PREPARATORY ACTION
‘CULTURE IN EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS’

Engaging the World: Towards Global Cultural Citizenship
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ANNEX 2: PROGRAMME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, 7-8 APRIL 2014 137
This report is the outcome of a sixteen-month inquiry that has been the centrepiece of the Preparatory Action ‘Culture in EU External Relations’. The inquiry covered 54 countries – the 28 EU Member States, the 16 countries included under the European Neighbourhood Policy¹ and the 10 Strategic Partnership countries.² It has uncovered a very considerable potential for culture in Europe’s international relations and has also explored the ways in which culture and cultural expression have been deployed already by European actors in multiple relationships with their counterparts elsewhere. These European actors have included Member States, artists and other professionals in the arts and culture sector (often termed ‘cultural operators’ in EU circles), civil society entities devoted to cultural production and/or delivery, the business sector, and, to some extent, European institutions.

At the same time, the inquiry has analysed how third country stakeholders have partnered with these European cultural actors and how they view their relationships with Europe. It has uncovered their aspirations and expectations for the future. It has confirmed that many people across the world have a strong interest in engaging culturally with Europe. It has shown the various ways in which they are attracted by the European ‘narrative’, to use a currently fashionable term, in particular by Europe’s cultural diversity, as well as by fundamental values, such as freedom of expression, and by the vigour of Europe’s cultural and creative industries.

¹ The ENP countries are the following: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Moldova, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.
² The Strategic Partner countries are: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the United States of America.
Yet the inquiry has also found that many of Europe’s privileged international positions face powerful and growing competition from other countries and regions. Thus it fully validates the European Union’s commitment to *enhancing the role of culture in the external relations of the EU and its Member States* – and societies – and the process set in motion by the European Commission’s 2007 ‘Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world’, which was endorsed by the Parliament and the Council in 2008.3

The report reveals how ties of cooperation and exchange in different domains of cultural and intellectual expression have been forged with partner countries and regions by Member States, their many, often autonomous institutions and cultural civil societies, and the European institutions. These ties encompass not only all the various domains of the arts and heritage, but also higher education, particularly in the humanities. While Europeans have already succeeded in projecting to the world an image of their shared space as one of cultural creativity and diversity, the inquiry reveals that the time has come for them to go beyond representation alone and engage with the rest of the world through stances of *mutual learning and sharing*. Adopting such stances would mean adopting a spirit of *global cultural citizenship* that recognises shared cultural rights as well as shared responsibilities, hinging upon access and participation for *all* in a framework of cosmopolitan solidarity.

How could it be otherwise, in a world in which all cultural practice is becoming increasingly trans-national and trans-continental, as artists and creative people everywhere remain rooted in their own cultures yet have recourse to globalised repertoires, methods and strategies? The challenge for Europe in this multi-polar world is to remain true to itself, yet to continue to position itself creatively in a globalised world of fluid and multiple identities and permanent cultural and social transformation. The positive forces shaping this transformation include the digital revolution, the exponential expansion of the social media and large-scale political and social changes across the world. Yet there is also a dark side to this globalisation. Cultural actors both in Europe and elsewhere are confronted by the growing concentration of ownership and power in the hands of massive trans-national conglomerates, as well as in a small number of privileged cities and regions. This concentration is already limiting cultural freedom and creativity. It will also restrict the scope of trans-national cultural exchange unless mechanisms are devised to promote small scale and local cultural entrepreneurship.

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The report demonstrates the ways in which stepped up cultural engagement with the rest of the world can serve the interests as well as the ideals of the EU and its Member States. Such engagement would benefit both intercultural dialogue and global solidarity. It would strengthen respect for and the affirmation of cultural diversity. It would also foster trade, investment and competitiveness. Equally, it would promote innovation and development, as envisaged by the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions – provided the EU manages to implement certain key provisions of that international treaty more effectively than it has so far. The report also foregrounds the intrinsic added value of the flourishing of culture and the richness of cultural exchange. This intrinsic added value is increasingly recognised across the world today.

On the basis of the inquiry, the report highlights the strengths and weaknesses of European international cultural relations to date, the opportunities that remain to be tapped, as well as the obstacles to be overcome. It presents key lessons for policy making in this area. It identifies and explores the ways in which cultural resources, deployed in a spirit of global cultural citizenship, can provide key tools for the strengthening and broadening of the external relations of the EU, its Member States, and their public and civic actors. It also reveals the strong added value that a strategy based on culture can afford all these European actors. It proposes a roadmap for such a strategy, consisting of the principles that should guide this kind of international cultural engagement.

The report’s chapter ‘recommendations for ways forward’, identifies the key building blocks of an approach that would bring together multiple stakeholders – European Member States, the European cultural sector and civil society, the corporate world and the European institutions – and become a ‘win-win’ option for all.

The first set of building blocks concerns key principles of values as well as method. The value-based principles include reciprocity and mutuality, notably mutual listening and learning; the more vigorous promotion of cultural diversity in the spirit of the 2005 UNESCO Convention; respect for open expression, critical reflection and free debate, notably regarding the ways in which artists and cultural operators appropriate and adapt cherished European values in their own diverse ways. In a nutshell, ‘Europeans must be willing to ask the ‘Other’ what (s)he really wants’.4

In relation to method, the report stresses the need to balance governmental responsibility with the autonomous practice of cultural creators and their organisations. Hence the planning and implementation of cultural

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4 Sir Martin Davidson, CEO of the British Council, at the International Conference in Brussels, 8 April, 2014.
relations should involve all cultural stakeholders right from the outset, including third country partners: the joint creation (‘co-creation’) of new projects is the bedrock of deep and lasting ties. Moreover, since meaningful cultural relations unfold in the long term, there can be no ‘quick fixes’ in this domain. Nor can one size fit all: patterns of cultural relations will have to be modulated on a case-by-case basis. These relations should not be limited to the presentation of European cultures to others and vice versa, although this aspect is of course important. Instead, they should give priority to sharing Europe’s multiple and diverse experiences in cultural capacity building and governance. Finally, little benefit can be expected from the deployment of culture in external relations unless procedures concerning applications for EU funding are greatly simplified and made more accessible.

The report also explores the ways in which the imperatives of diversity and European commonalities can be reconciled. To make it possible for the rich diversity of European cultures to come to the fore and for broader European interests to be served, more strategic communication and coordination are required; more effectiveness and efficiency in the trans-national dimension is needed, rather than new layers of bureaucracy. The EU itself will need to find coherence amongst its different tools and instruments and the entities and actors responsible for them. Given that competencies for external relations will remain principally anchored to Member States, progress will also depend on the achievement of subsidiary complementarity, through which the European institutions support Member States and expert organisations in delivering ‘European’ projects that are more than just the sum of many national projects.

In the light of these principles, the final chapter goes on to present a series of operational recommendations. These concern both innovations in the practice of culture in external relations as well as mechanisms that need to be put in place on a priority basis. These may be summarised as follows:

1. **A strategic framework, dedicated staff and proper co-ordination need to be put in place.** Such a strategic framework would require the key actors (EU institutions) to agree upon a small, but sufficiently strong coordination mechanism within the European External Action Service (EEAS) that could work across all the European Commission directorates general concerned, communicating and liaising with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders as well as with civil society. Personnel with cultural knowledge and experience should be assigned to selected EU Delegations to enable and facilitate cultural relations.

2. **Governance:** the structures and modus operandi of the EU institutions need to be flexible enough to adjust to a multi-layered and shared
system of governance. ‘Variable geometry governance’ has to be the way forward. Decision-making needs to ensure transparency, efficiency and accountability and should address not just the interests of European stakeholders, but also those with whom they are engaging. The facilitating role the EU provides must promote a truly inclusive dialogue. Advocacy of particular values by the EU must be acknowledged and made explicit, so that trust and respect can provide a solid basis for engagement with others.

3. **New methods of funding and fundraising** need to be actively sought, such as co-funding, pooled funding, public-private partnerships, the blending of grants and loans and the establishment of trust funds. The role of the private sector, of philanthropic organisations, corporate sponsors and other independent funding organisations should also be rethought and adapted to the requirements of international cultural relations. The potential is most obvious in fields such as the cultural and creative industries, and in clusters of ‘incubators’ in areas of need such as urban neighbourhoods.

4. **Resources should be pooled**, in a spirit of ‘smart’ complementarity based upon mutually agreed cooperation between Member States, notably via their cultural institutes and attachés abroad, as well as across a multitude of cultural civil society linkages and networks that operate in parallel to governments.

5. **Better communication is needed**, which is able to share European societies’ sense of commitment to the flourishing of their cultural sectors and explain clearly why the EU itself is also committed to strengthening the role of culture in external relations. The EU’s public diplomacy ought to communicate more imaginatively to a variety of audiences about the cultural relations opportunities offered by the EU, the Member States and other actors/institutions. This also implies **multilingualism** in the EU’s dealings with the rest of the world, not just within its boundaries.

6. **Barriers to mobility must be removed** in the interest of intensified culture relations and a denser flow of creativity, as envisaged by the 2005 Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. For this reason, reviewing the visa regime applicable to culture operators must become a priority for the Member States of the EU.

7. **Strengthening civil society** in countries where major social and political transformations are occurring should be a cultural priority for Europe. It is essential to deploy more resources through non-governmental channels,
in other words at the ‘people-to-people’ level. This is particularly needed in countries that lack clearly defined state policies or funding.

8. **A better fit with the cultures of young people is required.**

International cultural relations remain out of fit with the cultural interests and practices of young people. No future EU strategy can hope to succeed if it is not constructed squarely within the cultural environment in which young people across the globe construct their aspirations and pursue their dreams and/or if its agents are unwilling or unable to promote new cultural forms and voices. By the same token, the EU should also establish more exchange programmes for young people in both the educational and cultural domains. It is also at the elementary school level within Europe that the seeds should be sown for building European knowledge and awareness of other cultures.

9. **A focus on cities and towns:** urban cultural actors in all third countries, in cities both large and small, are particularly keen to network with European counterparts, trade cultural goods and services with them or learn from their experiences and skills. Demand for such relations with cities elsewhere is strong among European cities as well, which can also share with the rest of the world the EU’s experience with the European Capital of Culture programme.

10. **Alternative models of trans-national peer-to-peer learning:** independent ‘eye-to-eye’ forms of collaboration would be a form of much desired ‘cultural fair trade’ and could provide valuable mutual learning experience. These partnerships could bring together artists, cultural managers, journalists, writers, etc.

11. **Alternative ways of empowering local cultural actors:** the EU could attempt to develop new modes of cooperation between established cultural organisations and/or foundations and local actors in third countries.

12. **Monitoring and evaluation** also require a new ‘culture’, as it were, of measurement and benchmark based assessment. Many institutional initiatives fail for lack of such tools with which to identify roadblocks and wrong turnings. This is as true of international cultural relations as it is of any other field.

The report also argues that these recommendations should be tested by the design and launch in 2014 of a selected number of pilot projects. It therefore provides illustrative outlines of possible projects in the following areas: joint cultural strategy development workshops; a joint translations programme;
the establishment of ‘European Creative Hubs’ in emerging economies; the development of business and export skills in the cultural and creative industries sector; a young creative entrepreneurs networking programme; training in cultural management; city-to-city cooperation; the development of an online information tool to promote cultural relations; a properly structured EU Film Festivals scheme and, finally, the elaboration of a quantitative EU cultural relations index.

The report urges that, by 2017/2018, these projects be evaluated and the results reported upon, so as to yield a second set of revised recommendations. This phase of evaluation would be coterminous with other EU policy processes, including the mid-term review of the Financial Perspectives. The expertise of many partners will be needed at EU level, notably that of the EEAS, working in closer partnership with the Commission services, in particular those responsible for culture, and the EU Delegations, as well as with the Member States and their leading cultural organisations and networks, such as EUNIC.

The essence of the Consortium’s findings and recommendations may be expressed in the following 8 key messages:

1. Cultural relations have a huge potential for enhancing European influence and attraction in the rest of the world as well as for enhancing awareness, in Europe itself, of other cultures and the capacity to learn from them.

2. There is great demand, in Europe as well as elsewhere, for more and better European cultural relations with the rest of the world that can also deliver greater prosperity and human development for all.

3. But for this to be possible, the European Union must elaborate a coherent international cultural relations strategy. Any such strategy, however, must recognise that people in the rest of the world are not entirely happy with the way Europe currently approaches such relations. They want Europeans to engage with them in new ways, listening, sharing, imagining and creating together, rather than simply projecting our individual national cultures in a purely representational logic.

4. Any such strategy also has to be far more congruent with the cultural interests and practices of young people, who increasingly communicate with each other and create communities of interest and engagement trans-nationally through digital tools and the social media.

5. EU institutions, national cultural relations agencies and cultural civil society need to work together to build a strategy that is both transversal
and ‘joined up’ across different sectors and that also respects the ideas and ideals of **global cultural citizenship: reciprocity, mutuality and shared responsibility.**

6. Such a strategy requires political will and commitment. It also has to be adequately funded under the European Union’s budget. It should be implemented mainly by cultural professionals.

7. A series of **prototypes and pilot-projects** should be launched forthwith in order to inform and kick start the strategy. The projects selected should also trigger a process of transformative change in the way Europe’s international cultural relations are conceived and carried out.

8. The strategy should establish **clear goals, priorities and realistic outcomes.** At the same time, since sustainable impacts in external cultural relations cannot be achieved quickly, it has to **be conceived and designed for the long term.**

In a nutshell, the report reveals the considerable potential of culture in the rapidly changing and multi-polar world of the twenty-first century. The failure to maximise on this potential now would be a huge missed opportunity for Europe.
INTRODUCTION

Emergence of the mandate for the Preparatory Action

Strong awareness of the need for a strategy for culture in external relations has emerged in Europe over the last few years. The adoption in 2005 of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, to which both the EU and its individual Member States are Parties, underscored the importance of strengthening Europe’s relationships with other regions, notably in the developing world. It also underlined the need to enhance the autonomy of the cultural sector and of the cultural and creative industries everywhere. In 2007, in its ‘Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world’, the European Commission made ‘culture as a key component in international relations’ one of the three objectives of that agenda. This Communication was endorsed later the same year by the European Council.5

In parallel with, and in some instances preceding, these institutional developments, civil society cultural institutions and networks have also been advocating vigorously for a more salient role for culture in the EU’s external relations and for a more strategic approach to them. In 2006, for example, the European Cultural Foundation published three studies on the topic.6 After exploring Member State positions on the matter, notably as regards the potential added value of an EU-coordinated approach, the first study concluded that there were no ‘major conflicts of interests which could infringe or prevent future coordinated actions’. The study also proposed three key objectives for such actions: security, visibility and economic development. A 2007 follow-up study suggested criteria for the development of a ‘framework for action’ for a more integrated cultural component in external relations policies.7 The objectives cited included the strengthening of mutual understanding through intercultural dialogue, promoting the visibility of the EU, fostering trade based on Europe’s cultural and creative industries and the sharing of expertise in the heritage sector.

Also in 2006, several national cultural institutes came together to form EUNIC, in recognition of the fact that working in concert would enable their

6 For example, Dittrich-van Weringh, et al. (2006). A Cultural Component as an integral part of the EU’s Foreign Policy? Amsterdam, European Cultural Foundation.
individual project resources to go further and provide stronger advocacy for cultural relations. Co-operation was also seen as a way of giving a stronger voice to smaller EU Member States that did not have a significant international presence, as well as enabling members to tender jointly for EU contracts where previously they had competed. Today EUNIC has almost 30 members. Advocacy was also key to the More Europe external cultural relations initiative created with the support of a few cultural institutes and third sector partners such as the European Cultural Foundation, and designed to build awareness of the importance of the cultural dimension in the European Union’s external relations through debate and research.\(^8\)

In 2008, a report on EU instruments for relations with third countries and proposals for an EU strategy was presented to a conference held under the Slovenian presidency of the Union.\(^9\) In the same year the Member States themselves, in particular through the ‘Council Conclusions on cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue’, called for ‘a European strategy for incorporating culture consistently and systematically in the external relations of the Union and contributing to the complementarity of the Union’s activities with those of its Member States.’\(^10\) The Council stated that ‘these specific strategies could be defined, in accordance with the distribution of powers established in the Treaty, at the end of processes involving expertise and consultation with the regions and countries concerned.’

A decisive next step at the EU level was the initiative of the Dutch MEP Marietje Schaake to prepare a report in 2011 on the topic.\(^11\) In the report she presented to the Culture Committee, besides iterating the issues mentioned above, Ms. Schaake affirmed the following: ‘A coherent, coordinated EU strategy on culture in the EU’s external actions does not currently exist and needs to be developed. It is not a luxury but a necessity to sustain and foster Europe’s attractiveness in a globally connected and competitive environment.’ The Resolution the Parliament adopted on the report endorsed its main observations and conclusions, expressing notably its concern over ‘the fragmentation of external EU cultural policy and projects, which is hampering the strategic and efficient use of cultural resources and the development of a visible common EU strategy on the cultural aspects of the EU’s external relations.’ Hence the Parliament also called for ‘a coherent EU

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8 A study written for this initiative by expert Damien Helly in 2012 in fact anticipated several of the challenges discovered in the course of the present inquiry and made a number of recommendations that have been adapted for its purposes.


strategy for the international promotion of European cultural activities and programmes.’

In 2012, the European Parliament decided to launch a large-scale Preparatory Action (PA) – to be set in motion by the European Commission and executed by a bid-winning expert consortium. The purpose of the PA would be to analyse the existing situation as regards culture in the EU’s external relations and to carry out a comprehensive inquiry. The Terms of Reference subsequently issued by the Commission (EAC/09/2012) stated that the PA should aim ‘to support ongoing policy reflection and development on strengthening the role of culture in external relations and to nurture future work in this area’, naturally with special emphasis on the European dimensions. It was also expected to recommend a strategic approach to the deployment of culture in European external relations. Its scope was to include the 28 EU Member States, 16 European Neighbourhood countries (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Moldova, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine) and 10 other third countries identified under the Strategic Partnerships instrument of the EU: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the USA.

The Strategic Partnerships framework just mentioned is in fact emblematic of the entire project, since it is one of the most significant EU responses to the realities of an interdependent world in which ‘cooperation with key powers is necessary to ensure that the EU’s values and interests are preserved at the global level.’ A range of European concerns and anxieties coalesce around this notion of ‘strategic partnership’, accompanied by a number of hypotheses regarding the potential of European cultural resources in the EU’s external relations for the twenty-first century.

Verifying these hypotheses has been central to the way the Consortium responsible for the Preparatory Action has interpreted its mandate and oriented its task. As regards the mandate, it was clear that ‘cultural relations’ for the purposes of the inquiry should refer to ‘culture’ primarily as ‘the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity’. Yet the Consortium also recognised that in common contemporary usage this meaning is often conflated with culture understood far more broadly as ‘ways of life’. Sport, for example, a domain that is hugely important nowadays as a vector of relations between peoples (and is indeed one of the domains for which the European Commission’s Directorate General for Education and

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12 Open Call for tender EAC/09/2012 Preparatory Action “Culture in external relations”.
14 See Raymond Williams, *Keywords* (1988).
Culture is responsible, was not one of the fields analysed. Similarly, given that the report had to cover a very wide range of topics, it did not specifically foreground the role of culture in development. However, the inquiry has shown that the nexus between culture and development is central to the concerns of cultural operators in many third countries; it is and will continue to be an important axis of relations between the EU and these countries.

We shall now describe the unfolding of the inquiry more fully. But before doing so, it would be useful to refer briefly to the international terminological context in which the concern for culture in external relations has evolved in recent years.

The international terminological context

The place of culture in international relations has become a worldwide preoccupation in recent years, growing in tandem with the increasingly central place culture is accorded in many different spheres of life and in all sectors of society. The production, distribution and consumption of cultural goods and services have clearly become significant components of the world economy; they constitute a major productive sector in their own right. Yet beyond the economic sphere, culture and cultural expression are recognised as key elements in the social and interpersonal realms. They are enablers of dialogue between and among groups and nations, of peace building and conflict resolution, for the empowerment of civil society or the sharing of democratic values and human rights. Cultural practice is also a driver of innovation in many social, political and technological arenas, just as it has become a key to the development of cities and regions. In negative terms, culture clashes and conflicts over identity have also come to the forefront as security issues.

For all these reasons, culture has entered into the heart of international relations thinking everywhere as a major public policy issue. It is often invoked today in all kinds of dealings between States, and increasingly between the EU and third countries. In this context, many actors other than governments are building ‘a mass of connections between individuals, civil society, businesses, pressure groups and charitable organisations which are also part of the relations between nations.’

The most commonly used term for the practices involved is ‘cultural diplomacy’, yet in countries such as India a preference for less utilitarian

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16 The Right Hon. William Hague, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Af-
notions can be observed. Germany has long used the term ‘foreign cultural policy’, which appears to be close to the idea of cultural diplomacy, since it pertains to the objectives and strategic actions of the country in its relations with others through the deployment of culture as a diplomatic instrument.\textsuperscript{17} Although countries such as France have used the term since the nineteenth century, ‘cultural diplomacy’ entered common parlance in most other countries only in the 1990s. It was originally used to refer to the processes occurring when diplomats serving national governments took recourse to cultural exchanges and flows or sought to channel them for the advancement of their perceived national interests.

Indeed the EU’s deliberate preference for the more general term ‘culture in external relations’ is indicative of a reasoned conceptual and moral position. To be sure, the aims of traditional cultural diplomacy may remain essential for many, but equally important are the less instrumental objectives of promoting mutual understanding and cooperation, or sharing ideas for the sake of the common good, defined in global terms. This ‘relational’ reading of the notion has been fostered by the growing recognition that work done on the ground and in a true spirit of reciprocity is bound to lead to more robust and lasting relationships and results than top-down politics can achieve.

The different terms now in use have become a semantic constellation, as it were; they are often used interchangeably.\textsuperscript{18} For this reason, in Annex 1, we provide a glossary of the principal meanings assigned to relevant terms that are in common use today.

Two leading terms that deserve special consideration are ‘soft power’ and ‘public diplomacy’. The first was coined by the Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye in 1990.\textsuperscript{19} As the word is often misused, some clarification may be useful here. Writing to provide policy advice to the administration of President George Bush, the author distinguished between the command power – economic carrots and military sticks – that the United States of America possessed in ample measure and the co-optive or ‘soft’ power of ‘getting others to want what you want’. This soft power rests on the attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others are led to express. Political leaders and other kinds of persuaders have long understood the power that comes from

\textsuperscript{17} In practice the German policy framework allows the Goethe-Institut, which operates at arm’s length from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the approval of public opinion and media, to be largely autonomous.

\textsuperscript{18} Mitchell, J.M. (1986) \textit{International culture relations (Key concepts in international relations)}. New York: HarperCollins.

setting the agenda and determining the framework of a debate. The soft power Nye was advocating that the USA deploy alongside – not instead of – its hard power was the *universal appeal* of its popular culture, as embodied in cultural goods and services, as well as the *international influence* of what he called the ‘ethnic openness’ of its way of life, as well as the *political appeal* of the American *values* of democracy and human rights.

Hence the deployment of soft power involves much more than having one’s culture look good in the eyes of others, or than simply impressing the rest of the world. Cultural attractiveness is *not* soft power on its own. It can be a soft power resource, provided it is deployed to achieve clearly defined policy objectives under a thought-out strategy. Cultural power can therefore be *transformed* into soft power. It is not intended to replace ‘hard’ power, but rather to complement it; nor can there ever be such a thing as a State or supranational entity that defines itself as ‘a soft power’. Finally, of particular relevance to today’s Europe, is Nye’s later idea of ‘meta–soft power’, which is a group’s capacity and introspective ability to criticise itself that contributes to its international attractiveness, legitimacy and credibility.20

Soft power thinking is linked to another emergent notion, that of ‘public diplomacy’, advocated as a more citizen-oriented form of diplomacy than the standard model, that is a form of intercultural dialogue based on mutuality and reciprocal listening stance and where the ‘targets’ are no longer other governments so much as diverse national and global audiences and publics.

All these considerations have a direct bearing on the present inquiry. While the EU’s Member States have a wealth of accumulated experience in the cultivation of soft power resources (produced mainly by their cultural operators and institutions), the supranational European Union is a relative newcomer in this domain. There is clearly scope for it to achieve much more. But in doing so, it cannot seek to forge and project a cultural face as if this were comparable to the cultural identity of a single nation-state pluralised and writ large, nor should it ever be. Nurturing an *overarching sense of cultural belonging* and purpose across the panoply of Europe’s diversity – a vision of multiple cultural futures – and sharing these visions with the rest of the world are two faces of the same coin.

**From European strengths to global cultural citizenship**

A commonly expressed fear in Europe today is that the growing economic power of other regions and/or nations will lead to the eclipse of the cultural

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power of Europe. However, this is to underestimate its cultural strengths. Through its output of cultural goods and services, Europe remains a powerhouse. It is recognised as a singularly creative continent, whose fashion designers, architects, musicians, writers, cinematographers, painters, poets and chefs all contribute in a myriad of ways to the global civilisation that is today in the making. Even more significantly, the countries of Europe have put in place policies for their cultural life and cultural sectors that have stood the test of time. European cultural institutions and sectors have developed capacities that are recognised elsewhere for their levels of professionalization, whose lessons are worth sharing with the rest of the world. European societies have also established credible policies for the management of ethnic diversity in the broad sense. They are perceived by others as exemplary in nurturing excellence, in valorising cultural and natural heritage, in nurturing their creative forces and people. They are also seen to be open to exchanges with the rest of the world and, generally, capable of being self-reflective and self-critical, notably when it comes to recognising the impacts of their colonial pasts in the case of some European countries. It would be in accordance with fundamental European principles and ideals as well as in Europe's collective interest to share these achievements and qualities with the rest of the world, and to do so in a spirit of mutual learning and reciprocity.

Many Europeans understand how radically the world has been transformed in recent years. Europeans need also to act upon that understanding by taking new directions. The forces of globalisation have opened up many pathways for the circulation of creative ideas, goods and people. They have also generated a much better awareness of plurality, as well as many ‘horizontal’ circuits and spaces that are replacing the ‘North-South’ or ‘Europe and the Rest’ trajectories of the past. Influences and trends emanating from Europe alone are being superseded by a multidirectional web of interactions. The challenge facing Europe in this multi-polar world is to remain true to itself, yet continue to evolve creatively in a world of fluid and multiple identities and permanent cultural and social transformation. The challenge is also to assert a distinctive voice in the concert of cultural subjects, energies and information, notably in the face of the digital revolution, the exponential expansion of the social media and large-scale political and social transformation processes across the world and the domination of the global cultural economy by a handful of powerful trans-national players (who today originate in different ‘centres’ across the world).

In order to do so, however, it behoves the EU and its Member States to follow up far more adequately on the obligations they have contracted as Parties to the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, notably the implications of its Articles
concerning preferential treatment for developing countries and cooperation for development.

Dialogue through culture, understanding through culture, empowerment through culture, as well as prosperity through culture: these themes are the common threads that ran through the evidence of this inquiry. The three themes, each expressed as mutual processes, emerged from the aspirations and visions expressed by cultural actors in third countries, just as they did from the hopes of many European counterparts.

The themes could be grouped together in a new notion of global cultural citizenship, a term that encapsulates these shared horizons. The idea that citizenship has cultural dimensions has come to the fore strongly in recent years. Cultural belonging, cultural rights, cultural voice and cultural inclusion for both individuals and groups are now claims that accompany the demand for economic, political and social rights—claims that were and still are associated with classic notions of citizenship. The cultural citizenship paradigm concerns a far more active engagement, one that is made up of rights as well as responsibilities, whether on the part of the individual or the group to which (s)he belongs. It connotes access to and participation in wider communities of commitment and practice. It is not a given, rather it is a horizon of aspiration, a work in progress. It is a process, not a product; it requires mutual learning, notably about living together with others.21 It concerns both identity and action; it entails both personal and cognitive dimensions; it is both individual and collective; and it is both values-driven and interest-driven.

The notion of global cultural citizenship describes a process that meaningfully locates rights and responsibilities at the world scale, in an era when the exclusive link between citizenship and the single nation-state has been greatly weakened. It sees such rights and responsibilities as a horizon to be attained by humanity as a whole. Above all, it seeks the development of a global civil society and public sphere that is able to constructively ‘negotiate difference’ and foster a spirit of trans-national solidarity. As a goal to be pursued on the world stage cultural citizenship represents the needs and interests of both Europe and its partners. For these reasons, we use the term in this report as a metaphor for the kinds of cultural engagement we advocate on the part of Europe. Europe’s most visionary thinkers have already placed such ideas on their own horizons of aspiration and artists and creative people across the world share these with them.

These ideas of cultural citizenship are not confined to mutual understanding or tolerance. They are based rather on the even stronger values of mutual recognition and empowerment. It requires a rethinking of identity and difference across the world. They make it both necessary and possible to combine concern for social and political rights with the full recognition of cultural diversity. They encompass the demand for cultural capacity building, knowledge sharing, professionalization, professional exchange and mutual learning that the present inquiry has highlighted. They require of us as Europeans that we learn to balance a deep and genuine respect for difference with the rediscovery of the art of the common good. In other words, they require us all, our children and our children’s children, to become better global cultural citizens. But clearly such a goal cannot be met by countries acting alone. It is imperative, therefore that Member States pool their resources in freshly crafted alliances that preserve the distinctiveness of each while capitalising on the strengths that lie in numbers, where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Cognizant of this imperative, the European Commission set up in 2012 a group of experts, which focused on the development of a strategic approach to cultural relations with third countries taking China as a case study. The expert group confirmed the need for ‘closer cooperation among Member States within a broader EU perspective as this can generate stronger impact.’ Synergies and pooling initiatives, information sharing and networking among the EU Member States, according to the group of experts, ‘can help achieve a greater scale and critical mass of activities’, project a ‘more coherent image of the EU’ and ‘help better identify common interests and challenges, as well as mobilise appropriate expertise more effectively.’

The design and implementation of the Preparatory Action

a) The objectives

It may be recalled that the Preparatory Action was designed by the European Commission in 2012 in order to advance knowledge and reflection on the role of culture in external relations as well as to make recommendations for a strategy in this field. The six deliverables of the Preparatory Action set out by the Commission were the following. First, a factual mapping of existing resources, approaches and strategies

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regarding culture in external relations in EU Member States as well as the third countries concerned. This mapping would then feed into further research and a consultation process with key stakeholders in the third countries designed to analyse the manner in which they carry out culture in external relations, notably with EU Member States and the EU, as well as to ascertain their views on this cooperation and their expectations for the future. This work would yield a draft report, the third deliverable, which in turn would be summarised as the discussion paper for an international conference designed to shape and validate the principal conclusions of the inquiry as well as to ‘contribute to building consensus at European level on the added value of a European strategic approach to mobilising the potential of culture in external relations.’ The fifth deliverable would be the present final report including strategic recommendations prepared in the light of the conference. An overarching sixth deliverable, present throughout the inquiry process, would be a communication strategy to ensure the visibility of the process and the ongoing sharing of its results.

In the wake of a competitive bidding process, the Preparatory Action was entrusted by the European Commission to a consortium led by the Goethe Institute and including the British Council, the European Cultural Foundation, the Danish Cultural Institute, the Institut français, the ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen), KEA European Affairs and BOZAR, (Centre for Fine Arts, Brussels). The expert team designated by the Consortium to carry out the inquiry consisted of the Scientific Coordinator/Team Leader, Yudhishthir Raj Isar, together with four independent experts Rod Fisher (assisted by Dr. Carla Figueira), Dr. Damien Helly and, on an ad hoc basis, Gottfried Wagner. Mirjam Schneider at ifa and Yolanda Smits at KEA European Affairs also contributed to the analysis for certain countries as well as to the drafting of the present report. Professor Isar was the principal writer of the report.

b) The methodology used and its results

The initial phase of mapping designed to identify existing resources, facts, tools and strategies in each country was based on desk research, data being collected mainly from secondary sources and verified by the use of a checklist. A questionnaire was used to obtain additional information from government officials responsible for culture in external relations (ministries of culture, foreign affairs and in some cases trade) as well as from other stakeholders. The process focused on ascertainable facts and figures, as laid down by the Terms of Reference. Thus it sought
to identify the terminology and definitions relating to the role of culture in external relations, the key governmental and civil society actors as well as the key strategies, mechanisms and approaches deployed in this field. Other issues covered were the geographical scope of international cultural relations activities, the budgets and infrastructures available to conduct them and the principal domains and types of intervention. In the case of third countries, the mapping focused particularly on cultural strategies relating to the EU and its member states. On the basis of the information collected, the project team prepared a report for each country.

While these mapping reports provided a useful basis for the work that would be pursued in the third countries, they cannot be taken as stand-alone outputs for several reasons. First, the literature on culture in external relations is limited: there exist few published studies on the topic and many of these are already out of date. Websites on the other hand are even more challenging, since they generally present an exclusively positive and often oversimplified picture of the efforts of a government ministry or agency. The biggest obstacle, however, was the fact that not every stakeholder contacted was willing or able to complete the questionnaire, so that the research sometimes had to be based on the – limited – information available on the Internet. The mapping reports nevertheless convey a clear idea of the diversity of ‘culture in external relations’ approaches across the Union. They reveal the wide range of activities undertaken by Member States and other actors and the fields of common interest that could be points of departure for future cooperation. Key issues arising from the mapping reports on the EU Member States are summarised in chapter 1.

For the consultation process, the Consortium worked with both public and private sector stakeholders in the 26 third countries as well as representatives of European Member States and the EU delegations there. With the help of the national cultural institutes acting as local ‘contact points’, the experts organised workshops and face-to-face interviews with government officials, civil society actors as well as the EU Delegations. In addition to obtaining and validating facts and figures, their identified opinions and trends relating to the cultural policies and priorities of each country and in particular the relationships of different stakeholders with partners in the Member States as well as with the EU. They also made a point of carefully soliciting stakeholder expectations as regards the future development of cultural relations with European partners. The consultation process yielded a comprehensive understanding of the following:
- Member State stakeholders’ strategies, priorities, programmes and mechanisms regarding cultural relations with third countries; Third country stakeholders’ visions and strategies for international cultural cooperation (with a particular focus on the EU and EU Member States), including the types of actions and tools used;

- Third country views and expectations (governments, cultural sector and other civil society players, the corporate sector) as regards their cultural relations with EU Member States as well as the EU;

- Areas in which enhanced cultural cooperation with third countries might generate significant added value for the EU and its Member States.

These findings are presented in a consultation report for each third country. These ‘country reports’ have been posted on the website of the Preparatory Action. Summaries of these reports make up chapter 2 of this Report.

Chapter 3 of the Report is entitled ‘Lessons Learned’. The key findings are clustered in accordance with already existing interfaces that could form the basis for developing a fully-fledged strategy for culture in external relations. The chapter also identifies the principal hindrances and obstacles facing the implementation of such a strategy, as well as the value added it would afford European Member States, civil society and the EU itself.

On the basis of this analysis, chapter 4 sets out the value-based and methodological principles that should guide such a future strategy. This final chapter also provides recommendations for a strategy, as stipulated in the Terms of Reference of the Open Call for Tender cited above. In other words, it suggests the key building blocks needed for such a strategy, but does not actually elaborate the strategy itself. It therefore sets out the main components of a strategic approach that brings together multiple stakeholders – European Member States, the European cultural sector and civil society, the corporate world and the European institutions – that will be a ‘win-win’ proposition for all. It also suggests the different levels on which a future strategy for culture in external relations should be designed and proposes a purely illustrative selection of possible pilot projects that trigger and strengthen its launch.

The findings and recommendations of the draft report were endorsed at the international conference organised by the Consortium at BOZAR, (Centre for Fine Arts) Brussels, on 7-8 April 2014. The entire draft, in
particular chapters 3 and 4, has been improved and enriched in the light of the ideas put forward at the conference. Some 400 participants representing a wide range of stakeholders in both Europe and elsewhere took part in the conference. They included 20 invited participants from third countries, of whom 4 were among the 16 panellists. The third country participants came from Canada, China, Egypt, Georgia, India, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia, Ukraine and the USA.

At the Opening Session of the conference, the preliminary results of the Preparatory Action, based upon the Draft Report of the Consortium, were presented by Mr. Johannes Ebert, Secretary General of the Goethe-Institut, and the Scientific Coordinator, Professor Yudhishthir Raj Isar. These preliminary results were endorsed and commented upon by Ms. Androulla Vassiliou, Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth; Mr. Pierre Vimont, Executive Secretary General, European External Action Service and Mr. Morten Løkkegaard, Member of the European Parliament, Vice-Chair of the Culture and Education Committee. Mr. Pavol Demeš, Transatlantic Fellow of the German Marshall Fund Bratislava and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, was the Master of Ceremonies.

c) A concluding note...

It is important to conclude this Introduction by clearly stating the Consortium’s terms of engagement with the task of fulfilling the mandate it was given. First, it set out to delineate the existing level and nature of worldwide demand for interaction with European partners. Next, it sought to make evident the central role of cultural assets in strengthening the place of the EU and its Member States in an increasingly competitive and multi-polar world. It recognised that it would be imperative for the future of Europe to operate proactively in a rapidly changing and increasingly trans-national global cultural landscape, in which cultural creativity and innovation emanate from many different hubs across the world. The Consortium also sought to determine whether the benefits of cultural relations hinge essentially upon mutual exposure to cultural activities and products or upon the sharing of pathways, problems and processes, in other words, on mutual listening and learning. Finally, it decided to focus on identifying the expressed, or perhaps only partly defined needs, the expectations, the concerns and the hopes of the different stakeholders in both Europe and the third countries.
THE ‘MAPPING’ IN EU MEMBER STATES

Introduction

The EU presents a multifaceted picture of how Member States manage culture in external relations. Diversity is not only centre stage in strategies and policies. It is also mirrored in a range of areas such as the terms used (as mentioned in the Introduction),25 the way countries organise and structure themselves internally and abroad to meet the challenges of using culture in external relations, the chosen thematic and geo-political priorities, and finally the differences in scale of action amongst different Member States. Despite these differences, there are many features that European countries have in common. Understanding these commonalities, notably the shared policy shifts, will prove to be indispensable in seeking to elaborate an overarching EU dimension for culture in external relations. The mapping process has uncovered some of these.

In the last few years, many stakeholders in the Member States have been reflecting on culture and intercultural dialogue as key forces for change in multipolar global relations. Governments have been considering how to conduct international cultural relations in more innovative and effective ways. They have had to do this against the backdrop of declining public sector budgets as a result of the economic and financial crisis, notably as regards the cultural dimension of external relations. Several other factors have motivated them as well. These include: 1) globalisation and the attraction of the so-called ‘emerging’ economies; 2) facilitation of international communication through the use of the Internet and social media; 3) increases in the number and scope of cultural activities carried out by non-state actors – individuals, independent entities and networks; 4) a more competitive environment for cultural relations as many of the strategic partners of the EU have invested in the field of international cultural relations in increasingly dynamic ways; and 5) the expanding international ambitions of cities and regions in the EU.

The search for new strategies has taken place at the European level too. Member States have sought to attain synergies through enhanced cooperation in frameworks such as EUNIC Clusters and EUNIC Global. They have invested in research, awareness raising and advocacy, for

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25 The terms range from cultural diplomacy to international cultural policy, from cultural relations to cultural cooperation, and more. They are often used interchangeably. ‘Cultural exchange’, for example, is often applied both in Europe and in third countries to refer to outward one-way dissemination of culture rather than to the classic understanding of exchange as a process that has reciprocity built in.
example through pan-European civic initiatives such as MORE EUROPE. They are agreed on a new-shared emphasis on external cultural relations through Council resolutions and the EU Agenda on Culture among others. Independent or state-sponsored studies on the topic have been launched and conferences have been held.

Discussions at the European level have also reflected efforts made within governments in Member States for a better sharing of responsibilities among key actors, such as Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Culture (and to some degree others), cultural and other civil society actors as well as players at the level of cities and regions. Thus it was considered logical that the dialogue at EU level about a European dimension had to be conducted by the key ministries of each Member State, with input from non-state actors or networks. EU Presidencies, in particular those of Hungary, Poland, Denmark and Lithuania, organised meetings of senior officials of foreign affairs and culture ministries, the European Commission convened experts from both ministries of all Member States to discuss a pilot project that would develop a strategic European approach on China (see Chapter 2).

**Key findings of the mapping process**

The mapping of culture in external relations as carried out by Member States was not a fully-fledged scientific research project. Given the time and resources available (and the fact that government ministries in several countries did not respond) the short summary of findings presented below cannot claim to be comprehensive. Nor can it provide complete information on what is happening in each Member State. Nevertheless, the information gathered does make it possible to realistically assess the potential for creating a European dimension for the practice of cultural relations.

The mapping reveals that culture is an important feature of the external relations of the majority of the 28 Member States of the EU, while there are naturally both similarities and differences in their policy approaches. The patterns observed display a number of trends. The summary of these trends presented below focuses on the following five dimensions: 1) the principal actors; 2) the main objectives of national strategies; 3) the areas of intervention; 4) the geographical priorities; and 5) policy shifts.
1.1 The principal actors

In most EU Member States, the principal actors involved in culture in external relations are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Culture (MoC). They may cooperate in defining the strategy and policies, but do not always do so. In a number of countries they are assisted at the level of implementation by a specific governmental body and/or sector specific agencies. They are present abroad either through their embassies or a combination of embassies and cultural institutes/centres. While there are similarities in their modes of operation, important differences among them can be identified on the basis of three main axes of differentiation: a) centralised versus decentralised models; b) representations and infrastructures abroad; and c) level of national budgets.

1.1.1 Models

There are basically two models used by governments to implement their strategies and actions for culture in external relations. Some two-thirds of the EU Member States have a decentralised model (the so-called ‘arm’s length’ model) and one-third employ a centralised model. A centralised model does not always mean that governmental agencies have less liberty to act in interpreting the most appropriate ways to implement a strategy for culture in external relations, for sometimes this gives them more room for manoeuvre and allows them to be more pragmatic than actors operating under the arm’s length model. It should also be noted that despite structural and operational differences, governments and cultural institutions are increasingly working together at European level through the EUNIC network and are reflecting on better ways to coordinate their activities.

France, Germany and the United Kingdom have long established models, although they are organised and structured in different ways. France has a centralised model, whereby the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supervises the entirety of the French cultural network abroad, consisting of embassies, offices of the Institut français and the Alliance française and broadcasting agencies grouped together as France Media Monde. Germany and the United Kingdom have a more decentralised model and have created broadly independent arm’s length governance bodies for their international cultural relations. In Germany there is consensus that cultural relations should be at one remove from politics and several independent organisations receive funds from the MFA to implement cultural and educational policies (e.g., the Goethe-Institut, the German Academic Exchange Service, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation,
the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations, the Central Agency for
Schools Abroad, the Educational Exchange Service, and the Federal
Cultural Foundation). For the United Kingdom the British Council is the
principal actor, though the arts councils of the four nations of the UK also
have a modest role in supporting international engagement. The Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which is responsible for the country’s
officially designated public diplomacy, provides support to the British
Council, though the Council generates more than 75% of its income from
its language and education services. Although both the Goethe-Institut
and British Council enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy, they
operate within an overall framework of geographical and other priorities
defined by government.

Spain is also an active player and its activities are guided by a more
centralised model. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and the Ministry of Finance
and Administration are represented on the board of administration of
Acción Cultural Española (AC/E), a public institution set up in 2010 by the
merger of three existing governmental agencies. AC/E promotes Spain’s
culture and heritage at national and international level. In addition, the
government works with two other governmental agencies, the Instituto
Cervantes and AECID (Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and
Development). In neighbouring Portugal, international cultural relations
are developed through a quasi-independent body, the Instituto Camões.

In many countries, the Ministries of Foreign affairs and Culture also
cooperate with other ministries, such as those responsible for Education
and Science, for Economy and Finance, for Tourism, for Trade and
Finance, etc.. Denmark has a system of cross-ministerial collaboration
amongst the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture and
the Ministry of Business and Growth, which have together set up an
International Cultural Panel to enhance cultural exchange and strengthen
the internationalisation of Danish cultural life. In Sweden, and more
recently in Finland, a strong interconnection exists between national
and international cultural policies; in Sweden more than 40 government
agencies work both at national and international level (inter alia the
Swedish Arts Council, the Swedish Institute, the Swedish International
Development Authority, the Government Agency for Cultural Analysis, the
Swedish Film Institute, the International Studio & Curatorial Programme).
This type of cooperation also has an impact on infrastructures abroad.
Finland, for example, has an extensive network of public or publically
funded bodies in foreign countries (Finpro for trade promotion and Tekes
for technology) that also cover the interests of its cultural and creative
cultural industries (CCIs). In addition, the Ministry of Education & Culture
of Finland supports independently run Finnish Cultural Institutes and the recently established ‘Team Finland’ is now based in various countries and brings all these bodies together. Furthermore, the same Ministry supports the Arts Promotion Centre Finland and, directly or indirectly, sector specific bodies domestically that have an international dimension to their work.

For the Baltic and Central and Eastern European countries, international cultural relations are becoming increasingly important. In the Baltic States it is the MoC that takes the lead in setting the strategy rather than the MFA. In Latvia, for example, there have been some changes towards decentralisation and involvement of non-governmental organisations and civil society in the cultural field. This movement has been accelerated by the economic crisis and has led the Ministry of Culture to sign several agreements with non-governmental organisations (e.g. the New Theatre of Latvia, Latvian Literature Centre, the Music Information Centre, Latvian Centre for Contemporary Art) delegating to them the organisation of Latvian participation in large scale events such as the Venice Biennale of Art and Architecture, the Sao Paulo Biennial of Art, Midem and the Frankfurt Book Fair.

By virtue of its federal structure, Belgium is the only country in the EU with three distinct policies and structures for international cultural relations. Each of its three linguistic communities (the Flemish, French and German-speaking communities) has the competence for self-governance in the field of international cultural relations.26

1.1.2 Representation abroad

The bodies representing EU Member States abroad in cultural terms make up a varied landscape. In view of the challenges cited at the outset, governments and cultural institutions are rethinking existing modes and patterns of representation. Budget cuts in particular are forcing them to be more innovative and efficient. Debates are taking place on the infrastructure as well as on the services being provided. Maintaining an international infrastructure of cultural institutes/centres in difficult financial conditions has been one of the key issues that governments and their agencies have had to face.

26 In Flanders the Flemish MoC and the MFA and various governmental agencies/funds deal with culture in external relations, whereas in Wallonia it is only the MFA of the French Community and one specific agency (Wallonie-Bruxelles International).
Some countries have closed existing premises or relocated to less expensive premises, while others are considering doing so. There is a clear trend towards opening new offices in the BRICs nations or other emerging economies. One option for those wishing to maintain a presence is to establish virtual offices (antennae). Latvia, for example, has no cultural institutes based in EU Member States and operates a digital platform. France, on the other hand, has sought to maintain its international presence, but has reduced the number of personnel or regrouped its branches in a country.

As national borders are increasingly crossed by cultural operators, governments and cultural institutes envisage the possibility of working with regional structures in the EU rather than national ones. In the Nordic and Baltic states, regional cooperation is already well established. Also, although representation in other EU Member States will remain important, the authorities in some countries are of the view that cultural operators need less support to operate in other European countries. Not only are new offices being opened in the BRICs countries, but regional liaison offices are being set up that can service the offices of a cultural institute in a geographical region, e.g. the Goethe-Institut has a liaison office in Beijing that coordinates the operations of its other offices throughout Asia.

In addition, EU States are looking for more cost-effective ways to provide their services, such as the regrouping of their branch offices under a new single legal entity to reduce administrative and management costs, the development of digital strategies or platforms to communicate and interact with interested parties, e.g. online language classes and the evaluation of linguistic capacities. Means of reducing operating, management and human resource costs are also being envisaged, such as the replacement of expatriate employees from Europe by locally recruited personnel (who, in any case, generally have a more in-depth knowledge of the cultural environment in which they operate).

France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom have the most extensive international networks of cultural institutes. France has 98 Institut français and 400 Alliance française branches in 137 countries; the British Council has 191 offices in more than 100 countries; Germany’s Goethe-Institut has 135 offices in 92 countries; Spain has 86 Instituto Cervantes centres in 43 countries), Italy has 90 Italian Cultural Institutes and 400 branches of the Società Dante Alighieri, Portugal (48 Language Centres and 20 Cultural Centres in 69 countries). Austria also has a relatively large network of 30 Austrian Cultural Forum branches that are
closely affiliated with its embassies and also has nine language institutes. Denmark and Finland have a smaller number of cultural institutes.

In recent years, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have expanded their representation abroad. The Czech Republic has 24 Czech Centres; Hungary has opened 19 cultural institutes; Poland has 23 Polish Cultural Institutes; Romania 18 cultural centres and Slovakia eight. The Visegrád Group, an alliance comprising the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, was established to provide a cost-effective way of representation abroad for the four countries. It is active in furthering European integration and this has led to the setting up of international networks and platforms on culture, such as ‘Platform Culture – Central Europe’. Poland has established a strong regional structure, as part of its policy to take a leadership role vis-à-vis its Eastern neighbours (Belarus, Ukraine and Russia).

A number of other EU Member States have chosen to have only a few cultural institutions/centres abroad, e.g. Cyprus, Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), Greece, Ireland and Slovenia. Their cultural presence is generally managed through their embassies, as is the case with those countries in the EU that work through the cultural counsellors in their embassies in the absence of separate cultural institutions, for example, the Baltic States, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Croatia is planning to replace its network of cultural counsellors in Europe by Croatian Houses in major countries and cities in the near future.

With a few exceptions, the external cultural relations budgets of Member States have decreased in recent years. This is particularly the case for countries that have suffered the most from the economic crisis in Europe, such as Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Increases are noted on the other hand in Estonia (EUR 20.2 million – with more resources for cultural exports), Finland (EUR 16 million with an increase of EUR 5 million for cultural exports and international cooperation), and Poland EUR 21 million. This is also the case for Denmark, thanks to a higher priority given to culture in external relations by the MoC.

Larger Member States have also faced budget cuts in recent years, in particular France and the United Kingdom. Reductions in Germany have been less significant. Germany has an overall budget of EUR 1.597 billion (2013) for culture and education in external relations and the budget of the Goethe-Institut amounted to EUR 366 million for 2012/2013. As a result of budget cuts, the British Council will have to self-generate 80% of its 2014/15 budget of £969 million (EUR 1.2 billion) instead of 75%, as was the case hitherto. Partly as a result of its revenue raising efforts,
the operating budget of the British Council has increased by one-third in recent years and more engagement is envisaged in order to help British CCIs enter and operate in target markets. Moreover, government expenditure reductions mean the BBC is required from April 2014 to absorb the costs of the United Kingdom’s soft power asset the World Service, which was previously funded by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, but with no transfer of resources. France allocated a budget of EUR 1.3 billion in 2013 and the budget of the Institut français has decreased by 6% in the last two years.

Decreasing budgets are forcing all cultural institutions to become more creative in finding new financial resources to fund their activities. This is particularly the case for large projects executed outside the EU. Cooperation between governments and cultural institutions can be one of the solutions, as well as the development of partnerships with corporate entities. Increased cooperation will allow European cultural operators to leverage both the financial and technical capacity of its Member States. A good example is EUNIC’s ‘Creative Zimbabwe’ project in Africa.

1.2 The main objectives pursued

In the last decade a number of factors have led EU Member States to review their strategies for culture in external relations, in particular globalisation, the increase in international cultural engagement that takes place without government involvement or even awareness, and the economic crisis. Governments and their agencies have sought to be more efficient and to coordinate their resources to maximise the potential of the existing structures and systems.

Many EU Member States have outlined their strategies and policies for culture in their external relations in a single document, as they see it as an increasingly important pillar of their foreign policies and actions. Other countries have integrated their strategies and actions into other policies areas. Cyprus and Slovenia have each been discussing the role of culture in their external relations with a view to adopting new strategies.

Culture in external relations serves a range of goals that cannot be tied down to any one single objective. This makes culture a versatile strategic instrument that can be employed to reach out to different groups of people and organisations as well as different policy areas. At the same time its diversity and ‘multi-functionality’, so to speak, make it a difficult
tool to grasp. Not all countries share the same priorities, but the great number of similarities among them indicates that there is sufficient critical mass for the EU to adopt a strategy for culture in its external relations. The main objectives of policies for culture in external relations in Member States identified by the mapping exercise are the following.

1.2.1 Image, visibility and brand building

Image and brand building are among the most important goals for a number of Member States. Cultural relations are also employed to build trust and recognition as a reliable partner for political, economic and diplomatic reasons. Increasingly, they are seen as a tool for the acquisition ‘soft power’ that can influence people, notably leaders and policy makers, in other countries. Germany uses culture to promote a realistic and multifaceted image, whereas for Ireland, in recent years, it has been used as an instrument to, among other things, repair the international damage to its reputation caused by the economic crisis. Many Member States wish to be seen as creative and innovative on the world stage and specifically mention image and brand building in their strategies. Spain, for example, is trying to strengthen its image and build its brand through its Marca España project. Under this project, Spain has turned to its new creative sectors (fashion, design, entertainment, interactive leisure and architecture) to help identify it with modernity, innovation, diversity, professionalism and creativity. In the UK, the ‘GREAT’ campaign was launched by government to promote the country abroad as a place to invest in, study and visit. Creativity, heritage, music and sport are among the 10 pillars of the campaign. For some smaller Member States it is not so much a matter of branding as the need to secure a greater degree of international visibility. Croatia has followed the precedent set by other EU accession countries in giving particular emphasis to the promotion of its own culture in Europe in the lead up to its accession in 2013 and beyond.

1.2.2 Cultural cooperation, exchange and mobility

All Member States encourage cultural cooperation, exchange and the mobility of artists and cultural institutions. Among the purposes cited in this regard are the following: to further the development of collaborations and networks among artists and institutions; to stimulate the international mobility of artists and cultural practitioners; to disseminate national culture in other countries and boost opportunities for cultural practitioners to participate in international events. The promotion of arts
exchange, in particular collaboration between curators of contemporary art, is an activity that is in high demand among museums and galleries. Governments also recognise that international engagement is often indispensable for the flourishing of small and medium scale theatre and dance companies. Cultural dialogue is considered to be a decisive factor in good relations between nations. Austria sees new opportunities being opened up by the globalisation process and places increasing emphasis on a ‘two way street of intercultural exchange’. Cultural dialogue was one of the priorities of Slovenia’s EU Presidency in 2008. Denmark and Sweden are among those Member States that not only want to promote their own culture abroad, but see international collaboration as an excellent opportunity to renew and enrich their own national arts and culture. For Sweden the internationalisation of its society provides better opportunities for its cultural life to develop. It is considered to be just as important that Swedish culture can reach across borders as it is for Sweden to be open to inspiration from other countries. The OMC Working Group of EU Member States’ Experts on Mobility Support Programmes has called for a strategic approach to enhance the way culture is promoted in EU international relations, and the provision of mechanisms for the presence of artist in key cultural markets.27

1.2.3 Trade and investment

Many governments, working closely with the business sector, use culture to promote their economic interests by emphasising the ties between arts, commerce and the economy. The goal is to promote the export of cultural goods and services, notably in growing consumer markets where new middle classes are rapidly emerging, and to attract inward investment and tourism as well. The internationalisation of Portuguese culture and its agents, for example, has been identified as the answer to Portugal’s financial austerity, although budget cuts could hamper this.

1.2.4 Broadening the horizon for Europe’s cultural and creative industries (CCIs)

In the context of trade and investment interests in general, many EU Member States are placing much greater emphasis on the cultural and creative industries (CCIs) as the leading sector, notably as vectors for

greater income and employment. This has long been the case for the United Kingdom; today UK creative industry trade visits are increasingly common: leading figures from music, film and technology industries travelled to Los Angeles in 2013 to attract US investment. Other countries are adopting a similar stance. In point of fact, nine EU Member States are in the top 20 exporters of such goods worldwide. Several countries are therefore concerned with boosting the export potential of the sector, notably as regards the so-called emerging economies. The CCIs are also perceived as a tool to project a country as contemporary and forward thinking.

1.2.5 Languages/education

Language learning, teaching at universities and schools and the supply of educational material is a key objective of a number of countries. This is not only the case for France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, but also for countries like Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. Portugal is advocating (together with other Lusophone countries, in particular Brazil) for Portuguese to become one of the official languages of the United Nations.

Strengthening the attractiveness of the country as a location for education, science and research (e.g. by awarding scholarships) is also a goal foregrounded by a number of countries. Italy and the United Kingdom specifically referred to the development of professional expertise and skills in the arts.

1.2.6 Heritage conservation

Europe possesses considerable expertise in preservation, conservation and restoration techniques and the sharing of expertise in heritage remains a key objective of the cultural relations of several countries e.g. Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. Specialists from a number of European countries are engaged in heritage conservation efforts elsewhere and on both sides such cooperation is seen as an integral part of cultural relations. Many also recognise, however, that conservation philosophies and practices are diverse; key European principles, such as those enshrined the Venice Charter, do not necessarily carry the same weight elsewhere.
1.2.7 Engaging with Diasporas

Reaching out to the country’s diaspora is frequently cited as an aim by the Central and Eastern European countries as well as Ireland and Portugal. The diaspora is considered as an effective means to promote the national culture in foreign countries. The importance of the Irish diaspora is evident from the ‘Imagine Ireland’ initiative of 2011 – a programme of more than 1,400 events and 500 artists to showcase Irish arts and culture and to re-connect with more than 40 million Irish-Americans who live in the USA. In a major policy shift in Romania, the government has changed the mission of the Romanian Cultural Institute from one that sought to promote a contemporary image of the country to one primarily serving the interests of its diaspora community.

1.2.8 Promoting European integration

Although it is an intra-EU objective, it is important to mention here that for several countries, cultural relations are central to the goal of European integration. Austria and France see European integration as a ‘cultural task’. Austria emphasises a ‘Europe of diversity’, as opposed to a focus on policies promoting national identity. For historical reasons, the Goethe-Institut has sought to present Germany as part of the European family. It fosters policies beyond the issue of national identity and wishes to contribute to a more cultural Europe. This is illustrative perhaps of the fact that some cultural institutes are concentrating less on presenting themselves as showcases for the cultures of their countries than in the past. In Central and Eastern Europe, there is a strong focus on participation in EU programmes and the decision making process of international organisations, including notably UNESCO and the Council of Europe.

1.2.9 Other objectives

Other objectives were also mentioned in a number of Member States. These included in particular:

The UNESCO Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions calls for the integration of culture into international cooperation strategies and some countries are utilising development cooperation frameworks to conduct cultural projects in developing countries. The Swedish International Development Authority, for example, has been active through its Creative Force programme that seeks to provide
women, children and young people with greater opportunities to influence and participate in cultural life in the Western Balkans, Middle East and North Africa, etc. There are also specific initiatives that seek to facilitate networking by cultural practitioners from developing countries to engage with their counterparts in Europe or participate in cultural events in EU Member States.

The field of ‘culture and conflict’ has assumed a modest role in the cultural relations toolkit of some European governments and, especially, their cultural institutes. While cultural difference is generally more a pawn of conflicts over power and resources than a ‘cause’ of conflict in itself, the power of cultural expression can help heal the trauma, despair and rage that flow from strife, particularly violent conflict. Apart from well-known efforts in Northern Ireland and South-Eastern Europe, European artists and cultural organisations have done some ground-breaking work in this field on other continents. They have worked with local communities and counterparts with the encouragement, support and mediation of national cultural institutes. Such work can take different forms, such as cultural engagement with refugees, or the restoration of built heritage (which is often deliberately targeted in war), or support for cultural practice, e.g. the British Council’s assistance to develop the National Youth Orchestra in Iraq. Some countries such as the UK and Germany also find it useful to seek the mediation of artists when there is a diplomatic impasse. Another type of conflict-directed work based on the use of cultural objects, documents and artefacts is represented by the primarily educational efforts of museums and sites of memory, including an international network of ‘peace museums’. According to their location and context, these ‘peace museums’ range from being ‘sites for historic narratives and survivor stories, to centres for conflict resolution and transformative imagining, to memorial and reconciliation sites.’ Their common value is considered to be their capacity to provide ‘an alternative voice or resistance to the dominant and dominating voices of violence.’

There is widespread evidence, however, that cultural aspects are not taken into account at all sufficiently in crisis and post-crisis situations, including in refugee camps in particular. Although the role of culture as an instrument in preventing conflict is questioned in some quarters, a sufficient amount of good practice has emerged in post-conflict situations to justify further exploration of cultural expression as a tool in reconciliation and reconstruction.

1.3 Fields and tools of intervention

The fields and tools of intervention used by the EU Member States for culture in external relations are wide-ranging. The following list is merely indicative of the diversity uncovered.

Cultural days/seasons/years in foreign countries: France has extensive experience in such celebrations and the UK and Italy are among other Member States who have been similarly engaged. In February-March 2013, the Nordic countries organised ‘Nordic Cool’, a major festival of performing arts, exhibitions, film, literature and cuisine in conjunction with the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington DC.

Design/fashion/architecture: contemporary design is a strong common interest for all Nordic countries as well as the Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. A good example has been the four-year Dutch Design Fashion Architecture (DutchDFA) programme.

Visual and performing arts: all EU Member States provide a combination of the activities mentioned below:

- Support for the mobility of artists and cultural workers including: 1) participation in international festivals, fairs and events such as the Venice Biennale; and 2) presentation of works and performances before audiences in other countries.
- Organisation of festivals and other cultural events in the home country and support for the participation of national and international artists.
- Cultural projects organised in cooperation with cultural organisations abroad (exhibitions, festivals, publications).
- Organisation of study visits for foreign cultural operators and institutions to EU Member States (e.g. museum curators), showcasing of a country’s performing arts, or the provision of artists’ residencies.
- Support to international networks.
Heritage Conservation: sharing of skills and expertise in all the domains of tangible and intangible cultural heritage.

Literature promotion: participation in and organisation of international book fairs, translations, supply of books to libraries, awards (e.g. Sweden’s Astrid Lindgren Memorial Award).

Film and Audio-visual works: the activities of EU countries abroad include the following:

- Film promotion at festivals and market access activities.
- Organisation of film weeks/festivals.
- Co-productions.
- Assistance in presenting foreign films at film festivals in EU Member States.
- Regional Film Platforms: e.g. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Training and capacity building activities (including conferences and seminars), networking and sharing of skills and expertise with other countries, e.g. the ‘Cultural Innovators Network’ of the Goethe-Institut.

CCIs: mapping CCIs, export strategies and international market development, identification of key support bodies, vocational education and training – e.g. Austria, Estonia, the Netherlands and the UK.

Digitalisation of cultural resources: is a relatively new domain to promote culture in external relations and reach out to a worldwide audience. An example is Culturethèque, an online multimedia library of the Institut français. It was created in 2010 and offers a wide range of French e-books, audiobooks, lectures, films and documentaries online.

Conferences and debates: many cultural institutions and cultural attachés of embassies choose not only to support the organisation of cultural events, but they also engage in serious debates with the ‘change makers’ or ‘social agents’ of a country.
1.4 Geographical Priorities

In most EU Member States, the priority countries and regions are defined by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in line with their foreign policy objectives. Other European countries remain important and most countries particularly focus on their neighbours, former colonies and their trade partners. Countries sharing the same language also continue to be valuable partners for a number of EU countries, such as the English, French, Portuguese and Spanish-speaking countries around the world.

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007 there was a great emphasis in Western Europe on improving cultural cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As the EU expanded, closer cooperation with its new Eastern European neighbours – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine – came to the forefront. Poland in particular took a leadership role in improving cultural relations with these countries. However, in the last few years the Central and Eastern countries have become less of a priority for most European governments and cultural institutions due to their full integration into the EU. For geopolitical reasons and the wish to promote peace, stability, freedom and economic prosperity, EU Member States have turned their focus in recent years to the Western Balkans and the Southern Mediterranean countries. For the latter, this trend is likely to continue in the coming years.

While most Member States will continue to pay attention to their traditional partners, there is a clear shift taking place among all European countries towards the BRICs countries as well, in particular China. Countries wish to benefit economically from these emerging markets. This will most likely have an impact on budgets for activities in other countries, both inside and outside the EU.

EU Member States have tended to concentrate in recent years increasingly on many of the same countries and regions. This suggests that a shared strategic approach in the cultural domain should also focus on common priority countries and regions. EU-level activities would have the potential to complement and strengthen the activities of Member States and also offer the EU with new powers of attraction and influence.

1.5 Policy shifts

In recent years there has been much discussion about whether a paradigm shift has taken place in the cultural relations policies of EU Member States
towards third countries, and whether traditional approaches to cultural diplomacy have been superseded. The evidence in this regard appears mixed.\(^29\) Some of the indicators of policy change have already been signalled in this chapter, for example the greater willingness of cultural institutes to engage with each other, the emphasis given to the internationalisation and export of the CCIs in cultural relations strategies, and the focus on building cultural engagement with the BRICs countries whether or not there were historical or traditional cultural connections.

Other evidence was also forthcoming from the mapping. For instance, many cultural institutes now target a broader foreign public rather than the emphasis given to political elites and opinion-formers in traditional cultural diplomacy. The new approach has been influenced strongly by notions of public diplomacy. Social media and other new communications developments are fundamentally extending the pursuit of people-to-people contacts, especially with younger people.

The mapping exercise was expected to confirm the convergence of policy interests between cultural, educational, foreign affairs, trade, tourism and development, etc., implying the need for transversal international policy strategies and, indeed, there was some evidence of horizontal approaches in government. However, although greater co-operation between foreign affairs and culture ministries was noticeable (in itself an achievement given the territorial competition that has sometimes taken place), formal mechanisms for systematic collaboration between all the relevant ministries was less in evidence than might have been anticipated.

There has been a presumption for some time that Member States today are focussed on multilateral rather than bilateral cultural co-operation. While that is primarily the case within Europe, formal cultural agreements or more informal memoranda of understanding continue to be instruments frequently used in relations with third countries, e.g. Cyprus, the UK and others with China, or Spain with Iraq.

There are also indications that some cultural institutes are less ‘hands-on’ than in the past. They have the confidence in cultural actors to pursue their ambitions through international encounters with the minimum of supervision – sometimes taking calculated risks in the process.\(^30\) Of course, the

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\(^29\) Rod Fisher undertook research on this specific issue, initially in 2009 and subsequently updated his findings. These suggest that while policy shifts have certainly taken place, the extent of such change may have been over-estimated. Policy shifts were dependent on a number of factors, not least attitudinal change see Fisher’s article entitled ‘Has there been a paradigm shift in cultural diplomacy’, forthcoming.

\(^30\) Fisher, op. cit.
continuing reductions in budgets for culture in external relations suggest that policy ambitions are not being matched by adequate resources. As such they remain aspirational.
CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH EUROPE/ THE EU: NEEDS, CONCERNS AND EXPECTATIONS OF ENP AND STRATEGIC PARTNER COUNTRIES

Introduction

This chapter consists of summaries of the reports prepared on each of the 26 ‘third’ countries addressed by the Preparatory Action. These summaries contain key findings that emerged from the consultation in or pertaining to each country. Readers are encouraged to read the full reports of each country, which can be viewed online.\(^3\)

The Terms of Reference specified that the third countries to be researched would belong to the European Neighbourhood countries and the group identified as ‘Strategic Partners’. The sixteen countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) fall into two regional sub-groups. First, the ENP-East countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Second, the ENP-South countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. The ‘strategic partner’ countries are Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the USA.

The objective of partnership with the ENP countries is to ‘avoid the emergence of new dividing lines’ and ‘new borders’ between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to strengthen ‘the prosperity, stability and security of all’.\(^3\) In contrast to the EU’s relationship with ‘strategic partners’, its ties with ENP partners are more value-based and aim to strengthen democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The ENP is complemented by regional and multilateral co-operation initiatives: the Eastern Partnership (launched in Prague in May 2009), and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), formerly known as the Barcelona Process (re-launched in Paris in July 2008).

The strategic partnerships on the other hand are structured bilateral relations with those countries with which the EU wants to cooperate, notably with a view to shaping world affairs. The key strategic issues involved encompass not only partnerships of choice, but also partnerships of necessity that

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\(^3\) http://cultureinexternalrelations.eu/main-outcomes/
\(^3\) http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm
are formed in order to achieve and sustain what is regarded as critically important convergence with the countries involved. Strategic partnerships are particularly important for the EU’s pursuit of its economic interests, as one of the key aims of such partnerships is to advance a more open trade system, market access and reciprocity.\textsuperscript{33}

Within these two categories, the stances of individual societies are diverse – in terms of their histories, their political systems, their economies, their demographic make-up, etc.. Geographically, only one strategic partner country – Russia – is a neighbour of the EU. The others are distant from both the EU and often one another. Some of these countries, like the US, Canada and Japan, are broadly like-minded partners for the EU. Others, like Russia and China, have rather different political systems. Some are global players (China, Russia, the US and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and India), while others are regionally prominent powers (Mexico, South Africa and South Korea).\textsuperscript{34} Some, like Japan, are facing the challenges of aging populations, while others, like India, have very young populations. Some are industrially advanced countries, while others belong to the so-called ‘emerging economies’ category, such as Brazil, India and South Africa. The Neighbourhood countries are also very diverse. Some belong to the Arab world. Some of them have a western colonial history, others a Soviet past. Some of them are currently undergoing radical political change (Ukraine, Syria and Belarus) or have done so in the recent past (Egypt and Tunisia), others are stable democracies. A case in point is Israel, whose history and nature is \textit{sui generis}.

We have chosen to capture and present this diversity by providing short summaries of the key findings of the respective country reports below. Chapter 3 will process these findings according to a selected number of analytical categories and themes.

\subsection*{2.1 Algeria, Europe and the EU}

After enduring a long period of internal unrest in the 1980s and 1990s, Algeria’s cultural sector is currently caught between a government-led post-independence ideological approach to culture and a modernised vision of cultural diplomacy. Rapidly changing dynamics in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’ in neighbouring countries are a challenge for government structures.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/FG%20discussion\_paper\_Anne\_Schmidt.pdf
\item \textsuperscript{34} http://www.fride.org/download/Mapping\_Book.pdf
\end{itemize}
The EU’s largest bilateral cultural programme in the region is being developed in Algeria. This is a 21.5 million euro initiative (with 2.5 million euro contributed by Algeria) focusing on the protection, promotion and enhancement of heritage across the government spectrum with implications for tourism, capacity building, development and civil society. This programme could provide useful lessons for new strategic approaches.

Due to the current appetite for European culture in Algerian society, in particular among its young people, the potential for deeper cultural relations with the EU is real. It should be recalled in this regard that the main historical links between Europe and Algeria were forged by French colonialism (as well as through contact with Spain and Italy). It is thus essential to distinguish two sets of Algerian-European relations: on the one hand, relations with France, which have been strongly influenced by a history of colonial conquest and occupation that still affects sensitivities associated with questions of Algerian sovereignty and dignity, and, on the other, relations with the rest of Europe.

A future EU strategy would also have to face the challenge that the current state-led style of policy making in Algeria leaves little room for Europe to take the initiative: in the opinion of some European stakeholders, the EU ‘cannot act, but only react’. In addition, the role and place of Islam and religious extremism – with consequences such as self-limitation or self-censorship by government officials – could raise serious challenges for cultural relations with Algeria. The most radical cultural stakeholders consider that the EU and its Member States are actually collaborating with a dictatorial regime. In light of the sensitivities and tensions created by popular uprisings in North Africa and other Arab countries, supporting local non-state initiatives without antagonising the regime or appearing as a force of subversion may also prove a challenge.

Algerians wish to be perceived by Europeans beyond clichés and to be recognised as equal partners with whom mutual exchanges are possible. A positive step in this direction could entail greater efforts by Europe to support translations from Arabic (and other languages of Algeria) into European languages. At the same time, EU documents and public campaigns should be translated into languages spoken in Algeria. In addition, the EU should support contacts between cultural professionals and the transfer of knowledge and skills, and also between societies in general, with an emphasis on community development and educational objectives, taking into account the aspirations of young people. Such initiatives are also needed to improve relations between Algeria and members of the Algerian diaspora who already face exclusion in their host countries. There is a strong desire for far easier access to European visas to allow freedom of movement.
2.2 Armenia, Europe and the EU

Post-Soviet Caucasian and Middle Eastern geopolitics as well as the consequences of the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh have pushed the Armenian Republic into ambivalent relations with the EU and its neighbours. On the one hand, the country is trying to maintain a balance in its relations with Russia and the EU. For example, in 2013, it chose to join a customs union with Russia, essentially rejecting the EU’s offer of an association agreement, while keeping the door open for the development of stronger relations. On the other, the globalised Armenian diaspora is shaping cultural relations along two lines: first, by protecting the Armenian architectural and religious heritage as a way of sustaining and promoting Armenian identity and, second, by opening up the country’s cultural scene to international trends. The independent cultural sector within Armenia is very small and without resources, and it has limited access to languages other than Armenian and Russian.

Any EU strategy on culture has to take into account the unsolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which has to be understood within the framework of what Armenians view as ‘cultural genocide’, in other words the systematic destruction of their distinctive cultural traditions. In addition to being given cultural support by Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh is often presented as an essential part of Armenian culture and as a political entity waiting for recognition. Developing cultural projects with Nagorno-Karabakh therefore has a strong political significance for Armenians both inside the country and in the diaspora.

Because of their limited number and the lack of resources, Armenian stakeholders are keen to acquire new managerial skills to take their work to a more internationalised level. Among Armenian professionals, there is a strong desire to get closer to Europe in the cultural field. They still need to adjust to post-Soviet realities and to become better equipped to reform the way international cultural work is being done in their country. Whereas the Soviet Republic of Armenia previously designed its external cultural relations vis-à-vis publics in the Soviet Union, the Republic of Armenia now has to reinvent its audiences. Armenian cultural professionals need support from Europe and the EU in order to redesign their work for other potential markets. Their appropriation of European know-how in cultural management (e.g. legislation on culture and museums, cooperation with the private sector) is deemed essential. Information about opportunities offered by the EU in the field of culture abroad should be better communicated, possibly by setting up an Armenian Council that can work specifically on these issues to ensure stronger participation by Armenians in EU-funded initiatives. Alternatively, more reciprocal, small-size projects and exchanges (including
internships and training programmes for young people) could be organised with a view to enabling cultural professionals from Armenia to meet with their EU counterparts regularly and build up relations of mutual trust. Joint programmes, research and exchanges in the field of education could help Armenia reach European standards.

2.3 Azerbaijan, Europe and the EU

Over the last 20 years the government of Azerbaijan has strived to turn the country into a cultural relations hub connecting Asia, Russian-speaking areas, Europe and the Middle East. The presidential regime has ensured the continuity and stability of a cultural policy focusing on massive investments in vigorous nation-branding cultural diplomacy. Refashioning Azerbaijan’s image (despite problems related to its controversial style of governance and its unresolved conflict with Armenia) has been at the core of cultural relations with the EU, in parallel with oil and gas diplomacy. Impressive growth rates and sovereign funds allow the Azerbaijani regime to pick and choose its cultural partners, and the country is increasingly hosting international cultural events.

The other side of this coin is a rather poor record of human rights and tight control of the Internet. Yet, paradoxically, new cultural spaces are also being opened up. The evolution of cultural relations between Azerbaijan and Europe will mostly depend on the evolution of Azerbaijan’s internal governance. The more the government opens itself to European cultural practices and to free exchanges and initiatives at the level of civil society, the more relations will deepen, supported by the country’s cultural and financial resources. Any future EU strategy would have to face several challenges. The regime’s tight control over media and cultural life in the country while claiming to be on the road to democracy may have consequences for the way people in Azerbaijan deal with culture in their external relations. In this context, the outward-looking strategies of individual cultural stakeholders remain constrained. The real arena in which external cultural relations represent a significant stake is therefore the audio-visual sector and on the Internet, where culture and access to cultural resources become part of the way cultural stakeholders engage in public debate and free expression.

The EU itself has been criticised for applying double standards in Azerbaijan as far as rights-based cultural practice is concerned. Any future EU strategy has to continue struggling to make a true and decisive impact on the improvement of fundamental human rights and democracy in the country. However, most cultural stakeholders welcome closer cooperation with the
EU. In addition to bringing Europe to Azerbaijan, some cultural stakeholders hope for more opportunities to bring Azerbaijan to Europe and to make Azerbaijani cultural stakeholders more aware of the European approach to external cultural relations.

It could be helpful to create an EU-Azerbaijani coordination group that could design a strategic approach to cultural development. Such a coordinating unit would need to prioritise the fields in need of development. The non-governmental cultural sector deserves more space and should be encouraged to develop new international activities abroad. In this regard, the independent Arts Council of Azerbaijan could be a source of inspiration. Greater cooperation with the EU in the field of digital diplomacy and on ensuring accessibility to cultural offerings by way of Internet technologies would also be welcome.

2.4 Brazil, Europe and the EU

Brazil is in the global spotlight. Its recent economic growth as well as the organisation of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games have ensured that countries around the world are more interested than ever in increasing their cultural cooperation with Brazil.

The government is currently developing a new strategy to extend the role of culture in its external relations, a step that reflects the importance it now attaches to this domain. The Ministry of Culture is responsible for drafting the new strategy, albeit in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation and the Ministry of Tourism. The government is planning to release its new guidelines in 2014.

The existing cultural diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consists of actions to promote the dissemination and distribution of the diversity of Brazilian culture – to achieve cultural as well as political, commercial, economic, scientific and technological objectives. To broaden its cooperation with the private sector, it created in 2011 a Cultural Diplomacy Forum with Brazilian companies operating abroad.

Brazil has organised and been the guest of honour in a number of major cultural events in recent years, all aimed at highlighting the complexity and richness of cultural life in Brazil. The latest have been: Midem in February 2014, the Frankfurt Book Fair in October 2013, the Month of Brazil in China in September 2013, the Year of Brazil in Portugal and Year of Portugal in Brazil
from September 2012 to June 2013, and the country’s presence at Europalia in Belgium from October 2011 to January 2012.

Cultural activities in Brazil are sponsored extensively by banks and large companies through the ‘Lei Rouanet’ (Rouanet Act), the country’s tax incentive scheme. Most activities with an international dimension, however, involve bringing the manifestations of other cultures to Brazil rather than the projection of Brazilian cultural expression abroad.

Traditionally, Brazil has focused more on Europe than the rest of the world. However, globalisation is now starting to alter this focus. Apart from its historically important partners in Latin America (the Mercosur countries) and other Portuguese-speaking countries, including East Timor and Macao, the BRICS countries and Asia are now gaining importance for Brazil.

Yet Brazil and the EU still have a lot in common that can be conducive to the development of far deeper cultural ties. Brazilian stakeholders have expressed their eagerness to strengthen cultural cooperation with both the EU and its Member States. They consider that the EU needs to create a level playing field where the cultural operators of each of its Member States can have a fair and equal chance of succeeding in entering into cultural cooperation with Brazil.

A common European strategy for culture in external relations would allow the Brazilian government, cultural operators and businesses to use it as a basis to develop and/or adapt their own strategies and programmes. An EU strategy would enable policy dialogues with third countries that have (or are developing) a strategy. Without such a strategy there would be no encouragement for Brazilian actions and efforts that would concern the EU as a whole. It is the diversity of European cultures and cultural activities that makes Europe attractive to Brazilian cultural operators.

On a more practical level, in a first stage, EU-Brazil cooperation according to stakeholders could concentrate on the following actions: 1) an inventory of Brazilian and European cultural operators interested in cooperation or investing in each other’s markets; 2) measures to increase cooperation between the cultural and creative industries; 3) cooperation between universities on issues such as cultural policy, cultural management, heritage preservation and urban planning; 4) cooperation between cities and regions; and 5) structured cooperation between the EU Delegation and the European cultural institutions based in Brazil.
2.5 Canada, Europe and the EU

Canada’s relatively ‘young’ culture is much more than the product of British and French colonisation. In building an identity that differs considerably from its southern neighbour – the USA – Canada has to reconcile the interests not only of two major language groups, but also the so called ‘First Nation’ peoples (more than half a million North American Indians), the Inuit peoples, and an increasing population diversity as a result of immigration, especially from Asia, Central and South America, the Middle East and Africa (about 50% of the population of its largest city, Toronto, were born outside of Canada).

Among the other challenges that have faced cultural policy makers over the years are the fact that Canada’s population of approximately 35 million is spread over a huge land mass (it is the second largest country in the world) and the reality that it shares its southern border with the USA, which exercises a significant and constant economic and cultural influence (on its neighbour).

Responsibility for international cultural relations is shared between the Federal Government, provinces and cities. Key Federal Government actors are the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development and the Department of Canadian Heritage. The quasi-independent Canada Council for the Arts supports international tours and visits by Canadian artists abroad. Recent years have been difficult for Canadian culture, both domestically and internationally, as the sector has faced serious budgetary reductions. The Federal Government’s role in promoting culture in external relations has been much diminished since 2008/09, when it disbanded its main international programmes. Support at the provincial level has also fallen. The most obvious exception in this regard is Québec, where supporting culture has long been regarded as a political imperative. The Government of Québec has expanded its support for culture in external relations, focussing especially on the promotion of the province’s cultural and creative industries. The province has established cultural relations with a number of European regions and has representative offices in 15 countries, five of which are in the EU.

Although the Federal Government’s geographical interests are fairly broad, Europe remains on its radar and is regarded by many Canadians as an important area for international engagement. There is a general consensus in Canada that engaging with Europe and European organisations is generally easier than with many other parts of the world. This is partly attributable to the historical European roots of many Canadian citizens and the country’s continuing constitutional connection with the UK.
Canada was the featured country (together with Australia) in the 2013 Special Action for third countries conducted within the European Commission’s Culture Programme. In 2013 the EU and Canada reached an agreement on the key elements of a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement that seeks to eliminate most industrial tariffs. The impact of this agreement on the creative and cultural industries remains to be seen. However, Canadian cultural actors have registered concerns about the failure of trade commissioners outside Quebec to recognise that the cultural sector should also be considered when organizing trade visits.

The main obstacle to building stronger cultural relations with Europe is the lack of funds. Hence, any EU initiative would need to provide financial incentives to stimulate cultural projects between the two continents. Canadian cultural organisations and practitioners would welcome EU financial assistance if this would help co-operation initiatives, especially in the areas of museums, exhibitions, science centres, circus and the performing arts, higher education and research, and as long as application procedures are not (too) complex. Some Canadian organisations are well connected internationally and this could facilitate engagement with prospective European partners. Such co-operation should extend to support for collaboration at the municipal level, especially now that some Canadian cities and their cultural sectors appear to be more committed to international engagement than the Federal Government, although the available funding for such engagement may be restricted. Such constraints are far less in evidence in Québec in general and Montréal in particular, and both continue to offer avenues for stronger relations with Europe. Unlike a number of other countries, Canada is, in the main, open to providing visas for performances and temporary work in Canada, which should be acknowledged as an opportunity in itself.

2.6 China, Europe and the EU

The economic rise of China during the last decade has strongly influenced its appeal to the rest of the world. This has led the Chinese government to increase its utilization of culture in external relations as a tool to shape the perception and image of China abroad and expand its international influence. Culture has become an important tool of China’s “soft power”.

In 2007 President Hu Jintao announced at the Communist Party Congress that culture was of strategic importance for the image of China and its economic development. This policy prompted a shift in focus from cultural exchange to cultural trade. Culture is thus not only being used to improve the
image of China and promote mutual understanding, but has also become a tool for generating income and economic benefits.

Apart from investing heavily in the cultural and creative industries, the Chinese government has also invested in education, communication and information. A good example is the establishment of the Confucius Institutes around the world to promote the Chinese language and culture abroad. There are currently 456 Confucius Institutes and plans to have 1000 in place by 2020. To expand the number of institutes as quickly as possible the Chinese government is establishing joint ventures with foreign universities. Since most Western universities are facing budget cuts, such joint ventures are regarded as creating a win-win situation. There are no geographical priorities with regard to where these entities should be located abroad and many are being created in response to demands from foreign universities.

In order to provide a Chinese perspective on world events the government has set up a 24-hour news channel (a collaboration between the official press agency Xinhua and the public television broadcaster CCTV) and an international newspaper (China Daily).

At the central government level, the Ministries of Culture, Foreign Affairs, Education and Commerce have the competence to deal with culture in external relations. Regional and local governments are also entitled to engage in cultural cooperation with foreign authorities and cultural institutions. They have taken an active role in setting up culture-orientated development strategies and developed their own policies for cultural cooperation with foreign countries. In particular, the major Chinese cities have embraced the ‘creative cities’ concept and have adopted plans to enhance local culture and creativity. For example, Beijing, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Qingdao are becoming the leading ‘creative cities’ of China. Local authorities are also involved in the financing and selection of international projects and cooperate with state-owned companies to set up large-scale projects.

China’s priority countries for culture in external relations correspond to its foreign policy strategies (both political and economic). Its first priority is the US and its second is the EU. Japan comes a somewhat distant third. China is also beginning to show more interest in its other Asian neighbours, as well as countries on the African continent.

Chinese public and private stakeholders on the whole see an added value in an EU Strategy for external cultural relations. The Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have improved their cultural cooperation with the EC in the last decade and wish to continue the dialogues that have been
set up. Their suggested areas for cooperation are largely in line with their Five-Year Plans, programmes and the joint EU-China Declarations: transfer of knowledge for the development of innovative products; access to markets in the EU; management of cultural institutions and CCIs; cooperation in the field of intangible cultural heritage, and an increase of exchanges in the area of contemporary, performing and visual arts.

Chinese private stakeholders were, however, more critical. Although they support an EU strategy for culture in external relations, they hope that it will not turn out to be merely a ‘soft power’ tool of EU institutions or another strategy to impose a Eurocentric perspective on a new and attractive economic sector. People in China lack awareness of the EU, and culture could be a way to inform them about the changes taking place in Europe and the rest of the world. Many find culture to be a better tool of intercultural communication than economics or politics. Activities in the arts and culture could serve as the ideal mediators between the two very different value systems, through their capacity to express and convey mind-sets and concepts beyond preconceived positions.

According to private stakeholders, China’s mainstream CCIs and consumption currently provide the government’s terms of reference. As European culture is heterogeneous it would be valuable for the EU to focus on measures that could also explore the diversity of culture in China. People-to-people based artistic exchanges, creative hubs, intercultural training, management training, residency programmes and co-production activities were seen as essential tools by private Chinese stakeholders to improve EU-China cultural cooperation.

2.7 Egypt, Europe and the EU

Since the 2011 revolution in Egypt, the country’s state-led cultural policy system has been at a point of convergence between rebirth, reorganisation and destruction. Continuing instability and political struggles have made the adoption of a comprehensive external cultural strategy difficult. Ad hoc public action is likely to prevail, and most innovations will probably continue to emerge from the independent cultural scene that is supported by foreign partners.

Culture is a central element of many political and societal movements in Egypt. This has an impact on the role of culture in external relations, for instance in the field of film and television. Egypt has long been the epicentre of, and remains a reference for, Arab popular culture, producing popular TV programmes and series, singing contests and a range of literature. It is
also a hub of inter-Arab cultural relations. However, it is now experiencing competition from other Arab countries. Yet at the same time, non-state cultural initiatives connected to international partners and practices are flourishing. In the currently uncertain political environment, and as a result of a deeply entrenched mistrust of government structures, the non-profit, secular cultural sector, based in Cairo and Alexandria and mostly supported by national European and/or EU and other Western funders, has become a driving force in international cultural relations. For a number of experts, the main challenge ahead for contemporary Egypt involves the choice of the cultural identity the country wishes to embrace and deciding whether it should adopt already established models (whether from Egypt itself, from other Arab countries such as Tunisia, Morocco or Jordan, or from European cultures) or forge its own model.

Most stakeholders still see Europe as a very important partner for geographical, historical, cultural, economic (including tourism) and political reasons. However, some also argue that that it is not necessarily the most beneficial part of the world for them. According to Egyptian stakeholders, stereotypes on both sides persist and Europe is considered as too self-indulgent in its belief that Europeans know a lot about other cultures. Therefore Egyptian stakeholders propose placing more emphasis on showing the contemporary side of Egypt, not only its past and its heritage. In addition, some experts consider that Egyptians feel marginalised by Europe in terms of its international cultural relations, which are now geared towards other partners and models (for instance in Asia).

Any future EU strategy must also take into account that support from European national cultural organisations for independent Egyptian cultural professionals is sometimes controversial among Egyptian stakeholders. While it is naturally welcomed by those who depend upon it, such support is also viewed as a way of pursuing a political agenda that encourages ‘underground’ and unofficial organisations. In addition, EU programmes, and in particular what is perceived as a compulsory requirement for projects to form partnerships with European or other counterparts from the region, were sometimes criticised as disrespectful of the real intentions of project promoters. Stakeholders, therefore, recommended a focus on globally relevant topics with shared values.

While acknowledging the need for structural funding, several stakeholders insisted that there is a particular need for the transfer and re-appropriation of knowledge and know-how. It was therefore suggested that more exchange should be promoted between cultural professionals on the topic of culture in external relations itself. There is broad consensus about the need to support the sustainability (for instance by financing basic infrastructures and
equipment) of independent cultural organisations, while also contributing to their capacity-building and professionalization (training in fundraising). In the (perhaps unlikely) event that the Egyptian Government would agree, the EU could also offer help to re-work the legislative framework related to culture (from censorship to taxation of cultural activities, trade in cultural goods, audio-visual and distribution systems, and new media).

2.8 Georgia, Europe and the EU

Georgia is in a phase of political transition. The 2013 elections, which brought Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili to power, ushered in an era of political and cultural uncertainty. However, negotiations about a free trade agreement and an association agreement with the EU have moved forward. What remains to be seen is how the new prime minister will address the issue of unresolved conflicts and the impact this will have on the country’s external cultural relations.

Cultural relations between the Georgian cultural sector and its counterparts in the EU have intensified in the last few years, in particular since the launch in 2010 of negotiations on an association agreement, illustrating the strong aspirations of the Georgian leadership, notably former President Saakashvili himself, who has vocally proclaimed that Georgia belongs to Europe and to the West. For a country threatened by unresolved internal conflicts and historic tensions with Russia, culture has become an essential instrument with which to establish international connections and secure political support from abroad. The Georgian government has a deliberate policy of nation branding, of which cultural tourism is a part; these efforts will no doubt continue. Besides the government, there is a dynamic non-state cultural sector, though the two do not necessarily work in synergy. The Georgian Orthodox Church has a very strong political, economic and societal role in Georgia. Relations between the state and the church, particularly in the heritage field, are sometimes tense and these tensions have implications for the direction taken by the country’s heritage preservation efforts in the context of an outward-looking tourism policy.

General considerations and expectations vis-à-vis the EU and Europe relate to closer cooperation both with the EU as a donor and policy partner and with individual European countries. The stakeholders expressed their view that there is always a fine line between cooperation and imposition in EU-funded partnership projects – this should be kept in mind by Western European partners when interacting with Georgian counterparts, who want to be treated as skilled equals and not be burdened by clichés of
ignorant ‘citizens of a post-Soviet country’. Intensifying the relationship between Georgian stakeholders and artists and Western Europe could be part of cultural awareness-raising in the form of arts projects between the EU and neighbouring countries. More direct dialogue with high-level EU policy makers on cultural issues would also be welcome as a way of raising awareness among the latter of the need to ensure an enabling economic environment for cultural operators through resilient managerial structures. This would also enhance the situation of the cultural and creative industries, cultural heritage organisations and the contemporary arts.

A particular effort should be made in the field of translation. The idea of a web-based multi-lingual glossary/dictionary of cultural relations (including technical terms used in the trade in cultural goods) could be a first step. There is a strong need for more experience-sharing by EU cultural managers and professionals (for instance, with regard to existing EU and European decision-making and funding structures or with policies that enable and engage with disabled people). In the film sector, there is a strong need for more knowledge transfer and experience-sharing on taxation laws (WTO compliance and taxation clauses for the cultural sector) and bilateral co-production agreements. Support for the development of better statistics and analytical systems relating to cultural policies and the cultural sector is also expected from the EU to improve Georgian policy making structures.

2.9 India, Europe and the EU

Although the Indian government formally gives priority to relations with neighbouring countries in South, Central and East Asia in the context of its ‘Look East Policy’, the legacies of history, as well as prevailing societal preferences, have lent prominence to cultural relations with Europe. While cultural relations with partners in the individual Member States of Europe are rich and varied, both governmental and non-governmental cultural actors are sceptical about the potential for cooperation at the overarching EU level. Yet at the same time they also express clear expectations of a possible dedicated ‘culture in external relations’ strategy on the part of the EU.

Indian actors enunciate a number of key principles in this regard. First, any future EU strategy on culture should avoid homogenized ideas of culture on both sides, particularly since many European stereotypes about India persist, as do Indian stereotypes about Europe. Pan-European initiatives could help to overcome the considerable ignorance in India of the different types and forms of expression that (also) exist in Europe and vice versa. For Indian stakeholders, such initiatives need to go beyond the mere representation of European culture in India and Indian culture in Europe and instead cultivate
the catalytic, capacity-building and mutual learning that can take place through cultural encounters at many levels.

Examples include a journal on the ‘Europe of ideas’; a programme of residencies enabling European writers or stage directors to work in India and vice versa; a purposeful media campaign by the EU in cooperation with India’s broadcasting authorities; translations of Indian literary works into European languages other than English and European literary works into Indian languages other than Hindi. The EU needs to reach out effectively in the digital environment in order to ensure that its strategies have an impact on the country’s young people, who are increasingly connected to digital and social media networks in which culture has taken on different forms. Hence, digital information portals should be created in order to share information about the many and diverse cultural exchange opportunities that exist across both India and the EU. A unified online platform could also be utilized by both the individual MS and the EU to make applications, reviewing systems and follow-through procedures available.

There is also a great deal of scope for deepening cultural relations by reaching out more systematically to civil society in general, especially outside the major cities, as well as by adapting European cultural offerings to the needs and aspirations of a growing number of autonomous entrepreneurs in the Indian socio-cultural sector. Value is placed on collaborative ventures in which mutual learning occurs systematically across continents. As the Indian cultural scene lacks adequate professionalism, Indian cultural actors attach great importance to the empowerment, international networking and capacity-building brought about through cooperation with Europeans. The EU could play a coordinating role in promoting exchanges of expertise, methodologies and practices.

The potential of the Indian educational sector is perceived to be largely untapped. The EU should therefore also work through India’s many universities in order to present cultural relations as a process of mutual cultural education. Universities have become important centres of cultural production and presentation. Given the limitations of the publicly funded universities in India, the EU should also look to building links with the newly emerging private universities. Academics would like to see much more intellectual exchange than currently takes place, particularly in the light of the fact that there has been a reduction of centres of Indian studies in European universities in recent years.

Indian cultural actors would like to see dialogical and collaborative relationships of this kind take shape and be given significant support at Union level, in other words across the entire geographical space constituted
by the EU’s Member States. To this end, cooperation needs to be simplified. The EU needs to overcome its image as a complex organisation that is over-institutionalised and excessively bureaucratic, thus too complicated to cooperate with. Application procedures and the accessibility of information ought to be simplified and made far more transparent. Furthermore, the EU should simplify visa regulations, which currently constitute a major barrier to cultural exchange, particularly in the case of the Schengen countries.

The principle of ‘unity in diversity’ has played a major role in the development of the Indian nation, and India’s cultural actors would certainly greet any EU initiative that is truly designed and implemented on the scale of the Union as a whole.

2.10 Israel, Europe and the EU

The cultural life of Israel is rich and varied as a result of the country’s diverse population and its various minority groups. Despite the fact that Israeli art and culture are very well received around the world, the Israeli government does not make efforts to export culture on a large scale. The prioritisation of other policy areas, such as defence, means that funding for culture in external relations is limited. The ministries and government agencies responsible for cultural action abroad, along with private actors, depend on funding from outside – mainly from Jewish organisations in the US, but also from the cultural institutes of individual EU Member States, as well as from the EU as a whole. Israel was among the first wave of countries to agree on an ENP Action Plan with the EU. As European arts and culture are highly valued by the Israeli cultural stakeholders interviewed for this report, and as many of them feel ‘culturally European’, they would greatly welcome the development of a closer relationship with the EU.

However, at present, perceptions of the EU and expectations regarding a future EU strategy in Israel are sometimes contradictory. While private actors and NGOs underlined that they appreciate themes and emphases within European cultural programmes such as ‘diversity’, ‘European-ness’, ‘cross-disciplinarity’ and ‘multiculturalism’, government officials expressed concerns that the propagation of ‘European values’ within EU programmes - for example those connected with peace building, human rights and Arab-Israeli dialogue - could contribute to increasing the divisions within Israeli society. Any future EU strategy on culture should therefore take into account the significant impact that the Middle East conflict has on Israel, and recognise that there are many groups, parties and subcultures within the country that have expressed needs and expectations that are different
and sometimes contradictory. The EU must also take care not to exclude the ethnic minorities within Israel – of which Arabs make up the largest community.

However, in general, Israeli cultural actors – whether associated with the government or not – would like to be valued by the EU as equal partners. In particular, artists would like to have more access to European networks and platforms – an effort to meet that request could be coordinated on an EU-wide level. They would also like to see every relevant EU programme developed in collaboration with Israeli partners, possibly within the framework of an EU-Israeli commission. In future, EU programmes should aim to support capacity-building, help to build cultural institutions and improve sustainability. The exchange of experience in the ‘management of diversity’ – an area that presents opportunities for Israelis and Europeans to learn from each other – could provide a context for cooperation in the area of culture. The creative industries, particularly industrial and fashion design, are also seen as presenting opportunities for cooperation.

2.11 Japan, Europe and the EU

As a key player in Japan’s public diplomacy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a Public Diplomacy Strategy Division. It also provides much of the funding for the quasi-independent Japan Foundation to support cultural and intellectual exchange. Programmes for international cultural exchange are also provided by the Agency for Cultural Affairs, which is the main instrument of government support for Japan’s domestic cultural sector. However, cultural ‘exchange’ in the Japanese context focuses more on providing overseas opportunities for Japanese arts and artists than it does on reciprocity. Nevertheless, some funding for visits to Japan by overseas artists, academics and cultural organisations is provided by the government and a number of private foundations.

Currently, much of the government’s interest and its financial resources are being directed at a major branding initiative, ‘Cool Japan’, which is designed to promote interest in selected creative industries, aspects of Japanese culture and lifestyles as part of efforts to increase international opportunities for the export of Japanese cultural goods, enhance awareness of the ‘uniqueness’ of Japan, increase tourism and, in the process, to stimulate the domestic economy. The Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry has an important role in external relations by virtue of its support for the export of Japan’s creative industries and its involvement in the ‘Cool Japan’ initiative (for which a new body is being created to manage the campaign initiatives).
Japan’s geographical focus is on the Asian region in general and emerging cities in particular, rather than on Europe. It is evident that Japanese cultural practitioners may have some difficulty with the notion of co-operation with the EU as an entity as opposed to individual Member States, unless there is a European funding stream along the lines of the Creative Europe Programme 2014-2020 to which they and/or their European partners could apply.

That said, a number of possible avenues for greater EU-Japan engagement may be envisaged, especially if the focus is on the younger generation. At the same time, there are inhibiting factors, including limitations on visas for EU countries, a lack of confidence and language skills, and the somewhat introverted mind-set of many Japanese cultural professionals. The following areas have been suggested as possible avenues for engagement by the EU with Japan: co-production in the audio-visual sector and the performing arts and co-curation in the visual arts and design, as well as artist residencies and intellectual exchange in general; schemes that increase opportunities for the mobility of artists/performers and encourage young creative entrepreneurs to develop their skills and network between Japan and the EU; opportunities to share Europe’s experience in the area of intercultural dialogue; the sharing of expertise in the field of digital arts. It has been suggested that a network of new European/Asian media festivals could be developed and cultural collaboration could be encouraged between creative cities in the EU and Japan. How the cultural sector internationalizes itself is a big issue in Japan and perhaps consideration could be given to how the collective experience of EU Member States might be shared and whether this is something the EU might be able to facilitate.

2.12 Jordan, Europe and the EU

The Kingdom of Jordan’s international relations have historically been marked by openness and peaceful ties within a turbulent regional context, where neighbours have often been at war with another. An emphasis is placed on the cultural and creative industries, which are encouraged to grow and develop abroad: they represent an important asset in a small country without natural resources. Although Jordan does not have a fully-fledged external cultural relations strategy, there is a concerted national information technology (IT) strategy framing the efforts and initiatives of the cultural creative industries abroad. However, the cultural sector still lacks skills and professionals in the arts as well as in the field of cultural programme management. Non-state cultural work in Jordan is usually referred to in terms of a cultural market, rather than in terms of civil society organisations conducting cultural activities.
In the last few years, thanks to very effective synergies between Jordan’s creative industries, EUNIC and some public authorities as well as other international partners, the country’s cultural sector has been infused with a new dynamic in both its national and international dimensions. Building capacities and enhancing skills in the cultural and educational sectors represents one potential field of future cooperation with Europe/the EU.

2.13 Republic of Korea (South Korea), Europe and the EU

South Korea has a plethora of organisations and mechanisms involved in cultural diplomacy and international exchange. This is partly the result of bureaucratic fragmentation and inter-departmental competition within the central government and it has contributed to an absence of cohesive strategic goals. Recent studies have recommended new policies and structures to enhance and develop new ways of engaging in cultural exchange. The Ministry of Culture, Sport & Tourism has a lead role in cultural diplomacy and exchange both directly and via its support of the international presence of 25 Korean Cultural Centres and more than 90 Sejong Institutes offering instruction in the Korean language. It has plans to considerably expand the numbers of both. The Ministry also supports the Korea Arts Management Service (which provides mobility grants, partnership with international festivals and cultural organisations, and associated international services for performing arts) and the Arts Council Korea (which funds Korean input into international cultural events, as well as arts residency opportunities). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promotes public and cultural diplomacy initiatives and is responsible for its chief instrument of academic, cultural and intellectual exchange, the Korea Foundation.

It is evident where the key priorities for culture in external relations lie: the pursuit of greater international recognition of South Korea through the international exposure of its culture and its cultural industries and the desire to take advantage of the global interest in, and sustain the export income generated by the so-called Hallyu (or ‘Korean Wave’) – Korean TV dramas, pop music, films, fashion and video games – which currently tends to dominate government rhetoric on international cultural policy. A number of cities are actively engaged internationally and have branded themselves through specific art forms.

In the light of its desire for greater international recognition through its culture and cultural products, and the relatively generous budgets it is making available (culture is one of the priorities of the current government), South Korea appears open to international engagement with a wide range
of countries. These include a number of western and eastern European countries and, of course, the USA. However, in recent years Korea's focus has increasingly turned towards its immediate neighbours and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

As regards cooperation with Europe/the EU, the EU Delegation in Seoul is small and does not have a cultural dimension to its work. Cultural institutes/embassies of Member States are active in Korea, though EUNIC is not. The recently launched EU/South Korea Protocol on Cultural Co-operation could provide some impetus for co-productions in the audio-visual sector and cultural exchange and dialogue between cultural practitioners. At the same time, however, there is no enthusiasm among cultural actors for the EU to simply pursue a programme of activities that has little to do with the interests of cultural practitioners in South Korea or Europe and everything to do with promoting the EU.

Avenues that could be fruitful for the EU to consider are the provision of funds that would facilitate co-production and co-curation, as well as cooperation of European cities with cities in South Korea that are active in international cultural networks. EU support for small-scale activities that facilitate cultural engagement would be welcome. Although there appears to be quite a lot of interaction between South Korea and Europe, there is still not enough data available on the full extent of cultural mobility flows – a point recognised in a recent report on EU-South Korea trends in cultural exchange prepared for/by the European Expert Network on Culture. The authors point to the possibility of one of South Korea's research institutes (the Korea Culture & Tourism Institute springs to mind) undertaking such work, and one of the first things the EU could do would be to contribute funding for such a survey. Co-operation is needed on translations to address the imbalance in this area. There were also suggestions that the EU could provide a platform for cultural co-operation, such as ‘seasons’ or ‘years of’, open to smaller EU Member States that do not have the resources or international presence to pursue cultural activities in South Korea on their own.

2.14 Lebanon, Europe and the EU

In Lebanon, culture in external relations is mostly a non-state affair developed by an internationalised microcosm. The Lebanese diaspora and numerous links with the Arab world place Lebanese actors in the position of potential international cultural brokers. At present, the ongoing political and security

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problems caused by the Syrian crisis, along with the continuing presence of Palestinian refugees, is having consequences for the stability of Lebanese society as a whole, as well as the cultural scene. Culture in Lebanon – as in the Arab world in general – is highly politicised and provides a way to engage with contemporary debates on identity, religion and economic inequalities. Current humanitarian, political and security emergencies also constrain European cultural initiatives and raise new questions about Europe’s role and priorities.

Lebanon’s cultural relations with Europe are dominated by its links with France. Yet the English language is gaining influence as a result of the United States’ intensive involvement in Lebanese higher education and the increasing use of the Internet and new technologies, which have become crucial for those artists seeking to make their work known abroad. Among Westernised Lebanese cultural stakeholders there is a general appetite for closer relations with Europeans. Europe/the EU is considered to be an essential partner in external relations as well as a ‘connector’ to artists in other Arab countries. However, there is also a considerable mistrust of the EU’s interests in the region and some believe that European governments and institutions are using cultural work in Lebanon to pursue their political objectives, interests and agendas. It is, therefore, important for any future EU strategy on culture that Lebanese stakeholders are treated as equal partners by their European counterparts and the EU.

There is a general demand for more exchanges with Europe and the EU – provided that application procedures for funding are facilitated and that projects allow cooperation in line with the specific needs of Lebanese stakeholders. In order to create more accessible European local contact points, different types of local responsibilities were suggested. For instance, existing cultural institutes such as the Institut français could act as catalysts and hosts for other European initiatives and should be empowered by channelling European resources to them. A second option could be to strengthen EUNIC. Another suggestion was to facilitate more direct involvement by the EU delegation with cultural stakeholders in Lebanon. Some stakeholders considered that the Anna Lindh Foundation’s connection to the real cultural sector – particularly with regard to youth programmes – could be improved.

Stakeholders also emphasized the need to open EU cultural initiatives to universities and to find more effective ways of merging funding for higher education and culture. It was also suggested that the EU could conduct more systematic, brief and user-friendly feedback surveys about the efficiency of its work. The idea of developing inter-regional cultural relations, for instance between Europe and the Middle East, was also suggested.
2.15 Mexico, Europe and the EU

Since 2008, Mexico, as a newly industrialised country and an emerging power, has been – together with Brazil – one of the EU’s two strategic partners in Latin America.

Since 2012, when the last general elections in Mexico were held, all government departments have been undergoing a process of extensive reorganisation that is still affecting the country’s cultural sectors. The most powerful government agencies responsible for international cultural relations, such as CONACULTA (National Council for Culture and the Arts), AMEXCID (Mexican Agency for International Cooperation for Development) and ProMéxico, are currently being restructured or are reformulating their programmes. Therefore, it is not possible to create a nuanced profile of Mexico’s future policy as regards culture in external relations, yet some trends can already be discerned. The process of reorganisation in government agencies, the decrease in the budget for CONACULTA (which has traditionally been responsible for the area of cultural exchange) and the restructuring of AMEXCID, where a new department for the promotion of culture and tourism (replacing culture and education) is being established, clearly demonstrate the tendency to focus increasingly on the economic aspect of culture.

Mexican governmental and non-governmental stakeholders alike reiterated their strong interest in improving cultural relations with the EU, as Europe is considered to be culturally closer to Mexico than other regions, such as Asia. The current phase of politically mandated reorganisation has given rise to a range of expectations. Despite the fact that within the framework of the Strategic Partnership there is a legal basis for cultural cooperation with the EU as an entity, Mexican stakeholders deplored the continuing lack of real dialogue in the fields of culture and education. A bilateral agreement with the European Commission could help to further this dialogue.

Artists and civil society cultural actors, who are quite concerned about the decrease in CONACULTA’s budget, are looking to the EU above all for new funding opportunities. They request more grants and programmes for Mexico, facilitation of the application process and better communication regarding the availability of assistance for completing applications. The Fondo Mixto de Cultura México – Union Europea has been a highly successful collaboration, and funding for a new phase has been secured. Networking between galleries or theatres in Mexico and Europe could be initiated and coordinated on an EU-wide level in order to strengthen the partnership between institutions and the civil societies in Mexico and Europe.
Representatives of civil society also consider experience in managing diversity, which Mexico and the EU have in common, to be a possible area of cooperation for the future, with the two sides as equal partners. The exchange of know-how and experience, along with networking in the field of cultural diversity, would benefit both the Mexican agencies and NGOs that are responsible for cultural diversity and the protection of minorities, and the EU.

In contrast to representatives of civil society, ProMéxico, the organisation overseen by the Mexican Ministry of Economics, clearly focuses on economic interests. A common EU strategy on culture would be welcome in Mexico, the agency says, ‘if this helps us make deals with European countries more quickly.’ Priority areas of cooperation would be creative industries and culture, and information technology and training programmes in both fields.

Both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders consider the areas of heritage conservation and tourism to be those with the greatest potential for future cooperation. In the area of heritage protection, the EU could create and establish supranational measures to limit or prevent the illicit sale of art and its movement into and through Europe. Because face-to-face communication is very important in Mexico, the EU could follow up on the proposal put forward by the EU delegation in Mexico: to erect a building that would represent the EU in Mexico ‘with culture at its heart,’ which could become the EU hub for Mexicans as well as Europeans in Mexico.

### 2.16 Moldova, Europe and the EU

Unlike some other European post-Soviet countries, Moldova has clearly chosen the path of European integration by joining the Eastern Partnership and, in particular, by initiating an Association Agreement with the EU. This has significant implications for its external cultural relations. The shift has taken some time and the Soviet legacy continues to exercise a powerful influence on the country’s national identity, including its cultural sector. It is against this background that recent government strategies on culture can be understood and interpreted. At the governmental level, external cultural relations are primarily the preserve of three departments: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Culture has informed the European Commission of its three priorities for external relations over the period 2014-2017: cultural policies and internal institutional and human capacities, the mobility of artists and collections, and the restoration of the country’s cultural heritage.
Cultural professionals and artists are still organised in professional (writers, theatre, architects) unions based on the Soviet model. Despite their Soviet origins, most of these unions have evolved, diversified and modernised in the ways they operate. However, over the last two decades, the cultural sector has been affected by a massive brain and talent drain. This economic emigration has reduced the country’s potential to develop an active cultural sector. Moldovan cultural stakeholders who remain in the country receive very little support from the State and are struggling to survive economically. They stress that funding for Moldovan culture almost exclusively comes from foreign cultural institutes. Although pro-European governments have taken steps towards European integration in a variety of policy areas, cultural professionals feel that the supporters of pro-European policies have neglected the cultural sector.

Any future EU strategy on culture must also take into account the role of Romania in Moldova’s cultural relations: the two countries share a language and a significant historical heritage, but Romania is more developed than its neighbour and is already a member of the EU. While it has supported Moldovan emancipation from Russian influence, Romania has also been keen to exercise its own. Relations between the two countries have now become even more ambiguous, with Romanian officials openly referring to the hypothetical possibility of Romanian-Moldovan unification. Although this is not a realistic option in the short term, it certainly needs to be taken into consideration as far as cultural relations are concerned.

Moldova’s cultural sector is entering a new phase during which the attitude of cultural stakeholders is likely to be divided between enthusiasm and scepticism: enthusiasm about potential opportunities opened up by a closer relationship with the EU (Association Agreement, Eastern Partnership, Creative Europe programme) and scepticism generated by missed opportunities, previous EU-funded initiatives and often cumbersome procedures. Some stakeholders have clearly expressed their hope that culture will be addressed within the framework of all EU programmes, even if they are not explicitly labelled as ‘cultural projects’. A second set of expectations relates to better and deeper cooperation between Moldovan authorities in charge of external cultural relations and the EU. According to independent culture professionals, such cooperation will require not only strong incentives from the EU to encourage a long term strategy for external cultural relations, but above all knowledgeable policymakers with a shared vision and improved cultural management skills. The Ministry of Culture is hoping to receive funds from the EU to conduct a comprehensive mapping of Moldova’s cultural and creative industries with a view to identifying potential avenues of development of the cultural sector and, therefore, its external exposure.
2.17 Morocco, Europe and the EU

Whereas several other Arab countries have experienced uprisings in recent years, Morocco has entered a phase of apparent political modernisation. The ways in which its multicultural society and government engage in external cultural relations are very diverse and are evolving rapidly. The external cultural policy system, which is still dominated by conspicuous interventions from the state apparatus and influential corporate sponsors, is increasingly diversifying. However, access to culture remains very unequal and limited outside the big cities of Rabat, Casablanca and Marrakesh. The Ministry of Culture has a limited budget for its operations and concrete initiatives. The Ministry of Communication is in charge of new media and information and communication technology. It oversees the cinema sector and is in charge of initiatives such as the preparation of a White Paper on the sector following a participatory consultative process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation supports international cultural relations and events, in particular international festivals and other types of cultural cooperation.

The most outward-looking cultural sub-sectors include cinema, which receives strong support and is equipped with a variety of promotional (and training) bodies, and the cultural-festival sector, along with diaspora organisations and the country’s diplomatic network.

Morocco is among the countries covered by the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (and was the first recipient of its assistance) and is a member of the Union for the Mediterranean. Within the framework of its association with the EU, Morocco has an advanced status that provides it with special access to cooperation with and support from the EU.

All stakeholders agree that the cultural sector in Morocco, because it has a key role in the development of the country, needs to be strengthened (including through more systematic data collection and management of public and cultural practices) and that this could be achieved through a deeper and more equal partnership with Europeans and the EU. Stakeholders emphasised the need for EU support in the training of cultural professionals and managers and policymakers in public administration, including universities (where cultural work plays a positive role vis-à-vis religious extremism) and civil society. In terms of policy areas, skills enhancement in the use of new technologies and digital tools was also underlined. Building capacities in the media dealing with cultural issues would also help enhance perceptions of the added value of external cultural relations. Cooperation and experience-sharing on the status of the artist, the professionalization of the cultural and creative industries sector and ways of protecting its outputs from destructive
market forces (the ‘exception culturelle’ model) were identified as potential areas for joint work with Europe.

In order to achieve this, relations will have to become more equal and reciprocal. Many would like to see a more open European cultural market for Moroccan goods and a bigger effort made to increase awareness of Moroccan cultural diversity. Providing encouragement and support for intensified international cultural relations at the sub-national level between local authorities is also seen as a potentially fruitful avenue of endeavour, one that could be based on more robust and systematic public-private partnerships.

2.18 Palestine, Europe and the EU

The role of culture in Palestine’s external relations is closely linked to the situation of culture within the Palestine – both are affected by the absence of a nation-state and Palestine’s fragmentation into different areas (e.g. West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem) which are spatially separated from each other and subject to the laws of different governing bodies. Today, the two areas in effect have two governments: the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) governs the West Bank, and the Hamas government has had effective control of the Gaza Strip since 2007, although it faces international diplomatic and economic isolation. Palestinian cultural actors, as well as their counterparts from other countries who wish to engage in cultural activities and intercultural relations with them face visa restrictions, travel limitations and the recurring denial of access to certain areas, for example, Gaza.

Because of the limited (financial and political) power of the PNA Ministries of Culture (MC) and Tourism and Antiquities (MTA), the responsibility for international cultural relations rests mainly on the shoulders of civil society - not only in terms of carrying out cultural activities, but also in terms of influencing policy makers. Both the government and private stakeholders consider culture to be an important ‘tool in the liberation battle’, a phrase used in the Palestinian National Plan. Culture is thus not perceived as of value in and of itself, but rather as an instrument to express, strengthen and promote Palestinian identity. Any EU strategy therefore has to take into account the fact that European activities in Palestine take place in a context that is not entirely in line with European values such as peace building, gender equality, democracy and human rights. Palestinian positions are also, at times, characterised by essentialist notions of cultural identity.
Owing to its status as an ENP Country and to the extensive presence of European national cultural institutes, the geographical priorities of the Palestinian Territories clearly lie within the EU, where the main donors for national and international cultural activities are located. Because of their dependence on foreign support, governmental and non-governmental, stakeholders from both Palestine and Europe have criticised the existing donor-recipient relationship and asked the EU to consider how an equal partnership could be established – not by implementing more programmes necessarily, but by coordinating existing programmes in ways that serve the needs of the Palestinian cultural scene as a whole.

The EU should therefore cooperate not only with civil society, but also with the ministries of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Although private stakeholders currently wield more influence, a future EU strategy should also take into account the government’s proposals for international cultural relations – particularly in the light of its good relations with civil society.

Moreover, the EU should bear in mind that, due to the geopolitical fragmentation of Palestine, every area requires a specific approach that is harmonised with regional needs. There are also high expectations regarding the ability of the EU to pressure the government(s) to facilitate visa agreements.

Both the government and private actors also proposed that the EU should maintain a supranational coordination role on different levels: among the Member States in order to avoid duplication and overlapping of activities; between local EUNIC members and Palestinian stakeholders (for example, by organising regular meetings); between EUNIC members and government officials; and among Palestinians themselves (e.g. local Palestinian Institutions and private actors currently in competition with one another). Stakeholders therefore suggested that a ‘local manager’ from the EU should be appointed to coordinate activities and help develop databases. All the Palestinian stakeholders consulted see it as crucial that they be able to enter into personal contact with the EU.

Independently of content, the EU should focus on capacity-building and support long-term projects that allow Palestinians to accumulate and share knowledge, as opposed to ‘one-off’ programmes. These projects and programmes should be monitored and evaluated to avoid initiatives fizzling out without producing any results. Particular potential is seen in the heritage sector and in tourism: the EU could coordinate the activities of foreign NGOs in Palestine in order to avoid the abandonment of sites/projects once a project is completed and to support activities that strengthen community-based tourism.
2.19 Russia, Europe and the EU

Culture has become a part of the Kremlin’s new soft power diplomacy. Between 2000 and 2008, the budget for culture underwent a tenfold increase, rising from about EUR 91 million to 913 million. In December 2012, President Putin announced that the government planned to promote Russian culture and language within the context of its international relations. The Russian strategy on culture in external relations has been described in the February 2013 statement officially called the ‘Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’ as a ‘toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives. It is built around six elements 1) image building; 2) outreach to the Russian diaspora community; 3) dissemination of the Russian language; 4) international academic and student exchange; 5) scheme of bilateral ‘years’ or ‘seasons’ of culture with foreign countries and 6) cultural heritage preservation.

The media and the Orthodox Church are instruments actively used by the government to implement its strategy. 2014 is the ‘Year of Culture’ in Russia; ‘patriotism’ is deployed as a key word in the promotion of Russia’s historical achievements. However, critics of the government voice concerns that culture is being used too much as a propaganda tool. The Russian Government, particularly the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has a top-down approach to culture and rarely enters into dialogue with its citizens on cultural policies. A number of artists feel that they are being used to present a pseudo-democratic façade to foreign audiences.

The CIS States and Georgia with their large Russian communities are the priority countries for Russia. Russia recently signed cultural cooperation agreements with Brazil and China. Culture is also increasingly being used as an instrument to obtain more influence in Arab/Muslim countries such as Syria. The EU is regarded as less relevant and it is possible that in the future federal government officials will pay less attention to EU-Russia cultural cooperation policies and programmes. The current Minister of Culture appears to be more conservative in this regard than his predecessor. Constraints on cooperation with foreign NGO’s have recently been tightened. Foreign NGOs now need to be registered as ‘foreign agents’ and cannot apply for government funding. EU funding for the cultural sector is set to become more difficult to acquire in the future, as the EU is currently closing down many programmes. However, if the EU does not have a strategy for culture in its external relations with Russia, it will not be able to respond to the developments taking place there. It will be too difficult for individual EU Member States and their cultural institutions to promote cultural cooperation at the highest political level. Although Member States have the best access to cultural operators in their respective countries, they do not have the
political weight to take strategic cultural cooperation between the EU and Russia to the next level.

Despite the fairly negative outlook for future collaboration, consultations with both Russian and European public and private stakeholders are positive regarding the added value of a potential EU strategy for culture in its external relations. The Russian government would like to organise joint EU-Russia events during the ‘Year of Culture’ in 2014. Although EU-Russia cultural cooperation at the federal level looks to become more complicated in the future, at the local level, for example in Moscow, there is more interest in dealing with the EU. If a future EU strategy is to have a real impact, it needs to focus on young people, the ‘agents of change’, in the regions. A strategy is therefore needed on how to deal not only with the federal but also regional/local governments. The EU could also use culture as an instrument for improving relations between Russia and a number of EU Member States with which Russian citizens have previously not had good relations. Contemporary art is seen as an area with a huge potential for enhancing EU-Russia cultural relations and further promoting European culture on an international scale. A future EU strategy could also include projects based on the shared EU-Russia heritage, and the establishment of centres of excellence and clusters for culture at the regional level, as well as clusters within the cultural and creative sector in general. Such a strategy should also focus on providing international mobility funds for artists wishing to travel to third countries. The EU also needs to do more to promote itself in Russia, for example, by organizing large-scale events.

Culture has the advantage of providing avenues for addressing the concerns of the Russian population and promoting the common values of the EU such as human rights without this being perceived as a direct attack on the government.

2.20 South Africa, Europe and the EU

South Africa is the EU’s largest trading partner in Africa, and the EU is South Africa’s biggest trading partner after China. The Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement, in force since 2000, established a free trade area that covers 90% of bilateral trade between the EU and South Africa. Arts and creative products are an important part of this trade. However, there is a significant imbalance in favour of the EU as regards trade in cultural goods. At the same time, clear signals are being sent by Government that its geographical focus is South-South, especially the African continent, and the BRICS countries.
The South African government is currently seeking to establish a ‘whole’ government approach to external cultural policy formation, involving in particular the Department of Arts & Culture (DAC), which is focusing on processes of nation-building and social cohesion; the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), which aims to enhance South Africa’s position in Africa and the world, and the Department of Trade & Industry (DTI), which is seeking to increase trade and investment, especially through the creative and cultural industries, which have become a key focus for the government. As part of its ‘Mzansi Golden Economy Strategy’, which includes proposals for large-scale interventions to strengthen the arts, culture and heritage sectors, the government has committed itself to the creation of five million jobs over the next decade. However, the translation of policy into real action seems to be problematic, and the view of non-governmental cultural stakeholders in South Africa is that the government is not fulfilling its role in terms of cultural policy implementation whether domestically or internationally.

Although the government is interested in international cultural seasons (e.g. as with France in 2012 and 2013), in practice, international cultural initiatives are driven primarily by partners outside South Africa, by cultural institutes from EU Member States, or by non-governmental cultural stakeholders. Moreover, European cultural institutes and South African business partners are trusted more than government. Both the EU delegation and EUNIC are active and are an important part of the funding mix. Future cultural cooperation by the EU with South Africa needs to attach importance to the promotion of capacity building and the development of skills and networking among cultural actors in South Africa. The cultural sector is uncomfortable with EU support being channelled directly to government. There is a widely held view that it should go to organizations/stakeholders within the sector itself.

Historical baggage sometimes weighs heavily. The legacy of colonialism and apartheid has led to a tendency for government departments/officials to sometimes view relations with Europe or the EU as a subtle form of colonization. Access by South African cultural practitioners to visas for EU Member States is an even more significant obstacle to engagement with Europe.

Information gaps across the cultural sector suggest there may be a need in Africa for an equivalent to the 360° cultural co-operation portal developed by the Asia-Europe Foundation to facilitate Asia – Europe engagement. There is also strong support for the idea of a mobility fund that would enable cultural practitioners from South Africa to interact with their European counterparts, thereby stimulating greater interest in co-production and co-curation. The
EU could also consider ways of contributing to audience development in South Africa. This would be in line with one of the objectives of the new Creative Europe programme.

2.21 Tunisia, Europe and the EU

Since the 2011 revolution, the Tunisian government and cultural sector have functioned in a context of great uncertainty: a revolutionary phase of cultural liberation has been followed by the coming to power of a coalition in which Islamists have tried to gain more control over the cultural sector. The Ministry of Culture and the government have had to face both religious violence against freedom of expression in the arts and strong criticism of their positions from the arts and culture sector. As a result, culture has become increasingly politicised and polarised and a political stake in itself. Culture in relation to international partners has thus become part and parcel of the Tunisian political chessboard.

The independent cultural sector that played an instrumental role in the 2011 revolution is vibrant, but it now faces the challenges of the post-revolutionary era: the need to be sustainable and autonomous both from internal forces as well as from foreign influences.

A lot is expected of Europeans and the EU, but in a context of transformation and uncertainty, European cultural cooperation with Tunisia needs to be flexible. The improvement of reciprocal perceptions as a condition for going beyond a donor-recipient relationship will be crucial for any future EU strategy. For many stakeholders, many controversies and misperceptions between Tunisians and Europeans, but also amongst Tunisians themselves, are linked to enduring linguistic and attitudinal divides. The translation of books, but also subtitles on TV and broadcasting products in Tunisia and Europe, is seen as an essential means of building bridges between Tunisia and Europe. Despite an impressive blossoming of creative initiatives, the independent Tunisian cultural sector is still looking for sustainable and diverse financing modalities in a country where private sponsorship and philanthropy are not well established.

Some experts consider that in Tunisia cultural work should be understood in its broadest sense and be mainly directed towards education. Potential for an EU constructive approach is seen in the fact that post-revolutionary Tunisian society is now lacking ideas on how to transform itself: the younger generation, although having been at the forefront of the ‘cultural revolution’, feel that their conceptual horizon remains limited by their lack of experience in civil-society practices. Artists feel they need to redefine their work in
the wake of the revolution. Setting up and managing organisations is a completely new experience and a huge challenge. The EU could therefore provide training programmes for these cultural operators.

Options for EU-Tunisian cooperation include cultivating stronger relations between twinned Tunisian and European cities, engaging new generations on social networks, intensifying direct training and the transfer of knowledge between cultural professionals and managers from the public and nongovernmental sphere in relevant cultural fields (NGO management, lobbying practices, cinema, heritage, socio-cultural work), and promoting in-depth dialogue on the Internet and media regulation at national and global levels.

The EU could act as a bridge to other cultures in the Maghreb, Africa, the Arab world, Latin America and Northern European societies. Visa access and mobility should be facilitated.

2.22 Ukraine, Europe and the EU

Although Ukraine was a priority country for the EU well before the dramatic events that have unfolded in the weeks before this report was completed, in late 2013 its government took a decision to suspend preparations to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. Such an agreement, which would have included provisions relating to external relations in the fields of education, training and youth, culture, sport and physical activity, society, and cross-border and regional cooperation, would have been a milestone in the country’s international cultural relations. It would have opened up many new avenues for cooperation and integration beyond the Eastern Partnership culture programme. With the change of government in April 2014, the signing of an Association Agreement may well be on the policy agenda again soon.

The refusal to endorse the agreement and the turmoil it spurred are both expressions of the deep divisions within the country, both political and cultural. Culture is one of the main fault lines within Ukrainian society, which is caught between the EU and Eurasia or Russia and thus beset by geopolitical ambivalence.

The government plays a limited role regarding culture in external relations and has shown little sign of actively seeking greater rapprochement with the EU, though recent political developments may change this completely. International cultural activities appear fragmented across a variety of non-governmental initiatives, including several philanthropic foundations created by wealthy businessmen (the so-called ‘oligarchs’). The role of these
‘oligarchs’ in Ukraine’s economic, political, but also cultural life has become an extremely important variable that needs to be taken into account. Oligarchic philanthropy has become a powerful trendsetter and sponsor of large-scale, internationally relevant cultural work in Ukraine. At the same time, cultural philanthropy still inspires some mistrust within the population because of the controversial image of the ‘oligarchs’ and the existence of unprofessional, crime-based, fake foundations. However, the non-governmental cultural sector is where most of the innovations in external cultural relations are taking place and it has now become more important than the governmental one. Two other important groups of stakeholders are the churches in Ukraine, which play a very strong political and ethical role in the society, and the large Ukrainian diaspora, which protects the interests of Ukrainians abroad and takes a clearly pro-Western stance on what it refers to as Ukraine’s Euro-integration process.

However, there was consensus among the stakeholders interviewed that Ukrainian culture is not well known in EU countries and that this perpetuates a gap in cultural relations as well as a stereotype of Ukraine as a country in the cultural shadow of Russia. There is also a widespread feeling that Ukraine is not treated by the EU as an equal partner or as a representative of European culture. This state of affairs is worsened by EU visa policies, despite ongoing cooperation towards visa liberalisation. At the same time Ukrainian stakeholders also recognised that cultural policy makers lack skills and operate according to standards lower than those followed in the EU. They see the enhancement of cultural exchanges and relations as an opportunity to gain new knowledge through dialogue with Europeans. The country also needs to consider ways of promoting its research sector, and cooperation with the EU in this field could be useful.

It was recommended that culture should have a clearer role in meetings between high-level EU and Ukrainian policymakers. More support from the EU and European Member States for the independent cultural sector through exchanges, pilot reform projects, less restrictive visa procedures, and cultural management training would be of great value. Emphasis was also placed on the need for the EU to support government structures in order to reform practices and raise awareness of Western European experience and know-how in the management of external cultural policies.

2.23 The USA, Europe and the EU

As is well known cultural action in the United States of America is not centrally guided by any federal policy and is decentralized. No single
body has adopted a co-ordinating role in the pursuit of external cultural relations, nor is there any evidence of an overall strategic approach. For the US Government ‘culture’ is often equated with commerce and its cultural diplomacy is more akin to commercial diplomacy.

Cultural diplomacy is insufficiently regarded in the USA and the resources made available for cultural initiatives (whether through the Department of State, the National Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities and others) are very small for a country that has the world’s largest economy. One reason for this is a political perception that there is already a lot of US culture ‘out there’ in the wider world, a view based on the power and dominance of the audio-visual sector in general and Hollywood in particular. Another factor is that since the end of the ‘Cold War’ cultural diplomacy has not been considered so important. Arguments presented by numerous conferences and reports in recent years for greater involvement by the Federal Government in the cultural sector and for more resources to support culture in US external relations seem to have had little effect.

Implicit in the Federal Government’s use of culture as a diplomatic tool is a desire not only to (re)build trust through personal encounters, but also to combat violent extremism. Although Europe remains important to some extent to the Department of State (and even more so to many cultural practitioners), the Government’s geographical priorities are now especially focussed on East and South Asia and Africa.

The visa application process has changed the paradigm for international exchange. In the years since 9/11, US visa procedures for foreign artists and performers have become increasingly complex and expensive, and, according to arts presenters/promoters, decisions to grant visas have often been arbitrary. This situation is creating an impediment to international cultural co-operation with the US.

Fund-raising is very time-consuming and is another obstacle to international cultural engagement. Long before the first round of negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership between the EU and the US in July 2013, it was evident that there were considerable differences between the two sides, not least on issues such as the enforcement of intellectual property rights and the protection of Europe’s cultural sector in general and its audio-visual sector in particular. Moreover, the USA is the most prominent country that has not been prepared to sign the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.

Stakeholders consulted agree that any future EU strategy on culture should not be a branding exercise. In their view, such a strategy should focus on
providing advice and information for and about promising young artists as well as cultural organisations (perhaps via a dedicated online portal), and guidance that enables cultural practitioners from EU States/countries and the US to better understand each other and how they operate in their different cultural environments. Another important aspect of such a strategy in the view of stakeholders would be to provide an online platform for gathering information on visa applications, financing, taxation and other practical information that could facilitate cultural co-operation between the US and EU Member States.

A new organisation, the European-American Cultural Foundation, has been established to take over responsibility for ensuring a more secure framework for financing existing EU Delegation cultural activities, developing new educational, cultural and scientific programmes, and increasing awareness and the profile of Europe’s linguistic and cultural diversity. It will need to seek advice from cultural practitioners if it is to pursue a strategic and culturally relevant EU approach to culture in the US. Meanwhile, EUNIC clusters in Washington DC and New York City are quite active.

Suggestions for EU financial assistance included EU match funding/seed money for engagement between the European and US cultural sectors that would be directed to cultural organisations rather than to government, support for residencies not only for artists but also cultural managers, and funding not only for programming but also the international cultural project planning and evaluation process.
The preceding chapter has demonstrated several important things. The country report summaries have shown us that the patterns of cultural relations between Europe and the rest of the world are very variegated, shaped by the different motives that drive them and the different scales at which they operate. This is as true of the long-standing efforts of governments as well as those of civil society actors as it is of the culture in external relations efforts of the EU acting as an entity, modest though these have been so far.

In many instances, Europe’s cultural relations with third countries are already strong. This is notably the case (and for self-evident reasons) with countries such as Canada and the United States of America. It is also true of Russia, yet in somewhat different ways. Many countries in other regions have long-standing ties with countries in Europe, some of them dating back to the era of colonialism. In only a few instances are cultural ties still limited.

Yet in all cases, the consultation has revealed that so much more can and should be done. The pathways of interaction and exchange need to be broadened and made far more diverse and far-reaching than they are today. This will be essential in order to respond to the clearly expressed demand in third countries for stronger and better cultural relations with cultural operators from Europe, with European governments, as well as with the EU itself. While doubts have been expressed regarding the EU’s capacity to effectively reinforce such relations at the Union level, the European institutions often enjoy a good deal of credibility and are trusted in a way that nation-based cultural diplomacy often is not.

The consultation process itself raised expectations considerably within the third countries concerned. Moreover, many European cultural operators, notably, but certainly not exclusively, in so-called ‘small’ countries’ of the EU, have recognised the opportunities a fully-fledged European strategy would represent.

This high degree of interest on all sides is itself yet another sign of the increasingly visible place occupied by culture in the public policy agenda nearly everywhere, for economic and many other reasons. It is also a corollary of the widely shared yearning for an ethos and style of international cultural relations framed by more than just utilitarian considerations. The present moment is therefore charged with considerable promise for the deployment of culture in external relations. Europe and its interlocutors are at an important crossroads, between on the one hand great potential
and, on the other, equally great expectations. In many third countries, these expectations are such that a failure to meet them could lead to much frustration and disenchantment. Yet many obstacles remain. Overcoming those obstacles and realising the potential will release energies and commitments that could be of considerable added value for the EU and its Member States alike.

It is to all these topics that this chapter will now turn.

### 3.1 A coat of many colours

A key lesson learned is that the international cultural relations of all the countries studied for the purposes of this Preparatory Action make up a coat of many colours. There is a panoply of histories, motivations, attitudes, expectations, actors, stakeholders and domains. Hence no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution can be envisaged.

The third country consultations yielded many suggestions for how cultural relations with the EU might be developed or improved. Some of these are country-specific and have all been identified in Chapter 2. For the purposes of this chapter, we focus on those messages that are more commonly shared.

#### 3.1.1 Different motivations and goals

European patterns of cultural relations with other countries have been developed over several decades – in some cases centuries – to meet different sorts of goals. In third countries, the patterns of international cultural relations that have emerged are equally diverse. Almost everywhere, policy makers and cultural activists alike use the notion of ‘cultural diplomacy’ as the defining notion, so much so that it has become a new buzzword. An often-cited definition sees cultural diplomacy as ‘the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding.’

Often cultural relations are indeed practiced primarily in this idealistic spirit. However, more commonly, instrumental goals prevail, witness the statement of Marius Fransman, a South African politician, for whom cultural diplomacy

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'is about a country projecting its power in the domain of ideas – to influence the ideas and the outlook of states, international organisations and non-state actors in order to pursue its national interests and enhance its geopolitical standing.' For countries that are major exporters of goods and services as well as investments, their national interest requires expanding these domains, together with positioning the country in the international culture and tourism market. Yet other cultural actors, both official and non-official, are not primarily or not at all concerned with such ‘national’ or utilitarian goals, but seek rather the opportunity to interact with others for the sake of cultural and/or social enrichment and mutual benefit.

Governments themselves are increasingly keen to build alliances with non-state actors, notably artists and cultural operators, in order to engage in deeper relations, using (old and new) media that enable them to reach out to much broader audiences. Yet here too the consultation has shown that most artists and cultural practitioners themselves do not believe in the virtues of cultural relations for the same reasons that official bodies do. Instead of national projection or promotion, they seek in working internationally to attain mutual learning, the pooling of resources or co-financing, shared reflection, debate, research and experimentation and ‘in its most complex forms, cooperation in the creative processes, the creation of new artistic works’.

This is precisely the logic in which Europe’s many cultural networks have been operating over the last several decades. These networks have played a dynamic role in international cultural relations, facilitating contacts between professionals in many domains. In fact, some of the networks actually merged from a desire to find international partners with whom to share ideas and experience. Although often under-resourced, some networks have taken advantage of the EU’s cultural programmes and other funding sources to develop trans-national collaborative projects and build lasting relations with counterparts in many third countries. Many fulfil an important role as information sources for international cultural engagement. On the Move, the network for the promotion of artists’ mobility, for example, has produced a Guide to Funding Opportunities for the International Mobility of Artists and Cultural Professionals in Europe. Its links to information sources in other parts of the world, such as the Asia-Europe Foundation’s portal on cultural exchange with Asia (culture360.org), the Korea Arts Management

Service (gokams.or.kr/kams_eng) and the Arab Education Forum (www.almoultaka.com/defaulten.aspx) has enabled it to also disseminate information on funding opportunities for cultural exchange and mobility in Asia and in thirteen Arabic speaking countries.\(^3^9\) Networks clearly have a wealth of accumulated experience and goodwill that is of direct relevance to any future EU-wide strategy for culture in external relations.

In the eyes of many artists, cultural activists and commentators, crudely instrumental or interest-driven motives are threats to artistic and cultural integrity. Many officials and diplomats on the contrary have little faith in cultural value for its own sake. The consultation has shown, however, that the two positions do not constitute an ‘either-or’ alternative. Instead cultural relations can embrace both. There is ample space – and need – for policy and market driven ambitions, just as there is for intrinsically cultural or humanist ones. This being the case, whatever their differing ultimate goals may be, it is essential that the EU and its Member States explore common challenges and promote shared strategies so that cultural relations themselves become a form of global public good.

3.1.2 Different national and/or regional positions

In third countries, different historical trajectories and cultural conditions have created different expectations, stakes and potential with regard to international cultural relations with Europe.

Cultural actors in many European Neighbourhood countries depend – partly or even completely – on funding from European Member States or the EC to carry out international cultural relations. Yet in common with their counterparts in Strategic Partnership countries, many feel uneasy with the dependency implied in the existing donor-recipient relationship. They would prefer to see a spirit of partnership based on mutual learning and exchange and an equality of position. Stakeholders, both governmental and non-governmental, in countries formerly colonised by European powers, recognise only a fine line between cooperation and what is sometimes perceived as neo-colonialism in EU-funded partnership projects. Many of the eastern neighbours feel the same way.

Strategic Partners such as the BRICs countries, no longer focus exclusively or mainly upon Europe in their international cultural relations; their recently acquired economic and geopolitical salience has made them attractive to many countries across the world. This is the case

\(^3^9\) http://www.on-the-move.org
in a range of domains including the cultural. China, for example, has developed its own strategy, defined squarely within the ‘soft power’ paradigm and the country is investing significant resources with a view to enhancing its international image. Russia, on the other hand, is focusing its energies on improving its relations with the countries who make up the Commonwealth of Independent States and establishing a Customs Union, rather than working with the EU. South Africa’s geographical focus is firmly on Africa and the other BRICs countries, particularly Russia and China. The geographical focus of Japan is on the Asian region in general and emerging cities in particular, rather than on Europe. In this emerging multi-polarity, therefore, it can no longer be a question of Europe on the one hand and a homogenised ‘Rest’ on the other, just as the diversity of Europe itself should prevent it from being ever seen as a monolithic cultural entity. Europeans need to deploy an inventive palette of attractive cultural relations options accordingly.

In several third countries, major political and social transformations have occurred in recent years and are still unfolding. Thus opportunities exist to bring cultural actors in these countries face-to-face with counterparts in EU Member States who lived through comparable moments of transition in the decade of the 1990s. For example, in the framework of the More Europe initiative, recent encounters between cultural operators from Central and Eastern Europe as well as South Eastern Europe with colleagues from the southern rim of the Mediterranean have yielded very positive results.

3.1.3 Different actors and stakeholders

Within nations, the actors in international cultural relations are very diverse; they include governments and their agencies (including those operating at the municipal or regional level), organisations in the arts and culture sector (institutions, associations, centres, foundations, venues and networks), academic institutions, individual artists and cultural actors, as well as private businesses operating in the market-place for cultural goods and services. Similarly, there are different kinds of ‘target’ audiences and publics. Each is bound to have very different interests and needs. Also, there are bound to be conflicts of interests and overlapping priorities that will have to be addressed. No strategy can be envisaged that obeys a unitary logic.

In section 3.1.1 above, we mentioned the divergent motives that distinguish governmental approaches from those of the artists and cultural operators. There are yet other axes of differentiation. Some of these are political.
Many individual artists as well as arts-producing or arts-delivering NGOs in third countries, for example, find that EU funding is often sent directly to governments and does not reach them. On the other hand, some governmental stakeholders are critical of what they see as a tendency of certain European NGOs to simply follow their own agendas without paying any heed to the priorities of the government concerned. A case in point is provided by the current tensions in the Russian government’s relations with foreign cultural institutions and NGOs, as a result of which restrictions have been placed on the latter’s freedom of operation; all foreign NGOs now need to be registered as ‘foreign agents’, a term that in Russian is an euphemism for ‘spy’. Another tension emerges from the increasing emphasis placed on the economic value of culture rather than on civic or intrinsic values such as equal access and the promotion of rights-based claims, notably as regards the cultural rights of minorities.

Indeed, the inquiry has revealed that in countries whose ethnic composition is very heterogeneous, representatives of ethnic minorities often complain of neglect not only by their own governments, but also by EU programmes. For example, Israeli Arab cultural operators express concern that they are supported neither by the Israeli Government, nor by the EU in ways that meet their needs. Representatives of the Mexican Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas criticise the fact that they have not been invited by the government to participate in discussions on the country’s future cultural strategy. Minority groups expect that, in line with its own principles of cultural pluralism and political liberalism (which had to be defended against major threats in the twentieth century), European partners as well as the EU will see cultural rights as a core area of future intercultural relations.

The consultation also revealed that many European cultural initiatives are out of step with the cultural realities in societies where young people are such a large part of the population. Unlike in Europe with its aging societies (and declining populations), in many third countries (notably in the global South) the average age is much lower. In Algeria, for example, 75% of the population is under 30. In 2020, the median age of the population of India will be 29 years. This new generation is already well connected globally; the many trans-national and trans-continental pathways and networks young people have created flourish without help from well-meaning official institutions. This is as true of ‘popular culture’ as it is of ‘cultivated’ culture: young people are exponents of both. There is also great receptivity among young people to fundamental human principles and values, including those embodied by the European Union. Any EU cultural strategy that fails to engage with young people adequately would be stillborn.
In many third countries as well, organised religion plays a social and cultural role that is often not recognised at all in the highly secularised continent that is Europe. The values of the Orthodox Church are helping build bridges with many of Russia’s neighbours and partners. In the Arab world, mosques and madrasas are important loci of cultural transmission. Yet manifestations of fundamentalist religion, in whatever place and faith, can become serious hindrances to intercultural communication. They may also provide a pretext for both governmental and societal censorship, for limiting the freedom of expression and as a justification for many forms of official obstructionism. For these very reasons, the religious sector is also a significant stakeholder in intercultural dialogue.

3.1.4 Different layers within the EU

The core competencies for the field of culture remain with Member States and their own political systems will determine how these competencies are shared at the regional or city level (or federally in the case of countries such as Germany). The European Union – as stated in article 167 of the Lisbon Treaty – is charged with promoting cultural diversity, supporting its Member States, and acting according to the subsidiarity principle. Yet at the same time, as mentioned earlier, thinking within Member States over the past decade has led to a growing understanding of the importance of culture in external relations and of the benefits for all that a coherent European Union strategy would afford. A case in point has been the work of the ‘Expert Group on Culture and External Relations – China’ that presented a challenging report in November 2012.40

An EU strategy would help to coordinate, amplify and consolidate the efforts of Member States themselves. It would do so, however, only if it is based on explicit communication with third country partners as well as within the EU and with the actors of cultural policy and cultural action at all the different levels. A number of EU Member States combine in their external cultural relations both frame setting by the government and maximum autonomy for cultural operators on the ground, operating as skilled professionals in their domain. This is the arm’s length model that many in the third countries, whether in Africa, Asia or Latin America, would dearly like to see respected in any future Union-driven cultural relations policy as well.

The European Union National Institutes of Culture (EUNIC) has provided a platform for cooperation in the international arena between the cultural institutes of EU Member States after decades of individual, generally

40 ‘United in diversity’ – Culture in the EU’s external relations: A strategy for EU-China cultural relations.
mutually exclusive, even competitive efforts. With a network of some 2000 institute branches in more than 150 countries, EUNIC has global reach in various cultural fields and provides strong advocacy for cultural relations. The aggregated financial input of the institutes (plus the cultural departments of embassies) could become a very valuable asset for Europe as a whole. One of the aims of EUNIC is to bring its different country partners together to work on joint and explicitly European projects. It also aspires to provide a platform that is useful also for EU Member States, especially smaller ones that would be unable otherwise to have an extensive international presence. In addition, EUNIC aims to have a voice in policy development and to influence policy making institutions, both multilateral and European.

In some ENP and Strategic Partner countries (e.g. South Africa), the EUNIC clusters fulfil a vital role in assisting the work, capacity and international engagement of local actors. EUNIC members have experience that could certainly be deployed in any EU strategy in cultural relations. At the same time, it is evident that not all EUNIC clusters are active, or perceived to be genuinely European. The prevailing pattern instead is to aggregate national level activities rather than seek a common approach. Moreover, a few of the clusters appear to exist in name only. This is generally often because staff members in the respective institutes are short of time or lack the tools to collaborate beyond their own core activities. It is also apparent that the nature and level of cooperation is often dependent on the interests, enthusiasms and commitment of cluster presidents. The transition in thinking from national interests to joint European ones is still a work in progress in some countries.

There are also challenges of governance at the level of the EUNIC Global central office in Brussels that arise from the need to manage the collaborative efforts of almost thirty very different entities. Challenges also relate to empowering the executive to act quickly and efficiently. Some discrepancies between expectations and the means at hand are also reported. This might be the reason why smaller initiatives (partially supported by EUNIC members) that combine strategic yet modest goals with greater flexibility have been the most welcomed.

3.1.5 Different cultural domains, modalities and under-explored potentials

Third country stakeholders look forward to intensified cooperation with European partners across a wide spectrum of the arts and cultural
expression and in different modalities. While all of these cannot be taken up here, several warrant an explicit mention.

### 3.1.5.1 Domains

- **Fostering the cultural and creative industries in third countries**

In many third countries, the attention paid to the cultural and creative industries bears out the findings of the European Commission’s *Green Paper on cultural and creative industries of 2010* and its *Communication on promoting cultural and creative sectors for growth and jobs in the EU of 2012*. Both documents show that this sector has significant potential for international cultural relations. Third country stakeholders consider that Europe has considerable expertise and infrastructure to share with them. Ideas for cooperation include co-productions (in the audio-visual and film sectors, digital arts and design) and the provision of mobility opportunities for young creative entrepreneurs to visit other countries in order to develop their skills and exchange experiences and network with their peers elsewhere, notably in Europe.

In Brazil, for example, a new Secretariat for Creative Economy was set up within the Ministry of Culture in 2012. In the government’s view the cultural and creative industries will be key factors in determining the content of the ‘Brazil’ branding campaign. South Africa is seeking to increase trade and investment through its ‘Mzansi Golden Economy Strategy’, a focus of which is the cultural and creative industries. In South Korea, the international success of the ‘Korean Wave’ (*Hallyu*) – Korean TV dramas, popular music, video games, films and fashion – has led the government to focus on the creative industries sector. ProMéxico, the Mexican government agency responsible for finding new markets in different parts of the world, wishes to capitalize on the great potential it sees in this field as well.

That said, it would be illusory to think that we are living in a world of conflict-free or symmetrical opportunities for all – on a ‘level playing field’ as the cliché goes – as regards cultural production and exchange. The global landscape is dominated by powerful trans-national players; in a multi-polar world, as one observer has put it, ‘Google has replaced Hollywood’: the giants in today’s cultural

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economy originate in many different countries. Among these new hegemons are massive investment funds with large amounts of cash available to be ploughed back into book publishing, cinema, music, digital games and many other fields. For example, the Shanghai Culture Industry PE Fund has some 1.6 billion Euros to invest, while Providence Equity Partners (USA, UK, China and India) disposes of 37 billion USD. Within countries as well, notably in Europe, the creative economy tends to concentrate in large cities and/or regions that are already central places of financial capital, investment and power, leading to the impoverishment or cultural ‘desertification’ of smaller, less central, places. These centripetal tendencies have intensified because of convergence and acquisitions at the global corporate level. Small and medium sized cultural operators and entrepreneurs, whether in Europe or elsewhere, can do little on their own to confront these forces. This concentration is already limiting cultural creativity and will restrict the scope of cultural exchange unless mechanisms are devised to promote small scale and local cultural entrepreneurship such as incubators, platforms, credit and investment schemes, etc. This is why fostering efforts at the level of local authorities and communities must be seen as an integral part of the challenge in terms of international cultural relations. Of equal importance is more effective regulation at the national and world levels.

- **Regulatory frameworks for European cultural and creative industries**

There is a need for regulatory frameworks to support European cultural and creative industries. These industries depend on copyright and neighbouring rights to foster content creation. They also need regulations that ensure access to markets in third countries. Intellectual property rights (IPR) grant creators the exclusive right to prevent third parties from unjustly exploiting their copyrighted works. Robust IPR enable them to decide how to roll out new services to address the needs of consumers and be rewarded for their creative efforts; they therefore operate both as incentives to create cultural content with a market value and as tools to enable transactions between right holders and agents operating in other parts of the

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43 Ferdinand Richard, at the International Conference in Brussels, 8 April, 2014.
44 Figures cited by Ferdinand Richard, taken by him from the presentation made by Mr Edoh Kossi AMENOUNVE, Director-General of the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM) de l’Afrique de l’Ouest at the symposium Investir dans la culture au sein de l’UE-MOA, Ouagadougou, 10-12 December 2013.
value chain, such as distribution networks in third countries. The EU has had several IPR dialogues with third countries, but unfortunately they have not been focused enough on copyright issues and the interests of the European culture and creative sector, apart from the music industry. The EU is more active in defending the trademarks and patents of European industries.

Market access rules range from foreign investment regulations, to import quotas and from screening quotas to content regulation. Foreign investment rules can differ across the culture and creative sub-sectors and specific forms of cooperation have to be worked out for some business activities. In some cases, there is a need to set up joint ventures. In other cases one can enter a market through licensing agreements. For the cinema sector in particular there are many restrictions in third countries. It is important that the European Commission should regularly review market access conditions in third countries and negotiate with their governments, notably when European companies and cultural operators face difficulties due to unfair market access provisions in their legislation.

These needs suggest that it would be advisable to extend the EU structural funds in ways that would allow cities and regions in the EU that wish to support market access of the cultural and creative industries in third countries to do so effectively, as some are already. The EU Cohesion Policy could be used to develop such cooperation.

- **Sharing skills in heritage conservation and museology**

Scholars, professionals and policy makers alike in many third countries attach great importance to the heritage and museums sector as a platform for and vector of international relations. Their potential in this field encompasses museums and contemporary museum practice of all categories, architectural and objects conservation and the nexus between heritage conservation and the tourism industry through cultural tourism. In many cases, heritage both tangible and intangible is a fundamental component of the country’s national branding menu. Professionals and policy makers in many countries are eager to draw upon Europe’s long and diverse experience in this field, e.g. in capacity building, job creation, urban regeneration, tourism or community based tourism, as well as to share the benefits of custodianship. A number of practitioners consider that guidelines could be elaborated at EU level to develop binding standards for archaeological excavations, conservation of monuments and sites and the like, as well as avoid duplication of efforts among Member
States. The standards recommended should ensure, among other things, that projects are locally appropriate and that they promote local development, human resources and capacities.

Museums and galleries in many third countries are eager to engage with, or extend their cooperation with, partners in EU Member States, but are often held back by limited resources. The potential for greater collaboration and co-curation was mentioned by cultural stakeholders many times during the consultation phase. EU assistance to facilitate such cooperation, e.g. by way of seed money to attract other funding should be considered.

• **Promoting the performing arts**

Practitioners in theatre, dance, opera and music have been actively co-operating across frontiers for many years. Networks that bring together artistic directors, choreographers, festival directors, presenters and venue managers, such as the Informal European Theatre Meeting (IETM), have operated since the early 1990s. Such players have taken advantage of the EU Culture Programme in particular to engage in co-productions and other joint projects that have enabled them to develop their artistic ambitions, expand their international links and share financial risks. Initially focussed on cross-border, project-based collaboration within Europe, major advances in communication technology, together with years when there was a specific country focus in the EU’s Culture programme, have noticeably extended the range and geographical scope of their collaboration (the International Network for Contemporary Performing Arts [known as IETM], for example, now has a Satellite Meeting in Asia).46

• **Publishing**

Publishing is a huge global industry. Primarily a private sector domain, its principal form of state assistance is usually indirect, e.g., through copyright legislation. However, direct government assistance may be provided to enable publishers to exhibit at, or authors to attend, international book fairs. Such trade events often feature as a dimension of cultural diplomacy, since they have an international reach that can attract publishers from many countries. This is especially the case when such events have a specific country focus, e.g., Arts Council Korea promoted a Korean focus at the London

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46 The IETM Asia Satellite Meeting is to convene in Melbourne in May 2014 in association with the Australia Council for the Arts (ietm.org/melbourne).
Book Fair 2014 and reciprocal arrangements have been in train for UK publishers to participate in the Seoul international Book Fair.

- Translation

Translation is a domain cognate to publishing. Umberto Eco’s famous dictum, ‘Europe’s language is translation’, echoes the view expressed by many third country informants that a core priority for cultural relations should be to translate more, more often, and in a more reciprocal way. Although the new Creative Europe programme already includes funding for literary translations, some stakeholders in the neighbourhood countries underlined similar needs in fields such as technical translation, or as regards glossaries in specialised domains, or subtitling of audio-visual products. The EU has a wealth of experience in multilingualism and translation and has at its disposal powerful tools used for its internal policies. The Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union works for EU institutions, but does not have a focus on international partnerships. The DG Translation of the European Commission has established numerous translation tools to serve the work of its sister DGs. It puts at their disposal special translation software and glossaries. Other online resources are available in the marketplace. The EU could break new ground by opening its translation programmes and facilities to non-European partners. For instance, it could consider broadening the use of its translation tools to its neighbourhood and to the strategic partners. Moreover, cultural relations with some language communities, notably Arabic, would clearly benefit from more frequent exchanges, translation programmes (including modernised dictionaries) and systematic reciprocity using new media.

3.1.5.2 Modalities

- Capacity-building and professionalisation in and of the cultural sector

While sheer exposure to the cultural expressions of other cultures is greatly appreciated in itself, and is a powerful vector of mutual understanding, many cultural actors in third countries place even greater value on capacity building, leadership and professional development outcomes of cooperation with European players. They consider that there is much to be learned, e.g. from the way in which European cultural operators working with governments have been able to improve the management and administration of cultural institutions,
respond creatively to shrinking budgets and expanding needs in recent years, or innovate in the domain of audience development so as to considerably increase access to and participation in cultural life. They also consider that European cultural circles have developed novel forms of interplay between public actors and NGOs and its private foundations have launched and/or supported pioneering trans-national networks and projects. For example, ENCATC, the European network of higher educational institutions and training organisations dealing with cultural management and cultural policy education, has established cooperation projects with similar networks in other regions, as evidenced by its partnerships with the Association of Arts Administration Educators (AAAE in the USA) and the Asia-Pacific Network for Cultural Education and Research (ANCER, Singapore).

• **Joint reflection on cultural policies and strategies**

The time is ripe in many third countries for change-oriented reflection in the cultural policy domain. Few governments have enunciated a coherent strategy, while spending is limited in relation to rapidly growing and changing needs. Faced with this situation, non-governmental actors increasingly consider that it is now incumbent upon them to contribute to the elaboration of cultural strategies. Many new initiatives have been led by and/or funded independently by civil society activists and organisations, or have emerged from the marketplace, notably in the cultural and creative industries sector. Hence the development of new multi-stakeholder strategies is needed. Given the experience EU Member States have acquired in the cultural policy domain, a process of joint reflection may be envisaged, in which European intervention is catalytic in nature, but in no wise replaces the way third country stakeholders themselves formulate the challenges they face. Thus stakeholders in Georgia ask for support for the development of statistical and analytical tools, while the Ministry of Culture in Moldova has similar expectations with regard to a mapping of the country’s cultural and creative industries. Armenian professionals ask for guidance in adjusting to post-Soviet realities and improving the ways in which international cultural work is being done in their country. Egyptian stakeholders emphasise the need to rethink the legislative framework for cultural policy.

• **Artists’ mobility and exchanges**

All stakeholders agree that support for mobility programmes and the exchange of artists (and other cultural actors) are fundamental to any
future cultural relations with Europe and the EU. In fact, European cultural operators themselves have often made this claim, notably with regard to exchanges with the rest of the world. Many cultural operators in all the regions concerned by the Preparatory Action consider that current EU exchange programmes are still too one-sided. A number of them also commented that the cultural ‘exchange’ programmes operated in their own countries may also not live up to their name. Some of them suggest that there is a need for stronger interactions, based upon a system of regular exchanges. In all cases, the point is not just to allow others to benefit from European ways of doing things, but also for Europeans to be able to benefit from better knowledge of artistic practice elsewhere.

- **Festivals**

Many countries have a long tradition of cultural festivals. For some of them, festivals are the key component of their international cultural activities and are therefore considered to be appropriate platforms for future enhanced cooperation with the EU. In Algeria for example, around 30 international festivals take place each year under the aegis of the Ministry of Culture, including the Algiers Book Fair and the FIBDA comic book festival. Such events also play an important role in Egypt, for example the D-CAF festival, an international multi-disciplinary contemporary and performing arts event that takes place in downtown Cairo every spring, with support from the EU as well as cultural agencies and private sponsors from different Member States. Eastern partners such as Georgia also organise major annual festivals and stakeholders there are keen to strengthen cooperation with Europe in this field. The Japan Media Arts Festival attracts thousands of entries from a wide range of countries. Stakeholders in Japan have suggested the development of a network of European/Asian new media festivals, as this would bring considerable advantages of scale.

3.1.5.3 Under-explored potentials

- **Cities and regions**

As is the case in Europe, cities in many third countries have become autonomous cultural policy actors. While the European pattern of regions is not replicated exactly elsewhere, there are large federal polities (such as Brazil or India) where sub-national entities play an increasingly assertive role in international cultural cooperation. The
UN Creative Economy Report 2013 reminds us that cities in particular have become cultural and creative hubs, a finding confirmed during the consultation process. Seoul, for example, aims to become one of the world’s 10 most important global cities; and the city of Busan, which hosts one of the most important international film festivals in Asia, is being promoted as Korea’s ‘city of film’. Citizens as well as their municipal authorities in many cities today aspire to become part of a broader ‘community of cities not marked or limited by state and/or national borders’. Whether they are truly ‘global’ in their reach (New York, Los Angeles, Mexico City, Mumbai, Cairo, or Rio de Janeiro) or significantly large and diverse (Toronto and Cape Town) or of medium size, relatively speaking, cities have become the ‘mixing bowls’ in which all the combined and uneven processes of globalisation play out, particularly in the cultural field. Their cultural importance equals and sometimes exceeds that of national governments. Cities thus represent considerable potential for future cooperation. In some cases the priorities of city governments in external relations differ from those of the countries in which they are located. A study of 24 cities in 15 European countries carried for the EUROCITIES network in 2013 indicated that although their support for cultural mobility was focussed mainly on Europe, there was a growing interest in other regions, especially in Latin America and Asia. Some cities in third countries are far more interested in cultural cooperation with Europe than the central government would be, for example Lviv in the Western Ukraine, or Fès in Morocco. In Russia, although cultural relations with the EU are fraught and may well become even more difficult, the Moscow municipality is keen to cooperate with European partners. Cities can thus function as platforms for opening pathways of dialogue through cultural exchange, even when such dialogue is problematic at the national level.

Ways also need to be found to build connections between European actors and stakeholders who live in small towns or rural areas. An extreme example is the Gaza Strip in Palestine, which is completely cut off from the outside world and from international cultural exchange. Distance and remoteness in many different settings still make personal connections and face-to-face networking very

50 European cities and cultural mobility: Trends and support actions, a study commissioned by the City of Nantes and prepared by On the Move for EUROCITIES 2013.
difficult, notably as regards the sharing of skills or in relation to local development.

• **Stronger linkages of education and culture**

In several EU Member States as well as third countries, cultural policy is seen as closely linked with educational policy. International cultural relations often include a significant educational component or may be administered by ministries of education. Hence the educational sector offers significant potential. Universities in Mexico, India and the Arab world have become important centres of cultural production and presentation, with their own cultural projects, museums, art galleries and international cooperation networks. Neighbourhood countries such as Algeria, Armenia and Palestine, consider management training to be a part of educational cooperation. They have asked the EU to help develop contacts between cultural professionals as a means of transferring knowledge and skills, as well as between societies at the community and educational level, with a particular emphasis on the aspirations of young people. Another dimension of the education-culture nexus is represented by the existence (or lack thereof) of centres for European Studies in third countries and vice-versa. Such centres are usually located at major universities and their research and/or teaching activities can have major multiplier effects in processes of mutual learning between Europe and its interlocutors elsewhere. A recent trend deplored by academics in some third countries has been the elimination of such centres or the reduction in their budgets, whether for purely financial reasons or because demand for them is thought to have declined. This is a domain, therefore, that needs to be revivified.

At an even more fundamental level, it must be recognised that education can play an important enabling role. It is in the minds of children and young people that the spirit of mutuality and dialogue needs to be generated, so that people inspired by the fuller knowledge of themselves and others can one day take ownership of deeper international cultural relations. The seeds must be sown at school, for the early years are crucial for determining future behaviour. School is where the child learns respect, first self-respect then respect for others. It is here that the child needs to learn the basics of citizenship, civic consciousness and understanding of culture, both her own and those of others. These tasks imply the reworking of syllabi and
assessment criteria alike; they require innovation in teacher training and special attention to the learning of several languages.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbullet\quad \textit{Empowerment through culture for democracy and human rights}

Cultural activists in the civil societies of several third countries have played a significant role in empowering their fellow citizens for the democratisation of their societies. By supporting such efforts more systematically, the EU and Member States would attain a ‘new and more pro-active cultural role for Europe in the context of Europe’s international relations’.\textsuperscript{52} Precisely because civil society empowerment for democratisation and human rights is increasingly placed at the heart of the human development agenda, the potential of cultural expression to inform, inspire, and energise civic aspirations to democracy needs to be vigorously fostered, in the spirit of global cultural citizenship.

In many countries, artists and cultural organisations have long worked at this interface, often in conditions of great difficulty. European cultural actors have begun to cooperate with them in these efforts, but no doubt could do so in a more structured way. The ‘Arab Spring’ and other civic mobilisations in the global South have transformed the nature of our trans-national connections and obligations. Their force today has the potential to renew the content of notions such as ‘Euro-Mediterranean cultural cooperation’ or of ‘culture and human rights in the EU’s external policies’. They have opened a window of opportunity to help cultural actors in third countries take the reform process much further and for the European cultural sector to earn its own ‘democratic dividend’.

\textbullet\quad \textit{Culture and conflict}

For a number of European stakeholders, another field whose potential for international cultural relations is insufficiently tapped is ‘culture and conflict’. They observe that some positive results have been achieved through the deployment of cultural expression as a tool of conflict prevention and/or resolution, in bringing succour to the victims of conflict-driven emergencies (e.g. refugees), or in supporting efforts at post-conflict reconstruction. A growing number of


\textsuperscript{52} European Commission, Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world. COM (2007) 242 final.
activists and policy makers see a greater role in international cultural relations for artistic contributions to post conflict or peace building efforts – contributions that could help bring together opposing groups to create or curate together, focusing on the conflict itself. One of the issues that emerged from a conference organised by the British Council and NATO in 2010, was the difficulty of engaging with foreign publics when there was no mutual understanding. In such situations the task is to build trust through greater cultural awareness, which is not the same as shared values, but which can at least further connections.

Similarly, there is scope for ‘social protest art’ whose practitioners seek to resist and/or protest against violence. In this category also is work that uses the arts to create awareness, understanding and confidence with regard to threats against cultural freedom. On a cautionary note, however, it is important for European activists in this domain to bear in mind the fact that there may be limits to the benefits their catalytic role can bring to local situations that arise from a complex web of causes and antecedents – these factors are often resistant to models of intervention transplanted from elsewhere. Here again, it is vital that third country partners be listened to and their needs heeded with great care.

The obverse of the medal is when cultural assets, notably heritage, are deliberately targeted in war and other forms of violent conflict. Depriving ethnic or religious communities of their history and identity by targeting their cultural heritage has become increasingly frequent in conflict-ridden societies. In Europe itself, the methodical destruction of the Bosnian library of Sarajevo by Serb artillery in 1992 stands out as an example. Between 1992 and 1996, in Bosnia alone, 49% of the mosques, 68% of the archives, 75% of the dervish lodges, 75% of the Roman Catholic churches and 100% of all the Islamic shrines were destroyed.

Hence policies to prevent and respond to the wilful destruction or looting of cultural heritage in times of war or violent conflict should also be integrated into the EU’s agenda for the prevention and management of conflicts. In this view, EU governments should make sure that EU crisis management missions include heritage protection as part of their mandate and that EU peace keepers receive appropriate information and training about their obligations.

53 Conflict Prevention and Resolution: the Role of Cultural Relations
http://www.nato.int/nato_statc/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_03/20100429_100302-sda.pdf
54 Figures cited by Gijs de Vries at the international conference on 8 April, 2014.
under international law. Respect for cultural heritage as a legacy for all is a precondition of peaceful development in divided societies, and helping vulnerable groups restore or protect their heritage can increase the possibilities of reconciliation.

- Joining up culture and other sectors

Although many cultural domains and modes of action have been addressed separately in this inquiry (this has been essential for analytical purposes) a long-standing issue that was raised repeatedly during the consultation and at the international conference was the challenge of forging cross-cutting or ‘joined up’ relationships between policy making in culture and policy making in other fields. This applies not only to the field of education, as already mentioned, but also, inter alia, as regards conflict prevention and peace building, environmental conservation and regulation of the digital environment. The establishment of such transversal linkages was considered to be an integral part of the context in which stronger trans-continental relations need to be pursued. Such linkages, however, are not a hallmark, to say the least, of the manner in which the European Commission and other European Institutions have operated so far. Hence internal alliance building for cultural relations will be another precondition of success for an EU strategy.

3.1.6 Hindrances and Obstacles

The consultation process identified the following hindrances and obstacles that a future strategy on culture needs to tackle.

3.1.7 Negative and uninformed perceptions of the EU

The European Union is admired for the new form of nation-to-nation negotiation it has invented, the supra-national organisation of commonalities and differences it has put in place, and the way it balances economic growth on the one hand and social development on the other. The same may be said of the place European societies accord to the arts and culture and to the value of artistic excellence in and of itself, as well as the public support they give to free artistic practice. However, the EU has not managed to communicate this European ‘DNA’, to use a popular image, strongly enough to others. It has not been able to overcome the difficulties others have in grasping its true nature. How the whole is greater than the sum of its parts is part of this European DNA.
Culture in external relations is also affected by this gap. At the same time the field itself is well placed to close the gap through cultural exchange, people-to-people contacts, etc., carried out both by individual European governments and societies and at EU level.

Europe occupies a positive place in the imaginary of many people in the third countries, but very few have a clear idea of the EU as a political entity (beyond the recent travails of the Eurozone and the financial crisis) and its texture – of a Union of collaborative, yet distinct and sovereign Member States. It is often hard – even for Europeans themselves – to imagine better modes of coordination between the EU institutions, the Member States and civil societies for the purpose of presenting a common face. Unless they have been in direct contact with an EU Delegation, most cultural actors in third countries find it difficult to imagine how they might engage with the EU as such, rather than with individuals and organisations in or from individual Member States. They also wonder how such a heterogeneous entity could possibly articulate a coherent strategy that can also meet the needs and interests of multiple actors in the (smaller) Member States as well as those of third countries. These perceptions are fully understandable. They can only be corrected by effective deeds, not by more words. This makes the design of an effective cultural relations strategy so crucial.

More problematic, however, is the fact that the EU is perceived by many partners as a complex organisation that is over-bureaucratised and too complicated to cooperate with. There is a consensus among all third countries (shared it must be said by cultural operators in the Member States) that application procedures need to be made much easier and more transparent.

Last, but certainly not least, the current visa regime stands in flagrant contradiction to the desire for deeper cultural relations. Its negative impact has already cast a long shadow on cultural relations activities everywhere. Time and again, the consultation process revealed the serious difficulties that artists, academics and cultural operators often encounter in trying to obtain visas to come to EU Member States, in some cases even when European national cultural institutes themselves support legitimate applicants. Although the concerns mostly relate to third country cultural practitioners seeking to enter the EU, the process is made almost as difficult for EU based artists by third countries such as the USA or India. Unless all such visa restrictions can be eased significantly, cultural relations in many cases will remain a dead letter for many cultural operators. While it is true that procedures have been made more flexible vis-à-vis certain countries, the EU as a whole is certainly not respecting
either the spirit or the letter of the Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (notably, as regards developing countries, the provisions of Article 16: ‘Preferential Treatment for Developing Countries’).

### 3.1.8 The weight of history

Historical baggage weighs heavily on Europe’s relationships with strategic partners and neighbourhood countries alike, in both positive and negative ways. For several nations, historical cultural relations with Europe were based on conquest, conversion and colonisation. This legacy has certainly created shared understandings. Yet it has also led some people to view present-day European overtures in the cultural arena as a disguised form of neo-colonialism. Several stakeholders expressed the view that EU programmes mostly benefit European players, at the expense of their partners elsewhere. In countries as diverse as India, Lebanon or South Africa, government officials as well as private stakeholders are ambivalent towards European cultural relations activities. While many are eager to benefit from European achievements and know-how, there is an impression that cultural avenues are often used in pursuit of a country’s instrumental objectives. Generally, however, cultural operators recognise – and accept – that nation-state interests are a universal variable with which they are obliged to deal. Many do not see the challenge in black and white terms, but seek ways to balance their own artistic interests with the multiple interests of their European interlocutors.

### 3.1.9 Outmoded instruments

Although partners in third countries appreciate the efforts that the Member States and the EU have made in the field of international cultural relations so far, they have also expressed dissatisfaction with the way programmes are designed and implemented. They want to be true partners, involved right from the conception and design of any project, rather than merely the recipients of pre-packaged proposals. Several stakeholders have argued that the EU needs to consider the cultural scene of each country as a whole, as a system with mutually dependent parts. It is in this context that care should be taken with single programmes that may well be unsustainable and fail to achieve lasting results. It would be advisable to invest in a broader strategy of knowledge transfer and knowledge sharing with local institutions and among local cultural actors, enabling them in turn to share their experiences and ‘lessons learned’.
with others. In other words, creating partnerships of equals. According to most of the stakeholders consulted, capacity-building and sustainability should characterise any future strategy.

There is also a strong emphasis on the genuine flourishing of people-to-people contacts beyond official rhetoric. Almost without exception, stakeholders have expressed a desire to intensify mobility and artists-in-residence programmes, student exchanges, youth exchanges and the like. There is unanimous agreement that the use of new media can complement, but not replace the experience of direct personal contact and co-creation. Hence people-to-people contacts must be given real substance and be intensified.

The digital media have become fully-fledged vectors, shapers and repositories of contemporary culture and cultural creativity, as well as of intercultural communication. The rise of the digital economy has meant that ‘born digital’ firms, industries and practices have transformed the media and communications industries and professions. The rise of social media has transformed communication processes as well, together with the relationship of audiences to media content. Plus there has been a shift in geo-economic power balances in this field to the Asia-Pacific region. The new media are being deployed actively by many third country governments and civil societies in their international cultural relations. In both China and Russia, they now play a very significant role in the projection of positive images of these countries abroad. The phenomenal success on You Tube of rapper Psy’s performance of ‘Gangnam style’ attracted global attention to South Korea and its pop music, while the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 illustrated the power of social media not just in giving voice to citizen indignation, but also in spreading the message and sharing concerns with an international community of commitment and practice.

However, it is not only in countries going through turmoil, but all over the world that artists and cultural actors are becoming increasingly connected with each other through digital and social media networks. The consultation process revealed a widespread view that the EU’s media competence is ‘old fashioned’ and out of date in this regard. It needs to present itself far more effectively in the digital environment, notably by using the new media to reach out to younger generations as well as to people in smaller cities, towns and rural regions. This may be easier to advocate than to accomplish, however, due to the generation gap between most policy makers and the young people they purport to serve. Despite the lip service paid to these new media, there is still inadequate understanding – or outright misunderstanding – of how their
interactions with culture actually play out and the consequences the integration of digital technologies into everyday life has on individuals, families, communities, cultural producers, institutions and governments. The digital media are both vectors and repositories of contemporary living culture with which the EU needs to engage far more effectively than it does today.

3.1.10 Cultural activities in third countries are still ad hoc

Some EU Delegations are keenly aware of the potential of cultural relations in the country where they are located and of the ways in which culture can strengthen the EU presence and bolster the image of the Union there. They are making laudable efforts to develop cultural projects and programmes. Yet they are doing so on an ad hoc basis, without the benefit of any strategic framework whatsoever, with little evidence of an overarching vision or objective and with no dedicated budgets, only sums cobbled together from diverse sources, albeit often in imaginative ways. What is more, practically none of these Delegations have staff members who are qualified to design and manage cultural projects. In almost all of the Delegations there are no cultural affairs officers (Japan and the USA are the exceptions). Moreover, cultural projects are often conceived purely as vehicles to promote the EU – unsurprisingly perhaps as funding frequently comes from press and publicity budgets – rather than as reciprocal initiatives that might also meet the needs of local cultural practitioners. Owing to the limited nature of these cultural efforts, many of them appear to local observers as ephemeral and of limited impact.

A recent development in the USA, already mentioned in chapter 3, is the establishment of an independent European-American Cultural Foundation. The purpose of this body is to raise funds for European projects to make them more sustainable and to develop new initiatives. The Foundation could also eventually relieve the EU Delegation in Washington DC of responsibility for such activities. This could be a model that could be replicated elsewhere, providing input and advice from local cultural stakeholders is welcomed and taken fully into account.

3.2 The added value of a European strategy for culture in external relations

The consultation has shown that there could be considerable added value in a strategy for culture in external relations that is implemented at the level
of the EU and which, at the same time, buttresses the efforts of individual Member States.

For EU Member States, closer cooperation among themselves and, going a key step further, the pooling of their individual efforts can minimise duplication and make limited resources go much further in meeting the needs and expectations of the third countries. Naturally, the added value would differ according to Member States’ existing capacities in external cultural relations. Those that are seen as ‘smaller’ in this respect would gain visibility and would stand to gain from being part of a whole whose reach far exceeds what they could achieve purely on their own. ‘Large’ Member States in this respect could confidently expect to scale up their impact and achieve economic synergies as well, a particularly important benefit in times of shrinking national budgets. For both, there would also be improved access to globally circulating information and learning communities. Pooling resources and sharing know-how as well as uniting in the promotion of common interests can be decisive in confronting the challenges of globalisation. Cultural operators, cultural organisations and networks would benefit by the same token. This would be true also of cultural businesses (notably in the creative sector), which would benefit considerably from greater access to markets and wider distribution channels for their cultural goods and services.

Third countries could gain by the sheer increase in the volume and diversity of cultural cooperation that would be offered in a plural interface with Europe’s cultural actors, single entry-points for information, easier access to Europe’s cultural markets, expertise, patterns of cultural innovation and networks.

For the EU itself, the added value would emerge from the very process of projecting its own cultural diversity internationally, while by the same token affirming globally shared values and in a spirit of mutual learning. This would allow the Union to promote itself to the rest of the world in ways that are truly contemporary. These include cooperation with peoples worldwide in meeting shared challenges and threats. They encompass its attention to issues such as cultural diversity and cultural rights. Added value would emerge as well from a concerted approach to the boosting of the European creative economy. In a nutshell, enhanced culture in external relations can strengthen the EU’s ‘smart power’, as it tackles the cultural challenges of a globalising world.

Last but not least, such a strategy would also resonate strongly with the ideal of global cultural citizenship this report seeks to promote. However, attaining this many-faceted added value will require that certain key principles be respected and that appropriate instruments and mechanisms be put in
place. These principles, instruments and mechanisms will be taken up in the next and final chapter.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WAYS FORWARD

The central finding of this inquiry is that EU action in culture in external relations, once it is strengthened and better coordinated, offers considerable and multi-faceted potential for EU Member States, Europe’s civil societies and the EU itself.

This multi-faceted potential itself defines the purposes of a ‘strategy on culture in European external relations’ that the Consortium(’s) advocates. These purposes are to optimise the deployment of international cultural relations in a new spirit of dialogue, mutual listening and learning, joint capacity building and global solidarity. They include affirming an ethos of global cultural citizenship. They will afford the EU, its Member States and their cultural communities a multitude of strengthened pathways for international cooperation.

Multiple benefits for all will be the principal outcomes of such a new strategy.

These outcomes will include stronger links of mutual empowerment and trust between Europeans and their interlocutors in third countries. They will open up significantly greater markets for Europe’s creative economy or enhance and improve political relations with other regions. They will contribute to the nurturing of artistic excellence everywhere. They will therefore offer ‘win-win’ benefits across the board.

Yet this multifaceted potential can only be realised if a coherent strategy is designed and adopted. The strategy, in turn, will need to respect certain key guiding principles. Certain preconditions will have to be met. New or adapted mechanisms of governance and implementation will need to be put in place. Priorities will have to be established.

4.1 Guiding principles

The realities of contemporary culture in a rapidly changing world, the ideals and values to which Europeans and the EU are committed, as well as the interests, both economic and political, that they need to pursue globally, make it imperative for all European actors to respect a set of guiding principles. The inquiry has suggested that such principles need to be identified at both
the value-based and the methodological levels. Some of these principles were in fact affirmed even earlier by European institutions and experts. Others are corollaries of the ideas and ideals of global cultural citizenship that inspire this report. These principles also resonate with the vision of the 2005 UNESCO Convention, whose Preamble recognises that ‘the diversity of cultural expressions, including traditional cultural expressions, is an important factor that allows individuals and peoples to express and to share with others their ideas and values.’ The Convention also states that ‘the cultural aspects of development are as important as its economic aspects, which individuals and peoples have the fundamental right to participate in and enjoy.’

For all these reasons our inquiry, while it fully endorses the values traditionally affirmed as part of the European Union’s *acquis communautaire* – human rights, democracy and the rule of law – has foregrounded a different set of principles. All of these hinge on the quality of our relationships with others, as outlined below.

### 4.1.1 Value-based principles

- Communication between people and peoples today must take place in conditions of respect and equality. The stances of reciprocity and mutuality, notably mutual learning, embody these fundamental values and should therefore underpin the entire approach of the EU and its Member States.

- It is vital to protect and promote the diversity of cultures and the foundations upon which they are constructed. Hence all international cultural relations should be pursued in the spirit of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.

- In so doing, however, we must eschew all notions of culture as fixed and unchanging or of distinct cultures as homogeneous and unchanging bounded entities, and combat the resulting stereotypes that still persist as a consequence of such notions, both in European countries about third countries and in third countries about Europe, European countries and European institutions. We should recognise cultural identities as constructions that are multiple and fragmented, rather than essences that are natural and pre-ordained.

- Europeans need to take the time to listen to others as much as they communicate freely with them. Sharing values implies open
expression, critical reflection and free debate. It requires free spaces of the mind – as well as physical spaces. Most Europeans today are critically aware of the legacies of their histories – of both the positive and the negative aspects – including the colonial past in certain cases. Hence it would be simplistic to simply try to export European values wholesale to other regions. We must be ready to learn from the variety of ways in which people elsewhere, notably artists and intellectuals, choose to appropriate and adapt values that originated in Europe, but have become a legacy for all.

• Europeans should also recognise that there are also powerful forces elsewhere that reject cherished European values such as gender equality, freedom of expression and human rights. While fully upholding these values, the ethics of pluralism require Europeans practicing cultural relations to recognize the plurality of systems of beliefs and conduct that exist across the world.

4.1.2 Methodological principles

The principles of method set out below emerged from the inquiry, which also confirmed the salience of a number of ideas that had been put forward earlier.55

Two sets of principles have been identified. The first concerns the stances and attitudes that should guide the practice of cultural relations between European actors and their counterparts in third countries. The second concerns the interplay among European entities and actors themselves.

4.1.2.1 Principles for Europe in the world

• It is essential to balance public responsibility and the autonomous practice of cultural relations by professionals who are driven by intrinsically cultural imperatives rather than those of national representation. Some European Member States have achieved this balance internally through the application of the arm’s length principle. This principle needs also to be respected in the realm of international cultural relations.

55 Principles of good practice such as the following were distilled by Damien Helly in 2012 for More Europe: working together in partnerships around a single theme, idea or project; making sense locally and promoting local people, assets and potential; think beyond borders and barriers; securing the autonomy of cultural professionals.
Nevertheless, there can be no question of side-lining governments. In point of fact, in many third countries, governments and their agencies are as eager for and in need of better cultural relations with European actors as are civil society actors and non-governmental bodies. Hence the planning and implementation of cultural relations by governments and their institutions should involve all cultural stakeholders right from their inception and through to their conclusion.

In the same spirit, third country partners should be involved from the outset in the conception and design of cultural projects and programmes: the joint creation of new projects is the bedrock of deep and lasting ties. EU strategies based on equal partnerships will prove indispensable in dispelling perceptions of neo-colonialist aims and attitudes, notably in ENP countries.

Successful and meaningful cultural relations unfold in the long term. There are no ‘quick fixes’ in this domain. Europeans also need to apprehend the cultural policy landscape of each partner country as complex and constantly evolving.

The long-term perspective also includes respect for the goal of attaining sustainability. Whether it applies to a developing country or to a resource-rich strategic partner, any European act of cultural partnership should be seen as but a single moment in a process that unfolds over time, particularly if it is part of a deliberate strategy.

Cultural relations should not be limited to the mere presentation of European culture to others and vice versa, although this activity is of course important and may well remain a priority for governments. The point is, however, that because of the dense flows of ideas, creative forms, cultural products and people taking place today, there is much less need for the deliberate official presentation of ‘national’ cultures to others. Indeed, most third country stakeholders report that they are able independently to discover and understand the varieties of European culture (and vice-versa); they are more interested in interactions with European partners who can share their creative ideas, as well as European experiences of capacity-building and the governance of culture, notably in the management of cultural projects and institutions, the fostering of public-private sector partnerships, the encouragement of private sponsorship, the protection of intellectual property rights, the elaboration of an enabling fiscal
and regulatory environment or techniques of coproduction and cultural statistics. For this reason, the present recommendations do not deal with the classic devices of governmental cultural diplomacy such as sending artists or exhibitions abroad. These tend to be done fairly well already, even if their long-term impact is bound to be limited and resources are constrained.

- There is no single ‘model’, no ‘one size fits all’ solution for successful international cultural relations. Its practice will always be a matter of variable geometry. Any future EU strategy must be based on the informed choice and case-by-case consideration of appropriate partners in each local setting. As is the case within European Member States themselves, the landscape of cultural actors, officials, institutions and individuals within each country is diverse and varied. It often reveals the pursuit of divergent objectives and contrasting visions of culture. For example, the EU needs also to acknowledge the role of religious institutions in this field, yet always in the spirit of critical dialogue.

- Little benefit can be expected from the deployment of culture in external relations unless procedures concerning applications for EU funding are greatly simplified, made more accessible and founded on more transparent selection criteria. An equality of position for all stakeholders needs to be promoted, but without recourse to artificial bureaucratic procedures or quotas.

4.1.2.2 Principles regarding the interplay among different European policy actors

- Both the imperatives of diversity and European commonalities need to be combined in new ways. Clearly, the Member States are the key agents in this field and the European Commission’s role is to support and complement their activities. Achieving this aim is more complex than it may appear, however. It requires not just better communication, but also more effective coordination at the trans-national level. New layers of bureaucracy should be avoided at all costs. It is also indispensable, as mentioned earlier, that the autonomy of cultural professionals working bottom-up is fully respected. ‘Cultural civil society’ composed of NGOs and networks need to be involved at all stages, from planning to implementation. This is already the case at the national level in some countries, but rarely so at the Union level.
• Seriously pursuing the goal of richer external cultural relations means changing the ways in which different European actors work together. Innovative spaces and solutions are needed: such new alliances amongst cultural actors for better joint projects in third countries will require some high-incentive triggers to be found. These could include:

- The selection of key partner countries for specific actions and the most appropriate consortia of partners.

- The selection of leading themes of common interest, and European value-based inter-action in the global discourse; such priority choices would generate respective criteria for EU calls or tenders.

- Calls for action in key sectors such the cultural and creative industries based on the complementary comparative advantages of collaborators, as well as the respect for diversity and European interests.

- Europe-wide calls for and the application of multiplier strategies using tools such as the new media in the interest of Europe and its diverse actors, including civil society actors.

• In this process, the EU must strive for coherence and synergies amongst its different tools and instruments and the entities and actors responsible for them. Transparent and participative decisions must be taken as regards the role of different institutional players within the EU framework.

4.2 Key preconditions and required mechanisms

The inquiry has shown – not unexpectedly – that any strategy based on principles such as those outlined above should build on already existing successful practices, complementing some, reshaping others, notably patterns of relations that must be adapted to rapidly changing world realities. Such a strategy would harvest added value only if and when the main political building blocks are fully in place. Efforts at the EU level would have to be designed in ways that complement and amplify those of the Member States, step-by-step and in commonly agreed ways. They would have to include bold new initiatives, instruments and mechanisms.
4.2.1 Managing expectations

Many expectations rested earlier on the development of a new strategy that is cohesive, comprehensive, cooperative and convincing. The sound management of these expectations, which have been heightened or actually aroused by the Preparatory Action itself, will be a key precondition for success. Within the EU, some players would like to proceed very rapidly, while others prefer a more cautious consideration of the options available. Given this variegated picture – and the limited resources available – it would be wise to pitch our expectations prudently. A sensible timeline will need to be established and priorities identified. Initially at least, the maxim should be ‘less is more’. The starting point could be a small number of pilot projects that can be evaluated as they unfold and reported upon before the mid-term review of the European Financial Framework. The watchwords should be gradualism and flexibility. Close cooperation with the European Parliament as well with all the other European stakeholders will be essential, including both not-for-profit networks and key actors in the cultural and creative industries sector.

4.2.2 A strategic framework, dedicated staff and EU co-ordination

Progress will depend on the wise balancing of a strategic framework and autonomy for cultural actors. Given that competencies for external relations will remain principally with Member States, the search should focus on attaining what is often called subsidiary complementarity, through which the European institutions support Member States, their experts and expert organisations, in delivering better cooperation, communication and leverage for ‘European’ projects that are more than just the sum of many national projects, but are conceived in ways that generate trans-national added value and transmit the overarching European message in their content.

Implementing such a strategy would require the key actors (Council, EU institutions, the European Parliament) to agree upon a small, but sufficiently strong coordination mechanism within the European External Action Service (EEAS) that could work across all those European Commission directorates general concerned, communicating and liaising with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders as well as with civil society. An important role would also need to be played by European Commission staff in coordinating EU positions in other domains that have a bearing on global cultural dynamics, e.g. as regards issues such as
Internet regulation, IP legislation, etc. Addressing such issues would be the responsibility of different entities within the EU system.

The European Commission may wish to consider entrusting a coordinating role as regards cultural relations to EUNIC or even possibly to one of the European national cultural institutes, which could then act as a catalyst for a defined and agreed-upon project period, host other European initiatives and be a conduit for the distribution of EU funds.

An alternative would be to assign personnel with cultural knowledge and experience to some EU Delegations to enable and facilitate cultural relations. These tasks should ideally be carried out by experienced cultural professionals, skilled in the adaptation of programmes and projects to specific local needs, who would constitute a network of contact points. These cultural officers would also be instrumental in promoting person-to-person contacts and communication and information sharing. They could cooperate closely with local EUNIC clusters where they are operative. These ‘cultural officers’ could also strengthen cooperation between cultural operators and professionals in other fields of endeavour. A major hindrance regarding the cultural and creative industries, for example, is that responsibilities for their activities often lie with trade or finance ministries rather than ministries of culture or foreign affairs; besides, cultural ministry officials may have only limited understanding of the way the cultural marketplace actually operates or of the distinctive nature of the cultural economy. Qualified staff members in the EU Delegations (including nationals seconded to them) should also be accountable to the directorates-general of the Commission apart from EAC whose work has a cultural dimension. In order to test this model, focal points could be selected in countries where there is a strong demand from partners for support from the EU, or in countries where the EU has a specific strategic interest.

Last but not least, different EU players need to find ways to interact with each other much more effectively. Intra-EU coordination is crucial. This coordination should encompass the Council and its Working Groups representing Member States; the Commission and its directorates-general (DGs) – those responsible for culture and external action or, for internal policies that have an external relations dimension, the European External Action Service, the EU Delegations, the European Parliament (and its various committees dealing with external action and culture). Co-ordination with external players will also be essential, e.g. EUNIC; the European Cultural Foundation, national cultural bodies, agencies
and ministries; local authorities in their diversity and as represented in platforms or institutions, civic initiatives and European networks.

4.2.3 Governance

Whilst in many other policy areas clear provisions have been drafted to empower the EU to cooperate with third countries and international organisations, this is not the case with regard to international cultural relations. Thinking in this domain has developed at a slow, but steady pace; with the Preparatory Action a significant step forward is being taken. Additionally, the structures and modus operandi of the EU institutions need to be flexible enough to adjust to a multi-layered and shared system of governance. There can be little doubt that ‘variable geometry governance’ has to be the way forward. Future decision-making processes in this area, while assuring transparency, efficiency and accountability, also need to address not just the interests of the European stakeholders but also those with whom they are engaging. The facilitating role the EU provides here must include the listening tools both of governments, civil society and other relevant stakeholders, so a true inclusive dialogue can take place. Advocacy of particular values by the EU must be acknowledged and made explicit, so that trust and respect can provide a solid basis for engagement with others. A plethora of state and non-state actors – individuals, organizations, cultural institutions, foundations networks and the business sector – is readily available to support the EU in meeting these goals.

4.2.4 Funding

Another precondition will be adequate funding. One option would be to set aside an identified percentage for the cultural portfolio in the budget assigned to the EU’s external relations. This would be a target figure, based for example on a certain proportion of culture-related funding to structural funds and within external relations budgets. The culture related average of 1.7% of structural funds, to be matched in funding for external relations, could be a basic starting point.

It must be recognised, however, that many policy makers are sceptical of such percentage-based targets. Hence greater emphasis should be placed upon new methods of funding and fund-raising. The cultural sector itself, both in Europe and third countries, is also experimenting successfully with solutions such as co-funding, pooled funding, the development of public-private partnerships, the blending of grants and
loans, and the establishment of trust funds. The role of the private sector, of philanthropic organisations, corporate sponsors and other independent funding organisations is also being rethought. This experience needs now to be adapted to the specific requirements of international cultural relations so that innovative procedures can be devised.

That said, an option for the long term, after the initial pilot phase has been completed, would be the establishment, as of 2021, of a dedicated line for culture in external relations in the EU budget for external action; under the chapter 4 entitled ‘Global Europe’. Similarly, specific budget lines for systematic translation and a rapid translation facility would need to be envisaged in consultation with the various translation services of EU institutions, including DG Translation of the European Commission, but also the Council and the European Parliament.

4.3 Other instruments and mechanisms

Additional instruments will be needed in order to optimize the added value of a ‘joined up’ strategy. These instruments do not need to be numerous, nor do all of them need to be entirely new, but they should all be lean and flexible. Such instruments would include the following:

4.3.1 Pooled resources for ‘smart’ complementarity

Given the scale of demand for cultural relations and the impact of the financial crisis in Europe, the only realistic way to envisage stronger action is for the European cultural sector as a whole to pool its ideas, space and personnel (it does not necessarily always have to do this, or for every project). This implies mutually agreed cooperation between Member States, notably via their cultural institutes and attachés abroad, as well as across a multitude of cultural civil society linkages and networks that operate in parallel to governments. For example, a single online platform could be used by both individual Member States and the EU for funding applications, reviewing systems and follow-through procedures.

4.3.2 Better communication

The need for the EU to communicate better across the board is widely acknowledged. This means sharing European societies’ sense of commitment to the flourishing of their cultural sectors and explaining
clearly why the EU itself is also committed to strengthening the role of culture in external relations. The online platform ‘Capacity4Dev’ established by DG DEVCO is a good example of the use of new tools to enhance communication, the sharing of experience and collaborative participation. That said, traditional vectors of communication such as radio should not be neglected. The EU’s public diplomacy ought to communicate more imaginatively to a variety of audiences about the cultural relations opportunities offered by the EU, the Member States and other actors/institutions. These range from people in very poor and politically unstable societies to those in the flourishing BRICs economies. Indeed, in many strategic partner countries, cultural actors do not lack funds to practice international cultural relations. But the EU has many competitors for their interest and attention. For this reason, cultural relations with the strategic partner countries should be promoted at the highest political level; key policy actors need to be made aware of the added value of intensified cultural exchange with the EU. Although this can often be achieved through large-scale and large-impact projects, programmes and events that demonstrate European cultural creativity and diversity, the importance of small-scale initiatives must not be overlooked.

4.3.3 Multilingualism

The ability to communicate in other languages is essential if Europeans are to develop a broader international outlook. Thus, the development of a strategy for culture in EU external relations must take the area of language and multilingualism into account. Linguistic diversity is as important globally as it is within the EU (and, as mentioned already, in the educational system); hence the key messages of the EU should be made available in different languages, particularly in countries where several different languages are used. This implies heavier investment in the translation sector and leadership from the European Commission’s DG for translation. However, beyond the importance of making its message accessible, the EU should use its own multilingualism to engage externally. In the civil societies of Europe we can find echoes of almost all the languages in the world. Harnessing the potential of diasporas to communicate and develop bridges with their original communities in third countries is an area to develop. Policy recommendations and examples of good practice regarding multilingualism have recently been gathered through the Language Rich Europe project (http://www.language-rich.eu/home/welcome.html) - some of which should inform the EU culture in
external relations strategy. Language, as culture, is important for mutual understanding.

4.3.4 Eliminating barriers to mobility

Intensified cultural relations mean denser flows of creative people. Yet this aim is still being thwarted at every turn by stringent restrictions on the granting of visas to third country cultural actors by European Member States. Conversely, some third countries such as India and to some extent the USA make access almost as difficult for Europeans. Talking boldly of strengthening cultural ties while restricting physical access to artists and cultural operators from other countries is clearly an example of the double standard, wherever it may occur. Furthermore, in the case of Europe, it gainsays the commitment made by EU Member States – and indeed of many others in different regions of the world – when they ratified the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.\(^{56}\) Hence reviewing the visa regime applicable to cultural actors must be a priority for both the EU Member States and third countries.

In early April 2014 in fact, the European Commission announced proposals to shorten and simplify the procedures for visa applications for individuals from third countries, including artists and cultural professionals, who wish to make short visits to Schengen area countries. The proposals include a new visa type (touring visa) enabling legitimate travellers to circulate in the Schengen area for up to one year. Measures to facilitate the granting of visas to attend major events are also envisaged. As these proposals need to be accepted by both the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, the earliest they could come into force would be 2015. Moreover, they would not be adopted by six Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the UK.

4.3.5 Strengthening civil society

Cultural processes and values have played a key role historically in the nurturing of robust civil societies, notably over the past few decades in the ‘transition countries’ of Europe after the demise of the Communist

\(^{56}\) Article 16 of the Convention, entitled ‘Preferential Treatment for Developing Countries’ states the following: ‘Developed countries shall facilitate cultural exchanges with developing countries by granting, through the appropriate institutional and legal frameworks, preferential treatment to artists and other cultural professionals and practitioners, as well as cultural goods and services from developing countries’.
regimes in the 1990s. It is now Europe’s turn to share this experience with civil society cultural actors who are at the forefront of popular mobilisation in countries where major social and political transformations are occurring. It is clearly important to deploy more resources through non-governmental channels, in other words at the ‘people-to-people’ level.

This is particularly needed in countries that lack clearly defined state policies or funding.

4.3.6 A better fit with the cultures of young people

As observed in many third countries and corroborated by recent cultural research, most cultural relations as they are practiced today, particularly at the official level, are far removed from the interests and practices of young people. They are ‘out of synch’ with the ways young people already communicate with each other and create communities of interest and engagement internationally, notably through digital tools and the social media. In other words, many cultural relations efforts deployed by European governmental actors are irrelevant to the cultural horizons of young people in third countries. For this reason, no future EU strategy can hope to succeed if it is not constructed squarely within the cultural environment in which young people across the globe construct their aspirations and pursue their dreams and/or if its agents are unwilling or unable to promote the cultural forms and voices that are emerging in that environment. By the same token, the EU should also elaborate more exchange programmes for young people in both the educational and cultural domains. Moreover, since in many third countries young people – particularly girls – cannot travel easily, the EU should also ensure that such programmes are provided within the countries themselves. It is also at the elementary school level that the seeds should be sown of building European knowledge and awareness of other cultures.57

4.3.7 A focus on cities and towns

The EU can capitalise on the increasingly cosmopolitan awareness and sensibilities of city-dwellers everywhere. Urban cultural actors in all third countries, in cities both large and small, are particularly motivated to network with European counterparts, trade cultural goods and services with them or learn from their experiences and skills. Demand for such relations with cities elsewhere is strong among European cities. Local

authorities are often the key engines of local development, employment, tourism and improved quality of life.

Several of the European Capitals of Culture (ECOC), whether these have been large or medium-sized cities, have promoted the establishment of new platforms for international cooperation and co-creation. The ECOC accolade has also served as an opportunity to develop city cultural infrastructure to serve both domestic and international uses. The programme has also brought the cultural dimensions of regional developments outside Europe into sharper focus, and has promoted new types and channels of mobility for cultural creators and operators alike. The lessons of ECOC could be applied at the trans-continental level with the support of the European Commission, if funded by an appropriate EU scheme and if care is taken by future holders of the accolade to learn from past experience so as to avoid the pitfalls other cities have encountered. This could occur even more effectively and sustainably than in the existing scheme if the criteria and the selection process clearly reflect the strategic priorities formulated in the European Agenda for Culture.

4.4 Towards alternative modes of practice

Demands for change in practice emerged very clearly from the consultation process. They should be seriously heeded. These demands concern basic attitudes, modes of practice and funding with respect to cultural relations. They apply to the EU as well as its Member States. In particular, there is a need to adapt rules, regulations and procedures to the realities on the ground. Hence alternatives should be developed as regards the existing schemes or ‘models’ through which the EU’s cultural relations take place.

This is a challenge of both content and methodology. It concerns rules of financing, accountability, administrative processes that are largely perceived as ‘bureaucratic’ as well as political considerations that often come into play, such as limitations to funding in specific crisis situations. In reality, the EU has at best very limited capacities for rapid intervention in crises, unlike both public and private actors in North America, for example, who are able to react very quickly.

On a more general level, proposals involving third country actors are all too often drafted from a predominantly European perspective. EC calls for proposals have an over-determining effect as regards project design, since themes as well as strict conditions of participation are set out in
advance. The projects that emerge are often ‘manufactured projects’.\(^{58}\) Too much unproductive ex ante standardisation or, worse, projects designed specifically to meet pre-established EU criteria rather than developing organically, appear to be occurring. This allows little space for innovative forms of cooperation and restricts the range of eligible projects.

Hence at a recent joint ifa/More Europe workshop held in Brussels, participants pleaded for more open calls for proposals, so that third country partners themselves can be involved from the outset in project design.\(^{59}\) It flows from this that strategic planning and local empowerment should be combined, through relations of trust forged in a spirit of tailored cooperation, and by optimising the comparative advantage that exists on both sides. Hence also the idea of a code of conduct for culture in external relations. Many at the workshop also observed that there was no built-in structural commitment to cultural relations in the EU Delegations. The degree of interest shown by them was generally ad hoc, depending on the goodwill of particular individuals. In addition to a mandate for cultural relations they need also to be empowered to take non-political decisions on the basis of cultural expertise, rather than adhere to patterns of diplomacy governed by political agendas.

At a more specific level, the inquiry process led the Consortium to identify alternative ‘models’ of practice in several areas: trans-national peer-to-peer learning, financing of projects and the empowerment of local actors. In each of these areas, pilot projects could be developed on the basis of careful further reflection.

### 4.4.1 Alternative models of trans-national peer-to-peer learning

Independent ‘eye-to-eye’ forms of collaboration would be a form of much desired ‘cultural fair trade’ and could provide valuable mutual learning experience. These partnerships could bring together artists, cultural managers, journalists, writers, etc..

**Example 1**

Since 2007, the ‘Tandem cultural managers exchange programme’, supported inter alia by the Bosch Foundation, Mercator, DOEN and Mimeta, has benefited cultural managers with proven professional

\(^{58}\) Remark made by Pooja Sood at the international conference, 8 April, 2014.

\(^{59}\) The workshop was part of the research project ‘European external cultural relations: Paving new ways?’ carried out by Géaëlle Lisack for ifa and MORE EUROPE. The results of the research and the outcomes of the workshop will be made public in April 2014.
experience from countries inside and outside the EU. A decisive feature of its success is the equality of power relations in terms of who has the money, the knowledge or the capacity to deliver. Participants work together on the same footing and under the same conditions to co-create and co-produce. Each ‘tandem’ is completely free to define the project it wants to develop and each member of the tandem is equally responsible for the outcomes. The programme’s host organisation, the European Cultural Foundation, functions as a mentor and facilitator; it does not design projects for the tandems.

Example 2

From 2008 to 2012, the exchange programme for cultural journalists called *Nahaufname*, launched by the Goethe-Institut in 2008, sent German journalists to countries outside the EU and brought peers from these countries to Germany. The journalists were attached to a local media organisation and contributed material pertaining to their countries of origin. The same conditions were extended to all and the group created bonds that developed into a network that continues to operate today.60

4.4.2 Alternative models of financing cultural relations projects

Since budgets for culture in external relations are limited, different models of funding and EU leverage for them are going to be needed. There is no evidence whatsoever that private philanthropy or investment will step in to replace public subsidy in Europe any time soon. Yet there has been something of a shift from a vision of public support to the arts that consists of giving grants or subsidies to deserving cultural projects to the idea of ‘investing’ in cultural projects that are ‘bankable’, in other words have the potential for a return on investment. This shift of emphasis can be applied to international cultural relations as well. There is scope for the forging of public/private partnerships to complement traditional funding sources. New projects need to be designed that embody new models of combining public and private expenditures. The potential is most obvious in fields such as the cultural and creative industries, and in clusters of ‘incubators’ in areas of need such as urban neighbourhoods.

60 [http://www.goethe.de/prj/nah/enindex.htm](http://www.goethe.de/prj/nah/enindex.htm)
Example 1

The Dutch NGO HIVOS and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) are together providing pilot funding to support ‘incubator’ projects. One such project is a programme to set up and strengthen incubators for the cultural and creative Industries in the South-Mediterranean region; the programme will combine grants and investment incentives in order to help cultural entrepreneurs establish themselves as start-ups. It is also providing leverage in the process. HIVOS is seeking to facilitate new models of funding ranging from matching funds to crowd-funding. In collaboration with other partners, a creative investment fund will be set up, augmented by the core funders as well as by private investors interested in the initiative.

Example 2

The Marseille-based association Aide aux Musiques Innovatrices (AMI) is working under its DYNAMO platform with the French Government’s Caisse des Dépôts et des Consignations on an experimental scheme to provide publicly guaranteed loans to cultural organisations and artists. Here again, the idea is to convince private individuals to invest, rather than just give money away as a donation. The public guarantee is used to attract such investment. This model will make it possible to share private and public guarantees using matching arrangements and low interest rates. This project is being developed initially for micro-credits in France and if it is successful it could become international. (Cultural operators familiar with the proposed Creative Europe programme 2014-2020 have suggested applying the Creative Europe Guarantee Fund to culture in external relations).

Another area of demand is for re-granting through local institutions. The EU could work through local service providers in implementing projects across a larger area involving several (smaller) cultural actors on the ground, rather than operating on an individual project basis. For example, in the field of culture for development, the programme of the Norwegian culture and development NGO Mimeta aims to encourage decision makers in Africa to set up funds to assist emerging service providers.

Similar pleas are being made with respect to grants. First, for smaller ones: cultural operators are often deterred by the scale of some EU

62  http://www.mimeta.org/
grants – even the process of filling in applications can be daunting. Quick access to small grants is also needed for project development. Many operators observe that the creation of local foundations to channel funds could help avoid slow and cumbersome bureaucratic processes. This is particularly necessary in order to respond quickly to crisis situations in which local cultural players do not necessarily wish to receive funds directly from the EU or a governmental organisation.

Equally recurrent was the idea of targeting new players, mostly private investors. It was suggested that the EU could test brokering platforms with the finance community so that cultural projects become part of the profile for investment; it could also broker public incentives for private cultural investment (e.g. in African and Arab countries) or facilitate the creation of local funds independent of government influence and managed by local players.

4.4.3 Alternative ways of empowering local actors

Many examples of collaboration between established cultural organisations and/or foundations and local actors were cited during the consultation. There are potential models using different kinds of expertise. The EC could attempt to develop such new modes of cooperation and elaborate a pilot project for this purpose.

Example

A three-year cooperation project between the Sundance Institute and the Arab Fund for Culture (AFAC), carried out with the support of other donors, has empowered local documentary film makers. The key characteristic of the project was shared trust and clear rules of cooperation. The Sundance Institute supported its partners financially and by allocating one expert in each jury for the selection process. AFAC was able to operate freely, starting with the definition of calls for proposals. Sundance provided technical support on request. Through access to festivals it facilitated contacts in the film market. Exchanges between professionals created positive long-term impact. The scheme also enhanced the credibility of AFAC, making it easier for them to

63 http://www.arabculturefund.org/
find other funding for the project after the end of cooperation with the Sundance Institute.

**4.4.4 Monitoring and evaluation**

Monitoring and evaluation are overarching challenges that require new attitudes as well – a new ‘culture’, as it were, of measurement and benchmark based assessment – if they are ever to become meaningful tools. Many institutional initiatives fail for lack of such tools with which to identify roadblocks and wrong turnings. No such tools have yet been developed at EU level. The need for such mechanisms would be particularly strong in the case of any newly launched EU strategy for culture in external relations, hence their design and elaboration must be made part and parcel of the process.

**4.5 Pilot Projects**

Applying the prescriptions of this chapter will be a complex and long-term process, one that would be tantamount to actually elaborating a strategy. This is a task that transcends the competence of the Consortium and mandate assigned to it for the Preparatory Action. The Consortium considered, however, that there should be some form of *immediate follow up* and that this could best be achieved through the launch, preferably in 2014, of a few *pilot projects*.64 This *testing phase* should be given focus through pilot projects based upon the following essential principles: mutuality, knowledge sharing, capacity building in third countries and the professionalization of the cultural sector.

Designing such pilot projects was not part of the brief given to the Consortium. The inquiry has clearly identified, however, a certain number of *axes of priority*. These are clusters of domains in which the forging of more purposeful and strategic international cultural relations are urgently needed or could generate optimal results. These clusters are the following:

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64 In parallel with the demonstration effect of pilot projects it will also be important for further research and consultation to be carried out on issues that could not be covered adequately in the framework of the Preparatory Action. For this purpose existing research networks or entities could be mobilized. Links should also be built to research institutions such as the European University Institute in Florence and the Joint Research Centre, DG Research, etc.
1. **The cultural economy**: joint work on the cultural and creative industries, creative hubs, business models and alternative funding models.

2. **Cultural policy development**: joint programmes for the sharing of experience, capacity building, training, information and exchange platforms using new technologies.

3. **Culture and development**: joint projects that aim to enhance empowerment through culture, as well as its economic growth potential and the development of the common good.

4. **Culture and social transformation**: projects that share European and non-European knowledge and knowhow related to change making through artistic practice, the strengthening of civic participation and voice and the role of new media.

5. **Culture and conflict**: action and research into the role of cultural expression in conflict prevention and resolution.

Another key requirement with regard to pilot projects is that they should be continuously monitored. Assuming that a set of pilot projects will be launched, by 2017/2018, the Consortium recommends that they should be evaluated, so as to yield a second set of revised recommendations. This phase of evaluation would be coterminous with other relevant EU policy processes, including the mid-term review of the Financial Perspectives.

Furthermore, the expertise of many partners will be needed to design and then manage the practical implementation of the pilot phase: at EU level notably the EEAS, working in closer partnership with DG Education and Culture, other relevant DGs and the EU Delegations; at the level of Member States and their leading cultural organisations; and at the level of networks, for example, EUNIC, IETM, On the Move, ResArtis (the network of artists residencies) or NEMO (Network of European Museum Organisations).

These are clearly tasks for the future. Given the limits of the Consortium’s brief as well as the time available for the completion of the Preparatory Action, we provide only a set of outlines, essentially for illustrative purposes, of 10 possible pilot projects and/or programmes for the period 2014-2020.

### 4.5.1 Joint cultural strategy workshops

As observed in chapter 3, the time is ripe in many third countries for change-oriented reflection by all stakeholders in the cultural policy domain. In many third countries important new initiatives have been
taken by and/or funded independently of governments, notably by individual cultural activists. Others have been community-driven. Yet others have emerged from the marketplace. Hence the need for joint reflection and action among and by different stakeholders, with a view to developing more systematic arts and culture strategies. Most of these stakeholders will be working not just with governments, but also in addition to them. Such a process of joint reflection could take the form of learning workshops that compare European best practices with realities on the ground and with locally observed and studied realities. European experts could be invited to work together with counterparts in third countries; they would focus on critical factors and solutions relevant in Europe and assess their appropriateness in other settings. In each workshop, issues such as the following could be explored:

- Civil society mobilisation and role in the cultural arena
- Public and private initiatives for the strengthening of institutions, agents and intermediaries for the cultural sector
- Intellectual Property Rights
- Funding and development of public/private partnerships (PPP)
- Audience development
- Empowerment of cities as cultural policy actors

The mutual learning workshops could be followed by a strategy-building workshop in each third country selected, also with the participation of European experts, whose outcomes could include the following:

- A strategic vision for the cultural sector (all stakeholders);
- A roadmap for the self-development of cultural organisations in a spirit of entrepreneurship and networking.

The pilot project should envisage the above workshop process either in sub-regions or in selected third countries.

### 4.5.2 Joint translations programme

Intercultural dialogue as a key axis for the forging of global cultural citizenship frames this project. Its objective would be to facilitate and/
or promote the translation – on a joint EU-third country basis – of contemporary literary works as well as significant new writing in the humanities and social sciences. The project would aim at reaching readers in both the EU and third countries, where it would target a priority readership of young people. The translations could be made available online as well as in printed form and should be produced as cost-efficiently as possible. Initially, the project would concern Arabic-speaking third countries and would be based on Euro-Mediterranean partnerships between publishers, distributors, bookshops, educational institutions and governments. It would aim to create and/or consolidate a readership that would be given the opportunity to understand the diversity of responses to shared individual and/or socio-cultural issues. Project partners would be invited to suggest works for translation. Their proposals should be validated by a selection committee according to clearly defined criteria. These could include pertinence and quality; the existence of co-publication agreements that envisage the production of at least two works, each in a different language; and distribution capacities, notably in third countries.

The works selected could also compete for a translations ‘label’ jointly conceived and awarded by the EU and the third country concerned, or for financial support no greater than 25% of the cost of production and distribution. Each work so proposed should be accompanied by a detailed justification and business plan covering production and distribution costs in the Arab-speaking world. One or more labels could be awarded each year and the works selected could be presented at book fairs, literary festivals or translation days organised on university campuses and other educational or commercial institutions working in tandem with publishers and distributors.

4.5.3 European Creative Hubs

This would be a project in either Brazil or China (though ideally both) designed to support the establishment of European creative hubs in these emerging markets. Each creative hub would seek to strengthen the international position of the European cultural and creative industries. It would seek to assist artists, producers and companies in entering third country markets, building long-lasting international partnerships and focusing on local demand. In addition to hosting space and providing support to European as well as local cultural and creative industries, each hub would also be a platform for discussion, dialogue and shared learning with local stakeholders, the facilitation of trade missions and the organization of matchmaking events. A good example of an
already existing initiative is the Dutch DFA project, a four-year strategic programme (2009-2012) of the Dutch government for their design, fashion and architecture sectors.

4.5.4 Business skills and Internationalisation for the cultural and creative industries

The cultural and creative industries sector in the EU is made up principally of small businesses (with less than 10 employees), micro-businesses and self-employed/free-lancers. These businesses require more robust skills in order to be competitive internationally. They also need to be able to operate with the most up-to-date digital technologies, notably to create new audiences and consumers for the goods and services they produce. A pilot project could be developed between business schools, European trade associations representing the sector and national cultural institutes to develop training modules for the internationalisation of Europe’s cultural and creative industries. A programme to train the trainers could be set up to also so as to help make the training modules widely available and ensure that they are shared with all countries interested in promoting business cooperation in the cultural and creative sector with the EU.

4.5.5 Young Creative Entrepreneurs Networking Programme

There is real interest among young entrepreneurs and players in the cultural and creative industries in third countries to network and engage with their European counterparts and leading practitioners in their sectors. A specific programme could be designed to encourage promising younger creative people (say under 35) to make connections with professionals in Europe and help a new generation to accelerate their professional development. There is already a well-established model for this: the British Council’s Young Creative Entrepreneur Scheme that provides tailored visits to the UK for entrepreneurs from developing and ‘emerging’ economies in the design, fashion, film, interactive, music, performing arts, visual arts, etc. Modest EU funding is also available already through the ACP programme to assist cultural and creative industry entrepreneurs in some of those countries to break into international markets. However, it is also evident that there is demand from cultural and creative industry players in third countries with developed economies (e.g. Japan) to establish long-term collaborative
relations with Europe. A pilot initiative could be developed to run for two years from 2015.

4.5.6 Cultural Management Training Programme(s)

A programme enabling European actors to share their experience in the management of cultural institutions and projects, including trans-national initiatives, would be relevant both for strategic partners that want to open up new markets for their products as well as to neighbourhood countries seeking skills and expertise. Its curricula and teaching modules should be developed cooperatively between specialised institutes and/or higher education establishments and training centres in the Member States and counterparts in third countries. All cultural institutions within (in) the EU able to offer management training based on this curriculum should be allowed to participate and to invite young people from third countries to receive training in Europe. This ‘personal’ training should be accompanied by a (supranational) e-learning programme that allows the young managers to continue their studies at home.

4.5.7 City-to-city cooperation programme

To better exploit the potential of cities as autonomous cultural actors as well as the interest many city cultural officials in third countries express for cooperation with their European counterparts, a new city-to-city programme should be established. This programme could focus on the role Europeans have played in the cultural life of cities all over the world and the role non-Europeans have played in the history of European cities. Alternatively, it might support the most imaginative and sustainable city-to-city cultural links. In alternating years, a city within Europe and a city outside Europe could serve as the foci for exchanges in fields such as of architecture, design and urban planning. The EU could also consider finding ways to open the ‘European Capitals of Culture’ programme to third countries such as the Ukraine and Israel in order to encourage a focus on shared histories within the context of exhibitions, workshops, exhibitions, concerts and the like.

4.5.8 On-line cultural relations tool

Some third countries are hampered by insufficient information on both sides as regards their respective cultural systems and potential for cultural cooperation. A dedicated online information portal could be
established to remedy the situation. The portal could collect information on such topics as prospective partners, presenters, venues, artists’ residencies, touring circuits for live music, festivals, small scale theatre and dance, museums and galleries interested in co-curation, audio-visual companies interested in co-productions or sources of funds for international collaborations. A model already exists, the *Culture 360* portal developed under the auspices of the Asia-Europe Cultural Foundation, with guidance from culture and information specialists in both continents. Not only has this mechanism stimulated cultural cooperation between Asia and Europe, but also within Asia. Such a portal might be developed on a pilot basis between Europe and countries in Africa (where work has begun on gathering information in the visual arts). Any initiative should have due regard to the online information work done on mobility opportunities by On the Move.

4.5.9 Structured EU Film Festival Scheme

Film festivals are much favoured by EU delegations to promote Europe and, by association, the EU. While some of these are long established and popular with local audiences (especially when organised in conjunction with film institutes from the host country), most are promoted by EU Delegations (e.g. New Delhi and Beijing) on a shoestring budget and with limited human resources. Many of these festivals have not been presented in traditional cinema circuits. Some Delegations have shown films that are representative of the richness and diversity of European film production; others have not. The case can be made for a far more ambitious and structured scheme to replace some of the initiatives so far organised and funded by the EU Delegation itself or by European embassies or consulates with the support of the EU Delegation and Chambers of Commerce. Such a project could contribute to projecting a positive image of Europe and to enhancing intercultural dialogue. EU Delegations that wish to organise such festivals would be provided with a selection of recent or historically or culturally important European films, chosen on the basis of quality and significance. Sufficient funding would be made available to ensure that the films are marketed and distributed as effectively as possible to far larger audiences than a small capital city-based elite. Online film festivals should also be considered to reach wider and younger audiences, in particular in vast countries such as China, India, Brazil...etc. Each festival could include workshops for film-makers, producers, cinema funding agencies, distributors, etc. Film distribution in commercial circuits is a challenging marketing and management task. Hence ways will have to be found to involve professional expertise from the local cinema industry where this is not already provided. The
project may be entrusted to a consortium of national film agencies and/or national cultural institutes, together with film professionals who are competent to work commercially with local operators (distributors, cinemas, VOD platforms...).

### 4.5.10 EU Cultural Relations Index

No quantitative methodology exists for the monitoring and evaluation of cultural relations between the EU and third countries. Hence the idea of an *EU Cultural Relations Index* that would collate on the basis of desk research statistics relating to cultural links between the EU and third countries. On a scale of 1 to 100, each third country’s relationship with the EU, and the EU’s relationship with the rest of the world as a whole, would be measured and indexed in a ‘league table’ to be published annually. This would provide objective criteria for the prioritisation of scarce resources as well as a benchmark to measure the effectiveness of any new EU external cultural relations strategy. The data gathered would be as inclusive as possible, including education, creative industries, tourism, and sport. All of this information is in fact publicly available and could be acquired at little cost and with total transparency. A second step would be to build on the country-mapping exercise carried out for the Preparatory Action and gather qualitative data, via interviews and workshops in-country with stakeholders, on the EU-third country cultural relationships, not annually but triennially. This would provide a depth of analysis that would inform regular reviews of the strategy and also provide a check on the inevitable statistical anomalies produced by the quantitative reporting.

### 4.6 Concluding thoughts

The Preparatory Action has confirmed that cultural stakeholders in the third countries surveyed are strongly interested in *broadening and deepening cultural relations* with their European counterparts. It has also reaffirmed the desire on the part of the European cultural sector to so engage.

This Report has demonstrated the added value that a *strategically envisaged cultural dimension* would bring to the EU’s external relations: it would significantly enhance intercultural dialogue, promote cultural diversity and strengthen solidarity between peoples in the spirit of global cultural citizenship. It would also foster trade, investment and competitiveness and also stimulate creativity and innovation far more effectively than is the case...
at present. In addition, it could enhance international understanding of the European Union as an entity, as well as of the cultural diversity of its Member States and the unique relationship that has been forged between the two.

The opportunity to put in place such a strategic approach should be grasped immediately, for the time is ripe and the present moment is propitious. The *ad hoc* efforts undertaken so far in the field of external cultural relations contribute relatively little to increasing awareness of the Union and the values it represents.

The inquiry has revealed areas of considerable potential for cultural engagement with third countries, as well as obstacles that hinder such engagement. It has emphasised the importance of promoting such engagement on the basis of equal partnerships that, wherever possible, are ‘bottom-up’. Any future strategy will need to be flexible and tailored to the different needs of third countries. Any ‘one size fits all’ approach would be inappropriate and unsustainable.

The deployment of culture by the EU in its relations with the wider world should also respect the autonomy of the cultural sector and draw principally on the expertise of cultural professionals in its delivery. It should evolve on the basis of joined up thinking within the EU, as well as cooperation with Member States, their cultural institutes and the cultural sector itself. All these players should be fully involved in the policy planning process.

Finally, a coherent EU strategy will require that goals are determined, priorities established, realistic outcomes agreed and evaluation mechanisms built in. It will need to recognise that real impacts cannot be achieved quickly if they are to be sustainable.
ANNEX 1: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

CULTURAL AND CREATIVE INDUSTRIES/SECTORS (CCIs). Various overlapping usages of the two terms are current today. Some of these are contested uses. Common usage refers to cultural and creative industries (CCIs). The term cultural and creative industries sector (CCS) is often used as well. Official EU usage includes ‘in particular architecture, archives and libraries, artistic crafts, audio-visual (including film, television, video games and multimedia), cultural heritage, design (including fashion design), festivals, music, performing and visual arts, publishing and radio.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY refers in its original sense to the projection by governmental agents, i.e. diplomats, of their countries’ cultural values and achievements to the rest of the world. Nowadays, civil society and private sector agencies also consider the cultural relations they promote to be a form of cultural diplomacy. The term is now increasingly used as a synonym for international cultural relations, as defined below.

CULTURAL EXPORT refers to the pursuit of international markets for the products of a nation’s cultural sector, especially in the cultural and creative industries.

CULTURE IN EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS is the term employed by the European Union institutions to refer to the deployment of culture in the external relations of the EU with third countries. In the context of the present Preparatory Action, it refers to all forms of cultural relations between the EU and its partner countries, with the exception of development cooperation.

EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY (ENP) is an EU policy framework that focuses on cooperation with countries in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and the South shore of the Mediterranean that share a land or sea border with the EU, with the overall objective of increasing the prosperity, stability and security of the EU’s neighbours. The 16 ENP countries are the following: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel,

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65 For a review of these usages, see the UN Creative Economy Report 2013. Widening Development Pathways. New York and Paris, UNDP and UNESCO.
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.

**EU MEMBER STATES.** The European Union currently has 28 Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.

**EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS** deals with all the different type of relations that the EU has with third countries. It covers a wide variety of areas such as external trade, development and cooperation, humanitarian aid, human rights and democracy, foreign and security policies, conflict prevention etc.

**FOREIGN CULTURAL POLICY/FOREIGN CULTURAL RELATIONS** are interchangeable terms (used mainly in German) that describe the objectives and strategic actions of a country in its relations with other nations through the deployment of culture as a diplomatic instrument.

**INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL CO-OPERATION** refers to collaboration and encounters between cultural operators and/or organisations, whether or not supported by their governments or their agencies. It is not usually conditional on reciprocity.

**INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL EXCHANGE** refers in theory to reciprocal arrangements between countries for the presentation of cultural organisations, artists, exhibitions, events, etc. whether supported by governments or their agencies (for example through bi-lateral cultural agreements) or informally. In practice the term is used even when no reciprocity is built in.

**INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL RELATIONS** is an umbrella term referring to the fostering of understanding between countries and especially their peoples. Such relations seek to engage in dialogue with a much broader public than is the case with cultural diplomacy. They may result from specific government or cultural institute policies, or may grow organically without government intervention. Generally, cultural relations present a more ‘rounded’ picture of a country as opposed to cultural diplomacy approaches, which tend to emphasise the presentation of positive images.
**NATION BRAND/IMAGE** refers to the identification or association of a country with its products and services (e.g. cultural and creative industries such as design, fashion and film), tourism, sport, etc.

**NATION BRANDING** refers to the development, through strategic marketing, of a recognizable image (or ‘new’ image in the case of re-branding) for a country by the presentation and dissemination of its ideas, values, culture, heritage, political ethos, products or other symbols.

**PUBLIC DIPLOMACY** refers to the process whereby a country seeks to build trust and understanding by engaging with a broader foreign public beyond the governmental relations that, customarily, have been the focus of diplomatic effort.

**SOFT POWER** is the influence and credibility a country may obtain through the projection of its values, ideas, cultural attractiveness, etc. (as opposed to the wielding of ‘hard power’, which seeks to achieve such influence through coercion, including the threat or application of economic power or military force).

**THIRD COUNTRIES** are countries that are not members of the European Union.
Monday 7th April 2014

Master of Ceremonies
Pavol Demeš (SK),
Transatlantic Fellow German Marshall Fund Bratislava, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia

17:30

18:15 Opening statements
Androulla Vassiliou,
Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth
Pierre Vimont,
Executive Secretary General, European External Action Service
Morten Løkkegaard,
Member of the European Parliament, Vice-Chair, Culture and Education Committee

18:15

18:20 Introduction to the Preparatory Action
Johannes Ebert (DE),
Secretary General, Goethe-Institut

18:20

18:50 Presentation of the results
Prof Yudhishthir Raj Isar (FR/IN),
Professor of Cultural Policy Studies, The American University of Paris,
Scientific Coordinator & Team Leader of the Preparatory Action

18:50

19:10 Q&A Session

19:10

19:15 Concluding statement
Pavol Demeš (SK),
Transatlantic Fellow German Marshall Fund Bratislava, former Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Slovakia

19:15 Cocktail

Tuesday 8th April 2014

Master of Ceremony
Pavol Demeš (SK),
Transatlantic Fellow German Marshall Fund Bratislava, former Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Slovakia

09:30

09:35 Opening statements
Pavol Demeš (SK),
Transatlantic Fellow German Marshall Fund Bratislava, former Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Slovakia

09:35

10:15 Culture in EU external relations: realities and expectations
moderated by Marietje Schaake (NL), Member of the European Parliament
Sir Martin Davidson (UK), Chief Executive, British Council
Sana Tamzini (TN), President, FACT (Cultural Associations Forum in Tunisia),
CONNEXIONS, UNESCO
Ting Xu (CN),
Director for Communication and Cooperation, Shenzhen Creative Culture
Centre
Nina Obuljen Koržinek (HR),
Research fellow, Institute for Development and International Relations of Zagreb

10:15

11:00 Q&A Session

11:00

11:30 Coffee break

11:30

12:00 The potential added value of European dimensions and strategic
approaches to culture in external relations moderated by
Gottfried Wagner (AT), ad hoc expert to the Preparatory Action
Pooja Sood (IN),
Director/Curator, Khoj, International Artists’ Association, New Delhi
Ferdinand Richard (FR),
President, Roberto Cimetta Fund
Ambassador Cynthia P. Schneider (US),
Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Washington
Gijs de Vries (NL),
former adviser to Javier Solana, author of A Europe Open to Culture: Proposals for a European Strategy of Cultural Diplomacy

12:00

12:45 Q&A Session
12:45

| 14:15 | Lunch |

14:15

| 14:45 | The ‘smart’ and flexible options for the achievement of a strategic approach to culture in external relations moderated by
Isabelle Schwarz (DE/FR), Head of Advocacy, Research and Development, European Cultural Foundation
Oussama Rifahi (LB),
Director, AFAC-Arab Fund for Arts and Culture
Pawel Potoroczyn (PL),
Director, Adam Mickiewicz Institute
Corina Şuteu (RO),
President, FilmETC (Bucharest-New York)
François Rivasseau (FR),
Deputy Head, EU Delegation in the US |

14:45

| 15:30 | Q&A Session
Wrap-up session/conclusions |

15:30

| 15:35 | Sana Ouchtati,
Project Coordinator, Preparatory Action |

15:35

| 15:45 | Alain Ruche,
Senior Advisor on cultural matters, Office of the Secretary General, European External Action Service |
15:45

15:55  Jan Truszczyński,
       Director General DG Education and Culture, European Commission

16:00

17:00  Closing drink