the world	74	63	-11	72	65	-7
The EU should have a common immigration policy towards people from outside the EU	70	61	-9	75	66	-9
The EU should have its own seat on the United Nations Security Council	68	61	-7	71	66	-5
Applicant countries of 2004 EU enlargement should already have a say in EU foreign policy	70	59	-11	72	69	-3
The EU should have its own Foreign Minister, who can be the spokesperson for a common EU position	66	58	-8	70	63	-7
Member states which have opted for neutrality should have a say in EU foreign policy	54	49	-5	54	49	-5


As an overview, two observations about foreign and defence policy are especially noteworthy. First of all, three-quarters of the people within the CC-13 and four-fifths in the 2004 Member states agree that EU member states should promote a **common position in times of international crisis** (74%). (See also *FIGURE 2.3b* on the next page)

The next most clearly expressed opinion related to EU foreign and defence policy is that the **EU should guarantee human rights in each member state**, receiving 69% agreement on the CC-13 level, with only 9% opposed.

The next most important element, which also received 69% approval, is the creation of a “**rapid military reaction force**,” or in other words, a European army. Only 12% oppose this idea (we have dealt with this issue in the previous subchapter in more detail).

Two thirds of CC-13 respondents (65%) said that they tend to agree that **European Union foreign policy should be independent of the United States foreign policy**, while 12% definitely disagreed.

A somewhat lower proportion of CC-13 respondents (63%) said they tend to agree that the EU should have a **common asylum policy** towards asylum seekers and that the **European Union should work to guarantee human rights around the world**.



Just as many people (61%) said that the **European Union should have its own seat in the United Nations Security Council** as approve of the idea that the EU should have a **common immigration policy** for people from outside the EU.

The opinion that **future member states (2004 members) should already have a say in foreign and defence policy** is shared by 59% of respondents, and 58% percent of the candidate citizens are attracted to the idea that the **EU should have its own Foreign Minister** who can act as a spokesperson for a common EU position.

Candidate country citizens are the most divided on whether or not **neutral member states should have a say in EU foreign and defence policy**. A full 49% percent tend to agree, but 21% of the respondents are opposed. (ANNEX TABLES 4.7a-c)


## 4.4. Who should make decisions on European defence policy?

We asked respondents whether individual governments, NATO, or the European Union should make policy decisions on European defence. The data show that the European Union is by far the preferred option in almost in every region. The relative majority opted for the EU level in both the 2004 member countries (43%), and the CC-13 level (44%).

### A tendency for keeping decision-making in defence issues at home

The European Union is currently much more trusted in European defence matters than national governments or NATO.

On the CC-13 level 44% of citizens trust the EU the most in European defence issues generally, 29% prefer to keep those decisions on a national level, and 13% would delegate these decisions to NATO<sup>2</sup>. Only in Malta, with its heroic military history, and in Turkey, would most citizens prefer to have their government decide defence issues (42% and 44% would choose national competence).



On average, in the 2004 member states (of which the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia joined the Iraqi coalition<sup>3</sup>) 43% trust the EU the most in European defence matters, about one in four (23%) think that their governments should decide in defence policy issues, and 18% put most of their trust in NATO. A full 15% said they didn't know, which might indicate that the recent turmoil resulted in increasing uncertainty about how questions of war and peace should be decided in Europe. (see ANNEX TABLE 4.8a)

<sup>2</sup> Turkey has been a long-time member of NATO; the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have been members of NATO since 1999, and with EU enlargement, and the admission of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, all but two candidate countries will become members of the military organisation in 2004.

<sup>3</sup> As well as Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey



The proportion of those who chose the European Union as the level at which decision-making on defence issues should take place is nearly equal among the present EU members (45%), the candidate region (44%), and the 2004 Member countries (43%). The percentages of people who think this question should be handled on a national level are practically equal in the current member countries and in the 2004 member states (24% vs. 23%), but somewhat lower than in the CC-13 (29%). Support for the role of NATO also shows similar ratios in both the present EU states and the candidate countries – 15% of the citizens in the current member states trust NATO regarding this question while 13% on CC-13 level and 18% of the 2004 member countries' citizens do so.


Results by country show that Cypriots (72%) are by far the most likely to prefer the EU to make defence policy decisions, followed by the people in Bulgaria (67%) and in Romania (56%). The European Union is preferred by the majority in Slovenia (55%), Slovakia (53%), Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary (each 52%), and in Latvia (49%). In the remaining countries support for EU decision-making is under 44% (the CC-13 average). At the bottom of the list of support for EU defence policy decisions is Turkey, where only 36% prefer the European Union make these decisions, 44% would rather that their national government do so, and 9% think that NATO should take this role.

Hungary (an ally in the US-led military coalition in Iraq and a member of NATO) is the only country that trusts NATO decision-making more than their own government's (16% as against 14%). In Poland the difference is marginal (22% prefer NATO, 25% national government) as well as in Lithuania (12% prefer NATO, 14% national government). The lowest level of trust in a national government to make these decisions is seen in Bulgaria where only 12% trust their own government in questions of war and peace.

If we consider the demographic groups, managers (62%), the unemployed (50%), manual workers (49%), and other white collars workers (47%) most strongly believe that the European Union should be entrusted with the issue of European defence policy. Demographic analyses also shows that people with low education think that defence decision making should be taken by the national government (37%), while respondents who finished their full-time education at age 20 or older said in significantly higher proportion that this process should be made on an EU level (53% as compared to the CC-13 average of 44%).

The attitudinal analysis shows that 55% of respondents who regard their country's membership in the European Union as a good thing support EU-level decision making about European defence policy, 13% support NATO, and 23% prefer national governments. Among those who regard their country's membership as a bad thing, 52% are for decision making by national governments, 11% by NATO, and 14% by the European Union. Those who could not decide whether their country's membership is a good thing or not more often mentioned the national level as the proper source for defence decisions (38%) than the EU (31%), and NATO was selected by 15%.

The proportion not able or willing to give an opinion is relatively high in all demographic categories, varying from 6% among managers to 21% among those who belongs to the oldest age group (55 years old and above). (see ANNEX TABLE 4.8b)



Citizens in the candidate region are now more likely to think that European defence policy should be decided by national governments than they did in the summer survey (+4 percentage points, and +1 in the 2004 member countries). The proportion of those who prefer European Union level decision making in defence matters decreased 3 percentage points on CC-13 level and also decreased 3 percentage points among the ten accessing countries (see *ANNEX TABLE 4.8c*).

## 5. Attitudes and knowledge about enlargement and the accession process


To begin this chapter we will examine the sentiments, attitudes and fears surrounding enlargement that prevail in the candidate countries. Next we will look at opinions regarding the speed of accession — how fast people think the process is moving, and whether or not that's fast enough. Finally, we will look at the amount of information that the residents of candidate countries feel they have received about the enlargement of the European Union and the accession of their country to it.

### 5.1 Attitudes toward enlargement and accession

The first basic question that must be asked when considering attitudes about enlargement is: what proportion of people support enlargement of the European Union at all? (Of course in the candidate region it is hardly possible to detach this issue from the actual accession process of the countries.) In general, more than two-thirds (69%) of respondents in the candidate region support enlargement and only 11% are opposed. Additionally, one out of every five citizens (20%) could not answer this question. In the 2004 member countries about 2 percentage points more citizens support enlargement (71%), while 10% are opposed.

The strongest support can be found in Romania where more than four-fifths (83%) of the respondents support enlargement and only 2% are opposed. Support strong in Bulgaria as well, with 80% in favour of enlargement. Noticeably, these two leading enlargement supporters will not be joining the EU in 2004. Just behind Romania and Bulgaria we find that more than three-quarters of citizens in Slovakia (79%) and in Slovenia (78%) also favour enlargement. The proportion of support is higher than the average in Cyprus (75%) and Poland (74%) as well.

Among those countries with the smallest number of people committed to the enlargement we find Turkey with 59% and Estonia with 56% support. These states also represent the highest levels of opposition to enlargement (17% and 18% respectively). (ANNEX TABLE 5.1)




## Opinions about specific statements regarding to the enlargement of the European Union

Two-thirds (66%) of the public in the candidate countries believe that the membership of their country in the European Union is “natural,” that is, historically and geographically justified. They also believe that Europe will be culturally richer if more countries, such as theirs, join the union (61%), and that membership would help their own country’s economy (67%). The majority of the candidate countries’ citizens feel that the Union will be more important in the world if it includes more countries (66%).

A large number of respondents argue that the more countries in the European Union the more peace and security will be guaranteed in Europe (64%), and 60% believe that a country’s membership in the EU leads to a higher quality of life. Sixty-one percent think that with the enlargement their country would have a stronger voice in Europe, and 56% believe that their leaders are doing what is needed to become a member of the European Union.

A little bit more than every other respondent in the candidate region believes his or her country has a lot to offer the European Union (58%), yet almost every third citizen thinks that there will be more unemployment after his or her country joins the European Union (30%). (ANNEX TABLES 5.2a-c)



The following paragraphs provide a more detailed view of each statement.

### **Membership would help the country's economy**

Sixty-seven percent of our respondents agreed that *"being a member of the European Union would help the (NATIONAL) economy."* However, individual countries in the CC-13 do not agree with this statement uniformly. Levels of affirmation range from 79% in Bulgaria to 54% in the Czech Republic.

Countries in which significantly less people agreed with this statement than the CC-13 average (though agreement remains the majority) are Latvia (63%), Hungary, Lithuania (both 61%), Slovenia (60%), Malta (57%), Estonia, Cyprus (both 56%), and Czech Republic (54%). The number of responses agreeing with this statement in Poland (65%), Turkey (66%) and Slovakia (67%) do not differ significantly from the CC-13 average (67%).

### **With the enlargement, the EU will become more important**

People living in the candidate region envision a stronger Europe after the accession of the new member states. They are confident that *"the more member countries within the European Union, the more important it will be in the world."* On average, two-thirds (66%) of CC-13 respondents and 70% in the 2004 member countries agree with this statement. The highest percent of positive responses were recorded in Cyprus (85%), Malta (81%), Bulgaria (79%), Slovakia (75%), Slovenia (73%), Romania, Hungary and Estonia (each 72%). Respondents in Latvia (71%), Poland and in the Czech Republic (both 69%) shared this opinion just above the CC-13 average. Lithuania and Turkey are the least sure about this with 62% and 56%, respectively, affirming this statement.

### **Membership is justified**

A full 66% of candidate countries' citizens (among both the CC-13 and 2004 members) are positive that, historically and geographically, their country belongs to the European realm and thus their membership in the Union is natural and justified. However, results are noticeably polarized.

The people of Bulgaria (79%) and Cyprus (76%) are the most likely to think that their membership in the EU is fully justified on historic and geographic grounds, followed by Romania (74%), Poland (69%) and Slovakia (68%). A lower ratio than the average agrees with this in Hungary (65%) and Latvia (63%). Less citizens in Turkey, Slovenia (both 61%), Malta, and the Czech Republic (both 60%) feel this way. The least confident responses were found among the Estonians (57%) and the Lithuanians (56%).

### **More peace and security**

All candidate countries share the view that enlargement will bring more security and peace to Europe. Overall, 64% of respondents agreed, *"the more countries there will be in the European Union, the more peace and security will be guaranteed in Europe."* In the candidate region Cypriots are the most likely to concur (84%), followed by Bulgarians (76%), Romanians (74%), Slovaks (72%), Maltese (71%), Hungarians (70%) and Poles (69%). Fewer Latvians (61%), Lithuanians (59%) and Turks (53%) believe that the integrating force of the European Union will bring lasting peace to the continent.

### **Cultural enrichment**

Sixty-one percent of the CC-13 respondents think their country can add to the multicultural image of the European Union. We find the same proportion (61%) among the citizens in the 2004 member states who agree with the following statement: *"With more member countries, Europe will be culturally richer."* On CC-13 level 22% of citizens gave no response to this statement, and 20% among the 2004 member countries were equally unsure, or silent.

Respondents from Slovenia (72%), Cyprus, and Bulgaria (both 71%) are the most likely to agree. Yet nearly as many in Malta (69%), Romania (68%), Slovakia and Hungary (both 66%) also feel this way. Turks (58%), Estonians (55%), Czechs (51%) and Lithuanians (50%) are more sceptical in this regard, while Poles and Latvians (63%) represent about the CC-13 average.

### Membership makes the country more important in Europe

Sixty-one percent of citizens in the candidate countries expect to have increased European importance after their country's accession. At the same time, in the case of the 2004 member countries only 56% of the citizens agreed with the statement that "*With the enlargement, (COUNTRY) would be able to have its voice heard more strongly in Europe*". Cypriots are the most likely to expect greater appreciation for their country (81%), followed by Romanians (73%), Maltese (68%), Slovenians (64%), Turks (63%) and Poles (61%). The least likely to anticipate greater national importance after the accession are citizens in Latvia (58%), Bulgaria (57%), Hungary (55%), Slovakia (53%), Estonia (51%), Lithuania (46%), and the Czech Republic (40%) who each measure less than the CC-13 average agreement with this statement.

### Higher quality of life

Sixty percent of the CC-13 respondents expect a better quality of life from their EU citizenship. When we asked whether or not they tend to agree with the statement "*(COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU would lead to a higher quality of life,*" the Bulgarians (72%), Romanians (71%), Turkish (61%), Cypriots (60%), Slovaks and Maltese (both 58%) were the most optimistic. We found low levels of agreement in Poland, Lithuania (both 54%), Hungary (53%), Latvia, Slovenia (both 52%), the Czech Republic (49%) and Estonia (38%).

### A lot to offer

We asked our respondents if they agree or disagree with the following statement: "*(COUNTRY) has a lot to offer to the European Union.*" The region as a whole is not very confident in this regard. On average only 58% say they "tend to agree." Poland (62%), Romania (62%), Cyprus (61%) and Turkey (64%) are the most likely to think they will bring something valuable into a partnership with the EU. At the same time only 20% of Estonians think that their country "has a lot to offer" the European Union; Lithuania and Hungary are also rather pessimistic (30% and 42%, respectively).

### Leaders are doing what is needed

Compared to the previous statements, respondents were considerably less convinced that "*(COUNTRY)'s leaders are doing what is needed to become a member of the European Union in the near future.*" On average in the CC-13, 56% think their leaders do their job right to promote the accession process. Among the 2004 member states this proportion is 63%. The populations of Cyprus (88%), Malta (87%) and Estonia (83%) are the most likely to share this view, but also Latvia, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia are far above the average level. Sixty percent of Poles and 56% of Czechs are satisfied with their own politicians' work. In Turkey (51%), Romania (50%), and Bulgaria (47%) people are least likely to think their politicians are doing what is needed to become EU members.

### More unemployment


This has been the only negative statement tested, and has received the least confirmation from the CC-13 public. Only 30% of interviewed individuals agreed that "*with the enlargement, there would be more unemployment in (COUNTRY)*" while 43% disagree and 21% had no opinion. The 2004 members are more divided on this question: 35% tend to agree while 38% disagree with this statement. The Cypriots (64%), Estonians (47%), Latvians (41%), and Slovenians (38%) are most fearful that membership will foster unemployment. Also fairly likely to fear the effect of membership on their labour market are the Czechs (36%), Maltese (35%), Hungarians and Poles (both 34%). Slovaks and Turks (29%) represent the CC-13 average. But only 22% of Romanians and 17% of Bulgarians have similar concerns. (ANNEX TABLE 5.2a-c)

## A growing concern if acceding countries are welcomed in the Union

A noticeable number of citizens in the candidate region definitely have reservations about whether or not the current EU citizens support new memberships or not. Twenty-nine percent on the CC-13 level and 20% among the 2004 members believe that current EU residents are somewhat or very much against the joining of new countries to the Union. On the other hand 42% of candidate countries' respondents think that people in the EU are somewhat or very much in favour of welcoming the new members.

The results suggest that people in the candidate region have no clear idea to what extent people in Western Europe support their proposed membership in the European Union (13% do not know, 14% can't decide what the majority opinion might be), but very few think that current EU citizens would be indifferent (neither in favour nor against: 2%) to the new EU accessions. The 2004 members' responses are in parentheses.

Very much against	11%	(3%)
Somewhat against	18%	(17%)
Somewhat in favour of	35%	(45%)
Very much in favour of	7%	(6%)
<i>Some are in favour, other are against (spont.)</i>	14%	(17%)
<i>Neither in favour nor against (spont.)</i>	2%	(2%)
<i>DK/ No answer (spont.)</i>	13%	(8%)



There is very little variation among the countries, although the majority in Turkey (49%) thinks that Western Europeans oppose their EU membership. This is not the case anywhere else, but only Cypriots (64%), Maltese (61%), Slovenes (59%), Hungarians (57%), and Poles (56%) have a confident absolute majority that believes current EU residents support their country's accession, at least to some extent. (ANNEX TABLE 5.3)

<b>Table 5.1 Anticipated support for country's EU membership in the current member states</b> (very much and somewhat in favour for)		
Country	Autumn 2003	Difference between autumn 2003 and spring 2003
TURKEY	33	6
ESTONIA	45	5
LATVIA	44	5
BULGARIA	37	3
<b>CC-13</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>0</b>
SLOVENIA	59	-2
ROMANIA	38	-2
CZECH REP.	33	-4
SLOVAKIA	49	-5
HUNGARY	57	-6
CYPRUS	64	-7
<b>2004 MEMBERS</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>-7</b>
POLAND	56	-9
LITHUANIA	39	-10
MALTA	61	-16


With Bulgarians and Turks being now a bit less cautious how Western European would like them to join the Union, the mean expectation in this respect have not changed on CC-13 level. But in those countries where accession is imminent, citizens are now much more concerned if they will be welcomed by the incumbent citizens of the Union once they are joined in 2004 (positive expectations decreased by 7 percentage points). The Maltese (-16), the Lithuanians (-10), and the Poles (-9) changed their expectation for the worse in the greatest proportions.



## 5.2 Time frame of the EU accession


The survey measured public opinion about the perceived and desired speed of the accession process with the following question:

a. In your opinion, what is the current speed of the accession process? Please look at these figures (SHOW CARD WITH SCALE), No. 1 is standing still, No. 7 is running as fast as possible. Choose the one that best corresponds with your opinion of the current speed of the accession process.



b. And which corresponds best to the speed you would like? (Show same card)

Perceived speed integration into the European Union is slower than what people reported half a year ago. At the same time, among the countries that are set to join the EU in May of 2004, six countries evaluated their accession process to be faster than the speed they desire. In three countries, namely Hungary, Slovakia and Poland (representing almost three quarters of the population of the new member states), citizens tend to desire quicker integration into the European Union. The countries which are not included in the current round of enlargement would like a much faster pace in the accession process.




On a scale of 1 to 7, people believe their country's accession process is moving, on average, at 3.7. But people would like the accession process to be faster (5.22). As the figure below shows, the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer illustrates a very high net score difference, indicating a

widespread wish for further acceleration of accession negotiations. This sentiment is significantly more prevalent in countries that do not belong to the group of those countries where accession is imminent.

The average perceived speed of the accession process varies considerably from country to country. It is highest in Malta (6.08) and, reflecting reality, the lowest in Turkey (2.69). Accession is perceived to be moving quickly in Cyprus (5.71), Estonia (5.4) and in Lithuania (5.36). Other countries above the midpoint (4) of this seven-point scale are Latvia (5.2), Slovenia (4.94), Slovakia (4.69), Poland (4.53), and the Czech Republic (4.43). The Hungarian figure falls almost directly on the midpoint, with 3.98. Next to Turkish people (2.69), only Romanians (3.68) and Bulgarians (3.28) see the speed of the accession process as being rather slow. (ANNEX TABLE 5.4)

More than any other, Romania would like the process to speed up (6.26), followed by people in Turkey (5.39), Lithuania (5.38), Cyprus (5.34), Malta (5.23), Bulgaria (5.20), Slovakia (5.07), and Poland (4.97). The desired speed is lowest in Estonia (3.88), but these values are still on the fast side of the scale. (ANNEX TABLE 5.5)

As the above graph shows, the gap between the speed at which the accession process is perceived to be progressing and the speed at which people desire it to progress varies significantly from country to country. In most countries people would like to see the process move faster than the perceived speed, with the largest positive net difference found in Turkey (2.7), Romania (2.6) and Bulgaria (1.9). Estonia (-1.5), Malta (-0.9), Cyprus (-0.4), Latvia (-0.3), the Czech Republic and Slovenia (-0.2) are those countries with a small negative net difference between the perceived and the desired speeds. In Lithuania perceived speed matches the desired speed.




The trend analysis regarding the speed of accession process shows that the previous increase in average perceptions of the "current speed" have stopped. At the same time the average "desired speed" also reversed its increase trend. Thus, the net differences between perceptions and expectations have now reached their minimum values since measurement began. This is shown by both the mean response (a difference of 1.52) and the percentage of the respondents choosing 5, 6 or 7 on the accession speed scale (a difference of 31%). This could imply that as time goes by and the accession dateline approaches, people have more information about the accession process and know how much there is to do before that date. At the same time they understand that there is no reason to expect a faster process simply because the date of accession is less distant.

## 5.3 Feeling informed about enlargement and the accession process


### Enlargement

Candidate Countries Eurobarometer finds that the majority of people in the candidate region are still very poorly informed about the enlargement process. The results show that only 26% in the candidate countries and 37% in the 2004 member countries feel very well or well informed about enlargement process, while 70% on CC-13 level and 60% in the 2004 member states (respectively) feel not very well or not at all informed.




The individual country results indicate that only in Slovenia do more than half feel well informed about enlargement (53%). Poland (43%), Cyprus (34%), and Slovakia (33%) follow. In all other countries, less than one-third of the respondents feel well informed; this is especially true for Bulgarians and Turks, of whom only 22% and 12%, respectively, feel informed about the enlargement process. (ANNEX TABLE 5.6a)

A demographic analysis shows that the proportion of people who feel well informed about enlargement ranges from 11% among those who have the lowest level of education and those who work in the home to 47% among the most educated group. About one-third of men are confident enough to say that they are well informed, as opposed to only one-fifth of women (32% versus 21%). Feeling informed increases dramatically with education: those who left school at 15 are much less likely to feel informed (11%) than are those who left school after they turned 20 (47%). (ANNEX TABLE 5.6b)



## Accession

One might expect that people feel more informed on the subject of their own country's accession. The present results of Candidate Countries Eurobarometer is still unable to positively confirm this belief; only 30% of people in the candidate region feel well or very well informed about their country's accession process. This is only 4% higher than the figure regarding the enlargement process. Sixty-seven percent feel they are not very well or not at all informed (while 70% said this about the enlargement process). In the case of the 2004 member states the percentage of informed people is significantly higher, 41%, but remains a minority in these countries where the percent of not very and not at all informed citizens sits at 56%.




The country-by-country analyses don't add much to this. Overall, we have found people rank feeling informed about accession in much the same way they rank feeling informed about EU enlargement. (ANNEX TABLE 5.7a)

Again, Slovenia is the most informed country (63%), and Malta comes in second (56%). These are the only countries in which more than half of the population feels well informed about accession. In Malta the level of information about the accession process considerably exceeds that of the enlargement (56% versus 28%). Poland (47%), Cyprus (43%) and Latvia (42%) are just behind them and still above the 2004 members average (41%). With the exception of the Czech Republic (35%), in every other country less than one-third of the respondents feel themselves very well or well informed.

At the bottom of the list, representing those who are least informed about their country's accession process we find Hungary and Turkey. In Hungary 28% believe themselves to be well or very well informed while 70% are not very or not at all informed. In Turkey only 15% of the citizens said that they have some, or a lot of information about the accession as compared to 82% who are not very or not at all informed.

It comes as no surprise that the demographic analyses show exactly what we have seen before. The proportion of people who feel well informed about their country's accession ranges from 11% among house-persons to 51% among the most educated group. (ANNEX TABLE 5.7b)


The figure below shows the trend since autumn of 2001 concerning the feeling of being informed about the accession process. The results indicates that the proportions of well or very well informed and poorly or uninformed people in the candidate region after a small fluctuation are now about the same level as two years before.




## Pre-accession funds

The perception in the candidate countries as to whether or not one's state already receives financial support continues to show a relatively low awareness. Although most of the current candidate countries and their citizens have had access to various European Union funds, only 58% of respondents know about it. About one-fourth (23%) have no idea whether or not the EU has funded their country and 19% think their country is not receiving funding from the European Union.

However in the case of the 2004 member states more people think that their country is already receiving money from the EU (62%) than is seen among the CC-13 (58%). 22% of 2004 citizens had no idea about that question.



There are some candidate countries in which awareness of European funding is rather high: Slovakia (70%), Estonia (68%), Poland (65%), Romania (62%) and Lithuania (60%). Slovenia (58%), Hungary (57%), the Czech Republic (56%), Latvia, Malta and Turkey (each 53%) all show that more than fifty percent believe their country already receives funding from the EU. In Bulgaria and Cyprus awareness of the arrival of EU money remains below 50%. (ANNEX TABLE 5.8)




The perceptions of candidate countries' citizens about whether or not their country already receives funding from the EU shows us that with each study we find more and more respondents who believe that their country receives financial support from various EU funds. We also see that less people think that their country is not receiving funds than ever before. In sum, with the present survey we can establish that we currently see the highest rate of 'yes' responses (58%), the least "no" responses (19%), and the lowest percent of 'do not know' responses (23%) since measures began (the last three "don't know" measurements were 34%, 26%, and 24%).



## 5.4 Mutual support of membership in the candidate region

The candidate countries support each other's membership to varying degrees. However, with the exception of a few extremes (especially the relationship between Cyprus and Turkey in which only 25% of Cypriots support the membership of Turkey), the average level of support has decreased by 25% since the last measure. Presently, on average, 65% percent of people support the membership of other countries in the region. In the 2004 members group, an average 76% of the citizens support the membership of the other nine countries.

Certainly, there are countries that are more fond of some than others. The hierarchical cluster analysis of the expressed and received support for each country with each of the other countries reinforces long-standing experimental and common-sense knowledge, but also draws attention to some new developments in the region's dynamics. (FIGURE 5.4a)




As the map and the tree-graph show above, the historic regions of Central and Eastern Europe maintain commonality. The groups of countries sharing common history still stick together. Clearly we have a Baltic group with a Lithuanian-Estonian core. We see a Central European branch, with Czechs, Slovaks, and then the Poles at the core. Then we see Slovenia and other Slavic countries with Romania and Bulgaria joining in later with Latvia, and finally Hungary (the more to the right the "junction" is, the looser the mutual support relationship). There is a Balkan group with the two countries. However, the relationship between Romania and Bulgaria is not as close as before. The two islands of the Mediterranean Sea that are invited to join the EU do not have a particularly strong, but still mutual, sympathy towards each other's membership. Finally, Turkey has no 'natural allies' in the candidate region. (see ANNEX TABLES 5.9a-c)

It is enlightening to see the hierarchy according to which these groups connect. There is a relatively strong mutual relationship between the Slavic states led by Czechs, Slovaks and Poles, and this now extends somewhat to Bulgaria and the non-Slavic Romania. Among the Baltic states, Estonia and Lithuanian have a somewhat less strong relationship compared to earlier data. The least integrated is the Mediterranean group, right now accompanied with Hungary that lost much of its

connectedness compared to earlier measurements. Finally, all groups of countries are closer to each other than they are to Turkey.

Comparing mutual support six months ago with to the most current measurement shows very interesting modifications. First, we can establish that the relations (as measured by correlations) between groups of countries have become weaker than they were before. The exception to this is Turkey, for which support of other countries shows positive changes. Latvia, relatively speaking, lost the close connection with their neighbours, Lithuania and Estonia. Today, as compared to half a year ago, Poland has a stronger relationship with the Czechs and Slovaks and a relatively weaker one with Bulgarians. Finally, Hungary seems to be more and more detached — as far as mutual support for each others' EU membership is concerned — from the Central European group of countries compared to measurements last year.



If we study the received and expressed support by countries (*FIGURE 5.4c* above), we find that most are above the diagonal line in the chart, which expresses more support for their fellow countries than they gain from them. Hungary and the Czech Republic are on the line, meaning they support and are supported nearly equally. Turkey, being low on the vertical axis, is the country which is measured to be the least generous with support toward the other countries.

All countries above the line support more than they are supported by the others. The most extreme position in this matrix is Romania, which is the least supported country in the region, but at the same time expressed the highest level of support for the rest of the candidate countries. In the case of Turkey there is an inverse relationship visible: Turkey received the third highest rate of support but expressed the least towards the other candidate countries.

*TABLE 5.4*, on the next page, has detailed figures about support levels in each of the candidate countries.

**Table 5.4 Support for other countries' European Union membership in the Candidate Region (% by country)**


	BULGARIA	CYPRUS	CZECH REP.	ESTONIA	HUNGARY	LATVIA	LITHUANIA	MALTA	POLAND	ROMANIA	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA	TURKEY	AVERAGE
CC-13	in favour of the membership of	in favour of the membership of	in favour of the membership of	in favour of the membership of	in favour of the membership of	in favour of the membership of	in favour of the membership of	in favour of the membership of	in favour of the membership of	in favour of the membership of	in favour of the membership of	in favour of the membership of	in favour of the membership of	
2004 MEMBERS	62	70	68	62	65	62	63	63	64	57	64	64	69	65
BULGARIA	69	72	80	72	79	72	73	73	77	63	76	75	64	76*
CYPRUS	..	79	84	80	84	80	80	79	84	<u>77</u>	82	82	71	80
CZECH REP.	69	..	72	70	76	65	67	84	77	72	71	72	25	68
ESTONIA	59	61	..	62	76	63	62	64	76	50	77	70	46	66
HUNGARY	65	65	70	..	70	72	73	66	68	63	65	63	53	68
LATVIA	56	65	73	61	..	61	60	68	75	43	67	70	56	63
LITHUANIA	77	76	81	83	79	..	83	79	79	72	77	76	61	78
MALTA	59	57	65	72	64	72	..	59	66	56	62	61	51	64
POLAND	63	66	65	65	64	66	65	..	65	64	65	65	50	64
ROMANIA	74	76	82	76	81	77	78	77	..	69	80	78	73	77
SLOVAKIA	<u>88</u>	<u>85</u>	87	<u>86</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>86</u>	89	..	<u>88</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>87</u>
SLOVENIA	82	79	<u>92</u>	78	85	78	78	77	<u>90</u>	74	..	84	72	82
TURKEY	74	76	79	76	76	75	74	76	78	70	77	..	67	76
	43	60	45	37	40	38	39	40	44	46	38	38	..	43

\*average support for the other nine countries

## 6. The EU democracy and institutions

### 6.1 The European Union among other supranational institutions

At first look, we can see that the European Union is the most well known organization both among CC-13 countries (99%) and also in 2004 member countries (99%), followed closely by the United Nations and NATO. All these organizations have more than 90% awareness. The European Court of Human Rights (79%) and the International Court of Justice (69%) are better known in 2004 member countries (82%, 84%) than in the candidate region as a whole. The Council of Europe dropped to sixth place on the list: 68% (CC-13) and 74% (2004 members) of the respondents have heard about it.



The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (**OSCE**) is less well known. In the CC-13 countries 60%, and in the 2004 member countries 64%, have heard about it.

A more detailed look at the countries shows that the Bulgarians, Lithuanians and Romanians mention the **European Union** in the lowest proportion (all 97%). Respondents who left school when they were 15 or younger are somewhat less likely to have heard about the EU (98%) than are those who are still studying (100%), and house persons are also somewhat less well informed (98%) than managers (99%). Awareness of EU is 2 percentage points up from the previous survey wave in spring 2003, mostly due to the +4 change in awareness in Turkey.

Lithuanians have heard about the **United Nations** in the lowest ratio, 82%, followed by Bulgarians with 93%. Demographically, the data shows some difference by gender. The United Nations is better known by males (97%) than females (92%), and also better known to the younger generation (97% of the 15-24 years old age group). Only 89% of respondents aged 55 or older mentioned the United Nations. The older the respondents are the less likely they are to have heard about the UN.

**NATO** is best known in Slovakia (99%), Slovenia (98%) and Latvia (all 97%) and least known in Turkey (87%) and Malta (89%). Demographically NATO is best known by males (97%), the middle aged (95%), managers (99%) and those who left school at or after the age of 20 (98%). Awareness of NATO is 1 percentage point up in CC-13 countries from the previous wave in spring 2003, mostly due to the +3 change in awareness in Turkey. (Generally, the awareness for the other institutions did not change significantly in the past five months).

Cypriots are very familiar (93%) with the **European Court of Human Rights**, much more so than respondents from the Czech Republic (71%), Bulgaria and Malta (both 72%). Males (87%), the younger generation (85% among the 25-39 olds), managers (84%), and middle-aged respondents (83%) are also likely to have heard of the court.

Awareness of the **International Court of Justice in The Hague** shows an interesting detail among countries. Respondents in Cyprus (90%) and Slovakia (90%) have heard about this institution in the highest number, and Turks (45%) and Maltese (40%) show the lowest awareness. Males (76%) surpass females (62%) by 14 percentage points.


The **Council of Europe** is best known by Cypriots (84%), Slovaks (82%) and Maltese (81%). Respondents from Bulgaria (61%) and Turkey (60%) show the lowest awareness. Male respondents (77%) and those 25-39 years of age (73%) are more likely to be familiar with the council than are women (61%) or those who are older than 55 years (57%). Those who left school at 15 years of age or younger, and house-persons, show only 50% awareness.

The Slovaks (74%) and the Estonians (69%) show the most awareness of the **OSCE**, followed by Poles (68%) — but only 44% of the Lithuanians are familiar. The middle aged generations (67% among the 25-39 years old and 66% by the 40-54 years old), males (69%) and other white collar workers (77%) have heard about it in higher proportions than females (50%), and younger people have (53%). (ANNEX TABLE 6.1a-c)

The European Union is the most trusted international or supra-governmental organization in CC-13 countries – more than 6 in 10 (63%) CC-13 citizens trust it (trust in the European Union is smaller if it is put in comparison with national institutions, see Chapter 1.3). A similar number, 59%, trust the European Court of Human Rights, and 58% of the CC-13 trusts the United Nations. Also more than a half of the respondents (54%) in the candidate region say they trust NATO.

Trust in the European Union has decreased by 5 percentage points this year, especially in those countries that will be member states next May. Since spring 2003 the highest decrease in trust can be seen in Poland, Cyprus (both -8) and Slovenia (-7). At the same time, however, some states have experienced EU trust increases, the most significant being in Turkey (12 percentage points), Lithuania (7 percentage points), and Romania (6 percentage points). The 2004 member country results provide a similar pattern to that of the CC-13. However the European Union stands only in fourth place (58%) as opposed to first among the CC-13. For the 2004 members trust in the International Court of Justice in Hague leads the “trust ranking” with 64%, followed by the European Court of Human Rights and UN (63% both).

The OSCE dropped to last place in both regions, with 41% in the 2004 member states and 38% on CC-13 level.



Examining the countrywide results for each institution shows us the following:

- The **European Union** is trusted most by Romanians (79%, +6 — this shows the change compared to results of 2003 spring), Hungarians (70%, -5) and Bulgarians (70%, +2). The least trusting are Estonians (48%, 0) and Czechs (54%, +1). Trust in the EU has also increased significantly in Turkey (+12) and in Latvia (+7) compared to 2003 spring. The unemployed trust the EU more (70%) than self-employed people (61%) and house-persons (54%).
- Cypriots (80%) and Romanians (67%) trust the **European Court of Human Rights** more than any other nationality, especially Turks (49%) and Czechs (53%). Managers (78%) and those who finished their studies at the age of 20 or later (75%), trust it more than self-employed people (58%) or house-persons (40%). Bulgarians and Czechs trust in the European Court has increased in the highest proportion, by 5 percent compared to results from spring of 2003. There is also an increase in Estonia (+4) and in Turkey (+3). The highest drop has been experienced in Malta (-9) and in Cyprus (-7).
- The **United Nations** is trusted most by Hungarians (72%), (it was the almost same in 2003 spring (73%)), Romanians (71%) and Slovaks (65%), and least by Turks (46%). Trust in the UN among CC-13 countries in spring 2003 was two percent lower than at this time. We can see an increase in Slovakia (+8), Romania (+6), Bulgaria and Latvia (both +5), and a decrease in Poland (-4), Slovenia, Lithuania (both -3), and Hungary (-1).
- Trust in the **International Court of Justice in The Hague** is measured on a wide continuum. Cypriots (75%), Slovaks (71%), Hungarians (69%), Poles (67%), and Romanians (65%) trust it the most and Turks trust the least, with only 25%. As results of spring 2003 show, trust in this institution has increased by 2 percentage points among CC-13 countries and has decreased by 2% percentage points in 2004 member countries. As for country results there is an increase in Slovakia (+5), the Czech Republic (+5), and Bulgaria (+5). The greatest decrease can be seen in Cyprus (-6).
- **NATO** has fallen to fifth place among 2004 members and also to the fourth in the CC-13 countries on the trust scale. Romanians and Hungarians have the highest trust (75% and 62% respectively), but only 25% of Cypriots concur. Trust in NATO stayed the same in CC-


13 countries compared to results of the 2003 spring survey, but the 2004 members average trust has decreased by 3 percentage points. When looking at the individual country results we can say that the greatest drop has been in Lithuania (-8), Poland (-6) and in Hungary (-5), and the largest increase was in Romania (+9).

- The **Council of Europe** is less well known and less well trusted. In Cyprus 61% trust it, compared to 32% of Czechs and 30% of Turks. Trust in the Council of Europe stayed the same in CC-13 countries and has decreased by 3% in 2004 member countries since the 2003 spring survey.
- The **OSCE** is less trusted than any other tested institution. Individual country results show that Romanians are the most trusting in the OSCE (55%), while Maltese are the least (23%). (ANNEX TABLES 6.2a-c)

## 6.2 Citizens demand more influence in EU decision-making

This chapter shows who has the most influence in decision making within the EU according to respondents in the candidate region as a whole, the 2004 member groups specifically, and the European Union current members. (see opinions related to the assessment of EU democracy in Chapter 1.3)

Respondents were first asked about their thoughts regarding decision-making (thoughts, or beliefs — as to how informed candidate citizens are regarding EU affairs please refer to Chapter 2.1 - 2.2). Then they were asked about their expectations who they think should be the most influential in EU decision-making. (ANNEX TABLE 6.3)



More than a quarter of respondents (26%) think that the **European Parliament** has the most influence on EU decision making. This proportion is the highest in the 2004 member countries (32%), followed by the EU-15 countries (27%). Slovenians mentioned the European Parliament most often (44%), and the EP was mentioned second most often by Hungarians (41%). It was mentioned least often in Turkey (15%) and also rarely (28%) by the Cypriots.

**National governments** are considered to be the second most influential. Among the 2004 states 14% agree, as do 16% in CC-13 countries. The main proponents of national government influence are Cyprus (23%) and Estonia (23%).

There is a glaring difference between the EU-15 and the other regions regarding opinions on influence held by **citizens** and the **European Commission** within EU decision making. While current members think that citizens have very little influence on decision making (5%), the CC-13 and 2004 countries feel the citizens' influence is much stronger (15% and 11% respectively). Opinions regarding the **European Commission** are just the opposite. The respondents of the EU-15 feel the European Commission is more influential (17%) than do the people from the CC-13 countries (11%) and 2004 members (13%).


**National parliaments** (both 5% in CC-13 and in 2004 Member countries) and **pressure groups and lobbies** (5% in CC-13 countries and 4% in 2004 Members) are not considered to be very influential according to any region.

As for **business**, while 4% of the present members say businesses have a lot of influential on the decision-making process within the EU, slightly less of the CC-13 (2%) and 2004 member (5%) countries have this opinion.

**Trade unions** have little or no influence, according to respondents in every region.




Next people were asked about who should have influence in EU decision making. The public is strongly divided when asked about the importance of different organizations that might play an important role in the decision-making process. There is no absolute majority either for or against any possible player. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that “citizen” was the most common response. It's mostly the CC-13 and 2004 members that would like to see citizens have the most influence on decision making within the EU (42% and 41% respectively), followed by 40% in the EU-15. (ANNEX TABLE 6.4)



The **European Parliament** is listed in second place as the most important decision-making organisation, but with not very high percentages. Almost every fifth citizen says it should be the most influential, in particular the 2004 members feel this way (22%).

On the **CC-13 average** 13% of the citizens would give the most important decision-making role to **National governments**. The **European Commission** and **national parliaments** are seen as less important to decision-making within the EU; only 5-6% of the respondents mentioned these. **Trade unions** have very little support; only 1% in the EU-15 countries and 2004 member countries wish they had the most influence.

Along with trade unions, few respondents anywhere want **businesses** and pressure groups/**lobbies** to have the most influence on decision making within the EU.




Finally, as *FIGURE 6.2c* above illustrates, people in Europe feel that citizens should have more influence on EU-level decision making, but current Europeans feel a more urgent need compared to future citizens. Comparing current and desired roles, in the current member states there is a 35 percentage point gap between the experience and expectations for citizens' influence in the EU, while this is represented by 27 percentage points in the candidate region. All other institutions are thought to be more influential than desired. Interestingly, current citizens see the biggest difference between desired and perceived influence within in the European Commission's role, with -11 percentage points 'relative desirability' of its influence on EU decision making. In the candidate countries the EP closes this ranking with -8 percentage points' relative desirability.

## 6.3 The way the European Union works

This chapter explores opinions about how the European Union works. Respondents were given a list of statements pertaining to the effects of the EU and asked whether or not they tended to agree.

Looking closely at the different statements, we can see that most of the respondents would like closer co-operation between member states on social and economic matters, and a minority of people don't feel that the EU listens to their opinions.

As the following chart shows, the pattern of CC-13 responses is very similar to that of 2004 members, but they tend to agree a bit more with statements regarding matters of social and economic co-operation.




Going through each statement one by one (see also *FIGURE 6.3b*):

Primarily, people from CC-13 countries want **closer co-operation between member countries on economic matters** (69%), as do 2004 member countries. Mostly, the Slovaks and Latvians tend to agree with this matter (83% and 82% respectively), and Turks tend to disagree (55%).

The second most agreed-upon issue also pertains to **closer co-operation, but in social matters**, and with the same proportion as economic matters (69% in CC-13 countries). Latvians (84%), Slovaks (83%) and Cypriots (81%) would like to see this closer co-operation more than any other nationality, and Turks are the least likely to feel this way (54%).

Sixty-seven percent of the CC-13 respondents tend to agree that “**big countries have the most power in the European Union.**” The widest gap is between Estonians (79%) and Turks (54%).



According to 47% of respondents on the CC-13 level, **the way that the EU works is too complex**. Most of all the Hungarians (65%) and Maltese (62%), and only 32% of the Czechs agree. Older citizens are a bit more (49%) likely to agree than are the younger (at the age of 25-49: 46%).

The same proportion, 45% in the CC-13 countries tends to agree that **the EU will work well after enlargement**. Bulgaria (55%) and Romania (54%) tend to agree the most and Estonia (25%) the least.

Forty-five percent also tend to agree that **decisions made by the EU are generally sound**. There is no significant difference in agreement and disagreement between this issue and the previous one. Romanians, Maltese (both 55%) and Hungarians (54%), tend to agree the most that the EU generally makes sound decisions, and Czechs and Latvians (28 and 32%, respectively) are least likely to agree.

Forty-three percent of the respondents tend to agree that **after enlargement there will be more bureaucracy in the European Union**. Estonia and Slovenia (both 59%) most strongly feel this way, and Romanians (21%) disagree most.

Fewer than half of the respondents tend to agree **that their country has influence within the European Union** (41%). Nearly every second person disagrees (39%). Maltese (52%) and Cypriots (50%) are those who mostly tend to agree, and only 9% of Bulgarians feel the same.

Forty percent of respondent think that **more responsibilities should be transferred from the member states to the EU** and 24% disagree with them. Slovenians (50%) and Hungarians (45%) would most like to see responsibility transferred, and Estonians are at the other end of the spectrum (25%).

More respondents tend to disagree (45%) than agree (40%) with the statement **decisions taken by the European Union have an impact on my daily life**. Of the Cypriots, 59% and Bulgarians only 18% feel the EU has an impact on their daily life.

Another 38% tend to agree that **small countries can protect their interests effectively in the European Union**. Respondents from Cyprus (61%) tend to agree in the highest proportion and

respondents from Estonia (27%), Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary (all 30%) are least likely to feel the same.


More respondents say they don't really understand how **the EU works** (43%). Altogether, only 35% believe they do understand how the EU operates. More Slovenians (55%) find the EU understandable than any other nationality, and the Bulgarians find it the most incomprehensible (20% claiming to understand).

The last statement presented to respondents read: **the EU listens to the opinions of people like me**. More than half (54%) tend to disagree with this statement, leaving only 22% of the respondents to feel that their opinions are heard. Maltese are most likely to agree that the EU listens to their opinions (38%). Estonians (7%) and Bulgarians (5%) are the least likely to feel their opinions are heard. (see ANNEX TABLE 6.5a-c)

## 6.4 European Union institutions and bodies

### Awareness of the European Union institutions and bodies


The European Parliament is the most widely known organization in the candidate countries (81%). It is followed by the European Commission (68%) and the European Central Bank (55%). It is interesting to see that awareness of each of the five most well known institutions is higher in the EU-15 countries than in CC-13 and 2004 member countries. All three regions are about equally aware of the five least well known institutions, except the European Court of Auditors, of which a much higher proportions in EU-15 countries have heard (50%) than in the CC-13 and 2004 member countries (both 26%). For the Ombudsman a much higher proportions within the 2004 members have heard of it (53%) than have in the CC-13 and EU-15 countries (both 35%).



We find that there are significant differences among the 13 candidate countries' awareness of the two best-known EU institutions. Awareness of the **European Parliament** ranges from 92% in Malta to 75% in Turkey. Slovenia, Slovakia (both 90%), and Poland (88%) are also more likely to know the

European Parliament, whilst relatively few people are aware of it in Romania (78%) or Turkey (75%). (SEE ANNEX TABLES 6.6a-c)

There is an even wider knowledge gap regarding the **European Commission**. Awareness of this institution ranges from 81% in Malta to 58% in the Czech Republic and in Bulgaria. Countries that are more likely to know about the Commission include Poland (80%), Slovakia (77%) and Slovenia (76%). At the same time, Turks (62%), Bulgarians (58%) and Romanians (65%) are not very much aware of it.



The following table ranks the 13 candidate countries according to their average awareness of the nine listed institutions.


Slovakia (62%) headed the candidate region. This score is relatively high in Slovenia (61%), Cyprus (59%) as well. On the other hand, Bulgarians are not likely to know of these institutions (39%), nor are Turks (41%) and Romanians (43%).

Country	%	Country	%
SLOVAKIA	62	ESTONIA	49
SLOVENIA	61	LITHUANIA	47
CYPRUS	59	<b>CC-13</b>	<b>47</b>
HUNGARY	54	CZECH REP.	44
LATVIA	54	ROMANIA	43
POLAND	54	TURKEY	41
<b>MS-2004</b>	<b>53</b>	BULGARIA	39
MALTA	49		

## Role of the European Union institutions and bodies

Respondents were asked about the importance of several institutions in the life of the European Union. Most people assign the most importance to the **European Parliament**, primarily the EU-15 countries (78%) followed by the 2004 member countries (73%) and the CC-13 countries (65%). The **Committee of the Regions** is thought to be the least important. On average one-fourth of the CC-13 respondents, and a bit more than one-fourth (25%, 27% respectively) of the 2004 Member's think the Committee of Regions plays an important role in the life of the EU.

Opinions on the **Court of Justice** show an interesting detail: 65% of the EU-15 countries believe in its importance, while only 48% of the 2004 Members and 41% of the CC-13 countries feel the same.




The **European Parliament** is thought to be an important institution mostly by Slovakia (82%), Hungary (78%), and Malta (75%). Turks are the least convinced of its importance (56%).

The **European Commission** is seen as the second most important institution in the life of the EU. Slovakia (72%), Malta and Hungary (both 66%) lead the region in this opinion (ANNEX TABLES 6.7a-c).

## Trust levels in European Union institutions and bodies

The survey has investigated trust levels towards 9 of the European Union's institutions and bodies. The public is most likely to trust the European Parliament (54% in EU-15 countries), followed by the Court of Justice (49%), the European Commission (46% in EU-15 countries), and the European Central Bank (44% in EU-15 countries). People are least likely to trust the Committee of the Regions and the European Court of Auditors. The Social and Economic Committee is trusted by a little more than one-fourth of the respondents. The rank order of the extent to which people trust these institutions and bodies reflects their awareness of these institutions rather than a real difference in confidence levels. Since many people are not aware of most of these, the probability of being unable to decide is very high, at the expense of both trust and distrust.






The following table ranks the 13 candidate countries according to the extent to which they trust the nine listed institutions on average. In this respect, Cyprus leads the candidate region — the nine institutions claim 48% confidence among Cypriots. This score is also relatively high in Slovakia (44%), Hungary (43%), and Romania (38%) as well. On the other hand, Czechs, Turks, Estonians and Lithuanians have the lowest average trust in EU institutions (from 22% in Turkey to 28% in Estonia). In the candidate region, these institutions have a 31% average trust level (ANNEX TABLES 6.8a-c).

<b>Table 6.4b Trust in the institutions and bodies of the European Union</b> (Average trust level of 10 institutions & bodies, in % by country)			
Country	%	Country	%
CYPRUS	48	LATVIA	35
SLOVAKIA	44	MALTA	33
HUNGARY	43	<b>CC-13</b>	<b>31</b>
ROMANIA	38	ESTONIA	28
<b>MS-2004</b>	<b>36</b>	CZECH REP.	28
POLAND	36	LITHUANIA	27
BULGARIA	35	TURKEY	22
SLOVENIA	33		

Naturally, those institutions come first and second in the confidence rankings as well that have the best awareness among citizens (European Parliament, 65% aware and 50% trust; and the European Commission, 56% aware and 42% trust) — for the other institutions and bodies a large proportion could simply not tell if they trust them or not.

## Trust in the European Parliament


We will now look in more detail at the country results for the European Parliament (EP). The data shows that people in Slovakia (65%) and Hungary (66%) are much more likely to trust the EP than are citizens of the EU (57%). People in Estonia (42%) and Turkey (41%) are most likely to lack trust in the European Parliament. (ANNEX TABLES 6.8)



## Trust in the European Commission

The proportion of respondents who trust the European Commission is lowest in the candidate countries (42%), while among the 2004 members and EU-15 this ratio is 46%.

The country-by-country results for trust in the European Commission show the following results: Romanians (55%) and Hungarians (55%) top the list, and again, we find that they are more likely to trust the Commission than are EU member respondents. Czechs (35%) have the least trust in the European Commission. (ANNEX TABLES 6.8)




## 7. The future of Europe in the eyes of its future citizens

We close this report by looking at public sentiments related to some of the major political and institutional issues that face the European Union. Citizens in the candidate countries (as well as in the current member states) have little knowledge about what some of these concepts exactly mean. But they still have preferences, which are often based on reluctance to change the status quo. The conservative stance, however, is weaker in some instances than others.

### 7.1 The majority want a Constitution

People's opinions on the development of a European Union Constitution are not only clear but reflect current events. Two-thirds (68%) of the candidate citizens would like the European Union to have a constitution — a development that is more than likely to occur in the not too distant future. There are no significant differences among the future member states; their level of support varies according to their uncertainty, not their opposition. In the 2004 member states, 70% approve the writing of an EU constitution, which shows a one percentage point increase over the last six months, and eight point advantages over the EU itself. (FIGURE 7.1)




Romania (78%, up five points) are the most likely to support an EU constitution, followed by people in Poland (76%, unchanged), Cyprus (73%, +1), Latvia (73%, +9), Bulgaria (69%, +9) and Slovakia (69%, +2).

The opposition to a European Union constitution is highest in Estonia and Hungary. Still, in these countries only one out of six respondents thinks that the EU should not have a constitution (both 15%). More than a third (36%) of the Lithuanian citizens has no opinion in this regard. In Malta, the proportion of those who do not have a clear opinion on this question rose from 23% to 29% in the past six months, and support for the EU Constitution decreased by eight percentage points (from 70% to 62%). (ANNEX TABLE 7.1a)

The demographic analyses show that support for a constitution is highest among managers 80%, people who are still studying (79%), who stayed in full-time education above the age of 20, and other white-collar workers (both 77%). Overall opposition is low, thus differences in support levels are mostly explained by relatively large variations in the proportion of “don't know” responses.

Supporters of the EU (“EU membership is a good thing”) are more likely than its opponents (“EU membership is a bad thing”) to favour a constitution (77% vs. 43%). Of people who consider their country's membership in the European Union to be a bad thing 24% oppose a constitution, compared to 8% of people who support their country's EU membership. (ANNEX TABLE 7.1b)



Support for the a European Union constitution has been increasing at a stable rate (1-1 percentage point) since last autumn 2003 in candidate countries, but this change lies within the statistical error margin.


## 7.2 The Commission and the Commissioners


Recently there has been a lot of discussion about the executive body of the European Union. This Candidate Countries Eurobarometer explored people's views on some of these issues. First, we will look at the issues of democratisation that have arisen around the European Commission (whether or not the European Parliament should have some kind of control over the EC, and democratisation of the President of the Commission selection process), then we will present opinions about the planned abolishment of the rule prescribing one commissioner for each member state.

### The EP should have the right to withdraw confidence from the EC

As already outlined in Chapter 3.8, the majority of citizens believe that the European Commission (EC) should resign if it loses majority support in the European Parliament (EP). Through this, people seem to recognize the distinct executive function of the EC and the legislative power of the EP — the only body that represents citizens' votes directly.

In *FIGURE 7.2a* below it is apparent that many people lack an opinion on this issue, but the majority (with barely any outright opposition) says that the European Commission should resign if they lose majority support in the EP. Support ranges from 78% in Malta to 46% in Bulgaria. Overall, 33% lack an opinion on this question, a number that reaches 48% of all citizens in Bulgaria. (*ANNEX TABLE 3.27a*)





This question was asked in four Eurobarometer surveys, all of which were conducted in this year<sup>1</sup>. The trend diagram shows considerable fluctuation in support of this key issue since March 2003.

### Citizens have no desire to directly elect the President of the Commission


The President of the European Commission is currently appointed by the governments of the member states, and then approved by the European Parliament. We posed the following question to explore opinions regarding the selection of the most important person in the European Union:

*Which, if any of the following, statements comes closest to your own opinion? The President of the European Commission should be... ? (SHOW CARD - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)*

- solely nominated by the Heads of State or Heads of Government of the European Union
- solely elected by the European Parliament
- chosen both by the European Parliament as well as Heads of State or Heads of Government
- directly elected by the citizens of the European Union
- other (spontaneous)
- DK (spontaneous)

People in the candidate and 2004 member countries are somewhat less in favour of directly electing the President of the European Commission (27%) than are the citizens in the current member states (34%). (FIGURE 7.2c) Eighteen percent of the CC-13 and 21% among the 2004 countries prefer the mechanism currently in place — the president appointed by member states and subsequently approved by the European Parliament. Very similarly to the opinions found within the EU member states, 14% of the candidate and 13% of 2004 member regions would let governments appoint the president, and 18% of the 2004 members and 15% of the CC-13 would let the European Parliament decide. (ANNEX TABLE 7.2a)

<sup>1</sup> Spring 2003.1 in April, Spring 2003.2 in May, Summer 2003 in June)



Lithuanians are the most likely to favour direct elections of the president (32%), and Bulgarians support direct election the least (16%). Malta and Latvia are the most likely to support the current joint EP/head of state election system (27%), and the Turks are the least likely to approve of the current system (13%). The parliamentary solution is most popular in Hungary (25%), while Cypriot citizens are the most willing to let the President be selected by the governments of the member states (20%).


We find very little variation among the socio-demographic groups. Among the demographic groups the most projected data is students' support for a directly elected President (37%). Those who believe that their country's membership in the EU would be a bad thing are the most likely to favour direct election of the President (28%).



### Citizens want to have a commissioner for their country, and are not at all concerned that it would diminish the efficiency of the executive body.

In nearly equal numbers, CC-13 and EU citizens are strongly in favour of retaining the right to appoint at least one commissioner for each country. They feel that otherwise their national interests would suffer, and they aren't worried that going from 20 to at least 25 commissioners will result in potential inefficiencies. *FIGURE 7.2d* below presents the results.

Three-quarters of the citizens in the entire candidate region (72%, 78% in the 2004 member states) fear that not having "their own" commissioner would hurt their national interests. Based on this motivation, 69% agree that there should be at least one commissioner from each member state after the enlargement. About as many agree with a variation on the idea saying that their country should have the right to appoint a commissioner. The CC-13 average is just about the same as is found in the EU – 69-72% of current members agreed with these statements. The overall opposition in the candidate region toward this idea is as low as 1-7%.



Three-quarters (72% in the entire candidate region and 78% among the 2004 citizens) agree that their **country's interests would suffer if it had no national commissioner** in the EC. Of the current members 69% agree that not having their own national commissioner would hurt their country's interests. In the candidate region, Latvia (83%) and Cyprus (80%) are the most concerned, and Turkey (65%) is the least. Among the socio-demographic groups, managers (80%) and the highly educated group (86%) are most concerned that the lack of a national commissioner would be damaging to their country. (*ANNEX TABLES 7.3a and 7.3c*)

Looking at the right of **each member state to appoint a commissioner** — which is supported almost exactly as much as having at least one commissioner from each member state — the Maltese (86%) Latvians and the Czech (both 85%) are most in favour. The Turkish (52%) — due to the large proportion of those who have no opinion in the issue — are at the bottom of this ranking (here 11% opposition to retaining this right is the highest of all).

There is no variation in opposition among the different socio-demographic groups, but due to the different levels of willingness to form an opinion support levels range from 84% among managers to only 51% among those with the least education. (*ANNEX TABLE 7.3b*)


As many as 40% of the Bulgarians (but only 16% of the Maltese and Cypriots) were not able to formulate an opinion regarding the following statement: **“Small member states should have the right to appoint the same number of commissioners as big member states.”** Agreement is slightly more widespread in the candidate region, where 55% agree, compared to the current member states, where half of the citizens agreed (51%). The citizens of the smallest candidate country, Malta, are the most (79%), and Turks are the least in agreement (46%) with this statement.

There is not much variation among the different social-demographic groups in this respect. Those who finished the education beyond 20 years of age (66%), those who are still studying (66%) and “other” white collars (65%) consider in higher proportions that small states should have the same number of commissioners as big states.

Finally, just 19% in the candidate region are afraid that an extended European Commission would not be efficient after the enlargement. In the current member states, people are even less concerned that such a change would hamper the ability of the EC to operate efficiently. A full 34% in the candidate countries have no clear opinion on this issue, while the relative majority (47%) do not agree that **the European Union would be inefficient by increasing the number of commissioners**. The fear of deteriorated decision-making abilities is the most widespread in Hungary (35%), and the least prevalent in Estonia (15%). With only an eight percentage-point difference, unemployed are the most (23%) and managers (15%) the least worried about it. (ANNEX TABLE 7.3b)

## 7.3 European tax

People in the candidate countries are not very supportive of an income tax paid directly to the European Union (34% are for and 43% are against a direct European tax). EU citizens, who are already contributing to the European budget through national taxes, are even more reluctant to accept another tax that eventually goes to the Union (21% are for and 54% are against).



Except Romania, there is no country in which the population approves more than disapproves of a direct European tax. In Romania 39% say "yes" and 36% say "no" to the idea of a European tax. In Latvia the two figures come closest, but the supporting "yes" is higher than "no". (36% vs. 38%). Turkey is the second largest supporter of the tax, but matched with an even stronger opposition (37% say "yes" but 45% say "no"). With 61% disapproving, the Cypriots least favour direct financial contributions to the EU budget, followed by the Maltese (50%) and Lithuanians (49%). (ANNEX TABLE 7.4a)

A European tax is most appealing (though it never gets majority support) among managers (42%) and unemployed (40%), while the greatest opposition is among self-employed (47%), elderly people (above 40 years :44%), house persons and people with the lowest education (both (43%). It seems that people who support their country's EU membership are more willing to symbolically open their purses; among supporters, the number of those supporting the EU tax is higher (44%) and the number opposed is lower than average (44% vs. 35%). At the same time, opposition toward directly paying in to the EU budget reaches 65% among those who believe that EU membership will be bad for their country. (ANNEX TABLE 7.4b)

## 7.4 The Presidency


We asked the citizens in the candidate countries if they would agree with the extension of the period of the Presidency, which is currently rotated between member states every six months. Many people argue that the six-month period should be extended because it is too short for the achievement of significant goals, but others say that an extension would mean member states would less frequently hold the Presidency, which they consider unfair.

Our question was:

*The European Council is composed of Heads of State or Heads of Government of member states and the President of the Commission. The Presidency of the Council is taken by each country in turn, for a period of six months. Do you think that...? (READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)*

- the six-month period should be retained because it gives each member state a chance to hold the Presidency of the European Union on a regular basis
- the period of the Presidency should be extended because six months is too short to achieve significant results

Candidate citizens are much more divided in this issue than EU citizens, who are certainly in favour of such a change (49% say the Presidency should be extended, and 27% think that the current system is a good one). CC-13 citizens lean toward extending the period of the Presidency (36%), but nearly as many (35%) prefer keeping the old system — maybe in the hope that their country will hold the Presidency relatively soon. A bit more people in the candidate countries have no opinion on the question (29%), compared to the EU (24%).



In seven countries the proponents of the extended Presidency are in majority, but this opinion has an absolute majority only in Hungary (53% vs. 32%) and in Latvia (45 vs. 38%). In the other countries the difference between opponents and proponents remains below 4 percentage points. In Bulgaria (33%) and Romania (34%) the current system is as popular as the proposed. In four countries the current system is a bit more popular; the highest majority are in Slovakia (+8 percentage points) and in Slovenia (+7). (ANNEX TABLE 7.5a)


Among the different socio-demographic segments, only people between 25 and 39 years of age and the self-employed (both 38% vs. 33%) and house-persons (27% vs. 23%) prefer keeping the current system to extending the period of Presidency. The proportion of those who support extending the duration of the Council Presidency exceed the proportion of favouring no change among the white-collar workers (by 8%) and those over 55 years of age (by 5%). (*ANNEX TABLE 7.5b*)

## 7.5 A Government instead of the Commission?

Regarding European Government the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer asked:

*Are you for or against the formation of a European Union with a European government responsible to the European Parliament?*

The candidate countries marginally support a European Government that is responsible for the European Parliament (58%), and only 13% of the respondents are against this formation, though the proportion of uninformed people (DK/NA) is rather high (29%). Among the 2004 members we see a similar pattern: six out of ten are “for” the Government responsibility (61%) and only every tenth person is against (10%). The proportion of 2004 members who are unsure is exactly same as within the entire candidate region (28%) (ANNEX TABLE 7.6).



The Romanian people felt the most confident in responding to this question: eight out of ten could take a stand one way or the other. These Romanian respondents supported the responsibility of European Government to the European Parliament in the highest degree (76%), and are the least likely (together with Bulgaria) to oppose this responsibility (4%). The Czech Republic is the most sceptical. The Czech people supported this responsibility least of all (44%), and along with Malta are the most likely to be opposed (both 22%).

## 7.6 Decision-making

In this final chapter we will look at citizens' stance on their countries' right of veto in the European Union, as well as their support for joint decision making in a number of policy areas.

### The right to veto


In the transformed and enlarged European Union the right of veto — the main guarantee of the consensual decision making model that was adopted by the basic treaties of the European Union — is sometimes seen as a potential burden. According to some theorists, the more countries that can exercise the right of veto, the more likely it is that some of them would actually use it. For others, retaining the right of veto is the means of preserving national interests in the institutional network of the European Union.

We have repeated a question from the previous wave, from spring 2003:

*After the planned enlargement of the European Union, the number of member states will increase from 15 to more than 25. In your opinion, should European Unions decisions then be made ... ? (SHOW CARD - READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY)*


- unanimously by all member states
- by a majority of the member states
- DK / No opinion (spontaneous)

Our respondents seem to have changed their opinion from slightly favouring majority decisions to barely favouring the unanimous scheme, but the candidate region is just as divided on this question as it was six months ago. Now 43% (+2) are for keeping the unanimous decision making scheme and 41% (-3) support majority decision making. Among the 2004 members, most currently favour the majority vote model (48%, -4), and 39% opt for retaining the right of veto (+3 percentage points over the past six months).



Five countries clearly support the majority vote system (50% or above), most notably Hungary (right to veto (V): 32%, +0; majority vote (M): 56%, -1) and Latvia (V: 32%, -4; M: 55, +5). On the other hand, Romanians (V: 50%, +8; M: 31%, +3) and the Maltese (V: 60%, +0; M: 26%, -2) are keen supporters of unanimous decision-making in absolute majority (50% or above). There is no country where less than a fourth of inhabitants support the minority opinion. (ANNEX TABLE 7.7)

At another point in the survey we posed another question about the right of veto and received completely different results: the majority of the citizens want to have the right of veto. Ironically, Hungarians, who were the most in favour of majority decision making (instead of a unanimous scheme involving the veto), are the most sensitive to “preserving essential national interests” and are the most likely to support retaining the right of veto. (FIGURE 7.6b)



Fewer in the candidate countries (9%) than in the current member states (13%) are willing to give up “the right of veto,” but the general rule is that no nation would be in favour of abolishing this final weapon of self-defence. About every fifth citizen throughout Europe is ready for a compromise that would result in preserving the right of veto in only some fundamental areas.

It seems that if the “right of veto” is spelled out in the question explicitly, and is clearly connected with preserving essential national interests, people in all parts of Europe are in favour of keeping it. We have seen before that asking about “unanimous decision-making,” which might deteriorate the efficiency of the European Union, is slightly more popular than majority vote (among the CC-13). The moral of the story is that in many (or most) issues, the citizens are simply not well enough informed about how policies are interrelated, and are unfamiliar with the significance of policy measures in other areas or aspects. This is a textbook example of how question wording can affect responses, as well as a warning sign about how little people know about the fundamental problems of the European Union (see also Chapter 2.1 and 2.2 for more on citizens’ level of information). (ANNEX TABLE 7.8)



## Support for joint decision-making

In this chapter we will look at the citizens' support for joint decision-making in a number of policy areas within the European Union.


Overall, we have found very favourable attitudes in the candidate countries towards joint European decision-making. We listed the policy areas for our respondents and asked their opinions about decision-making; we detail their responses below.

But let us first compare the average level of support for joint decision-making in the policy areas we have listed in autumn 2002 (there were 25 policy areas), in summer 2003 and autumn 2003. It generally seems that support for joint decision-making has remained high and stable in the candidate region (TABLE 3a). In autumn 2002, average support was 55%, and it increased from there: 59% in the candidate region support common decision-making in the policy areas covered by the Maastricht and the Amsterdam treaties. Slovenians express the highest average support for joint decision-making with the European Union, while Turkey comes last in this ranking. We found an increased willingness toward shared decisions with the EU in eleven candidate countries, a slight decrease in Hungary, and no change in Estonia and Latvia over the past year.

Support in these areas has decreased 1 percentage point in present member states. At the same time, likely due to the EU campaigns, the citizens of candidate countries support these policy areas in higher degree than last year (+4 percentage points).

Table 7.6a Support for joint EU decision-making by country				
	Average level of support for joint EU decision-making (%)			
	2002 Autumn	2002 Summer	2003 Autumn	Change from 2002
<b>CC-13</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>+4</b>
<b>EU-15</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>-1</b>
SLOVENIA	68	74	76	+8
CYPRUS	66	75	73	+7
ROMANIA	62	68	71	+9
SLOVAKIA	64	66	68	+4
POLAND	62	70	65	+3
LATVIA	65	63	65	0
HUNGARY	62	62	61	-1
LITHUANIA	55	64	61	+6
CZECH REP.	57	61	60	+3
ESTONIA	59	58	59	0
MALTA	47	49	57	+10
BULGARIA	52	56	56	+4
TURKEY	44	42	50	+6
Please note that rounded differences between unrounded figures are presented, therefore they might appear to be inaccurate				


In the survey, the questions were divided into policy areas covered by the three pillars of the Maastricht Treaty (ANNEX TABLE 7.9a-c), and the new policy areas covered by the Amsterdam and Nice treaties (ANNEX TABLE 7.10a-c). We first look at people's views concerning the Maastricht Treaty policy areas.



About two thirds (69%) of the respondents would delegate decisions to the EU on scientific and technological research, and "information about the European Union." A similar proportion, 68%, respondents support joint decision-making in support for humanitarian aid issues. Issues regarding fighting unemployment and supporting regions in economic difficulties (both 67%), fighting poverty and social exclusion (66%), protection of the environment and foreign policy (both 64%), health and social welfare (59%), currency (55%), defence, agriculture and fishing policy, and education (each 52%) are mentioned by more than half of the candidate countries' inhabitants as areas that, they think, decisions should be made jointly within the EU as they become members. The remaining policy areas where joint decision-making is supported by half or less are basic rules for broadcasting and press (45%).

The most sensitive issues seem to be related to national culture. Support for joint decision-making in cultural policy is as low as 41%. Almost half of the respondents (47%) have the opinion that decisions on cultural policy issues should be made solely by the national governments (ANNEX TABLE 7.9a).

As for the post-Maastricht policy areas, we find that support for joint EU decision-making is most widespread as it regards the fight against international terrorism (76%), the fight against exploitation of human beings (74%), and the fight against organized crimes and drugs (both 72%). People are most likely to support national decision-making in the areas of justice (44%) and police (42%) (ANNEX TABLE 7.10a).



Analysing demographic groups in how much they prefer joint decision-making with the European Union on average of the 27 policy areas, we can establish that those who are more generally more informed (managers, highly educated citizens) as well as those who are likely to have some opinion (especially males) have a greater average support for joint EU decision-making than the elderly, the low educated and rural people.

Table 7.6b Mean agreement on the 27 areas that decisions should be made jointly with the European Union			
Male	63	Self-employed	58
Female	57	Managers	70
AGE: 15-24 years	62	Other white collars	66
AGE: 25-39 years	63	Manual workers	65
AGE: 40-54 years	60	House persons	47
AGE: 55+ years	54	Unemployed	65
EDU: up to 15 years	52	Retired	56
EDU: 16-19 years	64	Rural area or village	57
EDU: 20+ years	66	Small or middle sized town	63
EDU: still studying	64	Large town	60
CC-13	59	2004 MEMBERS	64

Finally, *TABLE 7.6c* on the next page summarizes developments in the support for joint decision-making according to policy areas. People are now more willing to share decisions, especially in the areas of accepting refugees (+6 percentage points difference since Summer 2003), and immigration policy, rules for political asylum, juvenile crime prevention, and protection of the environment and foreign policy (+5). At the same time, candidate citizens are less likely to favour relying on joint EU decisions in the areas of fighting against terrorism, currency, supporting poor regions (each -1), police (-2), and justice (-3) than in Spring 2003. (*ANNEX TABLE 7.9c-10c*)

Most of these changes are insignificant, but the support for joint decision-making has increased or remained stable in more issues (21 areas) than six months ago, and only in five areas has support decreased for joint EU decision-making in the CC-13 countries.

Support for decision making jointly with the EU in each of the areas has increased since last year (except currency, which is unchanged). This is especially true in immigration policy, rules for political asylum (+8 both), protection of the environment, and the fight against organised crime (+7 both).

<b>Table 7.6c Change in support for joint EU decision-making for each of the policy areas, CC-13, percentage points</b>		
	Decision to be made jointly with the EU, change from summer 2003	Decision to be made jointly with the EU, change from autumn 2002
accepting refugees	+6	+4
immigration policy	+5	+8
rules for political asylum	+5	+8
juvenile crime prevention	+5	+5
protection of the environment	+5	+7
foreign policy	+5	+5
the fight against organised crime	+4	+7
urban crime prevention	+4	+5
defence	+3	+5
basic rules for media	+3	+4
cultural policy	+3	+5
humanitarian aid	+2	+2
health and social welfare	+2	+3
fight against poverty	+2	+1
the fight against unemployment	+2	+2
agriculture and fishing policy	+2	+2
the fight against drugs	+1	+2
fight against trading people	+1	+4
education	0	+1
research	0	+3
information about the EU	0	+3
fight against terrorism	-1	-
currency	-1	0
supporting poor regions	-1	+1
police	-2	+2
justice	-3	+1


## 7.7. European Parliament election

### Participation in EP elections

The ten acceding countries will take part in the next European Parliament elections to be held in May 2004.

Predicted participation rates are extremely low throughout the region. Few of the candidate countries have even a slim majority who think they would definitely vote in EP elections. The most likely to participate are citizens from Romania (who will not yet have the chance to vote in 2004 48%), Cyprus (44%) and Malta (43%). The least likely are in Estonia (14%) and Lithuania (18%). (ANNEX TABLE 7.11).


Demographic results show that males have a higher willingness to take part in EP elections than females (33%, 28% respectively). As for age categories the middle-aged (25-39) have the highest willingness to take part in elections (32%). Managers are also the leader according to main economic category, 37% of them expressed willingness for taking part in EP elections.



## How to increase willingness to vote

Low turnouts on EP elections have traditionally harmed the legitimacy of the legislative body of the European Union. Eurobarometer also investigated if there are ways to better mobilise citizens to vote in European Parliament elections. We presented a list of possibilities regarding the elections and the voting itself, like through the Internet, at the supermarket. We asked: would people be more likely to vote if one of these new services were available, or not?

The analysis shows that none of the listed propositions met with unconditional support among the citizens, they remain rather sceptical if any of these would enhance the likelihood that they would take part on EP elections. But each of the propositions could at least somewhat further mobilise citizens for voting in May 2004.



Overall, the most frequently mentioned method of voter encouragement – free public transport on election-day – was chosen by 42% of the respondents as something that would increase their willingness to vote. Nearly just as many, 41%, said that free public transport on election-day would not effect their willingness to vote.

Having local elections organised on the same day as EU elections, or creating regional lists of candidates would mobilize one third of respondents to vote.

More than the half of the citizens said that they would not be more likely to vote even if they were able to do so over the internet (54%), if polling stations were set up in supermarkets (56%), or if citizens from other states were candidates on the ballot paper (55%). These proved to be the least effective voter motivation strategies.

If we look at these mobilizing factors within an individual country analysis we find interesting details within the candidate region.

**Free public transportation** would be much more likely to mobilize Turkish voters than citizens of any other country: 57% of Turks would be more likely to vote if public transport were free on election-day. The most moderate mobilisation effect of free public transport was found in Hungary (21%).

Organising **local elections on the same day as EU elections** would increase the number of citizens taking part in EP elections mostly in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (45% confirming higher likelihood of participation in both countries), Malta (43%), Cyprus (40%), and Bulgaria (38%) – compared to the CC-13 average of 34%. It would have the least effect in Poland (30%).

The possibility of **voting at one's workplace** would increase the general willingness to vote in EU elections in an above-average rate in Lithuania (39%), in Cyprus, Estonia, and in Turkey (each 38%). On the other hand, such possibility would encourage the least people to vote in Malta and Romania (24% both).

If there were **regional lists of candidates** Lithuanians (41%), Estonians (40%), and Bulgarians (38%) would be more inclined to turn out at the ballots. On the other hand, this proposition would have a rather modest effect Slovenia (22%).

If **EP elections took place on the same day throughout the EU** (which will be the case in 2004 at the very first time in EU history) 41% of Bulgarians, Cypriots and Lithuanians, 37% of Slovaks and 36% of Czechs would be more inclined to take part of voting.

The possibility to **vote over the internet** is the most attractive for Estonians (39%) and for Turkish respondents (36%). But overall we do not see much voting encouragement from the possibility of internet voting.

As far as candidate countries are concerned, setting up voting booths in **supermarkets** does not seem to be the best solution to invite more people to take part in EP elections. This option is more popular than the CC-13 average in Turkey (37%), Lithuania (36%) and Cyprus (32%).


In general we can say that all of the listed voter encouragement strategies aim the younger citizens. Respondents under the age of 40 seem to be much more flexible in their voting behaviour than the older respondents, i.e. they are more likely expected to change in their behaviour. Overall, younger citizens give a significantly higher proportion of 'yes' answers when asked if new voting circumstances would increase their likelihood of taking part in EP elections. Managers and other white-collar workers would be more likely to vote if it were possible to vote over the Internet, at their workplace, or if local elections were organised on the same day with EU elections. House persons can be mobilized with free public transportation on election day and with voting possibilities in supermarkets while manual workers would more likely voting on EP election if it would be possible to do it at workplace. (ANNEX TABLES 7.12 a-b).

## Main issues of the EP campaign

As we have presented earlier (Chapter 1.3, Problems facing the nations) unemployment is the prime issue in the candidate region, and as such, citizens expect the EP campaigns mainly focus on this issue.

Eurobarometer found that the European Parliament election campaign in the acceding countries should focus on country-specific issues as well: 56% of citizens hold this opinion. The only common “voter touch-point” in the current and future member states is addressing the crime situation in the EP campaign (47% in the acceding countries and 49 in the EU). Otherwise there are serious differences what citizens would like the campaign mainly focus on. Specific national issues (MS-2004: 56%, EU-15: 29%), agriculture (MS-2004: 51%, EU-15: 21%), and right as a European citizen (MS-2004: 48%, EU-15: 26%) are claimed to be much more important in the acceding block, while immigration is wished to be one of the central issues for the European Parliament elections campaign only in the current member states (MS-2004: 21%, EU-15: 44%).

Issues such as protection of the environment (33%), common defence policy (32%), and foreign policy (28%) are campaign elements that are important to nearly every third respondent in the acceding countries. The enlargement — by than a somewhat “expired” issue for the acceding countries — is seen as one of the desired themes by a quarter (24%) of the citizens. Finally, there are issues which draw the attention only of the sophisticated voter that include the activities of the European Parliament (20%) as well as the institutional reform of the European Union (18%).



Looking at the individual countries' data from TABLE 7.7, we should emphasize that among the important campaign elements, the question of *employment* is mentioned within one of the first three places in eleven countries. This item is mentioned in first place among 9 of 13 countries, second in Bulgaria, and third in Lithuania. The question of employment was mentioned by more than 50% of citizens in ten candidate countries, but it was not mentioned in the top three answer in Cyprus and in Turkey.



**Table 7.7 European Parliament election campaign should mainly focus on ...**  
(% of mentions, by country)

<b>Bulgaria</b>		<b>Malta</b>	
crime	62	employment	73
employment	59	education	66
issues specific to own country	56	issues specific to own country	64
<b>Cyprus</b>		<b>Poland</b>	
issues specific to own country	76	employment	70
crime	65	issues specific to own country	53
education	61	agriculture	49
<b>Czech Republic</b>		<b>Romania</b>	
employment	67	employment	61
rights as a EU citizen	57	agriculture	53
issues specific to own country	57	rights as a EU citizen	52
<b>Estonia</b>		<b>Slovakia</b>	
employment	47	employment	80
issues specific to own country	40	rights as a EU citizen	71
rights as a EU citizen	34	crime	59
<b>Hungary</b>		<b>Slovenia</b>	
employment	63	employment	67
issues specific to own country	61	issues specific to own country	52
agriculture	60	agriculture	47
<b>Latvia</b>		<b>Turkey</b>	
employment	68	issues specific to own country	73
issues specific to own country	59	education	61
agriculture	55	agriculture	40
<b>Lithuania</b>			
crime	65		
issues specific to own country	62		
employment	57		

European Parliament campaigns should mainly focus on *country specific issues* according to the citizens of eleven candidate countries where this was considered among the three most important campaign elements. In Cyprus and in Turkey this was felt to be the most important of all (with 76% and 73%), while it was not chosen in the top three only in Romania and Slovakia. This topic was mentioned by more than 50% of the respondents in twelve candidate countries as a question, the campaign should mainly focus on.

*Crime* as a main campaign element came up in Lithuania and in Bulgaria in first place, with 65% and 62% mentioning its importance. In Cyprus this is considered second most important, with 65%, and in Slovakia it holds third place, with 59%.

*Agriculture* was mentioned in six countries among the top three topics and in three of it — in Hungary (60%), Latvia (55%) and Romania (53%)— by more than 50% of the people.

*Rights as a EU citizen* is considered as one of the three most important in four countries: Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania and Estonia. *Education* made the top three in the three southernmost countries – in Malta and in Turkey at the second place, and Cyprus we find it in third place.